



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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To - Worry

**The MacNeil/Lehrer
NEWSHOUR**

5/24/90

Dear Ambassador Kampelman,

Here is a copy of your
interview the other day. I have also
enclosed a transcript for your use.

Thanks again for your help
during this busy time.

Good luck in Copenhagen!

Best Wishes,

Jeff Goodman

ape 1

MAX KAMPELMAN

w/Charles Krause

Q. We are interviewing Ambassador Max Kampelman, who has had a number of different positions over the years, but has been actively involved in the Helsinki process, and that's why we're talking today.

14:31:15
Let me begin by asking you to look back six months to the last summit that Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush held. Many people say that the world has literally turned upside down since then in Europe particularly. How would you characterize the changes that have occurred over the past six months?

A. Well, first let me say that the changes are part of a process.

When I was actively involved in the State Department, for example, under the Reagan administration, we saw the changes. The changes were there. We could go to Moscow. Every time I went to Moscow I saw fundamental changes taking place.

And what's happened in the last six months I think have been part of that rapidly developing process. Now, in

the last six months what's happened as I evaluate it is one, within Eastern Europe a disintegration of the Warsaw Pact peacefully, and secondly, I would say a more difficult time of it for Mr. Gorbachev within the Soviet Union.

That's the way I would characterize the last six months.

14:32:30

Q. But are these in a sense momentous changes, given what the U.S. policy has been since the end of World War II?

A. Yes. They are momentous changes because what has become vivid now and clear is that communism has failed. And whenever people now have had an opportunity to do so, they've thrown off what they looked upon as a yoke from communism, and have said we want freedom, we want democracy. That's momentous.

We've always believed this to be the case. We've always believed that this is what people wanted, which is why the communists never permitted free elections. But we've now had it amply demonstrated to us without doubt, and the Soviets accept this. They know it's the fact. And I would guess that I don't remember a time in my lifetime when the changes have been as momentous. And I might go on to say

that historians may tell us that in all of modern times there's never been as momentous a change.

And so we are living really through an important -- important period.

14:32:30
Q. In his Oklahoma State speech, President Bush called for -- quote -- a new western strategy for new and changing times. What did he mean by that?

A. I assume what he meant is that we have to take another look at that which has bound NATO together since the end of the Second World War.

NATO consists of 16 countries, all democracies, all friends sharing the same values; 14 in Europe, the United States and Canada. Since the end of the Second World War, NATO has directed itself toward the fact that the Soviet Union was a powerful military nation.

We knew it was a failure economically and socially, but militarily it was a major force. A larger army than any in the world. A nuclear force that was immense and threatening, to us as well as to our friends in Europe.

NATO came into being to say in unity there is strength. An attack on one is an attack against all of us. So it had that primary emphasis.

Now we've come to understand that the economic and social weaknesses of the Soviet Union have led the Soviets to de-emphasize at least verbally their military strength because it's been a heavy burden for them to carry. They have permitted Eastern Europe to get away from their grasp peacefully without putting up a fight.

That changes the dimension or potentially changes the dimension. Nevertheless, there are still tasks ahead. We, for example, have had more than 300,000 troops in Europe. Why? Because as we wade the number of Soviet troops, we found that number was the appropriate number. The number of Soviet troops will go down. It'll go down both because of the Soviets voluntarily withdrawing some, but also because we're far along on a treaty which we hope we will be able to sign, which will further reduce their troops.

That requires us to take another look. And we have concluded we don't need as many as we've had.

Similarly with respect to our nuclear weapons in Europe. We have one treaty already, the INF treaty, which we have signed and ratified, is going into effect. What does that do? That virtually abolishes to zero all the nuclear weapons between a range of roughly 500 miles and 1500 miles. Well, that also requires us to take another look see.

But realistically the President knows there are still dangers. The Soviets still have 30,000 nuclear weapons.

There are also other forms of danger involved. We're seeing a Balkanization develop. We're seeing ethnic tensions developing.

We want Europe to be stable. We want Russia to be stable. Any country that has 30,000 weapons, it's in our interest to help it be stable.

So what the President is suggesting, and I must say this is something which all of our friends in Europe agree must be done, is that we now sit down and reformulate our approach, and figure out what is now necessary for our security, and to advance our human values, our democratic values.

14:38:10
Q. Let me take some of the points you've made one by one, if I may. And let me ask you first a kind of general question which may seem obvious but nonetheless it's important for the way we are doing this interview.

Do you believe that the momentous changes, as you refer to them, in Europe have forced the United States or are leading the United States toward redefining its role in Europe?

A. Yes, I do believe that. I believe it's a welcome stunt, and a welcome development. It's -- it's really, if I can use simple terms, we're getting our wish. We had the wish, but realistically it was one of those wishes we didn't think would be fulfilled in our lifetime. We are getting our wish.

Now what we have to plan is where do we go from here.

14:39:12
Q. Restate that for me. You say we're getting our wish. What wish are we getting?

A. The wish is that the military threat against us and our security, and against our friends and their security is slowly changing and diminishing, decreasing. Maybe it will even disappear. We hope so. That's our wish, and that's what is evolving.

Another wish we have, and this is something that when I was in Madrid we talked about constantly, the United States, and when the Madrid meeting ended and George Schultz, the Secretary of State made the speech, you'll find it in his speech, that wish said let's not divide Europe politically into east and west. We don't like the idea of having the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians, the Rumanians, the

Bulgarians, the East Germans under the thumb of a Soviet dictatorship. Those people deserve freedom, deserve the integrity of their own ideals and national aspirations.

We're getting that wish. That's what I mean by that.

14:40:32
Q. But it's interesting, you and the President, I may say, seem to be somewhat tentative in your assessment of the changes, especially in Eastern Europe. Let me ask you directly, do you, and does the administration view the Warsaw Pact as still a threat?

A. I can only speak for myself about this at the moment, the way you phrase the question. The Warsaw Pact is not a threat because it has disintegrated -- realistically disintegrated.

The Soviet Union remains a threat. It's becoming less of a threat. Something has started. It isn't finished yet. Why? They've still got 30,000 nuclear weapons. We can't ignore that. They still have the largest army in Europe. We can't ignore that.

Now, I don't mean by that to suggest to you that the direction we're moving isn't a healthy one for us, and I feel

rather encouraged about it. But there is no certainty about it. And why do I say there is no certainty about it?

The newspapers every day are demonstrating to us signs of growing instability within the Soviet Union. It isn't as if those now in control of that government who talk about freedom and democracy and entering into agreements with us. It isn't as if they are certain of their position. And if they're not that certain of their position and complain about it publicly, how can we be certain of their position?

Now, again, personally I think they will stay. I think it will prevail. We're going to have ups and downs. We're going to have disappointments. But I think the direction will move in our way. But until we're certain of that, anybody responsible for the security and safety of our country cannot say well, it's started. They're there already. There's a difference between it's started which we're pleased, and they're there already.

14:42:53
Q. What would it take -- well, let me ask this: do you think that what's happened in Eastern Europe, first of all, could be reversed? Do you --

A. Very difficult to reverse what's happening in Eastern Europe, in my opinion.

Q. So a reconstitution of the Warsaw Pact as it --

A. I think it's not likely unless -- and maybe not even possible. But let me say what is possible, and please, when I say this I'm not predicting it. I don't really think it will happen, what I'm about to say. But it is possible that renewed military spirit might develop in the Soviet Union on the part of some who are not happy with the direction in which their country is now moving. And those troops might be directed to move into Eastern Europe again.

I can tell you this, that I've just returned from Eastern Europe. This is a concern on the part of a number of the leaders in Eastern Europe. They can't -- and they certainly can't stop the Soviet troops from moving back in.

As I say, I don't expect that they will be directed to move back in, but they have the capacity to do so. And when you're sitting in a living room talking about problems, you can take one kind of theoretical approach. But when you're the President of the United States and you have the responsibility and the people are looking to you to protect their security and their integrity, you can't make policy on the basis of a wish. So you have to protect yourself and be a little wary about it as you proceed.

You must proceed. It would be terrible if future generations looked back at this period and said the United

States muffed a historic opportunity. We must be careful not to do that. But we must also be careful not to assume facts before they're really facts.

14:44:56
Q. You mentioned something earlier which others have mentioned in the interviews we've been doing and that is the potential -- some people would argue that it is not the Warsaw Pact nor the Soviet Union that may be the threat in Europe. It may be the ethnic and nationalist tensions and rivalries.

Explain to me if you believe that, how you see that becoming a potential threat in Europe.

A. Yes, I do think it is -- if the present trends continue, and it looks like they are, and I'm not discouraged about that at all. What we're noticing is the fruits of 45 years of repression and a lack of freedom in Eastern Europe. And let me compare that a little bit to the West.

In those 45 years, today it's inconceivable and nations and peoples don't plan on the possibility that France may fight Germany. And yet just yesterday that was the reality.

A political maturation has taken place in Eastern Europe. They've learned to work together, to trade and do business together, to engage in politics together, to even plan military exercises together. They were free to do that as their economy got stronger.

That political maturity does not exist in Eastern Europe, where the governments were repressive, totally under control of the Soviet Union, and where peoples were repressed. And it's as if you have a teakettle and a top is on it which keeps it down, and now you remove the top and it's boiling, and we're seeing the boiling now coming up to the forefront.

What shape does it take? It takes the shape of yesterday because they haven't been able to mature out of yesterday. And so the old ethnic rivalries, for example, I'll be heading up our delegation at a meeting in Copenhagen in a few days. Thirty-five countries. I know that I'm going to hear complaints by the Hungarians against the Rumanians. I know I'm going to hear complaints within Yugoslavia.

The old ethnic and religious rivalries are now in the forefront. Our task, and I don't mean just the task of the United States -- the task of the free Europe with the United States and Canada participating, is to try to calm those, mediate those. Get them into a perspective so they don't

Tape 1

turn into a military threat. Because we've had history now of two world wars stemming out of small Balkan disputes.

None of us want that to happen, and I don't think it will happen. And the reason I don't think it'll happen is because I think we are ready and want to do what we can to ameliorate those tensions.

14:48:10

Q. Do you detect in Washington any concern, not necessarily publicly expressed, but nonetheless concern about a reunified Germany becoming a threat in Europe?

A. Yes. I don't think it's a prevailing view in Washington. I just came back from visiting five countries in Europe. I find a concern there too. I was in Germany.

The Germans are aware of the fact that there is a concern, and they understand it, because a united Germany will be a strong Germany. It'll be the strongest economic power on the continent, with a potential, if an irresponsible leadership should evolve, and if democracy goes by the board, with the potential of becoming the strongest military power as well. And that's why so many countries in Europe, with that latent fear, want the United States presence to continue as a stabilizing force.

That's why so many of our allies want NATO to continue as a stabilizing force. But the fact that some have that worry doesn't mean it's a prevailing view. I don't think it is.

I don't share it, for example. in my personal opinion, I think what's happened since the end of the Second World War is this maturation I've referred to. I think Germany has come to understand that it is such a strong economic power because Western Europe has integrated economically.

There is an interrelationship now that's developed. It's in their interest to keep that interrelationship and to keep that stability and that harmony.

Also, today Germany is a very successful democracy, a miraculous democracy, and the system's working. They all know it's working. It's produced results for them. So I don't -- I feel rather encouraged about it.

-- tape change --

14:51:10 Tape 2

Q. Let me go to something else. In the speech that we talked about earlier, the President's speech at Oklahoma State, he called for a strengthening of the CSCE process. What did he mean by that? Why did he say that?

A. In 1975 the United States signed the Helsinki final act. Every other country in Europe except Albania signed it. It was to be the means of East-West bridging, and the piece of paper that was signed was one expressing Western values. It was a wonderful piece of paper.

But it was on paper. It wasn't in deed. And in the last 15 years since that piece of paper was signed, and that piece of paper set a standard for European nations to aspire to and a standard by which we could judge them.

Now that standard has become reality for practically all of those 35 countries. It's not yet a reality in the Soviet Union though it's moving in that direction. It's not yet a full reality in Rumania though it's moving in that direction, and in most of the other countries it's there already.

So it's proven itself as something to be worthwhile. Now, we want to build on that. We have earlier talked a little bit about the ethnic problems. How do we deal with them?

Well, one of the things we're considering for Copenhagen is to put into effect a mediation procedure which these 35 countries working through the CSCE, putting the moral and political force of their unity behind it, would mediate disputes or offer to mediate disputes.

That could be a very important peace process development. The President wants to strengthen that. We are part of the CSCE. We are also part of NATO. But there are many other institutions in Europe of which we're not a part. The economic twelve, for example, the council of Europe. We cherish and understand it's important to our interest and to Europe's interest to keep as many relationships as possible. CSCE is one such relationship.

Let me go further, and I'll listen to your next question. If the Warsaw Pact disintegrates as it is, the CSCE will be the only institutional relationship that the Soviets will have with the rest of Europe.

And so this process of 35 countries meeting periodically, their foreign ministers meeting periodically, maybe by the end of the year their heads of government meeting together; it's very important toward assuring peace and stability in Europe.

14:54:32

Tape 2

Q. What I was going to ask you is in a sense, because in that speech the President talked about a more political role for NATO and talked about strengthening the Helsinki process. And in light of the changes that are occurring in Europe, and in light of the United States' obvious effort now to redefine its role in Europe, does it -- I mean, you've mentioned that it's the only -- CSCE is the only organization that the Soviet Union belongs to, but it's also the only European organization that the United States --

A. Except for NATO.

Q. But that isn't all Europe.

A. No, it's not all Europe. But this is all of Europe, which is its strength -- you're right, which is its strength. And you may notice that in that speech the President said that he had instructed me, as his representative in Copenhagen, to work on political pluralism, free elections, and the rule of law.

Another way of tying Europe together, all of Europe behind human values -- we're going to be doing that in Copenhagen.

One of the reasons I went to Europe last week was to work with the rest of the countries so that we can together fashion such a development and I think we'll do that.

14:55:52
Q. But in the Helsinki process there's also the security aspect. My question is essentially do you view as part of this redefinition of Europe and the U.S. role in Europe, do you view the CSCE as becoming, or another organization replacing NATO in the sense of it becoming an all European security umbrella as opposed to the East-West alliances that have been in place since the end of World War II?

A. It would be a terrible mistake if that happened, and I don't think it will happen, and I don't know of any of our people, our meaning the Western people, who would want to drop NATO.

I mean if anything, this is NATO's greatest moment of success, and for us then to drop an institution that's worked would be relatively foolish.

Now, what CSCE can do, since it ties in all the countries of Europe together, is it can do things that NATO doesn't even try to do in the security area. For example, mediating disputes -- ethnic disputes, national disputes that arise, even disputes between nations. NATO cannot do that.

What NATO provides is a political unity among 16 democratic states. What CSCE does is it says whether you're democratic or not, you're part of the CSCE.

There is a security component to the Helsinki final act. It's something which is called confidence building measures. It provides for confidence building measures. We can build those confidence building measures.

For example, if a nation has military maneuvers, it provides 21 days notice to every other nation, and it says look, we're going to have maneuvers on this and this day. Don't get upset by it. It's not a surprise attack, and if you want to come and have observers, come and have observers. They're welcome to see what we're doing. It builds confidence, relaxes tensions.

Our task is maybe to build on these confidence building measures. There's no need for us to think of only one institution. Now, as I indicated to you, there's good reason for the 16 of us to keep it the 16. A, we've been successful, two, there's still 30,000 nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. There's still some uncertainty in the Soviet Union. It would be foolish for us at this stage of the process to say no more NATO.

Tape 2

14:58:47

Q. On the other hand, I've been in some discussions recently, heard some discussions, some of your colleagues who are saying that within five to ten years, if things continue to move as they are, it may be very difficult to justify NATO, and it may be difficult, and the Europeans may ask the United States to remove most or all of the American military presence in Europe.

A. First of all let me say that a NATO can exist without a military presence of the United States in Europe. The NATO got born without a military presence of the United States in Europe. And as far as the military presence is concerned, if it's not needed and if Europe doesn't want us there, we pull out. That's not a problem.

It's conceivable that military strategists will come up with some idea under which the defense security mechanism can be accomplished without American troops there. I don't think that's likely but it's possible. And if so, let it be. It doesn't threaten it or undermine it.

But what I would say to you, sure, it's conceivable that in ten years there will be no military threat, or less. If there is no military threat, we take a new look at it.

I can only talk about what is. But I talked, for example, with one president of an Eastern European country -- I'd just as soon not mention his name at the moment -- who

said to me that if that time came where there is no longer a military threat, maybe we could take in some of the countries in Eastern Europe into this organization, and maybe instead of its' being called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it could be called the All European Treaty Organization.

Well, but he's talking about something down the road, because in the earlier part of his conversation with me, he was telling me, though he was a member of the Warsaw Pact, how important NATO was to stability in Europe today.

15:00:57

Q. But is there a kind of irony here, that in some ways, because the United States stood firm, if you will, because the United States for the last 40 years provided military security to Western Europe, that in a sense, having won the cold war, if you will, we may essentially lose our influence and power in Europe.

A. I really do not believe that our influence in Europe is based on the 300,000 troops we've got there. I think -- I think our influence in Europe is based on the theory that an attack by an aggressor against any of our friends in Europe, we would look upon as a threat to our security, and we would come in and help them.

Putting threats aside, I think our influence in Europe comes about as a result of our economic strength. The fact that you have the economy today integrated. The kind of thinking that is now required, if I can digress, the kind of thinking that appreciates that in one single day, a 24 hour period, more than one trillion dollars a day is transferred by computer from one part of the world to the next. That's more than our total annual budget.

The world has become economically integrated. Today you cannot trace in many cases the origin of a product because perhaps a dozen countries contributed to that product.

The Mediterranean is polluted by at least 18 different countries. If you want to deal with pollution in the Mediterranean, you need international action.

Canada can't take care of acid rain without the cooperation of the United States.

That's the world in which we are moving in, which we're at today. Communications. A dictatorship today can no longer survive. A dictatorship has to survive on the basis of a monopoly of information. With satellites, with fax machines, no way that you can have a monopoly of information.

The world scientifically, technologically, has moved in an interrelated manner, and what countries of the world have to come to appreciate is the requirement that the

politics of the world catch up with the science and technology of the world. And frankly, that's part of my explanation for the growth of human dignity in the world.

More people are free today -- percentage. Not only in numbers -- both in numbers and percentage -- than ever before in the history of the world. Let's appreciate what that means.

Where are you finding the revolutions for freedom? You see the Statue of Liberty in Tieneman Square in China. You see it in Napal. You see it all over Latin America. You see it in the Soviet Union. You see it in South Africa. Different cultures, different places of the world. What are people saying? We want societies based on human dignity. And that's consistent with economics as well. Because what is the basis of technology today? It's human ingenuity. It's the freedom to create. And that freedom to permit human ingenuity to flourish -- germinate and flourish is democracy.

15:05:05
Q. If I may, and this is one of the criticisms that some people have made of the current administration -- what you've just talked about, people are saying that this administration, this president has not grasped the kind of fundamental changes that are occurring and has reacted

slowly to these changes, and still seems to be talking about military alliances and NATO.

Not so much for today, but ten years down the road there still seems to be an over-reliance, perhaps the critics would say, on what was, rather than what will be.

15:05:50

Tape 2

A. The critics are wrong. It's those critics who felt there was no original threat to the Soviet Union. They said the Soviet Union is a strong country. It's not -- it's a weak country, rotten to the core.

Critics are frequently wrong, and I speak, I must say to you, not as a government official. I have a government assignment which I'm prepared to take for a month, but I'm a private citizen. I'm actually a democrat as you know, and not a republican. So I'm not looking at this from a partisan point of view.

The real task that the President -- any president has, is not to get lost in the dreams and the wishes for tomorrow, and to mistake those dreams and wishes for today. So that president has to take care of today, and yet must also have the vision for tomorrow, and understand the planning for tomorrow, and you've indicated to me that President Bush talks about the CSCE, which is, after all, tomorrow. Aspirations for tomorrow.

And my own observation is that he's done pretty well in balancing the requirements of today, at the same time as he's understood the need for us to move to prepare ourselves for the tomorrow.

Look. Mr. Baker just came back from Moscow where we're negotiating for tomorrow. All of those things are there. But for the moment we need NATO. Tomorrow who knows what'll happen tomorrow. But for the moment we need NATO, and we have to prepare for tomorrow.

So I don't share the criticisms of the critics.

15:07:26
Q. But do you sense that this administration is looking ahead, toward a new Europe and indeed a new world, that has begun to appear over the past six months or a year?

A. I do sense that, and I want to say to you that in my new life of diplomacy which has been in and out -- private life, government life -- I have worked for three presidents now. Carter, a democrat, Reagan and Bush. I've found, frankly, all three presidents fully appreciative of the need to prepare for tomorrow.

You know, I may have differences with immediate programs or policies -- I do. I have had with all three at

different times. But, you know, the people can say to me if you can do better, run for the office. Well -- but I want to say for all three presidents, I've been relatively satisfied with the direction, with their perception of where the country is going. And I don't think this is a partisan issue. I find in the congress, I spent a lot of time with members of Congress who call their friends. I find it's a cross party structure. I'm impressed and encouraged by the degree of bipartisanship that exists.

Look. A Republican president has just given me an assignment, a Democrat. And I find that it's working fairly well.

Tape 2

15:09

Q. Do you foresee a time, again, five, ten years from now, if things continue along the road they appear to be going, do you foresee a time when the Europeans may decide they really don't need the United States, in terms of their own -- to help them settle their own problems, provide their own security?

A. Oh, I hope so, if that is in terms of providing their own security, that would be very good. Europe is strong. But you can tell from what I've said a few moments ago that I

believe the world is moving to the stage where we all need each other. I can't see any single country in isolation, providing for its security needs, or its economic needs.

I think we're living in an interrelated world, and it's becoming more interrelated. And I think these are basically due to scientific and technological and communication changes. The world is becoming a smaller world.

Now, I'm aware of the fact that this is making many in the world uncomfortable, and this is causing some of the stresses of today. People are saying stop the world. It's going too fast. I want to get off. I'm not comfortable with it.

I am more comfortable with my religion, with my family, with my ethnic background, with my nationality. That I understand. And I want my kids to grow up without these alien new ideas. And they are uncomfortable, and that's cause for some of our problems today.

But I want to say to you that tomorrow is coming inevitably. And as I see tomorrow, it's growing interrelated.

(end side 1)

(Side 2)

Tape 3

15:12:40

Q. Let me ask you that to be specific in the sense that we have seen enormous change over the past six months or a year in Europe. What impact has that had on power and influence of the United States and its future role in Europe? Has it fundamentally altered the relationship?

A. I don't think that the recent events of the last six months have fundamentally altered our relationship. What I do find, for example, is the United States really at a high level of popularity in Europe -- moreso than in many years, because the international tensions are not there anymore. And when there are tensions for some reason political opponents would tend to blame it on the United States in Europe.

Well, if anything, American policy has succeeded. So I -- I find we're more popular. I find the Eastern Europeans are more dependent on us because they're worried about the Soviets, and they're worried about the Germans. So they're more dependent on us.

I think the Eastern Europeans also understand that they must depend for a great deal on our financial help and economic help.

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So the fundamental changes are not there. On the other hand, a process has begun which could lead to more fundamental changes. We can't predict that as yet, but it could lead to more fundamental changes.

But I'm not prepared at this stage to predict those fundamental changes. I feel rather encouraged about developments over the next few years. I find, for example, Europe '92 being energetically prepared for, and the Europeans going out of their way to assure us they don't mean that to be exclusive. They don't mean that to be protectionist against us. And as you know, a great many American businesses are now setting up in Europe in order to have this economic integration develop and mature.

15:15:03
Q. Do you think it's going to be more difficult politically in the United States to justify continued military expenditures, and the continued military presence in Europe, given the obvious chance it could happen.

A. It may be. That will depend on leadership here. We are, after all, reducing our defense budget which will reduce some of the tensions, political pressures given our domestic needs in this country. And it's quite possible that there

will be strong political opposition to our continued involvement.

I don't expect that to happen. I see the United States, since the end of the Second World War, fulfilling all of its responsibilities and paying more taxes in order to fulfill those responsibilities.

We've put massive amounts of Europe for the reconstruction of Europe -- of money -- for the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, and our people accepted it. We have maintained troops. Our people have accepted it.

As you know, politically movements would arise. They didn't get anywhere. I really think that the American people understand that we can't isolate ourselves from the rest of the world, in addition to which an increasing amount of American economic production depends on interrelating with the rest of the world. Our farmers selling grain is an example of that.

It's amazing -- I saw some figures recently about this, and it's impressive how much of American production goes overseas. Trade Unions understand this, businesses understand this. So that if our leadership makes this clear to the American people, then I don't see a development which requires us to pull back or pull out. But the move to do so

will arise, the debate will take place, it should take place and we ought to discuss it.

Tape 3

15:17:20

Q. Having said that, we interviewed Senator DeConcini yesterday and he was quite critical of the President in one area, and that area was his leadership in terms of providing an economic support to Eastern Europe, to the emerging countries in Eastern Europe. There have been calls for a marshall plan, there have been calls for the United States to make a major contribution. And yet this administration seems to be saying that there just isn't money available.

Do you think we're seeing the kind of leadership necessary to keep the United States involved in Europe?

A. I think the American people are more prepared to fulfill their responsibilities than the administration thinks they're prepared to perform their responsibilities. That's my personal opinion.

We started slowly, but I want to point out to you, we've gone up very much with the cooperation of the congress and the executive branch, we've gone up very much in our spending for economic recovery.

I want to make a difference, a distinction between what we ought to be spending for Eastern Europe, the independent countries of Eastern Europe, and what we ought to be spending within the Soviet Union.

In Poland, for example, they are trying now, energetically and genuinely to provide for a market economy. Czechoslovakia is moving in that direction. Hungary is moving in that direction. They need our help. We ought to give our help. We are providing some. Maybe we ought to provide more. I'd be prepared and I think the American people would be prepared to provide more, particularly since we are not the only providers. Western Europe is also contributing significantly to this bank of ideas.

Now, I am not for doing this with the Soviet Union at this moment for a very simple reason. I am afraid it would be money down a rat hole, until such time as they make the appropriate changes in their system so that we can be certain that the money will be wisely used. And that's very important, and I hope we are saying this to the Soviets. Change your system so that the money can be utilized, and then we will participate in this as well.

You know, I heard a story, for example, and I believe it's true, but I can't demonstrate it, that the Finns sent significant sums -- amounts of foodstuff to the Soviet Union at the time of the recent earthquake disaster, and I

understand that not only did the food disappear, but the Finnish trains also disappeared. They can't find them.

That's part of the corruption of the system. I mentioned earlier -- maybe I didn't mention to you, but I can mention it, the Germans recently sent massive amounts of food into the Soviet Union, and they now have come to appreciate that not all of it has been distributed because of inadequate distribution facilities and trucks and trains.

The system has to be changed, and then we ought to be helping them. And if that's what Senator DeConcini was saying, that's -- that's fine. I think we're doing better as a result of congressional pressure, and as a result of the President and the Secretary of State talking to European leaders. We're doing better now than we thought we were.

I for one believe the American people would be prepared to pay taxes for that, for better roads, hospitals, for school systems, for drugs. I think the American people are a mature people.

15-21-43
Q. Let me see if I can ask a last summing-up question. Are you at all concerned about even though events have seemed to be moving and Secretary Baker today was talking about this, events seem to be moving in our favor, certainly with

regard to the Soviet Union, certainly with regard to their actions in Eastern Europe. But they have now apparently -- things have come to a halt with regard to conventional weapons and reductions in Europe. Does that trouble you? Are you concerned that there may be some change of thinking in the Soviet Union that could affect the momentum?

A. I believe that every responsible American leader has to be concerned about what's taking place within Moscow these days, because we really don't know for sure what's taking place within Moscow.

I had the occasion early this week to talk with a Soviet military leader, a general, in Bonn, and I asked him about the conventional talks. I want to say what I got out of that conversation rather than quoting him. But what I got out of the conversation is that the Soviets are looking for increased leverage to allay their concerns about German reunification.

They may be looking for more money. As you know, the West Germans have agreed to support Soviet troops in East Germany for the next five years -- hundreds of millions of dollars. They may be looking for more money.

They may be looking for some kind of controls and leverage over the size of a German army. Whatever they're looking for, I believe they've been holding back a bit on the conventional to get that leverage.

Most of that treaty is all done. It requires some important decisions to be made. I have a feeling that those decisions didn't have to be made last week in Moscow and could be made next month, they think. Whether they're right or not, I don't know.

So I am not prepared to say that they're changing their mind about this because it's in their interest as well as in our interest. This is costing them a lot of money, maintaining their troops and their other armaments. But I would say we have to be concerned in broad terms about what's happening in Moscow.

Tape 3

15:24:37

Q. And in Germany is what you're saying.

A. I'm less concerned, as I indicated to you, about Germany. I'm saying there are people concerned about it. I am myself less concerned about it. I am much more concerned about what's happening in Moscow. For example, he clearly does not -- Gorbachev clearly does not seem to have the flexibility that he had six months ago. He seems to be tied in knots, for example, over the economy. He seems to be indecisive about it.

I believe the indecisiveness comes from the pressures. Now, there's going to be a very important 28th party congress

in July in Moscow. That may give him the assuredness that he needs to proceed with a more firm hand. But what is clear is that I think the decision-making instruments there are semi-paralyzed and that should be disturbing to all of us. That's one reason we still need a NATO.

15:25:42
Q. Going back, though, for a moment to your conversation with the Russian general in Bonn, do you think that their concerns, or the leverage, as you put it, that they're attempting perhaps to gain with regard to Germany is unreasonable?

A. No, I don't really think it's unreasonable, and we should be patient with them about this, in my opinion. They are after all one of the victorious nations, and they are part of the four. The essence of that relationship means you don't make decisions by majority vote. All have to participate in this decision-making process.

Given their history and their experiences, they are concerned about a strong Germany, understandably. Steps ought to be taken to provide them with the appropriate assurances.

Equally important, they're losing East Germany which is an important source of economic strength to them. And they see they're losing that. So you have to -- they have to find an adjustment to that process.

So I don't believe they're being unreasonable and I always feel -- I've been negotiating with the Soviets, as you know, intensely since 1980 and it never troubles me if they reach or even overreach. My job is to see to it as an American negotiator that they don't get more than they deserve and they don't get anything that's going to cost us significantly, that we shouldn't be paying.

But I don't blame them for trying to protect their position, and I think we are respectful of their position. And I think that as the two-plus-four meet, these adjustments will work out.

Tape 3

15:27:45

Q. In general terms, what do you see happening over the next couple of years in Europe? Do you see this process continuing?

A. I do. I see the process continuing over the next couple of years. If Gorbachev does not move quickly to change the economic system in the Soviet Union, to begin

emphasizing consumer goods much more than he's been, to permit private capital to move in, arrange for convertibility of currency, arrange for private enterprise in the market economy to move, then I think the Soviet Union may totally disintegrate into a confederation of nations, or just break apart because this cannot work this way. People are getting too unhappy about it in the Soviet Union, and I'm afraid it isn't going to be that easy to put the pieces together with a military dictatorship, or to reinstall a party dictatorship. And that could have a profound effect on the rest of Europe.

But I don't -- I think Mr. Gorbachev understands this as much as I do, and I think -- I think and hope that he will take the steps necessary to keep his -- his society in a stable form.

So I expect the process to continue. In Western Europe, I think the economy will get stronger. I think Eastern European countries will recover more rapidly than the experts now say, because I think there's a dynamism there that's ready to express itself, eager to express itself if given the opportunity to do so. And there's a creativity there.

You know, the Hungarians, the Czechs, the Poles historically have been innovative management people, productive people, and I think we'll see that.

So I do think that we're -- we're going to be entering a better period as we go ahead.

Q. But inevitably doesn't that mean that the United States becomes less important in Europe and perhaps in the world?

A. That may be, but I -- it depends on how we judge importance. I'm happy if my children grow up and begin to sustain themselves. Does it change the relationship when a child grows up? Of course it does. They're less dependent. They don't have to come to me for an allowance any longer. All of that is good. Yes. Is there a change, yes. Is it worse, no. It could be better. It depends on how we react to it, how maturely we react to it.

Some parents are never able to accept this and there's misery. There are others who can grow from it themselves. And that's our responsibility. So though the -- thought the relationship will change -- Europe is getting stronger, it should get stronger. That's why we had the Marshall Plan, so they could become independent. We never intended to keep all those troops there. We did because the Germans said to us we want a tangible demonstration that our fates are together.

As that tangible demonstration gets to be less necessary, as the military threat changes, we should be pleased if we have to reduce and maybe eventually withdraw our troops from the area.

Q. Thank you very much.

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