



Max M. Kampelman Papers

Copyright Notice:

This material may be protected by copyright law (U.S. Code, Title 17). Researchers are liable for any infringement. For more information, visit www.mnhs.org/copyright.

MAX M. KAMPELMAN
SUITE 800
1001 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004-2505

May 17, 1996

Mr. Eric Blantz
Program Officer
World Without War Council
1730 Martin Luther King, Jr. Way
Berkeley, CA 94709


Dear Mr. Blantz:

You did a splendid job of editing and rewriting. Thank you. You will find enclosed my final comments. I believe the document is now effective and presentable.

For the moment, I would rather not comment on whether you need organizations and institutions as partners. That is more appropriate for you to decide. I don't know all of the groups listed. I notice the American Academy of Diplomacy is not included. I don't know, for example, whether, if you proceed, you would want to have Freedom House included. There are also three large think tanks in Washington, the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and Brookings. I don't know if you are looking for think tanks. I believe this area is one that I don't feel qualified to comment on.

Once again, my thanks and my warmest best wishes.

Sincerely,


Max M. Kampelman



WORLD WITHOUT WAR COUNCIL
Berkeley • Chicago • Seattle • Washington D.C.

Office of the President:

1730 Martin Luther King, Jr. Way
Berkeley, California 94709
(510) 845-1992
Fax (510) 845-5721

May 9, 1996

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman
Fried, Frank, Harris Shriver and Jacobson
1001 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Ste. 800
Washington, DC 20004-2505

Dear Ambassador Kampelman,

Enclosed you'll find a reworking of your interview. Thank you for your efforts to make sure that your perspective is presented accurately and completely and for your thoughtful editing job. I regret that *you* were asked to correct *our* typos. I assure you that this version is much "cleaner."

As you'll see, we've made several minor, and a few more significant changes. Most importantly, question four now presents your answer to the relativist's challenge to US human rights policy. It is good statement, although its inclusion required some reworking of questions 1-5. I hope you'll agree that this has improved the former draft. If you'd care to respond to the Realists' argument as posed in the question, please feel free. It would be useful.

What is now answer # 2 (was #4), to which you added two brief sentences at the beginning in your editing, I rewrote in order to make it read more smoothly. I've included a photocopy of ^{your} editing so you can compare responses. Please let me know if you'd like the changes reversed or an entirely new approach.

I've also included a listing of those organizations and institutions that we're considering as potential partners in this work. Your suggestions as to which we are missing would be very much appreciated.

Thank you again. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Eric Blantz

*or especially
appropriate*

enc: draft 3 (copy of prior question 4), response form, list of potential partners, project description

**Interview with
MAX M. KAMPELMAN**

***Intro:** Before I entered public service, I was a political science teacher. I also practiced law in Washington. My diplomatic experience began when I was asked by President Carter in 1980 and then reappointed by President Reagan to serve as the head of the American delegation to the Madrid follow up conference under the Helsinki Final Act (the end product of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.)). Then, in 1985, President Reagan asked me to head up the American delegation to the nuclear and space arms talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva that were just beginning again. These talks were bilateral -- unlike the Madrid talks which*

FOR KE

involved thirty five countries -- and lasted from 1985 until I retired from government service in January of 1989. In 1987, I was also given the additional position by Secretary Schultz and the President to serve as Counselor to the State Department. After leaving government in 1989, I was asked to take and accepted a position as Chairman of the Board of the United Nations Association and that lasted until 1993. I have also served as Chairman of Freedom House and Chairman of the Jerusalem Foundation. I am today the Chairman of the American Academy of Diplomacy; Chairman of Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy; Vice-Chairman of the

✓ *United States Institute of Peace; on the Executive Board of the American Bar Association effort to strengthen the rule of law in the emerging democracies of Europe, the Central and Eastern European Law Institute. I am also occasionally engaged with the Atlantic Council, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Council on Foreign Relations.*

Q1: Based on your long experience in scholarly, governmental *and* nongovernmental circles and on issues ranging from human rights to arms control, what do you see as the most important contending voices in current debates about "global governance" issues?

A1: I think the major differences in perspective on this issue are long-term and fundamental.

On the one hand there are those who are convinced that it would be a good thing to supersede the nation state with a form of world authority; some form of world government. On the other hand there are skeptics of one sort or another; some of whom think that the *goal* is highly desirable but unachievable, and some of whom, wondering whether world government would be open and democratic, are skeptical about the goal as well. Those who accept the desirability of the goal, but are nevertheless troubled by the difficulty of achieving it, tend to seek to achieve similar goals in other ways. They try to avoid getting lost in the utopian idealism which permeates some of the groups promoting world government and tend to look at pragmatic regional or functional groupings as preferable systems to emphasize.

This view comes closest to defining my own position. I have never spent much time in my adult years pursuing impractical objectives. I'm sure a lot of that has to do with my political experience, which conditioned me to direct energy into practical problem-solving rather than theoretical problem-solving or star-gazing. I respect the vital role of those in our society who remind us of goals, but such goals must be measured against what is practically feasible.

Q2: Since the end of the Cold War, your prescriptions for US foreign policy have diverged from those of others who, like you, supported a strong defense against the Soviet threat. How do you explain the path you've chosen?

A2: During the Cold War, I strongly supported increasing certain conventional defense forces as well as S.D.I., the Strategic Defense Initiative program. I did so because I believed that the Soviet Union was headed for the dustbin of history *unless* it could use military force to assert its global presence. We needed to deter any such attempt and we did so by building our military capabilities. I don't know whether others were thinking along the same lines, but I certainly

don't expect that they all agreed with this assessment.

With the end of the Cold War, however, we -- and I now use the term broadly-- had an opportunity to begin moving in a more constructive direction; to update the lens through which we've looked at the world for several decades. Some people would call this idealistic, but I think a pragmatist would have to believe that this was very *realistic* given the change we've experienced in world politics. For example, after I retired in 1989, President Bush and Secretary Baker called me back to the government on five occasions. One of those occasions was to spend a month in Copenhagen heading up the American delegation to a C.S.C.E. conference on the human dimension under the Helsinki Final Act. All thirty five countries present, including the Soviet Union, agreed on a document which said that *European security and cooperation depends on each of our countries being democratic; with guarantees for competing political parties to function, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and dissent not being stepped on.* All of this was spelled out in rather great detail; a truly amazing achievement.

John Norton Moore, a professor of International Law at the University of Virginia Law School,

called this document the most important international agreement since the Magna Carta of 1215.

This agreement became the basis for the *Declaration of Paris* adopted by Heads of State a few months later.

That was 1990. Whatever the “real” significance of the document, I spent a lot of time in Europe in 1989, 90, and 91 and there *was* a great deal of optimism in the air; not only among governments, but also among the people. There it was available to us, or so it seemed. So far, however, we’ve failed to take advantage of that opportunity.

Q3: Owen Harries is one of those who shared your sense of the threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold-War, but who now argues for a return to a “cautious” American foreign policy focused on protecting America’s vital national interests. He is deeply skeptical of calls for a new “vision” for activist American leadership. Why is his post-Cold War prescription wrong?

A3: Only history will tell us what is right or wrong, but I believe that America's vital national interests require an international community's commitment that aggression by force must not be condoned. I say this because, if nothing else, the wars of this century should have taught us that when our friends, allies and partners get involved in wars, we cannot escape. Therefore, if there is a fundamental principle for peace anywhere in the world, it has to be those provisions in the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act which say, in effect: No profit from aggression! Existing boundaries must be respected! They're not necessarily the best, the wisest or the most just borders, but ^{THOSE WHO} if you want to change them, ^{HAVE} ~~you've~~ got to use *negotiation*, *not violence*. Those who use force are writing themselves out of the responsible international community. America must assert itself diplomatically, politically, and, where necessary (a judgement call) militarily if the international community is to sustain its commitment. We are the strongest nation in the world and have a profound interest in world stability. Serving that interest requires leadership.

Q4: Your vision for US leadership also emphasizes our role in protecting universal human rights. ¹²That view is challenged both by "Realists," convinced that foreign policy should be free from moralistic concerns, and by certain political leaders abroad, like Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, who contend that the West should not impose its particular conception of human rights on non-western cultures. How do you defend against the charge of "cultural imperialism"?

A4: The onslaught against our human rights foreign policy coming out of Asia is led by authoritarian politicians interested in preserving their own power. All of our human rights programs are fully consistent with the various declarations emanating from the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act. We are not attempting to impose religious beliefs on any group that doesn't share them, we are merely acting in support of a growing consensus that basic human rights should be protected. States assume certain obligations when they join international organizations or sign declarations, and we have every right to expect them to live up to the promises they make. *IT IS ALSO APPROPRIATE TO NOTE THAT THE VALUES OF HUMAN DIGNITY ARE SHARED BY ALL KNOWN RELIGIOUS GROUPINGS.*

9f
~~More fundamentally~~, I just don't accept the "cultural relativism" argument. I am assured by some Asian scholars and religious figures that issues of human dignity and the establishment of political organizations that respect human dignity are fully consistent with various Asian religious groupings and teachings. Dr. Joseph Chan from the University of Hong Kong recently published a paper in which he asserted that the most fundamental element in Confucian political thought is that the primary task of the state is to help citizens develop virtues and achieve the good life within the broad constraints of basic individual rights. Similarly, Professor Amartya Sen of Harvard University has referred to Asian theorists and leaders such as Ashoka who in the third century emphasized tolerance and liberty as central values of a good society. Buddha, he points out, explains nirvana in the language of "freedom:" freedom from the miseries of life. In more recent times, Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Sun Yat-Sen vocally defended the widest forms of democracy and civil rights.

It is grossly unfair to Asian cultures to assume that they value *suppressing* human rights. People who live in Asian cultures are as much entitled to strive for societies based on human dignity as

are those of us who live in the Western world. That striving is a human one, not a racial or

cultural one. ^{STABILITY AND} I believe that ~~lasting~~ global governance capable of preventing deadly conflict can

only be built on wider consensus about the need to protect fundamental human rights ^{RELATION} ~~AND GO~~

THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE CAN BE NO PROFIT FROM VIOLENT
AGGRESSION.

Q5: What do you see as the clearest evidence of America's failure to seize present opportunities?

A5: The Yugoslav situation was the first direct challenge to the "no profit from aggression"

principle and the international community's failure to curb Serb excesses has led to

discouragement, divisiveness and skepticism throughout Europe. Recent developments may

mean the beginning of some change. But I would say that the opportunity was ours to stop the

crisis early, and we muffed it. Our current efforts in Bosnia ~~are~~ ^{are} made necessary by our earlier

reluctance to response ^{are} are made all the more daunting by that failure. (^{HOPE IT IS}
NOT TOO LATE TO CORRECT AND COMPENSATE FOR OUR FAILURE.

were mistaken to recognize Croatia and thus hasten and legitimize the breakup of Yugoslavia.

But once the now familiar scenario unfolded we were even more mistaken in our failure to respond.

Q7: Your sense of our failures in Bosnia leaves you sounding rather pessimistic about the chances that the international community and America in particular will “seize the day.”

A7: I’m certainly disappointed when I consider the missed opportunities. But I’m also hopeful. Why? Because there are movements afoot over which we don’t have much control; *globalization movements*. These movements, taken together, constitute a radical change in the context of international politics. They are forcing changes in the way we cooperate at global and regional levels. Take my own lifetime, for instance. The sea changes that have taken place in my life have been absolutely immense. When I was a child, we didn’t have antibiotics or

refrigerators, we didn't have transatlantic airplanes, much less computers. Today, modern technology, modern science, modern industry have changed the way we live; and not just superficially. These changes have impacted the very nature of the economy and political community. Science is a good example. A recent Nobel prize was awarded to a team with a European, an Asian, and an American. They worked together. This is normal. Geographical or national boundaries no longer define the limits of community or cooperation in many realms. A border patrol can keep out a vaccine, but it cannot keep out germs, or ideas, or broadcasts.

A contributing factor has been the revolution in communication. In addition to linking people and building communities across political borders, changes in communications have also been a factor within states. Take the case of dictators, who have often relied on a monopoly on communication and information to survive. Given the state of modern communications technology, however, that kind of monopoly is no longer possible. Satellites hear what's happening all over the world. Tienammen Square demonstrated that. Chinese students and workers in Tienammen Square were getting faxes and telexes and listening to radio; they were

listening to the BBC. Mr. Gorbachev once told me that although the officers leading the coup d'etat against him had tried to cut off all communications, the first tactic of any coup, he knew exactly what was happening because he had a *radio*. He learned about the situation from the BBC and Voice of America!

The same processes are at work in economics and industry. You can't understand the New York Stock Exchange without understanding the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. More money is exchanged by computer in twenty four hours than our *total annual national budget--in twenty-four hours!* I remember George Schultz calling me into his office one day to show me some gadget which had a label indicating where it was made; that is, in about a dozen countries. Professor Reich pinpointed this new reality in an article in *The Wall Street Journal*, in which he asks, "So you want to buy an American made car, do you?" His answer: "Sorry, there's no such animal." What I'm suggesting is that this globalization process is here in the worlds of economics, technology, science, and communication. It's behind in the world of politics, and the pressure to catch up is growing. That is why Freedom House is

reporting that a larger percentage of people are living in "free" and "partly free" societies than ever before in recorded history.

Q8: Some point directly to the integrating trends you mention as not just "ahead" of politics, but as a force leading to the *erosion of state sovereignty*. In your view, what do these globalization trends mean for the future of states and the state system?

A8: Well, if you don't oversell it, it could mean an erosion of state power. It's certainly an important change. Simply put, it means that if you want to deal effectively with big and important problems, you need to have cooperation among the states. What it means practically is that to get rid of pollution in the Mediterranean Sea you've got to have the cooperation of eighteen to twenty countries that border on and pollute that sea; Canada and the United States need to cooperate if they're going to solve acid rain problems.

At the same time, and as I used to say to my Soviet colleagues, let's not get hung up on words.

One of the words we get hung up on is "sovereignty." When we talk about sovereignty being "eroded" or "ceded" a lot of hackles come up right away. If you ask people in the United States "where is sovereignty in the United States?," they'll say "we the people," the American people, are the sovereign. And if you talk to a Governor he'll probably talk about the "sovereign state of Virginia." In other words, you can have many concepts or units called "sovereign." So what? Acts to further global cooperation are what count.

✓ We also need to keep in mind that flags, languages, ethnic identities, patriotism, and tradition, ^{AND EVEN CURRENCY} remain important to people. We should not *and need not* challenge them. We've got to take that which is important to people and preserve it even as we pragmatically put into effect global and regional cooperative programs to deal with collective problems. We're most likely to succeed if we can avoid slogans and emotionally charged terms.

Chancellor Kohl of Germany recently said in Brussels that "nationalism is war" as he juxtaposed

it with European integration. The "nation-state of old," he said, "cannot solve the great problems of the 21st century." There is profound truth in that observation.

Q9: Those more skeptical about the assertion that globalization yields progress argue that for every increment of globalization there is a counter-increment of fragmentation, decentralization, and increasing chaos. Why are you encouraged by globalization?

A9: Science, medicine, technology, communication -- all these are globalized today. They hold promise for improving the health and welfare of people. They strengthen the likelihood of longevity, disease control, improved nutrition, greater comforts -- ingredients of a strengthened concept of human dignity. Freedom House also tells us that there is a steady tendency toward greater freedom in the world. There will be disappointments, but let's not exaggerate them or glorify them. Much will depend on us and our wisdom to take advantage of opportunities. Progress and improvements are not inevitable, but the opportunity is there.

Q10: Asserting the need for greater international cooperation does not, of course, answer the "how?" question. Many look to the United Nations for an answer. Where does the U.N. figure in your answer?

A10: What comes to my mind at the moment is the story of a fellow playing dice. A friend whispers to him, "Frank, the dice are loaded!" He says, "I know." "If you know the dice are loaded, why are you playing?" He answers, "Because it's the only game in town." The U.N. is the only game in town. I have no doubt in my mind about its weaknesses, but there is nothing else here. I know there is plenty of theoretical public support for the U.N. in America. But I also sense, and I think there's evidence to support my hunch, that when you dig deeper you find a lot of skepticism and disappointment as well. There's very little support for, say, putting US forces under U.N. command. There just isn't sufficient trust. *And with good reason.* I recall a number of years ago walking through the U.N. with the head of one delegation, not an American delegation, and as we walked he said "this fellow's from the East German KGB, and this is the

Moscow KGB," etc... The KGB permeated the whole organization; it was a major front in the

✓ Cold War. Even today, we've got a General Assembly which is ^{HEAVILY INFLUENCED} ~~controlled~~ by a group of

dictators in Africa and Asia, nothing close to a democratic body representing the people of the world.

It may be difficult, but I believe we should stay involved in the U.N. but without putting all of our eggs in that basket. I think that the failure of the United States after the cold war to develop

the kind of relationship with Russia which could have constructively influenced the U.N. has
I HAVE NEVER BELIEVED IN THE "BLAME AMERICA FIRST" SYNDROME AND RUSSIA'S PROBLEMS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE COMPLEXITY OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BUT OUR GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY ALERT TO THE CHALLENGE AND THIS HAS BEEN TRUE OF BOTH THE RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIONS.
been a big mistake. For instance, if the United States and Russia were able to come to an

agreement on a) finding an effective ^{new} international leader ^{for the U.N.} who is a good administrator, b) cutting

✓ the U.N. budget, ^{ADMINISTRATIVELY} and c) strengthening the organization, I think a lot of other countries would

follow suit. Maybe it could still be done, but in my opinion we just haven't been as alert as we should have been to the opportunity to leverage change in the U.N. and to develop a better relationship with Russia at the same time.

Q11: If I were the President and I asked, "Max, I'm under increasing pressure to support an expanded membership in the U.N. Security Council and commit American forces to a standing U.N. rapid reaction force under U.N. command. What should I do?," what advice would you offer?

A11: I would not be in favor of putting US forces under a U.N. command, *except*, and now here is the critical exception, I would ask for American volunteers. I would say to the American armed forces, "the United Nations is looking for US volunteers for a standing U.N. Force." I would be very specific about how they would serve and the rules of the game. In my opinion, one of the rules of the game ought to be, and I am open to discussion on this, that they would be under the control of an American General, but within the context of a broad U.N. force. Maybe in time we'd eliminate the requirement of a US general. I do not think that the American society should take kids who volunteer for the American armed forces and put them under U.N. control unless they themselves agree to it; not at this stage. I do think that a volunteer U.N. standing force would be a good idea, however.

Q12: You mentioned the U.N. as "the only game in town," but you also mentioned regional and functional associations and suggested that we spread our eggs around.

Specifically, which other "baskets" should we be emphasizing?

A12: The U.N. is clearly the most inclusive and political institution out there, and that makes it uniquely useful for certain purposes. But we need to explore strengthened and expanded cooperative arrangements wherever we can. The World Trade Organization is one option. We are cooperating well in the field of aeronautics internationally, so we're obviously doing something right there. We should work more closely with the Council of Europe. The Helsinki Final Act and the process that created it is another promising approach. *INSIDE OF ITS REFORM INITIATIVES.* When I finished my tour of duty in 1983 with the Helsinki Final Act, and as we moved to the end of the Cold War, I was asked to testify in Congress on two occasions dealing with whether the Helsinki process could be emulated in the Middle East and Latin America. The process seemed to have worked at that point, so the thinking was: why not try to apply the same principles to other parts of the world?

There was a lot of talk, a lot of thought. I received a letter from a group of presidents from African countries who were going to meet in Geneva to discuss whether the African nations had much that they could learn from the Helsinki process. Regrettably they gave me a date at short notice and I couldn't join them and I've never heard from them again. But, something like the Helsinki process might be considered in other areas as an example to be emulated. It's been weakened, but perhaps it can be revived. Traditional judicial tribunals might be another approach. We now have a tribunal examining the issue of war crimes in the ex-Yugoslavia. I think judicial tribunals should be strengthened as a way of convincing states and other actors that there are remedies other than violence to correct perceived injustices.

So, there's no shortage of options, but whatever we try will only succeed if we start with what made the Helsinki process work: first we need to have agreement on what *ought* to be the relationship. Without such agreement, we can't go anywhere. Once we have agreement on the *ought*, then we can look at the *is* and see the ground we have to cover to reach the *ought*. Our third step is to commit ourselves to closing that distance. That was what made the Helsinki

process work; the prerequisite of real progress is basic agreement on what *ought* to be the relationship.

Q13: In an article you wrote in connection with your human rights work in Madrid, you said that "man's evolving creativity produces opportunities, but the strength of our aspirations must not blind us to obstacles." Can you be more explicit about the obstacles you see to effective solutions?

A13: At present, I would say one of the most important obstacles we face is the loss of the American people's support when there is a danger of casualties. No American foreign or military policy can long last which doesn't have the support of a broad consensus in American society.

This is where values are important. G.K. Chesterton once wrote that the US was a country "with

the soul of a church." Consensus in our country requires ^{JEKAS TO TODAY} either an imminent danger ^{NATIONAL} or a defense ^{AMERICAN} of our values. Public support for US military involvement would diminish quickly given any

kind of danger for Americans and no clear national interest. On occasion, depending on leadership, the defense of values could satisfy that requirement. So, we need to build domestic support for US engagement abroad, whether it is U.N. sponsored or not, even if that just means

convincing people that we can't "stay home." *THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MUST ALSO BE PERSUADED TO UNDERSTAND THAT POWER IS USELESS IF ADVERSARIES COME TO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL NOT BE USED; AND IF CASUALTIES WILL RESULT IN A WITHDRAWAL OF OUR POWER, IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO CAUSE THOSE CASUALTIES.*

As for "external" obstacles, the majority of memberstates in the U.N. still have not demonstrated that they have the commitment to freedom and democracy that I would like to see. Moreover, the U.N. itself has not convinced me that it can be efficient, either operationally or administratively. I would say that the Bosnia experience highlights this. Until the U.N. expresses these qualities more credibly and consistently, I think there's only so much it can be asked or expected to accomplish. We should be working, therefore, to build pressure for change within the U.N. and its nondemocratic member states and willing to use other avenues when necessary.

Q14: What advice would you offer to individuals and organizational leaders considering

their own perspective on these issues?

A14: International relations is evolving to the point where citizens' groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a vital role to play in the process. Our government must be prepared to accept, welcome and adjust to this change so that it is not just an "intrusion" but a valuable asset. For their part, NGOs must come to appreciate that they are increasingly more than advocacy organizations. They must be ready to assume the responsibility for *executing* as well as urging policy. A healing process in Bosnia, for example, will require extensive NGO participation. These efforts must be guided and even regulated by a harmonizing, coordinating process ~~stimulated but not necessarily run by the appropriate~~
~~government agency~~

NGOs are today showing that maturity, and I sense that government is prepared to enter that partnership. But if the new partnership is going to work, NGOs must also make a concerted effort to be above political partisanship. This is true for all NGOs, but especially for NGOs

working abroad, since many foreign governments, as a result of their national experiences, are not likely to respect or appreciate the potential importance of NGOs in the international process. It is also vital for U.S. NGOs to foster and stimulate the establishment of viable NGOs and other civic institutions democratizing countries abroad since a durable civil society appears to be one of the best indicators of the viability of democratic institutions.

Perhaps most importantly, I think there's too much black and white and too little attention to the internal dynamics of organizations such as the U.N.. Most people are either for or against US involvement in the U.N., but very few are trying to figure out how the US can both participate in this organization and promote needed change *at the same time*. For example, we need to explore how to pay what we owe to the U.N. while leveraging much needed reforms. So long as our options are framed as "all or nothing," there won't be good solutions.

Q15: How has your perspective on the issues we've been discussing changed over time?

A15: First of all, I would say that I was slow to recognize the role that NGOs can play beyond

that of advocacy. Defining and developing that role is an important task at present. Secondly,

until I reached my adult years my "idealism" did not permit me to see that when faced with a

serious threat to peace and stability diplomacy can only succeed if it is supported by the

*WE ARE CHILDREN OF GOD CAPABLE OF REACHING FOR THE STARS, BUT OUR FEET
REMAIN STUCK IN THE MUD OF THE EARTH. THERE IS EVIL AND WE MUST RECOGNIZE ITS EXISTENCE
AND OUR NEED TO REPORT IT.*

availability of adequate military force. Finally, increasing emphasis on foreign policy problems

has led me to become less partisan in my politics. I believe our Presidents must learn to involve

members of Congress of *both* parties in the decision making process on matters of our

international policy. That is a pre-requisite if there is to develop the consensus that our nation

requires if we are to be an effective leader toward a better world.

Potential Cooperating Organizations

first tier:

Academic Council on the UN System
Alliance of Educators in Global and International Studies (AEGIS)
American Committees on Foreign Relations
Carnegie Endowment for International Affairs
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (DC)
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
Council on UN Reform Education - Walter Hoffman
Council on Foreign Relations
Ethics and Public Policy Center
Ford Foundation
Miller Center
National Council of World Affairs Organizations (NCWAO) -
Stanley Foundation
UNA
United States Institute of Peace
World Affairs Council, San Francisco
World Federalist Association

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
DIPLOMACY
~~AMERICAN~~

second tier:

National Planning Association
Association of Retired Foreign Service Executives

CSLE

M.

Interview with
MAX KAMPELMAN

US Ambassador to Madrid Human Rights Conferences
and to the ~~Space Based Weapons~~ Conferences in Geneva

NO LONGER AND SPACE BASED WEAPONS

[Please provide a regular bio sheet and a listing of relevant publications for our records.]

✓ **Intro:** I used to be a political science teacher. I also practiced law in Washington for a long time. My diplomatic experience began when I was asked by President Carter and then reappointed by President Reagan to serve as the head of the American delegation to the Madrid follow up conference under the Helsinki Final Act, the end product of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. That "meeting" lasted for three years, which I certainly did not expect, but I think it was a turning point in East-West relations. Under the leadership of the United States, the Soviet Union was branded an outlaw state because of its violations of human rights, its internal repression and the invasion of Afghanistan, all of which were ^{fully discussed} covered by the Madrid meeting. In 1985, President Reagan asked me to head up the American delegation to the nuclear and space arms talks with the Soviet Union that were just beginning again. This was bilateral, as distinguished from the Madrid talks which were multilateral, with thirty five countries involved. This lasted from 1985 until I retired from government service in January of 1989. In 1987 I was given the additional position by Secretary Schultz and the President to serve as ^{senior} counselor to the State Department. This was feasible because by then we had already established one treaty, the INF treaty, and we already had more than 400 pages of text agreed upon in the second treaty dealing with the longer range weapons. The remaining issues to be decided were highly technical, verification issues, so I felt comfortable spending less time in Geneva, supervising and most of my time in Washington as Counselor. I retired from government in 1989. Later that year I was asked to serve and accepted a position as Chairman of the Board of the United Nations Association and that lasted until 1993 when I began to drop all my New York oriented activities. I was also chairman of Freedom House and Chairman of the Jerusalem Foundation and I dropped those as well to concentrate in Washington. I am today the Chairman of the Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. I'm vice-chairman of the United States Institute of Peace, and am on the Executive Board of the American Bar Association effort to strengthen the rule of law in the emerging democracies, the Central and Eastern European Law Institute, CEELI. I am also still engaged with the Atlantic Council and with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *and the Council on Foreign Relations*

Q1: Your experience with world order issues includes work in scholarly, governmental and nongovernmental circles and on issues ranging from human rights to arms control. Based on this broad experience, what do you see as the most important contending voices in debates about "global governance" issues?

A1: I think the major differences in perspective on this issue are long-term and fundamental.

On the one hand there are those who are convinced that it would be a good thing to supersede the

nation state with a form of world authority; some form of world government. On the other hand

174020 MAX
you have skeptics of one sort or another; some of whom think that the goal is highly desirable

but unachievable, and some of whom are skeptical about the goal as well; wondering whether world government would be open and democratic. Those who accept the desirability of the goal, but who are nevertheless troubled by the difficulty of achieving it, tend to seek to achieve similar goals in other ways and to try to avoid getting lost in the utopian idealism which permeates groups, ^{SOME OF THEM} such as the World Federalism Movement.

Q2: Is the last position you described your own?

A2: I think so. I have never really spent much time in my adult years pursuing impractical objectives. I'm sure a lot of that has to do with my political experience, which conditioned me to direct energy into practical problem solving rather than theoretical problem solving or star gazing.

Q3: Still, much of your life has been devoted to advancing "idealistic" causes such as human rights. Would you say that those who advocate for what is *currently* unachievable are nevertheless playing an important and positive role in reminding us of the right goal?

A3: [Your response here, or attached]:

YES. THERE IS A VERY GOOD REASON FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE TO PURSUE A LOT OF IDEALISTIC GOALS, IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO FORGET THE "DUTY" AND TO REMEMBER THE "IS" BY HOW CONSISTENT IT IS TO THE "DUTY" WE ARE IN, HOWEVER, REMEMBER ALSO TO WHAT DUTY TO GO.

Q4: In 1982, you wrote that "for many years now we in the US have looked at international affairs through the prism of our relations with the Soviet Union, but... tomorrow will soon be with us. What will it be like? Will it be more of the same, or will an evolving world cause us to change the prism through which we look at the world and our place in it?" Thirteen years later, with the Soviet Union gone, has our prism changed?

A4: During the Cold War, I supported efforts to build up American military forces. I strongly supported increasing certain conventional defense forces as well as SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative program. I did so because I believed that the Soviet Union was headed for the dustbin of history *unless* it could use military force to assert its global presence. We needed to deter any such attempt and we did so by building our military capabilities.

With the end of the Cold War, however, we -- and I now use the term broadly ~~to encompass~~ ~~maybe even the entire human race~~ -- had an opportunity to begin moving in a more constructive direction, to change our "prism." Some people would call this idealistic, but I think a pragmatist

would have to believe that this was very *realistic* given the change we've experienced in world politics. For example, after I retired in 1989, President Bush and Secretary Baker called me back to the government on five occasions. One of those occasions was to spend a month in Copenhagen heading up the American delegation to a ^{CSCB} conference on the human dimension under the Helsinki Final Act. All thirty five countries present, including the Soviet Union, agreed on a document which said that *European security and cooperation depends on each of our countries being democratic; with ^{6 countries for} real ~~opposition from~~ ^{to freedom} competing political parties, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and dissent not being stepped on.* All of this was spelled out in rather great detail; a truly amazing achievement. [John Norton Moore, a professor of International Law at the University of Virginia Law School at the time, called this document the most important international agreement since the Magna Carta of 1215.] This agreement became the basis for the Declaration of Paris adopted by Heads of State a few months later. That was 1990. Whatever the "real" significance of the document, I spent a lot of time in Europe in 1989, 90, and 91 and there *was* a great deal of optimism in the air; not only among governments, but also among the people. There it was, available to us or so it seemed. So far,

however, we've failed to take advantage of that opportunity. Most dramatically, Europe failed

in the face of the first significant challenge to that optimism: Yugoslavia.

Q5: Owen Harries, who is also involved in this project, shared your perspective during the Cold War. Since its end, however, he has argued for a return to a "normal" American foreign policy; one focused on protecting America's vital national interests and deeply skeptical of the need for a "vision" or thematic mission. How do you respond to the argument that America should get used to being just another nation among nations?

A5: [Your response here, or attached]:

AMERICA'S VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS COMMITMENT THAT AGGRESSION BY FORCE MUST NOT BE CONSIDERED. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT WHEN OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND PARTNERS GET INVOLVED IN WAR, WE CANNOT ESCAPE. OUR "VISION", THEREFORE, MUST INCLUDE ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL ATROSCHEDE VIA OUR FOREIGN POLICY THAT CONDEMNES AND RESISTS PROFIT FROM AGGRESSION. FOR US TO BE EFFECTIVE, FURTHERMORE, WE MUST ASSESS OURSELVES DIPLOMATICALLY, POLITICALLY, AND, WHEN NECESSARY (A USHERMAN CALL) MILITARILY. SINCE WE ARE THE STRONGEST NATION IN THE WORLD AND HAVE A PROFOUND INTEREST IN WORLD STABILITY, WE MUST ASSESS OUR LEADERSHIP.

Q6: What principles or understandings best define the prism you now advocate for the US?

A6: If there is a fundamental principle for peace in Europe or any place in the world, it has to be that provision in the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act which says, in effect, "No profit from aggression! Existing boundaries must be respected!" They're not necessarily the best, the wisest or the most just borders, but if you want to change them, you've got to use *negotiation, not violence*. If you use force, you are writing yourself out of the responsible international community. The Yugoslav situation was the first direct challenge to that fundamental principle. The international community's failure ^{to curb} ~~there (as well as~~ Serb excesses) has led to all kinds of discouragement, divisiveness and skepticism throughout Europe. I hope that recent developments ^{mean} ~~are~~ the beginning of some change. But, thus far I would say that the opportunity was ours, and we muffed it. I am not suggesting that it is lost forever; I am saying that the opportunity is severely damaged and handicapped today. [Let me just say that I have had many differences with Presidents and with Administrations. I've always operated on the assumption that if I wanted to have somebody in office who represented me one-hundred percent I ought to run for that office. But I don't recall a time when I have been actually ashamed of my government's foreign policy and I have been ashamed of it in connection with the former

Yugoslavia; most particularly with the Bosnia aspect of it.]

Q7: What actions in Bosnia would have made you proud, or at least less ashamed? Could any of these actions have aided in developing the prerequisites for resolving future conflict by means other than war?

A7: [Your response here, or attached]:

DIPLOMATIC LEADERSHIP RATHER THAN TO PROCLAIM IT WAS
EUROPE'S PROBLEM TO DEAL WITH AND NOT OUR PROBLEM.
THAT LEADERSHIP SHOULD HAVE ALSO BEEN APPLIED TO
PERSUADE OUR NATO PARTNERS WITH OUR PARTICIPATION, TO
USE, IF NECESSARY, AIR POWER TO DESTROY THE AGGRESSOR'S
AIR FIELDS, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, BRIDGES, PORTS, AND
TRANSPORTATION HUBS. COMMUNICATING A WILLINGNESS TO
USE FORCE TO STOP THE BUTCHERY MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN
ENOUGH TO BRING THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

Q8: Although the Serbs are widely recognized to have been the primary aggressors in Bosnia, several factors, in addition to political pressures, complicate our ability to respond effectively. On the one hand, the outbreak of war occurred *in response to* internationally recognized changes in borders. In addition, as Benjamin Ferencz argues, the international community, having failed to define "self-defense," has no legally binding definition of "aggression." To what extent are these real or concocted impediments to effective intervention?

A8: [Your response here, or attached]:

THEY ARE NOT AT ALL PERSUASIVE, ALTHOUGH I
BELIEVE WE AND EUROPE WERE MISTAKEN TO PERMIT OURSELVES
TO BE PERSUADED TO RECOGNIZE CROATIA AND THUS
HASTEN AND LEGITIMIZE THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA.

Q9: On the optimist-pessimist scale, you sound rather pessimistic.

A9: I'm pessimistic when I consider our failure to seize opportunities. But I'm also optimistic. Why? Because there are movements afoot over which we don't have much control; *globalization movements.* These movements, taken together, constitute a radical change in the context of international politics. They are forcing changes in the way we cooperate at the global level. Take my own lifetime, for instance. The sea changes that have taken place in my life have been absolutely immense. When I was a ^{child} kid, we didn't have antibiotics or refrigerators, we didn't have transatlantic airplanes, much less computers. Today, modern technology, modern science, modern industry have changed the way we live; and not just superficially. These changes have impacted the very nature of political community. Science is a good example. A recent Nobel prize was awarded to a team with a European, ^{an Asian} ~~(a German, I think)~~ and an American. ^{This is not all} They worked together. Geographical or national boundaries no longer define the limits of

community or cooperation in many realms. That's one important fact to understand as we look at the world today.

A contributing factor has been the revolution in communication. In addition to linking people and building communities across political borders, changes in communications have also been a factor within states. Take the case of dictators, who often rely on a monopoly ^{of} ~~on~~ information. Given the state of modern communications technology, however, a monopoly on communication is no longer possible. Satellites hear what's happening all over the world. Tienammen Square demonstrated that. Chinese students and workers in Tienammen Square were getting faxes and telexes and listening to radio; they were listening to BBC. Mr. Gorbachev once told me that although the officers leading the coup d'etat against him had tried to cut off all communications, the first tactic of any coup, he knew exactly what was happening because he had a *radio*. He learned about the situation from the BBC and Voice of America!

The same processes are at work in economics and industry. You can't understand the New York

Stock Exchange without understanding the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. More money is exchanged by computer in twenty four hours than our total ^{ANNUAL} national budget; in *twenty-four hours*! I remember George Schultz calling me into his office one day to show me some gadget which had a label indicating where it was made; that is, in about a dozen countries. Bob Reich pinpointed this new reality in an article in *The Wall Street Journal*. He asks, in effect, "So you want to buy an American made car, do you?" His answer?: "Sorry, there's no such animal." What I'm suggesting is that this globalization effort is here in the worlds of economics, science, and communication. It's behind in the world of politics, and the pressure to catch up there is growing.

Q10: Some point directly to the integrating trends you mention as not just "ahead" of politics, but as a force leading to the *erosion of state power*, or state "sovereignty." In your view, what do these globalization trends mean for the future of states and the state system?

A10: Well, if you don't oversell it, it could mean an erosion. It's certainly an important change.

What it means practically is that if you want to get rid of pollution in the Mediterranean Sea you've got to have the cooperation of eighteen to twenty countries that border on and pollute that sea; Canada and the United States need to cooperate if they're going to solve ^{ACID RAIN} common problems.

Simply put, it means that if you want to deal effectively with big and important problems, you need to have cooperation among the states.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE'VE GOVERNMENT.
WE'RE LEARNING THAT THE FLAG,
LANGUAGE, ETHNIC IDENTITIES - THESE
REMAIN IMPORTANT TO PEOPLE.

Q11: What is your response to those who, seeing the often destabilizing effects of globalization, appeal to the need to preserve US "sovereignty" in the face of these changes?

A11: My own opinion is - and I used to say this to my Soviet colleagues - let's not get hung up

on words. One of the words we get hung up on is "sovereignty." When we talk about

sovereignty being "eroded" a lot of hackles come up right away. If you ask people in the

United States ^{what is sovereignty is} "what's the sovereign of the United States?," they'll say "we the people," the

American people, are the sovereign. But if you talk to a Governor of a state he'll talk about the

"sovereign state of Carolina." You can have many things called "sovereign," So what? It is how

you act to further global cooperation that counts. At the same time, if there is one thing we have

learned in recent years, it's that *the flag is important to people*. Language is important to people.

Patriotism and tradition are important to people. So you've got to take that which is important to

people and preserve it even as you pragmatically put into effect global programs and cooperative

programs to deal with collective problems. You're most likely to succeed if you can avoid

slogans and emotionally charged terms.

Q12: Those more skeptical about the assertion that globalization invariably yields progress argue that for every increment of "globalization," there is a counter-increment of fragmentation, decentralization, and collapsing authority. Why does globalization make you optimistic, especially given your prior observation that we've failed thus far to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War?

A12: [Your response here, or attached.]:

SCIENCE, MEDICINE, TECHNOLOGY, COMMUNICATION - ALL THESE ARE GLOBALIZED TODAY. THEY HAVE PROMISE FOR IMPROVING THE HEALTH AND WELFARE OF PEOPLE. THEY STRENGTHEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF LONGEVITY, DISEASE CONTROL, IMPROVED NUTRITION, GREATER COMFORTS - INCENTIVES TO STRENGTHEN THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY. FREEDOM HOUSE ALSO TELLS US THAT THERE IS A STRONG TENDENCY TOWARD GREATER FREEDOM IN THE WORLD. THERE WILL BE DISAPPOINTMENTS, BUT LET'S NOT EXAGGERATE OR GLORIFY THEM.

Q13: Appealing to the need for greater international cooperation does not, of course, answer the "how?" and "with who?" questions. Where does the UN figure in your perspective?

A13: What comes to my mind at the moment is the story of a fellow playing dice. A friend

whispers to him, "Frank, the dice are loaded!" He says, "I know." "If you know the dice are

loaded, why are you playing." And he answers "Because it is the only game in town." The UN is

the only game in town. I have no doubt in my mind about its weaknesses, but there is nothing

else here. I know there is plenty of public support for the UN in America⁶⁰⁰¹. But I also sense,

and I think there's evidence to support my hunch, that when you dig deeper you find a lot of

skepticism. There's very little support for, say, putting US forces under UN command. There

just isn't sufficient trust. *And with good reason.* I recall a number of years ago walking

through the UN with the head of one delegation, not an American delegation, and as we walked

he said "this fellow's from the East German KGB, and this is the Moscow KGB," etc... The

KGB permeated the whole organization; it was a major front in the Cold War. Even today,

we've got a General Assembly which is controlled by a group of dictators in Africa and Asia,

nothing close to a democratic body representing the people of the world.

It may be difficult, but I believe we should stay involved in the UN but without putting all of our

eggs in that basket. I think that the failure of the United States to develop the kind of

relationship with Russia which could have constructively influenced the UN has been a big

mistake. For instance, if the United States and Russia were able to come to an agreement on a) finding an effective leader who is a good administrator, b) cutting the budget, and c) strengthening the organization, I think a lot of the other countries would follow suit. Maybe it could still be done, but in my opinion we just haven't been as alert as we should have been to the opportunity to leverage change in the UN and develop a better relationship with Russia at the same time.

Q14: If I were the president and I asked, "Max, I'm under increasing pressure to support an expanded membership in the UN Security Council and commit American forces to a standing UN rapid reaction force under UN command. What should I do?," what advice would you offer?

A14: I would not be in favor of putting US forces under a UN command, *except*, and now here is the critical exception, I would ask for American volunteers; I would say to the American armed forces, "the United Nations is looking for US volunteers for a standing UN Force." I would be very specific about how they would serve and the rules of the game. In my opinion, one of the rules of the game ought to be, and I am open to discussion on this, that they would be under the control of an American General, but within the context of a broad UN force. Maybe in time we'd eliminate the requirement of a US general. I do not think that the American society

should take kids who volunteer for the American armed forces and put them under UN control unless they themselves agree to it; not at this stage. I do think that a volunteer standing force would be a good idea, however.

Q15: You mentioned the UN as "the only game in town," but you also suggested that we spread our eggs around. Which other "baskets" should we be looking at?

A15: The UN is clearly the most inclusive and political institution out there, but there are others that may prove equally important. We need to explore strengthened and expanded cooperative arrangements wherever we can. The World Trade Organization is one option. We are cooperating in the field of aeronautics internationally, so we're obviously doing something right there. The Helsinki Final Act, the Helsinki process, is another ^{REGIONAL} opportunity. ^{TO EXIST} When I finished my tour of duty in 1983 with the Helsinki Final Act, and as we moved to the end of the Cold War, I was asked to testify in Congress on two occasions dealing with whether the Helsinki process could be emulated in the Middle East and Latin America. The Helsinki process seemed to have worked at that point, so the thinking was: why not try to apply the same principles to other parts of the world? There was a lot of talk, a lot of thought. I received a letter from a group of

presidents from African countries who were going to meet in Geneva to discuss whether the

African nations had much that they could learn from the Helsinki process. Regrettably they gave

me a date at short notice and I couldn't join them and I've never heard from them again. But,

something like the Helsinki process might be revived, ^{AS AN EXAMPLE OF GOOD FACILITATION,} It's been weakened, but ^{PERHAPS} maybe it can be

revived ^{WITH PROBABLY EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP.}

Traditional tribunals might be another approach. We now have a tribunal examining the issue of

war crimes in the ex-Yugoslavia. I think that should be strengthened. I have no problem

strengthening the judicial tribunals as a way of leading states to feel there are remedies other

than violence ^{AVAILABLE} ~~able~~ to correct perceived injustices.

So, there's no shortage of options, but whatever we try will only succeed if we first have what

made the Helsinki process work in the first place: first you need to have agreement on what

ought to be the relationship. Without agreement on the *ought*, you can't even start to move

toward it. Once you have agreement on the *ought*, then you look at the *is*, and you obviously see

the ground you have to cover to reach the *ought*. Your third step is to commit yourself to moving the *is* closer to the *ought*. That was what made the Helsinki process work. But the prerequisite of real progress is basic agreement on what *ought* to be the relationship.

Q16: In an article you wrote in connection with your human rights work in Madrid, you said that "man's evolving creativity produces opportunities, but the strength of our aspirations must not blind us to obstacles." Can you be more explicit about the obstacles you see to arrangements that make progress toward goals like peace, freedom, and economic well-being more likely?

A16: At present, I would say one of the most important obstacles we face is the loss of the American people's support. No American foreign or military policy can long last which doesn't have the support of a broad consensus in American society, and I think that consensus is disappearing. In terms of the UN, public support for US involvement would disappear quickly given any kind of danger for Americans and no clear national interest. As a result, if we move too quickly, if we are overly ambitious, it can't last. So, we need to build domestic support for US engagement abroad, even if that just means convincing people that we can't "go home." In terms of "external" obstacles, the UN still has not demonstrated that it has the commitment to freedom and democracy that I would like to see or that it knows how to be efficient and how to administer. I would say that the Bosnia experience highlights this. Until the UN expresses these

characteristics more credibly and consistently, I think there's only so much that can be accomplished in that forum. We should be working, therefore, to build pressure for change within the UN and its nondemocratic member states.

Q17: As someone who's worked in both government and nongovernmental worlds, what advice would you offer to NGO leaders who are considering their own perspectives on these issues?

A17: I think there's too much black and white and too little attention to the internal dynamics of organizations such as the UN. Most people are either for or against US involvement in the UN, but very few are trying to figure out how the US can both participate in this organization and promote needed change at the same time. For example, we need to explore how to pay what we owe to the UN and leverage change at the same time.

Q17a: Can you expand on this point? Our primary audience is two hundred leaders of American NGO's. Are there four or five ideas, programs, cautions you'd like to present here?

A17a: [Your response here or attached.]

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IS EVOLVING TO THE POINT WHERE NGOS HAVE A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY IN THE PROCESS. OUR GOVERNMENT MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT, WELCOME AND ADJUST TO THIS CHANGE SO THAT IT IS NOT JUST AN "INTERUSION" BUT A VALUABLE ASSET. NGOS MUST SIMILARLY COME TO APPRECIATE INCREASINGLY THAT THEY BECOME MORE THAN ADVOCACY ORIENTED. THEY MUST BE READY TO ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXECUTING AS WELL AS URGING POLICY. A HEALING PROCESS IN BOSNIA, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL REQUIRE EXTENSIVE NGO PARTICIPATION. THESE EFFORTS MUST BE GUIDED AND EVEN REGULATED BY A HARMONIZING COORDINATING PROCESS STIMULATED BUT NOT NECESSARILY RUN BY THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY. NGOS ARE TODAY SHOWING THAT NATURALNESS AND I SENSE THAT GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO ENTER THAT PARTNERSHIP.

IT IS ALSO VITAL FOR U.S. NGOS TO FOSTER AND STIMULATE THE ORGANIZATION OF NGOS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, AS A RESULT OF THEIR NATIONAL EXCLUSION, ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO RESPECT OR APPRECIATE THE POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF NGOS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS.

NGOS MUST ALSO MAKE A DELIBERATE EFFORT TO BE ABOVE POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP.

Q18: How has your perspective on the issues we've been discussing changed over time?

A18: [Your response here, or attached]:

1 - I WAS SLOW TO RECOGNIZE THE ROLE THAT NGOs CAN PLAY BEYOND THAT OF ADVOCACY.

2 - UNTIL I REACHED MY ADULT YEARS, MY "IDEALISM" DID NOT LEAD ME TO SEE THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY TO BE SUSTAINED BY THE AVAILABILITY OF MILITARY FORCE WHEN FACING A SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE AND STABILITY.



WORLD WITHOUT WAR COUNCIL
Berkeley • Chicago • Seattle • Washington D.C.

Office of the President:

1730 Martin Luther King, Jr. Way
Berkeley, California 94709
(510) 845-1992
Fax (510) 845-5721

February 14, 1996

Max Kampelman
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson
1001 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Ste. 800
Washington, DC 20004-2505

Dear Max Kampelman,

Enclosed you'll find edited copy of the interview we conducted by phone a few months ago. Before I explain where we go from here, let me first thank you for your time and effort and apologize for the delay in transcribing and editing your interview.

I've triple spaced the text of your interview so that you can make corrections/additions directly on the copy. If you require more space, or would prefer to make comments on a separate sheet, just attach additional sheets or provide a disk (PC preferred) as necessary.

As for substance, I've tried to highlight the core themes and arguments made in our discussion. Where I thought the reader might benefit from further explication of a key point, I've inserted a follow up question and space for your response. Brackets [] indicate either places where additional factual information is needed or text, yours (that we were unsure about) or ours (inserted to clarify or develop a point), the accuracy of which you should pay particular attention to in your review.

The attached *response form* contains space for you to make additional comments regarding the substance or style of the interview. I'd especially appreciate your comments regarding elements of your perspective that are missing or insufficiently developed. I'd like to make sure that we've nailed what *you* feel are the basics of your perspective. Additional statements to be included in the transcript can be provided on the *response form* or however is easiest for you. I've retained something of the conversational tone of our discussion. I think this style makes the interview more readable. If you'd prefer a more formal style, please let me know.


If this transcription meets with your approval, either "as is" or with your submitted

corrections, please complete and sign box A on the *response form*. If, for whatever reason, you'd like to see the transcript again before approval, simply return the unsigned form with required changes indicated in box B and/or on the transcript. I will resubmit copy once changes have been made.

Finally, please attach a brief biographical sketch and listing of relevant publications to be included in our publication. Because of our tight schedule, I'd very much appreciate your response by the end of the month, if at all possible.

Your voice provides an interesting and provocative contribution to this important debate. We'll be working hard this year to share that voice with leaders in the independent sector and with interested Americans elsewhere. Thank you again for cooperating in this effort.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Blantz', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Eric Blantz
Project Director

P.S. Please note that Owen Harries is now
onboard. We'd especially like to distinguish
your perspective from his. Thanks again
for your help!

Eric

enc: transcript, response form, project description

GOOD GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?:

Possibilities and Pitfalls

Exploring with American NGO leadership the US' role in shaping global institutions capable of preventing deadly conflict

Many voices in the ongoing debate about the prospects for improved global governance point to US leadership as an important ingredient of "progress" toward institutions and structures capable of preventing mass deadly conflict. Such leadership cannot be formed or sustained, however, without greater public consensus - created, in part, through the active engagement of American NGOs - about the realities we face, basic objectives and how to pursue the latter without neglecting the former. Building such consensus, in turn, requires clarifying contending perspectives at a minimum and, where possible, identifying common ground between those who equate progress in world affairs with supranational or international institution building and those who insist that, given present realities, efforts to improve global governance will likely yield *anything but* a more peaceful, just or prosperous world. Moreover, with intrastate conflict now the dominant mode of war, the issue of the relationship between levels of "governance" (sub-national, national, regional and world) badly needs sorting out. In this fiftieth anniversary year of the United Nations and with the Cold-War now behind us, the time is right for an effort to advance public discussion of possibilities and pitfalls on the road to good global governance.

This announcement outlines a WWWC publication and eighteen months of programming with American nongovernmental and opinion leadership across the political spectrum. Our goal in both undertakings is improved debate and greater consensus on how America can aid in building governing institutions capable of preventing mass deadly conflict while advancing the well being of free societies.

"GOOD GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?:

Contending Perspectives on the US, the UN and the Future of Deadly Conflict"

Few "world order" publications, of which there is no shortage, present clearly the fundamental understandings and values that determine the specific prescriptions yielded by a particular perspective. Fewer still present a wide spectrum of contending perspectives concisely or in a format that facilitates comparison. We hope to do both in ways that stimulate leaders in America's independent sector to explore their own perspective and strategy of work on these issues. The publication will be used as a discussion framing document for our programming on these issues throughout 1996 (see below).

Purpose: To facilitate and encourage thoughtful consideration of contending perspectives on "global governance," in ways which move us toward common ground on criteria for judging proposals for US policy.

Contents: 1) Introduction setting out the fundamental points of contention, 2) concise and lively interviews with key figures with well-defined, contending perspectives on the feasibility, prerequisites, strategies and dangers of progress toward "good global governance," 3) carefully selected bibliographic and resource lists, 4) a thought provoking self-survey, and 5) questions and comments designed to frame discussion and debate about US policy and the role of nongovernmental organizations in shaping American purposes.

Use: Initially, some 800 selected leaders of nonprofit organizations at work on problems of America and world affairs; then the "attentive public," reached through these organizations and the media. We are exploring the possibility of serialization of these interviews in appropriate media outlets and distribution to schools and other educational institutions.

Participants/Interviewees:

Lincoln P. Bloomfield	<i>Prof. Emeritus of Political Science, MIT</i>
Harlan Cleveland	<i>Prof. of Political Science, University of Minnesota</i>
Benjamin Ferencz	<i>Prof. of International Law, Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials</i>
Ernst Haas	<i>Robson Research Prof. of Government, U.C. Berkeley</i>
Max Kampelman	<i>US Ambassador, Madrid Conference on Human Rights, Geneva negotiations on Arms Reduction</i>
Stephen Krasner	<i>Prof. of Political Science, Stanford University</i>
Ed Luck	<i>United Nations Association, New York</i>
Saul Mendlovitz	<i>Dag Hammarskjold Professor of Peace and World Order Studies, Rutgers University, President and Co-Director, World Order Models Project</i>
James Rosenau	<i>University Prof. of Political Science, George Washington University</i>
Owen Harries	<i>The National Interest, Editor</i>

Other possible participants: Owen Harries, *Editor, The National Interest*; Barber Conable, *Former President, World Bank*; Walter Hoffman, *President, Campaign for UN Reform Education*; John Mearscheimer, *Political Science, University of Chicago*; Brian Urquhart, *Fellow, Ford Foundation*; David Hamburg, *Co-Chair, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*; Paul Schroeder, *Political Science, University of Illinois*

Time Schedule: Interviews will have been conducted by the end of January, 1996. Publication of the final document is scheduled for April, 1996.

Leadership Programming

Throughout 1996 and into 1997, WWWC and cooperating organizations will conduct surveys, seminars and working groups in three parts of the country. We will engage leaders of influential organizations and institutions in media, world affairs, political, religious, academic and grantmaking arenas. In those arenas, most of the current debate is either narrowly issue oriented (e.g. Should the Security Council be expanded?), accessible only to specialists or hortatory in its appeal for or against US policy to advance greater "world order." We believe this project's focus on *examining an array of contending perspectives*, with differing goals, analyses, and strategies, and on *building agreement within American NGO leadership circles* can help re-energize and improve what is now a flagging, polarized, and sequestered public dialogue. Moving toward these objectives can help uncover the common ground on which agreement about wise US policy can be built. *Clarity*, at least on disagreement, and hopefully on agreed-to criteria for judging US policy on global governance questions, could emerge.

Sound, long term American engagement will, more than any other factor, determine whether world politics will continue to be dominated by deadly conflict or whether steady and wise progress toward strengthened world community and institutions of governance will one day yield alternatives to war in the resolution of conflict. Purposeful American leadership to that end, which also protects the well-being of free societies, is now needed and largely absent. This project's goal is to encourage that outcome.

For additional information contact:

The World Without War Council
1730 Martin Luther King Jr. Way, Berkeley, CA 94709
(510) 845-1992 Fax (510) 845-5721 wwwc@igc.apc.org

MAX M. KAMPELMAN
SUITE 800
1001 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004-2505

April 1, 1996

Mr. Eric Blantz
Program Officer
World Without War Council
1730 Martin Luther King, Jr. Way
Berkeley, CA 94709

Dear Mr. Blantz:

Thank you very much for your letter of March 22. You have done a very good job of working on the first draft and I am pleased with the direction in which we are moving. You will notice from the enclosed that I have made some further editing changes.

There is one area that we have not touched upon. It relates to the onslaught against our human rights foreign policy emphasis by Asian political leaders interested in preserving their authoritarian powers. The argument goes that we are imperialistically attempting to impose Western values on their Asian culture whether it be Confucian, Buddhist or Islam. It strikes me that you should prepare a question along those lines.

My response would be a relatively long one. At the very outset I think we should point out that our human rights programs are fully consistent with the various declarations emanating from the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act. We are, therefore, not attempting to impose religious beliefs on any group that don't share them. States, however, assume certain obligations when they join international organizations and we have every right to expect them to live up to the promises made by them.

More fundamentally, I am assured by some Asian scholars and religious figures, that issues of human dignity and the establishment of political organizations that respect human dignity are fully consistent with the various Asian religious groupings and teachings. Those in Asia who challenge our efforts are in effect attempting to apologize for their

own authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule. Professor Amartya Sen of Harvard University has referred to many Asian theorists such as Ashoka who in the third century emphasized tolerance and liberty as central values of a good society. Buddha, he points out, explains nirvana in the language of "freedom", freedom from the miseries of life. In more recent times, Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Sun Yat-sen vocally defended the widest forms of democracy and political and civil rights. It is grossly unfair to Asian culture to assume that its values are in favor of suppressing human rights.

Dr. Joseph Chan from the University of Hong Kong recently wrote a paper in which he asserted that the most fundamental element in Confucian political thought is that the primary task of the state is to help citizens develop virtues and achieve the good life within the broad constraints of basic individual rights.

People who live in Asian cultures are as much entitled to strive for societies based on human dignity than are those of us who live in the Western world. That striving is a human one and not a racial one.

In any event, it might be worthwhile to find room for this exchange in the next draft.

My warmest best wishes to you.

Sincerely,


Max M. Kampelman

P.S. I am enclosing a one page bio plus a rather long list of my publications which had been prepared for a more detailed Curriculum Vitae.

C NACH
ASTA

Response Form - 2

Name: Max M. Kampelman

Address: _____
(if different than that used on this envelope)

Phone: _____

* please attach a brief bio and listing of relevant publications

A. The enclosed transcript MEETS MY APPROVAL for publication

☐ AS IS

☒ WITH CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS AS MARKED

Signed, Max M. Kampelman

B. Please resubmit this transcript after:

YOU HAVE REVIEWED IT AGAIN AND JUST BEFORE IT GOES
into FINAL PRINT.

Comments and/or suggestions:

Interview with
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
US Ambassador to C.S.C.E. Human Rights Conferences
and to the Nuclear and Space Arms Reduction Conferences in Geneva

[Please provide a regular bio sheet and a listing of relevant publications for our records and for an annotated bibliography to be included in the publication.]

***Intro:** Before I entered public service, I was a political science teacher. I also practiced law in Washington for a long time. My diplomatic experience began when I was asked by President Carter in 1980 and then reappointed by President Reagan to serve as the head of the American delegation to the Madrid follow up conference under the Helsinki Final Act (the end product of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.)). Then, in 1985, President Reagan asked me to head up the American delegation to the nuclear and space arms talks with the Soviet Union ^{IN GENEVA} that were just beginning again. These talks were bilateral -- as distinguished from the Madrid talks which involved thirty five countries -- and lasted from 1985 until I retired from government service in January of 1989. In 1987, I ^{WAS} ~~had also been~~ given the additional position by Secretary Schultz and the President to serve as Counselor to the State Department. After leaving government in 1989, I was asked to take and accepted a position as Chairman of the Board of the United Nations Association and that lasted until 1993. I have also served as chairman of Freedom House and Chairman of the Jerusalem Foundation. I am today the Chairman of the American Academy of Diplomacy; ^{CHAIRMAN OF} Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy; Vice-Chairman of the United States Institute of Peace; on the Executive Board of the American Bar Association effort to strengthen the rule of law in the emerging democracies of Europe, the Central and Eastern European Law Institute (CEELI). I am also occasionally engaged with the Atlantic Council, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Council on Foreign Relations.*

Q1: Based on your long experience in scholarly, governmental and nongovernmental circles and on issues ranging from human rights to arms control, what do you see as the most important contending voices in debates about "global governance" issues?

A1: I think the major differences in perspective on this issue are long-term and fundamental.

On the one hand there are those who are convinced that it would be a good thing to supersede the nation state with a form of world authority; some form of world government. On the other hand there are skeptics of one sort or another; some of whom think that the *goal* is highly desirable but unacheivable, and some of whom, wondering whether world government would be open and democratic, are skeptical about the goal as well. Those who accept the desirability of the goal, but are nevertheless troubled by the difficulty of achieving it, tend to seek to achieve similar goals in other ways. They try to avoid getting lost in the utopian idealism which permeates some of the groups promoting world government. *THEY ALSO LOOK AT PRAGMATIC REGIONAL GROUPINGS AS PREFERABLE SYSTEMS TO EMPHASIZE.*

Q2: Is the last perspective you described your own?

A2: I think so. I have never ~~really~~ spent much time in my adult years pursuing impractical objectives. I'm sure a lot of that has to do with my political experience, which conditioned me to direct energy into practical problem solving rather than theoretical problem solving or stargazing. *I RESPECT, HOWEVER, THOSE WHO KEEP DREAMING GOALS.*

Q3: Still, much of your life has been devoted to advancing "idealistic" causes such as a tough policy on human rights. Would you say that those who advocate for what is *currently*

unachievable are nevertheless playing an important and positive role in reminding us of the right goal?

A3: Yes. There is a vital role in our society for those who desire to remind us of idealistic goals.

It is important not to forget the "ought" and to measure the "is" by how consistent it is with the

"ought." We may not, however, necessarily agree on what ought to be.

Q4: Since the end of the Cold-War, your prescriptions for US foreign policy have diverged from others who, like you, supported a strong defense against the Soviet threat. How do you explain the path you've chosen?

I DON'T EXPECT MY FRIENDS TO NECESSARILY ALWAYS AGREE WITH ME. I DON'T KNOW WHOSE OPINION WE DIFFER IN THIS AREA.
A4: During the Cold War, I supported efforts to build up American military forces. I strongly

supported increasing certain conventional defense forces as well as SDI, the Strategic Defense

Initiative program. I did so because I believed that the Soviet Union was headed for the dustbin

of history *unless* it could use military force to assert its global presence. We needed to deter any

such attempt and we did so by building our military capabilities. With the end of the Cold War,

however, we -- and I now use the term broadly-- had an opportunity to begin moving in a more

constructive direction; to update the lens through which we've looked at the world for several

decades. Some people would call this idealistic, but I think a pragmatist would have to believe

that this was very *realistic* given the change we've experienced in world politics.

For example, after I retired in 1989, President Bush and Secretary Baker called me back to the government on five occasions. One of those occasions was to spend a month in Copenhagen heading up the American delegation to a C.S.C.E. conference on the human dimension under the Helsinki Final Act. All thirty five countries present, including the Soviet Union, agreed on a document which said that *European security and cooperation depends on each of our countries being democratic; with guarantees for competing political parties to function, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and dissent not being stepped on.* All of this was spelled out in rather great detail; a truly amazing achievement. John Norton Moore, a professor of International Law at the University of Virginia Law School ~~at the time~~, called this document the most important international agreement since the Magna Carta of 1215. This agreement became the basis for the *Declaration of Paris* adopted by Heads of State a few months later. That was 1990. Whatever the "real" significance of the document, I spent a lot of time in Europe in 1989, 90, and 91 and there *was* a great deal of optimism in the air; not only among governments, but also among the people. There it was available to us, or so it seemed. So far, however, we've failed to take advantage of that opportunity. Most dramatically, Europe

failed in the face of the first significant challenge to that optimism: Yugoslavia.

Q5: Owen Harries shared your sense of the threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold-War, but now argues for a return to a "normal" American foreign policy focused on protecting America's vital national interests. He is skeptical of calls for a new "vision" for American foreign policy. Why is his post-Cold War prescription wrong?

ONLY HISTORY WILL TELL US WHAT IS RIGHT OR WRONG. I BELIEVE THAT
A5: America's vital national interests require an international community's commitment that

aggression by force must not be condoned. We have learned that when our friends and allies and

partners get involved in wars, we cannot escape. Our "vision," therefore must include

establishing an international atmosphere via our foreign policy that condemns and resists profit

from aggression. For us to be effective, furthermore, we must assert ourselves diplomatically,

politically, and, where necessary (a judgement call) militarily. Since we are the strongest nation

in the world and have a profound interest in world stability, we must assert our leadership.

Q6: What principles or understandings best define the prism you now advocate for leadership?

A6: If there is a fundamental principle for peace in Europe or any place in the world, it has to

THAT
be ~~that~~ provision in the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act which says, in effect:

No profit from aggression! Existing boundaries must be respected! They're not necessarily the

best, the wisest or the most just borders, but if you want to change them, you've got to use *negotiation, not violence*. Those who use force are writing themselves out of the responsible international community. The Yugoslav situation was the first direct challenge to that fundamental principle and the international community's failure to curb Serb excesses has led to all kinds of discouragement, divisiveness and skepticism throughout Europe. I hope that recent developments mean the beginning of some change. But, thus far I would say that the opportunity was ours, and we muffed it. I am not suggesting that it is lost forever; I am saying that the opportunity is severely damaged today.

Let me just say that I have had many differences with Presidents and with Administrations. I've always operated on the assumption that if I wanted to have somebody in office who represented me one-hundred percent I ought to run for that office. But I don't recall a time when I have been actually ashamed of my government's foreign policy and I have been ashamed of it in connection with the former Yugoslavia; most particularly with the Bosnia aspect of it.

Q7: What actions in Bosnia would have made you proud, or at least less ashamed?

✓ **A7:** ^{AT THE OUTSET} *Diplomatic leadership* would have helped, rather than to proclaim it was Europe's problem ^{IF DIPLOMACY DID NOT END THE AGGRESSION,} to deal with and not ours as well. That leadership should have also been applied to persuade our NATO partners, with our participation, to use, if necessary, air power to destroy the aggressor's air fields, military installations, bridges, ports, and transportation hubs. Communicating a willingness to use force to stop the butchery might well have been enough to bring the parties to the negotiating table. ^{ALSO} I believe we and Europe were mistaken to permit ourselves to be persuaded to recognize Croatia and thus hasten and legitimize the breakup of Yugoslavia, ^{but} once the now familiar scenario unfolded we were even more mistaken in our failure to respond.

Q8: On the optimist-pessimist scale, you sound rather pessimistic. Are you?

^{THESE WORDS ARE SIMPLISTIC OVER SIMPLIFICATIONS AND I DON'T LIKE TO USE THEM.}
A8: I'm ^{DISAPPOINTED} pessimistic when I consider our failure to seize opportunities. But I'm also ^{HOPEFUL} optimistic. Why? Because there are movements afoot over which we don't have much control;

globalization movements. These movements, taken together, constitute a radical change in the

✓ context of international politics. They are forcing changes in the way we cooperate at the global ^{AND REFORMING}

✓ levels, Take my own lifetime, for instance. The sea changes that have taken place in my life have

been absolutely immense. When I was a child, we didn't have antibiotics or refrigerators, we

didn't have transatlantic airplanes, much less computers. Today, modern technology, modern

science, modern industry have changed the way we live; and not just superficially. These

✓ changes have impacted the very nature of ^{THE ECONOMIC AND} political community. Science is a good example. A

recent Nobel prize was awarded to a team with a European, an Asian, and an American. They

worked together. This is normal. Geographical or national boundaries no longer define the limits

of community or cooperation in many realms. *A BORDER PATROL CAN KEEP OUT A VACCINE, BUT IT CANNOT KEEP OUT GERMS, OR IDEAS, OR BROADCASTS.*

A contributing factor has been the revolution in communication. In addition to linking people

and building communities across political borders, changes in communications have also been a

factor within states. Take the case of dictators, who ^{HAD TO} ~~often~~ rely on a monopoly of information to

survive. Given the state of modern communications technology, however, a monopoly on

communication is no longer possible. Satellites hear what's happening all over the world.

Tienammen Square demonstrated that. Chinese students and workers in Tienammen Square

were getting faxes and telexes and listening to radio; they were listening to BBC. Mr.

Gorbachev once told me that although the officers leading the coup d'etat against him had tried to cut off all communications, the first tactic of any coup, he knew exactly what was happening because he had a *radio*. He learned about the situation from the BBC and Voice of America!

The same processes are at work in economics and industry. You can't understand the New York Stock Exchange without understanding the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. More money is exchanged by computer in twenty four hours than our *total annual*

national budget in twenty-four hours! I remember George Schultz calling me into his office one

day to show me some gadget which had a label indicating where it was made; that is, in about a

dozen countries. ^{Production} Bob Reich pinpointed this new reality in an article in *The Wall Street Journal*,

in which he asks, "So you want to buy an American made car, do you?" His answer: "Sorry,

there's no such animal." What I'm suggesting is that this globalization effort is here in the

worlds of economics, technology, science, and communication. It's behind in the world of

politics, and the pressure to catch up ^{will grow.} ~~is growing~~. THAT IS WHY FREEDOM HOUSE IS

REPORTING THAT A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE ARE LIVING IN "FREE" AND
"PARTLY FREE" SOCIETIES THAN EVER BEFORE IN RECORDED HISTORY

Q9: Some point directly to the integrating trends you mention as not just "ahead" of politics, but as a force leading to the *erosion of state sovereignty*. In your view, what do these globalization trends mean for the future of states and the state system?

A9: Well, if you don't oversell it, it could mean an erosion of state power. It's certainly an important change. Simply put, it means that if you want to deal effectively with big and important problems, you need to have cooperation among the states. What it means practically is that to get rid of pollution in the Mediterranean Sea you've got to have the cooperation of eighteen to twenty countries that border on and pollute that sea; Canada and the United States need to cooperate if they're going to solve acid rain problems.

At the same time, and as I used to say to my Soviet colleagues, let's not get hung up on words.

One of the words we get hung up on is "sovereignty." When we talk about sovereignty being "eroded" or "ceded" a lot of hackles come up right away. ~~But~~ if you ask people in the United

States "where is sovereignty in the United States?," they'll say "we the people," the American

people, are the sovereign. And if you talk to a Governor he'll ^{PROBABLY} talk about the "sovereign state of

Carolina." In other words, you can have many ^(CONCEPTS OR UNITS) things called "sovereign," So what? It is how you act to further global cooperation that counts.

As we work on improving global cooperation, we need to keep in mind that the flag, language,

WE SHOULD NOT AND NEED NOT CHALLENGE THEM.

ethnic identities -- these remain important to people. Patriotism and tradition are important to

people. We've got to take that which is important to people and preserve it even as we

AND REGIONAL

pragmatically put into effect global programs and cooperative programs to deal with collective

problems. We're most likely to succeed if we can avoid slogans and emotionally charged terms.

CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY RECENTLY WAS SAID IN DUISBURG THAT "NATIONALISM IS WAR" AS HE Juxtaposed IT WITH EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THE "NATION-STATE OF OLD", HE SAID, "CANNOT SOLVE THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY". THERE IS PROFOUND TRUTH IN THAT OBSERVATION.

✓ **Q10: Those more skeptical about the assertion that globalization yields progress argue that for every increment of globalization there is a counter-increment of fragmentation, decentralization, and collapsing authority. Why does globalization make you optimistic?**
ENCOURAGE YOU

A10: Science, medicine, technology, communication -- all these are globalized today. They

hold promise for improving the health and welfare of people. They strengthen the likelihood of

longevity, disease control, improved nutrition, greater comforts -- ingredients of a strengthened

concept of human dignity. Freedom House also tells us that there is a steady tendency toward

greater freedom in the world. There will be disappointments, but let's not exaggerate them or

glorify them. *MUCH WILL DEPEND ON US. WISDOM TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES. PROGRESS AND IMPROVEMENTS ARE NOT INEVITABLE, BUT THE OPPORTUNITY IS THERE.*

Q11: Asserting the need for greater international cooperation does not, of course, answer the "how?" question. Where does the UN figure in your answer?

A11: What comes to my mind at the moment is the story of a fellow playing dice. A friend whispers to him, "Frank, the dice are loaded!" He says, "I know." "If you know the dice are loaded, why are you playing?" He answers, "Because it's the only game in town." The UN is the only game in town. I have no doubt in my mind about its weaknesses, but there is nothing else here. I know there is plenty of ^{THEORETICAL} public support for the UN in America. But I also sense, and I think there's evidence to support my hunch, that when you dig deeper you find a lot of ^{AND DISAPPOINTMENT AS WELL} skepticism. There's very little support for, say, putting US forces under UN command. There just isn't sufficient trust. *And with good reason.* I recall a number of years ago walking through the UN with the head of one delegation, not an American delegation, and as we walked he said "this fellow's from the East German KGB, and this is the Moscow KGB," etc... The KGB permeated the whole organization; it was a major front in the Cold War. Even today, we've got a General Assembly which is controlled by a group of dictators in Africa and Asia, nothing close to a democratic body representing the people of the world.

It may be difficult, but I believe we should stay involved in the UN but without putting all of our

eggs in that basket. I think that the failure of the United States ^{to take the old way} to develop the kind of relationship with Russia which could have constructively influenced the UN has been a big mistake. For instance, if the United States and Russia were able to come to an agreement on a) finding an effective ^{international} leader who is a good administrator, b) cutting the ^{U.S.} budget, and c) strengthening the organization, I think a lot of the other countries would follow suit. Maybe it could still be done, but in my opinion we just haven't been as alert as we should have been to the opportunity to leverage change in the UN and develop a better relationship with Russia at the same time.

Q12: If I were the president and I asked, "Max, I'm under increasing pressure to support an expanded membership in the UN Security Council and commit American forces to a standing UN rapid reaction force under UN command. What should I do?," what advice would you offer?

A12: I would not be in favor of putting US forces under a UN command, *except*, and now here is the critical exception, I would ask for American volunteers. I would say to the American armed forces, "the United Nations is looking for US volunteers for a standing UN Force." I would be very specific about how they would serve and the rules of the game. In my opinion,

one of the rules of the game ought to be, and I am open to discussion on this, that they would be under the control of an American General, but within the context of a broad UN force. Maybe in time we'd eliminate the requirement of a US general. I do not think that the American society should take kids who volunteer for the American armed forces and put them under UN control unless they themselves agree to it; not at this stage. I do think that a volunteer ^{U.N.} standing force would be a good idea, however.

Q13: You mentioned the UN as "the only game in town," but you also suggested that we spread our eggs around. Which other "baskets" should we be looking at?

A13: The UN is clearly the most inclusive and political institution out there, but there are others that may prove equally important. We need to explore strengthened and expanded cooperative arrangements wherever we can. The World Trade Organization is one option. We are cooperating well in the field of aeronautics internationally, so we're obviously doing something ^{WE SHOULD WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE.} right there. ^{STRENGTHEN} The Helsinki Final Act, the Helsinki process, is another regional opportunity to ~~explore~~. When I finished my tour of duty in 1983 with the Helsinki Final Act, and as we moved to the end of the Cold War, I was asked to testify in Congress on two occasions dealing with

whether the Helsinki process could be emulated in the Middle East and Latin America. The Helsinki process seemed to have worked at that point, so the thinking was: why not try to apply the same principles to other parts of the world? There was a lot of talk, a lot of thought. I received a letter from a group of presidents from African countries who were going to meet in Geneva to discuss whether the African nations had much that they could learn from the Helsinki process. Regrettably they gave me a date at short notice and I couldn't join them and I've never heard from them again. But, something like the Helsinki process might be ^{IN OTHER AREAS} ~~revived~~ ^{considered} as an example to be emulated. It's been weakened, but perhaps it can be revived.

Traditional tribunals might be another approach. We now have a tribunal examining the issue of war crimes in the ex-Yugoslavia. I think that should be strengthened. I have no problem strengthening the judicial tribunals as a way of leading states to feel there are remedies other than violence to correct perceived injustices.

So, there's no shortage of options, but whatever we try will only succeed if we first have what

made the Helsinki process work in the first place: first you need to have agreement on what *ought* to be the relationship. Without agreement on the *ought*, you can't even start to move toward it. Once you have agreement on the *ought*, then you look at the *is*, and you obviously see the ground you have to cover to reach the *ought*. Your third step is to commit yourself to moving the *is* closer to the *ought*. That was what made the Helsinki process work. But the prerequisite of real progress is basic agreement on what *ought* to be the relationship.

Q14: In an article you wrote in connection with your human rights work in Madrid, you said that "man's evolving creativity produces opportunities, but the strength of our aspirations must not blind us to obstacles." Can you be more explicit about the obstacles you see to arrangements that make progress toward goals like peace, freedom, and economic well-being more likely?

A14: At present, I would say one of the most important obstacles we face is the loss of the

WHERE THERE IS A DANGER OF CASUALTIES.

American people's support. [✓] No American foreign or military policy can long last which doesn't

have the support of a broad consensus in American society, and ~~I think that consensus is rapidly~~

THIS IS WHERE VALUES ARE IMPORTANT. G.K. CHESTER-ONCE SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS A COUNTRY WITH THE SPIRIT OF A CHICKEN. CONSENSUS IN OUR COUNTRY RESULTS EITHER AN INSTANT DANGER OR A FUTURE AND DEFENSE OF OUR VALUES.

~~disappearing.~~ In terms of the ~~UN~~ ^P public support for US ^{MILITARY} involvement would ~~disappear~~ ^{ALWAYS} quickly

given any kind of danger for Americans and no clear national interest. ~~As a result, if we move~~

ON OCCASION, ASSEMBLING THE LEADERSHIP
THE DEFENSE OF VALUES WOULD SATISFY THE REPUBLICANS.

~~too quickly, if we are overly ambitious, it can't last.~~ So, we need to build domestic support for

WHETHER IT IS UN SPONSORED OR NOT,

US engagement abroad, even if that just means convincing people that we can't ^{STAY} "go home." In

terms of "external" obstacles, the UN still has not demonstrated that it has the commitment to freedom and democracy that I would like to see or that it knows how to be efficient and how to administer. I would say that the Bosnia experience highlights this. Until the UN expresses these

^{QUALITIES}
~~characteristics~~ more credibly and consistently, I think there's only so much that can be

accomplished in that forum. We should be working, therefore, to build pressure for change within the UN and its nondemocratic member states.

Q15: What advice would you offer to individuals and organizational leaders considering their own perspective on these issues?

A15: International relations is evolving to the point where citizens' groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a vital role to play in the process. Our government must be prepared to accept, welcome and adjust to this change so that it is not just an "intrusion" but a valuable asset. For their part, NGOs must come to appreciate that they have increasingly become more than advocacy oriented. They must be ready to assume the responsibility for *executing* as well as urging policy. A healing process in Bosnia, for example, will require extensive NGO participation. These efforts must be guided and even regulated by a

harmonizing, coordinating process stimulated but not necessarily run by the appropriate government agency.

NGOs are today showing that maturity, and I sense that government is prepared to enter that partnership. But if the new partnership is going to work, NGOs must also make a concerted effort to be above political partisanship. This is true for all NGOs, but especially for NGOs working abroad, since many foreign governments, as a result of their national experiences, are not likely to respect or appreciate the potential importance of NGOs in the international process. It is also vital for U.S. NGOs to foster and stimulate the establishment of viable NGOs in other countries since a durable civic society appears to be one of the best indicators of the viability of democratic institutions.

Perhaps most importantly, I think there's too much black and white and too little attention to the internal dynamics of organizations such as the UN. Most people are either for or against US involvement in the UN, but very few are trying to figure out how the US can both participate in

this organization and promote needed change *at the same time*. For example, we need to explore how to pay what we owe to the UN while leveraging much needed reforms. So long as our options are framed as "all or nothing," there won't be good solutions.

Q16: How has your perspective on the issues we've been discussing changed over time?

A16: First of all, I would say that I was slow to recognize the role that NGOs can play beyond

that of advocacy. Defining and developing that role is an important task at present. Secondly,

until I reached my adult years my "idealism" did not permit me to see the need for effective

diplomacy to be supported by the availability of military force when facing a serious threat to

peace and stability. *THIRD, MY EMPHASIS ON FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS HAVE*

LED ME TO BECOME LESS PARTISAN IN MY POLICES; I UNDERSTAND

THE NEED FOR DEBATE ON ALL SUBJECTS IN A DEMOCRACY,

BUT I BELIEVE OUR REPRESENTATIVES MUST LEARN TO INVOLVE MEMBERS

OF CONGRESS OR BOTH PARTIES IN THE DECISION MAKING

PROCESS ON MATTERS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL POLICY. THERE IS

A PRE-REQUISITE IF THERE IS TO DEVELOP THE

NECESSARY CONSENSUS REQUIREMENT THAT OUR NATION REQUIRE

IF WE ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE TOWARD A BETTER WORLD