



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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To Miss H. Sharon

Dardine, Sharon

From: Terry B. Shroeder [shroeder@concentric.net]
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 1999 7:20 PM
To: Dardine, Sharon
Subject: Re:

Hi, Sharon,

My buddy Barry Fulton just left the Foreign Service heaped with honors. His last assignment was a big study on Diplomacy in the Information Age, which may or may not have impact at the Department. The Secretary did ask to see him to discuss the study, so that is hopeful.

The study has a website - www.csis.org/ics/dia

That is where I just read Barry's interview with Ambassador Kampelman. I've copied it for you here (if this works). Otherwise, you might want to check Barry's website. I thought the interview was quite good. The boss was full of beans. It must have taken place shortly before his disastrous visit to the hospital.

Here goes! Much love.

Terry

Interview with Max Kampelman

Chairman, American Academy of
Diplomacy

August 25, 1997

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Question #1: As we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, we seem to be hesitant to continue our active international engagement.

While there is little reluctance to fund activities that directly enhance American security and prosperity, according to a poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the American public no longer supports government expenditures directed at (a) defending human rights in other countries, (b) helping bring about democratic governments, (c) protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression, or (d) improving the standard of living of less developed nations.

Some argue, on the other hand, that we should actively promote such causes abroad.

Let's start with this question: Is it in our national interest to do so, that is to tax American

citizens to help strengthen global civil
society?

Kampelman: It certainly is. I was not aware
of that Chicago poll. I've seen other results of
the Chicago poll which indicate an interest
in foreign affairs by the American people, so I
don't understand the question and the answer
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Certainly my experience has been, wherever
I've spoken around the country and met with
people around the country, a keen interest in
it. I wouldn't say to you that it's a dominant
interest, given the fact there are no crises,
American national security is not today being
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The extent to which the poll reflects the
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it's the fact that the leaders of our country
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That's a natural, understandable, and I think
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And this is where the role of leadership in a
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Question #2: The State Department says "the
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Great Britain's former Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd spoke last year of three functions of diplomacy: (a) the accumulation and analysis of information; (b) negotiation; and (c) the promotion of national interests -- including "trade, finance, politics, culture, and tourism."

Others have argued that the most important functions of modern diplomacy are (d) preventive diplomacy and crisis management, (e) facilitation of commerce, (f) promoting human rights, and (g) safeguarding the global environment.

In addition, diplomats are responsible for (h) assisting Americans abroad, (i) providing humanitarian assistance, and now (j) battling terrorism, drugs, and weapons proliferation.

If you were defining -- or redefining -- American diplomacy for the 21st Century, what would be your priorities?

Kampelman: I'm not very good at trying to make definitions, nor am I necessarily that sympathetic to the idea of having others define something which has to be influenced by experience and events, which is what I think the essence of foreign policy is; it relates to our relationship to other countries. Since we don't have control over what other countries do, setting an agenda or setting a list of priorities is a unilateral act which may not bear any resemblance to reality, given the fact that it has to be influenced by what happens elsewhere beyond our control. So I'm not a great definer of these areas.

Now obviously, the American people expect its government to concern itself with national welfare. How you define it is always a difficult thing to do, and we have tended, realistically, to define it -- and I'm not so sure that's wrong -- with a seat-of-the-pants reaction to events and to crises. I mean, in a sense, I remember Dean Acheson attempting to make a definition and inadvertently leaving out Korea. And the next thing you know, North Korea or the Russians interpret this as meaning that we're not going to stop them if they want to invade South Korea. This is a price you pay when you try to get to be too textbookish about a very serious problem. And I don't, myself, tend to be very textbookish about these problems.

Many of the factors that you have mentioned are reasons why the United States cannot, even if it wishes to, isolate itself from the world. The American people, when it's explained to them, understand this. And they don't necessarily draw great, philosophical conclusions about this; they don't have to and it's also not their job to define it in the specifics. That's

why they pay the President and congressmen
such big salaries, and this is why they pay
you such a big salary at USIA. [It] is
because they're expecting their government to look
out for these things while they take care of
their families and their children and their jobs
and their recreational needs and their
communities.

Now, for me to be a little more specific
about this, I would say that we're living now very
obviously in a world which has been greatly
influenced by scientific and technological
developments, unique developments that have
never before taken place in the history of
the human race. What we have been observing
in this century -- as we enter the next
century it's important for us to look back --
but what we've been observing in this century,
particularly the last part of this century,
is probably greater in its significance, maybe, than
any act since the discovery of fire by
primitive man, and its consequences are great.

We live longer today because of medical
developments. We're healthier today because of
medical developments. We have medical
developments because we interrelate; our
doctors and scientists talk with doctors and
scientists in Japan and all over. I'm struck by
how many Nobel Prizes in science, for
example, are won by combinations of Americans
with non-Americans. Technology has permitted
this interrelationship to take place in the
scientific field and in the technical field,
and that has produced results.

I remember George Shultz once calling me into
his office when I was in the State
Department and showing me, because he and I
had been talking about this as he was very
much oriented in this direction, and I
remember him calling me into his office and
looking at a piece of machinery he had. I'm
not machine oriented. And it had a sign,
"Made in . . .," and it was, I remember it
was made in about a dozen countries.

Robert Reich, whom I have never met, former
Secretary of Labor, many years ago wrote a
piece in the Wall Street Journal which I do
remember and, indeed, have clipped, which
said, "So you want to buy an American made
automobile, do you?" And he shows you
how an American made automobile is really not
made in America. Some of it is made in
America, it might be assembled here, but it's
made in a number of countries. Honda
makes more money selling automobiles outside
of Japan than inside Japan. McDonalds
has more openings of new stores outside of
the United States; than in the United States,
this is what their last report shows.

So, we're internationally oriented, and it has consequences, politically for example. I don't think authoritarian states can long survive any longer because an authoritarian, totalitarian state requires really a monopoly of information in order to get the loyalty of the people. And they can't survive long without having some kind of a loyalty there, and that depends on a monopoly control of information.

Well, you're in the information business. There's no such thing as a monopoly of information any more. The Chinese in Tiananmen Square were getting faxes from colleagues in the United States. They know all about the United States and about American history. They had the Statue of Liberty there which they were paying tribute to.

It's an interrelated world today. Look, you cannot understand the New York Stock Exchange without knowing the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange because industry is so intermixed. We, in one 24-hour period, transfer more money around the world than our total national budget, national budget. All right, with this kind of hard fact, go isolate yourself.

I mean you can put up, if you want, soldiers along the boundary lines, and you can say, "No vaccine will pass," and we'll have a soldier every three yards, "No vaccine . . ." Great. But the germs pass and the ideas pass and the broadcasts pass, and that's what we have to understand. They are more powerful than the soldiers every three yards. And this is the reality that our leaders have to understand, that our leaders have to convey, and that the American people logically can accept and would be glad to accept and do accept when they think about it.

So now you talk about the businessmen overseas. Of course, we do a tremendous amount of business overseas. We also support a lot of other countries, like Japan and China, by what we import, but that's the nature of the world. We're an interrelated world and this has all kinds of consequences attached to it.

One of the consequences, I don't mean to be heretic about this, is even to raise questions about sovereignty. You talked about defining national interests. I wouldn't want to sit today and try to define what sovereignty means. In the United States, you go down to, just taking a state, South Carolina, Mississippi, listen to the governor talk. More than likely, he'll talk about the Sovereign State of Mississippi or the Sovereign State of South Carolina. We know goddamned well that it doesn't fit the traditional definitions of sovereignty.

So what is sovereign? Well, we know Washington has sovereign powers. Yet, the Constitution says we, the people, have sovereign -- it's really, it's a slogan. Now it has some reality; people do feel a sense of kinship with language, with their tribe, with their religion, with their families. That's healthy, that's fine. But to go arguing about, "I want sovereignty over this piece of territory," I mean when you think of it, you want certain rights, maybe, within that piece of territory, but you don't want to use a slogan to try to define a serious problem. And I'm concerned about defining national interest because it'll turn into a slogan which is going to be unrealistic in defining a national interest as you want to apply it to primary, serious problems that you face.

Canada can't deal with acid rain without help from the United States. Cooperation. Assume you want to clean the pollution in the Mediterranean Sea. Twenty countries pollute that sea. You can't deal with the pollution, unless you have a cooperative arrangement between all 20. Somebody told me it's 22 countries, I haven't counted them recently. Whatever it is, you can't clean up that sea, an important national task. We can't deal with the drug problem without serious international cooperation. Yet, it's a very serious problem for us. Crime is becoming international.

So I guess what I'm trying to say to you is that I don't look upon it any longer as, well, the answer to this is to come up with a definition of national interest and then say to the American people this is in our national interest. A lot of things are in our national interest. Having somebody in a country so that if you lose your passport, you can find it is in our national interest. Certainly, the people want to know that this is in their national interest. And a businessman who can't speak the language and doesn't know what to do, wants to sell something, he wants to go someplace to get help, that's in our national interest.

A lot of things are in our national interest, and we've got to be seat-of-the-pants about it, we've got to make judgments, and that's the key. The slogan always has a tendency to be a substitute for a decision for consideration for judgment. And, you've got to elect people to office who know how to exercise judgment because judgment is the key.

Question #3: Assume you have just been named as Ambassador to a country where we are seeking to strengthen relations. Your budget for conducting diplomacy is fixed, but within that budget you can use your resources any way you choose. The Embassy has a

staff of 70 Americans including political officers, economic officers, consular officers, public affairs officers, defense attaches, commercial officers, agricultural attaches, intelligence officers, representatives from several other federal agencies, as well as specialists in administration, communications, and security.

What functions would you strengthen? Which ones might you reduce or eliminate?

Kampelman: Well, it's hard to know strengthen from the given number of 70 because you don't know how the allocation of the 70 was. So, I don't want to express a judgment about what's strengthened, what should be strengthened, what should be minimized. Obviously, there are more functions that are more vital than other functions.

I've never been a country ambassador; my ambassadorial rank is by virtue of international activities. But I would certainly, since you're dealing with the information area, I would certainly pay attention to the information aspects.

I would, for example, like, wherever I am, to have an American library, to have a library which can provide information about the United States. I would consider that to be very important. I'd want to have not only the ambassador, but other members of the staff available -- they don't have to be full time on this -- but available to speak before groups of people in that country who ask for it, foreign policy groups, farm groups, labor groups, I'd want that. If you put it in your head that one of the things you're going to be doing is strengthening America, that's an important way of strengthening America and making friends there.

The extent to which I think the United States should continue, for example, to accept visitors from other countries -- scholars, diplomats, journalists -- to go to school here, I'd like that to continue. We get a big return for that, all of which are activities that the USIA has performed, together with the ambassador, who should be alert in this.

On the other hand, I also believe we need to keep in touch with the military of that country, wherever it is in the world. And where there are farmers, we ought to try to share our technology where our technology happens to be superior, so you'd need an agricultural attache of some kind. In general, as you can see, I don't believe that embassies should be looked upon as luxuries. Embassies are integral arms and legs of the American people and their ideals and their

values.

Now being on the scene, I would have to look and [ask], "Do we have too many people here, not enough people there?" I would also understand that there has to be a reasonable limit on the number of people because you cannot act as if budget is not a factor; a budget is always a factor. And I like a feeling where people feel they're tight, that is, I like people who are spending money to feel they don't have enough money. That just is a psychological factor. Now, within that context, the ambassador has got to run his shop, and he's got to allocate within that shop.

One of the problems that I see is that the military is generally paid by the Defense Department, the commercial attache is paid by the Commerce Department, and the agricultural attache by the Agriculture Department. And the State Department employee is paid by the State Department, and the State Department is generally, these days, more deprived of sums than the others, which does create a kind of inequity within the embassy. I know that we're now in the process within our government of trying to look at this kind of machinery and see if it can be improved upon so that there's a cooperative integration here, which would include also intelligence operations, so that somebody is not basking in the sun of funds while somebody else is working in the shadows. That's really something that has to be done more in Washington than at the embassy level.

Question #4: Larry Eagleburger has said that the Bush administration's decision to intervene in Somalia was greatly influenced by television coverage -- and others have observed that our decision to withdraw was also precipitated by the media. Madeleine Albright told the Senate Foreign Relations committee that "television's ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate engagement in areas of international crisis and immediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan."

Diplomacy was traditionally conducted behind closed doors by a few people who spoke for their governments. Today, diplomacy takes place in full public view with ever-increasing public participation, largely facilitated by information technology -- including telephones, faxes, the Internet, radio, and television.

What are the major changes that information technology should bring to the conduct of diplomacy?

Kampelman: All of these observations are probably accurate. I think information technology has had an impact on public opinion. And if you don't have a countervailing, or even if you do not counter, if you don't have an additional ingredient which enters into the consciousness of the body politic, then what the pictures show will dominate. Again, I'm saying this is a role of the leadership, a secretary of state or a president. You can't have the President do everything.

And the problem of television influence goes far beyond the politics of it or the public policy aspects of it. It is an extremely serious problem facing society. The current issue of The American Enterprise, which is published by AEI and which I was just reading last night, goes into very intelligent detail and the varied opinions on this question. It affects family values that have nothing to do with public policy questions. It affects habits of young people, children, young people. It affects behavior; emphasis on crime affects behavior. So I don't think one can address this problem in isolation with respect to the public policy aspect of it.

On the other hand, something can be done in the public policy arena, and I don't think it goes into the issue of technology, except for one, one aspect of it, which is the technology available to the United States government, let's say the State Department, which I believe they're trying to utilize now, which permits radio and television simultaneous broadcasts to the smaller stations outside of the network control throughout the 50 states.

I am told, and I'm not an expert in this field, that there are many local radio and television stations that are yearning for input to fill the time. If we could provide, and not try to do this subtly, but openly, "The State Speaks," meaning the State Department speaks, or, "Listen to Our Point of View," whatever is something that's openly frank about what you're doing but also maybe has a catchy title associated to it, and then have our government communicate, pretty much simultaneously with the network impact during the Somalias of this world, how to see it.

Now, let me give you an illustration if I may from another country, Israel. Now, it may not be a good illustration, but I just finished reading the other day the biography of the former president who died within the last few months, Chaim Herzog, and it was a good biography. I knew the man. And he received a big push forward with his own providence, because during the Six Day War where the

whole survival of the state was at stake and
where the free press was describing the
attacks against Israel and people were hearing
what the Jordan radio and television were
saying which would indicate Israel was going
down the drain, and which had a terribly bad
impact on morale of the people, and he got
on once a day at a particular hour, it was
advertised, and he honestly portrayed what he,
as then, going back, as a military officer,
had discovered about what was happening,
where it was happening. He gave the bad news,
as well as the good news. And the people
came to believe him quickly and came to
understand that there was bad news and good
news, and the good news they accepted as
honest, not propaganda, and reacted
responsibly.

Now, you're not going to be able [to do this]
since the crisis isn't that great with a Somalia,
but you can have an impact and maybe can even
get the networks if you keep doing this
regularly. But, you've got to be honest about
it, and you've got to just not be rhetorical
about it. You've got to be factual about it,
give the U.S. point of view.

But absent that done professionally and done
frequently and regularly and solidly, absent
that, we are going to be influenced by these
developments. One can make a strong case
in Somalia that while Somalia was a relief
and humanitarian operation, it had
overwhelming support. But once it turned into
a state-building operation and a tragedy
occurred, it lost that support.

Well, the transition from a humanitarian
intervention to a state-building intervention was
never clearly made to the American people,
with the result that a great many Americans
still look upon that as a humanitarian
[effort] and, therefore, as a tragedy to the
humanitarian part. We weren't open with the
American people about it, and you have to
be open with the American people about these
things.

But it has impact. I would say furthermore
that it requires a president, who is after all the
decision maker, to be willing to challenge
public opinion at any moment and to explain
why he is challenging it or she is
challenging it. Bush did that in the Middle East. Public
opinion polls, if you recall, were
overwhelmingly against American military intervention.
And as a result of that, all but a handful of
Democrats in both houses of Congress did not
support the President. It was a president of
a different party; they saw this as a way to get
political advantage, and they also saw it and
persuaded themselves -- I'm not suggesting
they were callous about it, but it's easy to

persuade yourself about a position -- that it was not in our national interest to do this. And lo and behold, the bonus? Public opinion supports them, so there's an incentive to do it. And Bush went ahead and said, "No, I'm going to do it," and he did it, and he ended up being popular for it.

Question #5: I have one final question that reflects the increasing participation of foreign publics in decision making.

If diplomacy is no longer just state to state, but people to people -- what role has the federal government in facilitating diplomacy among interested publics here and abroad? In particular, when international issues involve the government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector -- what should be done to ensure that we communicate effectively with foreign publics?

Kampelman: I would not like the increased attention being paid to the non-governmental organizations as any way to serve as an excuse to minimize state-to-state diplomacy or state-to-state foreign policy. It is the responsibility of the government; the government always ought to listen, but not necessarily follow. And I don't like this business of determining foreign policy on the basis of the Gallup Poll. It's consistent with what I've been telling you. So this business of people-to-people, again, sounds good, but I'm not for having people-to-people instead of government-to-government.

Now, do we have an obligation to listen? By all means. Do we have an obligation to explain? By all means. And I want to do that even more than we have been doing it. My sense is we are doing more than we used to do in this area of foreign policy. I sense we listen more to non-governmental organizations, we use them more, particularly in our AID program where we're giving money away in programs that we've decided are beneficial to those countries and to our interests. We frequently use Red Cross, we use CARE, we use church organizations, religious groups to do these things, and I'm for that. They sometimes can be more effective, and being on the scene, they know more than our government people can know, and they have even a greater sensitivity to other people. But I wouldn't want them to make policy.

They have a right to communicate their policy preferences to the government, and I would hope that the State Department will listen to what is said and not with a closed mind, but actually listen to what is said, because they can give us advice. But I wouldn't abdicate the decision-making responsibility

to them.

Question #6: There must be a question you would like to answer that I haven't asked.

What's bothering you? How are things different for you? What's frustrating you? What impact is technology having on you?

Kampelman: My greatest foreign policy concern is the lack of communication to the

American people on the part of our government, a lack of explaining. "Lack" is too strong a word, the inadequacy, because we do a lot of it, and I know that Nick Burns in the State

Department is trying to do more of it, and he was trying to do some of this radio

broadcasting that I was talking [about] -- all of which is fine. So, I don't mean to say "lack."

Just not enough, not enough of it.

But, I think that goes to the root of a serious problem, which is intense partisanship that has evolved in our international policy. We've always had some partisanship, that's not a

problem, it's there. After all, foreign policy should not be exempt from debate. But too often, a Democratic congressman is not sympathetic to what a Republican president recommends and a Republican congressman is not sympathetic to what a Democratic president recommends. I don't like that, and I don't think the American people like that.

I think the American people feel that politics should stop at the border. They kind of like politics, they like the debate, they're amused by it. But they are troubled by the extent to which it intrudes itself on fundamental questions of foreign policy, and it troubles me very much in this area.

We particularly, in the last few years, have this problem because we've had a new flock of people in the Congress. When you have a new flock of people in the Congress, these are people who haven't had enough experience on how the system works, they're highly partisan. They come in with ideas formulated in their home communities which are much less international, much more locally partisan and narrowly partisan.

This is one reason why I've been opposed to term limits. What I have found here, and I've been a long time in Washington, is that a lot of the people who come, whether you agree with them or not, [are] highly responsible people and they want to do well by the country.

But the longer they've been here, the more do they develop a loyalty to the institution of the Congress. And if you develop a loyalty to the institution, you develop a tolerance for it, a willingness to accommodate, a willingness to stretch your mind beyond the local

partisanship that has gripped you for so many years.

When you have term limits, as soon as somebody maybe begins to develop that kind of local institutional loyalty, which our forefathers had to this institution and, when I came to Washington, I found dominant in this institution of the Congress, they don't. As you keep changing people over and over again, the partisanship comes to the forefront, the narrowness comes to the forefront, and the lack of sophistication which you need to make it into the You've got to understand what's happening in the world today, and you may not always see it in your local community -- but you will see it certainly if you come here -- and it hasn't had an opportunity to put its imprint on the individual.

So, I guess I gave you a long answer, if I have any concern in this area, it is that concern.

And I have noticed now some of the newly elected Republicans, even in '94, and now it is only '97, '98, I noticed some of them are developing this. They understand their lack of early experience in the field, they're learning; this is a learning experience. It's a tremendous opportunity for a congressman to learn and to stretch, if he'll commit himself to or she'll commit herself to, and I see some of that now. But that's my concern, and we've experienced it.

Look at what's happened in the State Department budget, which is stupid, short-sighted. So that's my last speech, thank you.

Mr.
Interview
Max Kampelman
Chairman, American Academy of Diplomacy
August 25, 1997

Question #1: As we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, we seem to be hesitant to continue our active international engagement.

While there is little reluctance to fund activities that directly enhance American *security and prosperity*, according to a poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the American public no longer supports government expenditures directed at (a) defending human rights in other countries, (b) helping bring about democratic governments, (c) protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression, or (d) improving the standard of living of less developed nations.

Some argue, on the other hand, that we should *actively* promote such causes abroad.

Let's start with this question: Is it in our national interest to do so, that is to tax American citizens to help strengthen *global civil society*?

Kampelman: It certainly is. I was not aware of that Chicago poll. I've seen other results of ~~the~~ Chicago poll which indicate an interest in foreign affairs by the American people, so I don't understand the question and the answer that you report on.

✓ Certainly my experience has ^{been} ^{THAT} ^{FOREIGN POLICY} wherever I've spoken around the country and met with people around the country, a keen interest in ~~it~~. I wouldn't say to you that it's a dominant interest, given the fact there are no crises, American national security is not today being threatened. Obviously, there isn't a dominant interest, but I believe that
✓ there is a keen interest ~~is something~~.

The extent to which the poll reflects the opposite of what I'm saying, my guess would be it's the fact that the leaders of our country have not demonstrated to the American people that there's a reason for them to be interested and involved. The American people have always traditionally been inclined toward isolating themselves from the rest of the world. That's a natural, understandable, and I think a kind of desirable inclination. But the inclination has always been overridden with enthusiasm by the American people when they have been persuaded somehow that it's in our national interest to do so or when we've been threatened in any way.

And this is where the role of leadership in a democracy is so vital. The American people depend on the leadership to point out to them concerns or where they should be heading. They may reject that which is pointed out to them; they have that option on Election Day one way or the other. But the fact of the matter is, when the leadership is not portraying or conveying a need for them to have a point of view, they retreat toward a kind of understandable preference for isolating themselves from the stupidities that they see in the rest of the world.

So, what that poll for me reflects is not necessarily a problem with the American society as much as a problem with the leadership of our society, which has been emphasizing domestic, rather than international matters, and which I think has therefore been derelict in its responsibility.

Question #2: The State Department says "the purpose of United States foreign policy is to create a more *secure, prosperous, and democratic* world for the benefit of the American people."

Great Britain's former Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd spoke last year of three functions of diplomacy: (a) the accumulation and analysis of information; (b) negotiation; and (c) the promotion of national interests – including "trade, finance, politics, culture, and tourism."

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In addition, diplomats are responsible for (h) assisting Americans abroad, (i) providing humanitarian assistance, and now (j) battling terrorism, drugs, and weapons proliferation.

If you were defining – or redefining – American diplomacy for the 21st Century, what would be your priorities?

Kampelman: I'm not very good at trying to make definitions, nor am I necessarily that sympathetic to the idea of having others define something which has to be influenced by experience and events, which is what I think the essence of foreign policy is; it relates to our relationship to other countries. Since we don't have control over what other countries do, setting an agenda or setting a list of priorities is a unilateral act which may not bear any resemblance to reality, given the fact that it has to be influenced by what happens elsewhere beyond our control. So I'm not a great definer of these areas.

Now obviously, the American people expect its government to concern itself with national welfare. How you define it is always a difficult thing to do, and we have tended, realistically, to define it – and I'm not so sure that's wrong – with a seat-of-the-pants reaction to events and to crises. I mean, in a sense, I remember Dean Acheson attempting to make a definition and inadvertently leaving out Korea. And the next thing you know, North Korea or the Russians interpret this as meaning that we're not going to stop them if they want to invade South Korea. This is a price you pay when you try to get to be too textbookish about a very serious problem. And I don't, myself, tend to be very textbookish about these problems.

Many of the factors that you have mentioned are reasons why the United States cannot, even if it wishes to, isolate itself from the world. The American people, when it's explained to them, understand this. And they don't necessarily draw great, philosophical conclusions about this; they don't have to and it's also not their job to define it in the specifics. That's why they pay the President and congressmen such big salaries, and this is why they pay you such a big salary at USIA. [It] is because they're

expecting their government to look out for these things while they take care of their families and their children and their jobs and their recreational needs and their communities.

Now, for me to be a little more specific about this, I would say that we're living now very obviously in a world which has been greatly influenced by scientific and technological developments, unique developments that have never before taken place in the history of the human race. What we have been observing in this century – as we enter the next century it's important for us to look back – but what we've been observing in this century, particularly the last part of this century, is probably greater in its significance, maybe, than any act since the discovery of fire by primitive man, and its consequences are great.

We live longer today because of medical developments. We're healthier today because of medical developments. We have medical developments because we interrelate; our doctors and scientists talk with doctors and scientists in Japan and all over. I'm struck ^{by} ~~by~~ how many Nobel Prizes in science, for example, are won by combinations of Americans with non-Americans. Technology has permitted this interrelationship to take place in the scientific field and in the technical field, and that has produced results.

I remember George Shultz once calling me into his office when I was in the State Department and showing me, because he and I had been talking about this as he was very much oriented in this direction, and I remember him calling me into his office and looking at a piece of machinery he had. I'm not machine oriented. And it had a sign, "Made in . . .," and it was, I remember it was made in about a dozen countries.

Robert Reich, whom I have never met, former Secretary of Labor, many years ago wrote a piece in the *Wall Street Journal* which I do remember and, indeed, have clipped, which said, "So you want to buy an American made automobile, do you?" And he shows you how an American made automobile is really not made in America. Some of it is made in America, it might be assembled here, but it's made in a number of countries. Honda makes more money selling automobiles outside of Japan than inside Japan. McDonalds has more openings of new stores outside of the United States; than in the United States, this is what their last report shows.

So, we're internationally oriented, and it has consequences, politically for example. I don't think authoritarian states can long survive any longer because an authoritarian, totalitarian state requires really a monopoly of information in order to get the loyalty of the people. And they can't survive long without having some kind of a loyalty there, and that depends on a monopoly control of information.

Well, you're in the information business. There's no such thing as a monopoly of information any more. The Chinese in Tiananmen Square were getting faxes from colleagues in the United States. They know all about the United States and about American history. They had the Statue of Liberty there which they were paying tribute

to.

It's an interrelated world today. Look, you cannot understand the New York Stock Exchange without knowing the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange because industry is so intermixed. We, in one 24-hour period, transfer more money around the world than our total national budget, *national* budget. All right, with this kind of hard fact, go isolate yourself.

I mean you can put up, if you want, soldiers along the boundary lines, and you can say, "No vaccine will pass," and we'll have a soldier every three yards, "No vaccine . . ." Great. But the germs pass and the ideas pass and the broadcasts pass, and that's what we have to understand. They are more powerful than the soldiers every three yards. And this is the reality that our leaders have to understand, that our leaders have to convey, and that the American people logically can accept and would be glad to accept and do accept when they think about it.

So now you talk about the businessmen overseas. Of course, we do a tremendous amount of business overseas. We also support a lot of other countries, like Japan and China, by what we import, but that's the nature of the world. We're an interrelated world and this has all kinds of consequences attached to it.

One of the consequences, I don't mean to be heretic about this, is even to raise questions about sovereignty. You talked about defining national interests. I wouldn't want to sit today and try to define what sovereignty means. In the United States, you go down to, just taking a state, South Carolina, Mississippi, listen to the governor talk. More than likely, he'll talk about the Sovereign State of Mississippi or the Sovereign State of South Carolina. We know goddamned well that it doesn't fit the traditional definitions of sovereignty.

So what is sovereign? Well, we know Washington has sovereign powers. Yet, the Constitution says we, the people, have sovereign – it's really, it's a slogan. Now it has some reality; people do feel a sense of kinship with language, with their tribe, with their religion, with their families. That's healthy, that's fine. But to go arguing about, "I want sovereignty over this piece of territory," I mean when you think of it, you want certain rights, maybe, within that piece of territory, but you don't want to use a slogan to try to define a serious problem. And I'm concerned about defining national interest because it'll turn into a slogan which is going to be unrealistic in defining a national interest as you want to apply it to primary, serious problems that you face.

Canada can't deal with acid rain without help from the United States. Cooperation. Assume you want to clean the pollution in the Mediterranean Sea. Twenty countries pollute that sea. You can't deal with the pollution, unless you have a cooperative arrangement between all 20. Somebody told me it's 22 countries, I haven't counted them recently. Whatever it is, you can't clean up that sea, an important ^{INTER-}national task. We can't deal with the drug problem without serious international cooperation. Yet, it's

a very serious problem for us. Crime is becoming international.

So I guess what I'm trying to say to you is that I don't look upon it any longer as, well, the answer to this is to come up with a definition of national interest and then say to the American people this is in our national interest. A lot of things are in our national interest. Having somebody in a country so that if you lose your passport, you can find it is in our national interest. Certainly, the people want to know that this is in their national interest. And a businessman who can't speak the language and doesn't know what to do, wants to sell something, he wants to go someplace to get help, that's in our national interest.

A lot of things are in our national interest, and we've got to be seat-of-the-pants about it, we've got to make judgments, and that's the key. The slogan always has a tendency to be a substitute for a decision for consideration for judgment. And, you've got to elect people to office who know how to exercise judgment because judgment is the key.

Question #3: Assume you have just been named as Ambassador to a country where we are seeking to strengthen relations. Your budget for conducting diplomacy is fixed, but within that budget you can use your resources any way you choose. The Embassy has a staff of 70 Americans including political officers, economic officers, consular officers, public affairs officers, defense attaches, commercial officers, agricultural attaches, intelligence officers, representatives from several other federal agencies, as well as specialists in administration, communications, and security.

What functions would you strengthen? Which ones might you reduce or eliminate?

✓ **Kampelman:** Well, it's hard to know ^{WHAT TO} strengthen from the given number of 70 because you don't know ~~how~~ the allocation of the 70 ~~was~~. So, I don't want to express a judgment about what's strengthened, what should be strengthened, what should be minimized. Obviously, there are more functions that are more vital than other functions.

I've never been a country ambassador; my ambassadorial rank is by virtue of international activities. But I would certainly, since you're dealing with the information area, I would certainly pay attention to the information aspects.

I would, for example, like, wherever I am, to have an American library, to have a library which can provide information about the United States. I would consider that to be very important. I'd want to have not only the ambassador, but other members of the staff available – they don't have to be full time on this – but available to speak before groups of people in that country who ask for it, foreign policy groups, farm groups, labor groups, I'd want that. If you put it in your head that one of the things you're going to be doing is strengthening America, that's an important way of strengthening America and making friends there.

The extent to which I think the United States should continue, for example, to accept visitors from other countries – scholars, diplomats, journalists – to go to school here, I'd like that to continue. We get a big return for that, all of which are activities that the

USIA has performed, together with the ambassador, who should be alert in this.

On the other hand, I also believe we need to keep in touch with the military of that country, wherever it is in the world. And where there are farmers, we ought to try to share our technology where our technology happens to be superior, so you'd need an agricultural attaché of some kind. In general, as you can see, I don't believe that embassies should be looked upon as luxuries. Embassies are integral arms and legs of the American people and their ideals and their values.

Now being on the scene, I would have to look and [ask], "Do we have too many people here, not enough people there?" I would also understand that there has to be a reasonable limit on the number of people because you cannot act as if budget is not a factor; a budget is always a factor. And I like a feeling where people feel they're tight, that is, I like people who are spending money to feel they don't have enough money. That just is a psychological factor. Now, within that context, the ambassador has got to run his shop, and he's got to allocate within that shop.

One of the problems that I see is that the military is generally paid by the Defense Department, the commercial attaché is paid by the Commerce Department, and the agricultural attaché by the Agriculture Department. And the State Department employee is paid by the State Department, and the State Department is generally, these days, more deprived of sums than the others, which does create a kind of inequity within the embassy. I know that we're now in the process within our government of trying to look at this kind of machinery and see if it can be improved upon so that there's a cooperative integration here, which would include also intelligence operations, so that somebody is not basking in the sun of funds while somebody else is working in the shadows. That's really something that has to be done more in Washington than at the embassy level.

Question #4: Larry Eagleburger has said that the Bush administration's decision to intervene in Somalia was greatly influenced by television coverage – and others have observed that our decision to withdraw was also precipitated by the media. Madeleine Albright told the Senate Foreign Relations committee that "television's ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate engagement in areas of international crisis and immediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan."

Diplomacy was traditionally conducted behind closed doors by a few people who spoke for their governments. Today, diplomacy takes place in full public view with ever-increasing public participation, largely facilitated by information technology – including telephones, faxes, the Internet, radio, and television.

What are the major changes that information technology *should* bring to the conduct of diplomacy?

Kampelman: All of these observations are probably accurate. I think information technology has had an impact on public opinion. And if you don't have a countervailing, or even if you do not counter, if you don't have an additional ingredient which enters into the consciousness of the body politic, then what the pictures show will dominate.

Again, I'm saying this is a role of the leadership, a secretary of state or a president. You can't have the President do everything.

And the problem of television influence goes far beyond the politics of it or the public policy aspects of it. It is an extremely serious problem facing society. The current issue of *The American Enterprise*, which is published by AEI and which I was just reading last night, goes into very intelligent detail and the varied opinions on this question. It affects family values that have nothing to do with public policy questions. It affects habits of young people, children, young people. It affects behavior; emphasis on crime affects behavior. So I don't think one can address this problem in isolation with respect to the public policy aspect of it.

On the other hand, something can be done in the public policy arena, and I don't think it goes into the issue of technology, except for one, one aspect of it, which is the technology available to the United States government, let's say the State Department, which I believe they're trying to utilize now, which permits radio and television simultaneous broadcasts to the smaller stations outside of the network control throughout the 50 states.

I am told, and I'm not an expert in this field, that there are many local radio and television stations that are yearning for input to fill the time. If we could provide, and not try to do this subtly, but openly, "The State Speaks," meaning the State Department speaks, or, "Listen to Our Point of View," whatever is something that's openly frank about what you're doing but also maybe has a catchy title associated to it, and then have our government communicate, pretty much simultaneously with the network impact during the Somalias of this world, how to see it.

Now, let me give you an illustration if I may from another country, Israel. Now, it may not be a good illustration, but I just finished reading the other day the biography of the former president who died within the last few months, Chaim Herzog, and it was a good biography. I knew the man. And he received a big push forward with his own ^{PERSONAL} providence, because during the Six Day War where the whole survival of the state was at stake and where the free press was describing the attacks against Israel and people were hearing what the Jordan radio and television were saying which would indicate Israel was going down the drain, and which had a terribly bad impact on morale of the people, and he got on once a day at a particular hour, it was advertised, and he honestly portrayed what he, as then, going back, as a military officer, had discovered about what was happening, where it was happening. He gave the bad news, as well as the good news. And the people came to believe him quickly and came to understand that there was bad news and good news, and the good news they accepted as honest, not propaganda, and reacted responsibly.

Now, you're not going to be able [to do this] since the crisis isn't that great with a Somalia, but you can have an impact and maybe can even get the networks if you keep doing this regularly. But, you've got to be honest about it, and you've got to just not be

retorical about it. You've got to be factual about it, give the U.S. point of view.

But absent that done professionally and done frequently and regularly and solidly, absent that, we are going to be influenced by these developments. One can make a strong case in Somalia that while Somalia was a relief and humanitarian operation, it had overwhelming support. But once it turned into a state-building operation and a tragedy occurred, it lost that support.

Well, the transition from a humanitarian intervention to a state-building intervention was never clearly made to the American people, with the result that a great many Americans still look upon that as a humanitarian [effort] and, therefore, as a tragedy to the humanitarian part. We weren't open with the American people about it, and you have to be open with the American people about these things.

But it has impact. I would say furthermore that it requires a president, who is after all the decision maker, to be willing to challenge public opinion at any moment and to explain why he is challenging it or she is challenging it. Bush did that in the Middle East. Public opinion polls, if you recall, were overwhelmingly against American military intervention. And as a result of that, all but a handful of Democrats in both houses of Congress did not support the President. It was a president of a different party; they saw this as a way to get political advantage, and they also saw it and persuaded themselves – I'm not suggesting they were callous about it, but it's easy to persuade yourself about a position – that it was not in our national interest to do this. And lo and behold, the bonus? Public opinion supports them, so there's an incentive to do it. And Bush went ahead and said, "No, I'm going to do it," and he did it, and he ended up being popular for it.

Question #5: I have one final question that reflects the increasing participation of foreign publics in decision making.

If diplomacy is no longer just state to state, but people to people – what role has the federal government in facilitating diplomacy among interested publics here and abroad? In particular, when international issues involve the government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector – what should be done to ensure that we communicate effectively with foreign publics?

Kampelman: I would not like the increased attention being paid to the non-governmental organizations as any way to serve as an excuse to minimize state-to-state diplomacy or state-to-state foreign policy. It is the responsibility of the government; the government always ought to listen, but not necessarily follow. And I don't like this business of determining foreign policy on the basis of the Gallup Poll. It's consistent with what I've been telling you. So this business of people-to-people, again, sounds good, but I'm not for having people-to-people instead of government-to-government.

Now, do we have an obligation to listen? By all means. Do we have an obligation to explain? By all means. And I want to do that even more than we have been doing it.

My sense is we are doing more than we used to do in this area of foreign policy. I sense we listen more to non-governmental organizations, we use them more, particularly in our AID program where we're giving money away in programs that we've decided are beneficial to those countries and to our interests. We frequently use Red Cross, we use CARE, we use church organizations, religious groups to do these things, and I'm for that. They sometimes can be more effective, and being on the scene, they know more than our government people can know, and they have even a greater sensitivity to other people. But I wouldn't want them to make policy.

They have a right to communicate their policy preferences to the government, and I would hope that the State Department will listen to what is said and not with a closed mind, but actually listen to what is said, because they can give us advice. But I wouldn't abdicate the decision-making responsibility to them.

Question #6: There must be a question you would like to answer that I haven't asked. What's bothering you? How are things different for you? What's frustrating you? What impact is technology having on you?

Kampelman: My greatest foreign policy concern is the lack of communication to the American people on the part of our government, a lack of explaining. "Lack" is too strong a word, the inadequacy, because we do a lot of it, and I know that Nick Burns in the State Department is trying to do more of it, and he was trying to do some of this radio broadcasting that I was talking [about] -- all of which is fine. So, I don't mean to say "lack." Just not enough, not enough of it.

But, I think that goes to the root of a serious problem, which is intense partisanship that has evolved in our international policy. We've always had some partisanship, that's not a problem, it's there. After all, foreign policy should not be exempt from debate. But too often, a Democratic congressman is not sympathetic to what a Republican president recommends and a Republican congressman is not sympathetic to what a Democratic president recommends. I don't like that, and I don't think the American people like that.

I think the American people feel that politics should stop at the border. They kind of like politics, they like the debate, they're amused by it. But they are troubled by the extent to which it intrudes itself on fundamental questions of foreign policy, and it troubles me very much in this area.

We particularly, in the last few years, have this problem because we've had a new flock of people in the Congress. When you have a new flock of people in the Congress, these are people who haven't had enough experience on how the system works, they're highly partisan. They come in with ideas formulated in their home communities which are much less international, much more locally partisan and narrowly partisan.

This is one reason why I've been opposed to term limits. What I have found here, and

I've been a long time in Washington, is that a lot of the people who come, whether you agree with them or not, [are] highly responsible people and they want to do well by the country. But the longer they've been here, the more do they develop a loyalty to the institution of the Congress. And if you develop a loyalty to the institution, you develop a tolerance for it, a willingness to accommodate, a willingness to stretch your mind beyond the local partisanship that has gripped you for so many years.

When you have term limits, as soon as somebody ~~may~~ begins to develop that kind of local institutional loyalty, which our forefathers had to this institution and, when I came to Washington, I found dominant in this institution of the Congress, they don't. As you keep changing people over and over again, the partisanship comes to the forefront, the narrowness comes to the forefront, and the lack of sophistication which you need to make it into the You've got to understand what's happening in the world today, and you may not always see it in your local community – but you will see it certainly if you come here – and it hasn't had an opportunity to put its imprint on the individual.

So, I guess I gave you a long answer, if I have any concern in this area, it is that concern. And I have noticed now some of the newly elected Republicans, even in '94, and now it is only '97, '98, I noticed some of them are developing this. They understand their lack of early experience in the field, they're learning; this is a learning experience. It's a tremendous opportunity for a congressman to learn and to stretch, if he'll commit himself to or she'll commit herself to, and I see some of that now. But that's my concern, and we've experienced it.

Look at what's happened in the State Department budget, which is stupid, short-sighted. So that's my last speech, thank you.