



## Max M. Kampelman Papers

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As Read  
2/23/94

**TESTIMONY BY**

**MAX M. KAMPELMAN**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON COALITION DEFENSE AND REINFORCING FORCES**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS**

**UNITED STATES SENATE**

**Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC**

**February 23, 1994**

**Thank you, Messrs. Chairmen. I am grateful to you both and to your subcommittees for inviting me to share my thoughts with you this afternoon on the roles of NATO and of CSCE in a rapidly evolving Europe trying to find its way following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.**

**By way of introduction, let me say that from 1980 to 1983 I served under both Presidents Carter and Reagan as head of the United States delegation to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) under the Helsinki Final Act. That meeting solidified European opposition to the Soviet Union; made it feasible for the United States and our NATO allies to overcome persistent Soviet opposition and deploy Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe; strengthened opposition within the Soviet Union to Communist control; and firmly established universally accepted**

**standards of internal and external conduct by which to judge the legitimacy of states.**

**In 1985, President Reagan appointed me to serve in Geneva as head of the United States delegation to the negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons. These negotiations led to the INF and the START treaties, significant steps toward reducing the tensions between the East and the West, and eased the way toward the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.**

**In 1987, I was asked by Secretary of State Shultz to assume the additional duties of Counselor of the Department of State, which involved me in a whole series of broader problems and opportunities faced by our country, including those relating to NATO and CSCE.**

**NATO played a crucial role in both my Madrid and Geneva assignments. The clear success of our CSCE efforts in Madrid were directly tied to our active NATO involvement and leadership. During all of the three years of that negotiation, our NATO caucus in Madrid met practically daily when we were in session; sometimes three or four times a day when necessary; and frequently during our recesses. Soviet efforts to divide us failed. Our unity produced a cohesion which impressed the nineteen non-NATO states, including the Soviet Union. It established the primacy of human rights as a standard by which to judge the behavior of states. It also laid the**

**foundation for Spain's decision to apply for and be granted NATO membership in spite of Soviet objections.**

**Our Geneva negotiations were bilateral ones between us and the Soviet Union, but the United States began and ended every round of talks with a formal visit and full report to our NATO partners in Brussels. We answered questions and sought advice, without ever abandoning our prime responsibility and our leadership role. Our NATO partners were invited to meet with us for further briefings whenever any of their ministers and political directors visited Geneva. This coordination proved to be of great assistance to us during crucial negotiating periods and helped us succeed in these negotiations.**

**This brings me to what I believe to be the essence of your concerns. Following my retirement from government service in January, 1989, I was called back to serve for brief periods during the Bush Administration on five different occasions. One of my assignments was to be a member of the United States delegation at the Paris CSCE Heads of State Summit in November, 1990. The dominant mood of that meeting was euphoric. Europe felt that CSCE had contributed significantly to the demise and disintegration of the Communist world. The Declaration of Paris reaffirmed the conclusions arrived at earlier that year in Copenhagen, where I again had the privilege of heading the American CSCE delegation, which asserted unanimously that European stability and cooperation depended upon the strengthening of democracy in all of Europe. This requirement was spelled out in detail and included the right of**



**political parties to function freely, the right of a free press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of speech. These conclusion were supported by the Soviet Union and all the countries of the Warsaw Pact. That was 1990.**

**Only nineteen months later, in July, 1992, I was again privileged to be part of the American delegation to the next CSCE Heads of State Summit. This time, the euphoria had vanished and was replaced with a feeling of impotence and disillusionment. It was clear that with the breakup of Yugoslavia, with growing ethnic violence, and with Serbian aggression virtually unchallenged, Europe was failing its first post-Cold War test. I believe that the feeling of impotence and discouragement remains dominant in Europe today. The United States failed to assume its proper role of leadership in Europe. Both NATO and CSCE failed to take the steps necessary to fulfill their mandates. Europe, still timid and without leadership, finds itself unable to rise to the challenges to its integrity and values.**

**This is probably not the occasion for me to analyze or explain my concerns with you about CSCE and why it has been unable to fulfill its expectations. Certainly, the quick jump from 35 states to 53 states contributed to its disarray, particularly given the fact that a number of the new states had no deep commitment, experience, training or understanding in the political culture of human dignity and democracy. Whoever suggested that the slogan "from Vladivostok to Vancouver" should replace "from the Atlantic to the**

**Urals" as descriptive of CSCE's jurisdiction did a disservice to the CSCE and to Europe.**

**Fundamentally, however, I am convinced that the United States, with few exceptions, did not fully comprehend or take advantage of its CSCE opportunities. It is CSCE which legitimizes American presence in Europe as an integral part of the continent, its politics, its economics, its security, its social relationships. Yet, we did not take full advantage of what the United States could accomplish by exercising leadership in CSCE.**

**With the demise of the Soviet Union, there was also a fear on the part of many in our government that somehow CSCE might have aspirations to replace NATO. I did not understand or share that concern, but it was present. There was never, in my opinion, any suggestion that CSCE could fulfill a European military role. Coordination with NATO, yes, but not a replacement for NATO.**

**The concern about the future of NATO was understandable. The enemy had disappeared. A new enemy was difficult to identify. What and whom were we defending against? To decide that CSCE could not be strengthened because it might serve as competition for NATO was an unrealistic reflection of an inability to think through how NATO could continue to play a constructive role in the future of Europe. I assume, Mr. Chairman, that is one of the prime objectives of your hearing this afternoon.**

**It is true that the Soviet Union was no longer an enemy, but there was an enemy that had to be faced militarily. It was the xenophobic aggressive tendencies coming to the fore in parts of Europe. That was the enemy. A fundamental premise of NATO, reflected in the Helsinki Final Act and found as well in the Charter of the United Nations, is that national boundaries are to be respected and not violated by military force. It wasn't that those boundaries were necessarily just or wise. It was rather a realization that stability and peace required that they be respected. It was Carl Sandburg who asked "Why does the map of Europe never stay put?", a question raised because that instability constantly produced the wars of Europe. Boundaries can be changed by peaceful negotiations, but not by force. The use of armed aggression to change borders was and is anathema to what NATO and CSCE represent. That is the enemy.**

**Europe is engaged in creating a community. This is historically a relatively recent development and its current phase began with the end of the Second World War, nearly fifty years ago. Europe has done well with the help of the United States. It is steadily and continually coordinating itself economically. Twelve of its states are moving energetically closer together. Others will join. The Helsinki Final Act contributed immensely to the process of creating a community through formalizing a set of human values, democratic principles, military confidence-building measures, reductions of armaments and armed forces and the beginning of procedures for conflict resolution.**

**We have learned, however, that no community can exist without a police force and NATO must organize itself to serve as that police force. It no longer can limit itself to its current membership of sixteen. It must enlarge the area it protects to include more of Europe and it must open up its ranks to include the Baltic states and those states of the former Warsaw Pact that desire to join and can prove their eligibility to join. Criteria for admission should include a commitment to non-aggression, a democratic form of government, and a respect for human rights as defined in the various documents agreed upon under the Helsinki Final Act.**

**There is no doubt in my mind that Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, by any reasonable set of criteria, should be considered for early NATO membership. The fact that the United States has been slow to understand this is a disservice to Europe as well as a disservice to our own national interests. The newly formulated Partnership for Peace that NATO has decided upon, at the initiative of the United States, was primarily devised as an effort to avoid facing the necessity to add Eastern European and Baltic states to NATO's membership roles. That should rapidly change as the partnership evolves.**

**It is said by some American public officials that the reason for our reluctance is the hesitancy on the part of the American public to extend military protection to additional European countries at this time. This is an excuse and not a reason. Should an effort be made**

by an aggressor to invade or militarily threaten Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, or Slovakia, for example, it is inconceivable that we would acquiesce in that invasion and refuse to help them defend their borders. An acquiescence by us or NATO would produce a sense of outrage on the part of the American people and world public opinion. The American public is not infantile in its understanding of our international responsibilities. We have always responded to responsible leadership. Furthermore, the very fact of that protection through NATO would, as a matter of reality, dissuade any potential aggressor from attempting to invade another country's borders.

A more serious reason for our country's reluctance is our desire not to offend Russia or make life more difficult for Mr. Yeltsin's reforms. Let us recall that when President Yeltsin was in Poland he publicly assured the Polish government that Russia would have no problem with its admission into NATO. It was only when the Russian military objected that President Yeltsin changed his position. We hastened to calm the concerns of the Russian military. In doing so, we inadvertently reaffirmed the Yalta divisions of Europe which haunted us for 45 years. Since the end of the Second World War, we insisted that Russia had no special rights in either Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary or any other Warsaw Pact nation. We also took the position that the Soviet Union had no right to incorporate the Baltic states into its own government and we refused to recognize that usurpation. For us, now, to acquiesce in the face of Russian military opposition is contrary to our national interests and will mislead the Russian military and the ultra-nationalists in that society

**into believing that their aspirations are attainable. This is a formula for trouble ahead.**

**This brings me to the catastrophe of Yugoslavia, the horrible developments in Bosnia, the successful efforts by current Serbian leaders to gain territory through aggressive military savagery, and the unfortunate impact this outrageous uncivilized development has had on our hopes for a peaceful and stable European future.**

**I am testifying here today as an individual, but I want to say a few words about a newly energized organization of which I am a part. The Action Council for Peace in the Balkans is a group of prominent Americans, Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, who are gravely concerned with the direction our country has taken in its European foreign policy during the past three years.**

**We are distressed by a policy begun in the Bush administration and continued in the Clinton administration which separates our national interest from Europe's in preventing aggression. We have too long held ourselves aloof from the agonies of violence which began in Croatia and are so evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. It is a violence which could well overflow into Macedonia and Kosovo and adjacent countries. That aloofness was dramatically and regrettably illustrated by the President's unfortunate recent statement that "until these folks get tired of killing each other over there, bad things will continue to happen."**



**Our group is determined to persuade policy-makers, foreign policy experts, the Congress, the media, and the American public that we can and must do better. Our Steering Committee consists of many distinguished names from virtually every ideological persuasion on the political spectrum. They include leaders like Morton Abramowitz, William Brock, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Hodding Carter, David Dinkins, Geraldine Ferraro, Barbara Jordan, Lane Kirkland, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Edmund Muskie, George Shultz, Susan Sontag, George Soros, Paul Volcker and Elie Wiesel. The group, enlarging daily, also includes a number of Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives.**

**We are united in our concern over the direction in which our country is drifting. We are calling for stronger Presidential leadership and conviction, and I expect you will be hearing a good deal from us in the coming weeks and months.**

**It is difficult for me to understand what happened to our nation's leadership when Yugoslavia began to break apart. It is as if we went into a state of paralysis. It is evident that when we debate whether to use air power or ground troops, that reflects an initial failure of diplomacy on our part. That failure began the downhill slide toward chaos. I recall a meeting I held with a leading Yugoslav diplomat in 1991, during one of my special diplomatic assignments. He pointed out to me that he was a Serb, his wife was Croatian; and he asked what nationality his children would be. He was puzzled by**



**our American stance that diplomatic initiatives to settle his country's dangerous problems were the responsibility of the Europeans. He asked me whether we understood what we were doing. Do we want the Serbs to follow the lead of the United Kingdom? They are "over the hill," he said. "The French?" "Temperamentally unsuited," he continued. "The Russians?" "They can't stand on their own feet yet," he said. "What you are really asking us to do," he insisted, is to follow the lead of the Germans. "Don't you know our history, our culture? The Germans are our enemies!" He urged that only an active diplomatic involvement by top levels in the U.S. could fulfill the task. Instead, we abdicated. Europe's future is paying the price and so may we.**

**We are today preoccupied with Sarajevo. NATO's ultimatum is being hailed by some as a victory for sanity and a turn in the fortune of the Bosnian people. I hope so and am pleased to note that the realistic threat of force by NATO produced a modest, albeit uncertain, Serbian withdrawal. Many of us have long been urging that the U.S. and NATO express a realistic threat of air strikes behind the Serbian lines, within Serbia itself, at the source of their military supplies, as a way of ending the violence and bringing the parties to a balanced even-handed negotiating table.**

**But serious questions remain:**

- **Will the presence of Russian troops in Sarajevo in effect freeze the Serbian gains around this Bosnian capital and result in a de facto partition of the city?**
- **Will Europe and/or the United Nations now put Sarajevo under UN control thereby helping the Serbs to succeed in their undermining of Bosnian control of their own capital?**
- **Will Serbian heavy arms and artillery moved out of Sarajevo now be moved to other parts of Bosnia where the Serbs seek to consolidate the territory they have unlawfully captured?**
- **Does the fact that Pale, occupied by the Serbs, was excluded by the NATO ultimatum mean that Europe is prepared to recognize that Pale is the "capital" of a new "Serbian Republic"?**
- **Will the U.S. now capitulate to European pressure and join in persuading Bosnia to accept an ethnic partition plan, one that puts Bosnia in an isolated vise surrounded by hostile forces?**

**These and other questions are unsettling as we look to the future. They suggest an easy sell-out of a guilt-ridden problem that does not want to go away. They also suggest how easy it is to forget that a fundamental principle behind NATO and the Helsinki process, a principle to which our American policy must be dedicated, is that**

**military aggression cannot be permitted to be profitable for the aggressor.**

**Mr. Chairman, the role for the United States is clear. We must remain firm on the principle of no gain from aggression and lead NATO in that direction. We must once and for all indicate to the Serbs and to the Croats in unmistakable language, backed by realistic force if necessary, that unless they are prepared to abandon their aggression and the territory their brutality has unlawfully captured, we will end the arms embargo now handicapping Bosnia, and we will supply Bosnia with armaments. The Senate has already, under the leadership of Senators Dole and Biden, overwhelmingly expressed its opposition to that embargo on January 27. Senator DeConcini has recently proposed further legislation. We will supply arms reluctantly, but it is Bosnia's right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that must prevail.**

**It should then be Bosnia's responsibility to distribute the humanitarian aid provided by the world to those of its citizens in need. We should remove the U.N. troops now attempting to supply that aid, end the exercise of "feeding the condemned," and free the U.N. troops from being hostages to Serbian retaliation.**

**Finally, we should make it clear to the Serbians that unless they cease their aggression and withdraw their troops, the U.S. and its NATO partners will use our air power within Serbia itself. It is untenable for the victim of aggression to suffer while the aggressor**

goes virtually unscathed. Serbian electric power facilities, airfields, munitions centers, railroad stations, and port facilities are reasonable targets that we would reluctantly aim to destroy. It does not require American or European ground troops, as former Secretary of State George Shultz recently informed us, to "reduce Serbian power to make war" against its neighbors and that should be our objective.

I conclude, Messrs. Chairmen, by referring to the February 19, 1994 broadcast by President Clinton to the American people, in which he justified our country's action in urging the NATO ultimatum in support of Sarejevo. I refer to the broadcast because the justification found in it, as Anthony Lewis recently wrote in The New York Times, would have been applicable for American policy during President Bush's administration and during the first thirteen months of President Clinton's administration. There can be no reasonable excuse for the delay other than the realization that we can do nothing about yesterday, but we can do something about today and tomorrow.

The President's broadcast refers to:

- The fact that "this century teaches us that America cannot afford to ignore conflicts in Europe."
- The fact that "in this crisis our nation has a distinct interest".

- The fact that we have an "interest in helping to prevent this from becoming a broader European conflict, especially one that could threaten our NATO allies and undermine the transition of former Communist states to peaceful democracies."

- The fact that we have an "interest in helping to stem the destabilizing flows of refugees this struggle is generating throughout all of Europe."

- The fact that "we clearly have a humanitarian interest in helping to stop . . . the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia."

- The fact that our military goal should be "straight-forward: to exact a heavy price" on the aggressors, that "military force can make it more likely that Bosnian Serbs will seek a solution through negotiation . . . and that more innocent civilians will continue to live."

It is good to have the President now note those realities. They have been evident for a long time. They justify the programs and policies I have suggested this afternoon. Ignoring these realities has resulted in 200,000 people being killed and 2 million refugees. Continuing to ignore them will bring about extensive guerrilla warfare and perpetuate hatreds.

It is time for us to redeem ourselves.

**Thank you for your attention.**

**(PLEASE DO NOT DETACH THIS SLIP  
FROM THE TRANSCRIPT.)**

**UNITED STATES SENATE  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
Room SD-423, Dirksen Building**

March 4, 1994.

TO: MR. MAX M. KAMPELMAN

Attached is your copy of the hearing transcript of  
**FEBRUARY 23, 1994, THE FUTURE OF NATO: THE  
NATO SUMMIT AND BEYOND.**

Also attached are questions asked of Senator  
Kempthorne of which we need the responses.

Please make such minor factual and  
grammatical changes as are necessary for clarity  
and accuracy ONLY IN YOUR TESTIMONY; and  
RETURN THIS SLIP SIGNED WITH CORRECTIONS  
by MARCH 18, 1994.

**Rewriting will not be accepted.** *Failure to meet  
the above will delay the publication of the hearing.*

Additional material to be included in the hearing  
record, including copies of questions and their  
responses must accompany these corrections.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Please return to:  
The **Editor**  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
Room SD-423, Dirksen Building  
Washington, DC 20510  
Phone No. 1-202-224-3947

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SENATOR KEMPTHORNE'S

Questions for Secretary Schlesinger, General Galvin

and Ambassador ~~Galvin~~  
Kampelman

General Galvin, what size force should the U.S. maintain in Europe to signal its continued strong commitment to NATO?

Ambassador Kampelman, does it appear to you that the U.S. has postponed the expansion of NATO in deference to Russia? (YES)

Secretary Schlesinger, would an expanded NATO dilute the alliances mission, purpose and cohesion?

General Galvin, how important is equipment commonality to joint operations among the members of the alliance?

Secretary Schlesinger, do you believe that the U.S. nuclear umbrella should be extended to every new member of NATO? If so, what are the consequences of extending the nuclear umbrella to new members?

Ambassador Kampelman, can you comment on NATO's need for theater missile defenses? (VIOLENT GOVERNMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SUCH AS IRAN, IRAQ AND LIBYA HAVE ACCESS TO MISSILES THAT CAN CARRY NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS THAT A NEW NORTH KOREAN MISSILE WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 1000 KM MAY HAVE BEEN PURCHASED BY IRAN. THIS MAKES IT EVIDENT THAT SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL AND THE SOUTHERN TIER OF NATO COUNTRIES ARE VULNERABLE TO SERIOUS ATTACK. THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES. THE U.S. HAS AN OBLIGATION TO ITSELF AND ITS FRIENDS TO KEEP DEVELOPING BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES.)

(4)  
Stenographic Transcript  
Before the

COMMITTEE ON  
FOREIGN RELATIONS

# UNITED STATES SENATE

JOINT HEARING ON  
THE FUTURE OF NATO: THE NATO SUMMIT AND BEYOND

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Washington, D.C.

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JOINT HEARING ON  
THE FUTURE OF NATO: THE NATO SUMMIT AND BEYOND

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

U.S. Senate

Subcommittee European Affairs

Committee on Foreign Relations

Subcommittee on Coalition Defense

and Reinforcing Forces

Committee on Armed Services

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m.,  
in Room Sh-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.  
Biden, Jr., and Hon. Carl Levin, presiding.

Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on  
Foreign Relations Members Present: Senators Biden and Lugar.

Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces  
of the Committee on Armed Services Members Present: Senators  
Levin and Warner.

Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces  
of the Committee on Armed Services Professional Staff Members  
Present: John W. Douglass; and William E. Hoehn, Jr.

Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces

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1 of the Committee on Armed Services Minority Staff Members  
2 Present: Richard L. Brownlee, Minority Staff Director; and  
3 Romie L. Brownlee, Deputy Staff Director for the Minority.

4 Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces  
5 of the Committee on Armed Services Staff Assistants Present:  
6 Jacki Spivey; and Christina D. Still.

7 Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces  
8 of the Committee on Armed Services Committee Members'  
9 Assistants Present: Andrew W. Johnson, Assistant to Senator  
10 Exon; David A. Lewis, Assistant to Senator Levin; Kevin  
11 Monroe, Assistant to Senator Graham; Judith A. Ansley,  
12 Assistant to Senator Warner; Richard F. Schwab, Assistant to  
13 Senator Coats; and Glen E. Tait, Assistant to Senator  
14 Kempthorne.

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1           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S.  
2   SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

3           Senator Biden: The hearing will please come to order.

4           Gentlemen, thank you very much for taking the time to  
5   come to this hearing. We have a little bit of confusion, but  
6   in the capacities in which you have all served, no three  
7   people will better understand what I am about to say than the  
8   three of you. One of your successors, the Secretary of  
9   Defense, is, as we speak, briefing members of both the  
10   committees, actually, I guess, both our committees now, on  
11   matters of immediate import. And they will be trickling in as  
12   that briefing ends. But we decided that we should go forward,  
13   and we are here.

14          Today, the two Senate subcommittees, one from the  
15   Committee on Foreign Relations, the other from the Committee  
16   on Armed Services, resumes joint hearings on the future of the  
17   North Atlantic Treaty Organization, something about which all  
18   three of you know a great deal. At the first hearing  
19   concluded earlier this month we received testimony from a  
20   panel of administration witnesses who reported on the  
21   achievements of the NATO summit, specifically the  
22   administration's so-called Partnership for Peace proposal  
23   which the NATO leadership adopted last month.

24          Today, we are going to hear from three distinguished  
25   panel members, former government and military officials with

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1 long experience in European affairs and with reputations that  
2 are substantial throughout the community.

3 Forty-five years after the signing of the Atlantic Treaty  
4 and after the alliance successfully contained the Soviet  
5 monolith in Europe NATO now struggles to define its role in a  
6 new world order that we cannot yet define, either. As I noted  
7 in a previous session, I believe that at least two questions  
8 confront the alliance. First, what is NATO's mission in 1994?  
9 Should it look beyond its core mission, the collective defense  
10 of its member states, to become the guardian of peace and  
11 stability in Europe as a whole? And second, should NATO  
12 expand? If so, how and when and under what circumstances?

13 I happen to favor expanding the alliance over time, and  
14 I regard the Partnership for Peace as a proper first step on  
15 the road to NATO expansion, although I must acknowledge I  
16 would be somewhat more aggressive than has been proposed. But  
17 before increasing NATO's size, a step with profound  
18 implications for Western military commitments, a more  
19 fundamental question has to be addressed, and that is just  
20 what is NATO for? Why do we need NATO today? What is its  
21 role?

22 If NATO is to remain the bedrock of European stability,  
23 as I believe it must, then the allies must summon the  
24 political will to act when crises threaten the security on the  
25 continent of Europe, in my view. By any measure, I believe

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1 Bosnia is such a crisis. It is not a dramatic overstatement  
2 to suggest that a war in Bosnia could engulf the Balkans and  
3 NATO's southern flank in a regional conflagration of  
4 unprecedented scope in the last 3 decades.

5 NATO's ultimatum now being implemented in Bosnia in my  
6 view is a welcome development, but I deeply regret that its  
7 actions come nearly 2 years later than they should have. Had  
8 NATO acted then, I believe the slaughter of tens of thousands  
9 of innocents might have been prevented or at least diminished.  
10 It is not our purpose here today to debate the merits of  
11 Western intervention in Bosnia, but we cannot assess NATO's  
12 future, I believe, without recognizing that until this month  
13 the alliance had failed the first test of the post-Cold War  
14 era on Bosnia.

15 Today, I am pleased to welcome three men who have served  
16 this country with great distinction and have provided advice  
17 to this body on numerous occasions: James Schlesinger, former  
18 Secretary of Defense and of Energy, and who recently has also  
19 testified on the balanced budget amendment and why he thinks  
20 it is such a mistake; General John Galvin, former Supreme  
21 Allied Commander and the first man who introduced me in any  
22 detail to the operations of NATO in my numerous visits to him  
23 when he was spending his days and years there; and Max  
24 Kampelman, an old friend who has served as counselor at the  
25 State Department, chief negotiator at the START talks,

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1 ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in  
2 Europe, and been an advisor to many members of this body on  
3 both sides of the aisle.

4 Before we hear from our witnesses, I would not like to  
5 turn to the cochairman of these hearings, Senator Levin.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

2 Senator Levin: Thank you, Senator Biden. The fact that  
3 we have to subcommittees of both the Foreign Relations and the  
4 Armed Services Committee meeting jointly on this subject says  
5 something about the subject. It is not often that you will  
6 find the two committees joining together this way through  
7 their subcommittees to have hearings which allow us then to  
8 get into the diplomatic and the security aspects in a much  
9 more coordinated way, hopefully, over time in the Senate. So  
10 we particularly welcome you three gentlemen to be part of  
11 something which we hope will be an evolving effort on the  
12 Hill, which is to combine some of the work of subcommittees of  
13 two different full committees that have jurisdiction over a  
14 very critical issue. So this is somewhat historic for us.  
15 Nothing compared to what is happening with NATO, but inside  
16 this institution what you are part of is something of an  
17 historic moment.

18 As Senator Biden said, a few weeks ago we heard from the  
19 U.S. Government and military officials, civilian and military  
20 officials, on this subject, in particular about the  
21 Partnership for Peace proposal and program of the President.  
22 And generally, we received a pretty positive reaction to it, I  
23 think, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Nine nations have now  
24 applied for partnership, at least to participate in the  
25 program. They see it as a road to greater security and to

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1 greater economic cooperation with the West. It provides a  
2 foundation for stronger and hopefully eventually permanent  
3 political and military ties between NATO and its Eastern  
4 neighbors.

5 The questions we face are the questions which Chairman  
6 Biden made reference to, perhaps more specifically the  
7 question of whether or not NATO should be adapting itself to  
8 do more peace enforcement operations in the future, such as it  
9 is finally -- 2 years late in my book, too -- now doing in  
10 Sarajevo. How can NATO move more swiftly towards an expanded  
11 membership without having a negative impact inside of Russia?  
12 And under what circumstances, if any, should Russia be offered  
13 membership in NATO? What should NATO be doing to try to  
14 address the questions of ethnic unrest, regional unrest, in  
15 Eastern Europe that poses such a threat to human rights in the  
16 continent? What about the evolving relationship between NATO  
17 and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe? And  
18 again, how can the Partnership for Peace make a contribution  
19 to improving human rights performance of potential NATO member  
20 nations? There are literally dozens of questions, kind of  
21 subquestions to the main questions which Senator Biden laid  
22 out for us.

23 I want to add my voice of thanks to the three of you for  
24 all your efforts in so many causes over the years, and more  
25 specifically for being with us to add your experience and your

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1 wisdom to a subject that we are grappling with and that we  
2 will have to address in many manifestations over the year. So  
3 thank you for being with us.

4 Senator Biden: Thank you.

5 Gentlemen, without any further comment by us, I invite  
6 you, Mr. Secretary, to begin with your testimony if you would.

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1           STATEMENT OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF  
2     DEFENSE

3           Dr. Schlesinger: Thank you, Messrs. Chairmen. Chairman  
4     Biden, Chairman Levin, it is both an honor and a special  
5     pleasure to be invited to serve as lead witness before this  
6     joint hearing of these illustrious committees as you examine  
7     the future of NATO and America's perspective role. I say that  
8     it is a special pleasure for me in that I must confess at the  
9     outset to being one of your original NATO buffs, going back to  
10    the 1940's and 50's when the apparent Soviet threat to Western  
11    Europe was at its peak.

12           As Secretary of Defense in the seventies, I had the  
13    rewarding task of refocusing the DOD's efforts toward the  
14    security of Western Europe as our direct involvement in the  
15    Southeast Asian war phased out. As some of you will recall,  
16    it was not altogether an easy task. It was the era of the  
17    Mansfield amendment, it was the era of the post-Vietnam  
18    letdown. Many felt that our European partners should have  
19    been doing more to defend themselves and that a drawdown of  
20    our forces would induce them to do so.

21           Happily, we were able to rebuild our forces, to establish  
22    a credible conventional deterrent, and to recreate a solid  
23    security structure in Western Europe, just as the Soviet Union  
24    came to believe that the correlation of forces was turning in  
25    its direction. It was a set of actions in which I take no

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1       inconsiderable pride.

2               Now we have come to another great transition point. Once  
3 again there is a debate regarding the extent of American  
4 interest and of the American role. There is also some  
5 confusion. Some of that confusion, may I be so bold as to  
6 suggest, lies in the confounding of risk and value. Happily,  
7 with the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet threat, the  
8 risks to Europe have substantially declined. They have also  
9 been transformed.

10              From this happy outcome, some seem to have drawn the  
11 conclusion that Europe's importance to the United States has  
12 similarly declined. That is simply an error. It is the  
13 equivalent of saying that because our home has managed to  
14 survive a hurricane or a forest fire and is now under no  
15 immediate threat that somehow it has become less valuable to  
16 us.

17              Let me put this plainly: We should be under no illusion.  
18 Outside of North America, no other interest is of greater  
19 importance to the United States than the democracies of  
20 Europe. We are tied to those societies by similar  
21 institutions, by ongoing security arrangements, by shared  
22 purposes, by history, by kinship, and by affection. Not only  
23 the Cold War, but World Wars I and II underscore the stake  
24 that the United States has in the stability of Europe.

25              If I may say so, the administration regrettably has

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1 muddied the waters by suggesting that our policy in the past  
2 has been, quote, excessively Eurocentric. American policy in  
3 the past was not excessively Eurocentric. It was  
4 appropriately Eurocentric, for it was in Europe that the  
5 confrontation between East and West was centered and where the  
6 stakes of the international rivalry were highest.

7 To be sure, the decline of the threat to Europe does  
8 permit this Nation to devote more attention to other regions  
9 and to other problems, including our domestic problems. But  
10 we would be unwise to forget, even if temporarily, Europe's  
11 central importance to this Nation. Happily, in the recent  
12 summit conference in Brussels the President attempted to right  
13 that balance. Nonetheless, there is concern regarding  
14 America's policy and direction, and much work remains to be  
15 done. One is reminded of the theme of Winston Churchill's  
16 last volume on the Second World War: how the great  
17 democracies triumphed, and thus were in a position to resume  
18 the follies that had so nearly cost them their lives.

19 Gentlemen, the circumstances of today are not nearly as  
20 dire as they were after World War II as Soviet domination was  
21 established over Eastern Europe, as the West disarmed, and as  
22 the threat to the West grew. Nonetheless, we can ill afford  
23 to overlook Churchill's admonition of almost half a century  
24 ago. The fall of the Soviet empire has, as is regularly the  
25 case with collapsing empires, left in its wake instability in

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1 some places and near chaos in others. While the end of the  
2 Cold War permits us to relax to some extent, nonetheless, the  
3 democracies must remain on the alert.

4 We are now engaged in shrinking U.S. deployments in  
5 Europe to the two-division force that was deployed immediately  
6 after the invasion of Korea in 1950. Members of these  
7 committees, I urge that the United States maintain the  
8 deployment of roughly 100,000 troops that has been endorsed by  
9 this administration and by its predecessor. A continuation of  
10 that deployment is critical to Europe's stability and well  
11 being. It is especially so at this juncture, when there is  
12 widespread concern in Western Europe that the United States is  
13 either withdrawing inward or, alternatively, shifting its  
14 attention primarily to the Pacific. A substantial U.S.  
15 presence is essential not only for Europe's overall security,  
16 but to the maintenance of the political balance within Europe,  
17 and indeed to the continued progress of Europe toward unity.  
18 A substantial U.S. drawdown beyond what is presently planned  
19 would be highly disruptive.

20 I have frequently observed that both Europe collectively  
21 and the European nations individually tend to be manic  
22 depressive. With the stagnant conditions of the European  
23 economies, with high unemployment and growing unemployment,  
24 and with the signal failure of the European Community to  
25 achieve in Yugoslavia the political outcome that it believed

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1 it could achieve, Europe today is generally in a despondent  
2 state. A lessening of the American commitment, as opposed to  
3 a reduction of forces, would add to that despondency, would  
4 force the greater instability, and in general would be to  
5 resume the follies that Churchill warned against.

6 But the commitment to Europe's stability is clearly not a  
7 commitment for the United States alone. It is essential also  
8 for the European nations themselves not to turn inward, and  
9 for themselves to maintain an appropriate guard. In this  
10 connection one should take into account the dramatic decline  
11 in the forces of the nations of Western Europe. The European  
12 States must stand ready to bear their own military  
13 responsibilities. The American commitment must be solid, but  
14 it is clearly not unlimited.

15 During the Cold War it was plain that the role of the  
16 United States was both unique and indispensable in countering  
17 the military weight of the Soviet Union. But we are not now  
18 primarily faced with a massive military threat too great to be  
19 dealt with by the European States themselves. For  
20 peacekeeping or peace imposing actions, the bulk of the forces  
21 appropriately should be provided by the European nations.

22 You will recall that during the Cold War you very  
23 frequently heard that, quote, European nations provide 90  
24 percent of the divisions, 90 percent of the warships, 90  
25 percent of the aircraft, et cetera. You all know that litany.

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1 While it may not have entirely reflected the underlying  
2 reality during the Cold War, in this post-Cold War period  
3 surely the bulk of any forces designed to provide stability  
4 and security in Europe should be, indeed must be provided by  
5 the European nations.

6 Messrs. Chairmen, while the conditions in Europe have  
7 been radically altered, it is not certain what the future will  
8 bring. We do not know what further changes may occur or what  
9 threats may emerge. Russia, a great power with even greater  
10 potential for revived strength, is friendly, at least  
11 temporarily. We hope to keep her that way. The nations of  
12 Eastern Europe exhibit varied conditions. Some are more  
13 stable, some have made greater progress than have others. In  
14 some, reconstructed Communist Parties are demonstrating  
15 revived strength. For both Russia and several Eastern  
16 European countries the Weimar metaphor has been used, perhaps  
17 over-used.

18 While the United States should stand ready to help, in  
19 most cases the outcome is beyond the control of this country  
20 or even the West generally. As a consequence, it would be  
21 unwise to attempt to provide specific prescriptions for the  
22 future. It is important to maintain flexibility, to stay  
23 alert. One can be assured the challenges will come. The  
24 notion that history has come to an end with the close of the  
25 Cold War has an increasingly far-off sound. Events are likely

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1 to be both more complex and more fluid than was characteristic  
2 of the years of the Cold War. So all that one can properly do  
3 under these circumstances is to provide general guidance. In  
4 the time available I should like briefly to provide a number  
5 of observations that may prove helpful to the committees as  
6 they proceed with their work.

7 One: It is important to acknowledge how much things have  
8 changed. In the abstract, this may be obvious. In practice,  
9 however, it will be necessary to contend with the familiar  
10 mechanism of denial, of the belief never quite openly stated  
11 that the old ways will suffice. Indeed, one is likely to  
12 encounter a bureaucratic desperation to preserve  
13 instrumentalities that may have been critical in the past but  
14 which are no longer useful.

15 Two: It is the overall political unity of the West which  
16 remains critical. That unity is embodied in the alliance, in  
17 the North Atlantic Treaty. Preservation of the alliance is  
18 more important than any specific military functions or  
19 military tasks. To be sure, in the eyes of some what I have  
20 just said constitutes heresy. They would, unconsciously or  
21 consciously, make the future of the alliance dependent upon  
22 the creation or the maintenance of specific military  
23 functions. That would be an error.

24 Three: With the disappearance of the Soviet threat it  
25 would quixotic to expect the alliance to display the same

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1 degree of cohesion or unity now as it did when the members  
2 felt directly threatened. Inevitably, differences will  
3 develop and may be strongly expressed. Open quarrels may  
4 occur. Moreover, with the decline of the Soviet threat  
5 unavoidably the United States can no longer be as dominant  
6 within the alliance as it once was. While we should seek to  
7 provide leadership when the circumstances demand it, we should  
8 not expect to dominate the alliance as we once did.

9 Four: Nonetheless, the classic threat could be revived,  
10 though in reduced form. I observed earlier that Russia is now  
11 friendly and we hope that it will continue that way.  
12 Nonetheless, forces exist within Russia that bear watching.  
13 We must remain alert to those forces.

14 Five: While there is no clear and present danger as  
15 there was in the Cold War, while both the need and the threat  
16 have clearly been reduced, it is important neither to  
17 downgrade or dismiss the alliance. In some respects, Europe  
18 as a whole remains a trouble region even though there is no  
19 mortal threat to the traditional members of the alliance.  
20 Moreover, the alliance must be preserved to deal with either  
21 limited threats or with the hypothetical renewal of the  
22 classic threat. In that lies the danger of suggesting that  
23 our policies have been too Eurocentric and they should now  
24 place priorities on Asia.

25 Six: European self-confidence is not particularly high,

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1 nor are European attitudes especially good at this time.  
2 Economic stagnation has taken its toll, and politically Europe  
3 is troubled by the post-Maastricht psychological depression.  
4 In these circumstances, U.S. forces continue to perform an  
5 indispensable political function. They remain essential to the  
6 political health of Europe.

7       Seven: Collective action may be required to deal with  
8 developments either in the East or in North Africa and the  
9 Middle East. A framework for such collective action needs to  
10 be preserved. Moreover, the alliance should sustain an open  
11 mind and a willingness to explore adding new members that lie  
12 to the East. At this time, however, such expansion is neither  
13 required or tenable.

14       Eight: One must bear in mind that other players on the  
15 international scene, perhaps most notably the Chinese People's  
16 Republic and the several nations in the Middle East, will take  
17 careful note of the developing attitudes of the United States  
18 towards Europe and towards its security commitments in Europe.  
19 A lessening of that commitment will encourage boldness or  
20 apprehension, depending on the party, for America's continuing  
21 commitment in Europe is regarded as symptomatic of our larger  
22 international role. The Chinese will be observing whether or  
23 not this Nation begins to place primary emphasis on its  
24 relationship with Russia to the detriment of our relationship  
25 with Europe.

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1           Nine: Though I have suggested that specific military  
2 functions under present circumstances are less important than  
3 is the overall political relationship with Western Europe as  
4 embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty, nonetheless, it remains  
5 important to attend to those functions. The force structures  
6 and the doctrines of the past are no longer appropriate. It  
7 is important to review the existing patterns of expenditures  
8 with an eye toward adjustment. It is widely, and in my  
9 judgment correctly, believed that NATO forces of the future  
10 should be far more mobile. It would seem to me desirable that  
11 American forces increasingly be structured to be complementary  
12 to European forces and to help provide such capabilities as  
13 command and control, intelligence, lift, that the European  
14 nations have less need to provide for themselves. With the  
15 radically changed threat environment it seems necessary to  
16 review the headquarters structure, both international and  
17 national, that was appropriate for a hypothetical Warsaw Pact  
18 thrust but may now be less relevant and too costly.

19           It also seems to me to be desirable to improve the cost  
20 and to improve the training of our Europe-based forces, to  
21 examine whether these forces can increasingly be placed on a  
22 rotational basis. Moreover, it is essential for us to  
23 maintain in Europe the logistical capability not only to allow  
24 for rapid augmentation, but to be seen by others to have the  
25 capacity for rapid augmentation of forces.

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1 Messrs. Chairmen, let me close with the two following  
2 observations. First, the Cold War ended with the splendid  
3 triumph of American foreign policy. Our role in Europe today  
4 is less dramatic, but perhaps no less critical than it was  
5 during the Cold War. To be sure, there is no possibility of a  
6 Thermopylae. There will be less heroics. There is no need  
7 for American forces to defend the Fulda Gap against advancing  
8 Soviet tank armies. Nonetheless, while less heroic, our task  
9 in Europe should remain a central commitment of policy.

10 Second, I want to express my deep concern at the  
11 tendencies simultaneously to expand our commitments while  
12 shrinking our forces. Before we, in a burst of enthusiasm,  
13 expand our commitments, we must have reasonable insurance that  
14 we have the forces in place to fulfill such new commitments.

15 Thank you for your attention. I shall be happy to answer  
16 any questions that you may have at a later point.

17 [The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]  
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1 Senator Biden: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  
2 Ambassador Kampelman.  
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1           STATEMENT OF HON. MAX M. KAMPELMAN, FORMER U.S.  
2   AMBASSADOR TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN  
3   EUROPE

4           Ambassador Kampelman: Thank you.

5           Thank you, Messrs. Chairmen. I am grateful to you both  
6   and to your subcommittees for inviting me to share my thoughts  
7   with you this afternoon on the roles of NATO and of CSCE in a  
8   rapidly evolving Europe, trying to find its way following the  
9   collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the  
10   Warsaw Pact.

11          By way of introduction, let me say that from 1980 to  
12   1983, I served under both Presidents Carter and Reagan as head  
13   of the U.S. delegation to the Madrid CSCE Conference under the  
14   Helsinki Final Act. That meeting solidified European  
15   opposition to the Soviet Union, made it feasible for the  
16   United States and our NATO allies to overcome persistent  
17   Soviet opposition and deploy Pershings and cruise missiles in  
18   Europe, strengthened our position within the Soviet Union to  
19   communist control, and firmly established universally accepted  
20   standards of internal and external conduct by which to judge  
21   the legitimacy of states.

22          In 1985, President Reagan appointed me to serve in Geneva  
23   as head of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations with the  
24   Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms. These negotiations  
25   led to the INF and START treaties, significant steps toward

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1 reducing the tensions between East and West, and ease the way  
2 toward the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union and of  
3 the Warsaw Pact.

4 In 1987, I was asked by Secretary of State Shultz to  
5 assume the additional duties of Counselor to the Department of  
6 State, which involved me in a whole series of broader problems  
7 and opportunities faced by our country, including those  
8 relating to NATO and CSCE.

9 NATO played a crucial role in both my Madrid and Geneva  
10 assignments. The clear success of our CSCE efforts in Madrid  
11 were directly tied to our active NATO involvement and  
12 leadership. During all of the three years of that  
13 negotiation, our NATO caucus in Madrid met practically daily  
14 when we were in session, sometimes three or four times a day  
15 when necessary, and frequently during our recesses.

16 Soviet efforts to divide us failed. Our unity produced a  
17 cohesion which impressed the 19 non-NATO states, including the  
18 Soviet Union. It established the primacy of human rights as a  
19 standard by which to judge the behavior of states. It also  
20 laid the foundation for Spain's decision to apply for and be  
21 granted NATO membership in spite of Soviet objections.

22 Our Geneva negotiations were bilateral ones between us  
23 and the Soviet Union. But the United States began and ended  
24 every round of talks with a formal visit and full report to  
25 our NATO partners in Brussels. We answered questions and

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1 sought advice, without ever abandoning our prime  
2 responsibility and our leadership role. Our NATO partners  
3 were invited to meet with us for further briefings whenever  
4 any of their ministers and political directors visited Geneva.  
5 And this coordination proved to be of great assistance to us  
6 during crucial negotiating periods, and helped us succeed in  
7 these negotiations.

8 This brings me to what I believe to be the essence of  
9 your concerns. Following my retirement from Government  
10 service in January 1989, I was called back to serve for brief  
11 periods during the Bush administration on five different  
12 occasions. One of my assignments was to be a member of the  
13 U.S. delegation at the Paris CSCE heads of state summit in  
14 November 1990. The dominant mood of that meeting was  
15 euphoric. Europe felt that CSCE had contributed significantly  
16 to the demise and disintegration of the communist world.

17 The Declaration of Paris reaffirmed the conclusions  
18 arrived at earlier that year in Copenhagen, where I again had  
19 the privilege of heading the American CSCE delegation, and  
20 which asserted unanimously that European stability and  
21 cooperation depended upon the strengthening of democracy in  
22 all of Europe. This requirement was spelled out in detail,  
23 and included the right of political parties to function  
24 freely, the right of a free press, freedom of assembly,  
25 freedom of religion, freedom of speech. And these conclusions

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1 were supported by the Soviet Union and all the countries of  
2 the Warsaw Pact.

3 That was 1990. Only 19 months later, in July 1992, I was  
4 again privileged to be part of the American delegation to the  
5 next CSCE heads of state summit. This time, the euphoria had  
6 vanished and was replaced with a feeling of impotence and  
7 disillusionment. It was clear that with the breakup of  
8 Yugoslavia, with growing ethnic violence and with Serbian  
9 aggression virtually unchallenged, Europe was failing its  
10 first post-Cold War test. I believe that the feeling of  
11 impotence and discouragement remains dominant in Europe today.

12 The United States failed to assume its proper role of  
13 leadership in Europe. Both NATO and CSCE failed to take the  
14 steps necessary to fulfill their mandates. And Europe, still  
15 timid and without leadership, finds itself unable to rise to  
16 the challenges to its integrity and values.

17 This is probably not the occasion for me to analyze or  
18 explain my concerns to you about CSCE and why it has been  
19 unable to fulfill its expectations. Certainly, the quick jump  
20 from 35 states to 53 states contributed to its disarray,  
21 particularly given the fact that a number of the new states  
22 had no deep commitment, experience, training, or understanding  
23 in the political culture of human dignity and democracy.

24 Whoever suggested that the slogan, from Vladivostok to  
25 Vancouver, should replace X from the Atlantic to the Urals, as

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1 descriptive of CSCE jurisdiction did a disservice to CSCE and  
2 to Europe.

3 Fundamentally, however, I am convinced that the United  
4 States, with few exceptions, did not fully comprehend or take  
5 advantage of its CSCE opportunities. It is CSCE which  
6 legitimizes American presence in Europe as an integral part of  
7 the whole continent, its politics, its economics, its security,  
8 its social relationships. And yet, with the exception of the  
9 period during which George Shultz was Secretary of State, we  
10 did not take full advantage of what the United States could  
11 accomplish by exercising leadership in CSCE.

12 With the demise of the Soviet Union there was also a fear  
13 on the part of many in our Government that somehow CSCE might  
14 have aspirations to replace NATO. I did not understand or  
15 share that concern, but it was present. There was never, in  
16 my opinion, any suggestion that CSCE could fulfill a European  
17 military role. Coordination with NATO, yes, but not a  
18 replacement for NATO.

19 This concern about the future of NATO was understandable.  
20 The enemy had disappeared. A new enemy was difficult to  
21 identify. What and whom were we defending against?

22 To decide that CSCE could not be strengthened because it  
23 might serve as competition for NATO was an unrealistic  
24 reflection of an inability to think through how NATO could  
25 continue to play a constructive role in the future of Europe.

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1 I assume, Messrs. Chairmen, that is one of the prime  
2 objectives of your hearing this afternoon.

3 It is true that the Soviet Union was no longer an enemy,  
4 but there was an enemy that had to be faced militarily. It  
5 was the xenophobic aggressive tendencies coming to the fore in  
6 parts of Europe. That was the enemy.

7 A fundamental premise of NATO, reflected in the Helsinki  
8 Final Act, and found as well in the Charter of the United  
9 Nations, is that national boundaries are to be respected and  
10 not violated by military force. It was not that those  
11 boundaries were necessarily just or wise; it was, rather, a  
12 realization that stability and peace require that they be  
13 respected.

14 It was Carl Sandburg who asked, "Why does the map of  
15 Europe never stay put?" a question raised because that  
16 instability constantly produced the wars of Europe.

17 Boundaries can be changed by peaceful negotiation, but  
18 not by force. The use of armed aggression to change borders  
19 was and is anathema to what NATO and CSCE represent. That is  
20 the enemy.

21 Europe is engaged in creating a community. This is  
22 historically a relatively recent development, and its current  
23 phase began with the end of the second World War nearly 50  
24 years ago. Europe has done well with the help of the United  
25 States. It is steadily and continually coordinating itself

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1 economically. Twelve of its states are moving energetically  
2 closer together. Others will join.

3 The Helsinki Final Act contributed immensely to the  
4 process of creating a community through formalizing a set of  
5 human values, democratic principles, military  
6 confidence-building measures, reductions of armaments and  
7 armed forces, and, the beginning of procedures for conflict  
8 resolution.

9 We have learned, however, that no community can exist  
10 without a police force. And NATO must organize itself to  
11 serve as that police force. It no longer can limit itself to  
12 its current membership of 16. It must enlarge the area it  
13 protects to include more of Europe. And it must open up its  
14 ranks to include the Baltic States and those states of the  
15 former Warsaw Pact that desire to join and can prove their  
16 eligibility to join.

17 Criteria for admission should include a commitment to  
18 nonaggression, a democrat form of government and a respect for  
19 human rights as defined in the various documents agreed upon  
20 under the Helsinki Final Act.

21 There is no doubt in my mind that Hungary, Poland and the  
22 Czech Republic, by any reasonable set of criteria, should be  
23 considered for early NATO membership. The fact that the  
24 United States has been slow to understand this is a disservice  
25 to Europe as well as a disservice to our own national

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1 interests. The newly formulated Partnership for Peace that  
2 NATO has decided upon at the initiative of the United States  
3 was primarily devised as an effort to avoid facing the  
4 necessity to add Eastern European and Baltic States to NATO's  
5 membership rolls. That should rapidly change as the  
6 partnership evolves.

7 It is said by some American public officials that the  
8 reason for our reluctance is the hesitancy on the part of the  
9 American public to extend military protection to additional  
10 European countries at this time. This is an excuse and not a  
11 reason.

12 Should an effort be made by an aggressor to invade or  
13 militarily threaten Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic or  
14 Slovakia, for example, it is inconceivable that we would  
15 acquiesce in that invasion and refuse to help them defend  
16 their borders. An acquiescence by us or NATO would produce a  
17 sense of outrage on the part of the American people and world  
18 public opinion.

19 The American public is not infantile in its understanding  
20 of our international responsibilities. We have always  
21 responded to responsible leadership. Furthermore, the very  
22 fact of that protection through NATO would, as a matter of  
23 reality, dissuade any potential aggressor from attempting to  
24 invade another country's borders.

25 A more serious reason for our country's reluctance is our

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1     desire not to offend Russia or make life more difficult for  
2     Mr. Yeltsin's reforms.

3             Let us recall that when President Yeltsin was in Poland  
4     he publicly assured the Polish Government that Russia would  
5     have no problem with its admission into NATO. It was only  
6     when the Russian military objected that President Yeltsin  
7     changed his position.

8             We hastened to calm the concerns of the Russian military.  
9     In doing so, we inadvertently reaffirmed the Yalta divisions  
10    of Europe which haunted us for 45 years. Since the end of the  
11    second World War, we insisted that Russia had no special  
12    rights in either Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, or any  
13    other Warsaw Pact nation. We also took the position that the  
14    Soviet Union had no right to incorporate the Baltic States  
15    into its own government. And we refused to recognize that  
16    usurpation.

17            For us now to acquiesce in the face of Russian military  
18    opposition is contrary to our national interest, and will  
19    mislead the Russian military and the ultranationalists in that  
20    country into believing that their aspirations are attainable.  
21    This is a formula for trouble ahead.

22            And this brings me to the catastrophe of Yugoslavia, the  
23    horrible developments in Bosnia, the successful efforts by  
24    current Serbian leaders to gain territory through aggressive  
25    military savagery, and the unfortunate impact this outrageous

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1 uncivilized development has had on our hopes for a peaceful  
2 and stable European future.

3 I am testifying here today as an individual, but I want  
4 to say a few words about a newly energized organization of  
5 which I am a part. The Action Council for Peace in the  
6 Balkans is a group of prominent Americans, Republicans and  
7 Democrats, liberals and conservatives, who are gravely  
8 concerned with the direction our country has taken in its  
9 European foreign policy during the past three years.

10 We are distressed by a policy begun in the Bush  
11 administration and continued in the Clinton administration  
12 which separates our national interests from Europe's in  
13 preventing aggression. We have too long held ourselves aloof  
14 from the agonies of violence which began in Croatia and are so  
15 evident in Bosnia and Hercegovina today.

16 It is a violence which could well overflow into Macedonia  
17 and Kosovo and adjacent countries. That aloofness was  
18 dramatically and regrettably illustrated by the President's  
19 unfortunate recent statement that until these folks get tired  
20 of killing each other over that, bad things will continue to  
21 happen.

22 Our group is determined to persuade policymakers, foreign  
23 policy experts, the Congress, the media, and the American  
24 public that we can and must do better. Our steering committee  
25 consists of many distinguished names from virtually every

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1 ideological persuasion on the political spectrum. They  
2 include leaders like Morton Abramowitz, William Brock,  
3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Hodding Carter, David  
4 Dinkins, Geraldine Ferraro, Barbara Jordan, Lane Kirkland,  
5 Jeane Kirkpatrick, Edmund Muskie, George Shultz, Susan Sontag,  
6 George Soros, Paul Volcker, and Elie Wiesel. The group,  
7 enlarging daily, also includes a number of members of the  
8 Senate and the House of Representatives.

9 We are united in our concern over the direction in which  
10 our country is drifting. We are calling for stronger  
11 Presidential leadership and conviction. And I expect you will  
12 be hearing a good deal from us in the coming weeks and months.

13 It is difficult for me to understand what happened to our  
14 Nation's leadership when Yugoslavia began to break apart. It  
15 is as if we went into a state of paralysis. It is evident  
16 that when we debate whether to use air power or ground troops,  
17 that reflects an initial failure of diplomacy on our part.  
18 That failure began the downhill slide toward chaos.

19 I recall a meeting I held with a leading Yugoslav  
20 diplomat in 1991, during one of my special diplomatic  
21 assignments. He pointed out to me that he was a Serb, his  
22 wife was Croatian, and he asked what nationality his children  
23 would be. He was puzzled by our American stance that  
24 diplomatic initiatives to settle his country's dangerous  
25 problems were the responsibility of the Europeans.

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1           He asked me whether we understood what we were doing. Do  
2 we want the Serbs to follow the lead of the United Kingdom, he  
3 asked. They are over the hill, he said. The French,  
4 temperamentally unsuited, he continued. The Russians, they  
5 cannot stand on their own feet yet, he said. What you are  
6 really asking us to do, he insisted, is to follow the lead of  
7 the Germans. Don't you know our history, our culture? The  
8 Germans are our enemies, he said. He urged that only an  
9 active diplomatic involvement by top levels in the U.S. could  
10 fulfill the task. Instead, we abdicated. Europe's future is  
11 paying the price and so may we.

12           We are today occupied with Sarajevo. NATO's ultimatum is  
13 being hailed by some as a victory for sanity and a turn in the  
14 fortune of the Bosnian people. I hope so. And I am pleased  
15 to note that the realistic threat of force by NATO produced a  
16 modest, albeit uncertain, Serbian withdrawal. Many of us have  
17 long been urging that the U.S. and NATO express a realistic  
18 threat of air strikes behind the Serbian lines, within Serbia  
19 itself at the source of their military supplies as a way of  
20 ending the violence and bringing the parties to a balanced,  
21 evenhanded negotiating table.

22           But serious questions remain:

23           Will the presence of Russian troops in Sarajevo, in  
24 effect, freeze the Serbian gains around this Bosnian capital  
25 and result in a de facto partition of the city?

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1 Will Europe and/or the United Nations now put Sarajevo  
2 under United Nations control, and thereby helping the Serbs to  
3 succeed in their undermining of Bosnian control of their own  
4 capital?

5 Will Serbian heavy arms and artillery moved out of  
6 Sarajevo now be moved to other parts of Bosnia, where the  
7 Serbs seeks to consolidate the territory they have unlawfully  
8 captured?

9 Does the fact that Pale, occupied by the Serbs, was  
10 excluded by the NATO ultimatum mean that Europe is prepared to  
11 recognize the Pale as the capital of the new Serbian Republic?

12 Will the U.S. now capitulate to European pressure and  
13 join in persuading Bosnia to accept an ethnic partition plan,  
✓ 14 one that puts Bosnia in an isolated <sup>VISE</sup> ~~vice~~ surrounded by hostile  
15 forces?

16 These and other questions are unsettling as we look to  
17 the future. They suggest an easy sell-out of a guilt-ridden  
18 problem that does not want to go away. They also suggest how  
19 easy it is to forget that a fundamental principle behind NATO  
20 and the Helsinki process, a principle to which our American  
21 policy must be dedicated, is that military aggression cannot  
22 be permitted to be profitable for the aggressor.

23 Mr. Chairman, the role for the United States is clear.  
24 We must remain firm on the principle of no gain from  
25 aggression and lead NATO in that direction. We must once and

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1 for all indicate to the Serbs and to the Croats, in  
2 unmistakable language backed by realistic force if necessary,  
3 that unless they are prepared to abandon their aggression and  
4 the territory their brutality has unlawfully captured, we will  
5 end the arms embargo now handicapping Bosnia, and we will  
6 supply Bosnia with armaments.

7 The Senate has already, under the leadership of Senators  
8 Dole and Biden, overwhelmingly expressed its opposition to  
9 that embargo on January 27th. Senator DeConcini has recently  
10 proposed further legislation. We will supply arms  
11 reluctantly, but it is Bosnia's right of self-defense under  
12 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that must prevail.

13 It should then be Bosnia's responsibility to distribute  
14 the humanitarian aid provided by the world to those of its  
15 citizens in need. We should remove the United Nations troops  
16 now attempting to supply that aid, end the exercise of feeding  
17 the condemned, and free the United Nations troops from being  
18 hostages to Serbian retaliation.

19 Finally, we should make it clear to the Serbians that  
20 unless they cease their aggression and withdraw their troops,  
21 the U.S. and its NATO partners will use our air power within  
22 Serbia itself. It is untenable for the victim of aggression  
23 to suffer while the aggressor goes virtually unscathed.  
24 Serbian electric power facilities, airfields, munitions  
25 centers, railroad stations, and port facilities are reasonable

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1 targets that we would reluctantly aim to destroy. It does not  
2 require American or European ground troops, as former  
3 Secretary of State George Shultz recently informed us, to  
4 reduce Serbian power to make war against its neighbors. And  
5 that should be our objective.

6 I conclude, Messrs. Chairmen, by referring to the  
7 February 19, 1994 broadcast by President Clinton to the  
8 American people, in which he justified our country's action in  
9 urging the NATO ultimatum in support of Sarajevo. I refer to  
10 the broadcast because the justification found in it, as  
11 Anthony Lewis recently wrote in the "New York Times," would  
12 have been applicable for American policy during President  
13 Bush's administration and during the first 13 months of  
14 President Clinton's administration. There can be no  
15 reasonable excuse for the delay other than the realization  
16 that we can do nothing about yesterday, but we can do  
17 something about today and tomorrow.

18 The President's broadcast refers to the fact that this  
19 century teaches us that American cannot afford to ignore  
20 conflicts in Europe; the fact that in this crises our Nation  
21 has a distinct interest; the fact that we have an interest in  
22 helping to prevent this from becoming a broader European  
23 conflict, especially one that could threaten our NATO allies  
24 and undermine the transition of former communist states to  
25 peaceful democracies; the fact that we have an interest in

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1 helping to stem the destabilizing flows of refugees this  
2 struggle is generating throughout all of Europe; the fact that  
3 we clearly have a humanitarian interest in helping to stop the  
4 continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia; the fact that our  
5 military goals should be straightforward to exact a heavy  
6 price, the President said, on the aggressors, that military  
7 force, he continued can make it more likely that Bosnian Serbs  
8 will seek a solution through negotiation, and that more  
9 innocent civilians will continue to live.

10 It is good to have the President now note those  
11 realities. They have been evident for a long time. They  
12 justify the programs and policies I have suggested this  
13 afternoon. Ignoring these realities has resulted in 200,000  
14 people being killed and 2 million refugees. Continuing to  
15 ignore them will bring about extensive guerilla warfare and  
16 perpetuate hatreds.

17 It is time for us, Messrs. Chairmen, to redeem ourselves.

18 Thank you.

19 [The prepared statement of Ambassador Kampelman follows:]

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( NO NEED - IT WAS JUST READ )

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1 Senator Biden: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

2 General, welcome, and the floor is yours.

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1 well-trained and ready military structure, built on the  
2 principle of multinational task forces, with broad operational  
3 capabilities, and a supporting base of command, control,  
4 communications, intelligence, air space management, air  
5 defense, and the logistics necessary to make possible rapid  
6 expeditionary action. Much of this capability already exists.

7 And what of the other security organizations and entities  
8 in Europe?

9 CSCE will continue to overwatch arms control and  
10 confidence-building measures, and serve as a broad European  
11 forum for issues of stability and security. The WEU will no  
12 doubt continue its long search for a mission, and may find a  
13 home in the eventual European Union. The Eurocorps will go on  
14 symbolizing the French and German need to be good neighbors.

15 Can the United States still be the glue in NATO?

16 The events of the last few days would seem to say so.

17 We need to look at the North Atlantic Alliance through a  
18 new set of eyeglasses.

19 The alliance is: uniquely able to act in the  
20 politico-military sense; a stabilizer for transition in Europe  
21 without violence; as able as it was in earlier times to accept  
22 new members; it is a pool of capabilities for expeditionary  
23 action and crisis; it is a sign of U.S. commitment to  
24 coalition action in Europe; it is cheaper and less dangerous  
25 than renationalization or countries going back to building

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1 never to return, and that the power of these two great nations  
2 will be directed toward keeping the peace, as the new Europe  
3 endures the years of potentially unstable and dangerous  
4 transition that lie in front of us. Russia and the U.S.  
5 should agree that NATO enlargement equals better crisis  
6 management.

7 Would that we could have had the same kind of  
8 organization in the Pacific, where Russia and the United  
9 States, along with the United Nations, also have roles to play  
10 in regional stability. We have said that Russia is not an  
11 adversary. We should listen to ourselves.

12 Does the NATO treaty have to change?

13 I think eventually it does. As a minimum, it needs a new  
14 protocol to establish the relationship between its current  
15 membership and the other countries in the European region. It  
16 may be that a structure of two or three tiers is workable. We  
17 need to recognize that the essence of NATO is not necessarily  
18 its unanimity or its current size or its political and  
19 military configurations as they stand now. If we decide that  
20 we can get along well without complete unanimity in every  
21 decision, we will have resolved, among other things, the  
22 question of what Europe will do if it wishes to act on its  
23 own.

24 The Gulf War and Bosnia have shown that the alliance  
25 needs, first of all, a powerful political leadership of a

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1 miles along the Iron Curtain. In this new environment, NATO  
2 should be prepared to act even when it cannot reach an accord  
3 in every single detail of the action plan. We have already  
4 seen in the Gulf War, for example, that there is room for NATO  
5 members to say, I do not want to take part in the general  
6 action, but I also do not plan to block it.

7 For NATO the future options are clear. If the alliance  
8 tries to stay as it was, defending itself against massive  
9 attack, it will become an anachronism, and some would want it  
10 that way. If it wants to be relevant, it must expand its  
11 membership and become more versatile in its capability to  
12 respond to crisis.

13 The Partnership for Peace is a start. With it, NATO has  
14 confirmed that its strategic interest lies in helping to  
15 maintain the security of all of Europe. It is not so much  
16 that the West should go East. All Europe needs to get  
17 together and be prepared to act under the United Nations in  
18 order to prevent crises or make the proper moves to get a  
19 crisis under control. Countries establishing a close  
20 relationship with NATO will need to recognize the  
21 responsibilities and sacrifices that will be necessary, as  
22 well as the benefits that can be gained.

23 The Russians need to see that the United States  
24 understands the awesome responsibility it has, in conjunction  
25 with Russia, to make sure that the Cold War has gone away,

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1 being more political when in fact it has already become a much  
2 more political organization. In the old push-button days,  
3 everything was a matter of military execution of a general  
4 defense plan already approved by the political leaders.

5 We do not get a more political NATO by minimizing the  
6 role of the military, as the recent events serve to  
7 illustrate, but rather by increasing the capability and  
8 credibility of military action under strong and clear  
9 political guidance. NATO is more political when it can send a  
10 believable message into the heart of a crisis and be heard.  
11 Now that the time for quick automatic reaction is over, a  
12 political NATO is at last proving that it can deal with  
13 complex options.

14 In order to do so with more effect than we have seen  
15 lately, the alliance will have to look hard at its internal  
16 structure. Throughout the Cold War, the byword was  
17 solidarity, and the best example was the unanimity with which  
18 NATO consistently made its decisions. Unanimous action was a  
19 very necessary thing in those days, but not quite so necessary  
20 now. NATO does not have to show that in the event of a  
21 massive attack the 16 nations will rise up as one to defend  
22 themselves.

23 Instead, it has to be ready to meet a wide variety of  
24 circumstances of crisis in a very specific small area, rather  
25 than all across the old front lines that ran for hundreds of

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1 second time, and had to be taken by a police escort to an  
2 airplane at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey in order to  
3 get through my fellow countrymen demonstrating at the gate. I  
4 would not want any of us to be a player in such a scene again.  
5 It was nevertheless with some regret that I acceded to the  
6 point that we would send no fleet, not NATO and not U.S., into  
7 the Adriatic at that time.

8 If NATO were to be true to the strategy of crisis  
9 management, and if the potential crises of most importance to  
10 the alliance lie in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals  
11 and from the Baltic to Suez, and if the response to crisis is  
12 to be collective, then it would be necessary to build closer  
13 security ties between the alliance members and the other  
14 countries of the area, especially the Central and Eastern  
15 European countries, and of course Russia.

16 NATO now has acted in Bosnia. And the initial news of  
17 the results is favorable, although there is certain to be a  
18 long and difficult road ahead. The most important point is  
19 that the alliance has once again demonstrated the unique  
20 combination of politico-military strengths that make it so  
21 potentially effective in responding to crises, including those  
22 of the Bosnia genre which may be in evidence in other places  
23 in the future.

24 NATO, however, has its problems. It stumbles over  
25 shibboleths like "out of area." It criticizes itself for not

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1           The Yugoslav crisis that followed closely on the heels of  
2 the extraordinarily short Gulf conflict did not prove to be  
3 yet another step in NATO's progress toward exemplary execution  
4 of the new strategy. The crisis in Yugoslavia was to be  
5 resolved by the Europeans as they themselves said, and a tired  
6 and indifferent United States readily agreed to step back.  
7 The rest is an ugly history well known to all.

8           The European Community, the Western European Union, the  
9 United Nations, and NATO have all had an opportunity to show  
10 how much dissonance can be involved when there exists no happy  
11 combination of collective regional security strategy and the  
12 political/military power and willingness to back it up. What  
13 was done at Sarajevo in February of 1994 might have been done  
14 at Dubrovnik in October of 1991.

15           I should add as a personal note that although I did  
16 advance the option of interdicting the attack on Dubrovnik  
17 with a NATO or U.S. Naval response at the time, I sensed the  
18 futility of bringing this up, and the practical impossibility  
19 of its acceptance. The European nations were very far from  
20 any accord on what to do, with the United States conspicuous  
21 by its absence. There was no indication that the American  
22 public was ready for a commitment in Yugoslavia.

23           And I had some knowledge of what it is like when  
24 Americans feel dragged into a war. I remembered only too well  
25 the day in 1969 when I was going back to Vietnam for the

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1 clarion call for mobilization of reserves and could rattle the  
2 nuclear saber, but in the lead up to war over Kuwait, it ran  
3 into difficulty in attempting to do something as simple as  
4 provide surveillance in the Mediterranean, which was far  
5 removed from the Gulf.

6 As the buildup to the Gulf War continued, NATO stepped  
7 around its original reluctance and allowed itself to become  
8 involved as an alliance, beginning with the dispatch of  
9 reconnaissance aircraft, NATO AWACS, to monitor the airspace  
10 of Turkey and interconnect for a few minutes at a time with  
11 the same type aerial platforms flying over Saudi Arabia. When  
12 Turkey abruptly asked for protection under Article 5 of the  
13 North Atlantic Treaty, the alliance sent three squadrons from  
14 Italy, Germany and Belgium up to the border between Turkey and  
15 Iraq to show the flag and indicate to Saddam Hussein that an  
16 attack against Turkey would be an attack against the North  
17 Atlantic Alliance.

18 Many NATO members provided assistance to Turkey, sending  
19 air defense missiles, chemical weapons protective gear,  
20 communications support, and other help. The Germans, who felt  
21 they could not go out of area, sailed minesweepers and naval  
22 patrol craft to the Mediterranean to relieve other NATO  
23 countries, who then sent their own naval forces on to the  
24 Gulf. NATO thus made its first steps under the new strategy,  
25 tentative and diffident, but trail-breaking.

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1           STATEMENT OF JOHN GALVIN, GENERAL, USA (RETIRED)

2           General Galvin: Thank you, sir.

3           Messrs. Chairmen, I appreciate the chance to be hear  
4 today and talk about the future of NATO.

5           The new NATO strategy was conceived during the crisis of  
6 the Gulf War and that of Yugoslavia, which all happened in  
7 quick succession. The 1990 NATO summit in London announced a  
8 new strategic set of principles, and proudly asserted that  
9 NATO no longer had any adversaries. Following up in Rome in  
10 1991, the alliance chiefs of state in November approved a new  
11 strategic concept.

12          The alliance, recognizing what it called increased  
13 opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an  
14 early stage, said it would move away from the concept of  
15 forward defense and become more multinational, more mobile,  
16 more flexible, more ready for rapid response in times of  
17 crisis. NATO declared it would become a crisis prevented and,  
18 if not that, a crisis manager, a peacemaker. That came about  
19 just after the siege of Dubrovnik.

20          NATO's initial response to the Gulf crisis was halting  
21 and basically ineffective, primarily because NATO was shackled  
22 by the old system of alert procedures and automatic  
23 push-button responses that had characterized its defense plans  
24 against the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union for more than 40  
25 years. NATO could build barriers at Fulda and could sound the

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1 their own military forces and then putting them on the borders  
2 with somebody else; it is a builder of confidence and mutual  
3 understanding; it is a facilitator of internal stability among  
4 its members; it is an agent of change; and it is a contributor  
5 to a developing worldwide architecture of peace -- without  
6 inhibiting the sovereignty or freedom of action of its  
7 members.

8 We nevertheless need a thorough and painstaking review of  
9 NATO.

10 Will the alliance self-destruct in the process?

11 If such a thought frightens us, we really do not have an  
12 alliance worthy of the name, nor do we have the confidence in  
13 our fellow member nations that we have always extolled. The  
14 United States should continue to send the message, and make  
15 the signal stronger, that we support cooperation on defense  
16 and security matters, and we want to maintain the capability  
17 for interactive response, and not just a U.S. go-it-alone  
18 approach. Europe is still a fragile continent, caught up in  
19 the throes of change, and it needs the United States to help  
20 keep the peace.

21 Thanks for this chance to present my thoughts, Messrs.  
22 Chairmen.

23 [The prepared statement of General Galvin follows:]  
24  
25

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1 Senator Biden: Thank you very much, General.

2 Let me begin by asking you, Mr. Ambassador, Secretary  
3 Schlesinger made the point -- and correct me if I am wrong,  
4 Mr. Secretary -- that there is less of a need to find a  
5 precise military mission for NATO than there is to have  
6 political coherence within NATO?

7 And you, Mr. Ambassador, have played an important role in  
8 -- and initially, I think, we shared the same view about the  
9 promise of CSCE, which I have written fairly extensively about  
10 it and you have acted extensively with regard to it -- and you  
11 have expressed a sense of disappointment or lost opportunity  
12 here.

13 I wonder whether or not CSCE has a capability of doing  
14 what is envisioned -- or at least has been articulated thus  
15 far by the administration -- in its Partnership for Peace?

16 As I look at the Partnership for Peace initiative, signed  
17 on by our allies and explained by its authors, it seems to me  
18 to be a -- and I do not mean this in a critical way -- an  
19 artful dodge at this point, I think quite possibly a necessary  
20 artful dodge, of reconciling not merely concern for Yeltsin's  
21 stability and the rabid nationalism on his right that he faces  
22 -- how broad, how deep, how enduring that is, I do not pretend  
23 to know -- and a reflection of the differing stages of  
24 development toward democracy and market forces of the nations  
25 that have indicated, other than Russia, a desire to seek a

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1 it briefly.

2 First, let me say with respect to the question of the  
3 borders and whether the applicants for NATO membership can  
4 claim their borders are legitimate -- I want to remind you  
5 that every one of those countries is a part of the CSCE, and  
6 one of the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act is that  
7 existing borders must be recognized. And I think we just  
8 ought not to be asking for a reaffirmation of something that  
✓ 9 is already affirmed. ~~And~~ I think we ought to assume ~~that~~ that  
10 is the principle.

✓ 11 ~~We can assume that~~ If we are consistent about it, <sup>AND WE</sup> ~~which~~  
✓ 12 <sup>SHOULD BE CONSISTENT</sup> ~~is why I am so exercised~~ about the Bosnian Serbian problem, <sup>THE PRINCIPLE</sup>  
✓ 13 ~~Because~~ If we show an inconsistency <sup>HERE</sup> ~~there~~, I think it <sup>IS THEREFORE STRENGTHENED</sup>  
14 undermines the principal throughout the continent.

15 Senator Biden: By definition, we have already, have we  
16 not?

17 Ambassador Kampelman: Well, but we can recoup. In my  
18 opinion, I think we can recoup and redeem ourselves, which is  
19 the way I <sup>TESTIFIED,</sup> ~~answered~~. But, with respect to CSCE, let me say  
20 this to you. I have been critical, because I do not believe  
21 that we have been sufficiently alert to our leadership  
22 opportunities there.

23 But I do want to say that I am somewhat encouraged by the  
24 fact that the new person designated by the administration to  
25 be our CSCE ambassador strikes me as understanding the

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1 closer relationship, if not membership, in NATO.

2 So, is there room for CSCE to take up some of the  
3 political yearning of the former Soviet Union, former  
4 republics, now independent countries, and Eastern European  
5 powers while we continue down the road to see, what I think  
6 all of you may agree with, except I am not sure about General  
7 Galvin, and that is, the need for whomever joins NATO to be  
8 able to meet NATO responsibilities, which is to provide  
9 forces, to have settled borders, to have democratic  
10 institutions?

11 I am not sure all of those nations at this point who seek  
12 membership could even qualify on the first, and that is  
13 agreeing on what permanent borders there should be relative to  
14 their various countries. But it seems as though there is a  
15 process that possibly could, in a more aggressive and  
16 imaginative way, have CSCE take up in the near term some of  
17 the slack, if you will, and meet some of the needs of what is  
18 a broader, it seems to me, cry coming from Eastern Europe and  
19 the former Soviet Union, which is the need for integration  
20 into the West militarily or otherwise.

21 I am not sure I have not confused myself by that  
22 question.

23 Ambassador Kampelman: No, you have not. I have gotten  
24 it clear. And my answer will first be a quick one, which is,  
25 yes, the CSCE can do it. But I want to comment and enlarge on

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1 potential of that instrument. I have talked to him. I have  
2 been impressed by our conversation and by what I believe to be  
3 his determination to make full use of CSCE as a political  
4 instrument which can achieve cohesion, and therefore cooperate  
5 with NATO.

6 The fact that this individual seems to be, from what I  
7 understand, close to the President, adds, I believe, to his  
8 ability to have some influence with the other countries of  
9 Europe who belong to CSCE.

10 Senator Biden: You indicated you belong to an  
11 organization that is peopled with prominent Americans who  
12 share a view, as you know, I share in detail and have for some  
13 time. And you indicated you hoped there is something that it  
14 can do -- your organization. And I see one of your  
15 distinguished members, a man who I admire his decision on  
16 principle for having left the State Department and the reasons  
17 why.

18 You indicated that you hoped you could influence policy  
19 along the lines you suggested the group believes our policy  
20 should be and should take. And I want to ask you a question I  
21 have always wanted to ask and I cannot -- I do not know the  
22 answer here. Maybe you could enlighten me.

23 This is one of those circumstances -- I have sat here, as  
24 my colleagues have, who quite possibly know more about this  
25 than I do, and wondered as a young student how in God's name

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1 those folks in our seats in a different building -- the  
2 building was not here -- could have sat around in 1935 and  
3 1936 and 1937 and 1938 and 1939 on the foreign relations  
4 committee and the armed services committee and refused to make  
5 the decisions that, in hindsight, we learned in our civics  
6 classes, we learned in our undergraduate courses and our  
7 graduate studies were self-evident in retrospect.

8 And I could not understand how that could happen until,  
9 after 20 years of being here, in my 20th year, I found myself  
10 literally physically sitting in the same chair that one of  
11 those senior senators sat in in 1938, when he justified  
12 Czechoslovakia and justified what was happening in Europe.  
13 And it is real simple to me, and this really is a question.

14 No matter when we acted in the thirties, it would have  
15 been a cost to the American public, some cost. The cost may  
16 have been the difference between 10 lives and 10,000 or 10,000  
17 and 100,000 or 100,000 and 20 million, but there was a cost.  
18 And at every stage of the Bosnian thing, the Yugoslav crisis  
19 over the last 2 years, whatever action we took, and you are  
20 kind of preaching to the choir with this group here that are  
21 before you, there was a cost attached, a potential cost.

22 When the President made his decision to use air power or  
23 to threaten the use of air power and use it, I hope he means  
24 it -- we mean it.

25 The questions in that, quote, high level meeting sitting

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1 with the President with 15, quote, Congressional leaders, as I  
2 sat there I thought about who those people sitting in that  
3 same room were 45 years ago. And the question asked was a  
4 fair one and was asked by more than one prominent member.  
5 What happens if one pilot is shot down?

6 It was almost enough in the minds of those who asked that  
7 question that if that risk were real, and it is obviously real  
8 -- engine failure could cause a pilot to go down that was not  
9 shot down -- maybe it was not worth the effort.

10 Now, I have come to understand the inertia, I think, that  
11 probably existed. I am a politician. I understands  
12 politicians. As Emerson said in another context, he said  
13 society is a like a wave. The wave moves on but the particles  
14 remain the same. Politicians in 1940 were no different than  
15 politicians in 1994 or 1935 and 1995, when we get there.

16 I now understand what motivated them. But what I do not  
17 understand is what motivates your counterparts.

18 If you read the editorial pages of America, and you meet  
19 the foreign policy establishment, there is no unanimity. I  
20 believe the reason why this administration has not been more  
21 forceful, and the last one was not, is because there is such a  
22 split among opinion leaders who were unanimous in most accords  
23 on matters of national security during the previous 35 years.

24 Why is it? You ask the rhetorical question. You hope  
25 you all can do something. I think the one thing your group

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1 can do, more than anything else, is if you are able to take  
2 the top 20 editorial pages in America and get them all to  
3 endorse lifting the embargo, get them all to endorse -- get  
4 the New York Council on Foreign Relations and the Chicago  
5 Council and the L.A. Council, and all the foreign policy wonks  
6 who love to wonder around this town in pompous, inflated egos  
7 about how much they know about foreign policy, to step up to  
8 the ball and take a position, because that is the thing that  
9 seems to be missing.

10 Presidents as you know, you gentlemen working for  
11 Presidents very closely and having personal relationships,  
12 they are impacted on by that, in a strange sense more than  
13 they are, in my opinion, by any one of us.

14 Why is it, Max, that that is not the case? Do you have  
15 answer? I do not expect you to have one. Can you enlighten  
16 me?

17 Ambassador Kampelman: First of all let me say that there  
18 is, in my opinion, extensive support for the approach that you  
19 and I favor in the country and we do have a compilation of  
20 editorials that support us. I think we ought to do more.

21 That is one of the reasons we created ourselves is to do  
22 more, because we understand that in a democracy it is  
23 perfectly normal to have differences of opinion and  
24 differences of perspective, even though we may have  
25 fundamental values.

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1 I rarely criticize the values of people who disagree with  
2 me because I find that we share values. We just have  
3 differences in how to reach and exercise and obtain those  
4 values. So, we are trying to do just that.

✓ 5 I do not ~~what to say, however, that you ought not to~~  
6 minimize the importance of resolutions that the Senate passes  
7 or the House of Representatives passes. First, these  
8 resolutions have an impact on the so-called smart people  
9 around, on the editorial writers, and I also believe they have  
10 an impact on the President.

11 I have tried in all my differences here over the years,  
12 with one President or another President and with this  
13 President on this issue we are talking about, never to  
14 personalize this because I do not question their good faith.  
15 I question their judgment.

✓ 16 I realize <sup>THAT</sup> ~~the~~ politics injects itself, ~~into it~~. It is  
17 always how much can I do that I would like to do without its  
✓ 18 hurting me <sup>politically</sup> too much. And that is really the test constantly,  
19 on a daily basis, that is being faced. You people up there  
✓ 20 have been successful ~~on that~~ because you are still here. That  
✓ 21 is the test, ~~of it~~.

22 What we have to do is persuade the President that he can  
23 do more of what I hope he would like to do.

24 Senator Biden: I know he would like to do. I am willing  
25 to bet anything.

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1 Ambassador Kampelman: I certainly hope so and assume  
2 that he would like to do more, and what we have to do is make  
3 it possible for him to do more.

4 I myself, for example, understand. Here you have a  
5 President coming into a new position with a new responsibility  
6 who has not had extensive national experience. We know he has  
7 not had extensive experience with the military and, indeed,  
8 that is an area of vulnerability <sup>FOR HIM.</sup> ~~that he has~~

9 <sup>Then</sup> ~~And~~ he sits and talks to some military people who tell  
10 him you cannot do this, or think about the consequences of  
11 what you do. I can understand that <sup>ADVICE</sup> having an impact on him.

12 ~~And, therefore,~~ <sup>we</sup> create our group because we have to  
13 influence public opinion. We have to influence and encourage  
14 you to be assertive, although I gather from my observation you  
15 do not need much encouragement. You are ahead of us  
16 frequently in some of these areas.

17 Senator Biden: Well, I am now trespassing on their time,  
18 and I will yield to the Senator from the Armed Services  
19 Committee. We usually go Republican-Democrat. We are going  
20 committee-committee here.

21 Let me just remind you that we passed a resolution in the  
22 United States Senate in October, when President Bush was still  
23 President, calling for lifting the arms embargo and  
24 authorizing the expenditure of \$50 million off the shelf,  
25 equipment off the shelf to go straight to Bosnia. That

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1 passed. Every time we have done this, it has passed.

2 We did not do the embargo this time, we did the strike  
3 this time. But I really think, Mr. Ambassador, that the  
4 people that we need to change the views of are the opinion  
5 makers.

6 Ambassador Kampelman: Right.

7 Senator Biden: Not the American public, because I think  
8 the American public is much more understanding of what is at  
9 stake here than we give them credit for.

10 But at any rate, that is for another time. I have a  
11 number of other questions but I will yield.

12 Senator Levin: Thank you, Senator Biden. First, as  
13 Senator Biden said, I think probably the three of us have been  
14 consistently in support of a much stronger position in Bosnia.  
15 So, in a way we are not getting a typical picture here of the  
16 Senate as to who happens to be here. As somebody who has  
17 consistently favored air strikes and lifting the embargo, I  
18 feel also it is 2 years late and that we have failed.

19 I would like to suggest, perhaps, an answer to Senator  
20 Biden's question, although it was not addressed to me and I am  
21 not 100 percent I am confident I am right in any event. And  
22 that is, when people have looked at the risks and the costs of  
23 action, and they are significant; when you look at the risks  
24 of air strikes there is a significant risk and a cost.

25 What people have failed to do, including the opinion

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1 makers and including a lot of my colleagues, indeed, I think  
2 including a significant percentage of the American public, is  
3 put on that same scale the risks of not acting.

4 That puts it as simply as I know how. Indeed there are  
5 risks. There are risks that we may not be able to sustain the  
6 effort; that with the first evidence that we have had some  
7 losses in NATO as a result of those air strikes that we might  
8 lose public support for the continuation of those air strikes;  
9 that we would lose personnel, a loss of life itself, is  
10 obviously the first and foremost risk.

11 But where I think we have failed is as a people, as a  
12 polity, as an administration, as a public is to put on that  
13 same scale 2 years ago and a year and a half ago the risks of  
14 doing nothing, of letting that fire become a conflagration,  
15 and spreading, and all of the other things which a number of  
16 you have enumerated.

17 So I am wondering whether you would just quickly indicate  
18 whether or not you feel that is important; that when we look  
19 at risks of acting and costs of acting that we also explicitly  
20 put into the equation, in deciding whether the risks are worth  
21 it, the risks and costs of not acting. Would you agree with  
22 that assessment, that that is an important thing to do?

23 General, let me start with you.

24 General Galvin: Yes, I would agree with that, Senator  
25 Levin, that the risks of not acting have to be balanced against

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1 the risks of acting.

2 I would like to remind you, and you do not need to be  
3 reminded at all, that the United States is not a country that  
4 acts easily when it comes to going to war. I mean, we still  
5 World War I started in 1917 and World War II started in early  
6 1942, but there was a lot of war around before those dates.

7 We may be, and we are in fact, a very violent country  
8 domestically, but we do not go to war easily. And our caution  
9 may be something that in some ways that we can be proud of,  
10 but it does have to figure in here.

11 The same people who might be on a committee urging us to  
12 go to war, where will they be a year later?

13 Senator Levin: Or a month later?

14 General Galvin: Or a month later? Right now I notice  
15 that -- Jack Vessey told me that at the 34th Division reunion  
16 there was an interesting discussion there in which it came out  
17 that the 34th Division had lost more casualties, missing in  
18 action and never recovered from just the 34th Division that  
19 fought in Anzio and other places, than all the missing action  
20 in Vietnam but there was not the same response to that.

21 I do not think times change. I think that people are the  
22 same, they remain the same, but a lot of other things change  
23 such as, for example, we mentioned the media aspects of this.  
24 If we lose one aircraft the media will focus on that lost  
25 aircraft, and hopefully not but possibly the lost pilot or

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1 crew, to an extraordinary extent. But part of that is because  
2 people focus on that. It is not a media problem, it is a  
3 people problem.

4 When you talk about the risks, the risk is also the loss  
5 of solidarity in the United States. I think that has to be  
6 taken into account.

7 Senator Levin: All the risks, of action and not action.

8 General Galvin: Right. You know, when I bring that up  
9 sometimes people say, hey, wait a minute, you are the military  
10 man. Just tell me how many troops it takes to do this.

11 But the point is ever since I was a lieutenant I realized  
12 that the fighting will of my platoon was not just a military  
13 question.

14 Senator Levin: Well, let me change the question. I want  
15 to get to NATO quickly because that is the subject.

16 I want to talk to each of you about the timetable for  
17 membership expansion. And you have come at this from  
18 different directions. Ambassador, I think you are probably  
19 the most urgent in terms of expanding membership. Your  
20 statement is that, for instance, the four -- Hungary, Poland,  
21 Czech Republic -- by any set of criteria that is reasonable  
22 should be considered for early NATO membership, and this is a  
23 disservice not to have considered them.

24 You also give as your argument for that that it is  
25 inconceivable that we acquiesce in an invasion of Poland,

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1 Hungary, Czech Republic or Slovakia and refuse to help them.

2 Well, I am afraid it is not inconceivable to me. I am  
3 someone who does favor early membership, by the way. But for  
4 the reasons that the General just gave, unhappily and  
5 tragically it is not inconceivable to me that we would not  
6 come to the defense of those countries any more that it is any  
7 longer inconceivable to me that we would allow a 2-year attack  
8 on Bosnia to go without a response, and that Europe would have  
9 allowed it.

10 I would have said 2 years ago that it is inconceivable to  
11 me that there would be ethnic cleansing in Europe. I would  
12 have said that 2 years ago, but it no longer is inconceivable  
13 to me.

14 So, even though I happen to favor earlier membership than  
15 later, in trying to establish some criteria for membership and  
16 pushing that faster, I cannot do it for the reason you give  
17 which is that it is inconceivable to me that even without  
18 membership we would not come to their defense. Tragically it  
19 is too conceivable to me.

20 In any event, all three of you, can you give me your  
21 response to this question? Should we set criteria now for  
22 membership in NATO, milestones, to give some hope to Eastern  
23 Europe and the Baltic Nations that if they meet certain  
24 specified milestones and criteria that the membership will be  
25 there for them?

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1           Should we take some step now to give that kind of  
2   encouragement perhaps coupled, as I believe it should be, with  
3   a statement that there would be an effort to have a special  
4   relationship, a security relationship, between an expanded  
5   NATO and Russia because of the importance that I happen to  
6   hold that we not play into the hands of the right-wing in  
7   Russia, and that we should try to continue to give that kind  
8   of assurance that, yes, we are not giving you a veto but yes,  
9   also, we are aware of the internals and we are going to make  
10   an effort in any expanded NATO to have a special relationship  
11   if Russia is not a member between an expanded NATO and Russia  
12   of some kind of a security arrangement?

13           Let me start with you, Ambassador. The question is,  
14   should we set some kind of specific milestones, timetables for  
15   membership in an expanded NATO?

16           Ambassador Kampelman: In my statement I urge that  
✓ 17   ~~establish~~ <sup>BE ESTABLISHED</sup> criteria <sup>ADMISSION IS</sup> because it not just automatic. We ought to  
18   have criteria, agreed upon criteria, and I think it would be  
19   useful to establish those criteria now as you suggest.

20           I do want to say that what is important in my opinion is  
21   that we make it unmistakably clear that our intention is to  
22   add to NATO. What concerns me is very simple. If I was  
23   sitting in Moscow as a general or an ultranationalist, I would  
✓ 24   <sup>OPTIMISTICALLY</sup> looked at these recent developments.

25           And I want to drop a footnote, Senator Biden, and say

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1 that I do think that the original intent of this Partners  
 2 program was to kick the can maybe forever. But I think as a  
 3 result of objections within the United States we are coming to  
 ✓ 4 interpret this partnership so that it will produce ~~maybe~~  
 5 additional members into NATO.

6 But I do want to say that the extent to which we mislead  
 7 any of the Russian military or nationalists to believe that we  
 8 are not going to add, because they do not want us to add, we  
 9 make it more difficult to add a year from now and 2 years from  
 10 now because <sup>THE MORE WE WAIT</sup> it <sup>now is</sup> is a much more obvious slap in the face.

11 So, I would much rather now pull the tooth by saying here  
 12 are the criteria, we do intend to add as soon as the criteria  
 13 are met, and get it done now.

14 Senator Levin: Secretary Schlesinger, my time is almost  
 15 up, but can you give us a brief answer to that? Should we set  
 16 criteria now and stick with them?

17 Dr. Schlesinger: I cannot answer a complex question with  
 18 a brief answer.

19 Senator Biden: Take as much time as you want.

20 Senator Levin: Give me a medium-sized answer.

21 Dr. Schlesinger: My first observation picks up from  
 22 General Galvin's comments that NATO should be as able, and I  
 23 quote him, as it was in previous times to accept new members.

24 The original 12 members of NATO did not readily accept  
 25 new members. There was an extended, extended fight over

1 Greece and Turkey for reasons of doubts about their democratic  
2 leanings, about the difficulties of altering the composition  
3 of NATO. There was an extended fight in the 1950's about the  
4 admission of our former enemy, Germany.

5 I can remember in the early 1970's talking to our NATO  
6 partners about Spain, then under Franco, just to acknowledge  
7 the assistance that Spain was providing to NATO. There was a  
8 barrier to it.

9 Now, the nations of Eastern Europe have not clarified  
10 their futures. As I mentioned earlier there is a revival of  
11 communist parties within some of those states. What the  
12 future bears, we do not know.

13 Moreover, there is a long and complicated process, not a  
14 decade but some 18 months, 2 years, in which one begins to  
15 examine how the forces will relate one to another,  
16 communications, and those are all things that have to be  
17 ironed out. So, there is a time consuming process even though  
18 it is our intention to expand NATO.

19 Secondly, somebody, I think it was Ambassador Kampelman,  
20 said come to the defense of these countries. There should be  
21 no doubt that we would come to the defense of these countries.  
22 How? We should ask ourselves how we would come to the defense  
23 of these countries. That is not obvious. It is particularly  
24 not obvious, let us say, for the Baltic states which are close  
25 to the heart of Russian power and far, far away from American

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1 power. It is much easier to refer to the defense of the Czech  
2 Republic, which is Bohemia, which is close to the heart of  
3 NATO power.

4 So, before one expands NATO one is obliged, if we are to  
5 be responsible to say how do we defend these countries.  
6 Otherwise we create the risks that the British and French did  
7 in the 1930's of offering a pledge to Poland after the fall of  
8 Czechoslovakia, a pledge that they could not fulfill much to  
9 the cost to Poland.

10 Third, let me just simply assert that we are not giving a  
11 veto to Russia as has been publicly declared by various  
12 people. With regard to the membership of NATO we have no  
13 intention of giving a veto to Russia.

14 If Russia were to turn in the Zhirinovsky direction I  
15 have no doubt that within days the Visograd countries would be  
16 regarded as eligible for membership. So, there is no veto.

17 The fourth point, we deal with a complex reality out  
18 there, a very complex reality. If we were to admit the  
19 Visograd countries now we would draw a different line, not the  
20 line of Yalta to which Ambassador Kampelman referred, but a  
21 different line.

22 If you go to Sofia or Bucharest or even Kiev there is not  
23 the same enthusiasm for admitting the Visograd countries that  
24 we find in the Visograd countries understandably, because they  
25 will feel that we are pushing them into the Russian zone of

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1 influence even though we take in what have historically been  
2 Western nations.

3 It is for that reason that the Partnership for Peace, Mr.  
4 Chairman, murky as it is, may be the best that we can have at  
5 this time. Murkiness is not without its value in a complex  
6 situation.

7 Now, let me finally say that if such a line is drawn the  
8 countries that are admitted to NATO are the ones that are not  
9 under threat today. If the Russians were, and we hope that  
10 they will not turn, they will have to take Ukraine before they  
11 can get at Hungary or Czechoslovakia or, to some extent,  
12 Poland itself. We want, if we can, to provide stability in  
13 this region. And to provide stability in the region means not  
14 in effect leaving those countries most exposed and most to  
15 risk out in the cold. So, it is a complex reality.

16 Now I, myself, think that down the line we certainly can  
17 admit the Visograd countries and should admit the Visograd  
18 countries, and that we should have that firmly in mind. But  
19 the timing in part depends on the changes in Russia. If  
20 Russia turns sour they should be admitted earlier than the  
21 technicalities would suggest. If Russia does not turn sour,  
22 then to draw a line that pushes the countries further East  
23 into an exposed position seems to me not to be wise policy.

24 Thank you.

25 Senator Biden: Senator Lugar.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2 MICHIGAN

3 Senator Lugar: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 I was encouraged in your testimony Ambassador Kampelman  
5 that there are at least some bedrock principles that we can  
6 fall back on, specifically the Helsinki Final Act and the  
7 Charter of the United Nations, the idea that there are  
8 boundaries that should be changed by peaceful negotiations,  
9 not by force. And as you have indicated, in the former  
10 Yugoslavia this is a principle that applies and that if NATO  
11 was there NATO might have responded as a police situation.  
12 The enemy has xenophobic aggressive tendencies, as you pointed  
13 out, and that we failed to see that. I think that may or may  
14 not be accepted by everybody, but at least it is a good point  
15 of departure as to what order in the world is about.

16 And you have mentioned, and I was intrigued, in response  
17 to Senator Biden that we can recoup. When you said that,  
18 essentially do you mean that even at this late point we can  
19 assert Article 51 of the United Nations or the Helsinki Final  
20 Act or the United Nations Charter generally and say  
21 essentially that Bosnia is Bosnia, a country we have  
22 recognized, a member of the United Nations, and it must remain  
23 Bosnia? Or what do you mean when you talk about recouping,  
24 having set forth these principles?

✓ 25 Ambassador Kampelman: ~~Well, what I had in mind was, and~~

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1 I realize that it would have been easier 2 years ago. Every 6  
2 months that goes by makes it more difficult. Six months from  
3 now it will be more difficult than it is today.

✓ 4 What I had in mind was setting forth <sup>^</sup>this program which I  
5 do believe is applicable today and can be started toward  
6 today, tomorrow, soon, as a way of recouping, as a way of  
7 reasserting principles here, much more difficult today than a  
8 year ago or 2 years ago. As General Galvin said, it would  
9 have been stronger if we had started this in Dubrovnik. But  
10 we did not do it in Dubrovnik.

11 Now, I do not want us to be in a position where 6 months  
12 from now we say well, we could have done something in Sarajevo  
13 but we lost that.

14 Senator Lugar: Let me ask at this juncture, because  
15 Secretary testified this morning before the Foreign Relations  
16 Committee on the second part of the President's program. The  
17 first part was working with our NATO allies to indicate that  
18 we would strike at guns that were not removed in the 20  
19 kilometers around Sarajevo. But the second part is to try to  
20 pursue a peace in Bosnia.

21 Now, Secretary Christopher, in response to a question  
22 that I asked, said that the Bosnians in terms of their bottom  
23 line depend upon the United States being involved as observers  
24 and peacekeepers of the arrangement that would follow the  
25 acceptance by the three parties. Secretary Christopher, on

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1 February 10th of last year, said in the event all three come  
2 to a peace settlement NATO under the United Nations will be  
3 the stabilizing force and we will be a part of that group.

4 Now, the administration has not pressed that aspect  
5 because whenever troops on the ground had been mentioned,  
6 frequently they indicated there had been no commitment to  
7 troops on the ground. We are back now to this point in which  
8 the President and the Secretary are going to attempt to work  
9 apparently with the Bosnians, maybe the Croatsians likewise.  
10 Secretary Christopher mentioned some interest today in  
11 conversations between the Bosnians and the Croatsians.

12 But the point that I raised was, when he raised that  
13 thought, that he had to assure the Bosnians that we the United  
14 States were going to be there as a part of the NATO situation.  
15 Did he have at this point the approval of the Congress, of the  
16 American people, anyone? In other words, how can you go into  
17 these peace negotiations having affirmed that? And he  
18 understood that point.

19 He said earlier that before we send the people there the  
20 Congress would have to be involved and there would have to be  
21 some approval. But we are about to get into negotiations.  
22 Apparently the United States is a part of NATO in which we are  
23 going to encourage the Bosnians to do this with the assertion  
24 that we are going to be there before we know that we are  
25 there.

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1           This gets back anyway to a problem that General Galvin  
2 and Senator Biden were raising as far as public opinion in  
3 this country. He said that the people involved, General  
4 Galvin, I thought in a very important statement, said that in  
5 1969 there he was lifted over the fence out of harm's way of  
6 the American people who had a different view about his duty.  
7 And we have all been discussing this in a way. This situation  
8 has not been broached to the American people yet. But there  
9 is a vague thought that we are a part of NATO and we will be a  
10 part of peacekeeping and peace making if necessary. But  
11 20,000, 25,000 people, is a good number of people, not a small  
12 number of peacekeepers.

13           In short, I suppose the question I am raising, when we  
14 talk about recouping let us say that we proceed down this  
15 road. Is that recouping, in your judgment, if we are  
16 successful in getting a peace and sending in peacekeepers, or  
17 does this really deny the whole sanctity of the Bosnian  
18 country at that point if we participated in the partition, in  
19 the act of simply keeping things separate?

20           I am trying to get some idea as to what our ideal step  
21 ought to be. If it is not what Christopher and the President  
22 want to do, what?

23           Ambassador Kampelman: Let me say, Senator, that I am  
24 myself quite uncertain as to what the administration plans to  
25 do. I read the President's statement which indicated that we

1 area.

2 Senator Lugar: But what if Secretary Christopher were to  
3 say to you, as he said to me, that in order to get the  
4 Bosnians even to settle at all he is going to have to assure  
5 them that Americans will be there.

6 Ambassador Kampelman: I would have to know what are we  
7 pressuring the Bosnians to accept. If we are pressuring the  
8 Bosnians to accept something that really fundamentally they do  
9 not think is in their interest I do not believe we have a  
10 lasting solution or one that is going to work. The hatreds  
11 are very deep. The enmity is very deep there.

✓ 12 So that I have to ~~somehow~~ reserve judgment on the whole  
13 question of the point 25,000 or 15,000 or whatever the number  
14 may be -- because I have heard both figures used -- until I  
✓ 15 see exactly what <sup>THE TROOPS</sup> ~~they~~ are supposed to do. I do not think we  
✓ 16 just arbitrarily ought to talk about <sup>A NUMBER</sup> ~~that~~. I feel much more  
17 comfortable talking about air power now than I do about ground  
18 troops. Maybe it is because I am -- that may be a reflection  
19 on me. I am not saying I am right or I am wrong about it. I  
✓ 20 am only indicating that I do feel more comfortable about <sup>AIR POWER</sup> ~~that~~  
✓ 21 than I do about putting in ~~just 15 or 25,000~~ troops there  
22 without knowing what they are getting into.

23 I get a feeling we are heading toward something messy if  
24 we are attempting to impose a peace.

25 Senator Lugar: I appreciate your response. My time is

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1 should not have too many high hopes about taking the NATO  
2 ultimatum of Sarajevo and applying it to other cities. I  
3 wondered what that meant. What was the President attempting  
4 to convey to us when he suggested that it might not be  
✓ 5 appropriate or ~~maybe would not want to~~ or ~~maybe~~ the U.S. does  
✓ 6 not want to apply ultimatum in other cities. ~~so~~ I really do  
7 not know where the administration is heading and, of course, I  
8 have not read the Secretary's testimony this morning.

9 I do think that it is important for the United States as  
10 a part of NATO to inject itself into the efforts underway to  
✓ 11 try to produce a solution to this problem. ~~And~~ I am pleased  
12 that we have a capable person there representing us in an  
13 effort to do that.

14 I have to say to you that I am personally somewhat  
15 skeptical about putting 25,000 troops in there as  
16 peacekeepers. I just feel somewhat skeptical as to how that  
17 is going to work.

18 Senator Lugar: Why are you skeptical?

19 Ambassador Kampelman: Because I do not know the extent  
20 to which the result that it is supposed to keep is the kind of  
21 a result that will avoid further guerrilla fighting, enmity,  
22 mortar shots, and all the rest. That is, if it is an imposed  
23 peace, if it is a peace that takes the form of legitimizing  
24 aggression, I have a sad feeling that even a piece of paper  
25 signed under duress is not likely to provide stability in the

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1 almost up. I just wanted to compliment each of you on very  
2 constructive thoughts on what NATO ought to look like how it  
3 ought to proceed. Obviously, as Senator Biden and Senator  
4 Levin have indicated, we are sympathetic and eager with those  
5 situations. I would just say in behalf of the President's  
6 predicament we have all talked about obviously the need for  
7 that leadership. The administration really has to have a  
8 policy and has to move ahead with it. And this is very  
9 difficult.

10 I understand that as a candidate for reelection, moving  
11 around Indiana the last week visiting with groups, a great  
12 number of people are not interested in Bosnia nor really in  
13 any foreign policy question. The President may have been  
14 right in his own analysis in the '92 campaign that the economy  
15 was the issue or domestic situations. If so, of course, he  
16 has built a real problem for himself this year in trying to  
17 deal with things. After you get elected and find that only  
18 presidential leadership perhaps and the President of the  
19 United States in particular can break through. And often  
20 maybe without a great deal of public support or even support  
21 of opinion leaders.

22 I would agree with Senator Biden that would be  
23 inordinately helpful if the opinion leaders of this country  
24 were as sensitive as all of you have been to the status not  
25 only of Bosnia but of Europe. Obviously they have not been

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1 nor is there unanimity in the Senate, which leads me to a  
2 conclusion, maybe uniquely, that ultimately this is why we  
3 have Presidents. They have to break through and simply say  
4 this is the way it is because this is the world in which we  
5 live, and bring along the leaders and the public opinion who  
6 often, after the President has made up his mind crowd into the  
7 room to cheer the fact that he is offering leadership. And I  
8 think all of us are pressing this President, really, to assume  
9 that role.

10 Ambassador Kampelman: That is why we pay him so much,  
11 yes.

12 Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment which I do want to say  
13 in connection with Secretary Schlesinger's testimony on the  
✓ 14 criteria, the pace, and the difficulty on admission, ~~that~~ I  
✓ 15 fully agree with that thrust and ~~in~~ the phrasing of my words  
✓ 16 was conscious of ~~it in~~ making distinctions. And distinctions  
17 have to be made between Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, in  
18 the one case with respect to timing, and further admissions in  
19 the other case with respect to timing.

20 Senator Biden: Do you gentlemen have a few more minutes?  
21 Because I have a couple more questions, Mr. Secretary, I would  
22 like to ask you if you have a moment.

23 Dr. Schlesinger: Could I comment on Senator Lugar's  
24 observations?

25 Senator Biden: Please do.

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1 Dr. Schlesinger: Life is cruel. Life is ambiguous. And  
2 in a sense, what this Nation is faced with in Yugoslavia is a  
3 choice between unethical outcomes. There is the passive  
4 unethical action or inaction in which we simply stand aside  
5 and watch what goes on there. There is the choice of action  
6 and involvement.

7 But the circumstances, given the fact that the Serbs and  
8 the Croates have defeated at this juncture the Bosnians means  
9 that there will be a partition of Bosnia, which will be  
10 inequitable from the standpoint of the prior distribution of  
11 populations within Bosnia. And to the extent that we  
12 introduce those 25,000 peacekeepers we are faced with the  
13 ethical dilemma that Ambassador Kampelman has pointed out,  
14 that we are, in a sense, imposing on the Bosnians an outcome  
15 which is poorer than the outcome that they could have gotten 6  
16 months ago under Vance-Owen or the various European solutions,  
17 and that our failure to support partition in the past has made  
18 the present situation worse.

19 When we are involved in these complex international  
20 matters it is hard to find a clear difference between the good  
21 guys and the bad guys as we could in World War II. And to the  
22 extent that we become the judge we are going to impose a  
23 solution or fail to impose a solution, which is in some sense  
24 unethical.

25 Senator Biden: It is interesting, Mr. Secretary, you

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1 know more about World War II and many other things than I do.  
2 But we had no problem picking a bad guy to beat a bad guy.

3 Dr. Schlesinger: Exactly. Exactly.

4 Senator Biden: Let me suggest that with regard to Bosnia  
5 the reason why I think the President has an option to deal  
6 with this ethical dilemma is available to him and I think he  
7 will regret not pushing as hard as he can to exercise that  
8 option, and that is lifting the arms embargo. That is an  
9 option that is real. We can, in fact, stand somewhere between  
10 taking the role of Pontius Pilate and being the one who  
11 concludes that we are going to declare that one side is pure.

12 The fact of the matter is that inaction, I would suggest,  
13 has grave consequences.

14 Dr. Schlesinger: That is quite right, Mr. Chairman.

15 Senator Biden: At that same meeting that I referred to  
16 with the so-called leaders of the Congress I raised the  
17 question when one individual said in the meeting Mr. President  
18 I will be with you but that means we must win. And I asked  
19 the President, pleaded with the President publicly at that  
20 moment to define what the goal was, because this individual  
21 was prepared to make a case that if air power did not bring an  
22 end to the war that we lost.

23 That was not the mission the President was setting out.  
24 It was a very prescribed mission. Then he asked the question  
25 to this assembled group and I asked it to you all, all three

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1 of you, does anyone doubt that if we do not take any action,  
2 including air strikes, that there is any incentive on the part  
3 of the Bosnian Serbs continuing to be supported by the Serbian  
4 Serbs to continue to indiscriminately shell civilian  
5 populations? Because they do not have the manpower. They do  
6 not have the manpower to seize the land. They do not have the  
7 manpower or the will to march down into Sarajevo or Tuzla or  
8 Srebrenica or Garazde or any of the places you have named -- I  
9 have named. They do not have the ability to occupy the  
10 territory. There are less than 40,000 of them. There are  
11 125,000 Bosnians with Remington rifles, I might add. But they  
12 will play hell taking those streets.

13 I often find it interesting. People talk about the Serbs  
14 and how they took five German divisions. That occurred in  
15 Bosnia. It was not the Serbs. Some Serbs were there, but  
16 there were Moslems, too, so these are hard-assed folks.

17 I remember sitting with your former colleagues not long  
18 ago, including the former Joint Chiefs of Staff telling me  
19 that the Bosnians had not the capability of using any military  
20 hardware we gave them. It would be a waste of time. Who  
21 would have guessed a year later after 100,000 dead they would  
22 still be fighting. And I have no doubt -- and I should not  
23 say this but I am going to and I will end for your comment --  
24 I have no doubt the reason for the change in the French  
25 position was the Bosnians were starting to make gains, that,

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1 God forbid, in Europe the outcome would be the Bosnians had  
2 weaponry.

3 I would not bet on anything other than the only way they  
4 would not prevail would be if Serbia crossed the Drina  
5 wholesale and the JNA was in full force. Then that makes  
6 Europe face up come to their milk. Now, there is no pretext  
7 available. It would be the JNA crossing the Drina in full  
8 force and Tujjman deciding how much he wanted to gobble up  
9 coming from the north. Now Europe has a problem. They then  
10 have to make a decision. That is why the hell the French  
11 decided all of a sudden that they should support air strikes,  
12 because this is all about getting us into a situation where we  
13 impose upon the Bosnians something we have been unwilling to  
14 do. And that is a bottom line.

15 So my question to you is does it make any sense for the  
16 United States at this juncture to be talking about sending any  
17 American forces to enforce anything when we still have the  
18 opportunity and the option of lifting the embargo and standing  
19 back?

20 Mr. Secretary?

21 Dr. Schlesinger: Well, who is the we? That is the  
22 problem. I think all of us would favor lifting the embargo.  
23 It was earlier mentioned, I think by Senator Lugar or perhaps  
24 you Mr. Chairman, that the United States should forcefully  
25 proceed. Well, we urged our allies to lift the embargo,

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1 perhaps not forcefully enough, but that was the direction of  
2 American foreign policy. Nonetheless, our allies have  
3 resisted that solution. We are here to meet about the  
4 maintenance of NATO.

5 Senator Biden: Right.

6 Dr. Schlesinger: When one is part of a multilateral  
7 organization one is not free unilaterally to change.

8 Senator Biden: Which leads me to my next question.

9 Dr. Schlesinger: One more point. We could move  
10 unilaterally to remove the embargo, but then there are  
11 consequences. The Russians looking out of there may say why  
12 do they end that embargo in that situation unilaterally? We  
13 will end the embargo in Iraq.

14 Senator Biden: I agree. Now, that is why I wanted to  
15 get to this next one. It relates to you, General. Having  
16 been over there, the day-to-day operative guy on the ground,  
17 what happens in NATO if you are sitting there and President  
18 Levin said to you go tell them General we are lifting the  
19 sucker. I do not care what they do. What happens? What is  
20 your best guess of the dynamic that happens inside of NATO?  
21 You have run it. You have been there. You know it. What  
22 does your instinct tell you?

23 General Galvin: That is a hard one, Mr. Chairman, to try  
24 to predict what will happen there. First of all, I would say  
25 we are at a stage right now where we have done something. We

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1 have stopped the shelling in Sarajevo. Now, I would like to  
2 at this point see what happens next. Let us watch this. The  
3 Bosnians are not as weak as they seem. If they were weak the  
4 Serbs would have taken Sarajevo, just as you said yourself.

5 The Serbs have actually sat back at max range shelling  
6 Sarajevo. It is a merciless shelling, but it is really not a  
7 sustained shelling even at that -- that is, in terms of what  
8 the shelling of cities has been in time. Let us now see what  
9 happens.

10 It appears to me that if we take the big guns out of the  
11 equation we have really gotten a lot closer to leveling the  
12 playing field now, and what the President has said, and as a  
13 soldier I listen really hard when Presidents talk about the  
14 use of military force, he has said we want a comprehensive  
15 peace and if we get that we are willing to put forces on the  
16 ground. But if we do not get that we are not willing to put  
17 forces on the ground. But we are willing to use our combat  
18 power, especially in this case our air power, to try to see  
19 what we can do to make this equation a little bit more even.

20 So let us watch. Let us see what happens here.

21 Senator Biden: The reason why I asked the question,  
22 General, is not merely as it relates to Bosnia. It goes to  
23 the point you made. And as you talked about the future  
24 expansion of NATO you indicated that it does not have to be  
25 the way -- decisions do not have to be reached the same way

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1 they were reached in the past; that is, I assume by that in  
2 the past for NATO to take any action in-theater they would  
3 have to collectively conclude that that should be done, and  
4 there was essentially a veto power -- in fact a veto power --  
5 that any one nation has.

6 Now, ironically -- it is hard for Americans to understand  
7 this -- but Yugoslavia is essentially out of territory. I  
8 mean, it is not historically what we have focused on. And I  
9 wonder whether or not we could -- this notion of taking  
10 action, an expanded NATO that allowed one or two or three or  
11 five or seven nations to take a particular course of action  
12 that the others disagreed with without it causing the  
13 disillusion, the dissolving of the alliance. I wonder whether  
14 or not NATO and the former Yugoslavia may not be a fine test  
15 case for that.

16 By the way, I think if we did that, General -- I do not  
17 know as much as you guys know but I have been around 21 years  
18 fooling around with NATO. If the United States went in and  
19 said they are lifting the embargo there would not be anybody  
20 have the guts to veto it. There would not be anybody have the  
21 guts to do anything about it. They would march, boom, on down  
22 the line.

23 I am going to now hear in the French papers and the  
24 German papers about Biden once again bashing the Germans and  
25 the French and the Brits. I want to include them all. I do

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1 not want to hurt anybody's feelings by leaving them out.

2 They would all march, in my view, and say okay, they may  
3 not supply weapons, but they would do it. But I wonder  
4 whether this may not be the first test case to determine  
5 whether or not NATO is able to act politically in unison most  
6 of the time but acknowledge that as it relates to anything  
7 other than the core countries there may be a need to go our  
8 separate ways.

9 General Galvin: Actually, Mr. Chairman, there have been  
10 test cases, at least I would call them test cases, and that is  
11 in the Gulf. During the Gulf War it became within the North  
12 Atlantic Council almost like a marketplace for ideas on what  
13 we could do, a kind of debate.

14 There were times when we said, the Turks need -- they  
15 might get attacked by Scuds with chemical warheads. They need  
16 chemical weapons protective gear. Who has got some? And some  
17 countries said, well, I could supply some but I do not have a  
18 way of getting them there. Well then, who has got some  
19 airplanes or ships so we could get them there and so forth?

20 And so there seems to me to be a possibility here that we  
21 need to explore, and that is that we do not need any more, in  
22 the kind crises that we will face, to show this solidarity,  
23 one for all and all for one, and we will all rise up together  
24 and do something, where we can debate how we can respond in a  
25 crisis.

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1           If it happened, for example, to be a crisis over water or  
2 something between Syria and Turkey, and that is a possibility,  
3 maybe we would find a Nordic country that might say, you know,  
4 that is really not my deep interest here, but I will support  
5 what you do although I do not want to take part. I think  
6 there is room for this coming.

7           The other point that I would like to say, if I can, on  
8 expansion of NATO. We keep talking about whether we would  
9 expand to these other countries and what would be the  
10 criteria. First of all, in criteria I think this is going to  
11 be a little bit difficult. As Max Kampelman said, we do not  
12 want to say the criteria is nobody will change anybody's  
13 borders. We already said that with the Helsinki Final Act.

14           We would have problems with the history of NATO if we  
15 said that a country could not come in unless it had the forces  
16 to operate. There were countries who came in who did not have  
17 very much at all in the way of forces. There were countries  
18 who came in that it would be a little bit hard to say they  
19 were true democracies at that moment.

20           So really what I think we have to do first, before we  
21 talk about criteria, is do we need these countries for  
22 anything? Now, this is why I say if the strategy of NATO is  
23 not going to be forward defense and flexible response against  
24 the Warsaw Pact but it is going to be crisis management, then  
25 we have to decide, well, where are the crises that might take

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1 place that we would want to manage?

2 And if the crises would take place in Central and Eastern  
3 Europe, then we need a relationship with Central and Eastern  
4 Europe because if not we are intruding into the crisis in a  
5 way that may not be necessary if they are all part of us.

6 By the way, then the question comes up about what about  
7 Russia. First, I think that we need to be able to convince  
8 Russia of the relationship that exists between Russia and the  
9 United States especially in terms of the history and the need  
10 to balance and secure a peace in the area where there was a  
11 Cold War going on.

12 Also, we need to look at how much we believe in structure  
13 like the United Nations. We are ambivalent about these  
14 things. But I think in the future world structure is going to  
15 be very important to us when it comes to stability and peace  
16 and security. We need more structure in the Pacific, and  
17 Russia would obviously be a part of that structure.

18 So, I think the first thing that we have to do here,  
19 before we try to get into lesser questions, is answer two big  
20 ones. One is, what is the strategy of NATO and are we  
21 seconding the motion on that strategy of crisis management?

22 And second, how much do we believe in the idea that there  
23 would be, in this world ever getting smaller, a United Nations  
24 that was effective, that would get regional support from  
25 structures that were effective there, and how much do we want

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1 to work towards that?

2 Senator Biden: Senator Warner?

3 Senator Warner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Senator Biden: Before you start, I know that the  
5 Secretary has an important appointment at about 4:30. He has  
6 to leave here about 4:20. And I understand you all may also  
7 have planes and trains to catch, but if you can stay we  
8 appreciate it. If you really have to leave, we understand it.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2 VIRGINIA

3 Senator Warner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman  
4 Levin. I have the privilege of being the Ranking Member on  
5 Senator Levin's committee, and we worked on the charter for  
6 these hearings together with our distinguished colleague on  
7 foreign relations, and it is working out very well largely  
8 because we have the quality and the background of individuals  
9 like yourself willing to come forward. This is important  
10 business.

11 I want to start with taking a paragraph or so out of the  
12 statements that you have given, gentlemen, and I am sorry we  
13 have had Dr. Perry elsewhere today, and I just had to be  
14 there.

15 But, Dr. Schlesinger, this is a very profound observation  
16 you have on page 8. I will read it.

17 "Second, I want to express my deep concern at the  
18 tendencies simultaneously to expand our commitments while  
19 shrinking our forces. Before we, in a burst of enthusiasm,  
20 expand our commitments we must have reasonable assurance that  
21 we have the forces in place to fulfill such new commitments."

22 I very strongly agree, and I am hopeful that the new  
23 commission on rules and missions, Dr. Schlesinger, which you  
24 and I have discussed here, will see to it that that is a  
25 central part of their focus.

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1 I would like to pick up on a slightly different tangent  
2 to your important observation. I want to revise your sentence  
3 of, "second, I want to express my deep concern at the  
4 tendencies to expand our commitments", and I will go in this  
5 direction, before we know clearly the extent to which the  
6 people of the United States and the Congress of the United  
7 States will support an operation.

8 Now, no criticism to anyone. I have been here 15 years  
9 now. Senator Levin and I came together, and we have our elder  
10 statesman here who has got a few years on us. But last fall  
11 we witnessed here in primarily the Senate a very unusual  
12 chapter in our history. We encountered, General Galvin,  
13 casualties in the Somalia operation, casualties certainly  
14 greatly significant in many ways, relatively small compared to  
15 military engagements in the history of this country.

16 But as a consequence of that failed operation, only one  
17 failed operation out of several, seven to exact and one  
18 failed, we saw a country having to reverse its policy -- its  
19 policy with respect to our assistance to a helpless nation, a  
20 policy with respect to our partnership arrangement with some,  
21 and I have forgotten the exact number, I think 18 other  
22 nations that were there with us.

23 Then come back, and this institution came within a  
24 fraction of reversing what I perceive as the constitutional  
25 responsibility, Ambassador Kampelman, of a President as

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1 Commander in Chief to decide when to deploy forces and when to  
2 bring them home. We came with two to three votes of bringing  
3 them home at Christmas against the express judgment of the  
4 President of the United States, all of this engendered by the  
5 new element in foreign policy, namely the television camera.

6 Now before we, as you say Dr. Schlesinger, expand our  
7 commitments we have got to have a very clear understanding of  
8 what is involved with NATO in the future. And will our people  
9 remain steadfast while NATO carries out one of those  
10 commitments, be it the resolution of a border dispute or a  
11 cultural conflict, or these other not well defined  
12 contingencies that would be embraced were we to extend the  
13 full NATO charter to the Visograd countries?

14 Could you all give me a little of your reflection on that  
15 point, which I think I could summarize in two words -- does  
16 the U.S. having the staying power to stick with the President,  
17 stick with his commitment to NATO, and see through some of  
18 these operations?

19 Dr. Schlesinger: Well, the first point I should make,  
20 and I full agree with your observations, Senator Warner, is  
21 that we cannot expand those commitments without a full public  
22 debate just as we had a full public debate with regard to the  
23 admission of Germany to NATO, just as we had a full public  
24 debate in 1949 about the NATO Treaty itself. Unless we have  
25 that political base we are going to run into trouble.

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1 Chairman Biden at the outset said, why did we not take  
2 the actions in the 1930's that seem to be self-evident in  
3 retrospect? The answer is it is only in retrospect that these  
4 actions seem to be self-evident.

5 We are going to be in a position that we need to have  
6 public support and a public realization of some of the  
7 consequences of going east.

8 As I pointed out earlier, before your arrival, there is  
9 no problem in protecting Bohemia or the Czech Republic. There  
10 is little problem for us in protecting Hungary. There is some  
11 slight problem in offering protection to Poland, but I think  
12 that it is only a slight problem.

13 The difficulty comes when we begin to talk about  
14 protecting the Baltic states or Ukraine because we do not have  
15 the forces. And in the past we have threatened, in extremis,  
16 to use nuclear weapons. The Russians are turning in the  
17 direction of a first strike defense. And those kinds of  
18 questions have got to be very carefully analyzed before we go  
19 in and provide a guarantee in those places that we do not have  
20 the conventional forces to be serious.

21 Senator Warner: Ambassador Kampelman, does this country  
22 have the staying power?

23 Dr. Schlesinger: Mr. Chairman, may I depart?

24 Senator Levin: Yes. Thank you again, Dr. Schlesinger.

25 Ambassador Kampelman: Let me say that I agree fully with

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1 Dr. Schlesinger's statement about a public debate but I would  
2 add to that the necessity for Presidential leadership.

3 I believe that our history demonstrates that where a full  
4 explanation and a reason for a recommended policy decision is  
5 given to the American people and the debate is around that  
6 kind of an explanation I think it is quite likely that there  
7 would be support.

8 Senator Warner: Let me remind you --

9 Ambassador Kampelman: Excuse me.

10 Senator Warner: Let me remind you of such a debate. It  
11 happens to be a debate on a bill that I was privileged to draw  
12 up and that was the bill to authorize the President, this time  
13 George Bush, to use force in the Gulf. It prevailed by five  
14 votes, Ambassador Kampelman. Five votes might well have made  
15 the difference between our performing as we did in the Gulf or  
16 standing still.

17 Ambassador Kampelman: Yes, but you know a President can  
18 also take a constitutional position that with some military  
19 action it is not necessary to receive the approval of the  
20 Congress.

21 Senator Warner: Careful. The War Powers Act, which came  
22 during the period, Ambassador Kampelman, when you were very  
23 close to the Senate of the United States --

24 Ambassador Kampelman: I realize that, and I must say to  
25 you that as an individual I had questions about the War Powers

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1 Act, constitutional questions about its desirability, but that  
2 is not the point.

3 The point I want to support is Secretary Schlesinger's  
4 point that with full discussion and full debate you are more  
5 likely to get support. And before you came in Senator Lugar  
6 made a very cogent observation. In effect we pay the  
7 President the large salary we pay him because he has got to  
8 make ~~sometimes~~ these tough decisions, and the same might be  
9 said ~~sometimes~~ about members of the Senate or members of the  
10 Congress. There are times when tough decisions have to be  
11 made.

12 I am not suggesting that public opinion is at all  
13 irrelevant. On the contrary, I am saying the likelihood of  
14 those positions being able to prevail depends on support from  
15 public opinion.

16 Senator Warner: Well, I sort of grew up, and give or  
17 take a few years we are not that far apart in age, but I grew  
18 up in the generation of World War II where I served very  
19 briefly in the Navy. Ours is not the reason why but to do or  
20 die. And that same, General Galvin, philosophy carried over,  
21 indeed, to Korea, and the origins of Vietnam.

22 But then it is given away, and there is more now of, yes,  
23 we will reason and reason publicly and show our views before  
24 we step up to do or die.

25 General Galvin -- and also I agree with your comment on

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1 page 5 about the NATO Treaty change. I have repeatedly said  
2 that publicly, that I feel that we have to change that.

3 We are trying to capitalize on something that worked and  
4 worked so well, worked almost with perfection -- indeed, it  
5 did, we did not fire a shot -- and say that it can apply to  
6 all of these amorphous, undefined situation that might develop  
7 in the world today.

8 General Galvin: Let me say first of all that I see your  
9 question, Senator, as would we have American support if we  
10 wanted to expand NATO. I think that is the question.

11 Senator Warner: And also define what are the likely  
12 missions if we do take in the Visograd countries.

13 General Galvin: First let me say, when we go back into  
14 history and we look at times when America supported something  
15 that was very difficult to carry, such as the 4 years of World  
16 War II, and then we look at other times when American did not,  
17 I think we have to be very careful about why it was that we  
18 either did or did not.

19 I myself do not think that it has very much to do with  
20 American changing as an overall collective psyche called the  
21 United States of America. I think it has a lot to do with  
22 whether people believe that the strategy of the time, carried  
23 through and sustained, will solve the problems of the time.  
24 And I think it is as simple as that.

25 Now, there have been times when the American people were

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1 lured into something, usually by some strange coalescing point  
2 like the Battleship Maine or the Lusitania or something else.

3 Senator Warner: Pearl Harbor.

4 General Galvin: Pearl Harbor. And sometimes it worked  
5 and sometimes it did not. When you take Pearl Harbor, the  
6 United States is not a warlike country. The Russians were at  
7 the gates of Moscow at the time of Pearl Harbor, and yet we  
8 were not in the war. And it took that coalescing point to  
9 bring us in.

10 Senator Warner: And we were a very divided country at  
11 that time.

12 General Galvin: Yes, we were. Now, if we are going to  
13 do something like change the NATO strategy, which we did at  
14 Rome in 1991, to a strategy that it no longer is a defense  
15 against the Warsaw Pact with forward defense, and flexible  
16 response, and all the rest of that then we have to be sure  
17 that the actions that we take -- first of all that that  
18 strategy of crisis management does meet the realities of the  
19 new world, especially of the new world of Europe. And then if  
20 it does, then I think we can expect the support of the United  
21 States as people in carrying out that strategy.

22 Now, if the strategy says that we are going to try to  
23 manage crises, and if those crises are going to take place, as  
24 we think, in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe,  
25 then we should expand NATO.

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1 But if the strategy -- if we are still going to talk  
2 about protection of the countries like Poland or protection of  
3 some country that we are bringing into NATO under Article 5 of  
4 NATO, then we are back to the old NATO in which we brought  
5 countries in and countries came in because they wanted to be  
6 protected against the Warsaw Pact.

7 Now, we already declared in London in 1990 that we, NATO,  
8 have no adversaries, and especially we do not have any  
9 Russians as adversaries. So, are we going to take these  
10 countries in in order to protect them against the Russians?  
11 Is that the idea? Because if that is the idea, that is not  
12 the strategy that we stated for NATO.

13 The strategy that we would try to respond, and we changed  
14 even the force structure to more multinational rapid reaction  
15 forces, smaller forces, et cetera, because we were moving to a  
16 new idea, and that was that we, in a world of instability,  
17 unpredictability, and lack of security during this time of  
18 tremendous transition would have crises and we would try to  
19 respond to them.

20 It would be much better to respond to those crises when  
21 they occurred in countries that were associated with us, in  
22 NATO, rather than countries in which we came in as outsiders  
23 into that.

24 So, if we want support from the American public we have  
25 to articulate what the strategy is, and what is the world

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1 situation on which that strategy is based. And until we do  
2 that, we might get into this somehow through one of these  
3 coalescing points, for better or for worse -- some of them  
4 have been good and some of them have been not so good over  
5 history.

6 But we are not taking up the essential questions. We are  
7 dealing with -- for instance, right now we have a coalescing  
8 point which is the central marketplace in Sarajevo. It may be  
9 all for the good that that coalesces American public opinion.

10 But what really should coalesce American public opinion  
11 is a good understanding of what our strategy is to meet the  
12 world situation as we know it.

13 Senator Warner: Let me go back and see if I picked up  
14 correctly, and I want to do further research on this. The  
15 1991 Rome revision of NATO does not match a contingency  
16 problem against Russia or one of the other satellites.

17 General Galvin: In the London declaration of 1990, July  
18 of 1990, we said we no longer have adversaries. We said what  
19 our adversary was was a lack of stability and predictability  
20 in this world of transition in Europe.

21 We also stated some principles that would change NATO.  
22 Those would be such things as rapid reaction to crises, and  
23 that was especially the one.

24 But that was not a strategic concept. We did not have  
25 time to do a strategic concept. That was just after the big

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1 year of 1989 with all the change.

2       However, in 1991 in Rome, in November, we then did lay  
3 out a strategic concept. We said, there was still a problem  
4 that existed out there. In the possibilities we vaguely  
5 mention in the communique a potentially strong Soviet Union  
6 that still has -- I mean, I do not remember now whether it  
7 said Soviet Union or Russia or CIS that still has nuclear  
8 weapons. But the main point was that we were shifting to a  
9 strategy of crisis response.

10       I think that is clear now, and we have said it over and  
11 over, that we do not consider Russia to be our enemy or even  
12 our adversary. We are worried about things that might happen  
13 in the future but basically we are not trying to -- our  
14 strategy would dictate we are not trying to bring in Central  
15 and Eastern European countries in order to protect them  
16 against somebody. We are trying to bring them in because we  
17 have a strategy of crisis management and we could see crises  
18 in those areas.

19       Senator Warner: Thank you very much. Can I just observe  
20 the presence of Barbara Gallo, a former staff member of the  
21 Senate Armed Services Committee, here today working European  
22 Command and in attendance at this hearing on behalf of her  
23 European Command.

24       Ambassador Kampelman: I just wanted to point out,  
25 Senator, that one of the arguments used against enlarging NATO

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1 was that the American people were not prepared to pay the  
2 price of defending them in the event of an attack against  
3 them.

4 Senator Warner: And that was a sound argument in my  
5 judgment. I think the President was correct. Maybe you  
6 disagree with me.

7 Ambassador Kampelman: Well, my own judgment is that we  
8 should expand NATO. I think we need criteria. I think those  
9 criteria have to be thought through, ~~but I do think that, and~~  
10 ~~I agree with Secretary Schlesinger that~~ this is a slow  
11 process, but I think we ought to expand.

12 Senator Warner: Maybe so, but not until the United  
13 States is ready to live up to its commitments with an adequate  
14 force structure and the will power to back the President, who  
15 is committed as a partner in NATO, to see that the job is done  
16 whatever it is.

17 Senator Levin: One quick word on public opinion,  
18 throwing my 2 cents worth in on that, and a couple of  
19 questions.

20 Public opinion obviously is important in a democracy. I  
21 agree with Ambassador Kampelman and Dick Lugar. So is  
22 Presidential leadership, and what we often find is public  
23 opinion is not there until a President leads and then rallies  
24 to support a President after a decision is made.

25 I do not know what the public opinion polls show relative

1 to an ultimatum to the Serbs or else there were going to be  
2 air strikes, but I would bet you that a majority would not  
3 have supported that ultimatum in public opinion polls. I do  
4 not think it was there. I think it may have been there a year  
5 or two ago, but I do not think it has been there recently in  
6 terms of air strikes.

7 But the President did the right thing. Now I think  
8 public opinion will support what he did, even during the  
9 uncertain period before we knew whether or not that ultimatum  
10 would work or not.

11 So, there is obviously a critical role for public  
12 opinion, but it can come after Presidential leadership to  
13 support the Presidential leadership. In other words, it had  
14 better be there, but it does not necessarily have to be there  
15 prior to leadership, providing the leadership is such that it  
16 can instill the confidence in the public that we are on the  
17 right course.

18 I mean, during the Civil War there were draft riots in  
19 the North, severe draft riots. We had Presidential leadership  
20 at that time that, among other things, permitted that effort  
21 to be sustained. So, it is not unusual that there is a  
22 division of public opinion, and that nonetheless leadership is  
23 able to truly lead.

24 That is just my own feeling on the public opinion issue  
25 here.

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1           Senator Warner: I was not suggesting, Mr. Chairman, that  
2 this strategy be predicated on daily polls or a flash  
3 decision. But I think, as our witnesses have said, you have  
4 got to lay a very solid foundation so that the public  
5 understands why NATO has expanded and what is expected of NATO  
6 and the NATO countries should a contingency arise.

7           Senator Levin: I tend to agree with the formulation that  
8 public opinion has be there at some point. I would only add  
9 the ingredient that Presidential leadership can contribute to  
10 public opinion.

11          Senator Warner: Maybe we should call it public  
12 understanding and acceptance.

13          Senator Levin: I think that is an important title. Let  
14 me ask a few questions if you have a few more minutes. If you  
15 do not, that is fine, too.

16          General Galvin. I did not get to you on the NATO  
17 expansion issue, but you have covered it pretty well. My  
18 last question, last round, I talked about criteria, timetable,  
19 what your feelings were; and I never got to you in that round.

20          You have indicated that you think it is premature, is the  
21 way -- perhaps I am putting words into your mouth -- that we  
22 first ought to decide what our goal and strategy is. If it is  
23 crisis management, that is one thing; if it is to withstand an  
24 onslaught from the East, that is totally different. But we  
25 have already rejected that as our strategy and our purpose.

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1           Assume with me now, for the moment, that what you see,  
2   and I think most of us see, is a newer role for NATO, which is  
3   the crisis management role. Assume that that is our new  
4   strategy. With that assumption, should we set some specific  
5   criteria and some timetables for membership; either with a  
6   two-tier or with a sole tier?

7           General Galvin: First of all, I would like to assume  
8   that that is our strategy. And I said in my paper, and I  
9   would like to say again, that if NATO is going to try to  
10   continue to have a strategy of defense against something out  
11   there in the East, some gigantic power like the Warsaw Pact,  
12   or the Soviet Union, or even Russia, then NATO will become an  
13   anachronism.

14          Senator Levin: Assuming the new strategy is our  
15   strategy?

16          General Galvin: That is right. And I, therefore, think  
17   that the new strategy ought to be our strategy; and let us  
18   assume that it is. If it is, then what is really important to  
19   us is to establish a relationship with the Central and Eastern  
20   European countries that would allow us to use that strategy,  
21   which would be a strategy of crisis management. If crises  
22   occurred, then we would respond all together. That would  
23   include the Russians, also.

24          First of all, I think we should say to the Russians: An  
25   expanded NATO, under those circumstances with that strategy,

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1 equals peace and stability, and should be something that the  
2 Russians would support. And maybe even, be part of.

3 Now, this is very different from saying, "We are going to  
4 expand to the East, in order to protect these countries."  
5 Protect them, against what? We will then, therefore, have a  
6 response from the Russians. I am not saying that we have to  
7 be passing everything through the Duma in order to find out  
8 whether or not we can do it.

9 But I do think that what we need to do is take a hard  
10 look; first, at what is the world picture out there,  
11 especially in Europe? But overall. And then, what is our  
12 United States' strategy? And, if we see that as a coalition  
13 effort in this aspect, as far as Europe is concerned, that we  
14 would not be acting individually ourselves in Europe but as a  
15 coalition, then we need this expansion.

16 So we do not need, then, to start saying, if I may, sir,  
17 that, well, they have to meet a lot of criteria. They have to  
18 meet some criteria: They have to be democratic Nations. We  
19 said this in the past. They have already met the border  
20 criteria, with the Helsinki Final Act; they are all signers up  
21 to that. The forces, and whether they have forces or not I do  
22 not think is the important part. And to think that Poland or  
23 Czechoslovakia might not have forces like Luxembourg, and so  
24 forth, is to me, absurd.

25 Senator Levin: Let me see if I understand you, then.

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1        Assuming that the new strategy is accepted, which I think  
2        it is, but assuming it is, you then would see us moving fairly  
3        quickly to establish new relationships, whether or not Russia  
4        understood them or not.

5        You would try to persuade Russia that, given any strategy  
6        which is not based on any new threat to you, but based on any  
7        new strategy based on crisis management, understand Russia  
8        that this is a new strategy. But, whether or not they  
9        understood or not, as I am reading you here, that you think we  
10       should and could move quite quickly toward establishing either  
11       the same kind of relationship in Eastern Europe as we have in  
12       Western Europe, or a second- or third-tier kind of  
13       relationship.

14       General Galvin: I think, yes, especially in making  
15       Russia understand this. We would see Russia acting just as  
16       Russia is acting today in the former Yugoslavia. And Russia  
17       has been in the former Yugoslavia for months and months and  
18       months already; it has been in the Krajina area with its  
19       troops.

20       Senator Levin: The hard question for me would be, if  
21       they did not understand despite our best efforts to explain  
22       the new strategy, would you still proceed relatively rapidly  
23       to establish this NATO relationship with Eastern Europe?

24       General Galvin: I think that I would spend some time  
25       convincing the Russians, and I am not being cynical about

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1 this. I mean, convincing the Russians; I think they can be  
2 convinced, that the way to peace and stability in Europe is  
3 the expansion.

4 Senator Levin: All right. A quick word about your new  
5 protocol you made reference to. Could you expand a bit on  
6 what would be in that protocol? You said, possibly a  
7 structure with two or three tiers.

8 General Galvin: I think we have to --

9 First of all, as you know, NATO has had protocols before.  
10 Every time somebody new has come in, there has been a  
11 protocol. So this is nothing new. I think a protocol has to  
12 deal with questions that would come up from a good hard look  
13 at NATO right now.

14 One of them is: If we have this new strategy, why do we  
15 still have the old strategy hanging on here? And are we going  
16 to try to balance two strategies? Are we really still  
17 defending against the Warsaw Pact? That is a question that  
18 needs to come up.

19 The second one is: Why do we, if the strategy is crisis  
20 management, why do we need to be absolutely unanimous on every  
21 point that we take up, if what we are trying to deal with is a  
22 crisis in which we do not have 48 hours to have to make a  
23 decision, but maybe, 48 weeks or more to debate over the  
24 decision?

25 Those are some of the questions that I think should be

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1 part of a study, an agreement and a protocol; and I do not  
2 think NATO would self-destruct in the process.

3 Senator Levin: What are the two or three tiers you  
4 referred to?

5 General Galvin: I think we might have to, Senator, go  
6 through some kind of a staged metamorphosis here of NATO; as  
7 we come out of our old cocoon into whatever we are going to be  
8 next. And that might be in which these relationships with the  
9 Eastern European countries would go through stages, before we  
10 reached a final stage.

11 Senator Levin: There would be sort of an interim  
12 membership of some kind?

13 General Galvin: Well, there is a Partnership for Peace  
14 now. We could work that toward some stronger relationship. I  
15 very much think here that we have to put ourselves in Moscow  
16 and look westward from there at all of this; and I think that  
17 this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all concerned,  
18 if we do it right and if we do not rush into it, and so forth.

19 Senator Levin: A question for both of you, on Hungary,  
20 as it relates to Bosnia, but as to NATO membership. I think  
21 they are one of the countries that have indicated an interest  
22 in the Partnership for peace -- 9 have already. And there is  
23 a lot of support for Hungary being a member of NATO, including  
24 from me.

25 We read today, or yesterday, that Hungary is denied

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1 overflight privileges, in terms of air strikes. Does that  
2 create a problem, do you see, in terms of their becoming NATO  
3 members? Can we accept that? Is there anything unusual about  
4 that? Coming from a potential NATO member, when you have a  
5 NATO operation in Bosnia finally, in my view, 2 years late;  
6 that we have NATO members saying, "Sorry, do not fly over me"?

7 Or is that, did we find that case before? In Libya, for  
8 instance, when we attacked Qadafi, we had some countries as I  
9 remember that said, "Do not fly over us, please," in that  
10 particular process.

11 But can you comment on the Hungarian issue, as it relates  
12 to their potential NATO membership?

13 Ambassador Kampelman: Let me comment on it, by first  
14 suggesting to you in connection with what General Galvin  
15 talked about, different strategies.

✓ 16 ~~That,~~ Having myself talked with President Walesa and  
17 President Havel, I am convinced that they are themselves not  
18 certain that they are that safe from any kind of attack coming  
✓ 19 from the East. ~~It is not the kind of~~ I remember  
✓ 20 ~~specifically talking.~~ It is not the kind of thing they expect  
21 to happen. It is not the kind of thing that they think might  
22 happen in the near future.

23 But, as in effect both of them have said, as Presidents  
24 of their countries, they have a responsibility to think  
25 long-term, and to think long-term about the security of their

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1 country.

2 I do feel that the extent to which countries like  
3 Czechoslovakia and Poland and Hungary become part of NATO,  
4 this would all change. They might become more secure. They  
5 might get a broader vista, and a broader understanding of  
6 Europe as a whole. I think that is one of the advantages of  
7 membership and close identification, that you could get to  
8 spread your thinking further.

✓ 9 In specific. With respect to your specific question on  
10 Hungary and its present position, which is denying overflight  
11 to the NATO forces, it is disappointing. I would, myself, not  
12 look upon that as a disqualification.

13 Among the criteria for membership would have to be a  
14 respect for decisions made by NATO, with the caveat that  
15 General Galvin has pointed out, which permits one country to  
16 say, "Well, we cannot do this, that, or the other thing." And  
17 we can examine the nature of those caveats.

18 But I certainly would not disqualify a country which  
19 today differs with a NATO decision, and which did not  
✓ 20 participate in that decision. ~~And~~ Hungary, as you know, has a  
21 peculiar set of problems now, in connection with that total  
22 Balkan problem. And I have a feeling that they are on edge,  
23 with respect to the developments there.

24 Senator Levin: General Galvin, do you have anything you  
25 want to add?

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1 General Galvin: Let me just add, if I may -- if we are  
2 interested in peace in Europe, then we should follow a  
3 strategy of crisis management. If we do not, we will run into  
4 a lot of other problems.

5 If what we think we are interested in is continuing the  
6 old idea of forward defense and flexible response against the  
7 former Soviet Union or against Russia now, and if we go to  
8 these countries and say that your criteria for joining NATO is  
9 that you build a powerful military force that we are satisfied  
10 with, what is that force for? Is that force for crisis  
11 management?

12 Or is that a force because we are creating some kind of  
13 defense against Russia? We have to ask ourselves that hard  
14 question, because if we are asking Russia to be a part with us  
15 and with other countries in maintaining the peace in Europe,  
16 then I think we are on the right track. If we are going to  
17 try to do something else, then I do not understand why we are  
18 going East.

19 Senator Biden (presiding): Gentlemen, thank you very  
20 much.

21 Ambassador Kampelman, you have worn so many hats in  
22 different administrations, and have had so many pupils or  
23 Senators for such a long time. It is always good to hear what  
24 you have to say, and important to us. I sincerely hope the  
25 organization which you have begun has some success, additional

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1 success in dealing with public opinion makers.

2 I wanted to make it clear to you, I agree with  
3 Senator Lugar and you, that ultimately in all of these  
4 circumstances, Presidential leadership is required. I am  
5 merely suggesting that, on an issue which is very difficult to  
6 explain to the American people -- which our European Allies  
7 have consistently characterized as just more of hundreds of  
8 years of ethnic bloodletting -- in a generation that has  
9 either not experienced any war, or has experienced a war that  
10 was not very satisfying, that it does make the ability of an  
11 individual to make the right decision, more difficult. Not  
12 more necessary; it is not an excuse.

13 It is merely a reality, that it is harder to get a  
14 decision, when there is little consensus among the people who  
15 Presidents tend to rely upon.

16 But I do agree that it is ultimately, will require  
17 Presidential leadership. And I sincerely hope that, and as I  
18 understand the President's position relative to Bosnia and  
19 forces, ground forces, to participate in a peacekeeping  
20 effort, there has been deliberately no definition of what that  
21 constitutes, other than to suggest that, if it is a viable  
22 peace -- which I think is not wiggle room; I think that is a  
23 necessary caveat.

24 Otherwise, we put ourselves in the position of being the  
25 enforcers of Serb aggression, guaranteeing that aggression by

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1 insisting that Bosnia agree to something because there is  
2 nowhere else for them to go.

3 But I wish you luck. I wish you well, because the work  
4 you and your colleagues are doing, I think, is of vital  
5 importance. And it makes a difference when you speak. It  
6 makes a difference when the people that you mentioned speak.  
7 People listen. So I hope you will keep speaking.

8 General Galvin, let me say to you, I was -- and I am not  
9 being solicitous when I say this. I mean this, sincerely.

10 I was truly impressed with you, as a soldier; I am  
11 equally impressed with you, as a civilian. You are one of a  
12 number of military men that I have met, who not only  
13 understands far better than I do the military side of the  
14 equation, but you understand there is a thing called a  
15 Constitution, and that this is a democracy, and that  
16 Presidents and Congresses are required to reflect folks' views  
17 of what should and should not be done.

18 A foreign policy, no matter how brilliantly constructed,  
19 cannot be sustained without the popular will of the American  
20 people. And I thought several of your comments, quite  
21 frankly, are things I had not thought of, and not heard of  
22 before.

23 Your referencing the possibility that, I mean, your very  
24 fundamental question -- which no one is really answering --  
25 What is the purpose of NATO? Is this forward deployment of

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1 force to stop the Soviet Union? The truth is, half the people  
2 writing op-ed pieces, who want early admission, not all but  
3 half, are suggesting it for one simple reason: It relates to  
4 Russia; nothing else.

5 They think that there is a possibility of a revival of an  
6 aggressive, Nationalist, imperialist Russia. There has been  
7 no difference in Russian action, from Tzar through Commissar,  
8 in terms of how they have responded to their greater  
9 responsibility and role in that area of the world. And that  
10 is really what it is about, for many who are urging early  
11 admission.

12 And yet, you have pointed out that -- and I had not  
13 thought of it in these terms before -- that we made  
14 pronouncements in 1990, as to what, who our enemies were and  
15 who they were not. And it is a much more difficult, how can I  
16 say it? It is a much more difficult arrangement, to conclude  
17 that NATO is for crisis management. That is a harder job. It  
18 is easier when you decide there is an enemy, whether it  
19 actually has teeth like it did before, or not very many --  
20 only one tooth, a nuclear tooth, that it has right now.

21 But I am not sure we are ready to come to grips with an  
22 honest answer to that. And if we are not, I think we continue  
23 to founder -- not flounder, founder. And I quite had not  
24 thought about it, in the same stark terms that you stated it  
25 here.

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1           And lastly, I was impressed with the fact that your  
2 caution about what action, if any, we take next in Bosnia, has  
3 really, as they say, stood on its head what a generation I  
4 grew up on believed the military to be. You have the  
5 politicians saying, "Be more aggressive." You have the  
6 civilians saying, "Be more aggressive." And you have the  
7 military being, from my characterization, everything from  
8 intransigent to very cautious.

9           General Powell, who I had great respect for as Chairman  
10 of the Joint Chiefs, basically said, "Unless we can go in and  
11 send in 500,000 forces, we should not do anything." Because  
12 he did not want any more pieces of what the lessons he learned  
13 in the sixties, I think.

14           And now, we have a lot of military people who are still  
15 in uniform, saying, "Unless you can tell me what step 2, 3,  
16 and 4 is, do not take step 1 and 2." I do not know what we  
17 could have ever done then, because it is ironic that it is my  
18 generation of civilians who were saying in the past, "Unless  
19 you can tell me what steps 2, 3, and 4 was, do not do it," and  
20 the military saying, "We must move."

21           Now, as this new world order is taking shape, whether we  
22 guide it or not, it is still going to be the new world order.  
23 What the hell it is going to look like, I am not sure.

24           You have now the military folks, saying, "Wait a minute.  
25 Tell me what steps 2, 3, and 4 are, before you take steps 1

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1 and 2." And you have folks like me, saying, "I cannot  
2 guarantee you what steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 are, and 2, 3, and 4.  
3 But let us take step 1, because I think it will result in our  
4 not having to take steps 2 and 3." And it is an anomaly.

5 The President is in a position of making a commitment  
6 that, if he likes a peace agreement that is resolved, if there  
7 is one, that he will commit forces; and unlike what I did  
8 here, I had to take a telephone call but I could hear the  
9 testimony back there, I heard one of you say and I think it  
10 was you, Max. You are what I call a monarchist, when it comes  
11 to the war clause of the Constitution. I am not.

12 I do not think, Max, you can send in 25,000 forces  
13 without Congressional authorization. But, having said that,  
14 it is an incredible exercise we are undergoing. I guess we  
15 are all fortunate to be here, and maybe be able to play a  
16 little role in reshaping, hopefully we will do it as wisely in  
17 the year 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 as we did in the years  
18 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950. I am not as hopeful as I was  
19 18 months ago.

20 But I really have been impressed with your testimony; and  
21 I suspect this is not the last you are going to hear from  
22 members of the Senate, asking for your advice. Because this  
23 is, to use the slang, a moving crap game. I mean, this is  
24 really -- we are running to catch up with a lot of this.

25 And a lot of those Governments you dealt with on a

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1 day-to-day basis, as the man in charge in Brussels, General,  
2 they are not sure where they are going.

3 The Germans are having real problems; the French are  
4 being the French; and the Brits are not sure whether they are  
5 in Europe, an island out of Europe, part of the United States,  
6 in the Atlantic -- I mean, they are having real problems  
7 figuring out their future role.

8 And so, it is going to be a hell of a ride. But with the  
9 input of you gentlemen, I suspect it will be a smooth landing.

10 My mother has an expression. She says that God takes  
11 care of drunks and America, even when we make mistakes. I am  
12 hope she is right. Because I am not sure we are making all  
13 the right decisions right now, nor could we.

14 But I do appreciate your participation in this initial  
15 exercise, I guess is the way to say it, as we try to work  
16 through what the role of NATO should be.

17 General Galvin: Can I, Mr. Chairman, make one last  
18 comment about the reluctant military?

19 Senator Biden: I say that, not in criticism.

20 General Galvin: I know, yes, sir. I know that, and I  
21 think you say it in the right way. I would just like to  
22 elaborate for a minute.

23 I really am, I think, a stereotypical American soldier,  
24 or American military man. I think Colin Powell is, too. And  
25 I had a lot to do with -- you know, I talked to him a lot

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1 about these things.

2 And I think and I hope it would always be this way. And  
3 the way that it is comes from all the way back, and it is  
4 really not something new. And it is that I feel as I always  
5 felt as a soldier, subordinate to my civilian leadership.  
6 First of all, over there in the Department of Defense; but  
7 then, definitely, over here on the Hill; and definitely, the  
8 President of the United States.

9 And in the end, the people. Because that is who all of  
10 you represent.

11 And so, I always have to think, to whom am I subordinate?  
12 I am really subordinate to everybody. Powell said this, in  
13 his Foreign Affairs article. He had people comment that maybe  
14 he was being too political. I do not think so.

15 I have to think, what do the American people really think  
16 about? And as I said to you, I thought of it as a platoon  
17 leader; that my troops, when I was a platoon leader, were the  
18 American people. What they did was not just military. The  
19 reason they were willing to fight and die was not just because  
20 I, as a military man, told them so.

21 It had to do with who we are.

22 And so, we have to be, we can be what we were in the  
23 Gulf; which is, the blitz. But what you really want us to be  
24 is careful, considerate thinkers about power. And that is  
25 what I always try to be.

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1           Senator Biden: Well, it is reassuring. I never thought  
2 I would be frustrated by it, but it is reassuring.

3           Ambassador Kampelman: Mr. Chairman, I have a final word,  
4 too, if I may? And that is, to express my appreciation to you  
5 for your kind words, particularly your exaggerations.

6           But I also wanted to thank you immensely for the  
7 leadership role you have played for so many years now in  
8 public service; and it does not surprise me to find you saying  
9 that you and I once again agree on some issues, important  
10 issues of public policy. Thank you.

11          Senator Biden: Well, thank you both. Again, with your  
12 permission, I would like to be able to hold open the  
13 possibility in the next several months, of being able to pick  
14 your brains again. I know you are always available  
15 personally, but I think it is useful for the committee and the  
16 public as a whole, and the press, to hear what you have to say  
17 on these things.

18          Because ultimately, as I said, General, I agree with you  
19 that no policy can be sustained unless it is understood by,  
20 and supported by, the American people as part of this process.

21          I thank you both very, very much.

22          General Galvin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23          Senator Biden: We are adjourned.

24          [Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

25