



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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July 27, 1994

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Carl:

I apologize for being so slow in responding to your most generous letter of July 5. Your letter arrived during my presence in Bulgaria on an American Bar Association project. Let me now address the legal questions raised by Sam Nunn on the Senate floor. He raised the same questions with me during a brief personal exchange a few days ago.

The issue is whether the original Security Council Resolution (SCR) imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia can be legally and properly applied to Bosnia, given the fact that Bosnia was not in existence as a State at the time of its enactment and that the embargo on its face runs contrary to the United Nations Charter. Senator Nunn is persuaded by the Administration's argument that the Security Council has reaffirmed that application on "at least twelve occasions" since Bosnia became a sovereign nation.

My colleagues and I do not find the Administration's position to be at all persuasive. There is, of course, no doubt that the Security Council has on a number of occasions acted as if SCR 727 does apply to Bosnia. It is also true that the United States has supported this position. Neither action, however, legitimizes the embargo under international law, and I will explain why.

There is no denying the fact that SCR 713, when it was enacted on September 25, 1991, applied to Yugoslavia and to the sub-state entity of Bosnia. Its application to Serbia, as the successor state to Yugoslavia, in 1992, is also apparent. Once Bosnia became a state, however, and gained admission as a member of the United Nations, it acquired certain rights it did not have as a sub-state, including the vital "inherent" right of self-defense. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter acknowledges that inherent right. It does not grant it. It is uniformly acknowledged by the United States and the United Nations that Bosnia's territorial integrity and political independence have been directly under attack and threatened by internal and external Serbian and, until recently, Croatian forces. It is also recognized that its population has been victimized and exposed to crimes of genocide. To interfere with Bosnia's right to defend itself against the violence threatening its integrity as a State is to interfere with that inherent right as reflected in Article 51.

Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter do not create the "inherent" right of States to defend themselves. The Charter codifies this inherent right, which exists independent of positive law and may not be abrogated or infringed upon by positive law, whether or not in the form of Security Council resolutions. The arms embargo, when applied as interfering with Bosnia's right and ability to defend its territorial integrity (and also preventing Bosnia from defending its population against crimes of genocide), abridges Bosnia's inherent right of self-defense and is invalid.

Senator Nunn, in the floor debate, referred to that portion of Article 51 which follows the recitation of a state's "inherent right" to defend itself. That is proper. But he believes that the caveat: "... until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" is satisfied by the Security Council's many resolutions and failed efforts to achieve these objectives. This belief is inaccurate and dangerous. Action by the Security Council which is ineffective cannot serve to deprive a State of its inherent right to defend itself.

Senator Nunn has apparently been persuaded that once the Security Council "has acted in an area," even if unsuccessful or with only partial success, the inherent right of self-defense either disappears or becomes irrelevant. That is unreasonable, bad policy and without foundation. Such an interpretation would deny a State its inherent right to self-defense on the merest pretense of action by the Security Council. Under this construction, a State could be denied the right to defend its territorial integrity from aggression if the Security Council simply noted that such aggression was unlawful and called for its termination. It means that no matter how ineffective the action, the Security Council would be considered to have occupied the field thereby restricting other nations from taking effective action to maintain peace and security. The Security Council has, of course, been active in Bosnia for two years or more. It has passed more than 55 resolutions. There is neither peace nor security in Bosnia.

Interestingly, one of the arguments used by some who opposed U.S., Kuwait and Saudi military action against Iraq was that the Security Council had acted on the issue thereby making military activity defending the territorial integrity of Kuwait to be improper. The United States correctly rejected that position then. It remains bad law today.

This issue, as Senator Moynihan effectively pointed out on May 11 on the Senate floor, was faced in San Francisco at the 1945 Conference which adopted the U.N. Charter. The United States insisted that it had and would continue to have the right to come to the aid of any State under attack in the Western Hemisphere with or without Security Council authorization, notwithstanding any use of the veto to block U.N. action. This principle was also insisted upon by the Latin American States. Senator Vandenberg served notice on the U.S. delegation that unless this U.S. position was specifically and clearly set forth in the Charter, he would support a reservation on the subject as part of Senate treaty ratification. Article 51 as adopted in the Charter was considered to meet that requirement.

Secretary of State Stettinius, supported by Cordell Hull, explained that the right of self-defense arose immediately once "an armed attack . . . occurs" and, under Article 51, continues until such time as the Security Council has taken adequate measures to actually "maintain" peace and security, under Article 24, which would mean until the right of self-defense is no longer necessary.

The "caveat" portion of Article 51, given the failure of the Security Council to maintain peace and security in the area, cannot in any way reasonably or legally be interpreted to infringe upon Bosnia's right of self-defense or the right of the United States to lift the arms embargo and assist Bosnia in its inherent right to defend itself. What then does the 'caveat' mean? The more reasonable explanation is to read it as triggering Article 12 of the United Nations Charter, which governs the distribution of power and authority between the Security Council and the General Assembly. Once the Security Council takes jurisdiction over "any dispute or situation" (with no requirement of effectiveness), the General Assembly cannot make recommendations. Here we have the only reasonable explanation for the Article 51 caveat that is consistent with international law.

But let me further address the concern by some of your colleagues that repeated "reaffirmations" of SCR 713 and 727 may have provided a legitimacy to the application of the arms embargo to Bosnia. That is not so. The standard United Nations practice of reaffirming previous resolutions by rote is a practice designed to signify consistency of action. In the instances referred to by Senator Nunn, the reaffirmation paragraphs are preambular and not operative paragraphs. They have no binding effect. Indeed, the body of the resolutions in question do not either extend or modify the arms embargo. They relate, for example, to subjects of humanitarian aid, the creation of the war crimes tribunal, establishment of safe zones, and Sarajevo, subjects which are removed from the issue of the arms embargo.

It is appropriate to note that in recent months representatives of the United States publicly and privately justified support for a Security Council resolution after the Hebron massacre which referred to Jerusalem as "occupied," on the ground that the reference was found in the preambular rather than the operational portion of the resolution and, therefore, not a cause for concern by Israel and its friends!

The specific resolution that is habitually reaffirmed in various preamble paragraphs is SCR 727, enacted on January 8, 1992, prior to Bosnia's admission to the U.N. as an independent state. It never explicitly reaffirms the application of the Yugoslav arms embargo to Bosnia. Its paragraph 6 "decides" that the embargo applies in accordance with paragraph 33 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23353), but provides no hint or indication as to what paragraph 33 contains. Neither does the U.N. explanatory press release. The missing paragraph 33 states that Cyrus Vance, during his "recent mission . . . told all interlocutors" that the arms embargo would continue to apply to all areas that had been part of Yugoslavia. No justification for that conclusion is provided. There is no reference to Article 51; and there is no explanation of

Mr. Vance's authority to so proclaim. The main thrust of SCR 727, furthermore, deals with the killing (by the Serbs) of five European Community monitors. Ironically, because the Serbs, in violation of a cease fire, killed EC observers, the resolution passed is being interpreted as preventing any arms from being sent to Serbia's victims.

Furthermore, for the U.S. to take the position that the preambular reaffirmation of SCR 727 amounts to a renewed endorsement of the arms embargo as applied to Bosnia, raises questions about other preambular reaffirmations, such as SCR 820, dealing with sanctions against Serbia, which reaffirms SCR 808, dealing with war crimes, which in turn confirms resolutions affirming the territorial integrity of Bosnia.

A strong case can also be made that a number of other U.S. resolutions (SCR 757, 770, 787, 808, 819, 824, 827 and 836, as well as U.N. General Assembly resolution 48/42) are inconsistent in a number of respects with SCR 727; and they have been preambularly reaffirmed as often as SCR 727. The U.S. position exaggerating the significance of preambular reaffirmations creates a legal minefield. There are also contradictions between operational paragraphs in Security Council Resolutions. SCR 836, for example, reaffirms in an operative paragraph the need to "restore full sovereignty and territorial integrity to Bosnia." Aside from the fact that the arms embargo diminishes rather than restores "full sovereignty," SCR 836 can well be interpreted as calling for the end of the arms embargo against Bosnia! It is also important to note that SCR 820 reaffirms Bosnia's territorial integrity and calls for the reversal of ethnic cleansing. This is in direct conflict with the current U.S. policy of pursuing a 51%-49% partition of Bosnia.

To continue to treat the arms embargo against Bosnia as legally binding undermines the international structure and our aspiration for world order according to law. The U.N. Charter and organization are based on a functioning system of independent States. To make the organization work, these states accept limitations on sovereignty and agree to legal rules. They do not agree to commit suicide at the behest of a Security Council unable for reasons of international politics or otherwise, to protect the integrity of a member State. For this reason, Article 51's affirmation of the inherent right of self-defense is most important. I repeat its provisions that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. . . ." That language places limits on Security Council actions. The existence of the right of self-defense also reflects realism: States have not reached so high a degree of confidence in the United Nations as to cede all responsibility for self-preservation to the Security Council. We in the United States continue to have a special interest in preserving rather than undermining that inherent right of self-defense.

We do not in any way question the propriety and legitimacy of SCR 713 and 727 and hence have no problem with their reaffirmation. It is the application of those resolutions to Bosnia that we challenge. Indeed, we support the application of the resolution to Serbia, the successor state to Yugoslavia against whom it was originally intended to apply. My colleagues

and I -- and I have listed their names in the course of my testimony before the Committee -- have public service records clearly indicating that we do not want to encourage unlawful activity by any State, and certainly not by the United States.

We do not wish to place the United States in a position where we do not fulfill our obligations under the United Nations Charter and international law. We want to fulfill our obligations. That desire appears to be the primary motivation of Chairman Nunn and we applaud it. We are convinced, however, that our legal obligations require us as a nation to find that to apply the Yugoslav arms embargo to Bosnia certainly at this juncture, is for the Security Council to act ultra vires. Taking this position would be consistent with our obligations under Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter; Security Council Resolutions 752, 757, 770, 787, 808, 819, 824, 827, and 836; General Assembly resolution 48/42; and the United Nations Convention on Genocide. The inherent right of independent States to self-defense would be strengthened. The exemption of Bosnia from the Yugoslav arms embargo is substantially more consistent with our national obligations under the U.N. Charter and international law than is the application of the embargo.

This conclusion, I assure you, is not a personal one alone. It is shared by an impressive group of international law teachers, scholars and practitioners, including lawyers experienced as legal advisers to the State Department and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

It would clearly be preferable if the United States could persuade the Security Council to join us in such a declaration. We have, however, been unable or unwilling to demonstrate the leadership necessary for such persuasion. We have been content with rhetorical declarations of preference that the arms embargo against Bosnia be lifted, with the result that those declarations have been dismissed as empty. Significant leadership by the Congress might well invigorate our national leadership and strengthen our commitment to international law and order.

What about the likely negative consequences if we repudiate the arms embargo as a legal nullity? In spite of suggestions by the Administration to the contrary, our reaffirmation of the inherent right of self-defense, a right cherished by all States, would not encourage others to decide for themselves which law to obey and which to reject. We are struggling to build respect for law from Korea to Iraq to Haiti. We do no service to the rule of law by adhering to a posture that deprives a U.N. member, which is a victim of aggression and genocide, of its most important inherent right -- the right to exist and to defend itself. Nor do we advance the cause of collective security by such a position.

In December 1993, 109 members of the U.N. General Assembly urged all member States to help Bosnia exercise its inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 and to remove Bosnia from the arms embargo. No country voted against it. That General Assembly resolution, as a matter of analysis, not only strengthens the principle of self-defense, but it obviously challenges the legal validity of the Security Council's application of the arms embargo against Bosnia by

expressly urging "Member States . . . to extend their cooperation to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in [the] exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of Chapter VII of the Charter."

The resolution, as Senator Moynihan emphasizes, also points out that the Security Council has the responsibility and duty, under Article 24, "to take effective collective measures . . . for the suppression of acts of aggression." To distort this duty by trying to force Bosnia to accept a partition plan which effectively dismembers the State is a sad, cynical and criminal travesty. The intent of the Security Council to apply the arms embargo to Bosnia, whether expressed in six, twelve, or a hundred and twelve resolutions reaffirming SCR 713 and 727 is not relevant to whether or not that application is legally justified or legitimate. The repetitive action of the Security Council is ultra vires. It violates Bosnia's territorial integrity and the inherent right of that State to defend itself as codified by United Nations Charter Articles 2(4) and 51.

It was acknowledged at the hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the position we represented at the hearings, reflected in this letter, have a strong moral case. I am equally convinced that international law strongly supports our position as well. I respectfully further suggest that political and pragmatic considerations similarly support our position. Courage, determination and a commitment to principle by us would be welcome by the American people and the world. American foreign policy and an international order governed by law must be based on the principle that we reject aggression by force and will insist on no gain from such aggression.

In conclusion, Carl, I want to acknowledge and thank you for your co-sponsorship of the Dole-Lieberman Amendment and for the leading role you have exercised in its support.

All my best.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Max M. Kampelman', with a stylized, flowing script.

Max M. Kampelman

MMK
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SENATE TESTIMONY
June 23, 1994

Abshire, David
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Cole, Ken
Coyne, Marshall
Croker, Chet
DeMuth, Chris
Dobbin, Murial
Eagleburger, Larry (w/Larry: As per our brief exchange. All my best)
Eizenstat, Stuart
Fleischer, Arthur
Frye, George
Galant, Herb
Garrels, Ann
Ginsberg, David
Goldmuntz, Larry
Haberman, Rabbi
Johnston, Doug
Karatnycky, Adrian
Krasnow, Herb
Krogh, Peter
Lewis, Anthony
Lord, Betty Bao
Luck, Ed.
Manson, Shlomit
Mondale, Walter
Murphy, George
Myerson, Bess
Navoth, Menachim
Palmer, Jack (Jack you may wish to distribute to partners & asso. in DC office)
Pitt, Harvey
Rabinovitch, Itamar
Rabinowitz, Rabbi
Roberts, Cokie (I did not have an opportunity to hear your exchange with Jimmy Carter, but I'm on your side.)
Rostow, Eugene

Sessions, William
Shultz, George
Silverman, Leon
Solomon, Richard
Steinberg, Saul
Steinberg, Robert
Vartanian, Tom
Whitehead, Nancy Dickerson (at home)
Wohlberg, Rabbi
Wohlstetter, Albert
Yost, Casimir
Zax, Stanley
Zimmermann, Warren

TESTIMONY BY
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC

June 23, 1994

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to meet with you and the Members of your Committee this afternoon. You are deliberating the merits of a proposal that the United States end its support of an arms embargo against the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The essence of this proposal, submitted by Senators Dole and Lieberman, was, by a narrow margin, approved by the Senate on April 21. A similar proposal, submitted by Representatives McCloskey and Gilman, was on June 9 adopted by the House of Representatives with a larger margin of support. In examining the vote in the Senate, where two proposals on the subject were adopted, it is obvious that an overwhelming majority of the Senate expressed serious dissatisfaction with existing policy under which the United States supports and enforces the embargo against Bosnia.

I urge your Committee to support the amendment now before you. It is the Serbians who brutally invaded the territorial integrity of Bosnia. Yet, the embargo penalizes the Bosnian victims of that armed aggression. It is the Serbians whose policy of ethnic cleansing has caused millions of Bosnian citizens to become refugees while others have suffered the horrors of violence. Yet, the embargo prevents these people and their government from defending themselves, an inherent right assured them by the Charter of the United Nations. The embargo, I respectfully suggest, clearly, albeit inadvertently, aids the Serbian aggressor. This embargo must be lifted if we are to be true to our values, our national interest, and our role of moral leadership in the world.

Why have both Houses of Congress stated their opposition to the arms embargo against Bosnia? Why has President Clinton on a number of occasions stated his opposition to the embargo? Why in December 1993, did 109 members of the United Nations General Assembly, with no country dissenting, urge all member states to help Bosnia exercise its inherent right of self-defense by lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia? It is because the embargo is wrong, immoral, unfair and contrary to the best interest of a strong and secure Europe, thereby making it contrary to the best interests of our country.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, providentially gave the civilized world an opportunity to establish a new world order based on human dignity, the rule of law, and responsible international behavior. After my retirement from government service in January, 1989, I had the privilege of being called back to Europe by our government on five different occasions to help the CSCE, the Helsinki process, prepare itself to meet the new opportunities at hand for us and Europe. We and all of Europe arrived at constructive and unanimous decisions in Copenhagen, Paris, Geneva, Moscow and Helsinki on how best to establish and enforce rules of behavior to assure security and cooperation in Europe.

There is one paramount principle that stands out in the midst of the detailed rules we unanimously adopted. It is that there is no room for military aggression by one state in Europe against another. That is a guiding principle of the Helsinki Final Act and also, of course, a foundation of the Charter of the United Nations.

Differences between and within states would undoubtedly continue, but they were to be resolved by negotiations. Peoples seeking self-determination were, under our rules, to be assured human rights of expression, religious liberty, ethnic identification; but there was no right to seek

their goals by violence. The grievances were to be resolved by negotiation. It was not that existing boundaries or population dispersions were necessarily wise, or expertly arrived at, or fair. But their modification by violence could not be condoned. We all understood that stability and peace in Europe could not be assured without this firm commitment by all. The new order in Europe was to be civilized and free of the savagery of the past. As for genocide, we all said "never again!"

But Europe failed the first serious challenge to that fundamental premise which it faced in Yugoslavia. It continues to fail. The United States, in first separating itself from the challenge by defining it as a European problem for the Europeans and not for us to deal with, also failed. It continues to fail.

We learned through the lessons of two world wars that we and Europe have common interests. We forgot that lesson. We learned during the world wars and during the cold war that there was an indispensable need for American leadership to be exercised in pursuit of our common interests. We forgot that lesson. My criticism of American policy in Yugoslavia, Mr. Chairman, has not been a partisan one. I deeply regret the inadequacies of both the Bush and Clinton Administrations, in spite of the respect I have had for the institution of the Presidency and for both of our Presidents. It is not their motivation that I question. I deeply regret their lack of vision and leadership in the face of this vital frontal assault against our vital aspirations.

Our past errors and those of Europe have been serious. But, I don't dwell on them today. Our historians will do that and I fear history will judge us harshly. My primary interest today is to remind this Committee that American foreign policy can still be salvaged, but it requires a commitment to the fundamental principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of the United Nations. We cannot condone, or support, or assist, or otherwise legitimize armed aggression by one state against another. To tolerate, or justify, or defend, or ignore such

aggression and violence is to set a force in motion which is contagious, which will probably encourage other aggressors, and which will seriously return to haunt and damage us as parts of Europe retreat to the chaos and xenophobia of yesterday.

The President and others have attempted to excuse our country's failures in the Balkans by referring to the cruelties in the area as part of a civil war carrying out ancient enmities about which we are required to be neutral. It is not a civil war. It might have been one had we and Europe not persuaded the world that Croatia and Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were sovereign states eligible for membership with equal standing in Europe and in the United Nations. Having done so, there is no escaping the fact that Serbia has aggressively and cruelly and forcefully violated the sovereign borders of Croatia and Bosnia, sovereign member states of the United Nations. Their reasons for doing so, their objective of ethnic cleansing, their desire for a greater Serbia, their references to ancient wrongs -- these provide no justification.

Resolutions condemning that aggression -- and there have been many passed by the United Nations Security Council, all ignored -- are deceptively empty and inadequate. While American and other European naval vessels stop arms from reaching the Bosnians striving to defend themselves, we have refused to restrain or realistically inhibit the aggressor. We have rejected the option put forward by many distinguished Americans that we inform the Serbian aggressor that unless they withdraw their troops and return to the negotiating table, we will reluctantly be obligated to bomb Serbian airfields, military installations, bridges, and power plants within Serbia itself, the source of the aggression. Instead, we stop the victim from defending himself and we refrain from inflicting the necessary punishment designed to discourage the aggressor from continuing to act contrary to the rules of responsible international behavior -- a travesty which our nation should no longer tolerate.

Let me parenthetically but relevantly add at this point that I do not know whether the current policy of our government, worked out in consultation with Europe and Russia, will produce even a temporary cessation of hostility in the Balkans. We have been told endlessly and again today that the negotiations are at a critical juncture and should not be disturbed. We are likely to face another failed effort, but, even if not, I fear the result will only be a temporary truce while the parties prepare for the next onslaught.

I must express here my personal abhorrence at the thought that we are now prepared to say to the Serb aggressor that they cannot have the 66% or the 72% of Bosnia they have savagely and violently and illegally captured, but they can have 49% of the territory they have illegally and savagely captured! And, outrageous as it may seem, we are likely to be asked to send American troops to the area to protect Serbian control of that illegally and cruelly captured territory.

Mr. Chairman, I do not naively believe that the United States can alone solve the Balkan tragedy. Nor is it likely to do so in concert with our friends in Europe. The feelings of hurt and hate are deep. The bitter memories will last a long time. Imposed artificial boundary lines will not survive. Ethnic cleansing will continue to scar the whole area and its peoples.

Let us, however, as a nation remain true to our principles and to our vision of a new world based on civilized principles. We must no longer participate in an embargo against a victim, an embargo never originally intended to be so applied since it referred to a Yugoslavia which no longer exists. When the embargo was imposed, there was no government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When that government was admitted to the United Nations, it was not admitted as a successor state to Yugoslavia.

When we remove the arms embargo against Bosnia, let us also recognize the possible consequences including the removal of all United Nation forces within the area. Since these forces serve as potential hostages and thus tend to paralyze Europe's ability to deal with the Serbian threat constructively, it might be prudent to do so. The government of Bosnia could then distribute its own humanitarian assistance, and that which it receives from others, to its own people. It can do so if we provide for a level field.

Would such a policy be more effective if our allies and friends join us? Yes. Will they ever join us without firm leadership by the President backed up by a definitive decision taken by Congress? No.

We have, Mr. Chairman, heard the argument that a unilateral abandoning by us of the arms embargo against Bosnia would provide justification by others who may wish to consider unilaterally abandoning other UN embargoes such as those against Iran, Iraq, or Haiti. This is, I believe, most unpersuasive.

This Committee is not a judicial tribunal, but there is, I am convinced, persuasive legal support for the conclusion that the arms embargo was never intended to apply to a Bosnia, which was not in existence at the time of its enactment. There is additional persuasive legal support for the conclusion that the arms embargo violates Bosnia's inherent right to defend its territory under Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter. The lifting of an embargo, which has no legal standing and runs contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, cannot reasonably serve as a precedent for irresponsible action by those who wish to avoid their international responsibilities. Furthermore, those states which wish to avoid their international responsibilities will find ways of doing so regardless of what we do.

The end of the arms embargo against Bosnia will end an unfair, immoral, unjust policy. It is our duty and responsibility not to be a part of it. Abandoning that embargo does not require us to supply arms or armed forces to Bosnia. That is a totally separate public policy question. I believe that the end of our support for the embargo may, in fact, help bring about a lasting settlement between the parties.

Mr. Chairman, my appearance before you this afternoon is a personal one. I speak for no individual or group. But, I am a part of a group of prominent Americans who are gravely concerned with the direction our country has taken in its Balkan foreign policy during the past three years. The Action Council for Peace in the Balkans is comprised of liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans (even though the three of us who testify before you this afternoon all identify ourselves as Democrats).

Our Steering Committee includes: Morton Abramowitz, Fouad Ajami, Richard Allen, William Brock, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Hodding Carter, Walter Cronkite, David Dinkins, Frank Fahrenkopf, Geraldine Ferraro, Henry Louis Gates, Leslie Gelb, Barbara Jordan, Max Kampelman, Lane Kirkland, Jeane Kirkpatrick, John Lehman, Alfred Moses, Edmund Muskie, Aryeh Neier, Paul Nitze, John O'Sullivan, Martin Peretz, Richard Perle, Norman Podhoretz, Eugene Rostow, Donald Rumsfeld, Carl Sagan, Albert Shanker, George Shultz, Henry Siegman, John Silber, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Susan Sontag, George Soros, Paul Volcker, John Whitehead, Elie Wiesel, Albert Wohlstetter, Elmo Zumwalt. Our roster also includes a number of Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The list continues to grow.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy and attention.