



## Max M. Kampelman Papers

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DÉPARTEMENT FÉDÉRAL DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES  
DIPARTIMENTO FEDERALE DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI  
OSCE - CO-ORDINATION UNIT  
p.B.72.9.15.1.(55).3.-SAD

Berne, 28 September 1995

**Geneva Seminar on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act  
"From 1975 to 1995 and beyond: The achievements of the CSCE - the perspectives of  
the OSCE"**

Dear Colleagues

We have received your participation form for our meeting on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). We thank you very much for your interest and we are very pleased to welcome you on this occasion. As you can see from the attached list of participants, the Seminar has found widespread interest and has thus met with an overwhelming response. With the many distinguished professionals and experts on both the old CSCE and the new OSCE present, the event promises to achieve its double purpose: To look back into the history of the CSCE as well as to look into the future of the OSCE in facing the challenges of tomorrow's Europe.


For your information, please find enclosed the final programme, a list of the participants as well as a map of the City of Geneva.

In particular, please note the three following practical points:

- Due to the unexpectedly big participation, we have changed the venue: Now the meeting takes place at the Centre International de Conférences de Genève (CICG Conference Centre), which many of you will know very well, since most of the second phase of the negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Final Act took place there.
- For the reception given by the Foreign Minister of Switzerland, Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti, at the seat of the Court for Conciliation and Arbitration, Villa Rive-Belle, on Thursday, October 19, 1995, transportation is being provided. It will depart at 17:45 from the following meeting point: Centre Internationale de Conférences de Genève (CICG Conference Centre), Main Entrance, 17 Rue de Varembe, Geneva.
- **Participants who have not arranged their hotel at this stage are kindly asked to fill in the form of the Geneva Tourist Office included in the last letter and to send or fax it directly to that Office at the address indicated on the form by October 10 1995. Reservations arriving after this date cannot be accepted anymore.**

We look forward to seeing you in Geneva soon.

Yours sincerely  
HEAD OF CO-ORDINATION UNIT

  
Raimund Kunz

Annexes  
Programme  
Geneva City map  
List of participant  
Article by Hans Meesman (NL)

## FINAL PROGRAMME

### FROM 1975 TO 1995 AND BEYOND: THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CSCE - THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE OSCE

Meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, October 19 and 20, 1995

#### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1995

Meeting for specialists on questions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes at the Villa Rive-Belle, Seat of the Court for Conciliation and Arbitration (upon special invitation).

- 17:45 Departure of Transportation to the Villa Rive-Belle, leaving from the following meeting point: Centre Internationale de Conférences de Genève (CICG Conference Centre), Main Entrance, Rue de Varembe 17, Geneva
- 18:00 Reception given by the Foreign Minister of Switzerland, Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, at the Seat of the Court for Conciliation and Arbitration, Villa Rive-Belle, Rue de Lausanne 266, Geneva

#### FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1995

Meeting at the Centre International de Conférences de Genève (CICG Conference Centre), Salle II, Rue de Varembe 15, Geneva.

#### **Morning Session**

##### ***The Contribution of the CSCE to East-West Relations (1972 - 1990) - Panel***

- 09:00 - 09:15 Opening Statement  
Edouard Brunner, Ambassador of Switzerland to France, Chairman of the Panel
- 09:15 - 09:45 *The Place of the CSCE in the Strategy of Western Europe*  
Professor Vittorio Ferraris, Italy
- Discussion
- 09:45 - 10:15 Coffee break

- 10:15 - 10:45 *The CSCE in the US Perspective; between Security and Human Rights Issues - the Importance of a Balanced Approach*  
Ambassador Max Kampelman, United States of America
- Discussion
- 10:45 - 11:15 *The CSCE in the Soviet Union's Perspective:*  
H.E. Mr Yuri Kashlev, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Poland
- 11:15 - 11:30 Break
- 11:30 - 12:00 *The Impact of the CSCE's Third Basket on Citizens in Central and Eastern Europe under Communism*  
H. E. Mrs Hanna Suchocka, former Prime Minister of Poland, Member of Parliament, Member of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Diet
- 12:00 Closing Statement  
Ambassador Brunner
- 12:15 - 14:15 Lunch at the Restaurant Vieux-Bois, Avenue de la Paix 12, Geneva

#### **Afternoon session**

#### ***Perspectives for the OSCE in Tomorrow's Europe - Panel***

- 14:20 Opening Statement  
Ambassador Benedict von Tscharner, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the OSCE, Chairman of the Panel
- 14:30 - 15:00 Keynote address by Mr Nicolaj Afanasievskij, Deputy Foreign Minister, Federation of Russia
- 15:00 - 15:30 Keynote address by Ambassador John Kornblum, Department of State, United States of America
- 15:30 - 16:00 Keynote address by Ms Carmen Fontes, Asesora Ejecutiva del Gabinete del Ministro, Representative of the Spanish Presidency of the European Union
- 16:00 - 16:30 Discussion
- 16:30 Closing Statement  
Ambassador von Tscharner
- 16:45 Point de presse by Ambassador von Tscharner

MMK SCHEDULE  
GENEVA  
10/18-21/95

Wednesday, October 18

7:10 p.m. Depart Dulles, Swiss Air #117

Thursday, October 19

8:20 a.m. Arrive Geneva  
Pat Fullerton will meet you

Accommodations at Noga Hilton  
19, quai du Mt. Blanc  
011-41-22-908-90-81; fax 011-41-22-908-90-90

12:15 p.m. Lunch w/Dan Spiegel at La Cyne (in Noga Hilton)

5:45 p.m. Transportation to the Villa Rive-Belle  
departs CIG Conference Centre  
Main Entrance Rue de Varembe 17

6:00 p.m. Swiss reception at Villa Rive-Belle

8:00 p.m. Amb. Anne Anderson dinner  
43 Quai Wilson

Friday, October 20

Conference begins at 9:00 a.m. and ends at 4:45 p.m.

Your presentation is from 10:15-10:45

"The CSCE in the US Perspective: between Security and Human Rights Issues -  
The Importance of a Balanced Approach"

*CIG CONF CENTRE  
17 RUE DE VAREMBE*

Saturday, October 21

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4:40 p.m. Arrive Dulles

ALMAO

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October 10, 1995

Dear Mary,

The flowers are beautiful.

Thank you very much, They will  
make a nice weekend for me.

You have always been a thoughtful  
and wonderful person.

I considered it a privilege  
to work for you. I still  
miss the nice people we  
worked with in those days.

It was great to see you!

Please give my love to  
Meggie and Sharon.

all the best,

Pat



## THE CSCE IN THE US PERSPECTIVE: BETWEEN SECURITY AND HUMAN ISSUES - THE IMPORTANCE OF A BALANCED APPROACH

by Ambassador Max Kampelman  
United States of America

Mr. Chairman,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

~~I have a few words to say before I begin my talk.~~ And I wish to express my appreciation to the Swiss Government and the Swiss Foreign Ministry for arranging this event. Last night, I found a tremendous spirit of rapprochement, understanding, and good will, which, if nothing else, is certainly satisfying to those of us who have participated and who are participating today in this session. So for your efforts and to those of your associates, I know I speak for everybody here when I say "Thank you" for arranging ~~it~~. *THIS REUNION.*

~~But, this, to become a bit more serious,~~ is a particularly crucial and significant time for us to be assembling and examining this process in which we all at different stages have been involved. I realize that, because of my age, a number of people think that I was in at the beginning. The fact is that I was not in at the beginning. I did not get into the process until Madrid. But I must also say that those of you who were involved at the birth of the Helsinki process, gave birth to a magnificent idea and to a process which in my opinion was very much responsible for the fact that the changes we have seen in Europe during our recent lifetime were changes that took place without violence, peacefully.

~~I think the existence of the Helsinki process, the existence of the Helsinki Final Act and the meetings that have taken place in connection with it among all the at that time 35 countries,~~ have played a very, very important role in this peaceful and vital revolution that has taken place. I ~~must, at the same time,~~ give my congratulations to those of you who participated in this process, and I have no doubt that history will conclude as I have just stated. Yet I must confess to some ~~kind of~~ skepticism about the future. ~~And I have to be careful about that skepticism.~~

One of the reasons why I was so attracted to the idea of coming here was to see if I could learn something from the rest of you today on the OSCE as distinguished from the CSCE. Last night I talked to a few people, saying that I wanted to learn more about the OSCE. The uniform conclusion I got was: Well, it has not just changed, it is now fundamentally different from what you knew. Well, all right. I must say to you personally, I have never believed that something different is necessarily something better. And I want to find out whether this something different is going to be any better. I must admit that I generally prefer conferences to organizations, particularly where the conferences have worked. Somebody last night mentioned to me they

✓ thought of organizations as being somewhat like spider webs where you get caught into the web and don't have freedom of movement, don't have creativity, and don't have flexibility. I certainly hope that's not what we find as the OSCE begins to fulfill its role in Europe. As you know, there is the tendency to say 'I know it's true because I have <sup>seen</sup> it before'. But I want to come here with a fresh mind as I listen to the discussions and to see the facts of the matter as we examine how we can face these new problems and new responsibilities because they are all very serious.

✓ It is important to note that the changes that I have referred to above and which can simply be described as the end of the Cold War constitute only one aspect of fundamental changes that have taken place throughout the world. And I am not only pointing to what's happening, for example, in South Africa where, as Mr. Brunner pointed out yesterday, who among us would have imagined Mandela as president with a white vice-president who had been his opponent earlier? ~~I mean, these are the changes that are taking place and they are very, very fundamental changes.~~

✓ But even beyond the world of politics, where I think the changes have been fewer, all of us, myself in particular when I reflect on this, can think of changes in every day life. I recall when there were no antibiotics, certainly no television, no FM radio, no refrigerators, no air-conditioning. One lifetime! Yet today we take all of these things and many other things for granted. I made a list here of things, but I am not going to bother you with it. ~~But~~ One could go on endlessly with the things that we take for granted today that did not exist at some early part of our lives. Again, one lifetime! Simply look at the communications revolution that is taking place, or that has already taken place.

✓ It is extremely difficult for any authoritarian government to prevail today because authoritarian, totalitarian governments require a monopoly of information. And with satellites, there can be no monopoly of information any more. People hear things, people see things, people all over the world, and as a result of that, people want things. If they don't have them, they want them for themselves or for their children. ~~Because~~ they have seen things which may, if they don't have them, may only be an hour or two or three away from them. And this produces significant changes. This is a kind of globalization that we are living through.

✓ An economist, a businessman, can not understand the New York Stock Exchange without knowing what is happening in the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. It's interrelated. There was an article in one of our newspapers, The Wall Street Journal, not so long ago that read, "So you want to buy an American made automobile, do you?" Well, we found that the American-made automobiles are really made in different countries. Different parts in different places, but all interrelated: this is the kind of world in which we are living now. And ~~this~~ political development really isn't keeping pace with it. The world of science is totally globalized.   
 *THESE CHANGES*

✓ There was a recent Nobel Prize given to scientists in different parts of the world who were cooperating with one another. ~~Because~~ that's the way it works. Science couldn't work otherwise. You can have boundaries, and you can put soldiers on boundaries, and you can keep out all the vaccines with soldiers. But I suggest here you can not keep out the germs. And you can not keep out broadcasts. And this is the kind of world in which we are living. And that's the challenge that those of us and

those of you today who are involved in the world of politics, have to appreciate and understand: we have taken the curve and are on a new road.

Now the big question is, are we wise enough to be able to handle the opportunity and the challenge that were presented to us as a result of the end of the Cold War?

✓ And I am not sure. I don't see hopeful signs in that connection. I don't mean to be a Cassandra, most of you who know me, know me as an optimist. But the fact of the matter is that the signs are not hopeful. Let me explain why I say this and then I will let others go on and we can discuss this further.

✓ The essence of the Helsinki Final Act as I saw it has two components. One, which Mr. Brunner mentioned, is the component of accountability. ~~I mean, what were we doing with the Helsinki Final Act? We were agreeing first on what we thought ought to be the kind of relationship we should have with one another. What would we like to have, what ought to be? And this took a lot of negotiating in Geneva; it took a lot of negotiating in Helsinki. And finally we came to an understanding of what ought to be at that specific time. We did agree to continue to meet because our ideas about what we could agree upon and what ought to be would hopefully evolve. And they did evolve. I think it made a great show that it evolved. I think the results showed that it did evolve. We came to further agreements on what ought to be. I got back into the process with Copenhagen and with <sup>Moscow</sup> ~~Madrid~~ and with Geneva. The Copenhagen Document which was reflected in the Paris Agreement Documents, has been referred to by a number of scholars in my country as the most important international document since the Magna Charta of 1215. If any of you want to take the trouble to read it, you will see why that's the conclusion. And we agreed on it. I want to say that ~~I was present there~~ in Copenhagen <sup>every morning at that time</sup> with the Soviet Union. <sup>DELEGATE</sup> The Soviet delegate came to see me and asked how he could help. <sup>to do</sup> You see, we were working together. And we further discussed how to establish the rule of law which we thought the essence of the Copenhagen Document. Again our ideas of what ought to be got strengthened, and evolved. <sup>But then</sup> we said it's not enough to agree on what ought to be. We also have to see what is, and where the "is" is not the same as the "ought". We have ~~got~~ to do something about changing the "is". And that's where the question of accountability comes in. And again I think we did that. It was not easy to do. It created tensions, but it was necessary to do. If the document was to be relevant rather than irrelevant, if it was to be taken seriously by the people, we had to take it seriously and act on the basis of making states accountable for their behavior. All of us, in some way or another, always fall short of what we would like to be. We are not perfect, any of us. This was the struggle, but the process took place.~~

✓ There <sup>was</sup> a second principle of the Helsinki Final Act and of the United Nations Charter. That's the principle of no profit from aggression. We emphasized this a great deal, to a certain degree because of the Afghanistan situation. There can be no profit from military aggression. We said that. Now after the process' implementation and after my retirement from Government service and, as I mentioned the Copenhagen Document, I was part of our delegation to the CSCE Summit in Paris. I can tell you that ~~more than only for Europe, that meeting was euphoric. Everybody was happy about the new world we were entering. Everybody! Then I think just a year and a half later, I was at the next summit which was in Helsinki. And what I found in Helsinki was depression, the feeling the impotence, of failure. But no one could say why. Certainly very much because of the Yugoslav situation. That contributed immensely, but it was not the only situation.~~ And what I

REASON.

see, in Europe and in my own country, is the first challenge to the new world order, the first serious challenge. Because it involved military aggression, it involved genocide—we used to say never again—it involved brutality, it involved state sanctioned behavior that was really inexcusable in modern civilized terms. And people in my country were saying: it's not our problem, it's Europe's problem. And Europe was saying: it's not a problem, it has existed for hundreds of years. There's nothing we can do about it. And anyhow, they are all doing something wrong, none of them are perfect. And we failed. In my opinion we are failing today. And there are the consequences of this failure. In my opinion, we are failing again today because of this. I pray for an end to the killings. And maybe these negotiations will do something about ending the carnage.

*current*

~~But I want to say to you, as I look at the proposals, that we the civilized Europe are pushing for a solution. We are saying to the aggressor: yes, you are guilty of genocide. You are war criminals. We are all saying that. You are war criminals. You are guilty of genocide. A unanimous view! And you can not have at this time 70 percent. We will only give you 50 percent of what you had no business taking. Because it was illegal for you to use warfare to accomplish your objective and to kill people. I am not saying that this kind of a solution is a solution at all. Because I think it provides a kind of stimulation to the next aggressor elsewhere who says: we have an opportunity. Maybe aggression will work. And until the principle of no profit from aggression gets established, and I am afraid it has been seriously undermined, I for one have questions as to whether my country and the countries you are from are wise enough today to know how to enter the new world.~~

## THE CSCE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S PERSPECTIVE

by Prof. Yuri Kashlev  
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Poland

Mr. Chairman,  
Distinguished colleagues,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

When Alexandre Dumas, the widely popular French writer, was writing his novel "Twenty years after" he was most likely unaware that the title would prove very much relevant in 1995 for us, musketeers of the European process, who are celebrating our first success in Helsinki 20 years ago. It is very elating to see among the audience several of the musketeers, I would even say, d'Artagnan's among whom I would mention in the first place the "founding fathers" such as A. Kovalev, E. Brunner and others. I am most grateful to the people who have conceived and arranged this meeting, this journey back to our young diplomatic age.

The history of the OSCE's coming into being and its evolution is a vivid illustration of the dialectic triad formulated by Hegel. The great German philosopher, you will recall, formulated the concept of the unity and conflict of opposites where thesis and antithesis produce synthesis.

This is precisely what happened when the idea of the CSCE was conceived and again when the conference was convened. In the mid-60s when the Soviet Union and other socialist countries vigorously began to promote the idea of holding the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the West little by little began to accept the idea, the objectives the sides were pursuing were quite different. While the USSR and its allies sought primarily to codify the political and territorial results of the Second World War, to enshrine international borders and assure recognition of the GDR by the world community, the objective of the Western countries was to open up the socialist camp to a free flow of ideas and people, thus helping the erosion of communist ideology and the reduction of the Warsaw Pact's excessive level of armaments, etc. The convocation of the CSCE can be likened to a synthesis resulting from the collision of two policy courses—or, to put it differently, of this thesis and antithesis.

A most difficult period of preparatory work in 1972-1973 (which again was an illustration of the collision of opposites and of the resultant synthesis) was conducted in Dipoli. That was the place where CSCE's organizational, procedural and substantive aspects were tried out on a European scale for the first time in history. The almost two-year-long Geneva stage proved to be even more difficult. The Geneva forum was a unique school of multilateral diplomacy, an unprecedented experience in formulating new standards of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among virtually the majority of the industrially developed countries of the world. CSCE veterans will recall that at the time we all were subdivided into groups: the Warsaw Treaty seven, the Western European nine, the NATO sixteen, the N+N

nine. All of them were meeting incessantly and producing numerous documents. To give you an idea, in the course of the preparation of the Helsinki Final Act the delegations submitted 4700 papers, drafts and proposals and held 2500 formal sessions of the Conference's various bodies, to say nothing about thousands of informal meetings. The Helsinki Summit which followed that difficult preparatory work was an outstanding event comparable in scope to the 1815 Vienna Congress or the 1918 Versailles Conference. Meanwhile, if analyzed today the speeches made at the time by the 35 leaders make it obvious that Eastern and Western leaders had differing assessments of what had been achieved and saw CSCE's future in different perspectives. Yet, despite all the highfaluting rhetoric, hardly any of the leaders earnestly hoped that the process they had initiated would go on for decades.

Over the years following 1975 the CSCE lived through different stages at which the participants pursued different objectives and put forward different theses and antitheses. Yet, when viewed from today's perspective, the initial 15-year period of the CSCE process has introduced a number of important achievements into European political and diplomatic environment which are no less valid now than before.

Apparently, the most important achievement was that for the first time in history the term "security" began to be interpreted broadly so that it ceased to be the purely military and political concept that it was in the past, but became a multidimensional one which encompassed the famous Helsinki baskets, i.e. political as well as military, trade, economic and environmental relations, and even, partially, human rights. Today none would think of calling into question such a broad interpretation of security and cooperation. Yet at the time, in the mid-1970's, this was a novel, revolutionary approach.

Dipoli and particularly Geneva witnessed the emergence of yet another unusual European phenomenon, namely, the unprecedented growth of the role of smaller and medium-size nations—both those which were bloc members and those neutral or non-aligned. I believe that never before in European history had those countries felt themselves to be so weighty a force capable of defining the destiny of the European process. We all remember the noticeable and generally positive role which those countries have played in the CSCE's history.

What was further achieved in those difficult years was the introduction of the consensus principle into European political practice. In theory the principle was at times applied in the past, yet it was in the CSCE that it became a binding rule. That was not play but rather dead serious business. All of us remember how often progress in talks depended on small countries like Malta or Cyprus, and proved possible only after bigger countries had to seek compromise with them. I see several CSCE veterans present among the audience who in 1975 had to take long strolls along the shores of Lac Léman while Moscow, Washington and other capitals were busy looking for the suddenly missing Prime Minister of Malta Dom Mintoff in an attempt to persuade him to accept the draft of the Final Act. It should be acknowledged though that the CSCE thus introduced a democratic element into international negotiations.

I cannot say for sure whether we should count among valuable CSCE achievements the "novelty" that was used several times—in Belgrade, Stockholm and in other

capitals—i.e., the “stop the clock” procedure lasting at times for several days. I was astounded to see even a Swiss clock effectively stopped during the 1986 Berne Conference on Human Contacts.

One of the important, if not the most important, CSCE achievements during the first period was the shaping and functioning of the forum and mechanism to carry on European negotiations. We tend to overlook the fact that over the period between 1975 and 1990 there took place within the CSCE framework about a dozen meetings of Foreign Ministers of the 35 CSCE countries and two summit meetings—in 1975 and in 1990, after which a decision was taken to convene regularly, every other year. I will not mention numerous other CSCE events at various levels—from full-fledged follow-up meetings in Berne, Madrid and Vienna, to dozens of seminars and meetings of experts in various fields. One can easily say that in those uneasy years, the CSCE was among the most important fora and mechanisms for seeking agreed solutions to European problems.

This is the right point to mention that throughout this stage [I would put its time frame as between Geneva and the middle of the Vienna Meeting, i.e. from 1973 to roughly 1987] the Soviet CSCE policy was a highly contested topic inside the country, the subject matter of an acute political and ideological struggle, invisible to an outsider. In the period before 1975 our approach—as well as that of the Western partners for that matter—was highly confrontational.

From 1985, the Soviet leaders changed their approach to the CSCE. In summer 1975 in Helsinki, Leonid Brezhnev signed the Final Act without having had a good look at it. The speech he made there was, however, quite positive. Yet very soon the document was read and even scrutinized by many, including M. Suslov. More clearly than anyone else, he discerned in the Helsinki decisions a threat to the steel and concrete dogmas of the communist ideology, although the Final Act included but a few lines about human rights. That brought about a funny situation where Brezhnev and Gromyko decorated members of the Soviet delegation, including myself, with medals for Geneva and Helsinki, while A. Kovalev, Head of the delegation, was blacklisted by Suslov.

Only very slowly did the wizards who had formulated the CSCE concept [those were A. Kovalev, L. Mendelevitch and a few others] begin to succeed in introducing CSCE new, progressive standards into Soviet political and ideological practices. That was a kind of tactic these people had adopted: using our CSCE commitments to make the country drift away from Suslov's ideological orthodoxy, from “the besieged fortress” philosophy. The 1977 incorporation of the 10 Helsinki Final Act principles into the Soviet Constitution was a major landmark along that road.

Yet the CSCE at that stage was mainly characterized by confrontation. The climate that prevailed then at all fora—in Geneva, Belgrade, Madrid and numerous meetings of experts—was usually that of political propaganda confrontation and reciprocal attacks. Both sides, the East and the West alike, are to blame for that.

The confrontation between the socialist and western delegations, above all between the Soviets and the Americans, was particularly bitter at the 1977-1978 CSCE Belgrade Meeting. As you will recall, that was the time when a lot was being said and done in practice about the production of cruise missiles and neutron weapons

while parallel to that the Carter Administration launched a massive human rights campaign against the Soviet Union and its allies. Mutual recriminations were a common occurrence at negotiating sessions in the Yugoslav capital. The Meeting, as you know, produced practically no concluding documents, in place of which only a kind of brief communiqué several pages long was adopted.

I was among the delegates then and my impression was that the head of the delegation, Yuli Vorontsov, currently the Russian Ambassador to Washington, was not insistent enough in seeking the adoption of the concluding document. It was only later that I learnt from Vorontsov something I had not been aware of in Belgrade. It turns out that the instructions Vorontsov was receiving from the Soviet leaders, and from A. Gromyko personally, suggested that the Belgrade Meeting should be brought to an early end without a concluding document. To put it straight, the Soviet Union considered the Meeting to be useless. First, it could not under the circumstances count on any fundamentally new military and political agreements while considering inadmissible any "undue" emphasis on human rights or any criticism against us. Second, only two years had elapsed since Helsinki, and Moscow believed it inappropriate to "dilute" the Helsinki Final Act with new provisions of lesser importance. Hence the relatively resolute stand of our delegation: If you do not wish to have a concluding document—we can live without it.

In a more general vein, Moscow was then debating the issue whether it was worthwhile to pursue the Helsinki process or whether it was more appropriate to consider the Helsinki decisions as a one-time, though essential, success. After all, the view prevailed that the European process is necessary and valuable for Soviet foreign policy.

At the next all-European Meeting in Madrid the CSCE had to confront a still more formidable challenge. The Meeting may have been the most confrontational one since the beginning of the Helsinki process. Certain political and military complications were aggravated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, martial law in Poland, the subsequent Western response and, later, by the KAL 007 tragedy. All this served to heat up tensions at CSCE sessions.

However it was the Madrid Meeting that demonstrated another important aspect of the European process, namely, that the CSCE fora helped maintain the negotiating mechanism between the East and the West serving as a safety valve for the hot pot of international relations. Moreover, neutral and non-aligned countries were encouraged to get involved in settling differences between the East and the West like a referee in a boxing match. And the significant fact is that despite the tensions which were running high in Madrid the participants succeeded in adopting an extensive concluding document, in preparing a vast follow-up program and, what is most important, in making a decision to convene a conference in Stockholm devoted to disarmament and confidence-building measures.

Somewhat later, precisely during the Stockholm Conference, i.e. from 1985, Soviet foreign policy began to reveal signs of what was later to be called "new political thinking". Disarmament, abandonment of confrontation, and transition to co-operation with Western countries were important elements of this thinking. That helped assure the success of the Stockholm Conference whose activities were said to be closely followed personally by M. Gorbachev.

At the 1985 Helsinki Meeting to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Final Act, the new Soviet Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze who took part in such an important meeting for the first time, delivered to the West a sort of direct message from the new Soviet leadership regarding the country's sincere interest in pursuing the European process, in putting an end to confrontation and in using the mechanism to promote détente.

In Stockholm, for example, the Soviet leaders adopted novel approaches—and not only on arms control issues. In the humanitarian field too, I can refer to a very illustrative example of the CSCE Conference on human contacts which was held not far from here, in Berne, in 1986. For the first time the Soviet delegation was given flexible instructions thanks to which we were able to accept many provisions regarding the right to leave and enter the country, free travel, etc., which had been unthinkable in the past. Our delegation submitted at that time the largest number of practical proposals and was pursuing a vigorously constructive course. As you may remember, a funny thing happened there: the concluding document was drafted and adopted by 34 countries to be rejected by the United States alone. Later the Soviet Government formally decided that it would implement the Berne Document despite the US non-acceptance—a decision which was quite telling for the period.

Confrontation was indeed the name of the game at the beginning of the CSCE Vienna Meeting as well. The Meeting, I believe, played a highly important role in the evolution of the Helsinki process and in the life of the European continent as a whole. That time in Vienna I was appointed head of the Soviet delegation. Therefore, I had first-hand knowledge of the instructions we were receiving from Moscow, by which we were guided in our work since late 1987—early 1988, i.e. from the time Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev and others had effectively put Soviet foreign policy under their control and the CSCE's role had been reassessed. Substantively, our instructions at that time were as follows: seek to continue and deepen the Helsinki process in the spirit of the new political thinking; stress the military and disarmament aspect of the process, pursue the subject of the Stockholm Conference on disarmament and initiate new negotiations on the reduction of military forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals; overcome the confrontational trend in the humanitarian field, switching to constructive cooperation between states in the spirit of democratization and glasnost; work out a most intensive European follow-up program. The CSCE during that period generally became, not just in words but also in practice, a priority sector of Soviet foreign policy.

Vienna's two main achievements in my view are as follows: first, coupling the CSCE and disarmament talks, and second, the emergence in the course of the Helsinki process of what was practically a brand-new subject—"the human dimension". Speaking of the latter, everyone probably remembers the time and effort that had to be spent before the consultations of the 34 on the mandate for the negotiations on armed forces and conventional arms reductions in Europe truly became another branch of the CSCE tree. These consultations were placed under my responsibility along with the Vienna Meeting of the 35 states. My instructions from Moscow were to seek, besides the resolution of purely military matters, a coupling of the CSCE process with disarmament talks. Indeed, the Helsinki cause could not be regarded as a truly substantial contribution to détente unless it included a meaningful arms control element. Our endeavor was eventually a success, allowing the consultations

which first began in Vienna at the embassy of France, then moving on to other embassies by rotation, to result in the conclusion of an important treaty on conventional armed forces.

On the subject of purely military aspects involved in the consultations of the 34, some of you may recall the very tough debate arising from the term "mutual" as applied to arms reductions. Western countries insisted on using it; our side kept saying no. Finally I did accept it, and learned pretty soon afterwards how the Soviet Army General Staff officially complained to Gorbachev about my behavior, forcing Shevardnadze to come up with a written explanation. It was still a time when our military were convinced that disarmament was to be a unilateral exercise by NATO and not a mutual undertaking.

It was in another area that the Vienna talks saw a genuine breakthrough—that of humanitarian issues, where an extremely arduous negotiating process finally led to the formulation of a general concept as well as detailed provisions pertaining to "the human dimension" of the CSCE. Whereas the Helsinki Final Act addressed human rights in just one paragraph phrased in the most general terms, the Vienna document in turn contained an impressive array of humanitarian commitments taking up dozens of pages. That was where the program of future actions to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms was negotiated and adopted, including the three-phase human dimension conference (held successively in Paris, where I also served as head of the USSR delegation, Copenhagen and Moscow) as well as many other activities that continued into the 1990s. Today the Russian embassy in Warsaw, my present duty station, is only a short drive from the headquarters of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights—a special body established by all our countries to continue our work in this field. The idea of setting up this office also originated from the Vienna Meeting.

During the Vienna stage of the CSCE process, international CSCE obligations were invoked in Moscow in an effort to democratize domestic political life. For example, at the very same time when, driven by momentum, we were still engaged in rhetorical battles with Western delegations at formal sessions at Hofburg, we resolutely recommended to Moscow to stop jamming Western broadcasts, discontinue the practice of forcibly treating dissidents in psychiatric clinics, allow free emigration, etc.. When put in a straightforward manner, our proposals commanded no support in the Communist Party Politburo, still partially composed of the Brezhnev era politicians. Therefore Mikhail Gorbachev established a special committee, headed by A. Yakovlev, which was authorized to take decisions with regard to our proposals from Vienna. This is how ways were found to take decisions to stop jamming, put an end to forcible treatment of people in psychiatric clinics, etc.

And one more thing about Vienna. By the end of the Meeting we were faced with an alarming situation when a number of countries (first of all Rumania, most likely GDR and, possibly, Czechoslovakia too) were reluctant to sign the Concluding Document. Active steps were taken by Moscow so as to prevent the Document from falling through. In January 1989, I personally traveled to hold secret meetings with some leaders including E. Honecker in an attempt to persuade them to sign the Document. In the long run this was achieved and the Document was adopted. This in my view played no small part in the process of renewal and of democratic revolutions in Europe which took place in, and right after, 1989, the same year the Document was

signed. I am convinced that without the achievements reached in Vienna, communist regimes in Eastern European countries would have fallen much later.

In summarizing the results of what I classify as the first stage of the CSCE—from Dipoli to Vienna—one can draw the following conclusions. Both the principles of the Final Act and the CSCE mechanism have passed the test of the Cold War. The 10 Helsinki principles which are as relevant now as the day they were proclaimed, stay practically uncontested. Obviously, they will continue to be the sacred "ten commandments" of the process in the coming years. Some updating will probably be required or additional adoption of some new principles. In particular, contradiction will need to be clarified between the principle of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity on the one hand, and the right of peoples to self-determination on the other hand. The price Europe is paying for the current lack of clarity on this issue is too high. However, the Helsinki decalogue on the whole is nearly perfect and will certainly be maintained.

Indeed the CSCE mechanism played a positive role in the first stage as a forum for difficult talks, which helped bring together constructive inputs while at times serving as a safety valve to let off steam. It also helped produce the fabric for promoting détente in the form of numerous follow-up measures such as conferences, negotiations, meetings of experts and so on, which numbered several dozen even before 1990.

In its current new stage as well, which began in 1990, the CSCE maintains its traditional role of both a forum for negotiations and a school of all-European diplomacy. Yet, we are witnessing the emergence of a new number one priority in the current stage of the CSCE activities—the Organization has turned into a post-confrontation structure for strengthening European security and co-operation. Yet the functions that the Russian and Western OSCE participants envisage for the Organization at this stage are somewhat dissimilar. Evidently, this will be dealt with in greater detail by Ambassador V. Shustov who is to speak this afternoon. He will, *inter alia*, address the issue to which we, in Moscow, attach particular importance, i.e. the development, above all within the OSCE framework, of a common and comprehensive security model for Europe of the 21st century.

Those efforts, slow as they are, are bearing fruit. They will be crowned by success because the OSCE retains the same unique advantages which were shaped and developed throughout the entire life of the Organization and which are now as valid and effective as ever before. Those are OSCE's broad geographical scope, its comprehensive approach to security and cooperation, the democratic decision-making process, free access for wide public and non-governmental organizations, etc.. I believe that thanks to these characteristics the OSCE can look confidently towards the future.

Some people may disagree with me. I am open to discussions. Let, as Hegel put it, theses and anti-theses collide; let a free democratic and secure Europe be the resultant synthesis.

And one more thing. Alexander Duma besides "Twenty years after", wrote the book called "Ten years after". I wish all of us good health so that we could meet again 10 years from now.



MMK SCHEDULE  
GENEVA  
10/18-21/95

Wednesday, October 18

7:10 p.m. Depart Dulles, Swiss Air #117

Thursday, October 19

8:20 a.m. Arrive Geneva  
Pat Fullerton will meet you

Accommodations at Noga Hilton  
19, quai du Mt. Blanc  
011-41-22-908-90-81; fax 011-41-22-908-90-90

12:15 p.m. Lunch w/Dan Spiegel at La Cyne (in Noga Hilton)

5:45 p.m. Transportation to the Villa Rive-Belle  
departs CICG Conference Centre  
Main Entrance Rue de Varembe 17

6:00 p.m. Swiss reception at Villa Rive-Belle

8:00 p.m. Amb. Anne Anderson dinner  
43 Quai Wilson

Friday, October 20

Conference begins at 9:00 a.m. and ends at 4:45 p.m.  
Your presentation is from 10:15-10:45  
"The CSCE in the US Perspective: between Security and Human Rights Issues -  
The Importance of a Balanced Approach"

Saturday, October 21

12:30 p.m. Depart Geneva Swiss Air #116  
4:40 p.m. Arrive Dulles

MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
SUITE 800  
1001 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004-2505

October 23, 1995

H. E. Anne Anderson  
Permanent Mission of Ireland  
15-47 rue de Lausanne  
Case Postale 2566  
1211 Geneva, Switzerland

Dear Anne:

I am writing to thank you for your most gracious hospitality. The dinner was superb and an excellent introduction to the day that followed. You were generous and thoughtful to arrange a most pleasant evening.

In connection with your remarks on Bosnia during the course of the evening, you may be interested in the enclosed.

My warmest best wishes to you, and please tell your daughter that I was sorry not to have had an opportunity to greet her.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Max M. Kampelman', with a stylized, flowing script.

Max M. Kampelman

Enclosure

**MAX M. KAMPELMAN**  
SUITE 800  
1001 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004-2505

December 18, 1995

M. Linus von Castelmur  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Government of Switzerland  
OSCE Office  
3003 Berne, Switzerland

Dear M. con Castelmur:

Thank you for sending me the verbatim text of my remarks to our Geneva meeting. I have made some corrections in it, as you will see from the attached, which I am returning to you. On the other hand, I would far prefer if instead of using this text, you used the attached text which was the basis from which I talked. It is much clearer and written in better English. I don't think we are doing any violence to my message by using that prepared text and pointing out that this text was used as basis for my remarks. If this could be done, I would very much appreciate it.

My warmest best wishes to you.

Sincerely,



Max M. Kampelman



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