



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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MMK SCHEDULE
KENNEBUNKPORT/NEW YORK
September 3-4, 1997

Wednesday, September 3

8:23 a.m. Depart National US Airways Express (INTERIM TERMINAL)
10:23 a.m. Arrive Portland, Maine

LTS Limousine service to Bush residence

12:00 noon Meeting with President Bush

4:00 p.m. Depart Portland via Delta #4855
5:25 P.M. Arrive LaGuardia

Accommodations:
St. Regis Hotel
Conf. #38074
212-753-4500

787-3447

Thursday, September 4

9:00 a.m. Zenith Board Meeting

3:00 p.m. Meeting with Herb Krasnow
Meeting with Jeff Grabel/Anne Lask

time? Depart LaGuardia
Arrive National

**CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE ROUNDTABLE
"THE LEGITIMACY AND FUTURE STABILITY OF THE RUSSIAN STATE"**

WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 11, 1997

My purpose in serving as your chairman today is not to persuade you that my own views on "the legitimacy and future stability of the Russian state" merit your attention and support. It is rather to make it possible for me to learn from our distinguished panel of participants, whose scholarship and experience thoroughly qualify them to expect that we respect their views and opinions on the subject.

The United States Institute of Peace welcomes all of you, speakers, discussants and audience alike, to this timely round table. I want to acknowledge Patricia Carley for conceiving and arranging this discussion.

The USIP was created by Congress and President Reagan 12 years ago to explore and encourage practical as well as theoretical paths toward peace. We were mandated to provide grants, establish fellowships, arrange conferences, and creatively to encourage both traditional and non-traditional explorations, to advance our objectives. We have worked with high school teachers and students; with university faculties; with non-affiliated and affiliated scholars; with non-government organizations; with civic groups; with "wild card" and provocative non-routine applicants. Our participants have been American and non-American. Our aim has been to anticipate tensions before they become crises; and if a crisis does arise, to know how best to deal with that crisis.

Our session today is in that context.

The word "legitimacy" in our title, as it applies to Russia, has many implications. My own orientation is to keep in mind that all states are affected and frequently judged by their ancestry. During World War II, I recall a book by a very distinguished lawyer, whom I knew, urging the permanent destruction of Germany as a country given what he considered to be the natural propensity of the German people toward hate, aggression, violence. To paraphrase Yogi Berra, if that lawyer were alive today and could see Germany a democracy, he would turn over in his grave!

Can a Russia, steeped in centuries of feudalism and absolutism and nurtured by 70 years of an all-powerful totalitarian system, be considered today, after only a few short years, to be a legitimate state to be respected and treated as such by the family of nations? Some say "no." Indeed, a responsible American Embassy political official, Patricia informs us, wrote that Russia is governed by Mafia-type "clans" representing economic interests rather than stable state institutions; and that they certainly have no interest in achieving democracy.

Without in any way challenging these assertions, diplomats are aware that cultural and historical and religious differences complicate international relations. We learn to live with them and learn from them.

It is relevant here to keep in mind the alleged exchange between the English diplomat and the Asian Minister, during which the Asian said he was going to attend the funeral of a friend. The Englishman asked: "Will there be food placed in the grave, as is customary in funerals in your country?" The minister replied that he supposed there would be. The diplomat smiled condescendingly and asked: "Tell me, when will your friend eat that food?" The Asian paused a moment and then replied: "I would say, sir, that he will eat it as soon as the friend you buried last week will smell the flowers you put on his grave."

None of this is to minimize the problems we have and will have with Russia. A country which spans 11 time zones with a population that reportedly speaks more than 200 languages and dialects is a complicated one to deal with. A country which suddenly fell from perceiving itself as a major strong power must have problems dealing with a United States which is perceived by the world as the only remaining super power in the world.

Negotiating with the Soviet Union was always difficult. Negotiating with Russia is and will continue to be difficult. In my own experience, Soviet negotiators entered the process believing that their American counterparts (the serious and capable ones, not the sycophants) considered themselves to be superior beings; and they resented that. The same remains true of Russian negotiators. This frame of mind must be overcome if the negotiation is to become serious. I can vouch for the fact that respect (by no means approval) for the negotiators as individuals and for the people they represent goes far toward dealing with this problem.

We should understand that a Soviet negotiator was not rewarded or appreciated for his creativity. He was to master his subject, stick to his instructions and put on the best public face for the position of his government. The same is true of the Russian negotiator. His flexibility is very much limited. Only after a judgment is made that the orange is squeezed dry will the Soviet or Russian hierarchy move to modify a position and lead it to an agreement with his American high-level counterpart; and then only in return for some additional advantage. The existence of a Mafia or a Duma, or a Chechnya does not seem to alter this pattern — a pattern to which the Russians are accustomed and which they believe has worked to their advantage more often than it has not.

The Russian negotiator is not necessarily privately pleased or happy about the condition of his country, but I believe that he and his superiors are content

with the legitimacy that they have and that they believe their government possesses. The United States has sought to strengthen the perception of Russian legitimacy, both with Gorbachev and with Yeltsin. I believe that was wise. I see signs that Russia is coalescing toward legitimacy. It still has a way to go with stability, but I believe that too is developing. The Mafia remains a serious threat to that stability, more so than the American "robber barons" of the last century. But economic investment is increasing, which brings with it a demand for some kind of a "rule of law." The flight of capital out of Russia is serious, but with stability and economic opportunity, that direction may reverse itself.

The real danger remains political. We must energetically strive to have Russia look westward. They would like to do so. They want, if they feel welcome, to be a part of the west. We must appreciate, however, that it is in their interest to look to the east as well, both to advance their interest and to protect their east flank. It is good here to recall Sir Isaiah Berlin's essay on Russia in the 1840's, which described Russia's mixed feeling towards Europe:

" . . . on the one hand, intellectual respect, envy, admiration, desire to emulate and excel; on the other, emotional hostility, suspicion and contempt; a sense of being clumsy, of being outsiders . . . "

It is, obviously, for the Russians themselves to assure their legitimacy and their stability. We can help. Today's forum is designed to face this question, and we all look forward to our panel and our participants for greater insight as to how best to proceed.