[1956]

file - Research
Electoral Colleg-
Const. Amendments

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

Excerpts from The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 170 82d Congress, 2d session, pertaining to Electoral College.

Maintenance of the Office of President

"THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE"

The word "appoint" is used in clause 2 "as conveying the broadest power of determination."[1] This power has been used. "Therefore, on reference to contemporaneous and subsequent action under the clause, we should expect to find, as we do, that various modes of choosing the electors were pursued, as, by the legislature itself on joint ballot; by the legislature through a concurrent vote of the two houses; by vote of the people for a general ticket; by vote of the people in districts; by choice partly by the people voting in districts and partly by legislature; by choice by the legislature from candidates voted for by the people in districts; and in other ways, as, notably, by North Carolina in 1792, and Tennessee in 1796 and 1800. No question was raised as to the power of the State to appoint, in any mode its legislature saw fit to adopt, and none that a single method, applicable without exception, must be pursued in the absence of an amendment to the Constitution. The district system was largely considered the most equitable, and Madison wrote that it was that system which was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, although it was soon seen that its adoption by some States might place them at a disadvantage by a division of their strength, and that a uniform rule was preferable."[2] In the Federal Convention James Wilson had proposed that the Electors be "taken by lot from the national Legislature," but the suggestion failed to come to a vote.[3]

1 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27 (1892).
2 Ibid. 28-29.
3 Max Farrand, II, 97.

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF ELECTORS

Dealing with the question of the constitutional status of the Electors, the Court said in 1890: "The sole function of the presidential electors is to cast, certify and transmit the vote of the State for President and Vice President of the nation. Although the electors are appointed and act under and pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, they are no more officers or agents of the United States than are the members of the State legislatures when acting as electors of federal senators, or the people of the States when acting as electors of representatives in Congress. * * * In accord with the provisions of the Constitution, Congress has determined the time as of which the number of electors shall be ascertained, and the days on which they shall be appointed and shall meet and vote in the States, and on which their votes shall be counted in Congress; has provided for the filling by each State, in such manner as its legislature may prescribe, of vacancies in its college of electors; and has regulated the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes to the seat of the national government, and the course of proceeding in their opening and counting them."[1] The truth of the matter is that the Electors are not "officers" at all, by the usual tests of office.[2] They have neither tenure nor salary, and having performed their single function they cease to exist as Electors. This function is, moreover, "a federal function,"[3] their capacity to perform which results from no power which was originally resident in the States, but springs directly from the Constitution of the United States.[4] In the face, therefore, of the proposition that Electors are State officers, the Court has upheld the power of Congress to protect the right of all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the election of any legally qualified person as a Presidential Elector;[5] and more recently its power to protect the choice of Electors from fraud or corruption.[6] "'If this government,' said the Court, 'is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption. If it has not this power it is left helpless before the two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, open

violence and insidious corruption.'"[7] The conception of Electors as State officers is still, nevertheless, of some importance, as was shown in the recent case of Ray v. Blair,[8] which is dealt with in connection with Amendment XII.[9]

---

1 In re Green, 134 U. S. 377, 379-380 (1890).
2 United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 393 (1868).
3 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221 (1920).
4 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 545 (1934).
5 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884).
6 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934).
7 Ibid. 546. During the recent war Congress laid claim in the act of September 16, 1942, to the power "in time of war" to secure to every member of the armed forces the right to vote for Members of Congress and Presidential Electors notwithstanding any provisions of State law relating to the registration of qualified voters or any poll tax requirement under State law. The constitutional validity of this act was open to serious question and by the act of April 1, 1944 was abandoned. The latter act established a War Ballot Commission which was directed to prepare an adequate number of official war ballots, whereby the service men would be enabled in certain contingencies to vote for Members of Congress and Presidential Electors; but the validity of such ballots was left to be determined by State election officials under State laws. 50 (App.) U. S. C. A. §§301-302, 331, 341.
8 343 U. S. 214 (1952).
9 See pp. 942-944.

Purpose and Operation of the Amendment [12]

This amendment, which supersedes clause 3 of section 1 of article II, of the original Constitution, was inserted on account of the tie between Jefferson and Burr in the election of 1800. The difference between the procedure which it defines and that which was laid down in the original Constitution is in the provision it makes for a separate designation by the Electors of their choices for President and Vice President, respectively. The final sentence of clause 1, above, has been in turn superseded today by Amendment XX. In consequence of the disputed election of 1876, Congress, by an act passed in 1887, has laid down the rule that if the vote of a State is not certified by the governor under the seal thereof, it shall not be counted unless both Houses of Congress are favorable.[1] It should be noted that no provision is made by this Amendment for the situation which would result from a failure to choose either a President or Vice President, an inadequacy which Amendment XX undertakes to cure.

---

1 3 U. S. C. A. §17.

Electors as Free Agents

Acting under the authority of state law, the Democratic Committee of Alabama adopted a rule requiring that a party candidate for the office of Presidential Elector take a pledge to support the nominees of the party's National Convention for President and Vice President and that the party's officers refuse to certify as a candidate for such office any person who, otherwise qualified, refused to take such a pledge.

Election of President

One Blair did so refuse and was upheld, in mandamus proceedings, by the State Supreme Court, which ordered the Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee to certify him to the Secretary of State as a candidate for the office of Presidential Elector in the Democratic Primary to be held on May 6, 1952. The Supreme Court at Washington granted certiorari and reversed this holding.[1] The constitutional issue arose out of the Alabama Court's findings that the required pledge was incompatible with the Twelfth Amendment, which contemplated that Electors, once appointed, should be absolutely free to vote for any person who was constitutionally eligible to the office of President or Vice President.[2] This position the Supreme Court combatted as follows: "It is true that the Amendment says the electors shall vote by ballot. But it is also true that the Amendment does not prohibit an elector's announcing his choice beforehand, pledging himself. The suggestion that in the early elections candidates for electors--contemporaries of the Founders--would have hesitated, because of constitutional limitations, to pledge themselves to support party nominees in the event of their selection as electors is impossible to accept. History teaches that the electors were expected to support the party nominees. Experts in the history of government recognize the longstanding practice. Indeed, more than twenty states do not print the names of the candidates for electors on the general election ballot. Instead, in one form or another, they allow a vote for the presidential candidate of the national conventions to be counted as a vote for his party's nominees for the electoral college. This long-continued practical interpretation of the constitutional propriety of an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by a candidate for elector as to his vote in the electoral college weighs heavily in considering the constitutionality of a pledge, such as the one here required, in the primary. However, even if such promises of candidates for the electoral college are legally unenforceable because violative of an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, Art. II, §1, to vote as he may choose in the electoral college, it would not follow that the requirement of a pledge in the primary is unconstitutional. A candidacy in the

primary is a voluntary act of the applicant. He is not barred, discriminatorily, from participating but must comply with the rules of the party. Surely one may voluntarily assume obligations to vote for a certain candidate. The state offers him opportunity to become a candidate for elector on his own terms, although he must file his declaration before the primary. Ala. Code, Tit. 17, § 145. Even though the victory of an independent candidate for elector in Alabama cannot be anticipated, the state does offer the opportunity for the development of other strong political organizations where the need is felt for them by a sizable block of voters. Such parties may leave their electors to their own choice. We conclude that the Twelfth Amendment does not bar a political party from requiring the pledge to support the nominees of the National Convention. Where a state authorizes a party to choose its nominees for elector in a party primary and to fix the qualifications for the candidates, we see no federal constitutional objection to the requirement of this pledge."[3] Justice Jackson conceding that "as an institution the Electoral College suffered atrophy almost undistinguishable from rigor mortis," nevertheless dissented on the following ground: "It may be admitted that this law does no more than to make a legal obligation of what has been a voluntary general practice. If custom were sufficient authority for amendment of the Constitution by Court decree, the decision in this matter would be warranted. Usage may sometimes impart changed content to constitutional generalities, such as 'due process of law,' 'equal protection,' or 'commerce among the states.' But I do not think powers or discretions granted to federal officials by the Federal Constitution can be forfeited by the Court for disuse. A political practice which has its origin in custom must rely upon custom for its sanctions."[4]

---

1 Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 214 (1952).
2 Ibid. 218-219.
3 Ibid. 228-231.
4 Ibid. 232-233.

Mary Louise Ramsey
American Law Division
April 5, 1956

(Not printed at Government expense)

Congressional Record

United States of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 84th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Election of President and Vice President: Why the Daniel-Mundt-Thurmond Resolution Is Against the Public Interest

SPEECHES
OF
HON. PAUL H. DOUGLAS
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 26 and 29, 1956

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 31) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice President.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, the Senate has before it today the substitute to Senate Joint Resolution 31 proposed by Senators DANIEL, MUNDT, and THURMOND.

I. INTRODUCTION

This proposal is in fact a combination of two separate proposals, neither of which could gain acceptance in its own right. On what grounds two unacceptable proposals become acceptable when combined is something which has not yet been explained to the Senate and to the country.

At the present time we have an electoral system which can be termed a State-unit system. That is to say the popular winner in each State receives all the electoral votes of the State. In 1952, for example, General Eisenhower had a popular majority in Illinois and thereby received all the 27 Illinois electoral votes.

Under the compromise substitute, which is before us, a proportional method of dividing the electoral votes of each State would be in effect unless the State legislature of an individual State chose otherwise. That is to say, if in any State there were 100 electoral votes, and the popular vote was divided between the candidates in the proportion of 55 percent to 45 percent the electoral vote would be divided 55 to 45.

The effect of this proportional system, which is commonly called the Lodge-Gossett system, would be to diminish the importance of the large populous two-party States where the division between the parties is relatively even, and, therefore, increase the importance of the one-party States. In the Democratic Party it would enhance the power of the Southern one-party States, and in the Republican Party it would enhance the power of a few New England and several middle-western Republican-dominated States.

But, under the substitute amendment, a State legislature may, if it so desires, select an alternative method of choosing presidential electors. This alternative is a congressional district unit system, commonly known as the Mundt-Courdert plan. Under it a "winner-take-all" system by congressional districts would be substituted for a "winner-take-all" systems by States.

Because the boundary lines of congressional districts in the United States are determined by the State legislatures, the cities and populous areas of the country have a smaller representation in the House of Representatives in proportion to their numbers than do the less populated rural areas. This has been caused by gerrymandering. It particularly discriminates against the city people and makes it extremely difficult for the problems of the city and the issues affecting the people who live there to gain an equitable hearing in the Congress.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield for a question.

Mr. LONG. I wonder if the Senator agrees with me that this proposed reform of the electoral college would have the result that no one could look at the election returns and hope to tell who had been elected President unless he were familiar with the laws of all the 48 States.

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct. As I shall show later, there are 282 trillion possible combinations, or 2 raised to the 48th power, and one could never know precisely with which combination he is dealing.

Mr. LONG. Actually, for a person to know who had been elected President in a close race, even though one candidate might have received two or three million more votes than the other, it would be necessary for a person to get the law books off the shelf and to make a study of the laws of all 48 States.

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct; and then he would have to use a slide rule in order to work out the ratio. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LONG. Actually, it seems to me that the proposed compromise is no improvement whatsoever upon the existing system.

Mr. DOUGLAS. It is worse than the existing system.

Mr. LONG. Although the existing system is bad, the proposed compromise which would mix up the proportionate division of the electoral vote, on the one hand, and the Mundt-Coudert proposal, to figure by districts, and to have the States vote in that way, on the other hand, is the worst that has ever been proposed. No one has ever succeeded in proposing an electoral method which makes less sense than the one now under consideration.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I think the sponsors of the method are to be congratulated in offering positively the worst proposal which could be devised.

Thus, Mr. President, the alternatives have a common denominator, in that both would increase the power of the lightly populated areas of the country at the expense of the heavily populated areas of the country. Both systems would increase the power of the one-party States.

Mr. LONG. Having seen the kind of proposal which has come from the compromise group, which got together to try to resolve their differences, and who brought in a makeshift measure for election reform, I wonder if the Senator from Illinois would agree with me that rather than the proposal which is now before the Senate, it would be preferable to let the candidates draw straws.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I think the result might be approximately as good as that which would come under the present hydraheaded monster.

Under either system—and this is very important—the centers of power in the Republican and Democratic Parties would be shifted to the right wing of those parties, and would give the lightly populated or one-party areas a much more important voice than they now have, or they deserve to have in terms of the number of people who reside and vote in those areas in the election of a President.

Mr. LONG. I wonder if the Senator from Illinois would agree with me that after one studies all the possible proposals for the election of a President and goes over all the possibilities contained in them, about the only conclusion which makes any sense is that there ought to be the direct popular election of the President; and whichever candidate receives a single vote more than another candidate should probably be elected.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I voted for the Langer amendment when it was last before the Senate; I intend to vote for it again.

In addition, Mr. President, the compromise substitute has in it a provision that if a candidate does not receive a majority of the electoral vote—over 50 per-

384230—58251

cent—the election of a President shall be determined by the Congress from the three candidates receiving the highest number of electoral votes.

Later, I shall develop this point, but I wish to say now that this provision would give control to even a small third party over the presidential election and would promote third parties and encourage dissident factions in either major party to attempt to control the electoral votes in their State or region. I will show later, Mr. President, that under the proportional or Lodge-Gossett method, 8 of the last 19 elections would have been decided by the Congress.

It is argued by the proponents of the substitute amendment that the electoral procedures for electing a President of the United States should be changed. They argue that under the present State-unit system, a few large populous States with large electoral votes, States such as New York, Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, Texas, and the like, can determine the outcome of an election and they argue even beyond that that various minority groups—voting en bloc—can determine the outcome in several of the individual populous States and thereby determine who is to be President of the United States. I shall show later, Mr. President, that there are numerous flaws in this argument taken by itself but, Mr. President, it is true because of the present system that the large, populous, two-party States are of crucial importance to presidential candidates if they are to win in the election. But, Mr. President, they are crucial because so many people live in them. I look upon this, in general, as not a bad thing. For, it is in these large, populous States where the bulk of our citizens live and it is in the urban districts of those States where Americans of various races, colors, religions, and economic interests have come to understand each other and to live with one another in peace and harmony, thus promoting tolerance and friendship among diverse groups. This has led to greatness in America and earned us the title of "The Melting Pot of the World." The large cities have also been centers of culture in our land where some of the great art treasures of the world may be viewed; where great literature and great art is available to all, bringing pleasure, beauty, and broader understanding into the lives of countless Americans, who live not only in the cities, but also outside the cities.

Even if it were true, Mr. President, that the minority groups in the large cities voted en bloc—as the proponents of this measure claim—that would not, of itself, be a reason for changing our present electoral system, and it most certainly would not be a reason for changing the system to that which is now proposed to us. For, at the present time, it is only at the presidential election when the legitimate interests of the groups which make up our large cities are given the weight in our politics which they deserve. Therefore, in deciding what kind of electoral system we desire, and one which is just and equitable, it is not enough to look only at the presidential election system. In deciding this matter, we must look at our political system as a whole. When we do that, it becomes ever more clear that to deprive our cities, our minority groups, and our large populous States of what little power they exercise in a presidential election, would be to make their voices almost completely unheard in our political system. As the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] has already pointed out in his very able speech of last week, our political system is like the solar system and must be viewed as a whole.

We know that because of constitutional provisions, the Senate of the United States is made up of two Senators from each State, thereby giving each State an equal voice in the Senate, regardless of its population. We know that the State legislatures are dominated by the less populous, rural regions of our country. We know, also, that these State legislatures apportion the congressional districts and that they, too, are heavily biased against the cities.

In addition to all this, it should be noted that the system of separation of powers under which we operate divides power among three coequal institutions; the Presidency, the Congress, and the judiciary. Each can check and balance the other. Thus, to successfully pass and put into effect progressive measures, each of the three coequal divisions of our Government, and, in the case of the Congress, each of the coequal branches, must approve of, or at least not oppose, the legislation.

Owing to the unrepresentative nature of Congress, which comes about because of the constitutional makeup of the Senate, and because of the gerrymandering of House seats, and also because of the seniority system which puts great power in the hands of those who represent one-party areas, it is extremely difficult and, in fact, almost impossible, for such legislation as civil rights, pro-labor laws, and other social legislation to gain passage except when there are political landslides like that of the 1930's.

Thus, when our system is viewed as a whole, or in the language of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], as a solar system, it is seen that our great urban population, their legitimate interests, and the disproportionate number of representatives who represent them, have very little power in the political system.

To take from our great urban population and the great two-party States that last vestige of power, namely, the slight advantage they may now have in determining who shall be elected President of the United States—and this advantage, I may say, simply comes from the fact that there are large numbers of people living in those States—is something which in justice cannot and should not be condoned.

II–1. UNDERREPRESENTATION OF BIG STATES AND BIG CITIES IN THE SENATE

One of the basic facts of American political life is the gross underrepresentation of the big States, and hence of the big cities in the United States Senate. It is well-known how this came about. In the Constitutional Convention of 1787, there was a bitter tug of war between the large States, such as Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, which wanted the seats in the National Legislature to be apportioned among the States according to their relative population, and the small States which wanted each State, regardless of size, to be given equal representation in the national legislature and hence, as in the Confederation, to cast an equal vote.

It was this struggle between the large and small States which, as Irving Brant, the biographer of Madison has pointed out, deadlocked the Constitutional Convention for months. At one time it seemed it would result in a dissolution of the Convention and a failure to create a new union. As is also well known, this deadlock was broken by the so-called Connecticut Compromise proposed by Roger Sherman of that State. This provided for two houses in the legislative branch. In one, the Senate, the States, regardless of their size were to have equal representation, namely two Senators apiece. In the other, or the House of Representatives, the States were to be represented according to their populations.

Then the smaller States, in order to rivet down forever their equality of representation in the Senate, succeeded in adding a clause to article V, which provides for the amending process, that "no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." And I have quoted from article 5. This placed the equal representation of the numerically small States forever beyond the reach of the amending process. And this equality of representation in the Senate is therefore the one provision in the Constitution which cannot be changed. It is riveted in forever.

We of the large States can therefore do nothing about our under-representation in the Senate. We are forever doomed to suffer under it without possibility or hope of change. We have loyally abided by this decision, and we shall continue to do so. We accept our under-representation in the Senate and the chains which are forever imposed upon us. It is probably the price we had to pay for union, and there is nothing we can do about it.

But the nature of our sacrifice should not be callously taken for granted, nor treated with indifference. It is real, and it should be fully realized, as we consider the question as to whether we should still further decrease the political power of the big States and the big cities.

COMPARISON OF LARGEST AND SMALLEST STATES

Now let us look at the practical effect of all this. We all know that Nevada, with a population in 1950 of 160,000, has two Senators, or the same number as New York, with its population of 14.8 million people. A voter in Nevada has, therefore, between 92 and 93 times as much influence in selecting a United States Senator as does a voter in New York. He has 66 times the influence of a voter in the adjoining State of California, 65 times that of Pennsylvania voter, and 54 times that of a voter in my own State of Illinois. I once represented a ward in the Chicago City Council, in 1940, and at that time my ward had a

larger population than had the State of Nevada. May I also point out it takes 51 people in New York to have as much influence in electing a Senator as one person possesses in Wyoming. And it takes 47 New York people to equal one in Delaware.

COMPARISON OF EIGHT LARGEST AND EIGHT SMALLEST STATES

So much for individual instances. Now let us see how the small States, and hence a minority of the population, control the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that at this point in my remarks a table showing the population of the 8 largest and 8 smallest States be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Comparison of population and representation of the 8 largest and 8 smallest States

8 LARGEST STATES

	1950 population
1. New York	14,800,000
2. California	10,600,000
3. Pennsylvania	10,500,000
4. Illinois	8,700,000
5. Ohio	7,900,000
6. Texas	7,700,000
7. Michigan	6,300,000
8. New Jersey	4,800,000
Total	71,300,000

8 SMALLEST STATES

	1950 population
1. Nevada	160,083
2. Wyoming	290,529
3. Delaware	318,085
4. Vermont	377,747
5. New Hampshire	533,242
6. Idaho	588,637
7. Montana	591,024
8. North Dakota	619,636
Total	3,478,983

Total United States population 1950, 150,697,361 equals 100 percent.

Eight largest States 1950 [1] 71,300,000 equals 47.3 percent.

Eight smallest States 1950, 3,478,983 equals 2.3 percent.

	Number	Percent
Total Senate representation	96	100
8 largest States	16	16.6
8 smallest States	16	16.6

[1] Massachusetts, with a population of 4.7 million in 1950, is the ninth largest State. This would bring the total to 76 million, within or over 50 percent of the population in the 9 largest States.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, if we take the 8 largest States in the Union—that is, New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, Michigan, and New Jersey—as is done in the table, we find that as of 1950 they contained 71.3 million people, almost half of the total population of 150.7 million in the country as a whole. If we include the ninth largest State, Massachusetts, the total population of this group would be 76 million people, or slightly over 50 percent of the population.

These 8 States have 16 Senators, or, with Massachusetts included, 18. The 8 smallest States—Nevada, Wyoming, Delaware, Vermont, New Hampshire, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota—with a total population of only 3.5 million, also have 16 Senators, and if we include South Dakota, the smallest 9 States, with a population of 4.1 million, have 18 Senators. This means that one-half of the people in the United States have only about one-sixth of the total representation in the Senate, while only a little over 2 percent of the population—that is 2.3 percent—also have a sixth of the total representation. Think of that, my friends—a mere 2 percent of our population elect one-sixth of our Senators, or the same number as the half of our population which lives in our 8 largest States. Each man or woman in the 8 small States has therefore nearly 25 times the voice in the United States Senate as those of us who live in the 8 or 9 largest States.

COMPARISON OF POPULATION AND REPRESENTATION OF 12 LARGEST AND 12 SMALLEST STATES

If we take the 12 largest States, we find that as of 1950 they had 88.1 million people, or 58.5 percent of the population, or almost 60 percent of the population of the country. These 12 largest States have 24 Senators, or 25 percent of the total number. The 12 smallest States, with a population of 6.2 million or 4.1 percent of the total population, also had 24 Senators or 25 percent of their number.

This means that almost 60 percent of the people of the country have the same representation in the Senate as do 4.1 percent of the population of the country.

I ask unanimous consent that at this point in my remarks a table comparing the population and representation of the 12 largest and 12 smallest States be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Comparison of population and representation of the 12 largest and 12 smallest States

12 LARGEST STATES

	1950 Population
1. New York	14,830,192
2. California	10,586,223
3. Pennsylvania	10,498,012
4. Illinois	8,712,176
5. Ohio	7,946,627
6. Texas	7,711,194
7. Michigan	6,371,766
8. New Jersey	4,835,329
9. Massachusetts	4,690,514
10. North Carolina	4,061,929
11. Missouri	3,954,653
12. Indiana	3,934,224
Total	88,132,839

12 SMALLEST STATES

	1950 Population
1. Nevada	160,083
2. Wyoming	290,529
3. Delaware	318,085
4. Vermont	377,747
5. New Hampshire	533,242
6. Idaho	588,637
7. Montana	591,024
8. North Dakota	619,636
9. South Dakota	652,740
10. New Mexico	681,187
11. Utah	688,862
12. Arizona	749,587
Total	6,251,359

	Population		Senate representation	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
12 largest States	88,132,839	58.5	24	25
12 smallest States	6,251,359	4.1	24	25

COMPARISON OF THE 24 SMALLEST AND 24 LARGEST STATES

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, now let us take the 24 smallest States who have one-half of the votes in the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that a table showing the population of the 24 smallest States be inserted in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1950 population of 24 smallest States with 50 percent of the representation in the U. S. Senate

Rank in size	Rank in inverse order of size	State	1950 population
48	1	Nevada	160,083
47	2	Wyoming	290,529
46	3	Delaware	318,085
45	4	Vermont	377,747
44	5	New Hampshire	533,242
43	6	Idaho	588,637
42	7	Montana	591,024
41	8	North Dakota	619,636
40	9	South Dakota	652,740
39	10	New Mexico	681,187
38	11	Utah	688,862
37	12	Arizona	749,587
36	13	Rhode Island	791,896
35	14	Maine	913,774
34	15	Colorado	1,325,089
33	16	Nebraska	1,325,510
32	17	Oregon	1,521,341
31	18	Kansas	1,905,299
30	19	Arkansas	1,909,511
29	20	West Virginia	2,005,552
28	21	Connecticut	2,007,280
27	22	South Carolina	2,117,027
26	23	Mississippi	2,178,914
25	24	Oklahoma	2,233,351
		Total	26,485,903

	Number	Percent of total
Population, 24 smallest States	26,485,903	17.6
Population, 24 largest States (and District of Columbia)	124,211,458	82.4

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, as the table shows, the 24 smallest States have a population of only 26.5 million, or but 17.6 percent of the population.

One-sixth of the population therefore have half of the Senators and one-half of the population have one-sixth of the Senators. That shows how disenfranchised the people of the large States are, so far as representation in the Senate is concerned. In the Senate, the small States are certainly in the saddle. They are booted and spurred and we of the large States are saddled and bridled.

SENATORS FROM 17 STATES CAN PREVENT CLOTURE

This tendency is greatly intensified by the virtual impossibility of bringing any proposal to a vote to which a third of the Senators take basic and intense objection. For now under the rules of the Senate, as put into effect by

the Wherry amendment in 1949, discussion can only be terminated and the previous question moved by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Senate, or a total of 64. Thirty-three Senators by either voting "no" on a cloture motion or abstaining from voting can therefore prevent cloture and permit a measure to be filibustered to death. This restriction has since 1949 been riveted into the rules of the Senate by rule 22, which now forbids any cloture at all from being applied to motions to change the rules.

It is therefore theoretically possible for the Senators from the 17 smallest States, with a total population of only 12.1 million, or only 8 percent of the population, to exercise a veto over legislation desired by the other 92 percent of the population. I ask unanimous consent that a table, listing the 17 smallest States and their populations, be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

17 smallest States and their 1950 population

Rank in inverse order of size	Rank	State	Population
1	48	Nevada	160,083
2	47	Wyoming	290,529
3	46	Delaware	318,085
4	45	Vermont	377,747
5	44	New Hampshire	533,242
6	43	Idaho	588,637
7	42	Montana	591,024
8	41	North Dakota	619,636
9	40	South Dakota	652,540
10	39	New Mexico	681,187
11	38	Utah	688,862
12	37	Arizona	749,587
13	36	Rhode Island	791,896
14	35	Maine	913,774
15	34	Colorado	1,325,089
16	33	Nebraska	1,325,510
17	32	Oregon	1,521,341
		Total	12,128,969
United States population, 1950			150,697,361
Population, 17 smallest States, 1950			12,128,969
Percent of United States population in 17 smallest States			8

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, if it be objected that these 17 States would not in practice be the ones to prevent cloture, let it be observed that the so-called 11 Southern States and the 6 border States—Oklahoma, Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, West Virginia, and Delaware—which, with few exceptions, have a strong and perhaps intense fellow feeling for each other, comprise 50 million people, or 33 percent of the population. I ask unanimous consent that at this point in my remarks a table showing the 1950 population and vote participation in the 1952 presidential election of the 17 Southern and border States be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

384230—58251

1950 population of 17 Southern and border States and voter turnout in 1952 presidential election

State	Population	Voter turnout in 1952 presidential election [1]
1. Texas	7,711,194	43
2. North Carolina	4,061,929	52
3. Missouri	3,954,653	71
4. Georgia	3,444,578	31
5. Virginia	3,318,680	31
6. Tennessee	3,291,718	46
7. Alabama	3,061,743	25
8. Kentucky	2,944,806	60
9. Florida	2,771,305	50
10. Louisiana	2,683,516	40
11. Maryland	2,343,001	58
12. Oklahoma	2,233,351	69
13. Mississippi	2,178,914	24
14. South Carolina	2,117,027	31
15. West Virginia	2,005,552	73
16. Arkansas	1,909,511	38
17. Delaware	318,085	79
Total	50,349,563	
United States population, 1950	150,697,361	
Population, 17 Southern and Border States, 1950	50,349,563	
Percent of United States population, in 17 Southern and Border States, 1950	33	

[1] Number of voters per 100 citizens of voting age.

Mr. DOUGLAS. But, Mr. President, we know that in the presidential election of 1952—in which there was an extremely large vote—in the 11 Southern States only 39.1 percent of the citizens of voting age—and I emphasize voting age, rather than population—actually voted. Of course, in the 1952 presidential election, an unusually large proportion of people voted in the South, compared with previous elections. In the 1950 congressional election, for example, only 12.4 percent of the citizens of voting age actually voted. I shall place in the RECORD at a later point more detailed statistics on this subject.

In the Northern States of the country something like 70 percent of the citizens of voting age actually voted in the 1952 election; and over 50 percent of the citizens of voting age actually voted in the 1950 congressional elections—or in 1952 the proportion voting in the North was almost twice—although not quite twice—the proportion voting in the South; and in 1950 it was approximately 4 times as much. Thus, because of restrictions on voting in the Southern States, in practice those elected by a relatively small number of people form a bloc of States which in Congress can tie up vital proposals which the rest of the country desires. In truth, we all know that it is this very fact which prevents us from passing vital civil-rights measures which, on the whole, the majority of the country desires.

As I have said, in elections prior to 1952 a much smaller proportion of the adults actually voted in the South.

Thus, despite all that has happened in the last century, despite the great struggle from 1861 to 1865, the political theory of John C. Calhoun that no vital act should be passed unless concurred in by every significant sectional group in the country has triumphed. The theory of concurrent majority, or the right of one section to veto the will of the rest of the country, has triumphed. O, rigid believer in slavery and inequality, thou has conquered. From your seat in the political Vahalla, you must smile grimly at the way your successors have snatched victory from defeat, and have imbedded your theories deep into the rules and practices of the Senate.

Mr. President, I have shown that the large States and, hence, the large cities, are grossly underrepresented in the Senate. I shall show that they are also grossly underrepresented in the national House of Representatives. But the underrepresentation in the national House of Representatives occurs because they are underrepresented in the State legislatures which lay out the congressional districts, and hence largely determine the composition of the national House of Representatives.

It is the question of urban underrepresentation in State legislatures to which I now turn.

II–2. URBAN UNDERREPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES

That the urban areas of the States are underrepresented in the State legislatures is a notorious fact. In almost every State in the United States, the cities are lacking in fair representation in at least one house of the legislature. Unfortunately, there has not been enough thorough and systematic analysis of the extent of urban underrepresentation. We all know it to be a fact of political life. We do not know as much as we should about the extent of it.

In 1937, a Mr. Henry Stoner analyzed all of the State legislatures in the United States. He did this by adding the populations of the smallest districts electing representatives to each house in order to determine what was the smallest proportion of the total population which elected a majority of the representatives in that house.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table showing Mr. Stoner's computations be inserted in the RECORD at this point. The figures given under each house of the State legislatures indicate the percentage of the total population whose representatives constitute a majority of that chamber.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Percent of total population represented by a majority of seats in State legislatures (1937)

State	House	Senate
Connecticut	8.67	44.9
Rhode Island	22.3	8.86
California	47.6	12.5
New Jersey	46.7	15.4
Maryland	33.6	18.1
United States	43.4	18.2
Nevada	18.6	26.6
Idaho	37.2	21.5
Delaware	32.9	21.7
Montana	49.5	23.2
Florida	23.5	26.1
Kansas	26.5	37.6
Georgia	31.8	28.5
Michigan	28.8	34.1
Arizona	45.3	28.9
Missouri	29.4	35.4
South Carolina	45.4	30.6
Oregon	39.5	31.5
Ohio	31.8	46.2
Kentucky	32.3	39.7
Alabama	35.8	33.2
Iowa	33.7	35.3
North Carolina	33.9	49.4
Oklahoma	39.7	34.4
Wyoming	39.2	34.6
Tennessee	35.1	41.4
New Mexico	41.9	35.4
Illinois	35.4	35.4
Mississippi	35.5	39.8
Vermont	35.5	47.3
West Virginia	44.0	35.6
Indiana	37.7	42.8
Texas	41.7	38.0
Minnesota	38.5	42.3
Louisiana	41.2	38.8
Pennsylvania	44.4	38.8
North Dakota	44.1	39.9
Arkansas	40.3	46.1
South Dakota	40.3	42.3
Virginia	40.6	44.0
Wisconsin	40.9	44.1
Utah	41.8	42.6
Washington	42.3	45.6
Colorado	42.7	42.5
Maine	48.6	42.9
New York	51.9	43.9
Nebraska (unicameral)	46.8	
Massachusetts	48.5	48.0
New Hampshire	50.2	50.6

Source: Gus Tyler, The Majority Don't Count, New Republic, Aug. 22, 1955, p. 14.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, what these figures mean is that in Connecticut, a majority of the delegates in the lower house were elected from districts populated by only 8.67 percent of the total population of the State. In New Jersey, a majority of the senate represented only 15.4 percent of the people of that State; in California, a majority of the senate represented only 12.5 percent of the people; and so on.

Thirty-six of the States, then, had legislatures in which a majority of at least one house spoke for less than 40 percent of the people of that State, and 45 States had 1 house in which a majority represented less than 44 percent of the people. In 18 States, a majority of both houses represented less than 40 percent of the State's population.

SITUATION HAS WORSENED IN THE LAST 18 YEARS

What has happened in the intervening 18 years, Mr. President? In 1955, two political scientists from the University of Florida brought these figures up to date. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a table for 1955.

384230—58251

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Percent of total population represented by a majority of seats in State legislatures (1955)

State	House	Senate
Connecticut	9.59	36.50
California	44.70	11.88
Nevada	28.82	12.36
Vermont	12.58	45.67
Rhode Island	34.17	13.53
Maryland	27.57	15.52
New Jersey	43.95	17.01
Florida	17.19	17.67
Montana	40.80	18.40
Idaho	41.53	19.05
Arizona	(1)	19.30
Delaware	19.40	22.70
New Mexico	35.67	20.07
Ohio	29.19	20.68
Kansas	22.59	33.67
Missouri	23.71	47.37
Georgia	26.30	26.89
South Carolina	46.72	26.57
Utah	38.99	26.75
Alabama	27.15	28.26
Wyoming	39.92	28.77
Iowa	29.34	33.94
Illinois [2]	46.02	29.42
Oklahoma	33.38	29.45
Tennessee	30.13	33.26
North Carolina	30.16	40.09
Minnesota	31.56	35.93
Louisiana	31.94	36.00
Michigan	42.29	32.34
Mississippi	32.67	34.59
Washington	33.87	35.44
Colorado	34.67	36.12
North Dakota	39.02	35.36
Pennsylvania	41.63	35.44
Texas	39.85	36.80
Indiana	36.95	39.25
New York	37.06	40.91
New Hampshire	37.40	44.75
Arkansas	37.52	46.95
Kentucky	37.59	45.19
South Dakota	38.73	40.85
West Virginia	38.87	45.68
Wisconsin	38.87	47.53
Maine	39.12	39.71
Nebraska (unicameral)	41.88	
Massachusetts	42.15	48.76
Oregon	45.42	42.18
Virginia	43.69	43.93

Source: Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsay, Unrepresentative States, National Municipal Review, December 1955, pp. 572, 574.

[1] Not available.
[2] Based on reapportionment effective 1957.

Mr. DOUGLAS. In 1955, 44 State legislatures had one house in which a majority of delegates represented less than 40 percent of the States' population instead of 36 States in 1937. In 1955, 26 States had State legislatures in which both houses represented less than 40 percent of the population, as compared with 18 States in 1937. The situation, is therefore, getting much worse and not better, Mr. President.

Let us look further at the current figures. Thirty-two States have State legislatures in which a majority of 1 house represents less than 35 percent of the population; in 24 States, a majority of 1 house represents less than 30 percent of the people; and in 12 States, a majority of 1 house of the State legislature represents less than 20 percent of the people of those States.

SOME INDIVIDUAL STATES

What is the situation with respect to some of the individual States? In the Connecticut lower house, a majority represents only 9.59 percent of the people, while in its upper house, only 36.5 percent of the people are represented by the majority of the delegates.

In California, 11.88 percent of the people are represented by a majority in the upper house. In Rhode Island, it is 13.53 percent of the population which has the majority in the upper house—more than the remaining 87 percent. In Maryland, the figure is 15.52 percent for the upper house and 27.57 for the lower house. In New Jersey, only 17 percent of the people are represented by the majority of the State senate.

In Florida, a majority of both houses represents less than 18 percent of the population. In Delaware, it is 19.4 percent in 1 house and 22.7 percent in the other house. In Ohio, the figures are 21 percent and 29 percent; and in Kansas, 23 percent and 33 percent.

In my own State of Illinois, only 29 percent of the people now elect a majority of the upper house, and in Pennsylvania, 42 percent of the people elect a majority of the lower house, and 35 percent control the upper house. In New York the comparable figures are 37 percent and 41 percent.

Of the States I have mentioned, all except Rhode Island—and it still ranks as the fifth poorest State in providing equality of representation—have become worse since 1937. Only 3 or 4 States have improved at all since 1937.

GREAT DISPARITY BETWEEN LARGEST AND SMALLEST DISTRICTS IN EACH STATE

My son, John Douglas, made another analysis of State legislatures based on the census figures for 1940. He made two computations for each house of every State. First, he computed the average deviation of district from the number of people who would have been represented if each district had been the same size. That is, if there had been an average of 10,000 people per representative in the chamber and the average deviation had been 40 percent, it would mean that the average districts contained not 10,000 persons but a number either 40 percent more or 40 percent less than that figure. His second computation is the ratio between the largest and smallest district in each State. This figure is very simple—if the ratio is 5, it means that the largest district contained a population 5 times as great as that of the smallest district. If, as was the case with Connecticut House, the ratio is 539.6, it means that the largest district contained 539.6 times the population of the smallest district.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this table be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

	House		Senate	
	Percent of average deviation	Ratio between largest and smallest district	Percent of average deviation	Ratio between largest and smallest district
Alabama	40.2	4.9	41.0	29.4
Arizona	16.0	4.1	62.8	10.8
Arkansas	22.0	3.5	12.5	1.9
California	11.2	3.6	101.6	280.7
Colorado	18.0	4.9	17.6	2.1
Connecticut	111.2	539.6	14.6	4.6
Delaware	71.7	29.9	60.9	11.2
Florida	94.1	36.0	78.3	28.5
Georgia	43.6	35.1	46.4	22.9
Idaho	29.5	15.6	67.3	50.1
Illinois	49.6	5.4	49.6	16.2
Indiana	10.2	2.3	21.9	3.1
Iowa	41.9	9.6	34.3	8.0
Kansas	61.0	51.0	28.7	15.7
Kentucky	23.2	3.4	8.9	1.6
Louisiana	28.6	6.9	22.6	4.6
Maine	27.1	7.0	20.8	1.9
Maryland	43.0	4.9	72.2	14.9
Massachusetts	27.8	7.7	7.0	1.4
Michigan	48.4	8.9	50.6	7.3
Minnesota	34.5	8.9	27.3	7.3
Mississippi	37.9	9.5	29.8	4.6
Missouri	37.9	14.7	9.7	1.6
Montana	24.1	9.6	67.0	49.1
Nebraska	10.8	1.5	(1)	(1)
Nevada	24.7	3.0	79.3	26.7
New Hampshire	20.5	137.0	74.6	2.5
New Jersey	11.3	3.2	78.2	28.9
New Mexico	35.6	6.6	44.5	10.7
New York	27.0	9.5	24.0	2.4
North Carolina	39.2	10.7	19.7	2.6
North Dakota	24.9	4.6	22.6	4.2
Ohio	40.2	6.8	3.8	1.4
Oklahoma	18.2	9.5	39.6	7.9
Oregon	28.2	6.6	35.9	8.9
Pennsylvania	14.6	13.8	25.9	4.9
Rhode Island	33.5	23.1	89.6	96.4
South Carolina	8.8	1.9	50.4	13.2
South Dakota	25.4	5.7	19.1	2.9
Tennessee	37.8	14.7	36.2	4.4
Texas	37.9	8.7	34.6	5.5
Utah	26.6	27.9	26.1	2.2
Vermont	91.7	132.6	16.1	4.4
Virginia	20.0	2.8	18.9	3.2
Washington	15.3	2.9	15.9	2.8
West Virginia	18.7	4.9	17.0	2.1
Wisconsin	25.3	4.2	13.2	2.5
Wyoming	14.0	2.3	36.8	6.6

[1] Unicameral.

Source: John Douglas, unpublished manuscript.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I have a similar table which ranks each of the houses of the State legislatures on the basis of the ratio between the largest district and the smallest district. This table is current. I ask unanimous consent to have this table printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

State legislatures—Ratio between largest and smallest districts[1]

State and chambers:[2]	Ratio between largest and smallest district
Arkansas, S	1.5
Missouri, S	1.7
Illinois, LH	1.7
Massachusetts, S	1.8
Wisconsin, S	1.8
Nebraska, Unicameral	1.9
Kentucky, S	2.0
New York, S	2.3
Virginia, S	2.4
South Carolina, LH	2.4
Oregon, S	2.6
Maine, S	2.6
New Hampshire, S	2.9
Michigan, LH	2.9
Indiana, S	3.1
Wyoming, LH	3.2
South Dakota, S	3.4
Texas, LH	3.5
Colorado, S	3.7
Oregon, LH	3.8

Footnotes at end of table.

384230—58251

State legislatures—Ratio between largest and smallest districts[1]—Continued

State and chambers:[2]	Ratio between largest and smallest district
West Virginia, S	3.9
North Carolina, S	3.9
New Jersey, LH	3.9
Wisconsin, LH	3.9
Connecticut, S	4.1
Indiana, LH	4.4
Maine, LH	4.7
Tennessee, S	4.8
Utah, S	4.8
Vermont, S	5.0
North Dakota, LH	5.2
Mississippi, S	5.4
Montana, S	5.4
Arkansas, LH	5.5
Pennsylvania, S	5.7
Virginia, LH	5.8
Texas, S	5.9
South Dakota, LH	6.3
Michigan, S	6.5
Iowa, LH	6.5
Washington, S	6.9
Washington, LH	6.9
Maryland, LH	7.3
West Virginia, LH	7.3
North Dakota, S	7.4
Colorado, LH	7.4
Louisiana, S	7.9
Kentucky, LH	8.1
Minnesota, S	9.1
Ohio, LH	9.3
Wyoming, S	9.6
Nevada, LH	9.8
Alabama, LH	9.9
Missouri, LH	10.0
Montana, LH	10.0
Massachusetts, LH	10.0
Oklahoma, LH	10.1
Iowa, S	10.7
Mississippi, LH	11.6
Kansas, S	11.8
New York, LH	11.8
North Carolina, LH	14.1
New Mexico, LH	14.5
Minnesota, LH	14.7
Pennsylvania, LH	15.6
Oklahoma, S	15.8
Idaho, LH	15.9
Delaware, S	16.4
South Carolina, S	17.6
Tennessee, LH	19.0
Rhode Island, LH	20.2
Maryland, S	21.9
Illinois, S	22.5
New Jersey, S	26.3
Ohio, S	26.5
Delaware, LH	27.0
Louisiana, LH	28.3
Georgia, S	29.2
Alabama, S	31.0
Arizona, S	38.9
Kansas, LH	41.7
Utah, LH	46.1
Florida, S	47.5
New Mexico, S	48.3
Georgia, LH	63.3
Florida, LH	75.0
Rhode Island, S	75.2
Idaho, S	77.0
Nevada, S	81.8
New Hampshire, LH	136.2
California, S	296.3
Vermont, LH	676.6
Connecticut, LH	682.3

Figures not available for lower houses in Arizona or California.

Source: Gus Tyler, manuscript in process of publication.

[1] In certain instances, "largest district" figure used in this computation represents average population of districts in most underrepresented country.

[2] S indicates senate; LH indicates lower house.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I will merely say that in Connecticut the ratio between the largest and smallest districts is now 682.3 to 1; in Vermont, 676.6 to 1; in California, 296.3 to 1; in New Hampshire, 136.2 to 1; in Nevada, 81.8 to 1; in Idaho, 77 to 1; in Rhode Island, 75.2 to 1; in Florida, 75 to 1; in Georgia, 63.3 to 1; in New Mexico, 48.3 to 1; in Florida, 47.5 to 1; in Utah, 46.1 to 1; in Kansas, 41.7 to 1; in Louisiana, 29.2 to 1; in Delaware, 27.01 to 1; in Ohio, 26.5 to 1; in New Jersey 26.3 to 1; in Illinois, 22.5 to 1; in Maryland, 21.9 to 1; in Rhode Island, 20.2 to 1; in Tennessee, 19 to 1; in South Carolina, 17.6 to 1. A number of others show extraordinary disproportions.

In the Connecticut house, the ratio is no longer 539.6; the largest district is now 682.3 times as big as the smallest district. And, in Vermont, the ratio for lower house districts has grown from 132 to 676. More important than these extreme examples, however, is the situation in the vast majority of the States, including the ones with the largest urban populations. In California's senate, the largest district has 296 times the population of the smallest. In the New Jersey senate, the ratio is 26.3. In the Pennsylvania lower house, it is 15.6. In the Illinois senate, the largest district is 22.5 times the size of the smallest. In the lower house of the State of New York, the largest district has 11.8 times as many people as the smallest. In only 14 of the 95 separate houses of State legislatures—Nebraska having the unicameral system—does the largest district contain less than 3 times the population of the smallest.

UNDERREPRESENTATION OF THE LARGEST CITIES IN EACH STATE

John Douglas also compared the percentage of the population of the State living in the largest city or cities in each State with the percentage of the city's seats in each house of the State legislature.

I ask unanimous consent that this table also be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Representation of metropolitan centers in American State legislatures (1940)

State and city	City's population percent of State total	City's House seats percent of State total	City's Senate seats percent of State total
Alabama: Birmingham	16.2	6.6	2.9
Arkansas: Little Rock	7.9	7.0	5.7
California: Los Angeles	40.3	40.0	2.5
Colorado: Denver	28.7	23.1	22.9
Connecticut: Hartford	9.7	.7	8.3
Delaware: Wilmington	42.2	14.3	11.8
Florida: Miami	14.0	3.2	2.6
Georgia: Atlanta	12.6	1.5	1.9
Idaho: Boise	9.6	6.8	2.3
Illinois: Chicago	51.5	37.3	37.3
Indiana: Indianapolis	13.4	12.0	10.0
Iowa: Des Moines	7.7	1.9	2.0
Kansas: Wichita	11.3	2.4	2.5
Kentucky: Louisville	13.6	11.0	13.2
Louisiana: New Orleans	21.0	19.0	18.2
Maine: Portland	9.4	4.6	(1)
Maryland: Baltimore	47.2	29.3	20.7
Massachusetts: Boston	17.8	17.0	16.8
Michigan: Detroit	38.3	21.0	15.6
Minnesota:			
Minneapolis	17.6	12.2	11.9
St. Paul	11.1	9.2	9.0
Mississippi: Jackson	4.9	2.1	4.1

Footnotes at end of table.

Representation of metropolitan centers in American State legislatures (1940)—Con.

State and city	City's population percent of State total	City's House seats percent of State total	City's Senate seats percent of State total
Missouri:			
St. Louis	21.6	12.7	20.6
Kansas City	12.6	6.7	11.8
Montana: Butte	9.5	8.9	1.8
Nebraska: Omaha	18.8	14.2	(2)
Nevada: Reno	29.5	22.0	5.9
New Hampshire: Manchester	15.8	11.7	14.8
New Jersey:			
Newark	20.1	20.0	4.8
Jersey City	15.7	15.0	4.8
New York: New York	55.2	44.7	44.6
North Carolina: Charlotte	4.3	3.3	2.0
North Dakota: Fargo	8.3	8.0	6.1
Ohio:			
Cleveland	17.6	12.7	17.9
Cincinnati	9.0	6.5	8.9
Oklahoma:			
Oklahoma City	10.4	5.9	4.5
Tulsa	8.3	5.9	2.2
Oregon: Portland	32.6	23.1	22.7
Pennsylvania:			
Philadelphia	19.5	19.7	16.0
Pittsburgh	14.3	13.0	12.0
Rhode Island: Providence	35.6	25.0	11.4
South Carolina: Charleston	6.4	6.5	2.2
South Dakota: Sioux Falls	10.2	8.0	5.7
Tennessee:			
Memphis	12.3	7.8	8.9
Nashville	8.8	6.8	6.0
Utah: Salt Lake City	38.4	31.7	30.4
Vermont: Burlington	7.7	.4	1.7
Virginia: Richmond	7.6	7.0	7.5
Washington: Seattle	28.5	24.5	26.0
West Virginia: Charles Town	10.3	8.5	6.3
Wisconsin: Milwaukee	24.1	20.0	21.8
Wyoming: Cheyenne	13.2	10.7	7.4

[1] Indeterminate.

[2] Unicameral.

Source: John Douglas, unpublished manuscript.

Mr. DOUGLAS. It is instructive to look at this table. Birmingham, Ala., had 16.2 percent of the State's population, but only 2.9 percent of the seats in the State's senate, and only 6.6 percent of the house seats. Atlanta, Ga., with 12.6 percent of the population, had 1.9 percent and 1.5 percent respectively in the senate and the house.

Georgia is tied up with the county unit system, which binds the cities, and particularly Atlanta, in the selection of Representatives, and also in the selection of a governor and in the nomination of a United States Senator. These county unit provisions, it is true, apply to the primary in Georgia, but in the past the primary has always been equivalent to election, which indicates the subordinate position to which Atlanta, Augusta, Columbus, Savannah, Macon, and other Georgia cities are reduced. Not only has this had a great effect upon the past political history of Georgia, but it will have a great effect in the future.

Wichita, Kans., had 11.3 percent of the population, but 2.5 percent and 2.4 percent of the seats in the two houses of the State legislature. Los Angeles has 40 percent of the population, but only 2.5 percent of the State senators. Denver has 23 percent of the representation in each house of the legislature, but almost 30 percent of the people of Colorado live there; 42 percent of the people of the State of Delaware live in Wilmington, but they are represented by 14 percent of the delegates in one house and by 12 percent of the delegates in the other. Miami, Fla., with 14 percent of the population, has only about 3 percent of the representation in each house.

Almost 8 percent of the people of Iowa live in Des Moines, but in neither house do they have more than 2 percent of the delegates. Baltimore has about one-half the population of Maryland, yet is limited to less than one-third of the members of the lower house, and one-fifth the members of the upper house. Detroit has almost 40 percent of the State's population, but only one-fifth of the members of one house and less than one-sixth of the members of the other.

Newark and Jersey City have more than a third of New Jersey's people, but less than one-tenth of the State senators. St. Louis and Kansas City, Mo., each have about one-half of their just representation in the lower house. The pattern is similar in almost all States. The large cities are greatly underrepresented in their State legislatures—in one house in virtually all States in both houses in many of the States.

URBAN AREAS ARE STILL UNDERREPRESENTED

I also have two other tables which show similar but current data. The first shows the percent of population and representation of the most populous county in each State. The second was made by Mr. Gordon Baker, and was published in 1955. He makes the same kind of computation with respect to the major urban areas of each State. He groups the States in terms of the degree of urban underrepresentation, ranging from severe underrepresentation to equal representation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the RECORD at this point, the two tables I have mentioned.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Representation of most populous county in each State

State	County	Largest city in county	Percent of State population in county	County's percent of Senate seats	County's percent of seats in lower house
Rhode Island	Providence	Providence	72.6	47.7	68.0
Delaware	New Castle	Wilmington	68.6	41.2	42.9
New York	5 counties of New York City.[1]		52.7	43.1	43.3
Illinois	Cook	Chicago	51.8	41.4	50.8
Arizona	Maricopa	Phoenix	44.3	7.1	46.2
Utah	Salt Lake	Salt Lake City	41.1	30.4	31.7
Maryland	Baltimore City		40.5	20.7	29.3
California	Los Angeles	Los Angeles	39.2	2.5	38.8
Michigan	Wayne	Detroit	38.2	26.5	34.5
Colorado	Denver	Denver	31.4	22.9	23.1
Nevada	Washoe	Reno	31.4	5.9	6.4
Oregon	Multnomah	Portland	31.0	26.7	28.3
Washington	King	Seattle	30.8	17.4	16.2
New Hampshire	Hillsborough	Manchester	29.4	29.2	28.6
Connecticut	New Haven	New Haven	27.2	27.8	15.7
Wisconsin	Milwaukee	Milwaukee	25.4	21.2	24.0
Massachusetts	Middlesex	Cambridge	22.7	[2] 22.5	22.5
Minnesota	Hennepin	Minneapolis	22.7	13.4	13.7
New Mexico	Bernalillo	Albuquerque	21.4	3.2	13.6
Louisiana	Orleans Parish	New Orleans	21.3	20.5	20.8
Nebraska	Douglas	Omaha	21.2	16.3	(3)
Pennsylvania	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	19.7	16.0	18.6
New Jersey	Essex	Newark	18.7	4.8	20.0
Maine	Cumberland	Portland	18.5	12.1	15.9
Alabama	Jefferson	Birmingham	18.3	2.9	6.6
Florida	Dade	Miami	17.9	2.6	3.4
Ohio	Cuyahoga	Cleveland	17.5	18.2	12.2
Vermont	Chittenden	Burlington	16.6	15.3	6.6
Kentucky	Jefferson	Louisville	16.5	13.2	11.0
Wyoming	Laramie	Cheyenne	16.4	7.4	10.7
Tennessee	Shelby	Memphis	14.7	[2] 9.1	8.1
Oklahoma	Oklahoma	Oklahoma City	14.6	[2] 2.3	5.8
Indiana	Marion	Indianapolis	14.0	[2] 10.0	[2] 12.0
Georgia	Fulton	Atlanta	13.7	1.9	1.5
Idaho	Ada	Boise	12.0	1.7	6.8
West Virginia	Kanawha	Charleston	11.9	6.3	11.0
Kansas	Sedgwick	Wichita	11.7	2.5	2.4
South Dakota	Minnehaha	Sioux Falls	10.9	5.7	10.7
Texas	Harris	Houston	10.5	3.1	5.3
Missouri	St. Louis City		10.3	20.6	11.5
Arkansas	Pulaski	Little Rock	10.3	8.6	8.0
North Dakota	Cass	Fargo	9.5	8.0	6.1
Montana	Yellowstone	Billings	9.5	1.8	8.5
Iowa	Polk	Des Moines	8.6	2.0	2.0
South Carolina	Greenville	Greenville	7.9	2.2	8.1
Virginia	Richmond City		6.9	7.5	7.0
Mississippi	Hinds	Jackson	6.5		
North Carolina	Mecklenburg	Charlotte	4.9	2.0	3.3

[1] Figure includes Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, and Richmond Counties. Largest single county is Kings, which has 18.5 percent of State population, 15.5 percent of seats in senate, 14.7 percent of seats in lower house.

[2] These counties share some or all of their representation with other counties. The figures indicate percentage of the seats held by persons representing any portion of the county, though the districts may extend into other counties.

[3] Unicameral.

NOTE.—Figures not obtainable for Mississippi.

Source: Gus Tyler, manuscript in process of publication.

384230—58251

Representation of principal urban areas

States	Selected urban areas	Percent of State population	Percent of lower house	Percent of senate
GROUP I, SEVERE				
Georgia	6 largest urban counties	32	9	7
Florida	9 most urban counties	60	23	24
Delaware	Wilmington urbanized area	59	23	24
Maryland	Baltimore and 3 largest urban counties.	67	44	31
Connecticut	10 largest cities	46	7	[1] 46
Rhode Island	do	77	67	34
New Jersey	8 largest urban counties	75	73	38
California	4 largest urban counties	59	59	10
GROUP II				
New York	New York City	53	43	43
Kansas	3 largest urban counties	26	7	8
Alabama	do	30	13	9
Iowa	5 largest urban counties	24	10	10
Oklahoma	2 largest urban counties	26	12	6
Texas	4 largest urban counties	29	19	13
Minnesota	2 largest urban counties	35	23	22
New Mexico	Largest urban county	21	11	3
Tennessee	4 largest urban counties	38	22	20
Arizona	2 largest urban counties	62	62	7
Nevada	do	62	40	12
Michigan	Wayne County	38	35	21
Missouri	St. Louis and 2 largest urban counties.	45	25	41
Illinois	Chicago	42	39	31
Ohio	8 largest urban counties	54	39	54
South Carolina	3 largest urban counties	22	22	7
Vermont	Entire urban population	36	6	[1] 36
Idaho	4 largest urban counties	28	19	9
North Dakota	4 largest cities	17	12	10
GROUP II—cont.				
Montana	5 largest urban counties	37	32	9
North Carolina	4 largest counties	22	16	[1] 16
Mississippi	2 largest urban counties	10	4	4
GROUP III				
Utah	3 largest urban counties	64	48	48
Indiana	6 largest urban counties	46	32	34
Washington	3 largest urban counties	52	44	48
Colorado	Denver City	31	26	23
Oregon	Largest urban county	31	27	23
Nebraska	2 largest urban counties	30		23
Kentucky	3 largest urban counties	23	17	18
Louisiana	3 largest urban parishes	34	26	26
Maine	8 largest cities	27	19	[1] 27
GROUP IV, MODERATE				
Pennsylvania	2 largest urban counties	34	32	28
Virginia	8 largest cities and 4 largest urban counties.	34	28	33
West Virginia	3 largest urban counties	21	19	12
Wyoming	5 most urban counties	48	41	33
South Dakota	6 largest urban counties	30	28	23
Arkansas	3 largest urban counties	16	12	14
New Hampshire	3 largest cities	27	25	29
GROUP V, EQUAL REPRESENTATION				
Wisconsin	3 largest urban counties	33	32	33
Massachusetts	All cities over 50,000 population	50	50	[1] 50

[1] Approximate.

NOTE.—Figures are rounded to nearest percentage.

Source: Gordon E. Baker, Rural Versus Urban Political Power (New York: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 16–17.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, all these figures show the same pattern. The cities of the United States do not have their just and fair representation in the State legislatures. In only two States, Wisconsin and Massachusetts, do the largest cities have equal representation. On the other hand, New York, Philadelphia, New Haven, Providence, Minneapolis, Newark, Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Salt Lake City, Birmingham and many others of our great centers of population are underrepresented in one or both houses of their State legislatures.

WHAT UNDERREPRESENTATION MEANS

For example, the eight largest urban counties in New Jersey have 75 percent of the population in the State, but only 38 percent of the representation in the senate. In California, the four largest urban counties have 59 percent of the population, but only 10 percent of the senate's representation. New York City has 53 percent of the people of the State, but is represented by only 43 percent of the delegates in each house. Wayne County—Detroit—has 38 percent of Michigan's population, but only 21 permenent of the State Senators. Chicago is inhabited by 42 percent of the people who live in Illinois but is only permitted to send 31 percent of the delegates to the State senate. And so on.

What do these statistics mean in terms of the people who live in the areas which are grossly underrepresented or overrepresented? They mean that Los Angeles County, with a 1950 population of 4,151,687, has 1 senator in the State legislature, and that Inyo and Mono counties, with a combined population of 13,773, also have 1 senator.

Fulton County, Ga., which includes Atlanta, has about one-eighth of the population of Georgia and pays about one-fourth of the State's taxes, but is only permitted 3 representatives of the 205 in the lower house of the State legislature.

Or take Hartford, Conn., in which 177,000 people choose to live. It has two representatives in the lower house of the State legislature—but so does the town of Colebrook—which a mere 600 people have chosen as their home.

Bridgeport has only two. New Haven has only two. Danbury has only two. The big Connecticut cities are each limited to two. However, communities with 600 to 700, 800, or 1,000 population also have two.

Let us consider Oklahoma City, with a population of about 244,000. It has 7 representatives as compared with 11 for 11 rural counties with a total population of 83,000.

In Alabama, Lowndes County with a population of 18,000—of whom only a few hundred white persons usually vote—has equal representation in the upper house with Birmingham which has a population of over one-half million persons.

THE COUNTY UNIT SYSTEM IN PRIMARIES

Not only are the cities underrepresented in their legislatures, but in some States they are further discriminated against in the process of nominating candidates. In particular, Maryland and Georgia both use the county-unit system in primary elections so that even a few of the rural counties are able to outvote the urban centers which contain the bulk of the population of those States. This is the Mundt-Coudert formula at the State level. It completely freezes the cities out of their State governments.

CHANGES IN THE LAST 20 YEARS

There have been only two significant changes in the last 20 years with respect to the pattern of urban representation in the State legislatures. First, the urban population has continued to grow relative to the nonurban population, increasing the imbalance. Second, there has been a reapportionment in a number of States, but in almost every State in which reapportionment has been undertaken it has been done on the basis of reapportioning one house to achieve better balance, but at the price of freezing the discriminatory pattern in the other house. In other words the cities, in order to achieve justice in representation in one house of the legislature, have been forced to agree to permanent inequality in the other house. And so the pattern of urban underrepresentation is perpetuated.

RESULTS OF UNDERREPRESENTATION

One of the results of this pattern is that these legislatures perpetuate the pattern in the apportionment of Representatives to the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. I shall discuss this problem in detail later.

Another result is to send the cities to Washington for solutions to their problems. They run up against a stone wall in their State legislatures where they are unable to get an understanding hearing for their needs. They lack home rule. The rural-dominated State legislatures will not give them home rule. Lacking home rule, the cities are unable to get an understanding hearing for their needs. Lacking home rule, the cities must go to the State legislatures with transit problems; with all tax matters; for permission to undertake urban renewal; with housing problems; with health, welfare, and relief measures; in short the cities must go to State legislatures for a solution to almost every problem of city government. Without permission from the State legislature, the mayor of a city

frequently can make few decisions more important than when shall he go out for lunch. And the State legislatures generally turn a deaf ear to the requests of the cities. Consequently they are driven to the Federal Government where their representation, although less than fair, is more equitable than in the States, or where, sometimes, they find a friend in the President of the United States. A considerable expansion in the services of the Federal Government has resulted from the failures of the State legislatures to meet the needs of the urban populations of their States.

It is very interesting that those who complain most about Federal encroachment in the affairs of the States are most often the very ones who deny to the urban majorities in their States the opportunity to solve their problems through State action. Until the State legislatures have been reformed, the plea for Federal action will remain strong and just.

In presidential elections, the voice of the cities is heard. I repeat, it is heard to the degree that cities have populations, and therefore voters. It is the only place in the American electoral system where it is heard to the extent that it deserves to be. The proponents of this amendment would take away even this representation for them by diminishing their role in even the presidential elections.

REPUBLICANS HAVE THE ADVANTAGE IN STATE LEGISLATURES

A third result of urban underrepresentation is that the State legislatures are more Republican in character than the popular vote in those States would justify. This is fundamentally because the cities are underrepresented and the nonurban areas are overrepresented; and inasmuch as the Democratic strength is greater in the cities than it is in the nonurban areas and the Republican strength is greater in the country than in the cities, it follows that there is produced a lack of balance between the parties, and operates in favor of the Republicans.

In 1953 there were 29 Republican governors, and 19 Democratic governors, a high point for the Republican Party. The legislatures were divided about the same: 28 houses with Republican majorities and 23 Republican senates; 18 houses with Democratic majorities and 18 Democratic senates. There were two nonpartisan legislatures.

In 1954 the Democrats won 8 gubernatorial races, changing the balance in their favor to 27 governors for the Democrats, 21 for the Republicans. But the State legislatures are rigged so that the Democrats, in spite of winning 8 statewide races, were able only to pick up a majority in 6 houses, and were able only to gain majorities in 2 State senates. Further, the more Democratic governors elected the greater would be the disparity between the party of the governor and the party of the legislatures. Furthermore, the composite figures do not indicate the important States like New York and Illinois in which one house of the State legislature has been given what is virtually a permanent Republican majority which has been made unshakable—not by the affection of the voters for the Republican Party, but by apportioning the representation so that Democratic areas cannot achieve a majority no matter how great a majority they may achieve in statewide elections.

In New Jersey, for example, the governorship changes hands more or less regularly, but the State senate goes on the same—it is always Republican. Connecticut, another State where there is a two-party system with respect to the governor, has not had a lower house controlled by the Democrats since 1876.

Much the same is true in Rhode Island.

In 21 of the 35 years since 1920 there has been a Democratic governor in the State house in Albany, N. Y. But the Democrats have had a majority in the senate only 7 of those years, and had a majority in the assembly in only one of those years. The senate has been redistricted to try and prevent a repetition of even this meager representation.

Illinois has had a Democratic governor for 12 of the 35 years since 1920. But there has been a Democratic house for only 8 of those years, and there has been a Democratic senate for only 8 years of that period.

These are only examples. In Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and many other States the same situation prevails.

In Michigan the people have elected a Democratic governor each biennial election since 1948, but never has there been Democratic control of the legislature.

REASONS FOR URBAN UNDERREPRESENTATION

The underrepresentation of urban areas in State legislatures has been the result of several factors. One has been the rapid growth of the cities relative to the rural areas of the country. This growth has been so rapid that it has outstripped the normally slow-moving processes of government. But that alone is not enough to explain the failure of State governments to make a greater effort to adjust the pattern of representation in the direction of greater equality. Another very important reason for the failure of the States has been the understandable, but nonetheless unjustifiable, reluctance of rural areas and the representatives to surrender any of the power which remained in their hands. Furthermore, and this is very significant, their reluctance was reinforced by financial and corporate interests of the big cities which found the State governments easier to control for their purposes if the State legislatures were stacked against the cities, and against social reform measures.

URBAN UNDERREPRESENTATION SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO THE PRESIDENT

I think I have shown that the rural areas and the economic interests which support and control them have a stranglehold on most of the State legislatures. We must not extend that stranglehold to the election of the President of the United States.

Furthermore, adoption of this amendment would offer greater inducement to the States to increase the degree of urban underrepresentation. We cannot invite the State legislatures, in this vital matter of how we elect our Presidents, to gerrymander the congressional districts even more than they now are, to aid the regime in power in the statehouse to distort the people's will in electing a President. The present method achieves a very rough measure of justice, although it too is weighted in favor of the States with smaller populations, weighted in favor of the South. Let us not tamper with the system without careful consideration and a conclusive showing that there will be a genuine improvement.

II–3. URBAN UNDERREPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Although the national House of Representatives was intended by the framers of the Constitution to be the House in which the people received approximately equal representation, the unrepresentative State legislatures have frustrated this objective to a considerable extent. Since Congress has abdicated its constitutional authority to regulate the manner of electing the House of Representatives, and permitted the States to apportion their congressional seats in any way they see fit, it is not surprising that there has been a tendency to reproduce the unrepresentative character of State legislatures at the national level. Congressional districts are drawn so as to benefit the party in power in the State legislature. The result is that the urban areas of the country are underrepresented in the House of Representatives, although the injustice is not so great as in many of the State legislatures.

GREAT VARIATION IN THE SIZE OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

An average seat in the House should represent about 350,000 persons. Allowing for a margin of 15 percent to take care of geographic, county, and other reasonable factors, each congressional district should contain between 300,000 and 400,000 people.

In the present House only 256 Members come from districts having populations between those figures, while 177 Congressmen represent districts which are either over or underrepresented. The population ranges and number of districts in that range follow:

Population in thousands (1950):	*Number of districts*
150–200	4
200–250	26
250–300	63
300–350	147
350–400	109
400–450	52
450–500	14
500–550	8
550–600	2
600–650 (2 North Dakota, at-large)	4
650–700 (2 New Mexico, at-large)	2
800–850	1
2,000–2,500 (1 Connecticut, at-large; 1 Washington, at-large)	2
7,700–8,000 (Texas, at-large)	1

Of the 27 districts, not including Congressmen at large, with populations of

over 450,000, all but 1 are urban districts, and almost all of the 52 districts with populations between 400,000 and 500,000 are urban districts. In other words, almost all districts which are over the reasonable range of from 300,000 to 400,000 population are urban districts. The 13 largest districts take in the following cities: Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio, Tex.; Atlanta, Ga.; Indianapolis, Ind.; Birmingham, Ala.; Columbus and Dayton, Ohio; Detroit, Mich.; Miami, Fla.; Hartford, Conn.; the Bridgeport area in Connecticut; and Seattle, Wash.

VARIATION IN EACH STATE

Mr. President, I have a table showing the percentage variation from the average population for the State of each congressional district in the country. Also included are comparisons between the average population of urban congressional districts and the average population of nonurban districts. I ask unanimous consent to have this table printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Percentage variation of population of congressional districts (1955)

This table indicates the percentage variation in the population of each congressional district in each State, from the State average. A minus before the number indicates that the district has fewer people than the average-sized district in the State. Other numbers indicate districts having more people than the average district.

The number in parentheses following the name of the State indicates the average-size of a district. This number is obtained by dividing the number of Congressmen, excluding those elected at-large, into the total population of the State.

Below each State is indicated the average size of urban congressional districts—defined here as those wholly or partially within cities having populations of 100,000 or more. Also indicated is the average size of all other districts—that is, of those not classified as urban. An asterisk (*) next to the number of the district indicates an "urban" district.

The letters "D", "R", and "C", indicate, in that order, congressional districts which elected Democrats in 1952 and 1954, those which elected Republicans in 1952 and 1954, and those which elected a Congressman of one party in 1952 and of the other party in 1954.

Alabama (340,194)		
District 1*	9.1	D
District 2*	8.9	D
District 3	−10.8	D
District 4	−11.3	D
District 5	−8.7	D
District 6	−26.3	D
District 7	−19.7	D
District 8	−5.5	D
District 9*	64.3	D
Urban average: 433,479.		
Others: 293,551.		
Arizona (374,794)		
District 1*	−11.5	R
District 2	11.5	D
Urban average: 331,770.		
Others: 417,817.		
Arkansas (318,252)		
District 1	28.0	D
District 2	−29.5	D
District 3	1.8	D
District 4	5.9	D
District 5*	−10.9	D
District 6	4.6	D
Urban average: 283,437.		
Others: 325,215.		
California (352,874)		
District 1	3.5	R
District 2	−6.7	D
District 3*	12.1	D
District 4*	2.8	R
District 5*	16.9	D
District 6	14.4	C
District 7*	−7.4	R
District 8*	17.2	D
District 9	−33.2	R
District 10	5.3	R
District 11	−7.1	R
District 12	8.6	C
District 13	11.9	R
District 14	20.3	D
District 15*	2.1	R
District 16*	−36.6	R
District 17*	22.2	D
District 18*	−18.8	R
District 19*	28.6	D

Percentage variation of population of congressional districts (1955)—Continued

California—Continued		
District 20*	−35.8	R
District 21*	10.8	R
District 22*	−37.9	R
District 23*	19.5	D
District 24*	−18.6	R
District 25	4.8	R
District 26*	36.3	D
District 27	−20.2	D
District 28	−1.7	R
District 29	−34.0	R
District 30*	20.8	R
Urban average: 359,955.		
Others: 343,614.		
Colorado (331,272)		
District 1*	25.5	D
District 2	21.1	R
District 3	1.1	R
District 4	−47.7	D
Urban average: 415,789.		
Others: 303,100.		
Connecticut (401,456)		
District 1*	34.4	D
District 2	−20.6	R
District 3*	−7.7	R
District 4*	25.6	R
District 5*	−31.7	R
Urban average: 422,165.		
Others: 318,621.		
Delaware (no districts)		
Florida (346,413)		
District 1*	26.0	C
District 2*	−8.1	D
District 3	16.9	D
District 4*	51.6	D
District 5	7.2	D
District 6	−17.9	D
District 7	−36.4	D
District 8	−39.3	D
Urban average: 426,586.		
Others: 298,309.		
Georgia (344,458)		
District 1*	1.6	D
District 2	−17.1	D
District 3	11.2	D
District 4	−13.4	D
District 5*	79.5	D
District 6	−10.6	D
District 7	6.7	D
District 8	−22.5	D
District 9	−28.5	D
District 10	−7.0	D
Urban average: 484,241.		
Others: 309,512		
Idaho (294,319)		
District 1	−17.1	D
District 2	17.1	R
No urban districts.		
Illinois (348,485)		
District 1*	−7.2	D
District 2*	1.8	D
District 3*	.2	C
District 4*	26.8	R
District 5*	−4.7	D
District 6*	−3.4	D
District 7*	14.3	D
District 8*	−12.1	D
District 9*	−2.8	D
District 10*	6.7	R
District 11*	−9.6	R
District 12*	1.6	C
District 13	33.7	R
District 14	2.1	R
District 15	−7.0	R
District 16	1.5	R
District 17	−1.1	R
District 18*	−9.7	R
District 19	−6.5	R
District 20	−19.2	R
District 21	−.9	D
District 22	−3.4	R
District 23	−8.6	R
District 24	11.4	D
District 25	−3.8	C
Urban average: 348,965.		
Others: 347,966.		
Indiana (357,657)		
District 1*	2.9	D
District 2	−14.9	R
District 3*	10.7	R
District 4*	−8.3	R
District 5	9.5	R
District 6	−17.2	R
District 7	−16.5	R
District 8*	10.0	C
District 9	−27.7	R
District 10	−2.8	R
District 11*	54.3	R
Urban average: 407,467.		
Others: 316,148.		
Iowa (327,634)		
District 1	13.7	R
District 2	26.5	R
District 3	12.1	R
District 4	−22.8	R
District 5*	7.1	R
District 6	−8.3	R
District 7	−18.7	R
District 8	−9.5	R
Urban average: 350,784.		
Others: 324,327.		

Percentage variation of population of congressional districts (1955)—Continued

Kansas (317,550)		
District 1	.6	C
District 2*	13.2	R
District 3	−28.4	R
District 4*	41.2	R
District 5	−2.0	R
District 6	−24.6	R
Urban average: 403,954.		
Others: 274,348.		
Kentucky (368,101)		
District 1	−17.1	D
District 2	−10.9	D
District 3*	31.7	R
District 4	−11.1	D
District 5	1.1	D
District 6	−1.3	D
District 7	−5.6	D
District 8	13.3	R
Urban average: 484,615.		
Others: 351,456.		
Louisiana (335,440)		
District 1*	4.4	D
District 2*	17.1	D
District 3	−10.6	D
District 4*	−.7	D
District 5	−3.4	D
District 6*	24.6	D
District 7	−5.8	D
District 8	−25.5	D
Urban average: 373,542.		
Others: 297,337.		
Maine (304,591)		
District 1	7.6	R
District 2	−2.9	R
District 3	−4.7	R
No urban districts.		
Maryland (334,914)		
District 1	−37.1	R
District 2	9.6	R
District 3*	−10.8	D
District 4*	−6.5	D
District 5*	27.4	C
District 6	24.4	R
District 7*	−7.1	D
Urban average: 337,257.		
Others: 331,325.		
Massachusetts (335,037)		
District 1	−10.6	R
District 2*	2.4	D
District 3	−5.0	D
District 4*	5.2	D
District 5	9.2	R
District 6	−10.0	R
District 7	−16.0	D
District 8*	−1.8	C
District 9*	2.9	R
District 10*	16.7	R
District 11*	−.1	D
District 12*	−.7	D
District 13*	5.9	R
District 14*	1.7	R
Urban average: 346,966.		
Others: 313,565.		
Michigan (353,987)		
District 1*	7.5	D
District 2	8.1	R
District 3	−1.2	R
District 4	−17.6	R
District 5*	2.3	R
District 6*	33.0	C
District 7	17.1	R
District 8	−5.9	R
District 9	−22.3	R
District 10	−28.0	R
District 11	−35.6	R
District 12	−49.6	R
District 13*	−2.4	D
District 14*	31.8	D
District 15*	8.5	D
District 16*	48.4	D
District 17*	−5.8	C
District 18	11.9	R
Urban average: 408,488.		
Others: 310,386.		
Minnesota (331,387)		
District 1	1.9	R
District 2	−3.0	R
District 3*	30.9	D
District 4*	7.2	D
District 5*	1.9	R
District 6	−1.5	D
District 7	−7.8	R
District 8*	−12.0	D
District 9	−17.6	C
Urban average: 354,596.		
Others: 312,820.		
Mississippi (363,152)		
District 1	.6	D
District 2	−22.6	D
District 3	13.6	D
District 4	17.4	D
District 5	−14.3	D
District 6	5.3	D
No urban districts.		
Missouri (359,514)		
District 1*	19.0	D
District 2*	13.8	R
District 3*	18.5	D
District 4*	−10.0	C
District 5*	−1.1	D
District 6	−6.5	C

Percentage variation of population of congressional districts (1955)—Continued

Missouri—Continued		
District 7	11.9	R
District 8	−23.1	D
District 9	−1.6	D
District 10	−7.5	D
District 11	−13.6	D
Urban average: 388,487.		
Others: 335,370.		
Montana (295,512)		
District 1	−14.8	D
District 2	14.8	R
No urban districts.		
Nebraska (331,378)		
District 1	11.6	R
District 2*	3.1	R
District 3	−10.0	R
District 4	−4.7	R
Urban average: 341,641.		
Others: 327,956.		
Nevada (no districts)		
New Hampshire (266,621)		
District 1	3.9	R
District 2	−3.9	R
No urban districts.		
New Jersey (345,381)		
District 1*	28.0	R
District 2	−25.3	R
District 3	13.0	R
District 4*	5.9	D
District 5	21.6	R
District 6*	15.3	C
District 7	7.5	R
District 8*	−4.0	R
District 9	1.9	R
District 10*	−9.6	D
District 11*	−10.0	D
District 12*	−2.0	R
District 13*	−21.9	D
District 14*	−20.4	D
Urban average: 338,195.		
Others: 358,314.		
New Mexico (no districts)		
New York (344,888)		
District 1	−8.9	R
District 2	−8.0	R
District 3	−8.0	R
District 4*	2.9	R
District 5*	8.1	R
District 6	11.9	D
District 7*	11.2	D
District 8*	11.0	D
District 9*	10.5	D
District 10*	12.6	D
District 11*	10.6	D
District 12*	−7.9	R
District 13*	6.5	D
District 14*	11.2	D
District 15*	10.6	R
District 16*	−2.4	D
District 17*	−8.3	R
District 18*	−7.9	D
District 19*	−2.5	D
District 20*	−2.5	D
District 21*	−8.0	C
District 22*	5.2	D
District 23*	5.2	D
District 24*	5.2	D
District 25*	5.2	R
District 26	−7.1	R
District 27*	−5.5	R
District 28	−5.3	R
District 29	−6.0	R
District 30*	−12.4	D
District 31	−7.3	R
District 32	−4.6	R
District 33	−4.6	R
District 34*	−4.2	R
District 35*	−.9	R
District 36	−5.3	R
District 37	14.0	R
District 38*	−.6	R
District 39*	−9.4	R
District 40*	5.8	R
District 41*	5.8	R
District 42*	4.2	R
District 43	−13.8	R
Urban average: 352,791.		
Others: 324,471.		
North Carolina (338,495)		
District 1	−26.8	D
District 2	−9.3	D
District 3	−8.9	D
District 4	18.7	D
District 5	4.9	D
District 6	17.7	D
District 7	16.5	D
District 8	9.1	D
District 9	.1	D
District 10*	6.4	R
District 11	−12.6	D
District 12	−15.9	D
Urban average: 360,318.		
Others: 336,510.		

Percentage variation of population of congressional districts (1955)—Continued

North Dakota (no districts)		
Ohio (345,506)		
District 1*	3.3	R
District 2*	6.3	R
District 3*	57.9	R
District 4	−11.5	R
District 5	−25.8	R
District 6	−8.3	D
District 7	−2.8	R
District 8	−27.2	R
District 9*	14.5	D [1]
District 10	−26.7	R
District 11	−.1	R
District 12*	45.7	R
District 13	−17.2	R
District 14	30.4	R
District 15	−34.5	C
District 16*	19.3	R
District 17	−10.1	R
District 18	−7.0	D
District 19*	−8.4	D
District 20*	19.7	D
District 21*	24.6	D
District 22*	−11.6	R
District 23	−30.5	R
Urban average: 371,360.		
Others: 321,809.		
Oklahoma (372,225)		
District 1*	18.1	R
District 2	6.1	D
District 3	−28.2	D
District 4	−20.9	D
District 5*	17.3	D
District 6	7.7	D
Urban average: 438,069.		
Others: 341,553.		
Oregon (380,335)		
District 1	14.2	R
District 2	−35.0	R
District 3*	24.0	C
District 4	−3.2	R
Urban average: 471,537.		
Others: 349,935.		
Pennsylvania (349,934)		
District 1*	−11.4	D
District 2*	7.7	D
District 3*	−2.2	D
District 4*	−2.8	D
District 5*	6.4	D
District 6*	−5.7	R
District 7	18.4	R
District 8*	−2.0	R
District 9	12.6	R
District 10*	None	R
District 11	12.1	C
District 12	−9.2	R
District 13	.9	R
District 14*	−26.9	D
District 15	−21.0	D
District 16	−8.7	R
District 17	−9.0	R
District 18	−3.0	R
District 19	−2.4	C
District 20	−16.7	R
District 21	−10.5	D
District 22	5.0	R
District 23	−16.7	R
District 24*	17.2	R
District 25	7.9	C
District 26	27.1	D
District 27*	7.8	R
District 28*	6.0	D
District 29*	7.5	R
District 30*	11.7	D
Urban average: 353,249.		
Others: 347,033.		
Rhode Island (395,948)		
District 1*	−5.2	D
District 2*	5.2	D
Urban districts only.		
South Carolina (352,838)		
District 1	−2.0	D
District 2	17.9	D
District 3	−12.8	D
District 4	12.5	D
District 5	−24.5	D
District 6	8.9	D
No urban districts.		
South Dakota (326,370)		
District 1	53.1	R
District 2	−53.1	R
No urban districts.		
Tennessee (365,746)		
District 1	18.7	R
District 2*	28.0	R
District 3*	4.1	D
District 4	6.7	D
District 5*	−12.0	D
District 6	−12.9	D
District 7	−32.2	D
District 8	−32.2	D
District 9*	31.9	D
Urban average: 413,215.		
Others: 327,772.		

[1] Independent in 1952.

Percentage variation of population of congressional districts (1955)—Continued

Texas (367,200)		
District 1	−24.6	D
District 2	9.2	D
District 3	−26.2	D
District 4	−38.0	D
District 5*	67.4	C
District 6	−37.9	D
District 7	−32.4	D
District 8*	119.7	D
District 9	10.7	D
District 10*	−14.4	D
District 11	−23.1	D
District 12*	14.9	D
District 13	−20.5	D
District 14*	24.5	D
District 15	24.0	D
District 16*	−4.2	D
District 17	−38.3	D
District 18	−21.2	D
District 19	.6	D
District 20*	36.3	D
District 21	−26.8	D
Urban average: 495,347.		
Others: 303,126.		
Utah (344,431)		
District 1	−16.8	R
District 2*	16.8	R
Urban average: 402,310.		
Others: 286,552.		
Vermont (no districts)		
Virginia (331,868)		
District 1	−7.4	D
District 2*	21.7	D
District 3*	.7	D
District 4	2.0	D
District 5	−4.6	D
District 6	1.8	R
District 7	−12.7	D
District 8	−10.5	D
District 9	17.6	C
District 10	−8.6	R
Urban average: 369,025.		
Others: 322,579.		
Washington (396,494)		
District 1*	33.1	R
District 2	−5.6	R
District 3	−19.0	R
District 4	−9.9	R
District 5*	−13.8	R
District 6*	15.2	R
Urban average: 442,097.		
Others: 350,891.		
West Virginia (334,259)		
District 1	−16.2	D
District 2	−9.6	D
District 3	−5.6	D
District 4	−1.0	C
District 5	−1.1	D
District 6	33.6	D
No urban districts.		
Wisconsin (343,458)		
District 1	None	R
District 2	13.5	R
District 3	−12.6	R
District 4*	27.5	D
District 5*	26.1	C
District 6	−8.1	R
District 7	−11.7	R
District 8	5.0	R
District 9	−12.4	C
District 10	−27.3	R
Urban average 435,524.		
Others: 320,421.		
Wyoming (no districts)		

Source: Gus Tyler, Manuscript in process of publication.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I now come to a discussion of congressional districts in typical States.

Only three states, Arizona, Arkansas, and New Jersey, have urban districts which have average populations which are smaller for the urban districts than for nonurban districts. All other States have urban districts which are larger than nonurban districts or, in a few cases, have no urban districts. Many of the disparities are very substantial. For example, the average population of urban districts in Alabama is 433,479, but the average for other districts is 293,551. In Florida, urban districts average 426,586 as compared with 298,309 for the nonurban districts. Indiana has an average

of 407,467 for urban districts, and only 316,148 for nonurban districts. Michigan averages 408,488 people in its urban districts, but only 310,386 in the others. For Wisconsin the figures are 435,524 for urban, and 320,421 for nonurban districts.

TEXAS IS WORST STATE

The State which discriminates against its cities the most flagrantly is Texas. Its at-large Congressman has the largest constituency in the country. But let us look at some of its other districts. The Fifth Congressional District, Dallas, has a population of 614,799. The 20th, San Antonio, has a population of 500,460. And the Eighth District, Houston, has a population of 806,701 which makes it the most populous congressional district in the Nation. All 3 districts are among the 12 largest districts in the country. On the other hand, Texas has 10 of its 21 districts with populations of under 300,000 and 4 districts with populations of under 250,000. Its average urban district has a population of 495,347; its average nonurban district contains only 303,126 people. It seeems to me that the people of Texas would gain more from a redistricting of its congressional districts than from a constitutional amendment which gives even greater political weight to those small nonurban districts.

GREAT DISPARITY BETWEEN THE LARGEST AND SMALLEST DISTRICT IN EACH STATE

Mr. President, I have another table which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD. It shows the population of the smallest and the largest congressional district in each State for the years 1897, 1928, 1946, and 1954.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Disparities in apportionment, showing districts in each State having largest and smallest populations

State	1954		1946		1928		1897	
	District	Population	District	Population	District	Population	District	Population
Alabama	9th	558,928	9th	459,930	9th	310,054	2d	188,214
	6th	250,726	6th	251,757	6th	170,188	7th	130,451
Arizona	2d	417,817	[1]		[3]		[3]	
	1st	331,770						
Arkansas	1st	407,480	1st	423,152	1st	330,202	1st	220,261
	2d	224,278	3d	177,476	3d	180,348	4th	147,806
California	26th	480,827	3d	469,404	10th	216,253	5th	228,717
	22d	219,018	21st	194,199	2d	129,357	4th	147,642
Colorado	1st	415,786	1st	322,412	3d	281,170	2d	207,539
	4th	173,208	4th	172,847	4th	140,532	1st	204,659
Connecticut	1st	539,661	1st	450,189	1st	336,027	2d	248,582
	5th	274,300	5th	247,601	5th	224,426	3d	121,792
Delaware	[2]		[2]		[3]		[3]	
Florida	4th	525,041	1st	439,895	4th	315,292	2d	202,792
	8th	210,428	6th	186,831	2d	187,474	1st	188,630
Georgia	5th	618,431	5th	487,552	5th	308,364	2d	180,300
	9th	246,227	9th	235,420	3d	205,343	11th	155,948
Idaho	2d	344,660	2d	300,357	2d	253,542	[3]	
	1st	243,977	1st	224,516	1st	178,324		
Illinois	13th	466,064	7th	914,053	7th	560,434	13th	184,027
	8th	306,202	5th	112,116	5th	158,062	22d	159,186
Indiana	11th	551,777	11th	460,926	7th	348,061	7th	191,472
	9th	258,441	9th	241,323	4th	179,737	6th	139,359
Iowa	2d	414,421	2d	392,052	11th	295,449	11th	203,470
	4th	252,926	4th	268,900	1st	156,594	1st	153,712
Kansas	4th	448,435	4th	382,546	3d	280,045	7th	278,208
	6th	239,541	3d	249,574	4th	152,378	1st	167,314
Kentucky	3d	484,615	9th	413,690	11th	289,766	4th	192,055
	1st	304,978	5th	225,426	8th	168,067	7th	141,461
Louisiana	6th	417,898	6th	333,295	6th	255,372	3d	214,785
	8th	249,776	8th	240,166	7th	204,909	2d	152,025
Maine	1st	327,874	1st	290,335	1st	195,072	4th	183,070
	3d	290,146	2d	276,695	2d	188,563	1st	153,778
Maryland	5th	426,371	2d	534,568	2d	311,413	2d	208,165
	1st	210,623	1st	195,427	1st	194,568	5th	153,912
Massachusetts	10th	390,896	10th	346,625	8th	259,954	5th	174,866
	7th	281,589	1st	278,459	15th	217,307	6th	169,418
Michigan	16th	525,334	17th	419,007	6th	333,748	2d	191,841
	12th	178,251	12th	200,265	10th	198,679	9th	148,626
Minnesota	3d	433,942	6th	334,781	5th	275,645	2d	188,480
	9th	237,125	9th	283,845	9th	112,235	6th	184,848
Mississippi	4th	426,396	7th	470,781	3d	349,662	5th	224,618
	2d	281,207	4th	201,316	8th	177,185	1st	143,315
Missouri	1st	427,856	12th	503,738	10th	321,587	14th	230,478
	8th	276,499	9th	214,787	8th	138,807	9th	152,442
Montana	2d	339,247	2d	323,597	2d	333,476	[3]	
	1st	251,777	1st	235,859	1st	215,413		
Nebraska	1st	369,970	1st	369,190	6th	288,090	4th	195,434
	3d	298,104	2d	305,961	1st	173,458	3d	163,674
Nevada	[2]		[2]		[2]		[2]	
New Hampshire	1st	276,954	2d	247,033	1st	224,842	1st	190,532
	2d	256,297	1st	244,491	2d	218,241	2d	185,998
New Jersey	1st	441,978	1st	370,220	8th	290,610	7th	256,093
	2d	258,127	2d	226,169	11th	228,615	8th	125,793
New Mexico	[1]		[1]		[1]		[3]	
New York	37th	393,130	25th	365,918	23d	391,620	14th	227,978
	43d	297,131	45th	235,913	12th	151,605	7th	114,766
North Carolina	4th	401,913	4th	358,573	5th	408,139	6th	204,686
	1st	247,894	1st	239,040	3d	202,760	3d	160,288
North Dakota	[1]		[1]		[2d	220,700	[3]	
					[3d	210,203		
Ohio	3d	545,644	22d	698,650	14th	439,013	2d	205,293
	15th	226,341	5th	163,561	11th	167,217	12th	158,026
Oklahoma	1st	439,518	1st	416,863	3d	325,680	[3]	
	3d	266,995	7th	189,547	7th	189,472		
Oregon	3d	471,537	3d	355,099	1st	346,989	2d	158,205
	2d	247,383	2d	210,991	2d	160,502	1st	155,562
Pennsylvania	26th	444,921	11th	441,518	12th	390,991	4th	309,986
	14th	255,740	14th	212,979	15th	136,283	3d	129,764
Rhode Island	2d	416,605	2d	374,463	3d	210,201	1st	180,548
	1st	375,291	1st	338,883	2d	193,186	2d	164,958
South Carolina	2d	415,893	2d	361,933	7th	266,956	4th	200,000
	5th	266,559	5th	251,137	2d	203,418	5th	141,750
South Dakota	1st	493,641	1st	485,829	2d	251,405	[3]	
	2d	159,099	2d	157,132	3d	138,031		
Tennessee	9th	482,393	2d	388,938	3d	296,396	3d	199,972
	7th	247,912	5th	225,918	5th	145,403	5th	153,773
Texas	8th	806,701	8th	528,961	2d	349,859	6th	210,907
	17th	226,739	17th	230,010	7th	211,032	1st	102,827
Utah	2d	402,310	2d	293,922	1st	229,907	[3]	
	1st	286,552	1st	256,388	2d	219,489		
Vermont	[3]		[3]		[2d	176,596	1st	169,940
					[1st	175,832	2d	162,482
Virginia	2d	403,923	9th	360,679	2d	312,458	9th	187,467
	7th	289,598	4th	243,165	7th	167,588	2d	145,539
Washington	1st	527,768	1st	412,689	1st	348,474	[1]	
	3d	321,162	4th	244,908	4th	200,258		
West Virginia	6th	446,466	6th	378,630	6th	279,072	3d	202,289
	1st	279,954	1st	281,330	4th	214,930	1st	177,849
Wisconsin	4th	438,041	5th	391,467	5th	276,503	6th	187,001
	10th	249,654	10th	263,088	6th	214,206	10th	149,845
Wyoming	[2]		[2]		[2]		[2]	

[1] 2 Representatives elected at large.
[2] 1 Representative elected at large.
[3] Not yet admitted.

Source: Gus Tyler, manuscript in process of publication.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, this table shows that in virtually every State the disparity between the smallest and largest congressional district has grown since 1897. In some States there seems to be no reason for the disparity. South Dakota, for example, the State whose senior Senator [Mr. MUNDT] is a cosponsor of the measure, has only 2 districts, 1 district having a population of 159,099, the other one having a population of 433,641.

I was somewhat amused in reading the RECORD of the debate on Friday to find that the senior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] seemed to think of gerrymandering as a rare and seldom-used practice; and that, if it occurred, it could be easily corrected by Congress. I wish my good friend from South Dakota were here, because, if he were, I would urge him to look at the figures for his own State, where one district has three times the population of the other. That situation has not been remedied by the South Dakota Legislature; neither has it been remedied by the Congress.

Furthermore, in most States the situation has gotten worse since 1946. Many States have not redistricted for many years, and this is a major reason for the widening disparity between the smallest and the largest districts. I have some examples, including the date of last redistricting, as follows:

Outdated districting

Selected districts:	Populations
Alabama (1931):	
9 (Birmingham)	558,928
6 (West-central Alabama)	250,726
Connecticut (1931):	
1 (Hartford)	539,661
4 (Bridgeport)	504,342
5 (Northwest Connecticut)	274,300
(1 Congressman at large)	
Georgia (1931):	
5 (Atlanta)	618,431
9 (North Georgia)	246,227
Indiana (1941):	
11 (Indianapolis)	551,777
9 (Southern Indiana)	258,441
Iowa (1941):	
2 (Des Moines)	414,421
4 (Southern Iowa)	252,926
Kansas (1941):	
4 (Wichita)	448,435
3 (Southeast Kansas)	227,270
Louisiana (1912):	
6 (Baton Rouge)	417,898
8 (West Louisiana)	249,776
Minnesota (1933):	
3 (Minneapolis)	433,942
9 (Northwest Minnesota)	273,125
Oregon (1941):	
3 (Portland)	468,571
1 (Northwest Oregon)	432,448
2 (East Oregon)	245,976
Texas (1933):	
8 (Houston)	806,701
5 (Dallas)	614,799
20 (San Antonio)	500,460
17 (North-central Texas)	226,739
(1 Congressman at large)	
Washington (1931):	
1 (Seattle)	527,768
6 (Tacoma)	456,653
3 (Southwest Washington)	321,162
(1 Congressman at large)	
Wisconsin (1931):	
4 (Milwaukee)	438,041
5 (Milwaukee)	433,006
10 (Northern Wisconsin)	249,654

(Source: Baker, Rural Versus Urban Political Power, p. 44.)

AN URBAN VOTE IS WORTH LESS THAN A RURAL VOTE

What all these figures mean, Mr. President, is that in almost all States a nonurban vote for Congress is worth more than an urban vote in terms of the representation received. For example, I have prepared a ranking for all States in terms of the weight of 1 vote in the smallest district compared with 1 vote in the largest district.

States listed in order of disparity of congressional districts

(Figure indicates power of each vote in smallest district in proportion to one vote in largest district.)

Texas	3.6
South Dakota	3.1
Michigan	2.9
Florida, Georgia	2.5
Colorado	2.4
Ohio	2.3
Alabama, California	2.2
Indiana	2.1
Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland	2.0
Oregon, Tennessee	1.9

The eastern Oregon district has a relatively small population as compared with the Portland district.

Arkansas, Wisconsin	1.8
Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania	1.7
Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia	1.6
Mississippi, Missouri	1.5
Idaho, Utah, Virginia	1.4
Arizona, Massachusetts, Montana, New York	1.3
Nebraska	1.2
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island	1.1

No apportionment: Delaware, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming.

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS ARE GERRYMANDERED BY STATE LEGISLATURES

Nor is there always equality within the cities.

Up to now, I have been speaking about the disparities in the sizes of congressional districts. This is not, strictly speaking, gerrymandering. Gerrymandering is the practice by which a State legislature so arranges a district that the party which is in the minority in the State legislature has its majorities cooped up in a few districts, while the majority in the State legislature has its votes scattered over a number of districts, thus maintaining a smaller margin in each district, but getting more districts.

This also operates against the cities; and, as I shall show, it operates also against the Democratic Party. We all know, or should know, of the extraordinary district which the New York Legislature carved out in Brooklyn. The legislature went all over Brooklyn to find areas where Republican majorities existed, so that one Republican district could be created in Brooklyn. Apparently, there had not been such a district for some time; but the New York Legislature accomplished that job.

There are similar cases of gerrymandering.

Districts are frequently gerrymandered by the State legislatures to produce benefits to the party in power or, in the one-party States, one faction of the party. Gerrymandering is practiced by both parties. A more or less typical example is to be found in the redistricting of Los Angeles County in 1951. Of the 12 congressional districts, 3 had populations reasonably close to the average. Of the other 9, 4 were underrepresented, and 5 were overrepresented, as follows:

Overrepresented

District:	Population
16 (Jackson)	223,703
18 (Hosmer)	286,505
20 (Hinshaw)	226,679
22 (Holt)	219,018
24 (Lipscomb)	287,325
Total	1,243,230

Underrepresented

District:	Poulation
17 (King)	431,254
19 (Holifield)	453,942
23 (Doyle)	421,623
26 (Roosevelt)	480,827
Total	1,787,646

In 1952 and 1954 all 5 overrepresented districts went Republican, all 4 underrepresented districts went Democratic; the 4 Democratic districts represent almost 50 percent more people than do the 5 Republican districts. The result is that a Republican vote in the 5 Los Angeles districts is worth almost twice as much as a Democratic vote in the 4 districts in terms of representation in the House of Representatives. There are many other similar examples. In Buffalo, normally 50–50 between the parties, gerrymandering enables the Republicans to hold all three of its Representatives. Rochester has a somewhat similar situation.

REDISTRICTING CONTINUES INEQUALITY

After the census of 1950, 9 States lost representatives and 7 States gained Congressmen. Consequently there have been a number of States which have been redistricted since 1951. A look at the results of this redistricting should give us an idea if there is any intention on the part of State legislatures to redress the balance. The following table lists all the States which redistricted between 1951 and 1954 and compares the populations of the largest and the smallest districts.

Congressional redistricting, 1951–54

Selected districts:	Populations
Arkansas:	
1 (Little Rock)	407,480
2 (North-central Arkansas)	224,278
California:	
26 (Los Angeles)	480,827
22 (Los Angeles)	219,018
Florida:	
4 (Miami)	525,051
8 (North Florida)	210,428
Illinois:	
13 (Chicago)	466,064
20 (West-central Illinois)	281,468
Kentucky:	
3 (Louisville)	484,615
1 (West Kentucky)	304,978
Maryland:	
5 (suburban)	426,371
1 (Eastern shore)	210,623
Michigan:	
16 (Detroit, Dearborn)	525,334
6 (Flint, Lansing)	470,629
14 (Detroit)	466,448
12 (Upper Peninsula)	178,251
Mississippi:	
4 (Jackson, Vicksburg)	426,396
2 (Northern Mississippi)	281,287
Missouri:	
1 (St. Louis)	427,856
3 (St. Louis)	426,088
8 (Southern Missouri)	276,499
New Jersey:	
1 (Camden)	441,978
2 (South Jersey)	258,127
New York:	
37 (South-central New York)	393,130
43 (Southwest New York)	297,131
Ohio:	
3 (Dayton)	545,644
12 (Columbus)	503,410
15 (South-east Ohio)	226,341
Oklahoma:	
1 (Tulsa)	439,518
5 (Oklahoma City)	436,620
3 (Southeast Oklahoma)	266,995
Pennsylvania:	
26 (Southwest Pennsylvania)	444,921
14 (Reading)	255,740
Tennessee:	
9 (Memphis)	482,393
7 (Western Tennessee)	247,912
Virginia:	
2 (Norfolk, Portsmouth)	403,923
7 (Western Virginia)	289,498
West Virginia:	
6 (Charleston)	446,466
1 (Northwest West Virginia)	279,954

Source: Baker, Rural Versus Urban Political Power, p. 43.

It is to be noted that most of the largest districts are urban. While the disparity between the largest and the smallest districts in each State is not as large as in some of the States which have not redistricted for many years, there is little hope for the urban dweller to be found in this record of redistricting in the last few years. He still finds that his vote for Congressman counts for much less than that of his country cousin.

GERRYMANDERING DISTORTS THE POPULAR VOTE

The gerrymandering of congressional districts by State legislatures has seriously distorted the effect of the popular vote for Congress, and its application to presidential elections would introduce distortions of the popular vote which would be infinitely greater than the distortions in the present winner-take-all system within the States.

The rural areas of the country enjoy a tremendous advantage in the State legislatures. And, as I have shown, that advantage is transferred by the State legislatures to the Congress of the United States.

The present system of electing the President is weighted in one way somewhat in favor of the big States—the States with the urban populations—but again, I repeat, only to the degree that they have large populations. It is weighted in their favor because of the strategic importance of their large blocs of electoral votes. But the present system of electing a President is also weighted in favor of the small States, in that they receive a greater weight in the outcome of the election than their populations would justify; namely, each State is given two electoral votes because of its two seats in the Senate.

The present system of electing a President is also weighted somewhat in favor of the South, in that its bloc of electoral votes is based upon such a small voting population.

However, these distortions within the presidential system tend to cancel each other out, and tend to produce a rough measure of equality. In this case, apparently three wrongs make a right. In the Presidency there is represented an approximate balance of the major groups. It is the only place in the American political system where the people who live in cities get their due—not more than their due, but the consideration to which they are entitled.

They do not get that consideration in the State legislatures. They are in chains there. They do not get that consideration in the House of Representatives. They are in chains there. They do not get that consideration in the Senate. They are in chains there. They are loaded down with chains. Only one hand is free; that is, in the election of the President. They get consideration in the Presidency, as do the groups which dominate the State legislatures and Congress. Now the authors of the amendment would put chains on that office, and deliver the cities, bound hand and foot, into the power of the rural sections of the country.

The Presidency is the only office in the American political system as to which there is anything like equality of representation.

But what would happen under the proposed changes, Mr. President? Both would end any weighting in favor of the big States—in fact, they would go further and virtually eliminate the influence of the big States. And both would further weight the system in favor of the small States and the South, although they would do so in different fashion. What we then would have would not be a system in which three wrongs make a right, but a system in which 2 greater wrongs make a monstrous wrong, for then the urban areas would not be adequately represented anywhere in the political system, from bottom to top. Apparently the proponents of this amendment believe that everybody is equal, but some should be a lot more equal than others.

A NATIONAL GERRYMANDER

Mr. President, if you exclude those congressional districts in the South in which the Republicans traditionally make no contest, this was the result of the 1954 congressional elections, both in popular vote and in congressional seats won:

	Popular vote	Percent of total vote	Seats won	Margin of seats
Republican	19,785,410	49.7	199	58
Democratic	[1] 19,839,790	49.8	141	
Other	185,279	.5		

[1] Includes votes cast for Democratic candidates on Liberal Party ballot.

Mr. President, although the Democrats received more popular votes than the Republicans, the Republicans obtained 58 more seats than did the Democrats—a ratio of better than 4 to 3.

Mr. President, we have had computed some very interesting figures on the congressional elections of 1954. We have taken those districts in which there was a contest, and have excluded the one-party areas of the South in which there was no contest, taking only those districts where the two parties had rival candidates.

The popular vote of the Republicans and the Democrats was virtually equal in that election. The Republicans received 19,785,410 votes. The Democrats received 19,839,790 votes, a difference of only about 50,000 votes. The Republicans received 49.7 of the total vote. The Democrats received 49.8 percent.

One would expect, therefore, that for the representation in the House, numbering 340, they would be divided equally. But not at all. The Republicans won 199 of those seats. The Democrats won only 141 of the seats. The Republicans received a margin of 58 seats. Yet the popular vote for the Republicans was slightly less than that for the Democrats. We see here what the State legislatures are doing to the National House of Representatives.

Mr. President, in my judgment, the urban districts in the House are probably underrepresented by at least 30 seats. The rural districts overrepresented by 30 seats. The Democrats, in the main, lose 30 seats. The Republicans gain 30 seats. It means there has to be a terrific landslide, outside of the South, for the Democrats to get a majority of the Representatives in the non-Southern States.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. Is it not a fact that the eight largest States in the Union, with the great urban centers, cast, in 1952, about half of all the votes that were cast in this country?

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct.

Mr. LEHMAN. Is it not correct that as many votes were cast in those 8 States as were cast in the remaining 40 States of the Union?

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct.

Mr. LEHMAN. But at the same time the electoral votes of those eight States, because of their underepresentation, numbered only 209 votes out of 531, or less than 40 percent?

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator is completely correct. That is caused both by the underrepresentation of the cities in the House of Representatives, and the underrepresentation of the big States in the Senate. That is correct. The Senator is completely correct.

Mr. President, what we have in the pattern of districting for the House of Representatives is a national gerrymander. And what we are being asked to do is to extend the gerrymander to the election of the President of the United States. We are being asked to give away the political birthright of the Americans who live in cities. They now enjoy their fair share of political representation only in the Presidency. We must not take that away from them.

II–4. LACK OF VOTER PARTICIPATION IN THE SOUTH

I should now like to deal with the question of the lack of voter participation in the South. I think this is important, Mr. President, because the proponents of this measure argue that under the present electoral system minority groups voting en bloc can have a decisive influence on the presidential vote in the large Northern States with big electoral votes, and thus have a disproportionate effect on the outcome of presidential elections.

There are, of course, many flaws in that argument. In the first place, people do not always vote as blocs. The various ethnic groups are composed of individual human beings, who cast their votes as individual human beings. We know, too, that leaders of ethnic groups, farm organizations, labor organizations, and political parties have never been able to control their membership in presidential elections or other elections, as some would have us believe.

Further, Mr. President, almost all of us are members of some minority group, or, in fact, of several minority groups. The farmer is a minority, the Presbyterians are a minority, the Elks and Moose are minorities, just as much as the Negroes, the Polish Americans, and other ethnic, economic, and social groups. For the proponents of this measure to argue that one minority group does or can control the outcome of an election is to assume an insight into human motives and human behavior that few can really assume in certainty.

But even if the argument were true, the proposals before us would not cure the evils. We know that under them much greater weight in the electoral vote would be given to the one-party States, and particularly to the South. There, as we all know, a very small proportion of people vote at all. Those who do vote are in most cases the native white middle- and upper-class minorities in the areas. For proponents of this measure to argue that they wish to solve what the call the problem of minority control of presidential elections by offering proposals which would give even smaller minorities in crucial one-party areas the control over presidential elections, is at best to jump from the frying pan into the fire.

If the proponents of this measure really desire to do away with minority control of elections, they will give the ballot to the great mass of people in the Southern States who for one reason or another do not now exercise the vote.

Let us look at some of the figures on voter participation in the South and the rest of the country.

The 11 Southern States of the United States had a population of 36.5 million, or 24.3 percent of the total United States population. They also had 128 electoral votes, or 24.1 percent of the total of 531 electoral votes. Yet, in the 1952 election they cast only 8.6 million votes of 61.6 million votes cast in the United States for the office of President of the United States. This was only 12.3 percent of the total. Thus, those States with 24.1 percent of the electoral vote cast only 12.3 percent of the popular vote in the presidential election of 1952. I ask for unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD at this point a table showing the population in 1950, and the electoral and popular vote in the 1952 election of the 11 Southern States.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

	Population	Electoral votes	1952 presidential vote
Texas	7,711,194	24	2,076,000
North Carolina	4,061,929	14	1,211,000
Georgia	3,444,578	12	656,000
Virginia	3,318,680	12	620,000
Tennessee	3,291,718	11	893,000
Alabama	3,061,743	11	426,000
Florida	2,771,305	10	969,000
Louisiana	2,683,516	10	652,000
Mississippi	2,178,914	8	286,000
South Carolina	2,117,027	8	341,000
Arkansas	1,909,511	8	405,000
Total	36,550,115	128	8,555,000
United States, total	150,697,361	531	61,552,000
Percent of 11 Southern States to United States total	24.3	24.1	12.3

Mr. DOUGLAS. Now, I ask the question, Mr. President, what minorities are the proponents of this measure so concerned about? Should they not be equally concerned about the minorities which control elections in the South?

Mr. President, in the hearings, on page 304, there is a table which shows voter participation in the 1952 Presidential election. It gives the extent of popular participation in the 1952 Presidential election, based on the 1950 population figures, in State by State.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BIBLE in the chair). Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from New York?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. Is it not a fact that in the 1948 campaign the vote of 1 elector in South Carolina represented only 17,000 people, whereas in the States of New York, California, and I assume Illinois, an elector represented a population of 160,000 or more?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Is the Senator referring to population, or voters?

Mr. LEHMAN. Voters. In the voting, as far as the voters are concerned, I am sure the Senator from Illinois is familiar with these figures, that in the 1952 election about 50 percent of the eligible voters in New York State cast their votes, whereas in Mississippi only 13 percent of the eligible voters cast their votes. Thus, a vote in New York State had only one-fourth or one-fifth as much value as a vote in Mississippi.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I shall introduce into the RECORD evidence on that point, by means of the following table:

	Percent of population participating
Mississippi	13.1
Alabama	13.9
South Carolina	16.1
Virginia	18.7
Georgia	19.0
Arkansas	21.2
Louisiana	24.3
Texas	26.9
Tennessee	27.1
North Carolina	29.8
Kentucky	33.7
Arizona	34.8
New Mexico	35.0
Florida	35.7
Maine	38.5
Maryland	38.5
Vermont	40.6
Oklahoma	42.5
North Dakota	43.6
Pennsylvania	43.6
Michigan	43.9
Wyoming	44.5
West Virginia	44.6
Montana	44.8
South Dakota	45.1
Oregon	45.7
Nebraska	46.0
Minnesota	46.3
Washington	46.4
Ohio	46.6
Wisconsin	46.8
Idaho	46.9
Kansas	47.0
Colorado	47.6
Utah	47.8
Missouri	47.8
New York	48.1
Iowa	48.4
California	48.7
Indiana	49.7
New Jersey	50.0
Massachusetts	50.8
New Hampshire	51.2
Nevada	51.3
Illinois	51.4
Rhode Island	52.3
Connecticut	54.6
Delaware	54.7
United States	41.1

Ten of these 11 Southern States had the lowest voter participation of any State in the country. In these, participation ranged from 13 percent in Mississippi to 29.8 percent in North Carolina.

How does this compare with the large, populous Northern States? The voter participation was 43.6 percent in Pennsylvania, 43.9 percent in Michigan, 46.5 percent in Ohio, 46.8 percent in Wisconsin, 48.1 percent in New York, 48.6 percent in California, 50.8 percent in Massachusetts, and 51.4 percent in Illinois.

Thus, in these States, voter participation was anywhere from 2 to 4 times that of 1 or several of these 10 Southern States. In the one-party States of the North, and where I suppose one would include, until recently, Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; and, until 1954, also Oregon—voter participation was much greater than in the one-party States of the South.

Mr. President, I ask for unanimous consent that a table comparing the voter participation and the average number of votes per congressional district in the 1952 presidential election, be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Comparison of voter participation and average number of votes per congressional district in 1952 presidential election

States ranked in order of size	1950 population	State rank in order of voter participation: Rank	State rank in order of voter participation: Percent participation of total population	Presidential vote by State, 1952	Electoral votes	Congressional seats	Average number of votes per congressional district
1. New York	14,830,192	12	48.1	7,128,000	45	43	165,790
2. California	10,586,223	10	48.7	5,142,000	32	30	171,400
3. Pennsylvania	10,498,012	29	43.6	4,581,000	32	30	152,700
4. Illinois	8,712,176	4	51.4	4,481,000	27	25	175,240
5. Ohio	7,946,627	19	46.6	3,701,000	25	23	160,913
6. Texas	7,711,194	41	26.9	2,076,000	24	[1]22	98,857
7. Michigan	6,371,766	28	43.9	2,799,000	20	18	155,500
8. New Jersey	4,835,329	8	50.	2,420,000	16	14	172,857
9. Massachusetts	4,690,514	7	50.8	2,383,000	16	14	170,214
10. North Carolina	4,061,929	39	29.8	1,211,000	14	12	100,917
11. Missouri	3,954,653	13	47.8	1,892,000	13	11	172,000
12. Indiana	3,934,224	9	49.7	1,955,000	13	11	177,727
13. Georgia	3,444,578	44	19.	656,000	12	10	65,600
14. Wisconsin	3,434,575	18	46.8	1,607,000	12	10	160,700
15. Virginia	3,318,680	45	18.7	620,000	12	10	62,000
16. Tennessee	3,291,718	40	27.1	893,000	11	9	99,222
17. Alabama	3,061,743	47	13.9	426,000	11	9	47,333
18. Minnesota	2,982,483	21	46.3	1,379,000	11	9	153,222
19. Kentucky	2,944,806	38	33.7	993,000	10	8	124,125
20. Florida	2,771,305	35	35.7	989,000	10	8	109,809
21. Louisiana	2,683,516	42	24.3	652,000	10	8	158,625
22. Iowa	2,621,073	11	48.4	1,269,000	10	8	158,625
23. Washington	2,378,963	20	46.4	1,103,000	9	[1]7	183,833
24. Maryland	2,343,001	33	38.5	902,000	9	7	128,857
25. Oklahoma	2,233,351	31	42.5	949,000	8	6	158,167
26. Mississippi	2,178,914	48	13.1	286,000	8	6	47,667
27. South Carolina	2,117,027	46	16.1	341,000	8	6	56,833
28. Connecticut	2,007,280	2	54.6	1,097,000	8	[1]6	219,400
29. West Virginia	2,005,552	26	44.6	874,000	8	6	145,667
30. Arkansas	1,909,511	43	21.2	405,000	8	6	67,500
31. Kansas	1,905,299	16	47.0	896,000	8	6	149,333
32. Oregon	1,521,341	23	45.7	695,000	6	4	173,750
33. Nebraska	1,325,510	22	46.0	610,000	6	4	152,500
34. Colorado	1,325,089	15	47.6	630,000	6	4	157,500
35. Maine	913,774	34	38.5	352,000	5	3	117,333
36. Rhode Island	791,896	3	52.3	414,000	4	2	207,000
37. Arizona	749,587	37	34.8	261,000	4	2	130,500
38. Utah	688,862	14	47.8	330,000	4	2	165,000
39. New Mexico	681,187	36	35.0	239,000	4	[1]2	119,500
40. South Dakota	652,740	24	45.1	294,000	4	2	147,000
41. North Dakota	619,636	30	43.6	270,000	4	[2]2	135,000
42. Montana	591,024	25	44.8	265,000	4	2	132,500
43. Idaho	588,637	17	46.9	276,000	4	2	138,000
44. New Hampshire	533,242	6	51.2	273,000	4	2	136,500
45. Vermont	377,747	32	40.6	154,000	3	[2]1	154,000
46. Delaware	318,085	1	54.7	174,000	3	1	174,000
47. Wyoming	290,529	27	44.5	129,000	3	[2]1	129,000
48. Nevada	160,083	5	51.3	82,000	3	1	82,000

[1] 1 at large.
[2] At large.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, representation in the House of Representatives is based on the principle of equal representation. Of course, it is not possible to apportion the seats so that all districts are exactly the same size. Yet, there should be some rough equality from district to district. Of course, even this is not true. Yet we have before us a plan which would allow the State legislatures to use the Mundt-Coudert system of giving one electoral vote for each congressional district.

In the table I have just inserted in the RECORD, the unfairness of this plan can easily be seen.

In my own State of Illinois, the average number of votes per congressional district in the 1952 election was 175,000. In Texas, it was 99,000. In Georgia, it was 66,000. In Virginia, it was 62,000. In Tennessee, it was 99,000. In Alabama, it was over 47,000. In Louisiana, it was 82,000. In Mississippi, it was 48,000. In South Carolina, it was 59,000. In Arkansas, it was 68,000. In North Carolina, it was 101,000. In Florida, it was 110,000.

Thus, Mr. President, in Alabama and Mississippi, based on the congressional-district method of apportioning presidential electoral votes, the individual voter would have a vote equal to almost four votes of the voter in Illinois. In South Carolina, 1 vote would be worth over 3 votes in Illinois. In Virginia, 1 vote would be worth just under 3 votes in Illinois. In Arkansas and Georgia, 1 vote would be worth about 2½ votes in Illinois; and in Louisiana, 1 vote would be worth over 2 votes in Illinois, under the Mundt-Coudert plan.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD tables showing voter turnout for national elections, based on the percent of actual voters compared with the citizens of voting age in various elections.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Voting turnout for national elections

	Citizens of voting age	Actual voters	Voting turnout in percent
1950 CONGRESSIONAL			
11 Southern States	21,629,084	2,676,443	12.4
5 border States	8,394,704	3,582,323	42.7
32 Northern States	64,950,672	34,170,790	52.6
1952 PRESIDENTIAL			
11 Southern States	21,852,000	8,553,729	39.1
5 border States	8,444,000	5,609,816	66.4
32 Northern States	67,518,000	47,388,374	70.2
1954 CONGRESSIONAL			
11 Southern States	22,179,000	3,679,594	15.6
5 border States	8,349,000	3,631,457	42.4
32 Northern States	69,880,000	35,584,598	53.7

The 11 Southern States were those ranking 33–48 in the table below. The 5 border States are West Virginia (14th), Missouri (21st), Oklahoma (26th), Kentucky (35th), and Maryland (36th).

Voting turnout for the 1952 Presidential election

Rank	State	Number of voters per 100 citizens of voting age
1	Utah	80
2	Delaware	79
3	Idaho	79
4	Rhode Island	78
5	New Hampshire	78
[1]6	North Dakota	77
7	Connecticut	76
8	Iowa	75
9	Illinois	75
10	Indiana	75
11	Massachusetts	74
[1]12	South Dakota	74
13	Minnesota	74
14	West Virginia	73
15	Montana	73
16	Wyoming	72
17	Colorado	72
18	Nevada	72
19	Washington	72
20	Wisconsin	71
21	Missouri	71
[1]22	Kansas	71
23	California	70
24	New Jersey	70
25	Ohio	69
26	Oklahoma	69
[1]27	Nebraska	69
28	New York	69
29	Oregon	67
[1]30	Vermont	67
31	Michigan	66
32	Pennsylvania	65
[1]33	Maine	65
34	New Mexico	64
35	Kentucky	60
36	Maryland	58
37	Arizona	53
38	North Carolina	52
39	Florida	50
40	Tennessee	46
41	Texas	43
42	Louisiana	40
43	Arkansas	38
44	Virginia	31
45	Georgia	31
46	South Carolina	31
47	Alabama	25
48	Mississippi	24
	United States	63

[1] These are essentially one-party States outside the South. One will note the higher voter participation in the northern one-party States.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, this table shows that in the 1950 congressional election, the voter turnout was 12.4 percent in the 11 Southern States, 42.7 percent in the 5 border States, and 52.6 percent in the 32 Northern States. In the 1952 presidential election the figures were 39.1 percent in the 11 Southern States, 66.4 percent in the 5 border States, and 70.2 percent in the 32 Northern States. In the 1954 congressional election, the figures were 15.6 in the 11 Southern States, 42.4 in the 5 border States, and 53.7 in the 32 Northern States.

The table shows, also, that the 11 Southern States had the lowest turnout, without exception, in the 1952 presidential election. In those States the percentage of voter participation in the 11 Southern States ranged from 24 percent in Mississippi to 50 percent in Florida. This compared with a national average of 63 percent.

Mr. President, it is often argued by those from the Solid South and in other one-party States that the really high voter participation in their elections comes in the primary elections where there is often opposition between factions. It is argued that because of this, it is unfair to give figures for the general elections.

I have had prepared, however, a table which compares the vote in the 1952 primaries for the office receiving the highest statewide vote with the Presidential vote in 1952, to see how much validity there is in the assertion that it is in the primaries where the real voter participation lies in these one-party States.

For this purpose, I have taken the primaries in eleven 1-party States of the Solid South and five 1-party States in the North. Let it be remembered that I have taken the vote only for the single office receiving the highest statewide primary vote in these States.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have a table in regard to this matter printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Primaries and general elections in the solid States, 1952

State	Total vote for single office receiving highest statewide primary vote in 1952: Office	Primary	General election	Presidential vote, 1952	Number of votes cast in primary per 100 votes for President
Alabama	Public service commissioner	287,620	318,027	426,120	67
Arkansas	Governor	376,500	391,584	404,800	93
Florida	do	764,423	834,412	989,337	77
Georgia	Appellate judge	463,569	547,787	655,803	71
Louisiana	Governor	785,045	123,681	651,952	120
Mississippi	United States Senator	214,182	233,919	285,532	75
North Carolina	Governor	564,505	1,179,635	1,210,910	47
South Carolina	do	[1]346,329	[1]50,642	341,087	102
Tennessee	do	647,117	806,877	892,553	73
Texas	do	1,356,395	1,881,202	2,075,946	65
Virginia	United States Senator	345,309	543,516	619,689	56
Maine	do	156,165	237,164	351,786	44
Vermont	Governor	73,253	150,862	153,539	48
Nebraska	do	414,105	595,714	609,660	68
North Dakota	United States Senator	199,147	237,995	270,127	74
South Dakota	do	[1]134,185	[1]251,362	294,283	46

[1] No statewide primary in 1952. Figures are for 1950 primary and election.

Mr. DOUGLAS. In brief, Mr. President, in Alabama about one-third more votes were cast in the presidential election than in the primary; in Alabama, 139,000 more votes were cast in the presidential election than in the primary; in Arkansas, approximately 28,000 more votes were cast in the presidential election than in the primary; in Florida, 225,000 more votes were cast in the presidential election than in the primary. In Georgia, almost 200,000 more votes were cast in the presidential election than in the primary. Louisiana is an exception in this case; a larger vote was cast in the primary than in the presidential election.

But in Mississippi, more votes were cast in the presidential election than in the primary. The same was true in North Carolina where twice as many votes were cast in the presidential election as in the primary. It was not quite true in the case of South Carolina. But the same was true in the case of Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Maine, Vermont, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.

These figures show the highest vote cast for any office in the 1952 primary as a percentage of the vote cast in that State in the 1952 presidential election.

In Alabama, the figure was 67 percent; in Arkansas, 93 percent; in Florida, 77 percent; in Georgia, 71 percent; in Louisiana, 120 percent; in Mississippi, 75 percent; in North Carolina, 47 percent; in South Carolina, 102 percent; in Tennessee, 73 percent; in Texas, 65 percent; and in Virginia, 56 percent.

In the five Northern, one-party States, the figures were as follows: In Maine, 44 percent; in Vermont, 48 percent; in Nebraska, 68 percent; in North Dakota, 74 percent; and in South Dakota, 46 percent.

Thus, Mr. President, I think the evidence indicates that the figures I have given on voter participation in the South are not unfair. And it cannot be argued that one must look at the primary votes in those States which would show greater voter participation, because it is clear that, with only two exceptions, the vote in the presidential election was greater than the vote cast for the office which received the highest vote in the primaries in those States in 1952.

Mr. President, I say with all kindness that if our Southern friends, therefore, really want to enable more adults to have an influence on the election of a President, the remedy is close at hand: Abolish the polltax and other restrictions, and let the Negroes and the poor whites vote.

II–5. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

Let me touch now upon a somewhat different, but extremely important subject, namely, the allocation of congressional committee chairmen, who have great influence on legislation in both the House and Senate.

Let us look at the committee chairmen in the House and Senate to see to what extent the one-party States, or the 11 Southern States have control, and to what extent the large populous States have Representatives or Senators in influential positions.

At the present time, of the 15 standing committees of the Senate, the chairmen of 9 come from the 11 States of the Deep South. The chairman of one comes from a border State. The chairman of only 1 of the 15 committees comes from even a moderately sized Northern State, Washington.

But not 1 single chairman of a Senate committee at this time is from 1 of the large Northern States.

Let it not be inferred that I am now complaining. I am not arguing the merits of the seniority system today. The seniority system is not ideal, but it is difficult to devise another system which would operate any better. I have been giving some thought to this subject and I may have more to say about it at a later date. However, I point out that in the two-party States which are large States, and States in which the vote is rather evenly divided, the political life of a Senator tends to be somewhat abbreviated. It is pretty difficult to pile up seniority if a Senator comes from one of the large States of the North. The way to pile up seniority is to be a Senator from one of the one-party States of the South, or one of the small States. It therefore follows that committee chairmanships tend to gravitate into the hands of Members from one-party States.

Mr. President, I have pointed out that at present not a single chairman of a Senate committee is from one of the large Northern States.

In the House, the situation is not quite so biased against the large Northern States. There, 12 of the 19 standing committees are chaired by Members from the 11 States of the Deep South. Two more chairmen come from the border States of Missouri and Kentucky, and 5 of the committee chairmen come from the 4 large Northern States of Illinois, California, Pennsylvania, and New York—New York having 2 chairmen.

Thus, of the 34 chairmen of standing committees in the House and Senate, 21 come from the 11 States of the Deep South; 3 more come from the border States; only 5 come from the large Northern States; and of the remaining 5, 4 are from very small States and 1 comes from a medium-sized Northern State.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. I have listened to the figures which have just been stated by the Senator from Illinois. I think there is another matter, however, in which he may be very greatly interested, although in all probability it has already come to his attention.

The Senator from Illinois has spoken about the chairmanships of the different committees, headed, of course, in this instance, by the Democrats, because the Democratic Party has the majority in the Senate. But I wonder whether the Senator has given close study to this fact:

In each party there is a policy committee. The policy committee of the Democratic Party, with which I am, of course, much more familiar than I am with the policy committee of the Republican Party, consists of 9 or 10 Senators. Those 9 or 10 Senators represent States having a total population of less than 30 million out of a total population through the entire country of 165 million.

On that committee, with the exception of Texas, which is represented by the majority leader, not one of the 7 or 8 largest States in the Union is represented. It is true that some of the large States do not have Democratic Senators; but at least 5 large States do have Democratic Senators—States having populations of from 16,500,000 down to 4 million or 5 million. Among those States are New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, Minnesota, California, and Pennsylvania. Not one of those great States is today represented on the policy committee of the Democratic Party in the United States Senate.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator from Illinois was aware of what the Senator from New York has said, but he did not wish to bring it up, lest he open wounds. But now that the Senator from New York has raised the point, it is, of course, true that the big States almost always get left out, for one reason or another. They are really the conquered provinces.

II–6. THE AMENDING PROCESS

Another area in which the smaller and less populous States have an advantage over the large populous States is in the amending process. Under article V of the Constitution, "the Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress."

Of the 2 alternatives for proposing a constitutional amendment, as a practical matter only, Congress initiates them by a two-thirds vote. This means that in the Senate the votes of 64 Senators representing the 32 smallest States are the minimum number required to pass a proposed constitutional amendment, and, as the requirement is two-thirds of those present and voting, a smaller number is ordinarily needed.

I ask unanimous consent that at this point in my remarks a table listing the 36 smallest States and their 1950 population, and which shows as a substitute the population of the 32 smallest States, be inserted in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1950 population of 36 smallest States

Smallest States ranked in inverse order of size	Rank in size	1950 population
1. Nevada	48	160,083
2. Wyoming	47	290,529
3. Delaware	46	318,085
4. Vermont	45	377,747
5. New Hampshire	44	533,242
6. Idaho	43	588,637
7. Montana	42	591,024
8. North Dakota	41	619,636
9. South Dakota	40	652,740
10. New Mexico	39	681,187
11. Utah	38	688,862
12. Arizona	37	749,587
13. Rhode Island	36	791,896
14. Maine	35	913,774
15. Colorado	34	1,325,089
16. Nebraska	33	1,325,510
17. Oregon	32	1,521,341
18. Kansas	31	1,905,299
19. Arkansas	30	1,909,511
20. West Virginia	29	2,005,552
21. Connecticut	28	2,007,280
22. South Carolina	27	2,117,027
23. Mississippi	26	2,178,914
24. Oklahoma	25	2,233,351
25. Maryland	24	2,343,001
26. Washington	23	2,378,963
27. Iowa	22	2,621,073
28. Louisiana	21	2,683,516
29. Florida	20	2,771,305
30. Kentucky	19	2,944,806
31. Minnesota	18	2,982,483
32. Alabama	17	3,061,743
Subtotal, 32 smallest States		[1] 48,272,793
33. Tennessee	16	3,291,718
34. Virginia	15	3,318,680
35. Wisconsin	14	3,434,575
36. Georgia	13	3,444,578
Total, 36 smallest States		61,762,344

[1] 32 percent of United States population.

	Percent
Total United States population, 1950, 150,697,361	100
36 smallest States, 1950, 61,762,344	41
12 largest States, 88.1 million	58.5
District of Columbia, 800,000	.5
Total	100

Representation in U. S. Senate

	Percent of population	Number of seats
36 smallest States	41	72
12 largest States	58.5	24

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, the table indicates that the 32 smallest States, with a population in 1950 of 48.3 million, or 32 percent of the total, had 64 Senators, or two-thirds of the number of Senators, while the remaining 16 largest States contained 102.4 million people, or 67.5 percent of the population, but had only 32 Senators, or one-third of their number. In the House, of course, the situation is more equitable. The large populous States there are more equally represented and, except that the less populous areas are favored because of the gerrymandering of congressional districts, the individual States do have representation in proportion to their numbers.

In the ratification process the large populous States are again at a disadvantage. Three-fourths, or 36 States, are needed to ratify a constitutional amendment.

384230—58251

In 1950 the 36 smallest States had a population of 61.8 million people, or 41 percent of the total population, while the remaining 12 States, including the District of Columbia, contained 89 million people, or 59 percent of the total. So 41 percent of the people of the States could ratify a constitutional amendment.

When one also considers that the alternative most often used to ratify a constitutional amendment is by action of the State legislatures, and the method of ratifying amendments by State conventions was used only in the case of the repeal of the 18th amendment, the large populous areas are even more unrepresented than these figures show. This is true because, we all know, and I have given the evidence in some detail, the State legislatures are even more unrepresentative of the cities and the urban population in the States than in the congressional districts.

Therefore, in 2 of the 3 major avenues where constitutional amendments are proposed and ratified, namely, the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the State legislatures, the large populous areas are overwhelmingly discriminated against, and in the one area, namely, the House of Representatives, the gerrymandering of congressional districts also discriminates against the urban and populous areas of the country.

This is merely another reason, Mr. President, why, when viewed in the context of our total political system, the argument that the electoral system should be changed because of the power of the populous States does not follow. The amendment before us would not serve justice and equity if passed, but would give the smaller States, the one-party areas, and the less populous regions, total control of the major institutions of our Government.

If there is any group of States in the country which is underrepresented and has little political power in the National Government, it is the group of large, populous States.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. Will the Senator name a President who was elected in the last 50 years who did not come from a large State?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Calvin Coolidge. He came from Massachusetts, did he not?

Mr. LANGER. Of course. He became President by being nominated for Vice President, and he became President following the death of the President. Take the Democratic or Republican conventions. As a rule, is it not an exception when a man from a small State is nominated?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I think it is true that nominees for the Presidency who come from large States tend to be nominated, but the point I am trying to make is that that is the only place in the American political system where the large States and the large cities have some influence.

Up to now I have been pointing out the degree to which the large States and the large cities are relatively underrepresented in the National Government, and the degree to which the large cities are underrepresented in the State governments. Now I want to turn to the faults of the amendment which is now before us, and I wish to start off with an introduction, and then consider the Mundt-Coudert plan, containing the district unit plan, and then the Lodge-Gossett system of proportional distribution of the electoral vote within the States.

III. THE FAULTS OF THE LODGE-GOSSETT PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM AND THE DISTRICT UNIT SYSTEM

1. INTRODUCTION

Mr. President, the measure before us is a two-headed hydra; the one head is know as the Lodge-Gossett plan, and the other head carries the label of Mundt-Coudert.

The eyes in both heads are looking for a change in our electoral system which would make it unnecessary for either party to bid for the support of liberal voters in presidential elections. In recent years, the present electoral college system has compelled both parties to nominate presidential candidates who advocate policies which will win the votes of ethnic, religious, and economic groups in metropolitan centers, where these minorities often hold a balance of power in populous States controlling large blocks of electoral votes. Consequently, all recent presidential candidates of both parties have supported social security, collective bargaining, and civil-rights legislation. A bipartisan coalition now seeks to devise an electoral system which will make it possible to ignore the legitimate demands of those urban voters who have pressed for this 20th-century legislation. In short, the conservative spirits who animate the movement for so-called electoral reform seek a system which they hope will enable them to repeal the 20th century with all its reforms, lock, stock, and barrel. In addition, the southern conservations back this reform in an attempt to block civil-rights legislation.

As evidence of the truth of what I say, let me read from the testimony of former Congressman Gossett before the House Committee on the Judiciary on April 20, 1951. I shall quote Mr. Gossett, starting on page 263 of the hearings. This is a quotation from one of the principal sponsors of the Lodge-Gossett plan:

> The electoral college permits and invites irresponsible control and domination by small organized minority groups, within the large pivotal States. It aggravates and accentuates the building up and solidification within these States of religious, economic, and racial blocs: Small, definable, minority groups, organized along religious or economic or racial lines, by voting together, can and do hold a balance of power within these pivotal States. As a result, the political strategists in both parties make special appeals to these various groups as such. These groups have become more and more politically conscious. They know their power. In many instances, they have no political alinements or philosophy as such, but are simply up for sale to the highest bidder. * * *
>
> At the danger of stepping on some toes, let's get down to specific cases. Let's take a look at the political platforms of both major parties in the presidential campaigns of 1944 and 1948 and see how they were built and designed to appeal to minority groups and blocs in the large, pivotal States. First, both parties wrote the FEPC into their platforms. The platform makers of both parties will tell you frankly, off the record of course, that this was done as a bid for the Negro vote. There are enough Negroes in New York City, when voting en bloc, to determine often how the entire electoral vote of the State of New York is cast; enough in Philadelphia if cast en bloc to probably determine the result of an election in the State of Pennsylvania; enough in Detroit to perhaps decide the vote of the State of Michigan; enough in Chicago to carry the State of Illinois. Hence, a dangerous and radical proposal in which a majority of neither party believes was written into both platforms as political bait for a minority vote within the large pivotal States.
>
> A second minority group that was wooed by the platform makers of both parties was the radical wing of organized labor. In the large pivotal States above mentioned, the votes controlled by the political-action committee of the CIO was a tremendous, potential, political threat. The votes allegedly controlled by this organization in the large pivotal States, if cast en bloc, would be sufficient to swing the votes of such States and perhaps elect a President. Hence, both parties generally speaking wrote platitudinous provisions into their platforms concerning industrial-management relations. Both parties pussyfooted on the labor question because of organized labor's power through the electoral college.
>
> Now, with all due deference to our many fine Jewish citizens, they constitute a third group, to whom a specific overt appeal was made in the platforms of both major parties. There are 2½ million Jews in the city of New York alone. When they vote even substantially en bloc, it means the balance of power in our largest State. The candidate for whom they vote carries New York State and probably the Presidency. What did the platform makers of 1944 do? Both of them wrote into their platforms specifically and without equivocation the so-called Palestine resolution, calling upon Great Britain to immediately open Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration. Regardless of the merits of the Zionists' cause in Palestine, this was political demagoguery and dangerous meddling with British foreign policy in the Holy Land. As a result of platform endorsements by both major parties, we passed a resolution through the 79th Congress calling upon England to open up Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration. Within a few weeks after this resolution was passed, England asked us if we were ready and willing to back up our request with the Army and Navy if she got into war. We stuck our noses into British foreign policy for purely political reasons and to the detriment of all of our citizens, Jewish and otherwise.
>
> Then there are numerous other minority pressure groups within these large pivotal States to whom continuous political overtures are made by the strategists of both parties. There are more than 1 million Italians in New York City. There are 2 million Irish, many of whom are still politically conscious where Ireland is concerned. There are 500,000 Poles and other large racial groups. * * * It is largely within these big cities that the racial, religious, and economic blocs are found, and in which they operate.
>
> Now, please, understand, I have no objection to the Negro in Harlem voting and to his vote being counted, but I do resent the fact that both parties will spend a hundred times as much money to get his vote, and that his vote is worth a hundred times as much in the scale of national politics as is the vote of a white man in Texas. I have no objection to a million folks who cannot speak English voting, or to their votes being counted, but I do resent the fact that because they happen to live in Chicago, or Detroit, or New York, their vote is worth a hundred times as much

384230—58251

as mine because I happen to live in Texas. Is it fair, is it honest, is it democratic, is it to the best interest of anyone, in fact, to place such a premium on a few thousand labor votes, or Italian votes, or Irish votes, or Negro votes, or Jewish votes, or Polish votes, or Communist votes, or big-city-machine votes, simply because they happen to be located in 2 or 3 large, industrial pivotal States?

Mr. President, Mr. Gossett has told us in no uncertain language why many conservative southerners, nativist northerners, and antilabor groups are supporting this proposed constitutional amendment although not all of those who support this amendment fall into these categories. Let us turn more specifically to the provisions of the amendment, and spell out precisely how adoption of the amendment would accomplish the purposes of these so-called conservatives.

The amendment before us allows each State legislature to select one of two systems. Both would abolish the general ticket system by which the presidential candidate with a popular plurality in a State is awarded all of that State's electoral votes. Instead, the State legislature would be compelled to select either the Mundt-Coudert or Lodge-Gossett system. Let us look at each of these systems.

First, I shall take up the Mundt-Coudert plan, because last week the Lodge-Gossett plan was analyzed in great detail and with great ability by the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY].

III–2. EVILS OF THE MUNDT-COUDERT PLAN

The Mundt-Coudert plan provides that one presidential elector shall be chosen in each congressional district and the remainder in the State at large. In 1952, for example, Adlai Stevenson carried 6 congressional districts in California and, consequently, would have garnered 6 of California's 32 electoral votes; President Eisenhower won a popular plurality in the other 24 districts and, therefore, would have received 24 electoral votes plus 2 additional ones for carrying the State.

It is popularly believed that the proposal before us would abolish the electoral-college system. Senator MUNDT's plan would do nothing of the kind. Rather than abolish our 48 electoral colleges, it would create 430 more electoral colleges—1 in each congressional district. It would not abolish the winner-take-all rule. The presidential candidate with the popular plurality in a district would receive 100 percent of that district's electoral vote. The winner would take all in the congressional district. In short, the Mundt-Coudert plan would extend the evils of the Georgia county-unit system to presidential elections, the only difference being that the congressional district rather than the county would be the basic unit. In short, this proposal does not do the things it is purported to do:

First. It does not abolish our electoral colleges. It simply multiplies their number.

Second. It does not abolish the so-called winner-take-all rule. It simply transfers the application of this rule from the State to the congressional district.

Third. It does nothing to correct the disparity caused by allocating electoral votes among the States on the basis of representation in the Senate and House of Representatives. Each State would continue to have a number of presidential electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State is entitled. Today, the 9 States having over half of the population cast 18 of the 96 electoral votes based on senatorial seats, while the other 78 are controlled by the 39 States having less than half of the population. The proposal before us does not change this situation.

Fourth. The Mundt-Coudert plan does not correct the discrepancy between the popular and electoral vote, which is caused by the great variation in voter participation between the States, to which I have already referred. In my home State of Illinois in 1952, for example, 1 electoral vote represented 165,965 popular votes in contract to 1 of Mississippi's which represented only 35,692 popular votes. Enforcement of the second section of the 14th amendment, not the Mundt-Coudert or Lodge-Gossett plan, is the remedy for this situation.

Fifth. The Mundt-Coudert plan would not have changed the outcome of a single election since 1916. In every case, the Mundt-Coudert plan would have given the necessary 266 electoral votes to the candidate with the popular plurality.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks a table headed "Comparison of the Mundt-Coudert System With the Present Electoral System in the Presidential Elections, 1916–52."

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Comparison of the Mundt-Coudert system with the present electoral system in the presidential elections, 1916–52

Year	Electoral votes won under present system			Distribution of electoral votes under Mundt-Coudert plan			
	Republican	Democratic	Other	Republican	Democratic	Other	Uncertain [1]
1952	442	89	0	375	156	0	0
1948	189	303	39	193	299	39	0
1944	99	432	0	166	292	0	73
1940	82	449	0	135	321	0	75
1936	8	523	0	41	412	0	78
1932	59	472	0	85	363	0	83
1928	444	87	0	349	104	0	78
1924	382	136	13	291	145	15	80
1920	404	127	0	311	129	0	91
1916	254	277	0	175	267	0	89

[1] The reason for listing some electoral votes as "uncertain" is that a tabulation of the presidential vote in these congressional districts has never been made. These "uncertain" electoral votes are almost entirely in big-city districts, where it is most difficult to tabulate the popular vote by congressional districts because the city and even some wards and precincts are divided between several congressional districts.

Source: Hearings on S. J. Res. 3, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 339.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Having looked at the things the Mundt-Coudert plan would not do, let us now look at some of the things it would do—at some of the evils it would cause:

First. Adoption of the Mundt-Coudert plan would deprive the bulk of our people of the political education which a presidential campaign affords. Advocates of this resolution argue that its adoption would spread the campaign to every corner of the Nation. But would it? There are rarely more than 100 marginal congressional districts. This means that the presidential campaign would be confined to less than 100 districts. Do the advocates of this plan seriously contend that presidential candidates would actually campaign in the congressional districts of Alabama or Vermont?

Second. The Mundt-Coudert plan would enhance the power of the South in national politics by placing the South in a balance-of-power position. Under the present system, the 11 Southern States held a balance of power in only 2 of the past 10 elections—in 1916 and 1948. Under the Mundt plan, however, southern electoral votes would have been necessary for victory in 3, 4, or 5 of these last 10 elections—in 1916, 1944, 1948, and perhaps in 1932 and 1940 as well.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks a table headed "Electoral Vote Margin of Winner."

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Electoral vote margin

[Electoral votes in excess of the 266 necessary for victory]

Year	Present system		Mundt-Coudert plan	
	National margin of winner	Southern electoral votes for winner	National margin of winner [1]	Southern electoral votes for winner
1952	176	57	109	48
1948	37	88	33	81
1944	166	127	18–102	125
1940	183	124	145–230	123
1936	257	124	146–224	123
1932	206	124	97–180	122
1928	178	62	83–161	48
1924	116	0	25–105	2
1920	138	12	45–136	9
1916	11	126	1–90	123

[1] Because the popular vote for President has not been tabulated in a number of congressional districts, the margin under the Mundt-Coudert plan can be given only in terms of a maximum and a minimum. In 1944, for example, Roosevelt would have had an electoral vote margin of at least 18 and no more than 102 under the Mundt-Coudert plan.

Source: Hearings, op. cit., p. 340.

Mr. DOUGLAS. These figures explain precisely why some southerners are pushing for a change in our electoral system. In the past four Congresses, a number of southern Senators and Representatives have frankly stated that electoral change is favored in the South because it would make unnecessary the solicitation of minority votes in northern cities and, thereby, increase the voice of the South in the Democratic Party. Their views were neatly summarized in the Macon [Ga.] News—which, incidentally, is an extremely good newspaper—which spoke editorially as follows:

Dividing a State's electoral vote on the basis of its popular vote would take from Walter White [of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People] his ability to manipulate the votes of the mere 3 million Negroes living outside the South for a boasted control of 17 States and the Presidency.

The Vernon [Tex.] Times told its readers:

If the Republican Party succeeds in having the Gossett-Lodge resolution adopted * * * that will put an end to the bipartisan contest for Negro votes in pivotal States and eliminate the so-called civil rights issue from national politics.

Now, I have a special word for the Republicans supporting this measure. A number of them are probably thinking that it would enable a Republican presidential candidate to gain some electoral votes in the South. I suggest that this measure would put the South in a position so that it could mold the Democratic Party in its own image. Naturally, we northern Democrats do not relish this prospect. But I want to tell my Republican friends that, if the South could dominate the Democratic Party, the Republican presidential candidate would lose rather than gain southern votes.

One thing is certain: Adoption of this formula would shift the balance of power within each of our political parties. In the Democratic Party, the South would have the controlling voice. I think this would likely mean at least three parties, namely, a Southern Democratic Party, a Northern Liberal Democratic Party, and a Republican Party. In the Republican Party, the conservatives would likely gain a stronger voice because of the decreased importance of the large States and big cities where liberal Republicanism is now largely found.

I wish to make an exception of the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], who, on domestic matters, I believe, possesses one of the finest voting records in the Senate. However, he realizes that he has been, so to speak, a lonely figure in the past few years. Republican progressivism in the Western States, which was so strong 30 years ago, has greatly decreased. On domestic matters, the big States have a much more liberal attitude within the Republican Party than the States west of the Mississippi, or perhaps west of the Allegheny. The third party is likely to consist of liberal Democrats and Republicans in the North. This would mean a breakdown of our two-party system—two conservative parties and one liberal party. If this developed and three presidential candidates were in the race, no candidate would receive a majority of the electoral vote, and, under this proposal, the election would be thrown into the Congress, where no one party would have a majority. Imagine the strategic position of Southern Representatives in Congress trying to make deals with the two other parties.

There is still another, but I think a less likely, possibility. A Democratic Party under greater southern domination would lose considerable northern support, which would probably be channeled into the third party I've already mentioned. The Republicans, however, might find it necessary and expedient to bid for this northern support, a contingency which would likely strengthen the voice of liberal forces in the Republican Party. I cannot believe that the authors of the Mundt-Coudert plan want us to adopt a system which might force a political realinement, which in turn might strengthen the liberal elements in their own party.

I suggest that adoption of this proposed constitutional amendment would promote a political realinement of some sort. I am not sure, however, that it would promote a political realinement of the sort the conservatives desire. As I shall show, I think probably it would. In any case, if political realinement is the real purpose of electoral change, let us debate the merits of a political realinement rather than sneak realinement in under the cloak of "electoral reform."

Third. The Mundt-Coudert system would decrease the voice of the large States in presidential elections. I have already indicated the disadvantages under which the large States now operate in our Federal system. Their voice is small in the Senate; they are underrepresented in the electoral college to the extent that electoral votes are based on senatorial seats; their voice in the constitutional amendment process is small; and so forth. The general ticket system is the one device which gives these States some voice in national politics. A presidential candidate will seek the votes of the people living in the large States, because they control a large bloc of electoral votes. President Eisenhower campaigned in Texas in 1952, because a popular plurality in that State meant 24 electoral votes in the Republican column. This was a prize worth seeking. If the Mundt-Coudert plan had been effective in 1952, however, Eisenhower's electoral vote margin in Texas would have amounted to 8 rather than 24. I suggest that presidential candidates would have paid less heed to the desires of Texas if they had known that their net gain in that State would be less than 10 instead of 24 electoral votes.

In 1952, the 9 States having over half the population—50.6 percent—contributed 237 electoral votes to the victorious presidential candidate. This was the prize which made it worthwhile for the presidential candidates to heed the voices of the voters in the large States. If the Mundt-Coudert plan had been operative in 1952, however, Eisenhower's electoral vote margin in these 9 States would have been reduced from 237 to 117. In other words, the victorious candidate's net electoral vote gain in these 9 States would have been reduced 50 percent; the prize would have been worth only half as much. This is why adoption of the Mundt-Coudert plan would reduce the importance, and hence the voice, of our most populated States in presidential elections.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table I have prepared be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Electoral votes of 9 States containing more than half of the total population of the United States

State	Electoral vote margin in 1952		
	Present system	Lodge-Gossett	Mundt-Coudert plan
1. New York	45	5.355	17
2. California	32	4.352	20
3. Pennsylvania	32	1.856	12
4. Illinois	27	2.673	13
5. Ohio	25	3.400	17
6. Texas	24	1.536	8
7. Michigan	20	2.280	12
8. New Jersey	16	2.368	10
9. Massachusetts	16	1.392	8
Total	237	25.212	117

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, in 1952, the 39 States having less than half of the population controlled 294 electoral votes. Under the general ticket system, this represented a margin of 294. If the Mundt-Coudert plan had been operative in 1952, the margin of 294 would have been reduced by less than 25 percent.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table I have prepared be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Electoral votes of 39 States containing less than half of the total population of the United States

State	Electoral vote margin in 1952		
	Present system	Lodge-Gossett plan	Mundt-Coudert plan
1. Alabama	11	3.256	11
2. Arizona	4	.664	4
3. Arkansas	8	.968	6
4. Colorado	6	1.278	6
5. Connecticut	8	.944	8
5. Delaware	3	.117	3
7. Florida	10	1.000	4
8. Georgia	12	4.728	12
9. Idaho	4	1.540	4
10. Indiana	13	2.223	11
11. Iowa	10	2.820	10
12. Kansas	8	3.064	8
13. Kentucky	10	.010	4
14. Louisiana	10	.580	8
15. Maine	5	1.610	5
16. Maryland	9	1.044	7
17. Minneapolis	11	2.232	7
18. Mississippi	8	1.664	6
19. Missouri	13	.208	5
20. Montana	4	.772	4
21. Nebraska	6	2.304	6
22. Nevada	3	.684	3
23. New Hampshire	4	.872	4
24. New Mexico	4	.444	4
25. North Carolina	14	1.092	6
26. North Dakota	4	1.704	4
27. Oklahoma	8	.736	6
28. Oregon	6	1.296	6
29. Rhode Island	4	.076	2
30. South Carolina	8	.112	2
31. South Dakota	4	1.544	4
32. Tennessee	11	.053	1
33. Utah	4	.712	4
34. Vermont	3	1.299	3
35. Virginia	12	1.548	8
36. Washington	9	.864	9
37. West Virginia	8	.304	4
38. Wisconsin	12	2.676	10
39. Wyoming	3	.768	3
Total	294	49.810	222

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, a fourth evil of the Mundt-Coudert plan is that it would reduce the voice of the large cities in presidential elections. This is especially true if the State legislatures continue to gerrymander the States to the disadvantage of the metro-

politan areas. Let me take my own State, for example. Under the present system, every popular vote in Illinois has equal value in determining the presidential race in our State. If the Mundt-Coudert plan became operative, however, a popular vote in Chicago's 13th Congressional District would have only about half the weight of one popular vote in the 20th District downstate. The 13th and the 20th Districts would each be entitled to one district electoral vote under the Mundt-Coudert plan; but 466,064 people live in Chicago's 13th District, whereas only 281,468 live in the 20th District downstate.

According to the 1950 census, there are 14 cities outside the South each having more than a half million inhabitants. From 1932 through 1948 the Republicans were often able to roll up a plurality or even a majority outside the big cities; but their margin was often insufficient to offset the large Democratic margin in the big cities. In 1948, for example, Dewey won a popular margin of 167,224 in downstate Illinois. But Truman's margin of 200,836 in Cook County gave him all of Illinois' 28 electoral votes under the present system. Thus, these 28 electoral votes were determined by the big-city margin.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table I have prepared be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Electoral votes determined by large-city vote margins in presidential elections, 1932–52

Year	11 States' electoral vote [1]	Electoral votes determined by big-city margins
1952	242	None.
1948	241	Democratic, 78; Republican, 0.
1944	241	Democratic, 152; Republican, 0.
1940	242	Democratic, 124; Republican, 0.
1936	242	Democratic, 47; Republican, 0.
1932	242	Democratic, 64; Republican, 0.

[1] The 11 States and 14 cities are: Los Angeles and San Francisco, Calif.; Chicago, Ill.; Baltimore, Md.; Boston, Mass.; Detroit, Mich.; Minneapolis, Minn.; St. Louis, Mo.; New York City and Buffalo, N. Y.; Cleveland, Ohio; Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, Pa.; and Milwaukee, Wis.

Source: Hearings, op. cit., p. 340.

384230—58251

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, the Mundt-Coudert plan is devised to take the big city out of this strategic position. The party which failed to carry the large cities would usually gain more electoral votes in the big-city States under the Mundt plan than under the present system.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table I have prepared be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Distribution of electoral votes in 11 northern and border States [1] having a central city of one-half million or more inhabitants

[Votes under Mundt-Coudert plan in parentheses; others are votes under present system]

Year	Republican	Democratic	Other	Uncertain
1952	242 (185)	0 (57)	.....	.....
1948	109 (116)	132 (125)	.....	.....
1944	37 (92)	204 (89)	.....	(60)
1940	19 (72)	223 (106)	.....	(64)
1936	0 (27)	242 (146)	.....	(69)
1932	36 (53)	206 (115)	.....	(74)
1928	215 (145)	18 (22)	.....	(66)
1924	220 (147)	0 (5)	13 (13)	(68)
1920	233 (152)	0 (2)	.....	(79)
1916	170 (101)	63 (53)	.....	(79)

[1] The 11 States are: California (Los Angeles and San Francisco), Illinois (Chicago), Maryland (Baltimore), Massachusetts (Boston), Michigan (Detroit), Minnesota (Minneapolis), Missouri (St. Louis), New York (New York City and Buffalo), Ohio (Cleveland), Pennsylvania (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh), and Wisconsin (Milwaukee).

Source: Hearings, op. cit., p. 341.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, this balance of power position held by certain large cities, which in the past has enabled these cities to help to determine from 47 to 152 electoral votes, gave them an important voice in national politics. It helped to compensate for the cities' under-representation in our national and State legislative bodies. It forced presidential candidates at least to pay some attention to the needs and problems of metropolitan populations, whose needs and interests are all too often ignored by Congress and the State legislatures.

A number of Republicans have doubtless been attracted to the Mundt-Coudert plan on the mere assumption that a Republican presidential candidate would benefit from reducing the electoral power of the large cities, which have usually turned in Democratic pluralities during the past 24 years. I would like to point out to my Republican friends, however, that big-city margins did not deprive Eisenhower of a single electoral vote in 1952. Moreover, voting patterns change. In general, Republican gains over the past 15 years have been greater in cities and urban areas than in rural areas. This is partially shown by 2 tables which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GOP percentage of the major-party vote in the 14 cities having at least one-half million inhabitants

	President				Congress 1954
	1940	1944	1948 [1]	1952	
Los Angeles	38.9	40.4	43.1	52.1	51.0
San Francisco	39.7	39.1	45.8	53.5	[3] 38.8
Remainder of California	43.2	44.8	48.9	58.4	47.6
Chicago	41.5	38.6	41.4	45.6	40.0
Remainder of Illinois	54.0	56.3	56.7	61.5	59.4
Baltimore City	36.0	40.8	43.9	48.2	[3] 34.5
Remainder of Maryland	46.0	54.2	54.3	60.5	52.0
Boston	36.7	37.7	27.7	40.4	[4] 29.3
Remainder of Massachusetts	48.6	49.0	47.1	56.9	50.7
Detroit	37.0	35.0	36.7	39.5	33.7
Remainder of Michigan	53.4	54.3	55.8	62.4	57.2
Minneapolis	44.1	41.8	41.2	50.8	49.7
Remainder of Minnesota	49.0	37.6	39.9	55.7	45.9
St. Louis City	41.9	39.6	35.2	38.0	40.9
Remainder of Missouri	49.2	51.0	43.3	54.0	45.2
New York City	38.8	38.3	35.4	44.6	[5] 34.6
Buffalo	45.5	44.4	40.7	50.4	60.8
Remainder of New York	59.3	59.0	59.3	67.5	62.9
Cleveland	30.1	32.1	34.0	40.1	45.2
Remainder of Ohio	50.1	52.5	51.0	58.6	56.6
Philadelphia	40.0	41.1	48.4	41.6	42.7
Pittsburgh	38.4	39.2	38.3	43.9	47.6
Remainder of Pennsylvania	49.4	51.9	53.6	57.0	51.9
Milwaukee	35.9	38.3	37.9	48.5	38.6
Remainder of Wisconsin	52.1	54.0	49.0	64.1	57.2

[1] Henry Wallace considered 3d major-party candidate in 1948.
[2] No Republican candidate in 1 of 2 San Francisco districts.
[3] No Republican candidate in 1 or 3 Baltimore districts.
[4] No Republican candidate in 1 of 3 Boston districts.
[5] No Republican candidate in 1 of 22 New York City districts.
See also Gallup's Political Almanac, 1952, pp. 26–38.

Republican percentage of major-party vote in presidential elections

Year	New England	Mid-Atlantic	East Central	West Central	Mountain	Pacific	South	United States
1896	71.7	60.5	54.1	52.7	18.3	51.4	39.5	52.7
1900	61.5	57.5	54.5	55.8	45.7	56.9	39.2	53.2
1904	63.0	61.0	64.5	66.7	62.2	73.1	34.9	60.0
1908	63.9	58.3	56.2	56.0	53.6	63.1	37.8	54.5
1912 [1]	33.6	26.7	27.0	26.5	30.2	11.1	18.7	25.1
1916	52.5	54.2	51.9	49.7	40.0	49.6	31.5	48.3
1920	68.9	68.3	66.3	69.5	61.9	71.6	41.7	63.9
1924 [1]	63.5	58.9	61.0	50.2	49.9	56.0	34.5	54.3

Year	New England		Mid-Atlantic		East Central		West Central		Mountain		Pacific		South	United States
	Cities [2]	Outside cities [3]	Cities [2]	Outside cities [3]	Cities [2]	Outside cities [3]	Cities [2]	Outside cities [3]	Cities [2]	Outside cities [3]	Cities [2]	Outside cities [3]		
1928	40.1	59.1	.....	.....	.....	.....	53.5	61.4	.....	.....	.....	.....	51.6	58.8
1932	38.3	54.0	37.2	53.3	43.0	46.5	36.2	37.4	42.5	.....	38.2	.....	23.7	40.9
1936	33.5	51.0	30.2	47.9	34.4	45.5	30.0	41.0	31.8	.....	30.1	.....	24.3	37.5
1940	37.6	50.7	39.6	53.0	41.5	53.3	41.7	53.6	43.3	44.6	40.6	43.4	27.1	45.0
1944	38.0	51.2	39.6	54.8	39.9	55.9	41.6	54.8	45.6	47.8	41.2	45.4	30.8	46.2
1948 [1]	34.1	51.7	39.0	56.0	41.8	54.6	39.2	48.2	46.2	45.4	45.1	48.4	29.7	45.3
1952	44.5	60.5	45.3	61.5	46.5	61.6	47.6	63.7	58.0	60.7	54.0	58.7	49.0	55.4

[1] Republican percentage of 3-party vote. In 1948, Wallace's Progressive Party was considered a 3d major party outside the South and the States Rights Party was considered a 3d major party in the South.
[2] Cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants in 1950. There were 13 such cities in New England, 21 in the Middle Atlantic, 18 in the East Central, 10 in the West Central, 3 in the Mountain, and 12 in the Pacific States, totaling 77 outside of the South. There are 29 in the Southern States, totaling 106 in the 48 States.
[3] Area outside the cities mentioned in the above notes:
New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
Middle Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
East Central: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, an dOhio.
West Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
Pacific: California, Oregon, and Washington.
South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

Source: Hearings, op. cit., p. 346.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, the Republicans' big-city gains would show up even more clearly in the two above tables I have inserted if it had been possible to compile the statistics on the basis of the standard metropolitan area rather than on the basis of the central city. For the Republican Party has gained heavily in the suburban areas around the central city, such as Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties in New York.

In my own State there are suburbs west of Chicago and north of Chicago and in the quasi-suburban counties of DuPage and Lake, where the same appears to be true.

In contrast, Republican strength has been declining in a number of rural areas. These declines have been especially significant in the dairy and less prosperous farm regions of the Middle West. In short, an electoral system which might have enlarged the Republican electoral vote in 1932, 1936, 1940, 1944, and 1948—all elections which the GOP would have lost in any case—might very well make the Republican presidential candidate its victim in the next five presidential elections.

I believe, Mr. President, that reduction of the large cities' voice in presidential elections would be a real evil for a number of reasons.

CRITICISM OF CITIES NOT WHOLLY JUSTIFIED

A great deal of unfavorable publicity has been put forth with regard to the big cities. Much of it is unjustified. In the first place, we should judge not the absolute amount of crime or juvenile delinquency which takes place in a city, but the relative amount, in proportion to population. If we take the relative amount, we find that the cities do not do badly at all. In fact, they do better than some areas in the countryside. Mere size itself seems to be unesthetic, and evils which are ignored in the countryside are reprobated in the city.

When I was a member of the City Council of Chicago, as a part of my duties I specialized in the disposition of waste and garbage. The amount of garbage per person is not greater in the city than it is in the small town. However, since there are only a few people in the small town, the garbage can be disposed of without bringing esthetic blemishes upon the countryside. However, the disposal of the garbage of three and a half million or eight million people creates a very difficult problem, and is one which exposes a city to condemnation, which is not fair.

If I may indulge in a literary aside, that is the very fact why I have never thought Rabelais a particularly humorous writer, because the functions which he described on the part of a giant are to me extremely repulsive, even though for a child that would not be the case.

CITIES AN INFLUENCE FOR TOLERANCE

In our big cities, Americans of various races, religions, and ethnic origins all live side by side as close neighbors, and worship together. It is true that in the beginning there is a certain amount of hostility, but the hostility soon changes to acceptance, then to toleration, then to understanding, and finally to cooperation and to fellowship. The broadmindedness and tolerance which emanates from our cities is a leaven in each of our political parties. To deprive our two great parties of the broadminded and tolerant influence of the cities would be a severe blow to our national progress. Moreover, the general ticket system forces both major parties to recognize the legitimate interests of the minority groups which are concentrated in our metropolitan areas. I am not arguing that minority groups in pivotal States should have undue influence in national party councils. I am simply arguing that consideration of their legitimate interests incorporates these groups into the national community and makes our two-party system possible. This means that most members of the group are willing to compromise with other conflicting groups within a major party. Most members of such a group do not at present feel the need to form special interest parties to protect their interests. This means that the so-called radical elements are forced to moderate their extreme demands and seek terms of accommodation with other groups inside one or the other of our two major parties. In this way, we have avoided the creation of numerous political parties to represent the many different racial, religious, economic, and other minority groups in the Nation. Through our two broad-based political parties we have been able to incorporate the members of these minority groups into our national life. Under the proposal before us, the major parties would tend to give less attention to the legitimate interest of these minority groups; and this in turn would weaken our two-party system. Minority groups in pivotal States do not now have undue influence in presidential elections or on national policy. The fact is that neither major party can afford to yield to the extreme demands of a minority lest it lose its broad support throughout the Nation. I am afraid that some of those who advocate this constitutional amendment do so, not because they wish to free the major parties from giving undue consideration to minority groups, but because they wish the two major parties almost completely to ignore these groups.

Let me quote from the Wichita Daily Times of November 28, 1948:

Southerners in Congress, laying plans for quieting the loud voices of racial and labor

384230—58251

minorities in the Democratic Party, have high hopes of putting the Gossett-Lodge constitutional amendment through Congress. * * * Southerners were the first to rally in large numbers behind the amendment following President Truman's civil-rights recommendations. They argued that if the President had not felt he needed the Negro vote in Harlem, Chicago, and Philadelphia to win the huge electoral votes of New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, the message would have never been written.

Our two-party system will surely break down if our two major parties do not represent the various economic, racial, religious, social, sectional, and other groups in the Nation. Today, neither major party closes its doors to any significant element in our population. Both major parties recognize and protect the legitimate interests of such groups. We are a heterogeneous people and must adjust the conflicting interests of our people. These adjustments are made within each of our major parties. This system has made liberty, democracy, and domestic order possible, because Americans know that neither party is a serious threat to the interests of any group.

This proposed constitutional amendment is pushed by those who object to compromising with other interests within their own party. Conservative rural Republicans hope to devise an electoral system which will free them from having to compromise with liberal Republicans from urban industrial areas inside the Republican Party. Southern Democrats hope to devise an electoral system which will free them from the necessity of compromising with the liberal northern Democrats inside the Democratic Party. These conservatives are so sure they are right, and I do not question their sincerity, that they are ready to turn their backs on the democratic process of compromise. They want to free themselves from the necessity of forming majorities by compromise between minorities. They are looking for an electoral system which will enable them to force their policies on the rest of the Nation.

At this point, I should like to call attention to a quotation of Judge Learned Hand, one of the noblest of Americans, to the effect that the spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure it is right. Any change in our electoral system, which would make our two major parties less sensitive to the vital interests of any important segment of our population, will undermine the two-party system. Any change in our electoral system, which will free even a majority from the obligation of compromising with other groups within the party will undermine our system of free government based on popular consent.

AMENDMENT COULD LEAD TO FURTHER RESTRICTIONS OF THE FRANCHISE

A fifth evil which will arise from adoption of the constitutional amendment proposed here is that it would probably lead to additional restrictions on the franchise in the "safe States."

A popular vote in a "safe" State is, on the average, worth approximately three popular votes in the larger States. In some cases, the disparity is even greater than 3 to 1. I have already placed in the RECORD tables showing voter participation in previous elections. In 1952, for example, one electoral vote in Illinois stood for 165,965 popular votes in contrast to one of Mississippi's, which represented only 35,692 popular votes.

This inequity is roughly compensated for under our present system, which gives the large State's entire electoral vote to the candidate receiving a plurality of the popular vote in that State. The Mundt-Coudert plan would eliminate this compensating factor by dividing the State's electoral votes. In this way, the relative importance of the "safe" States would be increased and the relative importance of the two-party States would be diminished. The incentive of the dominant party in such a State to keep that State "safe" would be tremendous.

The dominant party in such a State would do everything in its power to preserve its advantage. This is especially true in the Southern States, where the franchise is already severely restricted by statute and extra-legal practices. We know that the dominant party would not voluntarily lift these restrictions and thereby extend the franchise to those who might use the vote to threaten the power of those now in control. On the contrary, the dominant party would probably use its present power to guarantee its continued dominance through further restriction of the franchise.

Proponents of this measure claim that adoption of the plan would enlarge the vote in the Southern States. They argue that presidential elections would become real contests in the South if a Southern State's electoral vote could be divided between the two major candidates. Republicans would come to the polls, the argument continues, because their votes would no longer be futile, and Democrats would come to the polls because their votes would no longer be superfluous. This, I believe, was former Senator Lodge's argument back in 1950. But what are the facts? The voting pattern of the South has been remarkably uniform ever since the end of reconstruction. Popular participation in elections in the South is lower than elsewhere in the Nation. Even if one compares the primary vote in the South to the general election vote in the other 37 States, the number of Southerners going to the polls is relatively low. As a matter of fact, in the South as a whole participation in a presidential election is usually greater than participation in the largest primaries. I have introduced material to that effect, showing figures for 1952. For example, the 1942 primaries were supposed to have turned out the largest primary vote in the South in many years.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point figures showing that the primary vote was smaller than was the presidential vote.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

State	For single office receiving highest statewide vote in 1942 primaries		Total vote for presidential electors	
	Office	Total votes	1940	1944
Alabama	Governor	279,454	294,219	244,743
Arkansas	Attorney General	228,414	200,743	212,954
Florida	United States Representative	258,668	485,492	482,592
Georgia	Governor	301,686	312,539	328,111
Louisiana	United States Senator	321,041	312,305	349,383
Mississippi	do	133,449	175,824	180,080
North Carolina	do	320,755	822,648	790,554
South Carolina	do	234,942	99,830	103,375
Tennessee	Governor	297,197	522,823	510,792
Texas	United States Senator	983,512	1,041,168	1,150,330
Virginia	United States Representative	41,318	346,607	388,485
Total		3,400,436	4,674,198	4,741,399

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1943, pp. 234, 237; Ibid., 1944-45, pp. 251, 257, and 44 American Political Science Review 98 (March 1950).

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes, Mr. President; advocates of this electoral change tell us that more southerners would vote in the presidential elections if this change were adopted. In support of this statement, they tell us that more southern voters participate in primaries, where the ballot really counts, than in general elections which are a foregone conclusion. But I have already put into the RECORD facts from the 1952 election which show conclusively that this is not true.

These figures indicate that having one's vote count is not so effective in bringing southerners to the polls. Moreover, comparing voter participation in the South with voter participation in the so-called one-party States outside the South would indicate that mere political apathy in a one-party State is not the only cause for low popular participation in southern elections.

I suggest that restricted franchise is an important factor in explaining why so few southerners vote in presidential elections. If a proposal were adopted so that a State's electoral vote could be divided, southern Democratic legislatures would almost surely tighten suffrage qualifications to guarantee continued control by those southerners who are now in the saddle. Remember that democracy met the agrarian and Populist challenge with a program of systematic disfranchisement through literacy tests and cumulative poll taxes.

I have gone into the question rather thoroughly, and I find that after the Populist movement was started, bringing in poor farmers and poor Negroes and creating an alternative party, we found expansion of the poll tax, the literacy test, the grandfather clause, and all these other measures that tend to restrict the franchise so as to perpetuate one-party control.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. Is it not true that at one time the Populist Party was very strong in the South?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes, indeed. Tom Watson was once a Senator from Georgia and the leader of the Populist Party in the South. The Populist Party was strong in Georgia, Texas, North Carolina, and South Carolina. At one time it looked as though it would be the second party in the South.

Mr. LANGER. But the people got rid of it, just as the distinguished Senator said a few moments ago.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I have stated one of the ways.

THE POSSIBILITY OF UNPLEDGED ELECTORS

A sixth evil which will arise from adoption of the Mundt-Coudert plan is that it would open the door to the possibility of unpledged electors. Under this measure, an elector would be freed from casting his electoral vote for the presidential candidate selected by the voters unless that elector were specifically pledged to that presidential candidate. Some advocates of the Mundt-Coudert plan have said that adoption of the district system would mean abolition of the presidential short ballot, that the names of the candidates for district elector rather than the names of the presidential candidates would appear on the ballot in the popular election, that a presidential elector would be thought of as a lawful public officer and as a candidate in his own right rather than a symbol of his party's presidential candidate, and that the electoral college would become a deliberative body which would elect the President. Mr. President, at least some of the advocates of the Mundt-Coudert plan envisage that their plan would take election of the President out of the hands of our people. They argue that the district system would put an end to popular election of the President. They want to reverse 165 years of democratization in the process by which the President is elected.

Lines 11 to 13 on page 4 of the substitute amendment say:

> Any candidate for elector who before the [popular?] election has pledged his vote for President or Vice President to a specific person shall, if elected, cast his vote for such person.

This language might be held to repeal the custom by which an elector is bound to vote for the candidate on whose ticket he was elected. There have been only 2 exceptions to this rule:

First. One elector in New Hampshire in 1824—See volume 42, American Political Science Review, pages 527 to 528, note 24.

Second. One elector in Tennessee in 1948. But this elector was pledged to Thurmond, ran on both the Truman and Thurmond tickets, was elected on the Truman ticket, and cast his ballot for Thurmond in conformity with his pledge—volume 44, American Political Science Review, pages 86-87.

It might be argued that this amendment would repeal the binding custom by specifically stating that "pledged" electors are bound. It is silent as to other electors. This could be said to mean that other electors are not bound. The pertinent rule or guide to statutory construction is that in case of an enumeration in a constitution or statute, all things not enumerated are excluded. (Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.) Since pledged electors are enumerated, unpledged electors may be said to be excluded. Citations for this rule: J. D. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1943), volume II, section 4915, page 412; Earl P. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes (1940), section 195, page 334.

Unless the proposed amendment is clarified and strengthened on this point, the adoption of it might well weaken the existing practice and binding custom which, as the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] has pointed out, has so effectively resulted in over 12,000 electors following the will of the voters of their States.

In order to really understand the possibilities, which I hope and believe to be wrong, of the Mundt-Coudert plan, every one of us should read a book published in 1953, The American Electoral College—Caldwell, Idaho; Caxton Printers—written by Roger Lea MacBride, who advocates adoption of the Mundt plan precisely to end the popular election of the President. On pages 78-79, MacBride says that adoption of the district system would be the first step toward restoring the electoral college as a deliberative body. He advocates that, once this step is taken, party nominating conventions be prohibited, and that the duly chosen electors meet in convention for the nomination of presidential candidates, after which the electors would return to their States and cast their electoral votes. Mr. MacBride says:

> Any revival of the electoral college as a body to choose a President, influenced but not governed by the desires of the qualified voters, will await a general recognition of the desirability of such an institution. Adoption of the district system may increase the probability of such a development, and it is with this possibility in mind that I became fully and firmly convinced that the district system should and will be adopted into the Constitution.

Mr. President, if adoption of the Mundt-Coudert plan means that we would revive the electoral college as a deliberative body and take the right to elect a President away from the people, let us debate the real issue: Are we ready to turn the clock of democratic progress back 165 years?

Are we ready to repeal not only the 20th century, but the 19th century, as well, and go back into the womb of the 18th century?

PLAN WOULD PROMOTE GERRYMANDERING

A seventh evil which would arise from adoption of the Mundt-Coudert plan is that it would promote further gerrymandering. The gerrymandering problem is even now a serious one although a few States have equalized congressional districts during the past 20 years.

Let us look at a few examples from the 84th Congress. In Texas, as we have pointed out, the largest district has a population of 806,701 and the smallest only 227,735; in Georgia, the figures are 618,431 and 246,227; Michigan, 525,334 against 178,251; Illinois, 466,064 and 281,468; South Dakota, 493,641 and 159,099; Ohio, 545,644 and 226,341; New York, 393,130 and 297,131.

Let us examine this problem of gerrymandering in relation to the Mundt-Coudert plan. Advocates of the plan have said that gerrymandering can be easily remedied and that, therefore, the district system should not be rejected on this ground. Past experience and political realism indicate that the contrary is true. Robert G. Dixon, professor of political science at the University of Maryland, and an expert on this subject, says:

> The problem of gerrymandering is serious and virtually insurmountable.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a portion of the testimony given by Professor Dixon in the hearings on the bill, beginning on page 197, may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the portion of the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

> It may be conceded that under article I, section 4, of the Constitution—
>
> The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.
>
> Congress has power to regulate congressional districting by the States, and perhaps to draw the district lines itself. On this point the Supreme Court said in *Smiley* v. *Holm* (285 U. S. 355, 366-367 (1932)):
>
> "In exercising this power, the Congress may supplement these State regulations or may substitute its own. It may impose additional penalties for the violations of the State laws or provide independent sanctions. It has a general supervisory power over the whole subject."
>
> Presumably the Congress would have a similar regulatory or plenary power over the districts in which presidential electors were to be chosen, and if there were any doubt on this score it could be resolved by definite constitutional provision.
>
> Past experience indicates, however, that the fundamental problem is not one of power to correct gerrymandering but rather of willingness to exercise that power and to back it up with effective sanctions.
>
> From the census of 1870 to the census of 1910 the Federal reapportionment acts require the State legislatures to devise districts of equal population and contiguous territory, and after the census of 1900 the requirement of compactness was added. And yet, during this period, even though it preceded the big wave of urbanism, there were important disparities of population between districts inside many of the States. That the disparities were not greater than they were is to be attributed not so much to an attempt to abide by the equality requirement as to the fact that urbanism had not reached full flower.
>
> Examples of population disparities between districts under the 1910 census as given in Schmeckebier's Congressional Apportionment (Washington, D. C., Brookings Institution, 1941) are the following: Colorado, largest district, 228,444 and smallest district, 134,469; Connecticut, 250,182 and 190,403;

Illinois, 349,883 and 167,634; Louisiana, 234,382 and 165,563; New York, 300,000 and 194,708; Ohio, 264,297 and 164,474. A list covering all the States for the year 1897 is found in appendix I to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove v. Green (328 U. S. 549, 557–559 (1946)).

One method of compelling compliance with congressional regulations in this field would be for the House of Representatives to refuse to seat Congressmen from improperly devised districts. The House has never done this, although as Schmeckebier notes, the matter at least was discussed on 3 occasions: 1843, when 4 States did not use districts at all; 1901, a Kentucky district, and 1910, a Virginia district. In view of the interminable wrangles and interstate reprisals which would flow from a serious attempt of the House of Representatives to police a districting formula, this sanction appears inadvisable. The vital task of legislating might suffer.

Can the Federal courts be looked to for help in enforcing statutory or constitutional formulas for districting? Under present precedents the answer appears to be in the negative. In 1932 two Federal district courts invalidated State districting laws in Mississippi and Kentucky for noncompliance with the standards fixed in the congressional statute of 1911. But the Supreme Court reversed. The majority placed the decision on the ground that the 1911 law had expired, thus leaving open the question of whether the Federal courts would enforce congressional standards for districting. But four members of the Court, Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo, would have dismissed the suit for want of equity (*Wood* v. *Broom* (287, U. S. 1 (1932)); *Mahan* v. *Hume* (287, U. S. 8 (1932))). The question left open by *Wood* v. *Broom* now appears to be settled by the later cases of *Colegrove* v. *Green* (328 U. S. 549 (1946)) and *South* v. *Peters* (339 U. S. 276 (1950)).

For discussions of *Colegrove* v. *Green* see Burdette, the Illinois Congressional Redistricting Case, the American Political Science Review, volume 40 (October 1946), pages 958–962; note, Constitutional Right to Congressional Districts of Equal Population, Yale Law Journal, volume 56 (1946), pages 127–139.

Colegrove v. *Green* was a suit in Federal district court for a declaratory judgment that Illinois congressional districts were in violation of the Federal Reapportionment Act of 1911 and the Federal Constitution, and for an order restraining the holding of the 1946 congressional election on the basis of these districts.

The district court dismissed on authority of *Wood* v. *Broom*. The Supreme Court affirmed in a 4 to 3 decision. Three members of the majority, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, placed the affirmance on the broader ground of nonjusticiability; that is, resorted to the doctrine of political questions. Justice Frankfurter said that this issue was of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not mete for judicial determination (p. 552).

Further, he said:

"Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law" (pp. 553–554).

South v. *Peters* involved a challenge of the Georgia county unit system under the 14th and 17th amendments. In a per curiam rejection of the challenge the Supreme Court said:

"Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a State's geographic distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions" (p. 277).

It is also axiomatic that a court will not issue a mandamus or an injunction compelling a legislature to act or to desist. *Fergus* v. *Marks* (321 Ill. 510, 152 N. E. 557 (1926)); *McChord* v. *Louisville & N. R. Co.* (183 U. S. 483 (1902)). On the general doctrine of political questions in the Federal courts see Post, the Supreme Court and Political Questions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936). Also in point are Harris, The Judicial Power of the United States (Louisiana State University Press, 1940) and my own The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Federal Immunity Statutes, to appear this spring in the April and June issues of the George Washington Law Review. * * * I feel that the district system should be postponed—perhaps forever. The problem of gerrymandering, and by this I include of course the so-called silent gerrymander, i. e., that slow strangulation of metropolital political strength by simple failure to redistrict, is a virtually insoluble problem. The Federal judiciary will not, and probably should not, interfere even to enforce constitutional mandates.

The legislatures have the power, indeed, have always had the power. But the power of the rural and small-city legislative majorities naturally has not been modified by a desire for political immolation. It would be quixotic to expect otherwise, now or in the future. Likewise, it is unlikely that the problem of the gerrymander will be solved by mass population movement within the foreseeable future.

Mr. DOUGLAS. In summary, Mr. President, as Professor Dixon has said, Congress has never enforced effectively, and probably never will enforce penalties in an effective way. Moreover, we cannot look to the courts for relief, because the Supreme Court has ruled in Colegrove against Green that the gerrymander question is political and, therefore, non justiciable. This alone is a sufficient reason for rejecting the Mundt-Coudert plan.

IT WOULD HANDICAP REPUBLICANS

An eighth evil which would arise from operation of the Mundt-Coudert plan is that it creates all sorts of anomalies. First of all, the plan would tend to favor the party which failed to carry the State in the popular election. In 1952 for example, Eisenhower carried Tennessee, but he would have received only 5 electoral votes to Stevenson's 6. In 1948 Mr. Truman carried California and Ohio; but Mr. Dewey would have captured a majority of electoral votes in each of these States. Application of the Mundt-Coudert formula to the statistics for the last 10 elections produces dozens of anomalies similar to these examples.

The Mundt-Coudert plan, like the Lodge-Gossett plan, would make presidential elections closer contests by enlarging the electoral vote of the candidate who was defeated in the popular election.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a table of statistics which I have prepared on the electoral vote margin.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Electoral vote margin

Year	Present system	Mundt-Coudert plan	
		Minimum	Maximum
1952	353	219	219
1948	114	106	106
1944	333	61	199
1940	367	111	261
1936	515	293	449
1932	413	195	361
1928	357	167	323
1924	246	66	226
1920	277	91	273
1916	23	3	181

NOTE.—Because the popular vote for President has not been tabulated in a number of congressional districts, the electoral vote margin under the Mundt plan can be given only in terms of a minimum and maximum. In 1944, for example, Roosevelt would have had at least 37 and perhaps as many as 205 more electoral votes than Dewey would have had.

Source: Hearings, op. cit., p. 341.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, at best, this situation would merely enlarge the electoral vote consolation prize of the defeated candidate. At worst, it would enlarge the electoral vote of the candidate defeated in the popular election to the point that he could snatch electoral victory from the jaws of popular defeat. Perhaps, equally as bad, it would enlarge the electoral vote of the popularly defeated candidate sufficiently to throw the election into the Congress.

In speaking about the eighth evil of the Mundt-Coudert plan, let me say a word about how the plan might operate to the advantage of one party and the disadvantage of the other. In general, I think the plan would benefit almost nobody except the South. In Democratic years, we would trade large blocs of electoral votes for nothing. In Republican years, the Republican candidate would trade large blocs of northern electoral votes for a mere handful in the South. In 1952, for example, Eisenhower would have lost 58 northern and 9 southern electoral votes. In 1924, Mr. Coolidge would have traded somewhere between 95 and 177 northern electoral votes for 3 or 4 southern electoral votes.

This all brings me to a point about which I have heard much, namely, that the amendment before us would greatly handicap the Republican Party in years when the GOP polls a national plurality in the popular election. I am not here to promote the interests of the Republican Party. But I am here to defend our two-party system, and the Republican Party is a vital part of that system. I think there is a very real possibility that this plan would deprive the Republican Party of the presidency in years of Republican popular victory, because they would trade such large blocs of electoral votes in the North for so few in the South. The Lodge-Gossett plan is likely to be more unfair than the Mundt plan in this respect. I think, however, that the Mundt plan would also handicap the Republican candidate in this respect even though a majority of Northern States have Republican legislatures which could further gerrymander the Northern States in favor of the Republican Party.

THIRD-PARTY COMPLICATIONS

Let us look at this formula if a third-party complicated the situation. If a third-party candidate drew popular votes mainly from the Democratic candidate, such as Wallace did in 1948, the Republican could win more electoral votes under the present system than under either the Mundt-Coudert or Lodge-Gossett plans. For the present system allows the Republican to garner all of a State's electoral votes by polling a mere plurality of the popular vote. In 1948, for example, Dewey's 46.3 percent of the popular vote in New York gave him all 47 of that State's electoral votes. Under the Mundt-Coudert plan, however, Dewey would have received only 24 to Truman's 23 electoral votes. Under the Lodge-Gossett plan, he would have had a margin of only four-tenths of an electoral vote—21.6 to Truman's 21.2 and Wallace's 3.9.

Conversely, if there were a third-party candidate who drew a sufficient number of popular votes from the Republican candidate in normally Republican areas to reduce the Republican to second or third place, as La Follette did in some areas in 1924, the Republican would likely gain more electoral votes under the proposed amendment than under the present system. The Lodge-Gossett plan would benefit the Republican most if the third-party candidate's strength were spread throughout the State so that the Republican could carry only a few if any congressional districts. In Wisconsin, for example, in 1924, Coolidge was able to win a popular plurality in probably no more than one and certainly no more than 3 congressional districts. Consequently, he would have received 1, 2, or 3 electoral votes under the Mundt plan but would have received 4.9 electoral voes under the Lodge-Gossett plan and actually received none under the present system.

If a third-party candidate's strength were concentrated in only certain congressional districts in a normally Republican State, however, the Mundt plan would give the Republican more electoral votes than would the Lodge-Gossett plan. The result in Minnesota in 1924 gives an example. La Follette carried at least 2 and no more than 4 congressional districts and, consequently, would have received 2–4 electoral votes to Coolidge's 8–10. But Coolidge's 8–10 electoral votes under the Mundt plan would have been cut to 6.2 votes, and La Follette would have received 5.0 electoral votes under the Lodge-Gossett plan.

In considering the Mundt-Coudert plan, we are actually operating in the dark. The presidential vote has never been completely tabulated by congressional districts except for the two most recent elections.

On this point, let me quote from the testimony of Dr. Ruth Silva, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University. Professor Silva is the most skilled expert on the whole subject. I am quoting from the hearings, starting on page 342:

It is actually impossible to tell exactly how the Mundt plan might work, how it might affect party alinement in general, or how it might affect the fate of either major party until a more thorough statistical analysis has been made. This, in turn, will require a tabulation of the popular vote cast for each presidential candidate in each congressional district. It will also require making a statistical analysis of other elections. We need to know how the plan would operate if the South were not solid. Therefore, we should apply the Mundt-Coudert formula to the elections of 1864, 1868, 1872, and 1876. We should know exactly what would happen under the Mundt-Coudert plan if there developed a third-party which drew on Republican strength. Therefore, we should apply the Mundt formula to the elections of 1912 and 1924. Certainly, we ought to know how the Mundt formula would operate if there were a third-party candidate who drew votes from the Democratic candidate in non-metropolitan areas. Therefore, the formula should be applied to the election of 1892. Perhaps we should also know how the Mundt formula would have operated in the election of 1824.

If the Mundt-Coudert plan should be adopted without first applying the formula to a sufficient number of past elections to get some idea how the plan would work under various conditions, we are likely to find that we have opened a political Pandora's box. We have been told, however, that it is not necessary to tabulate the popular vote cast for each presidential candidate in each congressional district in order to apply the Mundt formula to past elections. For, one witness has said, we may safely assume that each political party would have elected one presidential elector for each House seat won. As a matter of fact, elaborate tabulations of electoral votes under the Mundt plan have been made on the basis of this assumption. In the following table is reprinted a part of such a tabulation:

Year	Republican	Democratic	Other	Total
1952	299 (375)	231 (156)	1 (0)	531
1948	203 (193)	289 (299)	39 (39)	531
1944	214	315	2	531
1940	182	344	5	531
1936	92	426	13	531
1932	128	398	5	531
1928	349	181	1	531
1924	317	207	7	531
1920	375	155	1	531
1916	251	273	7	531

NOTE.—Electors assumed elected where parties' Representatives were elected and States were carried by presidential candidates. (Congressional Directories and World Almanacs, 1935 and 1945 editions, the New York Times on 1948 election. Hearings on S. J. Res. 8, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 217.

The figures for 1952 and those in parentheses were supplied by Ruth C. Silva. The figures in parentheses are electoral votes won under Mundt-Coudert plan on the basis of tabulations of the actual popular vote for President in congressional districts.

It is submitted that tabulations such as the ones presented in the above table are not a satisfactory substitute for tabulating the actual vote cast for each presidential candidate in each congressional district. The weakness of assigning electorial votes on the basis of House seats won is shown in the assignment of electoral votes to third-party presidential candidates. In 1948, Thurmond would have received only 8 electoral votes for carrying 4 States according to the method used in the table. Yet 39 electoral votes were assigned to Thurmond in the table for no reason consistent with the method. This method of assigning electoral votes on the basis of House seats won means the assigning of electoral votes to third parties which had no presidential candidates. It means the assigning of electoral votes to third parties which actually endorsed a major party's presidential candidate. Such electoral votes, it seems, should be assigned to the major-party endorsed.

The fallacy of assigning electoral votes on the basis of congressional seats won is clear in 1952, when the presidential and congressional candidates of different parties carried 84 congressional districts. Thus, there would have been 84 errors in assigning electoral votes on the basis of House seats won. Some of these errors cancelled each other out, however, so that only 76 errors remained in the 1952 total given in the table. In 1948, the presidential and congressional candidates of different parties carried 100 congressional districts.

In defense of tabulating the electoral vote under the Mundt formula for past elections on the basis of House seats won, it has been said: "The assumption regarding district presidential electors is based on the fact that in New York and some other States the name of the party's candidate for district elector would appear on the voting machines right next to that of the party's candidate for Representative in Congress, the offices being arranged on the party's row on the voting machine in descending order from the statewide to the smallest constituency. * * *

"At first blush it may seem that the * * * (tabulations) should be based on the popular vote for President in congressional districts. However, reflection from common knowledge will support the view that such a basis would be a distortion due to the mere mechanics of ballot and voting-machine arrangements of candidates."

The mere mechanics of ballot and voting-machine arrangements of candidates will not insure that a party's candidate for Representative in Congress and its candidate for district elector will run together like siamese twins if the Mundt plan were adopted for the following six reasons:

1. Actually, 27 States controlling 363 electoral votes use the so-called presidential short ballot. In these 27 States the only change the Mundt plan would make would be that a popular vote for a presidential candidate would be tabulated as a vote for his party's candidate for district elector and its two or more candidates for electors at large instead of being tabulated as a vote for each of his party's candidates for elector in the entire State. If there is anything in the Mundt-Coudert plan which would require abolition of the presidential short ballot, adoption of the plan would reduce rather than increase the democratic character of presidential elections.

2. In 18 States controlling 252 electoral votes, candidates are arranged on the ballot according to the offices they seek rather than according to party affiliation. In all of these States except Pennsylvania, the voter would have to select his party's candidate for Congress and its candidate for district presidential elector from two separate groupings on the ballot. In Pennsylvania, the voter may vote a straight-party ticket by marking a single X in the party square or circle. Therefore, we cannot safely tabulate the electoral vote for past elections under the Mundt plan on the basis of House seats won.

3. All ballots are not arranged to encourage straight-party voting. In 17 States using the office-block type of ballot plus 5 States using the party-column or party-row ballot, there is no party square or circle on the ballot or party lever on the voting machine to encourage or facilitate straight-party voting. These 22 States control 256 electoral votes. This fact too shows the fallacy in tabulating electoral votes on the basis of congressional seats won.

4. At least one State (Michigan) facilitates splitting the ticket between the presidential candidate and the congressional-State ticket by providing the voter with a separate presidential ballot or a separate presidential lever on voting machines.

5. In New York, the name of the party's candidate for district elector probably would not appear on the voting machine right next to the party's candidate for Representative in Congress. The State legislature would probably continue to consider the presidential candidate as the leader of the statewide ticket and not merely as a candidate in the congressional district. As a matter of fact, many State officials doubtless hope to slide into office on the coattails of a popular presidential candidate. Consequently, the State law would probably continue to place the presidential candidate at the top of the ticket before the other statewide candidates and would not move his name down on the ballot to the district level.

6. Under the Mundt-Coudert plan, the voter would be voting for at least 3 candidates for presidential elector—1 in his congressional district and at least 2 in the State at large. Therefore, even under the New York State law mentioned above, it is likely that the courts would decide that the statewide electors were controlling and thus that the presidential candidate should be placed at the head of the ticket rather than next to the district congressional candidate.

These six points are quite irrelevant, of course, if adoption of the Mundt-Coudert plan meant abolition of the presidential short ballot and if it meant that the presidential elector were thought of as a lawful public officer and a candidate in his own right rather than a symbol for the presidential candidate. (See a recent Ohio ruling to this effect, 150 Ohio St. 127). Some advocates of the Mundt plan have said that adoption of the Mundt plan would mean these things. In fact, one advocate of the Mundt plan wrote a book supporting adoption of the district system for choosing presidential electors and making the electoral college a deliberative body which would elect the President. (Roger Lea MacBride, the American Electoral College (Caldwell, Idaho, Caxton Printers, 1953).)

Professor Silva has presented a sufficient amount of data to prove to me that we have no idea what we are playing with when we consider adoption of the Mundt-Coudert plan. Indeed, I agree with Representative JOE MARTIN and the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE] that we would be opening a political Pandora's box.

III–3. EVILS OF THE LODGE-GOSSETT PLAN

The other head of the two-headed hydra is the Lodge-Gossett plan. This plan would divide a State's electoral vote among the presidential candidates in proportion to their popular vote in that State. In 1952, for example, President Eisenhower in Pennsylvania polled 52.738 percent of the popular vote and won all 32 of Pennsylvania's electoral votes. Under the Lodge-Gossett formula, Eisenhower would have received only 52.738 percent, or 16.876 of Pennsylvania's electoral vote. This plan sounds reasonable on the face of it—so reasonable that I voted for this plan myself back in 1959. More careful study of the Lodge-Gossett plan, however, shows that it is full of snares and gimmicks—evil snares and gimmicks.

The Lodge-Gossett plan has many of the evils of the Mundt-Coudert plan:

First. It decreases the power of the large States. The electoral votes margin in New York, for example, would be reduced from 45 to something between one one-thousandth and 3 electoral votes.

Second. It would reduce the voice of urban areas in presidential elections and, consequently, in national politics.

Third. It would stack the cards against the Republican candidate, in my judgment. In translating popular votes into electoral votes, it would consistently magnify the Democratic vote and minimize the Republican vote.

Fourth. It would enhance the importance of the South in presidential elections and, consequently, in national politics.

Fifth. It would encourage further restriction of the franchise in the solid States.

Sixth. It would encourage disputed elections.

Now, I want to spell out these last four evils of the Lodge-Gossett plan—that it would handicap the Republican Party, put the South in the saddle, encourage restriction of the franchise, and promote election disputes.

It is true that there is now a disparity between the popular and electoral vote under the present system. In 1952, for example, President Eisenhower polled 55 percent of the popular vote, but carried 39 States and received 83 percent of the electoral vote. This exaggeration of the electoral vote is by no means an evil; in these troubled times, I think there is great psychological value in the electoral system which represents a fairly close victory as decisive. We Americans pride ourselves on accepting the result of a democratic election. That is, in part, a consequence of our electoral college system which magnifies the difference between the winner and the loser in the popular election—I think that is a good argument, although I personally favor a direct, popular election of the President. But the disparity between the electoral vote and the popular vote is caused by at least three factors in our present electoral system.

First is the allocation of electoral votes among the States on the basis of congressional representation. This magnifies the power of the small States. Today, the 9 most populous States, which have 51 percent of the population, have only 18 of the 96 electoral votes based on representation in the Senate. The other 39 States have the remaining 78 of these electoral votes. In 1948, for example, 1 electoral vote in California represented 395,040 people, in contrast to 1 of Nevada's electoral votes, which represented only 46,667 people. The Mundt-Coudert, Lodge-Gossett resolution does nothing to correct the anomalies caused by allocating electoral votes abong the States on the basis of congressional representation. New York, with a population of more than 81½ times that of Nevada, would continue to have only 15 times as many electoral votes as Nevada has—Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1955, page 15.

The second cause for discrepancy between the popular and electoral vote is the assignment of electoral votes to the States without regard to the popular vote. In 1952, for example, 1 electoral vote in Illinois represented 166,000 popular votes, whereas 1 electoral vote in Mississippi represented only 36,000 popular votes.

Therefore, 1 vote in Mississippi was worth 4.6 as much as 1 vote in Illinois; in Alabama, 4.3 times as much as 1 vote in Illinois; in South Carolina, 3.9; in Arkansas, 3.3; in Virginia, 3.2; in Georgia, 3.0; in Louisiana, 2.5; in Tennessee, 2.0; in Texas and North Carolina, 1.9; and in Florida, each vote was worth 1.7 times as much as a vote in Illinois. In the South as a whole, 1 vote in the 1952 presidential election was worth 2.5 times the value of 1 vote in Illinois.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a table showing the number of popular votes per electoral vote in 1952.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Number of popular votes per electoral vote in 1952

11 Southern States:	
Average	66,863
Alabama	38,727
Arkansas	50,625
Florida	93,900
Georgia	54,667
Louisiana	65,200
Mississippi	35,692
North Carolina	86,500
South Carolina	42,625
Tennessee	81,182
Texas	86,500
Virginia	51,667
5 Border States:	
Average	116,875
Kentucky	99,300
Maryland	100,222
Missouri	145,538
Oklahoma	118,625
West Virginia	109,250
32 Northern States:	
Average	133,490
California	160,688
Connecticut	137,125
Idaho	69,000
Indiana	150,385
Kansas	112,000
Massachusetts	148,938
Minnesota	125,364
Nebraska	101,667
New Hampshire	68,250
New Mexico	59,750
North Dakota	67,500
Oregon	115,833
Rhode Island	103,500
Utah	82,500
Washington	122,556
Wyoming	43,000
Arizona	65,250
Colorado	105,000
Delaware	58,000
Illinois	165,965
Iowa	126,900
Maine	70,400
Michigan	139,950
Montana	66,250
Nevada	27,333
New Jersey	151,250
New York	158,400
Ohio	148,040
Pennsylvania	143,156
South Dakota	73,500
Vermont	51,333
Wisconsin	133,917
United States	115,917

Tabulated from data in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1955, pp. 332 and 334.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, the amendment before us would do nothing to remedy this cause for disparity between the popular and electoral vote. An electoral vote in the 32 Northern States would continue to represent twice as many popular votes as a Southern electoral vote.

The third cause for the discrepancy between the popular and electoral vote is the present general ticket system, whereby the candidate with the popular plurality in a State receives all of that State's electoral vote. This third cause for disparity would be changed by the Mundt-Coudert, Lodge-Gossett plan. Now, under the Lodge-Gossett plan, the Democrats could win more electoral votes per million popular votes than could the Republicans. When the Republicans poll enough votes in the North to obtain a national plurality in the popular election, the present system allows the GOP to acquire large blocs of Northern electoral votes to offset the Democratic advantage in the South. The point is that, with our sectional pattern of politics and our 48 different sets of suffrage qualifications, the general ticket system in Republican years corrects the disparity caused by magnifying the electoral power of the South. By abolishing the general ticket system, the Lodge-Gossett plan would correct that part of the disparity between the popular and electoral vote which favors the Republicans when they win the popular election, without correcting that part of the disparity which favors the Democrats. Although I am not here to further the interests of the Republican Party, I do not want to adopt a system which would deny them the presidency when they poll a majority of the popular vote. I want to play under fair rules. I do not want the Democrats to win the game with loaded dice, nor the Republicans, nor States Righters, nor any group or faction. Advocates of the Mundt-Coudert, Lodge-Gossett plan say a great deal about how the general ticket system denied the presidency to the candidate with the most popular votes in 1824, 1876, and 1888. These three cases, and a number of others, require examination.

Critics of the present electoral college system claim that the general ticket system defeated Andrew Jackson, the peoples' choice in 1824, and gave victory to John Quincy Adams in the electoral college. The answers to this are three:

One. We do not know that Jackson was the people's choice in 1824 for the following reasons:

There was a 4-way split in the popular vote, and Jackson polled only 43 percent of that vote.

And in six States, which contained one-fourth of the population of the United States, the legislature appointed the electors, and no popular votes were cast.

In North Carolina, approximately 5,000 votes which were probably pro-Adams were cast for the Jackson-Adams fusion ticket and are incorrectly credited to Jackson.

Furthermore, a very small proportion of the adult population voted in the 18 States where popular elections were held.

Also, Adams ran against Jackson in only 11 of the 18 States where popular elections were held. We have no way of knowing what the popular election returns might have been if Jackson had run against Adams in a 2-way contest in all 24 States.

Two. Jackson did better in the 18 States where popular elections were held under the system used than he would have under the Lodge-Gossett formula. Jackson's electoral vote margin in these 18 States would have been only 11.6 under the Lodge-Gossett plan instead of 36 under the system used. Thus, Jackson would have been worse off by 24.4 electoral votes if the Lodge-Gossett plan had been used in 1824.

Three. Adams was elected in the House of Representatives, not in the electoral college. There were at least five factors other than the general ticket system which contributed to Jackson's defeat in 1824:

The Constitution requires that a candidate receive a majority of the electoral vote in order to win the presidency but Jackson received only 38 percent of the electoral vote.

Another factor which contributed to Jackson's defeat was the constitutional provision for election by a "lame duck" House of Representatives in which voting was by States. Moreover, even if the Members of the House had voted as individuals rather than by States, Adams would still have had a plurality—but not a majority—in the House.

A third factor which may have helped Adams win the Presidency was the political maneuvering in the House. On the other hand, one might well argue that this maneuvering redounded to Jackson's advantage.

Still a fourth factor which contributed to Jackson's defeat was the fact that Clay threw his support in the House to Adams.

Finally, the electors chosen by districts and those appointed by the State legislatures favored Adams over Jackson, a fact which suggests that the Mundt-Coudert plan would have defeated Jackson more decisively.

These five factors, rather than the general ticket system, defeated Jackson in 1824. In summary, Jackson would have had less than a majority of the electoral votes under the present proposal and the election would have been thrown into Congress. The votes in the House were 87 for Adams, 71 for Jackson, and 54 for Clay. It is mere optimistic speculation to assume that the 54 votes for Clay and the 48 senatorial votes would have been cast so as to have given Jackson the requisite 131 votes.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a table showing the popular vote, the electoral vote, and the vote in the House in the election of 1824.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Election of 1824

Candidate	Popular vote	Electoral vote					Vote in House	
		GT	D	L	Total	L–G plan	Members	States
Adams	114,023	37	11	36	84	62,399	87	13
Jackson	152,901	75	9	15	99	73,984	71	7
Crawford	46,979	24	1	16	41	31,997	54	4
Clay	47,217	16	17	4	37	21,792		
Uncertain						71,000		
Total	361,120	152	38	71	261	261,172	212	24

GT—Electors chosen by general ticket system.
D—Electors chosen in districts.
L—Electors appointed by State legislatures.
L–G—Electoral vote under Lodge-Gossett formula.

Sources: Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency (Boston, 1904), pp. 133–140; Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington, 1949), p. 288.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, critics of the present electoral college system claim that the general ticket system defeated Samuel J. Tilden, the peoples' choice at the polls, and gave victory in the electoral college to Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876.

The general ticket system seems to have had little to do with the election of 1876. Fraud and violence attended the popular voting in both North and South. The methods by which Tilden won his popular plurality are not above reproach. Hayes probably would have won a free popular election, but an honest count of the votes actually cast would have given the Presidency to Tilden. Actually, nobody knows how Tilden would have fared under the Mundt-Coudert plan, since the presidential vote in 1876 has never been tabulated by congressional districts. Probably the most that can be said for the Lodge-Gossett plan in connection with 1876 is that it would have permitted Tilden's spurious plurality to have won the Presidency for him.

There are at least seven factors other than the general ticket system which contributed to Tilden's defeat in 1876.

First, the failure of the Democrats in their efforts to bribe a Hayes elector to vote for Tilden.

Second, two electoral colleges met in Oregon because the Democratic Governor used highhanded methods against the Republican electors chosen at the popular election.

Third, in South Carolina, the Democrats complained because the Army of Reconstruction was stationed near the polls. The Democrats refused to recognize the choice of Republican electors, saying there had been no free election.

Therefore, two electoral colleges met in this State as well.

Fourth. In Florida, the number of legal votes cast for electors was in dispute. There were two sets of election returns and allegations of fraud and manipulation of returns on both sides.

Fifth. In Louisiana, there was anarchy—2 Governors, 2 returning boards, 2 sets of returns showing different results, and 2 electoral colleges.

Sixth. The carpetbaggers, scalawags, and Union Army seemed to have perpetrated fraud and intimidation for the Republicans, while Dixie Democrats used Ku Klux Klan methods to intimidate Republican voters.

Seventh. The Electoral Commission, consisting of 8 Republicans and 7 Democrats, gave the Presidency to Hayes by a vote of 8 to 7.

In summary, Tilden was defeated, not by the general ticket system, but by disputed election returns and by a Republican majority on the Electoral Commission which settled the disputed returns. Although nobody knows how the Mundt-Coudert plan would have operated in 1876, one thing is sure: The Lodge-Gossett plan is no guaranty against disputed election returns. Indeed, the operation of the Lodge-Gossett formula is likely to increase the possibility of contested returns. For elections would become closer contests as a result of dividing the electoral votes in each State. In 1900, for example, there would have been a margin of only one-tenth of an electoral vote. Thus, a few hundred popular votes, properly distributed, could determine the outcome. Such a situation is quite likely to give rise to election disputes, re-counts, fraud, and precisely the sort of thing that confused the picture in 1876—Haworth, The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Election of 1876, Cleveland, 1906; United States Electoral Commission, The Electoral Count of 1877, Washington, 1877.

Critics of the general ticket system are on a little firmer ground when they point to the election of 1888. If the Lodge-Gossett plan had been in effect and if its operation had not altered the popular vote, Grover Cleveland's popular margin of 95,713 would have put him in the White House. Remember, however, that Cleveland did not poll a majority of the popular vote, only 48.678 percent; and his popular margin was less than 1 percent. Moreover, application of the Lodge-Gossett formula to the popular vote in 1880, 1892, 1896, 1900, 1908, 1912, 1924, and 1948 would have given no candidate a majority of the electoral votes; and the election would have been thrown into Congress. In two of these elections, 1880 and 1896, the Republican, who won the popular plurality, would have received fewer electoral votes than would his Democratic rival. In four of these elections—1896, 1900, 1908, and 1924—the Republican candidate polled not merely a popular plurality but an absolute majority of the popular vote.

A few simple calculations show that the Lodge-Gossett plan will handicap the Republicans as long as the South remains comparatively solid and southern suffrage continues to be restricted. The difference between each major party's percentage of the popular vote and its percentage of the electoral vote under the Lodge formula is revealing.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a table relating to this question.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Year	Lodge-Gossett plan, electoral vote	Popular vote	Difference
	Percent	*Percent*	
DEMOCRATIC PARTY			
1880	49.295	48.225	+1.070
1884	50.000	48.842	+1.158
1888	50.599	48.658	+1.941
1892	45.653	46.119	−.466
1896	49.508	46.824	+2.684
1900	48.591	45.530	+3.061
1904	37.605	37.597	+.008
1908	46.977	43.051	+3.926
1912	46.460	41.821	+4.639
1916	53.540	49.265	+4.275
1920	40.038	34.666	+5.372
1924	36.045	28.828	+7.217
1928	43.616	40.793	+2.823
1932	61.695	57.411	+4.284
1936	64.087	60.194	+3.893
1940	58.380	53.847	+4.533
1944	55.499	51.644	+3.855
1948	49.190	49.363	−.173
1952	45.469	44.377	+1.092
REPUBLICAN PARTY			
1880	47.453	48.308	−0.855
1884	47.307	48.215	−.098
1888	46.334	47.817	−1.483
1892	41.937	43.100	−1.163
1896	48.166	50.934	−2.768
1900	48.613	51.699	−3.086
1904	56.408	56.412	−.004
1908	47.785	51.581	−3.796
1912	21.450	23.178	−1.728
1916	41.827	46.058	−4.231
1920	56.478	61.237	−4.759
1924	48.738	54.054	−5.316
1928	54.972	58.110	−3.138
1932	35.706	39.651	−3.945
1936	33.070	36.539	−3.469
1940	40.414	44.770	−4.356
1944	42.147	45.869	−3.722
1948	41.902	44.988	−3.086
1952	54.531	54.879	−.348

LODGE-GOSSETT FAVORS DEMOCRATS

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, as I look at these Lodge-Gossett figures for the last 19 elections, I notice that, in 17 of the 19 elections, the Democratic candidate would have received a larger electoral vote under the Lodge-Gossett plan than he was entitled to by his percentage of the popular vote. Conversely, the Republican's portion of the electoral vote would have been smaller than his portion of the popular vote in all 19 elections.

The Lodge-Gossett formula would handicap the Republicans because the Democrats could secure large blocs of electoral votes in the South, where relatively few popular votes will capture an electoral vote. In contrast, the Republicans would have to win the bulk of their electoral votes in the North, where more popular votes are required to gain an electoral vote. As shown in this table, which I shall ask to have inserted in the RECORD, Democratic leverage under the plan varies directly with southern solidarity and/or inversely with southern participation in the popular election. In other words, the more solid the South is and the fewer the southerners who vote in the popular election, the more the Lodge-Gossett formula will magnify Democratic strength.

I ask unanimous consent to have the table printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD. as follows:

Year	Democratic advantage taken from the previous table	Southern solidarity (in percentage)[1]	Comparative southern popular participation [2]
1880	+1.070	59.75	75.74
1884	+1.158	61.41	73.92
1888	+1.941	63.45	69.33
1892	−.466	61.47	70.31
1896	+2.684	66.33	65.58
1900	+3.061	66.27	53.76
1904	+.008	70.33	40.43
1908	+3.926	68.02	42.88
1912	+4.639	70.94	43.19
1916	+4.275	74.73	42.54
1920	+5.372	67.55	41.22
1924	+7.217	70.36	36.63
1928	+2.823	57.18	38.62
1932	+4.284	83.27	40.66
1936	+3.893	83.07	39.18
1940	+4.533	80.44	40.18
1944	+3.855	73.66	41.28
1948	−.173	45.03	43.91
1952	+1.092	53.16	57.65

[1] "Southern solidarity" is an average percentage of the popular vote polled by Democrats in the Southern States, weighting each State according to its electoral vote. This method must be used because it makes a great difference whether the Democrats poll 95 percent of the popular vote in a State with 3 or 23 electoral votes. The rank-difference coefficient of correlation between southern solidarity and Democratic advantage under the Lodge Gossett plan is 0.588. The 11 Southern States are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

[2] Popular participation in the South compared to that in other States is a relation between the percent of the national popular vote polled in the South and the percent of the total electoral vote cast by the South. Popular participation in the South for 1924, for example, was measured as 36.63 percent, which means that, if the election had been determined by the nationwide popular vote regardless of State lines, the South would have had only 36.63 percent of the power she actually had in choosing the President. The rank-difference coefficient of correlation between Democratic advantage under the Lodge Gossett plan and popular participation in the South is negative 0.568; the coefficient of multiple correlation between Democratic advantage, Southern solidarity, and comparative Southern popular participation (R1.23) is 0.684 (hearings, p. 336).

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, the Republican disadvantage under the Lodge-Gossett formula is not due to the magnified electoral power of the small States which results from giving the constant two electoral votes to all of the States and from giving one additional elector to Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming, which do not always have the population quota requisite for the election of one Representative in all other States. Actually, the small States' electoral vote is usually rather evenly divided between our two major parties. If the magnified electoral power of the small States were the cause of the Republican handicap under the Lodge plan, we could expect the Democratic advantage to increase in proportion to the number of States carried under the Lodge formula. Actually, the correlation is so small as to indicate neither a direct nor inverse relation between the Democratic advantage and the number of States carried under the Lodge plan. Professor Ruth Silva found the rank-difference coefficient of correlation for the Republicans to be only negative 0.063 and only positive 0.114 for the Democrats—volume 44, American Political Science Review, page 94, note.

It is revealing to compare electoral-vote percentages under the Lodge formula with popular-vote percentages for a period when the South was not so solid.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point a table on that matter.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Year	Percent of electoral vote under Lodge plan	Percent of popular vote	Deviation
DEMOCRATIC PARTY			
1864	44.292	44.940	−0.648
1868	45.986	47.332	−1.346
1872	43.470	43.823	−.353
1876	50.976(?)	50.933(?)	+.043
REPUBLICAN PARTY			
1864	55.708	55.060	+0.648
1868	54.014	52.668	+1.346
1872	56.011	55.621	+.390
1876	47.995(?)	47.951(?)	+.044

Silva, 44 American Political Science Review 96.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, to the elections of 1864, 1868, 1872, and 1876, we may add two others. The Democrats would have suffered a disadvantage under the Lodge formula in 1892, when the Populists polled a sizable part of a relatively large popular vote in the South, and in 1948, when the States Rights Party invaded southern democracy.

The reason for the Republican handicap under the Lodge-Gossett plan can be seen in the 1952 election. President Eisenhower received more popular votes that did any presidential candidate in American history. Although he would have been elected under the Lodge-Gossett plan—288.457 electoral votes to Stevenson's 240.241—the Lodge formula would have defeated him in spite of his popular majority, if the South had continued its customary voting habits in 1952. The average number of electoral votes given to the Republican candidate by the 11 Southern States under the Lodge formula in 8 previous elections, 1916 to 1948, was 27.9. In 1952, however, Eisenhower would have received 59.8 electoral votes in the 11 Southern States. Thus, Eisenhower's share of the southern electoral votes was 32 more than the average of previous Republican candidates. If 26 of these 32 electoral votes had gone to Stevenson, in conformity with tradition, Stevenson would have been elected with 266.241 electoral votes to Eisenhower's 262.457. In 1952, one southern electoral vote represented 66-, 863 popular votes. Therefore, Stevenson could have won an additional 26 Southern electoral votes by polling approximately 1,738,000 more popular votes in that area. The Lodge-Gossett plan would have allowed such a shift of 1,738,000 popular votes from Eisenhower to Stevenson in the South to have elected Stevenson, although Eisenhower still would have had a nationwide popular margin of nearly 3 million. In other words, the Lodge-Gossett formula would have defeated Eisenhower, the candidate who had an absolute majority of the popular vote.

One of the authors of this plan, former Senator Lodge, has said that the plan would not harm the Republican Party, because it would have given Thomas E. Dewey more electoral votes in 1948 than he actually received. Yes, it would have enlarged Dewey's electoral-vote consolation prize; but he would have lost the election nevertheless. Actually, the Lodge formula would also have given the Republican candidates more electoral votes in 1884, 1892, 1912, 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944—all elections which they would have lost in any case. The same would be true for the Democrat in those elections in which the Democrat met popular defeat—Hearings on House Joint Resolution 2, 81st Congress, 1st session, page 99. In general, it would enlarge the vote of the losing candidate; and in the case of a popularly defeated Democrat, it would enlarge his electoral vote sufficiently to endanger a Republican electoral victory in spite of the Republican popular victory.

LODGE-GOSSETT WOULD NOT PROMOTE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE SOUTH

Sponsors of this resolution have objected to applying the Lodge-Gossett or Mundt-Coudert formula to the statistics of past elections. "The candidates, the issues, and the popular vote would have been different," they say, "if our proposal had been in operation." This may be true: there might have been 3, rather than 2, major party candidates; the problems of the large States and big cities might have been ignored; and at least 2 of the candidates might have been more conservative—1 might even have been a South Carolinian. I am not willing to agree, however, that the Lodge-Gossett plan would produce a Republican-Democratic-two-party system in the South.

The Republicans have no power in southern legislatures to enfranchise the Negroes and poor whites. As a matter of fact, I believe that those who now control southern legislatures would tighten up suffrage qualifications if they were threatened with a split in a State's electoral vote. Surely, those in control of southern legislatures would not extend the franchise to people who would use the vote to threaten their supremacy. In any case, as I said before, southern legislatures met the agrarian and populist challenge with a program of systematic disfranchisement.

Sponsors of this resolution claim that more southerners would vote in presidential elections because operation of the Lodge-Gossett plan would miraculously create real contests in the South. In other words, they argue that there are a number of southern Republicans who just do not bother to vote under the present system but who would vote in huge numbers if the Lodge plan were adopted. Well, first of all, I think southern legislatures would adopt the Mundt plan, rather than the Lodge plan, for reasons which I shall explain later.

Moreover, where would Republican votes come from in the South? I suppose the Republican Party might appeal to the southern racist who may not bother to vote now. That, however, would endanger the GOP's liberal and Negro support in the rest of the Nation. Can you not just imagine, Mr. President, what would happen to the Republican Party in the North if its presidential candidate approved racial segregation in order to woo southern voters. The other possibility is that the Republican Party might appeal to southern Negroes and poor whites. The trouble is that most of these people cannot vote. Furthermore, appeal to southern Negroes and liberals would alienate the conservatives to whom Republican economic and fiscal policy is most likely to appeal. Would not the Democratic South have trapped the Republican Party in a real box? Really, does not it sound foolish to speculate about where the Republicans can win more votes in the South? I think it does, because all of us are political realists enough to know that adoption of the Lodge plan will not produce southern Republicans.

During hearings on the Lodge-Gossett plan in the last four Congresses, several southerners said that adoption of the Lodge plan would not enlarge the Republican percentage of the southern vote. If this is true, as I believe it is, and if southern participation in popular elections remains limited, as I believe it will, then the Republican Party would be almost forced to try to decrease the South's voice in the electoral college, through enforcement of the second section of the 14th amendment. I think the Republican Party would be forced to this as a matter of sheer self defense.

In the absence of action to reduce the southern electoral vote, adoption of the Lodge-Gossett plan would increase the importance of the South in national politics. I have before me some figures showing the southern electoral vote and the margin of electoral victory in the past 19 elections. I ask unanimous consent that this table be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The southern electoral vote and the margin of victory in presidential elections, 1880–1952

Year	Present system			Lodge-Gossett plan			Year	Present system			Lodge-Gossett plan		
	Winner	Electoral votes in excess of majority	Southern votes for winner	Winner	Electoral votes in excess of majority	Southern votes for winner		Winner	Electoral votes in excess of majority	Southern votes for winner	Winner	Electoral votes in excess of majority	Southern votes for winner
1880	Republican	29	0	(1)	−9.4	56.8	1920	Republican	138	12	Republican	34.4	40.0
1884	Democrat	18	107	Democrat	0	65.7	1924	do	116	0	(1)	−6.7	31.1
1888	Republican	32	0	do	2.4	67.9	1928	do	178	62	Republican	26.4	53.4
1892	Democrat	54	112	(1)	−19.3	68.9	1932	Democrat	206	124	Democrat	$62.1	103.3
1896	Republican	47	0	(1)	−2.2	74.3	1936	do	257	124	do	74.8	103.0
1900	do	68	0	(1)	−6.2	34.6	1940	do	183	124	do	44.5	98.7
1904	do	4	0	Republican	30.5	29.5	1944	do	166	127	do	29.2	93.5
1908	do	79	0	(1)	−10.7	33.1	1948	do	37	88	(1)	−4.3	57.2
1912	Democrat	169	126	(1)	−18.8	89.4	1952	Republican	176	57	Republican	23.0	59.8
1916	do	11	126	Democrat	18.8	94.2							

[1] Election by Congress: 1880, 1892, 1896, 1900, 1908, 1912, 1924, and 1948. This table was taken from p. 338 of the hearings but adapted to fit the Mundt-Lodge-Gossett substitute, which requires a majority of the electoral vote in order to be elected.

The 11 Southern States are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, and Virginia.

DANIEL PROPOSAL INCREASES POWER OF SOUTH

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, these statistics show that, under the present system, the 11 Southern States held a balance of power in only 4 of the last 19 presidential elections—only in 1884, 1892, 1916, and 1948. In contrast, the Daniel version of the Lodge-Gossett plan, with the majority electoral-vote requirement, would have made Southern electoral votes absolutely necessary for victory in every election except the one in 1904. In all the other elections, the withholding of southern electoral votes from the popular victor would have meant his certain defeat in the electoral college.

This would give to a minority—southern whites—an influence in presidential elections which would far exceed the influence of any metropolitan minority today. The fact is that Republicans and northern Democrats would be at the mercy of the South in national politics.

THE LOST-VOTE FALLACY

Sponsors of the Mundt-Lodge-Gossett resolution make a great deal out of what they call "lost votes" or votes "counted for the opposition." The argument runs something like this: Stevenson polled 90,000 votes in South Dakota, but all of South Dakota's electoral votes were cast for Eisenhower. Therefore, they argue that Stevenson's 90,000 votes were lost or counted for Eisenhower. Under their resolution, however, Eisenhower's 55 percent of the popular vote in the Nation might well have been lost if the Lodge formula had been used in the 39 Eisenhower States and the Mundt formula had been applied in the 9 Stevenson States, with Congress deciding who should be the President. What of the defeated majority with 55 percent of the popular vote?

I cannot be disturbed over this argument of lost votes. I think it is naive and without reason or logic. In every election, where there can be only a single winner, all votes cast for the losing candidate can be labelled either "lost" or "counted for the winner." The Mundt-Coudert plan would merely transfer the winner-take-all rule from the State level to the congressional district. The votes cast for the candidate who failed to carry the congressional district could be called either "lost" or "counted for the candidate" who did carry the district. The Lodge-Gossett plan would merely transfer these so-called lost votes from the State to the national level. As former Senator Homer Ferguson has said, "the truth is that no votes are lost when validly cast in an election. They are actually counted toward the final decision; and, if insufficient for victory, they have simply exhausted their power as votes."

III–4. FIFTY PERCENT OF ELECTORAL VOTE NEEDED TO ELECT

In the substitute Daniel-Mundt-Kefauver amendment, Mr. President there is one provision which is perhaps the most dangerous proposal to our electoral system which has been seriously offered in many years. That is the proposal that if any candidate fails to receive a majority of the electoral vote, the Congress will meet to decide the issue. The language of the proposal reads as follows:

> The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, and the person having the greatest number of votes for Vice President shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electoral votes."

UNDER PRESENT PROPOSAL ALMOST HALF OF ELECTIONS SINCE 1880 WOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY CONGRESS

Mr. President, I believe the method by which this amendment proposes to settle the election of a President, once it is thrown into Congress for decision, is an improvement over the present system in which each State is given one vote in the House. What the proponents of the proposal have overlooked—or perhaps some of them have not overlooked it—is that almost half the elections since 1880 would have been thrown into Congress for decision, if the Lodge-Gossett amendment had been operating. Furthermore, Mr. President, had the plan been in operation in these years, third parties would have been in a much stronger strategic position than at the present time, and one can only be led to the belief that all or almost all of the elections would have been decided by the Congress.

Mr. President, this on the face of it is such a ridiculous proposal that this fact alone should lead the Senate at least to recommit the proposal until the Committee has had time to study its full implications.

Now for the proof.

First, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a table which shows the total popular vote and the actual electoral vote by number and percentage for the Democrats and Republicans from the election of 1880 to that of 1952.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Popular vote and electoral vote of presidential candidates, 1880–1952

Year	Popular vote				Actual electoral vote					
	Republican		Democratic		Republican		Democratic		Other	
	Number (1000)	Percent	Number (1000)	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1880	4,454	48.3	4,445	48.2	214	58.0	155	42.0		
1884	4,852	48.3	4,874	48.5	182	45.4	219	54.6		
1888	5,444	47.8	5,540	48.7	233	58.1	168	41.9		
1892	5,191	43.1	5,554	46.1	145	32.7	277	62.6	22	5.0
1896	7,036	50.9	6,468	46.8	271	60.6	176	39.4		
1900	7,220	51.7	6,358	45.5	292	65.3	155	34.7		
1904	7,629	56.4	5,084	37.6	336	70.6	140	29.4		
1908	7,679	51.6	6,409	43.1	321	66.5	162	33.5		
1912	3,484	23.2	6,286	41.8	8	1.5	435	81.9	88	16.6
1916	8,534	46.1	9,128	49.3	254	47.9	277	52.1		
1920	16,147	60.2	9,141	34.1	404	76.1	127	23.9		
1924	15,725	54.1	8,387	28.8	382	71.9	136	25.6	13	2.5
1928	21,391	58.1	15,016	40.8	444	83.6	87	16.4		
1932	15,762	39.7	22,822	57.4	59	11.1	472	88.9		
1936	16,680	36.5	27,477	60.2	8	1.5	523	98.5		
1940	22,304	44.8	26,827	53.8	82	15.4	449	84.6		
1944	22,006	45.9	24,777	51.6	99	18.6	432	81.4		
1948	21,969	45.0	24,106	49.4	189	35.6	303	57.1	39	7.3
1952	33,779	54.9	27,315	44.4	442	83.2	89	16.8		

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, we should note that in the elections of 1880, 1884, 1888, 1892, 1912, 1916, and 1948 the Presidents were elected with less than a majority of the popular votes cast for all candidates. Because of the existing electoral system, however, less than a majority of the popular vote, nevertheless, produced a sizable majority in the electoral vote.

Thus Garfield, in 1880, with 48.3 percent of the popular vote to 48.2 percent for Hancock, won by an electoral margin of 214 to 155, or by 58 percent to 42 percent in the electoral college. In 1884 Cleveland received 48.5 percent of the popular vote to Blaine's 48.3 percent; but Cleveland had an electoral margin of 219 to 182, or 54.6 percent to 45.4 percent. In 1888, of course, Harrison, with fewer popular votes than Cleveland—he received 47.8 percent to Cleveland's 48.7 percent—nonetheless, received 233 electoral votes to Cleveland's 168, or 58.1 percent to 41.9 percent of the electoral vote. In 1892 Cleveland received 46.1 percent of the popular vote to 43.1 for Benjamin Harrison and won by 277 to 145 in the electoral college, or by 62.6 percent of the electoral votes, to 32.7 percent of the electoral votes for Harrison. James P. Weaver, the Populist candidate, received over 1 million votes, about one-ninth of the total, but got only 22 electoral votes, or one-half of 1 percent.

Further, in 1912, Woodrow Wilson won only 41.8 percent of the popular vote, but 81.9 percent of the electoral vote, because of the Taft-Roosevelt split in the Republican Party. In 1916 Wilson got less than 50 percent of the popular vote, 49.3 percent; and Hughes received 46.1 percent. Wilson won the election with 277 electoral votes to 254 for Hughes, or by a 52 to 48 percent margin in the electoral college.

Finally, in 1948, President Truman got only 49.4 percent of the popular vote to Dewey's 45 percent; yet President Truman won in the electoral college by 303 to 189, with another 39 votes going to Thurmond. Truman's electoral percent was 57.1 to 35.6 for Dewey and 7.3 percent for Thurmond.

PRESENT SYSTEM PRODUCES DECISIVE RESULTS

The point of these figures, Mr. President, is this—and I do not rise to blame the system, but to praise it—that without the present electoral system, which produces decisive electoral victories with only small popular victories, the office and power and prestige of the Presidency would suffer irremedial harm. Our people would be less willing to accept electoral decisions. The President would be in a weak position. The country would be divided and there would be constant and continuous bickering over the results. I believe it is a healthy thing to have the winner receive an electoral vote larger than his popular majority or plurality. I believe this is good; and without it there would have been great division in the country in almost all the elections in which the popular vote was close or in which the winner received only a plurality rather than a majority.

Mr. DUFF. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am glad to yield to the very able Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. DUFF. Is not one of the great difficulties of this proposal that at a time when decisiveness is necessary in a critical world situation, we might very well have a critical world situation and also a lack of decision in the United States, when decision is vital to the welfare of the free world?

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator from Pennsylvania is exactly correct. Even if the election were not thrown into the Congress, if the vote were close, the prestige of the incoming administration would be damaged. If the election were thrown into the Congress, particularly if there were a third party, no one would be able to state what would happen, and the Government would be greatly weakened. The Senator from Pennsylvania is completely correct.

I rise to point this out, Mr. President, because of what I believe is an irremedial flaw in the plan produced by the Senators from Texas, South Dakota, and South Carolina. When we have opposed this plan on grounds that the Mundt-Coudert half of it, based on the unit vote in congressional districts, would introduce into the presidential electroal system the same unfair and unrepresentative features which already exist in the way in which congressional districts are apportioned, we have been told that the Mundt-Coudert portion of it probably would not be accepted by many States. Thus, it is claimed that the Lodge-Gossett or proportional system would be almost the universal choice of the individual States.

Personally, I do not agree with that point, inasmuch as I believe that the States would choose the plan most advantageous to each of them, and that States would in fact, shift back and forth to further the designs of the party or regime in control in each of the States. Although as a matter of fact, later I hope to demonstrate that probably the pressures which would be applied would be such that a majority of the States would choose the Mundt-Coudert system, nevertheless suppose we accept the verdict that the Senator from Texas has advanced, namely, that the Lodge-Gossett or proportional system would be used by almost all States. I do not think that would happen, but let us assume that it did happen. In that event, I believe it would bring even more devastating results than thoses which would be brought about by the Mundt-Coudert system, as now proposed.

LODGE-GOSSETT METHOD UNWORKABLE

First, all of us know that under the Lodge-Gossett system the electoral vote, at least for the two large parties, would parallel the popular vote more closely than would occur under the present system. For example, in 1952 the popular vote was divided 54.879 percent for Eisenhower, and 44.377 percent for Mr. Stevenson. Under the Lodge-Gossett proportional method of dividing the electoral vote, Eisenhower would have received 54.531 percent of the electoral vote, and Stevenson 45.467 percent of the electoral vote. Actually, Candidate Eisenhower received 442 electoral votes to 89 for Governor Stevenson, or 83 percent of their number.

Therefore, under the Lodge-Gossett system, the electoral vote parallels rather closely the popular vote. Since 1880, under the Lodge-Gossett plan, the greatest deviation of the electoral vote from the actual popular vote for the Democrats would have been plus 7.2 percent in 1924; and for the Republicans, minus 5.3 percent in the same year. In most elections, however, the deviation of electoral vote percentage from the popular vote percentage under the Lodge-Gossett method would have been only 1 to 2 to 3 percent.

In the hearings on page 335, in the very brilliant testimony of Dr. Ruth Silva, there is a table which applies the Lodge-Gossett method to all the presidential elections beginning with the one in 1880. The table applies the Lodge-Gossett system to our past elections. I ask unanimous consent that the table be inserted at this point in the RECORD, as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Year	Democratic Party			Republican Party		
	Lodge-Gossett plan electoral vote percent	Popular vote percent	Difference	Lodge-Gossett plan electoral vote percent	Popular vote percent	Difference
1880	49.295	48.225	+1.070	47.453	48.308	−0.855
1884	50.000	48.842	+1.158	47.307	48.215	−.908
1888	50.599	48.658	+1.941	46.334	47.817	−1.483
1892	45.653	46.119	−.466	41.937	43.100	−1.163
1896	49.508	46.824	+2.684	48.166	50.934	−2.768
1900	48.591	45.530	+3.061	48.613	51.699	−3.086
1904	37.605	37.597	+.008	56.408	56.412	−.004
1908	46.977	43.031	+3.926	47.785	51.581	−3.796
1912	46.460	41.821	+4.639	21.450	23.178	−1.728
1916	53.540	49.265	+4.275	41.827	46.058	−4.231
1920	40.038	34.666	+5.372	56.478	61.237	−4.759
1924	36.045	28.828	+7.217	48.738	54.054	−5.316
1928	43.616	40.793	+2.823	54.972	58.110	−3.138
1932	61.695	57.411	+4.284	35.706	39.561	−3.945
1936	64.087	60.194	+3.893	33.070	36.539	−3.469
1940	58.490	53.847	+4.533	40.414	44.770	−4.356
1944	55.499	51.644	+3.855	42.147	45.869	−3.722
1948	49.190	49.363	−.173	41.902	44.988	−3.086
1952	45.469	44.377	+1.092	54.531	54.879	−.348

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, in her testimony on the same page, however, Dr. Silva points out that in 17 of the 19 elections since that date, the Democratic Party candidates would have received a greater electoral vote than the one they were entitled to by the percentage of the popular vote. She says also that—

> In contrast, the formula would have consistently given the Republicans a smaller

electoral vote than they were entitled to by their percentage of the popular vote.

Mr. President, after Senate Joint Resolution 31 has been reported, we have now been offered, in its stead, a new formula. It includes, among other new provisions, the language that if no candidate receives a majority—not a plurality, but a majority—of the electoral vote, the election will be decided by the Congress.

Under the original Lodge-Gossett proposal, as amended by my former colleague from Illinois, Senator Lucas, the figure was 40 percent, but such strenuous objections were made that, since third parties under the plan would receive a close approximation of electoral votes to popular votes, the plan would promote third parties and splinter parties, that this new provision of a clear majority—50 percent or more of the electoral vote—was substituted for the 40 percent provision.

Mr. President, if we apply this 50 percent formula—which now is a part of the Daniel-Mundt-Thurmond substitute—it is clear from the facts which were placed before the Judiciary Committee, and from the table on page 335 of the hearings, that at least 8, and possibly 9, of the last 19 presidential elections would have been thrown into the Congress for decision. That, I submit, Mr. President, would be an intolerable situation. It is clear, too, that knowing that this would so easily be possible, third parties would be more powerful, and would hold the balance of power in almost all our elections.

But I wish to give the proof of the fact that 8 and possibly 9, of 19 elections since 1880 would have been decided by the Congress under the present proposal, before I point out the disastrous consequences of such a system.

Under the Lodge-Gossett plan, with the provision that a candidate must receive one-half of the electoral vote, or else the decision will be thrown into the Congress, stalemated elections would have been produced in 8 elections since 1880. In those elections, under the Lodge-Gassett formula the following percentages of the electoral vote would have been received by the candidates of each party:

Year	Democratic candidate electoral vote percent	Republican candidate electoral vote percent
1880	49.295	47.453
1892	45.653	41.937
1896	49.508	48.166
1900	48.591	48.613
1908	46.977	47.785
1912	46.460	21.450
1924	36.045	48.738
1948	49.190	41.902

Source: Hearings, p. 335.

In 1884, the Democratic candidate, President Cleveland, would have received a bare 50 percent of the electoral vote, under the Lodge-Gossett system, to 48.21 percent for Blaine, his Republican opponent. It is not clear whether 50 is a majority; and perhaps this election, too, would have been thrown into the Congress for decision.

EVEN WITH A POPULAR MAJORITY FOR A PRESIDENT, FOUR ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN THROWN INTO THE CONGRESS

In 4 of those elections—those of 1896, 1900, 1908, and 1924—the Republican candidate received more than half the popular vote; the percentages were 50.9, 51.7, 51.6, and 54.1. But, first, because the Lodge-Gossett system would make the electoral vote percentage very close to the popular vote percentage, rather than to exaggerate the electoral vote, as at present; and, second, because it would consistently give the Republican Party a somewhat smaller electoral vote than its percentage of the popular vote, those four elections would have been thrown into the Congress under the provision in this substitute that will happen unless a candidate receives an electoral-vote majority. And, of course, that is in addition to the other 4 elections since 1886 which would have been thrown into the Congress for decision—elections in which the winning candidate did not receive a majority of the popular vote, and would not have received a majority of the electoral vote under the Lodge-Gossett plan.

I repeat, Mr. President, that under the Lodge-Gossett system, as now proposed, 8 elections, and possibly 9, would have been decided by the Congress since the election of 1880.

The proponents will say that we are not to use history if it helps us to show what a ridiculous and senseless proposal we have before us, although I must say that the proponents have not hesitated to call upon the past when discussing what they regard as the faults in the present election system. What is sauce for the goose is certainly sauce for the gander.

PROPOSED SYSTEM A BOON TO THIRD PARTY

But I would say that if this system had been in effect, and knowing that any candidate would have had difficulty in getting a majority of the electoral vote, and knowing especially that the Republican vote would consistently be underrepresented by the Lodge-Gossett method, there would have been a field day for third party or States-rights parties or States-righters running under a Democratic label in the South. This effect of the 50 percent proposal may, in fact, be the reason why some have insisted upon raising the requirement from 40 percent to 50 percent. It would give a third party, especially in one-party States and States where a very small electorate has disproportionate power, the opportunity to throw almost any presidential election into Congress for decision.

When this compromise was brought forward, one of two things happened: either, the full implications of this 50 percent provision were not realized by its proponents—in which case the Senate should vote overwhelmingly to reject this dangerous and ridiculous substitute amendment; or the advocates of this amendment knew full well the implication of this provision in their substitute, in which case the substitute should be defeated overwhelmingly by the Senate as unworkable, unreasonable, and a greater threat to our Presidential election system than any which has yet occurred in the history of our Republic.

PROPOSAL WOULD PROMOTE UNPLEDGED ELECTORS

There is yet another provision of the substitute amendment which should be examined closely. It is the provision which states that—

> Any candidate for elector who before the election has pledged his vote for President or Vice President to a specific person shall, if elected, cast his vote for such person.

On first reading, Mr. President, this provision appears to be an improvement over our present system, under which, as we know, electors can, and have, failed to vote for the presidential candidate of their party, although that has happened on only rare occasions.

However, when reviewed in the context of the Lodge-Gossett, Mundt-Coudert arrangement, this is, in fact a very dangerous provision.

Third parties and regional parties, under the substitute proposal, would have a controlling influence in every election. Knowing this, there is nothing in this language to prevent—and indeed the substitute amendment would encourage—electors running unpledged. This would give them an influence over the electoral vote which unpledged delegations now have in closely contested national party conventions, with which I think the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF] is somewhat familiar.

I think we should not suppress, as Senators, what as men we know to be true; namely, if either Democratic or Republican Party platforms or party candidates, took stands on issues such as civil rights, labor legislation, or progressive social legislation, groups in both parties who disagree with such issues not only could, but probably would, keep electors in their States unpledged, thus giving them controlling influence over an election and throwing it into the Congress.

This would also be true, but somewhat less true, of dissident groups on the left as well as on the right. I say this because the Lodge-Gossett or proportional system gives much greater influence to third parties in one-party States than to third parties in the large two-party States. For example, even though the proponents of Lodge-Gossett claim that it would fairly distribute the electoral vote in proportion to the popular vote, this is not true. In 1948, the two third-party candidates received almost precisely the same popular vote. Thurmond got 1,169,021 votes and Wallace got 1,157,172 votes. In that election Thurmond received 39 electoral votes and Wallace none. Under the Lodge-Gossett proportional method, which is supposed to remedy such situations, Thurmond would have received 38.6 electoral votes, or 7.3 percent of the total number, and Wallace 9.4 electoral votes or 1.8 percent of the total. Thus, even this proportional system gives much greater weight to a third party in one-party States than to third parties in large two-party States. Of course this is true, also of the vote of the two major parties—i. e., the one-party States would have the whip-hand.

PROPOSAL WOULD PROMOTE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

There is yet another consequence which follows from the Lodge-Gossett proposal. I have shown that 8 and possibly 9 of the last 19 presidential elections would have been decided by Congress under its 50 percent provision. This means that congressional candidates would be running not only as representatives of their districts, but as presidential electors. In this respect this provision would change, completely, the American system and make it far more like the parliamentary system where the personalities of the local candidates and the local issues they represent, are much less important than the national party label. This might be good or bad, depending on one's point of view, but it would be a logical consequence of the substitutes now before us.

Now, Mr. President, if we are going to have a parliamentary system, let us debate that and decide that on its merits, but let us not drag it in by the back door as it would be dragged in under the provisions of this substitute amendment.

PROPOSAL RISKS DISASTER

Let us look further as to the consequences of throwing almost all elections into Congress for decision.

First of all, the will of the people would be frustrated. Many, and in fact most, of the presidential candidates who received a majority of the popular vote, would find that notwithstanding their popular majority Congress itself would have to determine the election. That is a much greater evil than any supposed evil which now exists in the electoral system.

Second, there would always be an 8 weeks delay before the public knew the outcome of our Presidential elections—that is from the election date in November until the Congress met in January. This type of delay and uncertainty, which would occur every 4 years, would strain our presidential election system beyond the breaking point. The budget would be delayed, there would be no time for the candidates to determine the personnel they desired to serve with them, there would be trades and bargains for every conceivable post, position, and benefit desired by this or that powerful group in Congress, and all three candidates would be operating in a vacuum, not knowing whether they or their opponents were to be the President. We would have a Hayes-Tilden circus in every election. This general indecisiveness could bring down the system.

Third, it is quite clear that in any election, the man with the third highest popular vote would continue to remain in a strong position even after his clear defeat at the polls. With stalemates between the two front runners, the third party candidate would be in a position not unlike that now held in party conventions by the dark horse candidate when the two front runners are deadlocked. If not chosen as President, he would dictate who would be President.

Fourth, and perhaps the most dangerous implication is that this process would, as the Senator from Pennsylvania has observed, weaken the presidential leadership which is imperative at this stage in our history. In almost any election, the winning candidate would be dependent on Congress for his election. Think of the concessions he would have to make to group after group. Think what effect this would have on the general concept of division of power between three equal institutions—the Presidency, the Congress, and the judiciary. Congress would dominate. The President would be in its control and power. And given the groups and regions which would have the decisive and controlling influence in the Congress, this could only mean a weakening of the progress at home and a return to isolationism abroad.

Mr. President, under this amendment and its clear implications and consequences, our Nation would be courting internal disaster in a time of external peril, if we were to be so foolish as to pass it with a two-thirds vote of the Senate.

Mr. DUFF. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. DUFF. In effect, is it not true that what we would be doing would be borrowing the uncertainties which have paralyzed the French Government in times of great crises?

Mr. DOUGLAS. We would be copying some of that uncertainty. Of course, that is the tendency of a multiparty system.

III–5. WHICH SYSTEM WOULD THE INDIVIDUAL STATES CHOOSE?

Thus far, we have been examining the Lodge-Gossett and Mundt-Coudert plans separately. In fact, of course, they are combined in the substitute amendment. We are faced with the situation that, if passed and ratified, the States could choose the method they desired to use. This brings almost limitless complications, and this fact alone should cause us to reject this two-headed monster or recommit it until the Judiciary Committee can study it and give some clear information as to its consequences.

Because of the combination we are laboring under unusual and unique handicaps.

In the first place, there are no official public statistics of the actual votes for President by congressional districts in previous elections. Further, such figures were not presented to us by the committee, although a tabulation was given by one witness based on the best available evidence. Even this left great uncertainty for the elections prior to that of 1948. We have, however, found that the Congressional Quarterly did publish such unofficial figures for the 1952 election in January of this year. By going to the experts and by making calculations, I believe we are now able to present accurate figures, but only for 1952.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks certain tables from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, which I am using by permission. I am deeply indebted to the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for its willingness to allow this material to be reproduced and who gave permission to me to use it on the floor of the Senate.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

House election percentages, 1950–54—Percentage of Eisenhower vote by districts, 1952

This exclusive Congressional Quarterly chart shows the election patterns for the 82d, 83d, and 84th Congresses, and also the percentages of the vote which President Eisenhower chalked up in each congressional district in 1952. Districts consistently won by over 60 percent of the total vote seldom change politically. Districts in the 55 to 60 percent bracket are key districts, but most of them stay in the same party. Districts which normally elect Representatives by less than 55 percent of the total vote are usually doubtful and can go either way. Figures under the appropriate year columns pertain to winning candidate in each election, not necessarily to present holder of seat.

	1954	1952	1950	1952 Ike percent
Alabama:				
3 Andrews (D)	X	X	X	(27.8)
1 Boykin (D)	X	X	X	(42.2)
7 Elliot (D)	(78.9)	(72.5)	X	(57.4)
2 Grant (D)	X	X	X	(56.8)
9 Huddleston (D)	X	X	X	(45.8)
8 Jones (D)	(91.6)	(87.3)	X	(29.4)
5 Rains (D)	X	X	X	(27.5)
4 Roberts (D)	X	X	(93.7)	(55.9)
6 Selden (D)	X	X	X	(38.7)

House election percentages, 1950–54—Percentage of Eisenhower vote by districts, 1952—Continued

	1954	1952	1950	1952 Ike percent
Arizona:				
1 Rhodes (R)	53.1	54.0	(60.6)	(60.0)
2 Udall (D)	(62.1)	(56.9)	(69.1)	(56.2)
Arkansas:				
1 Gathings (D)	X	X	------	(59.2)
4 Harris (D)	X	X	------	(56.5)
5 Hays (D)	X	(78.8)	------	(47.8)
2 Mills (D)	X	X	------	(58.8)
6 Norrell (D)	X	X	------	(59.5)
3 Trimble (D)	X	(56.0)	------	(57.2)
California:				
7 Allen (R)	53.0	X	55.3	(58.7)
6 Baldwin (R)	50.9	(50.6)	------	(47.3)
2 Engle (D)	X	X	------	(57.8)
10 Gubser (R)	61.2	59.2	------	(60.3)
14 Hagen (D)	(65.1)	(51.0)	------	(54.8)
11 Johnson (R)	52.6	X	------	(55.6)
4 Maillliard (R)	61.2	55.0	------	(61.7)
8 Miller (D)	(65.4)	X	------	(51.8)
3 Moss (D)	(65.3)	(50.8)	------	(51.4)
29 Phillips (R)	57.9	X	------	(64.7)
1 Scudder (R)	59.1	X	------	(68.9)
5 Shelley (D)	X	X	------	(48.1)
27 Sheppard (D)	(64.8)	(55.0)	------	(57.0)
12 Sisk (D)	(53.8)	X	------	(49.2)
13 Teague (R)	52.5	51.0	52.1	(61.0)
28 Utt (R)	66.2	63.0	------	(69.1)
30 Wilson (R)	60.4	59.6	------	(62.0)
9 Younger (R)	54.5	53.1	------	(63.1)
Los Angeles County:				
23 Doyle (D)	(70.9)	X	------	(44.8)
21 Hiestand (R)	58.7	53.6	------	(63.8)
25 Hillings (R)	65.2	64.3	60.1	(68.8)
20 Hinshaw (R)	71.2	X	------	(71.5)
19 Holifield (D)	(74.8)	X	------	(58.6)
22 Holt (R)	58.2	60.4	------	(63.2)
18 Hosmer (R)	55.0	55.5	------	(58.8)
16 Jackson (R)	60.8	59.7	------	(64.6)
17 King (D)	(60.1)	(54.6)	------	(51.8)
24 Lipscomb (R)	56.9	X	------	(60.1)
15 McDonough (R)	56.9	X	------	(57.2)
26 Roosevelt (D)	(60.1)	X	------	(39.8)
Colorado:				
3 Aspinall (D)	(53.5)	(50.0)	(57.3)	(64.3)
3 Chenoweth (R)	53.0	57.7	51.6	(59.0)
2 Hill (R)	55.3	63.1	57.5	(65.6)
1 Rogers (D)	(55.6)	(50.8)	(50.3)	(56.5)
Connecticut:				
3 Cretella (R)	52.7	52.8	52.1	(55.8)
1 Dodd (D)	(57.0)	(54.0)	(58.2)	(50.6)
4 Morano (R)	57.6	60.1	55.8	(61.1)
5 Patterson (R)	32.8	56.7	53.7	(56.9)
AL Sadlak (R)	50.9	55.0	50.4	(55.7)
2 Seely-Brown (R)	50.7	55.5	50.8	(56.0)
Delaware:				
AL McDowell (D)	(54.9)	51.9	56.7	(51.8)
Florida:				
2 Bennett (D)	X	X	------	(48.5)
1 Cramer (R)	50.7	(50.7)	------	(61.9)
4 Fascell (D)	X	(66.0)	------	(56.1)
7 Haley (D)	(55.5)	(56.3)	------	(56.7)
5 Herlong (D)	X	X	------	(63.0)
8 Matthews (D)	X	X	------	(42.5)
6 Rogers (D) [1]	X	(60.8)	------	(65.5)
3 Sikes (D)	X	X	X	(26.7)
Georgia:				
8 Blitch (D)	X	X	X	(26.7)
10 Brown (D)	X	X	X	(28.6)
5 Davis (D)	(64.4)	X	X	(40.6)
4 Flynt (D)	X	X	X	(17.4)
3 Forrester (D)	X	X	X	(27.4)
9 Landrum (D)	X	X	X	(29.5)
7 Lanham (D)	X	X	X	(30.8)
2 Filcher (D)	X	X	X	(25.9)
1 Preston (D)	(83.7)	X	X	(37.7)
6 Vinson (D)	X	X	X	(26.0)
Idaho:				
2 Budge (R)	60.8	66.2	57.1	(68.6)
1 Pfost (D)	(54.9)	(50.3)	50.5	(60.9)
Illinois:				
16 Allen (R)	X	66.5	67.3	(66.5)
17 Arends (R)	65.0	63.6	------	(64.8)
19 Chiperfield (R)	56.5	60.8	59.0	(61.2)
25 Gray (D)	(52.6)	56.2	------	(55.0)
21 Mack (D)	(54.8)	(52.4)	------	(55.3)
15 Mason (R)	62.8	63.6	63.3	(62.5)
24 Price (D)	(69.2)	(64.8)	(64.9)	(40.6)
14 Reed (R)	72.4	71.5	74.2	(72.7)
20 Simpson (R)	62.9	61.8	------	(60.9)
22 Springer (R)	62.0	63.0	------	(61.1)
18 Velde (R)	57.4	55.2	61.6	(60.5)
23 Vursell (R)	52.9	58.1	------	(59.1)
Chicago-Cook County:				
7 Bowler (D)	(78.4)	(70.0)	------	(51.2)
12 Boyle (D)	(54.1)	55.7	------	(55.2)
13 Church (R)	69.6	70.6	------	(70.4)
1 Dawson (D)	(75.3)	(73.5)	------	(25.4)
8 Gordon (D)	(68.4)	(59.0)	------	(41.9)
10 Hoffman (R)	57.3	65.0	66.5	(64.8)
5 Khuczynski (D)	(73.2)	(64.5)	------	(58.6)
4 McVey (R)	52.1	56.6	------	(55.9)
3 Murray (D)	(53.8)	54.5	------	(55.0)
6 O'Brien (D)	(71.7)	(63.1)	------	(58.9)

House election percentages, 1950–54—Percentage of Eisenhower vote by districts, 1952—Continued

	1954	1952	1950	1952 Ike percent
Chicago-Cook Co.—Cont.				
2 O'Hara (D)	(61.6)	(51.4)	------	(49.1)
11 Sheehan (R)	50.9	59.4	56.7	(58.0)
9 Yates (D)	(60.3)	(52.4)	------	(51.5)
Indiana:				
4 Adair (R)	59.8	63.7	56.2	(64.9)
5 Beamer (R)	53.1	56.9	54.1	(57.5)
7 Bray (R)	55.4	56.1	50.0	(56.6)
11 Brownson (R)	54.9	59.3	56.5	(60.5)
3 Crumpacker (R)	50.4	54.5	52.8	(55.9)
8 Denton (D)	(52.1)	52.6	(51.0)	(55.3)
2 Halleck (R)	59.8	59.3	57.2	(67.5)
6 Harden (R)	52.5	55.7	52.4	(58.5)
10 Harvey (R)	55.9	59.9	58.7	(60.4)
1 Madden (D)	(61.4)	(56.4)	(52.6)	(44.7)
9 Wilson (R)	51.7	56.4	54.9	(58.6)
Iowa:				
5 Cunningham (R)	55.6	58.8	56.9	(58.7)
6 Dolliver (R)	60.3	68.7	64.6	(65.3)
3 Gross (R)	62.1	65.8	64.0	(66.4)
8 Hoeven (R)	63.8	X	64.1	(68.8)
7 Jensen (R)	60.4	67.3	62.0	(67.4)
4 LeCompte (R)	55.6	61.9	56.7	(62.7)
1 Schwengel (R)	57.0	62.8	61.7	(65.5)
2 Talle (R)	55.4	62.2	58.8	(65.1)
Kansas:				
1 Avery	54.3	(51.5)	66.5	(71.5)
3 George (R)	55.4	59.5	54.7	(64.5)
5 Hope (R)	64.9	70.9	61.8	(71.5)
4 Rees (R)	56.2	59.4	58.9	(71.5)
2 Scrivner (R)	54.7	57.3	52.2	(76.4)
6 Smith (R)	53.3	62.5	59.5	(76.4)
Kentucky:				
4 Chelf (D)	X	(55.9)	------	(47.7)
1 Gregory (D)	X	(65.8)	------	(38.6)
2 Natcher (D)	X	(54.4)	------	(47.4)
7 Perkins (D)	(60.4)	(58.2)	------	(42.9)
3 Robsion (R)	50.2	54.0	55.5	(54.6)
8 Siler (R)	63.4	68.8	------	(66.4)
5 Spence (D)	(61.0)	(55.4)	------	(50.2)
6 Watts (D)	(60.9)	(56.3)	------	(45.4)
Louisiana:				
2 Boggs (D)	X	(66.4)	X	(48.5)
4 Brooks (D)	X	X	X	(59.8)
1 Hébert (D)	(82.3)	X	X	(48.5)
8 Long (D)	X	X	X	(40.7)
6 Morrison (D)	X	X	X	(41.3)
5 Passman (D)	X	X	X	(46.1)
7 Thompson (D)	X	X	X	(42.9)
3 Willis (D)	X	X	X	(48.0)
Maine:				
1 Hale (R)	52.1	61.6	54.0	(64.7)
3 McIntire (R)	60.5	76.2	62.9	(70.4)
2 Nelson (R)	54.0	66.3	57.7	(64.7)
Maryland:				
2 Devereux (R)	56.1	61.4	------	(65.2)
4 Fallon (D)	(57.2)	(54.7)	------	(55.7)
7 Friedel (D)	(54.5)	(51.4)	------	(51.5)
3 Garmatz (D)	X	(70.9)	(65.7)	(58.2)
6 Hyde (R)	51.4	57.8	61.9	(61.1)
5 Lankford (D)	(53.7)	54.4	------	(57.1)
1 Miller (R)	55.5	61.1	57.0	(57.2)
Massachusetts:				
6 Bates (R)	71.2	X	71.4	(61.7)
2 Boland (D)	(59.6)	(51.8)	(53.7)	(53.8)
10 Curtis (R)	50.7	54.3	54.2	(56.2)
4 Donohue (D)	(57.1)	(54.4)	(55.0)	(57.1)
1 Heselton (R)	55.6	67.1	66.2	(57.7)
7 Lane (D)	X	(74.7)	(74.2)	(41.5)
8 Macdonald (D)	(53.2)	50.9	51.2	(58.5)
14 Martin (R)	62.0	63.2	61.8	(58.5)
12 McCormack (D)	X	(82.2)	(77.5)	(54.4)
9 Nicholson (R)	56.7	59.1	55.2	(65.2)
11 O'Neill (D)	(78.2)	(69.3)	(75.1)	(57.2)
3 Philbin (D)	X	(67.3)	(69.1)	(49.1)
5 Rogers (R)	X	75.9	74.0	(59.7)
13 Wigglesworth (R)	58.0	60.6	59.9	(61.8)
Michigan:				
12 Bennett (R)	55.9	58.2	61.7	(53.8)
8 Bentley (R)	62.7	66.6	60.5	(69.3)
10 Cederberg (R)	61.4	67.5	66.2	(69.4)
18 Dondero (R)	53.9	56.2	------	(61.0)
5 Ford (R)	63.3	66.3	66.7	(64.9)
6 Hayworth (D)	(51.1)	52.6	52.8	(59.5)
4 Hoffman (R)	62.3	66.6	68.6	(68.5)
3 Johnson (R)	59.4	62.0	61.4	(67.5)
11 Knox (R)	54.9	59.3	66.5	(63.3)
2 Meader (R)	59.8	63.4	60.4	(66.7)
9 Thompson (R)	55.7	59.5	54.5	(62.8)
7 Wolcott (R)	52.8	60.3	63.0	(64.5)
Detroit-Wayne County:				
13 Diggs (D)	(65.8)	(64.8)	(61.4)	(57.2)
15 Dingell (D)	(72.7)	(66.7)	(64.1)	(57.2)
17 Griffiths (D)	(52.2)	52.9	------	(57.6)
16 Lesinski (D)	(67.9)	(60.7)	------	(43.3)
1 Machrowicz (D)	(88.3)	(84.2)	(82.2)	(59.1)
14 Rabaut (D)	(58.2)	(53.0)	------	(51.0)
Minnesota:				
7 Andersen (R)	52.6	62.6	61.7	(60.9)
1 Andresen (R)	60.9	69.4	67.1	(65.9)
8 Blatnik (D)	(71.8)	(62.6)	(62.9)	(58.5)
5 Judd (R)	55.8	59.2	58.7	(56.5)
9 Knutson (D)	(51.2)	(60.5)	(61.9)	(57.0)

House election percentages, 1950–54—Percentage of Eisenhower vote by districts, 1952—Continued

	1954	1952	1950	1952 Ike percent
Minnesota—Con.				
6 Marshall (D)	(61.9)	(52.6)	(56.2)	(61.5)
4 McCarthy (D)	(63.0)	(61.7)	(60.4)	(44.4)
2 O'Hara (R)	57.9	67.7	59.9	(66.8)
3 Wier (D)	(54.4)	(52.2)	(51.7)	(50.7)
Mississippi:				
1 Abernethy (D)	X	X	------	(32.7)
6 Colmer (D)	X	X	(87.9)	(41.5)
3 Smith (D)	X	(87.2)	X	(49.9)
2 Whitten (D)	X	X	------	(28.0)
4 Williams (D)	X	X	------	(51.2)
5 Winstead (D)	X	(94.1)	------	(31.7)
Missouri:				
5 Bolling (D)	(58.9)	(56.0)	------	(46.6)
9 Cannon (D)	(59.0)	(54.7)	------	(52.2)
8 Carnahan (D)	(57.2)	(52.8)	------	(50.6)
4 Christopher (D)	(52.0)	53.3	------	(54.9)
2 Curtis (R)	54.7	56.9	------	(56.3)
6 Hull (D)	(53.6)	52.4	------	(55.8)
10 Jones (D)	(63.9)	(60.7)	------	(55.4)
1 Karsten (D)	(66.3)	(64.2)	------	(49.1)
11 Moulder (D)	(55.3)	(50.4)	------	(55.2)
7 Short (R)	53.6	61.7	------	(64.9)
3 Sullivan (D)	(71.0)	(64.8)	------	(54.4)
Montana:				
2 Fjare (R)	50.6	62.0	54.1	(61.0)
1 Metcalf (D)	(56.0)	(50.3)	(60.2)	(57.2)
Nebraska:				
2 Chase (R)	52.9	56.1	63.5	(58.3)
3 Harrison (R)	65.2	71.9	66.9	(73.3)
4 Miller (R)	70.4	73.3	65.8	(73.9)
1 Weaver (R)	58.6	72.0	54.5	(71.6)
Nevada:				
AL Young (R)	54.5	50.5	(52.8)	(61.4)
New Hampshire:				
2 Bass (R)	60.4	66.4	64.5	(65.4)
1 Merrow (R)	50.2	60.2	57.5	(58.7)
New Jersey:				
11 Addonizio (D)	(56.3)	(52.2)	(51.6)	(52.2)
3 Auchincloss (R)	57.6	64.4	62.4	(62.4)
8 Canfield (R)	54.8	62.6	63.6	(64.3)
5 Frelinghuysen (R)	59.3	62.2	61.6	(62.0)
2 Hand (R)	63.6	63.4	54.3	(58.4)
12 Kean (R)	53.1	54.8	53.1	(54.5)
9 Osmers (R)	60.2	66.2	57.8	(67.2)
10 Rodino (D)	(63.4)	(56.9)	(61.0)	(53.3)
13 Sieminski (D)	(60.8)	(55.1)	(51.9)	(48.4)
4 Thompson (D)	(58.4)	(54.7)	(52.2)	(49.0)
14 Tumulty (D)	(62.4)	(51.5)	(59.2)	(50.5)
7 Widnall (R)	(62.2)	68.3	69.7	(68.3)
6 Williams (D)	(56.1)	63.9	62.2	(60.5)
1 Wolverton (R)	54.3	55.0	56.7	(48.9)
New Mexico:				
AL Dempsey (D)	(59.3)	(52.0)	(58.6)	(55.4)
AL Fernandez (D)	(58.7)	(52.3)	(56.4)	(55.4)
New York:				
3 Becker (R)	58.3	65.4	------	(68.3)
37 Cole (R)	71.7	69.4	------	(71.9)
2 Derounian (R)	63.7	68.8	------	(71.1)
26 Gamble (R)	64.0	67.3	------	(67.6)
27 Gwinn (R)	57.2	58.5	------	(67.3)
32 Kearney (R)	61.5	67.4	64.1	(67.8)
38 Keating (R)	71.9	69.3	------	(60.8)
33 Kilburn (R)	68.1	69.0	------	(69.2)
40 Miller (R)	60.9	59.6	------	(59.2)
30 O'Brien (D)	(61.2)	(53.7)	------	(54.6)
39 Ostertag (R)	64.8	65.8	------	(64.6)
42 Pillion (R)	57.6	55.2	------	(56.8)
41 Radwan (R)	63.1	55.9	------	(54.8)
43 Reed (R)	64.8	66.2	------	(68.6)
35 Riehlman (R)	63.5	63.2	61.9	(65.0)
28 St. George (R)	64.9	65.6	61.8	(69.6)
36 Taber (R)	68.4	69.9	------	(73.4)
31 Taylor (R)	66.2	70.6	------	(72.3)
1 Wainwright (R)	63.1	60.4	------	(74.3)
29 Wharton (R)	66.5	69.8	65.8	(71.4)
34 Williams (R)	59.3	58.8	------	(63.7)
New York City:				
8 Anfuso (D)	(77.7)	(65.3)	------	(38.2)
5 Bosch (R)	51.7	53.5	------	(61.3)
24 Buckley (D)	(57.6)	(46.5)	------	(55.5)
11 Celler (D)	(83.5)	(73.8)	------	(25.4)
17 Coudert (R)	50.2	57.5	------	(57.6)
20 Davidson (D)	(67.2)	(60.2)	------	(40.3)
7 Delaney (D)	(59.0)	(51.0)	------	(50.3)
23 Dollinger (D)	(75.6)	(63.8)	------	(22.3)
18 Donovan (D)	X	X	------	(42.0)
12 Dorn (R)	51.3	52.7	------	(54.8)
22 Fine (D)	(67.8)	(58.0)	------	(38.3)
25 Fino (R)	50.4	50.4	------	(57.5)
6 Holtzman (D)	(54.5)	(49.2)	------	(51.1)
10 Kelly (D)	(76.8)	(71.2)	------	(31.6)
9 Keogh (D)	(71.1)	(61.1)	------	(40.5)
19 Klein (D)	(74.6)	(66.0)	------	(53.7)
4 Latham (R)	54.2	62.6	------	(63.0)
13 Multer (D)	(78.8)	(68.3)	------	(39.9)
16 Powell (D)	(77.6)	(73.9)	------	(17.0)
15 Ray (R)	51.6	57.9	------	(67.5)
14 Rooney (D)	(73.1)	(64.2)	------	(41.6)
21 Zelenko (D)	(67.8)	63.4	------	(37.0)
North Carolina:				
9 Alexander (D)	(52.2)	(51.5)	(61.1)	(58.1)
3 Barden (D)	(77.3)	(76.1)	X	(56.9)

Footnotes at end of table.

384230—58251

House election percentages, 1950–54—Percentage of Eisenhower vote by districts, 1952—Continued

	1954	1952	1950	1952 Ike percent
North Carolina—Con.				
1 Bonner (D)	(92.5)	X	(92.8)	(93.7)
7 Carlyle (D)	(81.2)	X	(84.0)	(89.9)
5 Chatham (D)	(66.2)	X	X	(44.1)
4 Cooley (D)	X	(75.3)	(72.8)	(57.9)
8 Deane (D)	(59.1)	(59.9)	(59.6)	(48.9)
6 Durham (D)	(74.2)	(69.5)	(75.4)	(47.4)
2 Fountain (D)	X	(94.8)	X	(48.8)
10 Jonas (R)	57.5	57.4	(52.3)	(59.0)
11 Jones (D)	(67.5)	(63.0)	(68.9)	(59.0)
12 Shuford (D)	(61.5)	(56.9)	(63.7)	(61.5)
North Dakota:				
AL Burdick (R)	71.7	78.4	77.0	(71.0)
AL Krueger (R)	62.4	X	65.6	(71.0)
Ohio:				
9 Ashley (D) [2]	(36.4)	(10.9)	------	(51.7)
14 Ayres (R)	54.6	58.5	------	(59.5)
13 Baumhart (R)	59.1	58.8	------	(62.8)
8 Betts (R)	63.0	68.7	------	(68.5)
22 Bolton, F. P. (R)	58.3	58.8	------	(56.0)
11 Bolton, O. P. (R)	65.3	58.8	------	(57.8)
16 Bow (R)	58.3	54.4	------	(58.3)
7 Brown (R)	62.2	X	------	(62.6)
5 Clevenger (R)	59.5	63.2	------	(68.2)
20 Feighan (D)	(67.7)	(65.2)	------	(47.3)
18 Hays (D)	(57.3)	(55.8)	(50.8)	(49.0)
15 Henderson (R)	54.0	(64.3)	------	(62.3)
2 Hess (R)	58.4	56.6	------	(58.5)
10 Jenkins (R)	61.7	64.0	------	(60.6)
19 Kirwan (D)	(67.5)	(66.3)	------	(44.2)
4 McCulloch (R)	67.6	68.3	------	(64.9)
17 McGregor (R)	64.6	68.2	------	(65.9)
23 Minshall (R)	67.5	64.6	------	(69.4)
6 Polk (D)	(52.2)	(59.1)	------	(56.9)
3 Schenck (R)	52.6	61.5	------	(53.6)
1 Scherer (R)	54.3	61.6	------	(69.7)
21 Vanik (D)	(76.0)	(68.6)	------	(32.7)
12 Vorys (R)	61.5	62.3	64.1	(60.3)
Oklahoma:				
3 Albert (D)	(83.3)	(77.9)	------	(37.1)
1 Belcher (R)	58.8	58.6	------	(65.2)
2 Edmondson (D)	(64.7)	(59.2)	------	(51.4)
5 Jarman (D)	(66.0)	(62.4)	------	(56.5)
4 Steed (D)	X	(58.7)	------	(52.1)
6 Wickersham (D)	(69.3)	(63.3)	------	(53.7)
Oregon:				
2 Coon (R)	52.6	58.5	55.4	(62.1)
4 Ellsworth (R)	55.9	66.3	59.5	(63.9)
3 Green (D)	(52.4)	54.0	50.7	(55.0)
1 Norblad (R)	63.0	68.0	66.5	(63.9)
Pennsylvania:				
30 Buchanan (D)	(69.0)	(63.6)	------	(38.7)
17 Bush (R)	56.5	61.1	------	(65.8)
10 Carrigg (R)	50.5	53.6	------	(55.5)
25 Clark (D)	(53.5)	50.4	52.4	(51.6)
29 Corbett (R)	60.6	61.7	------	(58.8)
9 Dague (R)	62.5	66.2	67.2	(67.5)
28 Eberharter (D)	(65.1)	(58.7)	------	(42.2)
12 Fenton (R)	55.5	60.7	56.8	(60.2)
11 Flood (D)	(50.9)	50.2	(54.4)	(54.8)
27 Fulton (R)	62.8	62.6	------	(56.1)
23 Gavin (R)	61.9	67.8	------	(68.1)
7 James (R)	60.9	61.7	62.7	(61.6)
24 Kearns (R)	52.0	57.1	57.0	(58.0)
21 Kelley (D)	(61.1)	(52.9)	(57.1)	(42.2)
8 King (R)	51.2	59.3	58.2	(59.7)
13 McConnell (R)	64.3	66.4	66.2	(66.6)
26 Morgan (D)	(65.3)	(59.1)	------	(38.9)
16 Mumma (R)	59.8	61.7	------	(65.0)
19 Quigley (D)	(51.0)	52.3	------	(58.5)
14 Rhodes (D)	(62.0)	(49.7)	(49.8)	(58.4)
22 Saylor (R)	51.9	52.4	52.5	(58.9)
18 Simpson (R)	55.9	63.5	------	(64.8)
20 Van Zandt (R)	56.3	62.8	59.5	(62.5)
15 Walter (D)	(61.6)	(54.8)	(58.3)	(59.0)
Philadelphia:				
1 Barrett (D)	(51.5)	(68.2)	(53.8)	(33.7)
3 Byrne (D)	(55.4)	(58.4)	(50.3)	(48.7)
4 Chudoff (D)	(65.7)	(69.9)	(57.5)	(30.5)
2 Granahan (D)	(61.2)	(61.8)	(57.0)	(59.0)
5 Green (D)	(55.0)	(54.2)	(55.5)	(46.6)
6 Scott (R)	50.6	51.7	50.0	(51.9)
Rhode Island:				
2 Fogarty (D)	(60.4)	(53.4)	(60.6)	(51.8)
1 Forand (D)	(59.2)	(54.9)	(63.2)	(49.9)
South Carolina:				
4 Ashmore (D)	X	X	X	(39.4)
3 Dorn (D)	X	(93.9)	X	(54.2)
6 McMillan (D) [3]	X	X	X	(49.6)
5 Richards (D)	X	(93.9)	X	(55.5)
2 Riley (D)	X	X	X	(57.4)
1 Rivers (D)	X	X	X	(62.1)
South Dakota:				
2 Berry (R)	62.7	69.0	60.3	(70.8)
1 Lovre (R)	58.0	68.5	60.8	(69.0)
Tennessee:				
2 Baker (R)	58.0	68.9	52.2	(62.8)
6 Bass (D)	X	X	------	(33.0)
8 Cooper (D)	X	X	X	(33.6)
9 Davis (D)	(83.5)	X	X	(47.5)
4 Evins (D)	X	X	------	(39.3)
3 Frazier (D)	(59.2)	(70.0)	------	(54.3)
7 Murray (D)	X	X	X	(47.1)
5 Priest (D)	(90.8)	(67.5)	X	(41.0)
1 Reece (R)	62.5	65.9	46.5	(69.5)

Footnotes at end of table.

384230—58251

House election percentages, 1950–54—Percentage of Eisenhower vote by districts, 1952—Continued

	1954	1952	1950	1952 Ike percent
Texas:				
5 Alger (R)	52.9	X	X	(68.0)
14 Bell (D)	(93.8)	X	X	(51.2)
2 Brooks (D)	X	(79.0)	X	(43.7)
17 Burleson (D)	X	X	X	(54.5)
AL Dies (D)	(88.0)	X	------	(53.2)
7 Dowdy (D)	X	X	X	(45.5)
21 Fisher (D)	X	X	X	(61.6)
3 Gentry (D)	X	X	(91.1)	(59.7)
13 Ikard (D)	X	X	X	(48.4)
20 Kilday (D)	X	X	X	(56.5)
15 Kilgore (D)	X	X	X	(55.5)
19 Mahon (D)	X	X	(93.9)	(50.2)
1 Patman (D)	X	X	X	(49.5)
11 Poage (D)	X	X	X	(48.6)
4 Rayburn (D)	X	X	X	(42.3)
18 Rogers (D)	(64.9)	X	(52.5)	(59.1)
16 Rutherford (D)	X	X	X	(59.4)
6 Teague (D)	X	X	X	(59.0)
8 Thomas (D)	(62.1)	X	(77.8)	(57.7)
9 Thompson (D)	X	X	X	(54.0)
10 Thornberry (D)	X	X	X	(49.2)
12 Wright (D)	X	X	(80.6)	(56.5)
Utah:				
2 Dawson (R)	57.2	52.5	(53.4)	(58.2)
1 Dixon (R)	53.4	60.5	(51.1)	(60.1)
Vermont:				
AL Prouty (R)	61.4	71.8	73.4	(71.5)
Virginia:				
4 Abbitt (D)	X	X	X	(46.5)
10 Broyhill (R)	53.7	50.2	------	(60.3)
3 Gary (D)	(58.0)	(57.7)	X	(61.0)
2 Hardy (D)	(74.4)	X	X	(47.9)
7 Harrison (D)	(74.2)	(79.1)	(69.4)	(64.4)
9 Jennings (D)	(50.5)	51.7	(58.4)	(55.0)
6 Poff (R)	62.3	51.5	X	(62.8)
1 Robeson (D)	X	X	(81.0)	(53.2)
8 Smith (D)	(66.6)	X	X	(57.6)
5 Tuck (D)	X	X	X	(53.6)
Washington:				
4 Holmes (R)	61.0	67.5	64.3	(61.4)
5 Horan (R)	58.6	56.0	54.8	(56.2)
3 Mack (R)	64.9	53.3	52.9	(53.4)

House election percentages, 1950–54—Percentage of Eisenhower vote by districts, 1952—Continued

	1954	1952	1950	1952 Ike percent
Washington—Cont.				
AL Magnuson (D)	(57.6)	(50.5)	------	(54.5)
1 Pelly (R)	52.6	51.4	(51.4)	(52.3)
6 Tollefson (R)	55.2	59.8	60.5	(50.2)
2 Westland (R)	52.4	54.2	61.2	(54.5)
West Virginia:				
3 Bailey (D)	(58.9)	(53.4)	(54.4)	(48.5)
4 Burnside (D)	(50.2)	53.3	(51.6)	(55.6)
6 Byrd (D)	(62.7)	(55.6)	(61.6)	(44.5)
5 Kee (D)	(67.5)	(63.8)	(65.7)	(59.9)
1 Mollohan (D)	(52.7)	(52.9)	(51.7)	(48.2)
2 Staggers (D)	(55.0)	(51.5)	(54.3)	(52.0)
Wisconsin:				
8 Byrnes (R)	62.0	73.6	62.0	(68.2)
2 Davis (R)	54.0	62.9	57.6	(60.7)
9 Johnson (D)	(55.4)	65.2	70.8	(64.4)
7 Laird (R)	59.1	72.3	68.3	(67.5)
10 O'Konski (R)	59.7	67.4	57.0	(57.6)
5 Reuss (D)	(52.2)	51.6	51.6	(54.8)
1 Smith (R)	54.4	59.4	57.2	(59.6)
6 Van Pelt (R)	62.5	71.7	65.0	(68.4)
3 Withrow (R)	62.1	75.1	58.8	(68.9)
4 Zablocki (D)	(71.1)	(64.3)	(60.9)	(48.9)
Wyoming:				
AL Thomson (R)	56.2	60.1	54.5	(62.7)

KEY

Democratic percentages of the total vote, roman figures in parentheses.
Republican percentages, lightface figures.
Independent percentages, lightface italic figures.
Eisenhower percentages, italic figures in parentheses.
X, no major party opposition.
Blank space in 1950 column indicates redistricting.

[1] Dwight L. Rogers died Dec. 1, 1954

State by State electoral vote by congressional district (Mundt-Coudert) method, 1952 election, and comparative figures—Continued

(1) State	(2) Eisenhower percentage of popular vote, 1952	(3) Congressional districts carried, 1952 A By Eisenhower	(3) B By Stevenson	(4) Electoral vote by congressional district (Mundt-Coudert) method, 1952 A Eisenhower	(4) B Stevenson	(5) Republican congressional candidates' percentage of popular vote, 1952	(6) Congressional seats won, 1952 A By Republicans	(6) B By Democrats	(7) State legislature control, Dec. 1, 1954 A Senate	(7) B Assembly
South Carolina	49.3	3	3	3	5	2.0	0	6	D	D
South Dakota	69.3	2	0	4	0	68.6	2	0	R	R
Tennessee	50.0	3	6	5	6	29.1	2	7	D	D
Texas	53.1	14	8	16	8	1.3	0	22	D	D
Utah	58.9	2	0	4	0	55.6	2	0	R	R
Vermont	71.5	1	0	3	0	71.8	1	0	R	R
Virginia	56.3	8	2	10	2	31.0	3	7	D	D
Washington	54.3	7	0	9	0	56.5	6	1	R	D
West Virginia	48.1	2	4	2	6	46.1	1	5	D	D
Wisconsin	61.0	9	1	11	1	11.6	9	1	R	R
Wyoming	62.7	1	0	3	0	60.1	1	0	R	R
Total	55.1	297	138	[4] 375	[5] 156		221	213		

[1] Nonpartisan.
[2] Independent.
[3] Tied.
[4] 70.6 percent.
[5] 29.4 percent.

Sources: Columns 2, 5, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. IX, p. 618 (1953); column 3, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. XI, p. 716-17 (1955); column 7, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. XI, p. 713 (1955).
Symbols: R=Republican; D=Democratic.

ALMOST LIMITLESS COMBINATIONS

Mr. DOUGLAS. In the second place the combinations which are possible under this dual system are almost limitless. We have 48 States. Each State can select one or another alternative. Thus, the number of combinations which are possible under this amendment are at least two to the 48th power—2^{48}. This means that there are 281,474,976,710,656 different combinations of electoral votes which could be produced in any election under this hybrid monstrosity.

Thus, in almost any election, except a huge popular landslide, with the same number of votes in exactly the same States, districts, counties, towns, wards, and precincts, a range of results stretching from a Republican landslide to stalemate to a Democratic landslide could happen, depending on which alternative the individual States selected.

I repeat, this is both possible and probable, and could happen without changing a single vote.

Thus, although we can apply the Lodge-Gossett system to previous election statistics, and can say with certainty what the outcome would have been—and if we had the precise figures for presidential voting by congressional districts for all past elections, we could apply the Mundt-Coudert formula to past election results and could say with certainty what the outcome would have been—with this hybrid system, we get a range of possible results which number 281,474,976,710,656 or 2 to the 48th power.

This is true, Mr. President. It is ridiculous, Mr. President. And it could happen without changing a single vote in a single precinct.

Let me give some examples, Mr. President. First, let us take the 1948 election. I now ask unanimous consent to have placed in the RECORD a tabulation showing how the result of the 1948 election, by combining the formulas in this amendment, would have given Dewey the most electoral votes and which, under the 50-percent provision of the amendment before us, would have thrown the election into the Congress.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1948 election: Dewey with most electoral votes by State—Choice of system most favorable to Dewey

State	Formula used	Total electoral vote	Dewey	Truman
Alabama	L-G	11	2.0	0.0
Arizona	L-G	4	1.8	2.1
Arkansas	L-G	9	1.9	5.6
California	M-C	25	13.0	12.0
Colorado	L-G	6	2.8	3.1
Connecticut	M-C	8	6.0	2.0
Delaware	M-C	3	3.0	0
Florida	L-G	8	2.7	3.9
Georgia	L-G	12	2.2	7.3
Idaho	L-G	4	1.9	2.0
Illinois	M-C	28	18.0	10.0
Indiana	M-C	13	8.0	5.0
Iowa	L-G	10	4.8	5.0
Kansas	M-C	8	7.0	1.0
Kentucky	L-G	11	4.6	6.2
Louisiana	L-G	10	1.7	3.3
Maine	M-C	5	5.0	0
Maryland	L-G	8	4.0	3.8
Massachusetts	L-G	16	6.9	8.8
Michigan	M-C	19	13.0	6.0
Minnesota	L-G	11	4.4	6.3
Mississippi	L-G	9	.2	.9
Missouri	L-G	15	6.2	8.7
Montana	L-G	4	1.7	2.1
Nebraska	M-C	6	6.0	0
Nevada	L-G	3	1.4	1.5
New Hampshire	M-C	4	4.0	0
New Jersey	M-C	16	10.0	6.0
New Mexico	L-G	4	1.7	2.2
New York	M-C	47	24.0	23.0
North Carolina	L-G	14	4.6	8.1
North Dakota	M-C	4	4.0	0
Ohio	M-C	25	13.0	12.0
Oklahoma	L-G	10	3.7	6.3
Oregon	M-C	6	4.0	2.0
Pennsylvania	M-C	35	22.0	13.0
Rhode Island	L-G	4	1.7	2.3
South Carolina	L-G	8	.3	1.9
South Dakota	M-C	4	4.0	0
Tennessee	L-G	12	4.4	5.9
Texas	L-G	23	5.7	15.0
Utah	L-G	4	1.8	2.2
Vermont	M-C	3	3.0	0
Virginia	L-G	11	4.5	5.3
Washington	L-G	8	3.4	4.2

1948 election: Dewey with most electoral votes by State—Choice of system most favorable to Dewey—Continued

State	Formula used	Total electoral vote	Dewey	Truman
West Virginia	L-G	8	3.4	4.6
Wisconsin	L-G	12	5.6	6.1
Wyoming	L-G	3	1.4	1.5
Total	----	531	260.4	228.2

Symbols: L-G=Lodge-Gossett. M-C=Mundt-Coudert.

Sources: For the Lodge-Gossett formula, Senator Taft's tables at pp. 1271-1272 of the Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Feb. 1, 1950); for Mundt-Coudert formula, Dr. Ruth Silva's tables on pp. 274-275 of hearings on H. J. Res. 11, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

There may be minus and fractional discrepancies for the effect of votes for 3d, 4th, and even 5th party candidates is not clear in every case.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, by using the alternative most favorable to Dewey in each of the 48 States, the electoral result would have been 260.4 electoral votes for Dewey and 228.2 electoral votes for Truman.

This result would have happened without the shift of a single vote in the country if the individual States had been operating under the formula most advantageous to Dewey in each State.

In the second example I have produced an overwhelming Truman victory, with exactly the same vote in the same places as actually happened in 1948. By assuming that the States would use that formula most advantageous to Truman, the result would have been 334.7 electoral votes for Truman and 156.2 electoral votes for Dewey.

I ask unanimous consent that this table be reproduced in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1948 elections: Overwhelming Truman victory by assuming States operated under plan most favorable to Truman

State	Formula used	Total electoral vote	Dewey	Truman
Alabama	M-C	11	0.0	0.0
Arizona	M-C	4	0	4.0
Arkansas	M-C	9	0	9.0
California	L-G	25	11.8	11.9
Colorado	M-C	6	1.0	5.0
Connecticut	L-G	8	4.0	3.8
Delaware	L-G	3	1.5	1.5
Florida	M-C	8	1.0	7.0
Georgia	M-C	12	0	12.0
Idaho	M-C	4	0	4.0
Illinois	L-G	28	13.8	14.0
Indiana	L-G	13	6.4	6.3
Iowa	M-C [1]	10	3.0	7.0
Kansas	L-G	8	4.3	3.6
Kentucky	M-C	11	1.0	10.0
Louisiana	L-G [1]	10	1.7	3.3
Maine	L-G	5	2.8	2.1
Maryland	M-C	8	4.0	4.0
Massachusetts	M-C [1]	16	4.0	12.0
Michigan	L-G	19	9.3	9.0
Minnesota	M-C	11	0	11.0
Mississippi	L-G [1]	9	.2	.9
Missouri	M-C	15	1.0	14.0
Montana	M-C	4	0	4.0
Nebraska	L-G	6	3.3	2.7
Nevada	M-C	3	0	3.0
New Hampshire	L-G	4	2.1	1.9
New Jersey	L-G	16	8.0	7.3
New Mexico	M-C	4	0	4.0
New York	L-G	47	21.6	21.2
North Carolina	M-C	14	1.0	13.0
North Dakota	L-G	4	2.1	1.7
Ohio	L-G	25	12.3	12.4
Oklahoma	M-C	10	1.0	9.0
Oregon	L-G	6	3.0	2.8
Pennsylvania	L-G	35	17.8	16.4

Footnote at end of table.

1948 elections: Overwhelming Truman victory by assuming States operated under plan most favorable to Truman—Con.

State	Formula used	Total electoral vote	Dewey	Truman
Rhode Island	M-C	4	0	4.0
South Carolina	[1] L-G	8	.3	1.9
South Dakota	L-G	4	2.1	1.9
Tennessee	M-C	12	2.0	23.0
Texas	M-C	23	0	4.0
Utah	M-C	4	0	1.1
Vermont	L-G	3	1.8	8.0
Virginia	M-C	11	3.0	8.0
Washington	M-C	8	0	8.0
West Virginia	M-C	8	0	8.0
Wisconsin	M-C	12	4.0	3.0
Wyoming	M-C	3	0	
Total	----	531	156.2	334.7

[1] Thurmond got bulk of the electoral vote.

There may be minor and fractional discrepancies for the effect of votes for 3d, 4th, and even 5th party candidates is not known in each case.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Now, Mr. President, let us apply the two-headed system to the 1952 election. Let us assume that the votes actually cast in that election in the actual places they were cast, were distributed according to the electoral vote method in the amendmnt before us which was most favorable to Mr. Stevenson. By this method, Eisenhower would have received 264.9 electoral votes and Stevenson 263.9 electoral votes and since Eisenhower did not have a majority of the electoral vote Congress would have had to determine the final result.

I ask that a table be inserted in the RECORD at this point, showing how, by each State choosing the formula in the Daniel substitute most favorable to Mr. Stevenson, this result could have been produced.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1952 election: Statlemated election by States, choosing formula most favorable to Stevenson

State	Formula used	Total electoral vote	Republican	Democratic
Alabama	M-C	11	----	11.000
Arizona	L-G	4	2.332	1.668
Arkansas	M-C	8	1.000	7.000
California	L-G	32	18.016	13.664
Colorado	L-G	6	3.618	2.340
Connecticut	L-G	8	4.456	3.512
Delaware	L-G	3	1.554	1.437
Florida	L-G	10	5.500	4.500
Georgia	M-C	12	----	12.000
Idaho	L-G	4	2.616	1.376
Illinois	L-G	27	14.796	12.123
Indiana	L-G	13	7.553	5.330
Iowa	L-G	10	6.380	3.560
Kansas	L-G	8	5.504	2.440
Kentucky	M-C	10	3.000	7.000
Louisiana	M-C	10	1.000	9.000
Maine	L-G	5	3.300	1.690
Maryland	L-G	9	4.986	3.942
Massachusetts	L-G	16	8.672	7.280
Michigan	L-G	20	11.080	8.800
Minnesota	L-G	11	6.083	4.851
Mississippi	M-C	8	1.000	7.000
Missouri	L-G	13	6.691	6.383
Montana	L-G	4	2.376	1.604
Nebraska	L-G	6	4.152	1.848
Nevada	L-G	3	1.842	1.158
New Hampshire	L-G	4	2.436	1.564
New Jersey	L-G	16	9.088	6.720
New Mexico	L-G	4	2.216	1.772
New York	L-G	45	24.975	19.620
North Carolina	M-C	14	4.000	10.000
North Dakota	L-G	4	2.840	1.136
Ohio	L-G	25	14.200	10.800
Oklahoma	L-G	8	4.368	3.632
Oregon	L-G	6	3.630	2.334
Pennsylvania	L-G	32	16.864	15.008
Rhode Island	L-G	4	2.036	1.960
South Carolina	M-C	8	3.000	5.000
South Dakota	L-G	4	2.772	1.228
Tennessee	M-C	11	5.000	6.000

1952 election: Stalemated election by States, choosing formula most favorable to Stevenson—Continued

State	Formula used	Total electoral vote	Republican	Democratic
Texas	L-G	24	12.744	11.208
Utah	L-G	4	2.356	1.644
Vermont	L-G	3	2.145	0.846
Virginia	L-G	12	6.756	5.208
Washington	L-G	9	4.887	4.023
West Virginia	M-C	8	2.000	6.000
Wisconsin	L-G	12	7.320	4.644
Wyoming	L-G	3	1.881	1.113
Total	----	531	264.921	263.966

There may be minor and fractional discrepancies for the effect of votes for 3d, 4th, and even 5th party candidates is not known in every case.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, an electoral system which is as capricious as the one we are asked to accept, and which, depending on the formula used in each State, could produce a range of results, should most certainly be rejected by the Senate.

To accept it would be to introduce chaos into our system. It would bring charges every 4 years of "rigged" elections. It would tempt the States to shift back and forth from one system to another. If such a system existed, at this time of the year before a presidential election, Mr. Hall, of the Republican National Committee, and Mr. Butler, of the Democratic National Committee, would be touring the State legislatures of the country, urging and cajoling them to adopt the system each thought most favorable to his candidate.

Although I do not believe it would happen, it is certainly possible that State legislatures could wait until after an election to determine by which method their electoral vote would be cast. Certainly they would choose that method better designed to promote the fortunes of the party or faction in power at the time of the election.

Now that we have looked at the various mathematical possibilities under the Daniel substitute, with its alternative choice of methods, let us ask the question, Which system would each State be more likely to choose?

One can make at least two generalizations about this question.

The first is that the one-party States would probably choose the Mundt-Coudert or district unit system of casting their electoral vote. The reason for this is that the one-party States would ordinarily have their two Senators and all of their Representatives from one party. Thus, under the Mundt-Coudert system, all of their electoral votes would go to one party, whereas under the Lodge-Gossett formula the electoral vote would be divided in the proportion which the popular vote each of the three top candidates received was to the total popular vote. Thus, under Lodge-Gossett, even the minority candidate would receive some of the electoral vote whereas under Mundt-Coudert all of the electoral vote would go to the top candidate in these one-party States.

The Mundt-Coudert method would thus give the one-party State a huge prize and a larger margin with which to bargain than would the Lodge-Gossett method.

Second, it is clear that in those large populous two-party States where the popular vote is ordinarily about equally divided but where the State legislature is controlled by one party—as is ordinarily the case in States like New York, Ohio, Illinois, and California, to name only a few—the Mundt-Coudert system would also be selected. The reason is simple. Under the Lodge-Gossett method, the electoral vote in these States would ordinarily be about evenly divided. The margin would be 1 or less, or at most 2 or 3 electoral votes.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. KENNEDY. In States such as Massachusetts where the House is controlled by the Democrats and the Senate is in control of the Republicans, and the Governor is a Republican, what compromise or what gyrations would be gone through to work out which plan was to be established? That is true with respect to many other States, I may say to the Senator from Illinois, particularly States like New York.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Except that in New York the Democrats seldom control either house.

Mr. KENNEDY. But the Governor is a Democrat.

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct. However, the Governor probably would not have any choice in the matter. I do not believe he would have a voice in the selection of the method. The method is to be selected by the legislature, as I understand.

Mr. KENNEDY. But the Governor would have the veto power; would he not? I understand that the plan that would be used would be a matter of legislative determination. I understand that the acceptance of the amendment would depend entirely upon legislative action in the various States. However, deciding which plan would be used would be subject to veto by the governor; would it not?

Mr. DOUGLAS. As I understand, they would have to use the Lodge-Gossett method unless the legislature provided that the Mundt-Coudert method was to be used.

The proposal refers to legislative process, not legislature. Therefore, although I am not an expert on the subject, in my opinion, the governor would have no voice in the matter. It would be a matter of agreement between the two houses of the legislature. However, the possibility of conflict between the two houses in those States where one party is in control of one house and the other party is in control of the other house would be great indeed.

Mr. KENNEDY. What decision has the Senator come to on the question of the governor's veto power?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I was referring to section 3.

Mr. KENNEDY. As I read it, the governor would not have the power of veto.

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct. As I read it, the governor does not have the power of veto. Frankly, in this respect the Democratic Party would lose in the

States in which the legislatures tend to be Republican more than Democratic.

Mr. DUFF. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I yield.

Mr. DUFF. Is there any time limit specified during which the General Assembly is obliged to exercise its discretion with respect to when the legislation is to be used?

Mr. DOUGLAS. No; I see nothing in the proposal to that effect.

Mr. DUFF. Therefore, would it not be possible for a legislature to exercise the power after the vote had been cast?

Mr. DOUGLAS. That is correct. That is a point I tried to make earlier in my speech. The legislature could do it after the election, and they could switch back and forth between elections.

I was referring to the margin of division of the electoral vote under the two systems, and said the margin would be 1 or less, or at the most 2 or 3 electoral votes. The size of margin is not a large enough prize to be of great importance in a national election. Therefore, to enhance their bargaining position, and because of the gerrymanding of congressional districts, these two-party States could become important prizes by using the Mundt-Coudert plan and insure the party controlling the legislature a greater electoral vote than otherwise would have been the case.

In fact, in those Northern two-party States which are really one-party States so far as State legislatures are concerned, the Mundt-Coudert system would most certainly be selected. And in these circumstances, the Mundt-Coudert system would be a one-way street. For once selected at a time when say, the Republicans in New York controlled both the governorship and the legislature, it could rarely be undone for even though the Democrats so often take the governorship in New York, it is seldom that they control both the State house and Senate at the same time because of State district gerrymandering.

Mr. President, there is another consideration, also. I have given the political consideration, but there is an arithmetical consideration, namely, the Mundt-Coudert system produces a greater difference between the vote of the two parties in the two-party States than does the proportional system, and, therefore, a State wishing to magnify its importance in the electoral process and also in the nominating process would tend to choose the Mundt-Coudert system because it would become more of a prize for the victorious party and, hence, that State would have more influence in the selection of a candidate. That is the reason why it would be selected if this measure passed, just as it is the reason why States do not use it now because the present system gives a bigger prize than the district unit system.

Thus, Mr. President, because the Mundt-Coudert system would enlarge the electoral prize, it is quite clear that it would be chosen—

First, in the completely one-party States.

Second, in those two-party States where one party controls the machinery of the State government. This would be a great advantage to the Republican Party.

As one of these two situations is true in the vast majority of our States, I believe that the Mundt-Coudert system would be chosen much more often by the States than the Lodge-Gossett formula. Certainly if a State knew its own best interests it would be chosen, and I believe that in general, States are aware of their own interests.

Mr. President, since the Lodge-Gossett plan in itself is unsatifactory, since the Mundt-Coudert plan itself is unsatisfactory, since the two of them together are even more unsatisfactory, I do not see the justification of adopting this constitutional amendment. I hope, Mr. President, it will be defeated by a resounding vote so that it may be buried for a long time to come.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I wish to compliment the Senator from Illinois on what I think is one of the most outstanding speeches I have heard. I think it analyzes the pending proposal in the most detailed manner, and makes a point, which cannot be made too often, that if we are considering a radical shift in the balance of power in the United States, it should not be undertaken lightly; and, in my opinion, it should not be undertaken at this time.

384230—58251

Constitutional Election Reform

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PAUL H. DOUGLAS

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, March 29, 1956

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, Walter Lippmann's column entitled "Invitation to Confusion," sharply emphasized the chaotic situation that would be created by the passage of the proposed amendment. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD, for the information of Members, Mr. Lippmann's column, which was published in the Washington Post of March 27, 1956.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TODAY AND TOMORROW

(By Walter Lippmann)

INVITATION TO CONFUSION

There is at present strong support in Congress for a variety of constitutional reforms, all of which have to do with the Presidency. The Senate will be voting this week on several amendments dealing with the electoral college and how the popular vote for President should be counted. There is in the background the revised version of the old Bricker amendment to limit the treaty-making powers of the National Government. And there are in the works a number of bills to clear up the unsettled questions of what happens if the President is disabled.

Of these 3 subjects, it may fairly be said that only on the last 1 is it both desirable and urgent to act now. The Bricker amendment is not only not needed, but might well prove extremely embarrassing to the President. As for the reform of the electoral-college system, the fact is that though a theoretical case can be made for reform, there is no agreement among the reformers on what the reform should be.

The leading proposal now before the Senate, the so-called Daniel-Mundt amendment, proves on its face that Congress is not ready to deal with the question. This amendment would not institute a new system of voting for President. It only sounds as if it might if one does not look at it carefully. All that it really does is to invite each of the 48 State legislatures to do what those legislatures have now, and have always had, the right and power to do. The Daniel-Mundt amendment is not in fact what it purports to be—a new and better system of electing the President.

It offers each State legislature a choice of systems. Senator DANIEL, in section 2, offers each State legislature the right—which it already possesses—to order the electoral vote divided among the three leading candidates in proportion to the popular vote. Senator MUNDT, in section 3, offers each State legislature the right—which it has always had, and has in fact at times used—to let the electors be chosen like Senators and Representatives—two at large and the rest by congressional districts. Senator MUNDT also offers the State legislatures—though nothing is said about it—the right to keep the general ticket system provided they also elect their Representatives at large.

So far as I can make out, as to how the popular vote shall be counted, the one and only thing the amendment changes is to prohibit a State from electing its representatives by districts and its electors on a general ticket. If the State wanted to have the general ticket system for electors it would—like New Mexico and North Dakota today—have to elect its Congressmen on a general ticket. The temptation to do just that would be strong, especially in the smaller States, because with all the electoral votes counted as a unit, the State has a greater impact on the choice of a President. The best proof of this is that for more than a century all the States have voluntarily adhered to the general ticket system. The reason they have adhered to it is that this system gives them their greatest political weight.

Whatever may be said in favor of the Daniel reform, the Mundt reform, or any of the other proposed reforms, nothing can be said in favor of a constitutional amendment to invite each State legislature to consider before each presidential election how it will have the popular vote in its State counted. That, however, is what the Daniel-Mundt amendment really does. It decides nothing. It merely invites and incites the majority party in each State legislature to tinker with the system in order to help shape the result of the election.

Thus the system of electing Presidents, which is now stable and uniform by general consent throughout the Nation, would become variable and unsettled. A close national election could come to depend on whether a particular State legislature had for that election picked one system rather than another.

Congress is quite evidently not ready to propose a reform of the electoral system. For what is now before it in the Daniel-Mundt amendment is in fact an elaborate pretense. It covers what is simply a passing of the buck to the 48 State legislatures.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

EXTRACT

Reform of the Electoral System

Of recent proposals for the reform of the Electoral System, the best advertised currently is the Lodge-Gossett plan, with its twin in the 84th Congress, the Daniel-Humphrey resolution. The plan, as introduced in the 84th Congress, calls for the abolition of the Electoral College, but the electoral vote of each state is still retained, to be divided among the several candidates for President in proportion to the popular vote cast for each within a given state. The fractions involved would be carried to three decimal places. The candidate having the greatest number of electoral votes would be President if that number were at least forty per cent of the electoral vote. If it were not, the Senate and the House, sitting in joint session, would choose the President from the two candidates with the most electoral votes.

Various claims have been made for the Lodge-Gossett, Daniel-Humphrey proposal. (1) It would give proper weight to the minority vote cast in each state by accurately reflecting that vote in the electoral vote. Former Senator Lodge holds that under the present system votes cast for the losing candidate in a given state are "of no more effect that if they never had been cast." Under the proposed plan, he maintains, every popular vote would count, since what are now wholly unused blocs of votes would be carried over into other states and added to other votes. Public opinion, it is maintained, would be more accurately mirrored in presidential elections, and popular interest and participation would be heightened in all states. Under present procedures activity fluctuates widely from great intensity in pivotal or doubtful states to total neglect in sure and small states. (2) The plan would abolish the evil of the one-party state. (3) It would overcome the tendency of the present unit rule to focus a disproportionate amount of political attention on local blocs. (4) The plan would preclude the danger, sometimes realized under present practice, that the candidate receiving a minority of the popular vote will receive a majority of the electoral vote. (5) The plan harmonizes with the structure of our federal democracy by protecting the interests of the small states and observing the principle of the equality of the states in the Senate. In sum, as Mr. Lodge has put it, the plan claims to be "fair, accurate, and democratic." [Corwin and Koenig, The Presidency Today, 1956 pp. 109-110.]

the Judicial Conference has published the results of at least two comprehensive studies of the over crowded docket conditions existing in the Federal system and its recommendations for additional district and circuit judges needed to adequately cope with the cro[illegible]

I have therefore, in the bill I am now introducing, changed the language of my previous bills so as to conform to those Judicial Conference recommendations as they pertain to the State of Maryland. Those recommendations provided for the appointment of at least two additional judges to the district court bench and two additional judges to the bench of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

I have many times in the past publicly stated my views on the need for these additional judges and the need grows greater with each passing day.

The present caseload of the two courts, according to the Judicial Conference's reports, is much higher than the national average. Those statistics reveal a phenomenal increase in civil cases filed since the end of World War II in Maryland's U.S. district court. For the 7-year period from 1946 through 1952, the average annual civil filings were 571.

In the succeeding 7-year period, from 1953 through 1959, they rose to 892, an overall increase of 56 percent with no increase in judge power. The average number of civil cases commenced per judgeship in 1959, 418, was almost twice the national average of 215.

The situation is also critical with respect to the criminal caseload which in 1959 was more than 60 percent above the national average of 108 per judgeship. Nevertheless, the median time for disposing of cases in the district of Maryland—10.4 months in 1959—is consistently below the national median—15.3 months in 1959.

An analysis of the court records of the fourth circuit will reveal that the need for the additional two judges recommended for that court is equally great.

The nationwide need for additional Federal judges has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Democratic controlled 85th and 86th Congresses by the Attorney General who has long been concerned with overcrowded docket conditions.

The drastic need had also been recognized by President Eisenhower, who in an effort to get the Congress to act, promised to split the appointments to newly created judgeships equally among the two major political parties. That was indeed a generous bona fide gesture made in an effort to get action. The President was, nevertheless, ignored.

Mr. President, I doubt that the present administration will make the same generous offer, but whether it does or not, I strongly urge that this Congress take action not only on my request for additional Federal judgeships in my jurisdiction but on all recommendations of the Judicial Conference as well.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 226) to provide for the appointment of additional district court judges for the district of Maryland; and for the appointment of additional circuit judges for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, introduced by Mr. BUTLER, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, weeks have passed since the presidential election. In its immediate aftermath there was a vast outpouring of public indignation from every State of the Union over the patent inadequacy, the creaky antiquity and the glaring inequity of the entire presidential electoral system from beginning to end.

Today, the inadequacy remains; the antiquity remains; the inequity remains. But I wonder, Mr. President, how much of the public indignation remains. It is a long time from November to January and, somehow, we have once again muddled through a presidential election which has managed, more by accident than design, reasonably to reflect the views of the voters in the selection of the President and the Vice President of the United States.

The flaws in the electoral system are still there; but is the will to do something about them still there? As the Senate well knows, after every major election which, in one manner or another, highlights the outrageous weaknesses in the system, there is a clamor for change. The attempt to improve the system has been made before, many times. Rarely have the attempts met with success and many times they have failed. These failures, notwithstanding, it seems to me that the attempt must be made again and again so long as the flaws remain. The attempt must be made and, someday, it must succeed if we are to insure the continued vitality of the basic political machinery of the Nation.

It has sometimes taken great catastrophies in other areas of our social life to end inertia and to produce significant changes in practices, as, for example, in fire prevention, in banking, and in many other matters. I hope that it will not require anything so drastic to produce significant changes in the basic but outmoded instrumentalities of our political freedom—that for selecting the President of the United States so as to encourage the best possible choice as well as the continued responsiveness of the office to the people of the Nation.

During the last political campaign I announced that I would present for the consideration of the Senate, certain measures for dealing with what appeared to me to be significant flaws in the Presidential electoral system. That is what I shall do, today, after these explanatory remarks have been completed.

The significant flaws, as I see them, the flaws requiring priority consideration, are the following:

First. The out-of-date unrepresentative, and on occasion completely irresponsible, electoral college system.

Second. The long interregnum or transition when the administration remains in the hands of the incumbents from early November to late January—in hands which have, in reality, already been cut off from their source of power.

Third. The brutal length of presidential campaigns and its brutalizing effect on the level of debate and discussion.

Fourth. The costs of campaigns and the methods of financing them.

Fifth. The nomination of presidential candidates by the major parties under the present convention system.

Today I wish to introduce three legislative measures which are designed at least to begin to cope with these five categories of flaws. They are not the first legislative word, and I am sure, not the last word on any of these problems. They represent one Senator's thinking—aided in its legal expression by the experts of the Library of Congress and the office of the Senate Legislative Counsel. They are an attempt to find a legal road out of the morass of confusion, inequity, and irresponsibility which characterizes the present system of presidential selection.

The first of the three measures, Mr. President, is a proposal to amend the Constitution of the United States. This measure represents a complete departure from the present electoral college system. It does not seek to patch up that system; it seeks to end it.

The proposed amendment calls, simply, for the election of the President and Vice President by direct popular vote. It would give to every vote—wherever it may be cast in the Nation—an equal value with all others cast. In short, it would write into the Constitution the principle that one American voter equals one vote—no more, no less, in the selection of the President and Vice President of the Nation.

This approach is not new, Mr. President. It has been tried time and again since the very beginning of the Republic. In recent years, the distinguished majority whip, the able Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] and other Members have fought well but without success to bring about this change.

It remains to be seen whether a renewal of the effort at this time will meet with any results. I must confess that I am not sanguine in my expectations. The issue is not simple and even if it were, constitutional changes are not easily or quickly made, nor should they be. Nevertheless, it seems to me most desirable that we test periodically in the Congress these propositions: First, we have reached that point in our continuing constitutional evolution in which Americans should express their unity as a people, beyond State divisions, by selecting by equal vote throughout the land the President of the United States; and second, we have reached, as a people, that point of political enlightenment and maturity at which Americans are competent to fill the Presidential office by direct vote, without the faceless intermediaries of the electoral college.

My experience with my fellow Americans, not only in Montana but throughout the Nation, leads me to subscribe to both propositions. It is for that reason that I will introduce this proposed

amendment. It is for that reason that I have considered but rejected alternative proposals for changes which would, in essence, seek to amend or to patch up rather than abolish the electoral college system. No matter how it may be changed, so long as the institution remains, we will not conform to the basic principle of one American voter—one vote in the selection of the President. All significant measures short of this, so far as I can see, can act only as a rejockeying of inequities, as efforts to shift advantages as between large States and small States, between rural areas and urban areas. I, for one, can see no real national purpose in exchanging the inequities which exist in the present system for the unknown inequities which various halfway measures may substitute for them.

To the only significant argument which still serves to underwrite the electoral college system, that is, that it is a part of the Federal system and as such must be preserved, I can only reply that, in my opinion, the Federal system is not strengthened through an antiquated device which has not worked as it was intended to work when it was included in the Constitution and which, if anything, has become a divisive force in the Federal system by pitting groups of States against groups of States. As I see the Federal system in contemporary practice, the House of Representatives is the key to the protection of district interests as district interests, just as he Senate is the key to the protection of State interests as State interests. These instrumentalities, and particularly the Senate, are the principal constitutional safeguards of the Federal system, but the Presidency has evolved, out of necessity, into the principal political office, as the courts have become the principal legal bulwark beyond districts, beyond States, for safeguarding the interests of all the people in all the States. And since such is the case, in my opinion, the Presidency should be subject to the direct and equal control of all the people. That is what this proposed constitutional amendment, if it is approved, will help to do. And may I add that under its terms the proposition would be put, not to the State legislatures for ratification, but as also provided for in the Constitution and as was done in the case of the repeal of the 18th amendment, to the direct and specific consideration of amending conventions chosen by the people in the States solely for that purpose.

This amendment, as now proposed, will do one thing more. It will speed the day for the assumption of office by a President-elect from January 20 to the December 1 prior. In short, this provision will reduce the lame-duck presidency by several weeks and thereby cut the dangerous drift in national leadership during periods of administrative changeover. At the same time it will give the new President a greater opportunity to shape his program more effectively to action by permitting him more time to gain control over the continuing processes of the executive branch before the meeting of the new Congress.

Let me turn next, Mr. President, to the first of two bills which I shall also introduce today along with the proposed amendment. This bill, Mr. President, is aimed, simultaneously, at two flaws in the present electoral system—the cost of campaigns and their brutal and brutalizing length. I need hardly explain to Members of this body that the costs of political campaigns—particularly presidential campaigns—has reached enormous levels. If all the expenditures from all sources are totaled, the cost runs into tens of millions of dollars—no one really knows exactly how much. Money is clearly a factor in all campaigns and, in close campaigns, it may be the decisive factor.

I do not think that it serves the interests of the entire Nation when elections can be influenced significantly or even decided by the question of which candidate can raise the most money. I do not think it serves the national interests when the expenses for those who campaign to serve all the people must be financed by a relative handful of people and organizations which make large contributions directly or indirectly. I do not think it adds to the dignity and vitality of the nation's political life when another major source of political finance is the patently unsatisfactory practice of selling $2 steaks at $100-a-plate dinners. I do not think it serves the national interest when political campaigns which begin as instruments of public enlightenment end in a crescendo of weary repetition and name calling as the length of the campaign exhausts the candidates and forces of hate and malicious gossip are emboldened to join in a final chorus of distortion and defamation at the close of the campaign.

Let me say, Mr. President, that I do not criticize the loyal adherents of any party in these comments. They work hard for their candidates.

They raise money as best they can because money is essential in political campaigns. They do the best that they are able to do. But I do believe all of us, in the Congress, and in the Nation, share reponsibility for the neglect and inertia which makes a most vital instrument of freedom dependent for its financing on a system less equitable and less rational than the fundraising devices of obscure charities. I do believe both parties share responsibility for persisting in campaigns whose length is more attuned to the age of drum signals in the jungle than to the age of instant and full national electronic communications.

This bill which I am about to introduce, Mr. President, acts to supplement in a limited way, out of public funds the resources of the major parties so that they will become more dependent in a financial sense on all the people rather than on a relative handful of contributors. I would hope that the bill will be seen as complementary to the kind of legislation proposed by our late colleague, Senator Hennings, during the last session. His interest in this subject was intense, and he sought to bring about a rational approach to the limitation on expenditures by all parties.

The bill that I am about to introduce, Mr. President, seeks to isolate a principal cost of modern presidential campaigns—TV and radio broadcasting which have become the most important single devices of public discussion of the issues. It would have the Nation underwrite out of the Treasury $1 million of the cost of such broadcasting for each party. This would pay for roughly a total of less than 10 hours of a full national network coverage on radio and TV. It would do this, however, only if the parties held their nominating conventions for President and Vice President after September 1. In other words, Mr. President, the people would cover with public funds a part of the cost of a presidential campaign but only if the parties in turn agree to shorten their campaigns which, in effect, they would do if they held off their nominating until September 1.

Finally, as I noted, the bill would also act to simplify and to make more equitable the conditions of nomination of candidates in the party conventions. For to be eligible for the financial aid provided under the measure, a party's convention would not only have to be held after September 1 but votes at the convention would have to be allotted on the same basis as congressional representation and no fractional voting would be permitted. Convention delegates, thus, would have to be chosen in rough proportion to population. Conventions would consist uniformly of about 600 delegates rather than the many more who now participate, and we would see an end to that curious convention phenomenon whereby some delegates are worth half a body while others are whole and full of value.

I turn now to the second of the two bills which I shall introduce today. This bill is concerned with the question of the use of the direct primary as a device for the nomination of presidential candidates. Let me say at the outset, that in preparing this bill, I have drawn heavily on the original work of the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. Douglas], the able Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Proxmire], and our late and dedicated colleague from Oregon [Mr. Neuberger].

I considered for a long time the possibility of a direct national primary. For constitutional reasons as well as those of practicality, I have now come to the conclusion that something along the lines of the approach of the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], which would not require a constitutional amendment, would be most practical at this point. What is proposed, then, is a modification and elaboration of a bill presented by him in the 82d Congress. It would give Federal assistance at a set rate to States to help them finance the conduct of preferential primaries for nominees for the Presidency. In short, it is an effort to encourage States to use this device so that when the conventions do meet they will have before them a far more extensive grasp of popular sentiment as expressed through preferential primaries than is now the case, a sentiment which they would ignore at their own peril. In short, the bill is designed to help bring

the nominating processes out from behind the closed doors and to encourage wider popular participation in them. The bill attempts to meet objections which were raised against the original Douglas legislation, and it goes further in providing some financial assistance to serious candidates for the nomination for the Presidency in each party.

That, Mr. President, completes my presentation of the three measures affecting the electoral system which I am about to introduce. I present them to the Senate only after the most careful study of the problem and with a full awareness that changes in the basic political machinery of the Nation ought never to be lightly undertaken. I introduce them with the expectation that they will be carefully considered by the appropriate committees along with other motions on this subject.

By the same token, I introduce them in the belief that action to modernize the electoral machinery for the Presidency and to introduce a measure of greater dignity and public responsibility into political campaigns is long overdue, I introduce them in the belief that more equitable conditions for the selection and consideration of candidates and more direct popular control will better serve the present needs of our people and help to revitalize and encourage greater popular participation in the most important single expression of political freedom in this Nation—the election of the President and Vice President of the United States.

Mr. President, I send to the desk for appropriate referral the following:

A proposed amendment to the Constitution providing for the direct popular election of the President and Vice President.

A bill to authorize the appointment of a Federal Presidential Election Board to conduct preferential primaries for the nomination for President.

A bill to reimburse political parties for radio and television expenditures in presidential election campaigns.

Mr. President, these thoughts are presented for the consideration of the Senate and, particularly, for the study of the appropriate committees. Any or all of them—on the basis of further study—may prove to have some merit. Any or all of them may not. They have been introduced for the purpose of bringing about consideration of a set of electoral problems of serious proportions. The proposals are presented in the hope that the responsible committees will weigh them along with other proposals and come up with some effective answers to these electoral problems.

Let me say finally that not a little of what has been proposed and much of what has been said can be found in legislation previously introduced by Members of the Senate and the House, both Democrats and Republicans. I have borrowed heavily from other colleagues and, if there is any credit in these suggestions, they, the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, and the Senate Legislative Counsel, deserve most of it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the joint resolution and bills I have introduced may be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The joint resolution and bills will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the joint resolution and bills will be printed in the RECORD.

The joint resolution and bills, introduced by Mr. MANSFIELD, were received, read twice by their titles, appropriately referred, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

To the Committee on the Judiciary:

S.J. Res. 23. Joint resolution proposing an amendement to the Constitution of the United States relating to term of office of President and Vice President, and providing for election of candidates for President and Vice President by popular vote.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by conventions in three-fourths of the several States:

"ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during a term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, shall be elected by votes cast by the people of the several States. No person constitutionally ineligible for the office of President shall be eligible for that of Vice President of the United States.

"The Congress shall determine the time of such election, which shall be the same throughout the United States. Until otherwise determined by the Congress, such election shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November of the year in which the regular term of the President and Vice President, as herein provided, is to begin.

"The persons voting in each State in such election shall have the qualifications requisite for persons voting for members of the most numerous branch of the legislature of that State. The places and manner of holding such election shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations. The candidates for the offices of President and Vice President shall be selected in such manner as the Congress shall by law provide. The names of the candidates so selected shall be placed on the ballot in each State, and shall so appear thereon that a single vote will be cast by each voter for the candidate of a political party for the office of President and the candidate of the same party for the office of the Vice President.

"SEC. 2. Within two weeks after such election, the chief executive of each State shall make distinct lists showing the number of votes cast in such State for the candidates of each political party for the offices of President and Vice President, which lists shall be signed, certified, and transmitted under the seal of such State to the seat of the Government of the United States directed to the President of the Senate.

"On the twenty-first day following such election the President of the Senate shall open all certificates in the presence of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chief Justice of the United States, and the votes shall then be counted. The candidates of a political party for the offices of President and Vice President having the greatest number of votes shall be President and Vice President, respectively. If the candidates of two or more political parties shall have an equal number of votes for President and Vice President, and the candidates shall be deemed elected who shall have received the greatest number of the votes in each of the greatest number of States. The Congress may by law provide for the case wherein one or more of the persons referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph are unable to be present on the day fixed for the opening of the certificates, declaring who shall act in their places.

"SEC. 3. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the first day of December in the fourth year of their term; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.

"SEC. 4. The first, second, third, and fourth paragraphs of section 1, article II, of the Constitution, the twelfth article of the amendment to the Constitution, that part of section 1 of the twentieth article of amendment to the Constitution which refers to the terms of the President and Vice President, and section 4 of the twentieth article of amendment to the Constitution are hereby repealed.

"SEC. 5. This article shall take effect on the first day of June following its ratification.

"SEC. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in three-fourths of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by Congress."

To the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. 227. A bill to provide for the reimbursement of political parties for their radio and television expenditures in Presidential election campaign.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, for the purpose of reimbursing political parties for their expenditures for radio and television broadcast time in aid or support of the election campaign of their candidates for President and Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay, with respect to each Presidential election, from the sums appropriated pursuant to section 4:

(a) A sum not to exceed $1,000,000 to each political party whose candidates for President and Vice President receive 10 per centum or more of the total popular vote in such election; and

(b) A sum not to exceed $100,000 to each political party whose candidates for President and Vice President receive more than 1 per centum but less than 10 per centum of the total popular vote in such election.

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Act, a political party shall not be eligible for reimbursement under such provisions unless—

(a) Such political party submits to the Secretary of the Treasury, within — days after the date of the election, an application for reimbursement accompanied by a correct and itemized statement of the expenditures with respect to which it seeks reimbursement; and

(b) The candidates of such political party for President and Vice President in such election shall have been nominated at a convention—

(1) which was convened on or after the first day of September of the year in which such election is held, and

(2) in which (i) the number of votes allotted to each State was equal to the number of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives from such State, (ii) the number of votes distributed among the other areas under the jurisdiction of the United

States did not exceed six, and (iii) fractional voting was not permitted.

SEC. 3. In any case in which the candidates of any political party for President and Vice President are also the candidates of one or more other political parties, reimbursed under this Act shall be made only to whichever one of such political parties received the greatest number of popular votes.

SEC. 4. This Act shall apply to the presidential election to be held in 1964 and to each such election thereafter.

SEC. 5. There is herby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

To the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. 228. A bill to establish a Federal Presidential Election Board to conduct preference primaries in connection with the nomination of candidates for President.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) in order to encourage the use of preferential primaries for the purpose of suggesting nominees for President to the major political parties, there is hereby established the Federal-Presidential Election Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") which shall consist of the following members:

(1) Two members to be appointed by the President of the United States;

(2) Two members to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States;

(3) Two members to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(4) Two members to be appointed by the President of the United States from each political party which polled more than 10 per centum of the total popular vote in the next preceding presidential election, such appointment to be made from among names submitted by the national committees of such parties; and

(5) One member to be appointed by the President from each political party which polled more than five but not more than ten per centum of the total popular vote in the next preceding presidential election, such appointment to be made from among names submitted by the national committees of such parties.

(b) Members of the Board shall be appointed for terms of four years beginning on March 1 of the year following a presidential election except that (1) any member appointed to fill a vacancy prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be appointed for the remainder of such term, and (2) the terms of office of the members first appointed after the enactment of this Act shall commence on the dates of their respective appointments and shall end on February 28, 1965. Vacancies shall be filled promptly by appointment as provided in subsection (a) of this section. After the appointment of the first members of the Board, and at the beginning of each four-year term thereafter, the Chief Justice of the United States shall designate one of the members of the Board to call a meeting of the Board at which the first order of business shall be the election of a chairman and vice chairman.

SEC. 2. (a) The Board is hereby authorized to enter into agreements with the several States, through their appropriate officials, to conduct preferential primaries for suggesting nominees for President to each political party which polled 10 per centum or more of the Nation's total popular vote in the next preceding presidential election.

(b) The Board is hereby authorized to compensate each State with which an agreement is made for use of its facilities and services, but such compensation shall not exceed in any State an amount equal to twenty cents multiplied by the total number of votes cast in the preferential primary held in that State.

SEC. 3. (a) No person shall be a candidate for nomination in a preference primary under this Act unless there shall have been filed with the Board—

(1) a petition on behalf of his candidacy signed by at least 1,000 citizens of each of three-fourths of the States who are registered or otherwise qualified to vote in their respective States; and

(2) a bond in the sum of $25,000 which shall be forfeited if such person fails to poll at least 3 per centum of the total vote in all States in which preferential primaries are held under the provisions of this Act.

(b) Whenever the Board shall receive a petition which appears to qualify the name of a candidate for President, it shall forthwith in writing notify the prospective candidate of such petition and shall advise him that, unless he informs the Board of the withdrawal of his name from the ballot within ten days after receipt of such notice, or unless there is a failure to comply within such time as may be fixed by the Board therefor with the provisions of subsection (a)(2), his name shall appear on the ballot of his party in such presidential preference primary in all States which entered into agreements therefor with the Board.

SEC. 4. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), each candidate whose name appears on the ballot in a preference primary held under the provisions of this act shall be eligible for reimbursement by the Board in an amount not to exceed $250,000 for expenditures made by him or by any person for him with his knowledge and consent in aid or support of his primary campaign.

(b) The reimbursement authorized by this section shall not be paid to any candidate unless—

(1) the candidate shall file with the Board, within 20 days after the last preference primary has been held, a correct and itemized account of each such expenditure together with the name of the person to whom such expenditure was made, except that only the total sum of expenditures for items specified in section 309(c) of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925 (2 U.S.C. 248 (c)), need be stated; and

(2) the candidate polls at least 3 percent of the total vote in all States in which primaries are held under the provisions of this act.

SEC. 5. The Board shall by regulation specify the time within which the petitions referred to in section 3 shall be filed, the dates of such preference primaries, and other details necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes and provisions of this act, but no such preference primary may be held later than August 1 of any presidential election year.

SEC. 6. As used in this act, the term "State" means one of the several States. The Board may, however, in its discretion, conduct preferential primaries in other areas under the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States, either independently or in conjunction with local officials.

SEC. 7. Each member of the Board shall receive the sum of $50 for each day or part thereof spent in the performance of his official duties. The Board shall appoint and fix the rate of compensation of such other employees as it may from time to time find necessary for the proper performance of its duties. All of the expenses of the Board, including all necessary travel and subsistence expenses incurred by the members or employees of the Board under its orders, shall be paid out of appropriations therefor, and there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Board in each presidential election year not to exceed the sum of $10 million to carry out the purposes of this act.

Mr. KEATING subsequently said: Mr. President, with the approval of the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], the able majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that my name may be added as a cosponsor of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 23) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to term of Office of President and Vice President, and providing for election of candidates for President and Vice President by popular vote, introduced by him earlier today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

"National Electoral Reform"

Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides for the election of the President and the Vice-President.

Although the subject of electoral reform has long occupied the attentions of Congress, there has never been an attempt made to obtain a national concensus through the proper procedure of a constitutional amendment. In the absence of national direction individual states have at various times during the last century and a half succeeded in twisting the electoral system to their advantage or to that of a particular political configuration. This anarchic method of decision-making is directly responsible for the injustices and inconsistencies of our present system.

The electoral college has long out-lived its original purpose; it has become a potential instrument of trouble-making. During the last national election one delegate legally cancelled the ballots of the voters in his district by asserting his right to make an independent decision. His action, so nearly crucial to the result of the election, serves as a reminder of how very antiquated our system is.

My resolution is a compromise. It offers a middle way between direct popular election of the President and the proportional method. Under my plan the two senatorial electoral votes will go to the candidate receiving a plurality of the popular vote in each state. The remaining 435 electoral votes are to be divided among the candidates according to the proportion each candidate receives on a nation-wide basis.

This proposal recognizes the federal principle, which the direct election schemes do not, yet it permits the national electorate to influence the presidential choice directly to a greater degree than the plans for proportional division of the electoral vote in accordance with the popular vote in each state. It eliminates the office of elector, while it retains the stabilizing influence of the electoral vote. Through its lack of overwhelming emphasis on the state as a unit, it will increase voter participation in those areas which have been considered "safe" for one party or another. It will finally insure that every citizen of the United States is the possessor of an equal vote.

I submit this resolution in hopes that the Congress will give it deep thought and consideration.

87th Congress - First Session
Report No. 9 - June 26, 1961

research - electoral college

LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS

PROPOSALS TO REVISE THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

PUBLISHED AND DISTRIBUTED BY THE
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION
1012 FOURTEENTH STREET, N. W., WASHINGTON, D. C.
EXECUTIVE 3-8205

THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION, established in 1943, is a nonpartisan research and educational organization which studies national policy problems.

Association publications take two major forms:

1. LEGISLATIVE ANALYSES—factual analyses of current legislative proposals before the Congress. A typical AEA report comprises: (1) a brief statement of pertinent background, (2) a digest of significant provisions, (3) a discussion of the pro and con arguments, and (4) a series of questions designed to bring out the basic issues. The reports present no conclusions and reflect no policy position in favor of or against the subject proposal.

2. LONGER RANGE STUDIES—basic studies of major national problems of significance for public policy. The Association, with the counsel of its Advisory Board, utilizes the services of competent authors, but assumes no responsibility for their opinions.

ADVISORY BOARD

Herrell F. DeGraff, Chairman
Babcock Professor of Food Economics, Cornell University

Karl Brandt, Director
Food Research Institute
Stanford University

Milton Friedman
Professor of Economics
University of Chicago

Arthur Kemp, Professor
of Money and Finance
Claremont Men's College

Paul W. McCracken, Professor
School of Business Administration
University of Michigan

Felix Morley
Editor and Author

Stanley Parry, Chairman
Department of Political
Science
University of Notre Dame

Roscoe Pound
Professor Emeritus
Harvard University

E. Blythe Stason
Dean Emeritus, Law School
University of Michigan

OFFICERS

President
Allen D. Marshall

Vice-Presidents
Walter C. Beckjord
Henry T. Bodman
Carl N. Jacobs
H. C. Lumb

Treasurer
Henry T. Bodman

William J. Baroody
Executive Vice-President

Thomas F. Johnson
Director of Research

Roy Wood
Director of Legislative Analysis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY	1
INTRODUCTION	3
THE PRESENT SYSTEM	4
ASSERTED OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENT PROCEDURE	5
Objections to the Office of Elector	5
Objections to Unit-rule Method of Counting Electoral Votes	6
Objection to Procedure for Election by Congress if no Majority in Electoral College	7
MAJOR PROPOSALS FOR REVISION	8
THE ARGUMENTS	10
Proposals to Abolish the Electoral College	10
Direct Popular Election	11
District Elector Plan	11
Proportional Representation Plan	12
QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE STUDY	15

* * *

AEA Publications . . . . . Inside back cover

RESOLUTIONS

Direct Popular Election

S.J. Res. 1	Sen. Smith (Me.) for herself and Sens. Beall, Chavez, Morse, and Aiken
S.J. Res. 23	Sen. Mansfield, for himself and Sen. Keating
H.J. Res. 24	Rep. Baldwin
H.J. Res. 28	Rep. Broomfield
H.J. Res. 36	Rep. Collier
H.J. Res. 55	Rep. Matthews
H.J. Res. 76	Rep. Stewart Udall (now Secretary of Interior)
H.J. Res. 126	Rep. Merrow
H.J. Res. 128	Rep. Monagan
H.J. Res. 369	Rep. Farbstein

District Elector Plan

S.J. Res. 12	Sen. Mundt, for himself and Sens. Thurmond, McClellan, Hruska, Morton, and Blakley
H.J. Res. 54	Rep. McSween
H.J. Res. 125	Rep. Matthews
H.J. Res. 200	Rep. Whitten
H.J. Res. 377	Rep. Berry

Proportional Representation Plan

S.J. Res. 2	Sen. Johnston
S.J. Res. 4	Sen. Dodd
S.J. Res. 9	Sen. Smathers
S.J. Res. 17	Sen. Kefauver
S.J. Res. 28	Sen. Saltonstall
S.J. Res. 96	Sen. Ervin
H.J. Res. 25	Rep. Bennett (Fla.)
H.J. Res. 46	Rep. Kilgore
H.J. Res. 106	Rep. Wright
H.J. Res. 116	Rep. Smith (Miss.)
H.J. Res. 122	Rep. Dingell
H.J. Res. 165	Rep. Fisher
H.J. Res. 169	Rep. Herlong

Variations

S.J. Res. 26	Sen. McGee
S.J. Res. 48	Sen. Case (S.D.)
H.J. Res. 84	Rep. Zablocki
H.J. Res. 161	Rep. Hiestand
H.J. Res. 175	Rep. Seely-Brown
H.J. Res. 274	Rep. MacGregor

PROPOSALS TO REVISE THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

SUMMARY

The Constitution provides that the President and Vice President shall be chosen by electors appointed by the several states. Each state is entitled to a number of electors equal to its Representatives and Senators in Congress and is authorized to appoint its electors in such manner as its legislature may direct. Under present practice the states select their electors by popular vote. However, electors usually run as a slate pledged to a particular candidate and the slate receiving the largest number of votes, even though not a majority of the total vote, wins the right to cast all of the state's electoral votes. Where the presidential candidates' names are on the ballot, the votes for a candidate are credited to his slate of electors. If no candidate for President obtains the votes of a majority of all electors, the House of Representatives chooses among the three candidates who have the highest number of electoral votes. But in such a case each state, regardless of population, is entitled to only one vote.

The electoral college has been described as "a mystifying and distorting factor" which may resolve a popular defeat into an electoral victory. In the last election neither of the two major candidates received a majority of the total popular vote. Although the difference between the popular vote for Sen. Kennedy and Vice President Nixon was less than one per cent, the electoral vote was 303 to 219. In two states electors were not pledged to any candidate, and in another an elector who ran on the Nixon ticket cast his electoral vote for Sen. Byrd who was not a candidate.

It is frequently argued that the framers of the Constitution intended that electors exercise their independent, nonpartisan judgment in selecting the President. However, the Constitution itself does not spell out such a requirement but leaves each state free to elect pledged electors by popular vote and to award its electoral votes on a "winner-take-all" basis.

Following the electoral count last January, over 30 members of Congress introduced resolutions to amend the electoral college provisions of the Constitution. Generally, these fall into three categories: (1) direct elections by popular vote, (2) the district elector plan, and (3) what is known as the proportional representation plan.

An amendment for a direct vote for President has been proposed by Sen. Mansfield. Under this proposal a plurality of the total national vote would be sufficient to win. A similar proposal sponsored by Sen. Margaret Chase Smith would provide for presidential primaries to select party nominees and would require a majority of the total national vote to win. A run-off election between the two highest tickets would be held if necessary.

The principal argument made for a direct vote, of course, is that every voter would have an equal voice in selecting the President. It is

also argued that a direct vote would stimulate interest in national elections, particularly in the "safe" states.

Opponents contend that a federalized system would lead to Federal control of voter qualifications and other election requirements. They point out, also, that every state is now entitled to a minimum of three electoral votes whereas the popular vote in some small states would give them less influence in presidential elections.

Under the district elector plan electoral districts would be established "containing as nearly as practicable the number of persons which entitled the State to one Representative in the Congress." In addition to an elector from each district, two would be elected on a state-wide basis. Such a plan, it is argued, would more nearly reflect the popular vote than the present state-unit system, and would be more realistic from a political point of view. Under this plan as embodied in the Mundt Resolution (S.J. Res. 12), if no candidate obtains a majority of the electoral vote, the Congress as a whole would elect a President and each member of Congress (instead of each state delegation) would cast a vote.

Opponents assert that the "winner-take-all" approach would still apply to some extent under the district plan, and that it would still be possible to have a minority President elected. Although the proposal attempts to minimize "gerrymandering" of electoral districts, opponents doubt that this would be effective.

Under the proportional representation plan, the office of elector would be abolished. However, each state would continue to have a number of electoral votes equal to the number of its Senators and Representatives. Under this plan, as proposed by Sen. Kefauver (S.J. Res. 17), the electoral vote for each state would be divided in proportion to the total vote for each presidential candidate within the state. The candidate with the largest total number of electoral votes would be elected. Most proposals in this category would require a candidate to receive at least 40 per cent of the electoral votes in order to be elected. Failing this, the election would go to the Congress. That body, voting individually, would pick the President from the two highest candidates. A majority of the total authorized membership of Congress would be required to elect.

Like the supporters of the direct popular vote, proponents of the proportional plan say that abolishing the office of presidential elector would eliminate many risks which can arise under the present system. Its sponsors claim further that the proportional plan, like other plans to eliminate the state-unit rule, would measure the influence of special interest groups in pivotal states by their members rather than by their bargaining power. But the method, as embodied in S.J. Res. 17, is opposed on the ground that it would permit the election of a President who receives only 40 per cent of the vote.

INTRODUCTION

In the 1960 Presidential election neither of the two major parties' candidates received a majority of the total popular vote. Although the difference between the total popular vote for Sen. Kennedy and Vice President Nixon was only a fraction of one per cent, the electoral vote was 303 to 219. All of the electors in one state and over one-half of those in another were elected without pledging themselves to either candidate. In another state an elector pledged to vote for Mr. Nixon cast his electoral vote for Sen. Byrd who was not a candidate. Such an outcome in a political contest which is so important inevitably leads to publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the election processes and to proposals for reform.

Many respectable authorities contend that the founding fathers expected the electoral college to be composed of outstanding men who would exercise an independent, nonpartisan judgment in their selection of the President. The electoral college, it is said, was designed to avoid election of the Executive by popular vote. However, the electoral college has not functioned in accordance with the independent elector concept and its continued use has provoked substantial criticism. Over 130 proposals to revise the procedure for the election of the President have been introduced in Congress since 1947. The Senate, in 1950, passed one proposal, but it failed in the House. A majority of the Senate—but less than the necessary two-thirds—voted to adopt another proposal in 1956.

Since the 87th Congress assembled last January, over 30 joint resolutions proposing constitutional amendments to reform the electoral system have been introduced in the Senate and House. Most proposals repeat the legislation introduced in earlier Congresses. Several proposals would abolish the electoral college and would provide for the popular election of the President and Vice President; some would retain the college but substitute a district system for the state-unit system; and others would distribute the electoral vote by states in proportion to each candidate's popular vote in each state.

THE PRESENT SYSTEM

Under the present procedure for the election of the President and Vice President, each state appoints, in such manner as its legislature directs, a number of electors equal to the number of its Senators and Representatives in Congress. At the present time the state-wide "general ticket" or unit-rule system is used. The slate of electors which obtains the greatest number of votes, whether or not a majority of the total votes cast, is empowered to cast all of the electoral votes allocated to the state. This is known as "The-winner-take-all" concept now employed in most of the states.

The electors meet in their respective state capitals to vote for the President and Vice President. Candidates for elector generally pledge themselves to vote for party nominees and they usually cast their votes in accordance with their pledges.[1/] Subsequently, certified lists of the votes are forwarded to Washington and they are opened and counted before the House and Senate in joint session. The candidates having the greatest number of electoral votes are elected, provided such votes are equal to a majority of the total electors appointed.

If no candidate for President receives a majority, the House of Representatives chooses the President from the three candidates having the greatest number of electoral votes. The voting in the House of Representatives is conducted by states, each state having one vote regardless of its size, the vote of each state being determined by separate vote of its delegation. Concurrence of a majority of the states on the winning candidate must be obtained.

If no candidate for Vice President receives the votes of a majority of the electors appointed, the Senate makes the choice from the two highest candidates.

As stated above, the states use the unit-rule system to choose electors instead of choosing them individually by districts within each state. According to James Madison, it was the latter method which had been "mostly if not exclusively in view when the Constitution was adopted."

1/ In 1948 one Tennessee elector cast his vote for Gov. Thurmond, the States Rights candidate, although President Truman had carried the State and received the vote of all the other Tennessee electors; in 1956 one Alabama electoral vote was cast for Circuit Judge Walter B. Jones, who had not been mentioned as a presidential candidate; also, in 1960, 15 electors from three states cast their votes for Sen. Harry F. Byrd, who was not a candidate.

ASSERTED OBJECTIONS TO PRESENT PROCEDURE

Objections to the Office of Elector

One of the objections made to continuing the office of presidential elector is that it no longer serves the purpose for which it was created. The late Justice Jackson expressed a widely accepted view when he said that "No one faithful to our history can deny that the plan originally contemplated, what is implicit in its text, that electors would be free agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan judgment as to the men best qualified for the Nation's highest offices."[1/] However, the Constitution itself contains no express requirement that electors function as "free agents" etc. It provides that the appointment of electors shall be left to the states and it does not expressly prevent the states from electing pledged electors by popular vote. It has been said that the practice of selecting pledged electors by popular vote dates back to the first election under the Constitution. In construing the electoral provision of the Constitution the Supreme Court has cited the following finding by a Senate Committee in 1826:

> In the first election held under the constitution, the people looked beyond these agents [electors], fixed upon their own candidates for President and Vice President, and took pledges from the electoral candidates to obey their will. In every subsequent election, the same thing has been done. Electors, therefore, have not answered the design of their institution. They are not the independent body and superior characters which they were intended to be. They are not left to the exercise of their own judgment: on the contrary, they give their vote, or bind themselves to give it, according to the will of their constituents. They have degenerated into mere agents, in a case which requires no agency, and where the agent must be useless, if he is faithful, and dangerous, if he is not.[2/]

In 1952 the Supreme Court pointed out that over 20 states do not print the names of electors on their ballots. Instead, the names of the candidates themselves are shown and a vote for a candidate is counted as a vote for his pledged slate of electors. An elector may be required to pledge his vote, not only to a known candidate, but to whomever his party may nominate—"to a candidate not yet named, by a convention not

---

1/ Dissent, Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 232, 96 L.ed. 905. For a contrary view see Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Electoral College, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. xi.

2/ S. Rep. No. 22, 19th Cong., p. 4.

yet held, of delegates not yet chosen."[1/] In declaring such a requirement constitutional in 1952 the Supreme Court said that—

> ...The suggestion that in the early elections candidates for electors--contemporaries of the Founders--would have hesitated, because of constitutional limitations, to pledge themselves to support party nominees in the event of their selection as electors is impossible to accept. History teaches that the electors were expected to support the party nominees.[2/]

On the other hand, two dissenting members of the Court contended that despite "political practice" such a "perversion of the forefathers' plan" should not be elevated "into a constitutional principle."[3/]

Objections to Unit-rule Method of Counting Electoral Votes

Probably the most important of the asserted defects in the present electoral college procedure is that all of the electoral votes of a state may be cast for the candidate who has only a plurality within the state. This unit-rule method, proponents of electoral reform contend, results in too much emphasis being placed on the larger, so-called "swing" states in presidential campaigns. It is pointed out that there is a natural temptation for a candidate who can win large blocks of electoral votes from certain states to concentrate his campaign in those states, and a natural temptation for a party to pick candidates from the larger states. Furthermore, it is stated that a candidate may be encouraged to make important concessions to minority groups found in metropolitan centers who often can swing an election within a state from one of the major parties to the other.

In addition, the unit-rule method is charged with discouraging individual political activity in "sure" states. Many members of the minority party may not bother to vote since they know their votes will be lost and many members of the majority party may not vote since a bare majority captures the entire electoral vote of the state. The unit-rule system is also criticized on the ground that it can produce minority

---

1/ The late Justice Jackson, dissenting, in Ray v. Blair (1952) 343 U.S. 233, 96 L. ed. 906.

2/ Ibid., 343 U.S. 228, 96 L. ed. 903. The decision in 1952 held that a candidate for elector can be denied a place on a party primary election ballot, if permitted by state law, unless he pledges his electoral vote to the party nominee. It did not decide whether an elector can be compelled to carry out a party pledge; however some authorities have expressed the view that such an elector could be compelled to do so.

3/ Ibid.

Presidents who receive fewer popular votes than their leading opponent. This has in fact happened three times (Adams in 1824, Hayes in 1876, and Harrison in 1888); and it is argued that it is not an unlikely consequence of a system which gives all of the electoral votes of a state to a candidate with an insignificant plurality within the state.

Proponents of electoral reform point out that the present unit-rule system creates an undesirable "landslide psychology," because the electoral vote is frequently top-heavy while the popular vote in fact is fairly evenly divided. And, finally, it is contended that the present system is objectionable because it encourages the development of additional political parties. Under the present system small minority parties have on occasion been able to swing critical states from one column to the other. The example is cited of the Wallace vote in 1948, which, though meager by comparison with the total votes cast, swung two states to Governor Dewey which might otherwise have gone to President Truman.

Objection to Procedure for Election by Congress if no Majority in Electoral College

Under the present system, if no candidate has an absolute majority of the full membership of the electoral college the selection of the President is made by the House voting by states, and the objection to this, of course, is that each state has one vote regardless of its size. However, it has been pointed out that there are only two instances (1801 and 1825) in the history of the country in which the House has performed this presidential electoral function.

MAJOR PROPOSALS FOR REVISION

Most of the proposals before the Congress would abolish the electoral college. Others would eliminate the "winner-take-all" rule. The three most common proposals are the direct popular election, the district election, and proportional election plans.

The direct popular election plan would provide for the election of the President and Vice President by a plurality of the voters over the Nation as a whole. This plan was the first considered at the Constitutional Convention, 1787, and has been frequently proposed as an amendment since 1826. Several proposals to permit a direct vote for President and Vice President are now before the Congress (see p. ii).

Among the more prominent proposals in this category is S.J. Res. 23, introduced by Sen. Mansfield for himself and Sen. Keating. The resolution would provide for each voter to cast his ballot "for the office of President and the candidate of the same party for the office of the Vice President," thereby avoiding the possibility of electing the two officers from different parties. The Mansfield proposal would provide further for the inauguration of the President and Vice President on December 1 following the November election.

The district elector plan would retain the electoral system but each state would be divided into "compact and contiguous" electoral districts of approximately equal population equal to the number of congressional districts to which the state is entitled. Each district would be entitled to an elector; and two additional electors, corresponding to the states' Senators, would be elected on a state-wide basis. This plan was among the popular early proposed reforms of the electoral system. This district plan has been revised in recent years and was embodied in legislation popularly known as the Mundt-Coudert plan introduced by Sen. Mundt and former Rep. Coudert.

Several proposed district-plan amendments are now pending (p. ii), one of which (S.J. Res. 12) was introduced by Sen. Mundt for himself and Sens. Thurmond, McClellan, Hruska, Morton, and Blakley. The proposal would keep the office of elector but would provide for his selection in the same manner as Senators and Representatives. It would provide for electoral districts "to be composed of compact and contiguous territory containing as nearly as practicable the number of persons which entitled the State to one Representative in the Congress." In case no candidate received a majority of the total electoral vote, the proposals would have the "Senate and House of Representatives assembled and voting as individual members of one body,...choose immediately, by ballot, the President;..." and Vice President from candidates for the respective offices having "the three highest numbers on the lists of persons voted for..."

The proportional representation plan would abolish the present electoral college system. Each state would be entitled to electoral votes equal to the number of its Representatives and Senators. A candidate's share of the states's electoral votes would reflect the proportion of the total vote received by him within the state. Over a dozen bills to adopt this plan are now pending before the Congress (p. ii).

Sen. Kefauver has characterized the electoral college as the ox cart method of electing a President. The Senator introduced S.J. Res. 17, which includes the proportional representation plan. The proposal provides that if no person receives as much as 40 per cent of the total electoral votes then the Senate and House of Representatives in joint session would immediately choose the President from the candidates "having the two highest numbers of electoral votes for President...." In this event, a majority of the total authorized membership of Congress would be required to win.

The Vice President would be chosen in the same manner as the President.

There is now no apparent support for the election of the President in the first instance by either one or both chambers of the Congress, although this was very seriously considered during the drafting of the Constitution. Nor are there any bills pending in Congress to carry out the independent elector concept attributed to the founding fathers although failure to follow this concept is often cited as an argument for electoral reform.

At least one proposal would give the states a choice between the district plan and the present state-unit plan. Others would retain the state-wide unit vote but eliminate the electoral college. Some of the proposals present somewhat complicated formulae for allocating the electoral vote.

Among the many pending resolutions are proposals to require the nomination of candidates by national primaries; to abolish state tax and residence provisions for voting in Federal elections; and others which are beyond the scope of this analysis.

THE ARGUMENTS

Proposals to Abolish the Electoral College

Proponents: The arguments made against the present system by proponents of resolutions to revise it have been summarized (p. ii) and are briefly restated below:

The system does not operate as intended. Asserting that presidential electors have become "intellectual nonentities," two justices of the Supreme Court have made the following statement with respect to the electoral college:

> ...At its best it is a mystifying and distorting factor in presidential elections which may resolve a popular defeat into an electoral victory. At its worst it is open to local corruption and manipulation, once so flagrant as to threaten the stability of the country.1/

The state-unit method of selecting electors is a "winner-take-all" rule which unfairly disfranchises a minority of voters.

Election by the House, in cases where no one candidate receives the votes of a majority of the electors, gives each state the same voice--one vote--regardless of its population. Also, the votes of the minority members of a state delegation are eliminated in the final count.

Opponents: Those who oppose abolishing the present electoral college system argue that it has withstood the test of time; they maintain that the "minority" Presidents of the past probably would have won in run-off elections. Supporters point out that only once has a "majority" candidate (1876) failed to become President and the choice has been made by the House of Representatives only twice (1801 and 1825) following the elections of 1800 and 1824.

Those who would keep the unit rule maintain that it discourages the development of minority parties, which could destroy the smooth-functioning, two-party system that has developed in the United States. It is also argued that the unit system brings about a greater semblance of nation-wide backing for the winner of what is often a bitter and close contest.

1/ Justice Douglas and the late Justice Jackson dissenting in Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 232, 234.

Supporters say that the present system brings about a better balance in the government by allowing the urban centers a voice in the final selection of the President comparable to the influence of rural areas upon congressional elections.

Direct Popular Election

Proponents: Proponents of the direct popular vote argue that it would be the fairest method of selecting the President, since it gives to all voters an equal voice and to all sections of the country a weight proportional to their population.

It is asserted that the direct vote would correct the claimed abuses of the present system, including those involved in the selection of electors, and the disfranchisement of the minority votes. The direct vote approach, in the opinion of many students of the problem, would be "a gain for simplicity and integrity of our governmental processes."1/

Supporters maintain that a direct vote would invigorate the two-party system. They hold that interest in national political campaigns would be stimulated in various parts of the country and assert that the importance of political machines at the state level would be lessened.

Opponents: Opposition to the direct election plan arises from various sources. Some opponents argue that it would eliminate the basic concept of a federal republic; that the states still have the right to name independent electors if they wish; and that they do so in some cases. They point out that some small states would lose a present advantage since every state is entitled to two electors (because they have two Senators) regardless of population.

Opposition from some states is also based on their desire to continue to control the method of electing, or appointing, electors and to their ability, in some cases, to prevent the selection of unpledged electors. Also, some fear the imposition of Federal standards for voting in Federal elections.

District Elector Plan

Proponents: The district plan would retain the office of elector but would provide for the electors to be chosen on the same basis as the Representatives and Senators. Elector districts would be established "containing as nearly as practicable the number of persons which entitled the State to one Representative in the Congress." In addition to an elector selected in each district, two electors would be elected in each state on a state-wide basis. The plan would revive a practice followed by a number of states prior to the Civil War.

1/ The late Justice Jackson, 343 U.S. 234.

Supporters of the district plan believe that it would result in the House of Representatives, except in very close contests, being controlled by the party of the President, in accord with the concept attributed to the framers of the Constitution. They say that this would result in electing a President with views more in harmony with the views of members of Congress and subject to substantially the same pressures, having been elected by the same constituencies.

Proponents argue also that the district plan would more nearly reflect the popular vote than the present state-unit system and that it would encourage a healthier participation in the political process.

The proponents of the district-elector approach state that while it would not bind electors to vote as pledged, only eight electors are alleged to have voted contrary to the views of those who named them since 1820, and in no case did any of these votes affect the outcome of the election.

Another point made for the district-elector plan, as embodied in the Mundt Resolution, is that where no candidate obtains a majority of the electoral vote the Congress as a whole would elect a President by a majority of the membership and each member (instead of each state delegation) would cast a vote. This would, of course, more nearly reflect the popular voting strength of the large states.

A requirement that elector districts be "composed of compact and contiguous territory" it is said, would prevent gerrymandering of such districts and would highlight the present practice of "setting up unfair congressional districts."

Opponents: Opponents of the district plan fear that despite the intent of its sponsors, it leaves an opportunity for states to influence the presidential election by gerrymandering.

Opponents argue that since the "winner-take-all" approach would apply to the electors selected by districts as well as those selected on a state-wide basis, it would still be possible to have a minority President elected, the major problem the plan is recommended to correct. They add further that minority parties or splinter parties might wield the balance of power in a close election by concentrating on relatively few promising districts.

The harmony between executive and legislative branches of government sought by the plan is opposed as unwise. Opponents suggest that the different methods which are used in this country for election to different branches of the government help provide the checks and balances which are one of the system's major strengths.

Proportional Representation Plan

Proponents: Under the proportional representation plan each state would have a number of electoral votes equal to, as in the case of the present electoral college, the number of Senators and Representatives

of the state in Congress. The electoral vote for each state would be divided in proportion to the total vote for the various presidential candidates within the state. The candidates for President and Vice President who received the greatest number of electoral votes throughout the country would be elected.

There are various differences among the proportional representation proposals. However, most of the proposals in this category include a provision which would require a candidate to receive at least 40 per cent of the electoral votes in order to be elected. Failing this, the election would go to the Congress. That body, sitting jointly and voting individually, would pick the President from the highest two candidates. A majority of the total authorized membership of Congress would be required to elect.

Like the supporters of the direct popular vote, proponents of the proportional plan say that abolishing the office of presidential elector would eliminate many risks which can arise under the present system. Also, proponents maintain that proportional representation would bring nation-wide uniformity to the system of electing the President and that it would do much to eliminate those features of the present system which contribute to a lack of interest and confidence in the electoral process.

It is contended that the proposed amendment would successfully overcome the claimed objections to the present unit-rule procedure. Since the electoral votes in all states would be in proportion to the popular vote, there would be less incentive to concentrate campaigns in close states in which an entire state electoral vote can be changed by a small shift in popular vote. The opportunity for candidates to be selected from small states would, it is claimed, be increased; minority groups would be less likely to control "swing" states, and minority parties in states which are now substantially dominated by a single party would no longer feel that their presidential votes are invariably wasted.

While the two electoral votes corresponding to the two Senators from each state make it theoretically possible for a candidate who receives fewer popular votes than his opponent to win an election, the likelihood of this occurring would, it is argued, be substantially reduced. Finally, it is said that the proportional system would eliminate the "landslide psychology" inherent in the top-heavy electoral vote frequently produced by the present system, and would discourage the formation of splinter parties whose influence in the electoral college is in excess of numerical strength.

Opponents: Major opposition to these changes is based on a conviction that the need for constitutional amendment has not been demonstrated with sufficient clarity and persuasiveness to justify such a change. Opponents point out that under this plan it would still be possible to elect the candidate who lost the popular vote.

It seems to have been assumed by both proponents and opponents of revision of the election procedure that it is undesirable to encourage the formation of third or additional parties, and that presidential elections should not be thrown into Congress for decision. The former assumption is based on an appraisal of the operation of the two-party system in this country and the problems created by multiple parties in countries such as France. The latter assumption seems based, in part, on a feeling that members of Congress would vote for the candidate of their parties without regard to his qualifications.

It is argued that the plan would encourage the formation of third parties, and is likely to result in the election of a great many Presidents by the Congress. It is argued by some that should the proposed system be adopted splinter parties, or minority groups of both left and right, which cannot win a plurality in any state under the present system, would seek to throw elections into Congress, where their bargaining influence might be substantial.

Another argument against this proposal is that it would introduce the principle of proportional representation into election procedure. The objection is not so much that this is dangerous in presidential elections as that, once the principle is introduced into any national election, it might be adopted and applied to the election of Congress. It is not clear, however, just how the proportional representation idea could be applied to the election of a Congressman.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE STUDY

1. Does the electoral college, or the office of elector, any longer serve a useful purpose?

2. Should a state be required to cast its electoral votes so as to reflect the popular vote for each candidate, or should the "winner-take-all"?

3. Should electors be permitted to exercise discretion in casting their votes for President?

4. Should states be able to deny to candidates selected by a national party the opportunity of running under the party label in the state?

5. Are election campaigns unduly concentrated in large swing states?

6. Are substantial concessions made to various urban minority groups in election campaigns? If so, should these groups have this bargaining position?

7. Would the granting of an opportunity to cast its share of electoral votes for President and Vice President to a minority party in a state stimulate political participation in "sure" states?

8. Would any of the proposed plans encourage the development of new political parties? If so, would this be desirable?

9. Is it likely that the allocation of electoral votes in proportion to popular vote in Presidential elections would lead to proportional representation in the election of Congress?

10. Would it be desirable for the National Government to regulate the size and shape of electoral districts?

11. Should presidential elections be decided in Congress where no candidate has a majority? If so, should each member of Congress have an equal vote?

12. Is the uncertainty as to how any of the proposed amendments would work in practice so great that their adoption would be unwise?

13. If the present system is to be revised, which of the alternative proposals would be most desirable?

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION

PUBLICATIONS

Legislative Analyses Published to Date, 87th Congress, 1st Session

Report Number and Subject	
1. THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE AGED	A Special Analysis
2. PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL AID TO DEPRESSED AREAS	S. 1--Sen. Douglas, et al.; S. 9--Sen. Dirksen, et al.; S. 6--Sen. Scott; and other bills.
3. PROPOSALS TO PROVIDE TEMPORARY EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS	H.R. 3864--Rep. Mills.
4. PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938	S. 895--Sen. McNamara, et al.; H.R. 3935--Rep. Roosevelt; and other bills.
5. PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE IN FINANCING ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS	S. 8--Sens. McNamara and Hart; S. 723--Sen. Cooper, et al.; S. 1021--Sen. Morse, et al; H.R. 4970--Rep. Thompson (N.J.); and other bills.
6. PROPOSED SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1961 (not including proposed health care benefits for the aged)	S. 909--Sen. Anderson; H.R. 4222--Rep. King; H.R. 4571--Rep. Mills; H.R. 6027--Rep. Mills.
7. PROPOSED HOUSING ACT OF 1961	S. 1478--Sen. Sparkman; H.R. 6028--Rep. Rains.
8. PROPOSALS TO PROVIDE HEALTH CARE FOR THE AGED UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY	S. 909--Sen. Anderson; H.R. 4222--Rep. King; and other bills

Recent Longer Range Studies

Morley, Lorna, and Morley, Felix. THE PATCHWORK HISTORY OF FOREIGN AID. April 1961.

Haberler, Gottfried. INFLATION: Its Causes and Cures, Revised and Enlarged Edition. June 1961.

Analyses and Studies: One dollar each
Discounts: 25 to 99 copies-20%; 100 to 299 copies-30%
300 to 499 copies-40%; 500 and over-50%

JK 516 C 3

225/107

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

PROPOSALS TO REFORM OUR ELECTORAL SYSTEM



By
Mollie Z. Margolin
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
December 21, 1960
Revised, Robert Tienken
October, 1963

Washington 25, D.C.

CONTENTS

	Page
Historical Background	1
Present Method of Election	1
Presidential Electors	1
Electoral College	1
Count of Votes by Congress	2
Election thrown into House	3
"Appointment" of Electors - State Law	5
Development of Electoral System	14
Movement for Reform	15
"Minority" Presidents	17
Arguments in Favor of Retaining Present System	19
Arguments Against Present System	21
Proposals to Reform Our Present System	21
Detailed Study of the Various Proposed Plans	23
Direct Election Plan	25
Arguments in Favor of Direct Election Plan	25
Arguments Against Direct Election Plan	38
District Plan (Mundt-Coudert Plan)	49
Arguments in Favor of District Plan	53
Arguments Against District Plan	58
Proportional Plan (Lodge-Gossett Plan)	61
Original Daniel Plan	65
Daniel Substitute (Combination Plan)	65
Arguments in Favor of Proportional Plan	78
Arguments Against Proportional Plan	87
Popular Interest in Reform	95
Automatic Operation of Existing System	96
Selected References	98

PROPOSALS TO REFORM OUR ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Historical Background

(The following materials contain references to State laws through October 1963, and to Congressional action through June 30, 1963)

Present Method of Election

The President of the United States is not elected directly by the people as are Senators and Representatives, but indirectly, by the Electoral College, which is composed of Presidential electors who are elected directly by the people.

Presidential electors - The Constitution of the United States provides that "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress" (Art. II, sec. 1), and the 23rd Amendment provides for electors from the District of Columbia. All States and the District of Columbia provide for "appointment" of electors through direct election by the people. In 1964, there will be 50 States with a total of 100 Senators and 435 Representatives, plus three electors from the District of Columbia; thus the total number of Presidential electors in 1964 will be 538.

The Electoral College - Under the Constitution, Congress has the responsibility of setting the date on which electors are chosen and also of setting the date on which such electors shall meet and cast their votes (Art. II, sec. 1). Congress, accordingly, has set the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in every fourth year as the

date for choosing the electors, and the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following their election as the date on which such electors shall meet and cast their votes (3 U.S.C. § 7).

The political party obtaining the most votes in the State, regardless of how small or how large its majority or plurality may be, wins the total electoral vote to which the State is entitled.

The electors thus chosen on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November convene as "colleges" in their own States on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December and cast their votes for a President and Vice President of the United States. These "colleges" are known collectively as "the Electoral College."

Count of Votes by Congress - After the electors have cast their votes, the results are sent to the President of the Senate. Pursuant to statute (3 U.S.C. 15), the Senate and the House of Representatives meet in joint session on January 6 following the meetings of the electors, and the President of the Senate, in the presence of Congress, opens all the certificates containing the electoral votes. The votes are called out and counted, State by State, and the result is announced. The person who receives a majority of the electoral votes (in 1964, 270 out of 538) is declared to have been elected (Const. Amendment XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15). Usually this is merely a formality since the results of the election are almost always known as soon as the last State has finished counting its ballots after the November election.

Election thrown into House - If no Presidential candidate obtains a majority of the whole number of electoral votes, the election of the President falls into the House of Representatives which shall immediately choose a President, by ballot, from the candidates who received the highest number of votes in the Electoral College, not exceeding three such candidates.

The Constitution provides that in choosing the President the votes in the House shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of the representations from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice.

Each State's representation arrives at its one vote by polling its Members. The candidate receiving the greatest number of votes of that State's Representatives will receive the one full vote of the State. If the State's votes in its poll are evenly divided, the State will lose its one vote. In that event the State may either submit a blank ballot or decline to vote. The House can keep taking ballot after ballot until one candidate receives the votes of a majority of the States. Thus, in the election of 1800, which fell into the House of Representatives, Jefferson was chosen on February 17, 1801, on the thirty-sixth ballot. (For a description of what happened in the Electoral College and in the House of Representatives during the Election, see American Historical Association Report (1913), Vol. 2, pp. 132-137).

If no Vice-Presidential candidate should receive a majority of votes in the Electoral College, then from the two candidates having the highest number of votes, the Senate shall choose a Vice-President. A quorum for that purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators (67 in 1964), and a majority of the whole number (51 out of 100 in 1964) shall be necessary to a choice (Amendment XII).

If the election should fall into the House of Representatives and if the House should fail to elect a President before January 20th, then the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified, and Congress may by law provide for a situation where neither a President elect nor Vice-President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President. or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice-President shall have qualified (Amendment 20).

"Lame Duck" Congress - Until the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, the electoral votes were counted by the outgoing or "lame duck" Congress, which conceivably could be under the control of the defeated party. With the ratification of the Twentieth Amendment by the thirty-sixth State in 1933, this possibility was eliminated, since that Amendment provided that the term of the newly-elected

Members of Congress should commence on January 3 instead of March 4. Now it is the newly-elected House which would, if necessary, choose a President.

"Appointment" of Electors -- State Law - Every State now elects its presidential electors at the general election held in November of presidential election years.

The laws of the various States differ, however, as to the method of nomination of these electors, as to the placement of the name of candidates for presidential electors upon the general election ballots, and as to the special instructions issued to such electors concerning their conduct after their election.

Nomination

The methods of nominating Presidential electors in the various States fall into three categories:

Conventions - In the following States electors are nominated by State conventions of the political parties: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

State Committees - In the following States, electors are nominated by the State committee of the political party: Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, and Tennessee.

Primary - The law calls for primaries in Arizona. In Alabama there is no statutory requirement for a primary, the method for nominating Presidential electors being left to the party organization. However, in 1960, a primary was held and candidates were chosen therein for Presidential electors.

In Alaska, presidential electors are chosen either at a State party convention or in any other manner prescribed by the by-laws of the party.

In Delaware, presidential electors are nominated by party organization which chooses either the convention method or the State committee method.

In the District of Columbia, electors are nominated by the executive committee of each political party.

In Florida, the Governor nominates the electors on the recommendation of the State Executive Committee of each political party.

In Kentucky, presidential electors are chosen either at a State convention or by primary, according to party rules. Democrats used the convention method in 1960.

In Louisiana, the manner of nominating electors is within the discretion of the State central committee of the political party but nomination is generally by party state convention called by such committee.

In Pennsylvania, presidential electors are nominated by the Presidential nominee of each political party.

Pledge of Electors

Primaries - In the States which nominate electors in primaries, the nomination papers filed by or in behalf of candidates for Presidential electors contain wording from which a pledge to vote for the party's Presidential candidate may be implied.

In Alabama, in the 1960 primary several candidates for presidential electors were pledged to the national party Presidential candidate, while others ran "Unpledged." Several of each category were finally nominated.

In Alaska, the party shall require from each candidate for elector a pledge that as a elector he shall vote for the candidates nominated by the party of which he is a candidate.

In Arizona, the electoral candidate nomination papers contain a statement that such candidate is considered "as representing the principles of said party."

In Oklahoma his declaration of candidacy states "that I believe in the principles of said _____ Party, and intend to support its principles and policies, and vote for its nominees at the coming general election."

Others - In Florida, where the Governor nominates the candidates for Presidential electors on the recommendation of the State Executive Committee of each political party, the Governor must nominate only persons who have taken an oath to vote for their Party's Presidential candidate.

In Oregon, where the State Convention of the political party nominates the candidates for Presidential elector, "each candidate for presidential elector so selected shall pledge himself, if elected, to vote in the electoral college for the candidates of his party for President and Vice-President."

In Pennsylvania, where electors are nominated by the Presidential nominee, it seems apparent that such electors must have pledged their loyalty to such Presidential nominee or he would not have selected them.

Election

Presidential short ballot - By authorizing the use of the so-called "Presidential short ballot," where the names of the Presidential

and Vice-Presidential candidates are printed on the general election ballot in lieu of the names of Presidential electors, 34 States have implied that they expect the presidential electors, if elected, to vote for the Presidential candidate whose name appears on the ballot in their party column. The laws of these States contain a provision to the effect that a vote cast for the candidates for President and Vice-President is deemed to be a vote cast for the electors of that Party which such Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates represent: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York (where voting machines or short ballots are authorized), North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island (in voting machines), Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.

Ballots containing Presidential Candidates and Electors - The same inference of a pledge may be made from a ballot which contains the names of a group of Presidential electors, headed by the names of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates: Arizona, Georgia (optional), Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New York (in precincts which have no voting machines and do not authorize short

ballots), North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island (voting machines should be equipped both ways), South Carolina (if requested in certification), South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.

Ballots containing electors only - In only 3 States does the law provide for the names of unpledged electors on the general election ballot: Alabama (those who have been chosen in the primary as "Unpledged"), Georgia and Mississippi. The Georgia statute gives the respective political parties in the State the discretionary power to leave the name of the presidential and the vice-presidential nominees off the ballot. Several other States have laws which appear to contain provisions under which the Presidential Electors will not have to vote in the Electoral College for the party Presidential candidate selected at the National Convention. This should not be confused, however, with the idea that such electors are voting contrary to the instructions of the electorate. For those States have provisions whereby the general election ballot will plainly show to whom the electors are pledged, or whether they intend to remain unpledged, and although the electoral vote of a major political party may thereby be split, nevertheless the voters will have the opportunity to express their choice of a Presidential candidate by voting for certain groups of electors.

Special Instructions to Electors

The laws of several States contain specific instructions to the elected Presidential electors:

Alaska - "The electors shall proceed to cast their votes for the candidates for the office of president and vice-president of the party which selected them as candidates for electors and shall perform the duties of electors as required by the constitution and laws of the United States."

California - "The electors when convened, if both candidates are alive, shall vote for those persons for President and Vice-President who are the candidates of the political party which they represent, one of whom at least is not an inhabitant of this State."

Connecticut - "Each such elector shall cast his ballots for the candidates under whose names he ran on the official election ballot. . . ."

Colorado - "Each elector of President and Vice President shall be required to vote for the pair of Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who received the highest number of votes at the preceding general election in Colorado."

District of Columbia - "Each person elected as elector of President and Vice President shall, in the presence of the Board (of Elections) take an oath or solemnly affirm that he will vote for the candidates of the party he has been nominated to represent, and it shall be his duty to vote in such manner in the electoral college."

Florida - ". . . but the names of the actual candidates for

President and Vice-President for whom the electors will be expected to vote if elected, are printed on the ballot . . ." (Underscoring added).

Hawaii - "The electors, when convened, if both candidates are alive, shall vote by ballot for that person for President and that person for Vice-President . . . who are the candidates of the political party which they represent, one of whom at least, is not an inhabitant of this State."

Idaho - Presidential electors ". . . shall be bound to vote for the party candidate for President and Vice-President, respectively, whose names appear at the head of the party ticket."

Maryland - "[They] shall cast their votes for the candidates who have received the majority of the votes cast in the State of Maryland."

Michigan - "Those candidates for electors of president and vice president of this state shall be deemed elected whose names have been certified to the secretary of state by that political party receiving the greatest number of votes for said office at the ensuing November election."

Nevada - "The presidential electors shall vote only for the nominees for President and Vice President of the party that prevailed in this State in the preceding general election."

New Mexico - "The presidential elector nominees of the party whose nominees for President and Vice-President of the United States receive the highest number of votes at the general election shall be deemed the elected presidential electors . . ."

New York - Lists of nominations published shall not contain the names of presidential electors but such candidates shall be described as a specified number of presidential electors "nominated to support the party candidates, naming them for the office of President and Vice-President."

Oklahoma - "Any person elected as Presidential elector . . . after taking and filing the oath or affirmation prescribed . . . who violates said oath or affirmation by either failing to cast his ballot . . ." for his party's candidates for President and Vice President, "or by casting his ballot for any other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000."

Oregon - "Each candidate for presidential elector so selected shall pledge himself, if elected, to vote in the electoral college for the candidate of his party for President and Vice-President."

Tennessee - ". . . the words at the head of the group of electors . . . reveal the name of the candidates for president and vice-president . . . whom such group of electors is pledged to support."

Virginia - "The electors selected by the State conventions . . . shall be expected to vote in the electoral college for the nominees of any national convention to which the said State convention elects delegates unless said candidates for electors shall be instructed by a State convention at least 60 days before the general election in November that they are expected to vote for other persons; in which

event any person or persons duly authorized so to do as a national representative of the party holding such national convention may certify to the State Board of Elections under the same terms and with the name of the political party and the names of the candidates for President and Vice-President for whom they are expected to vote in the electoral college."

Development of Electoral System

In creating the electoral college system, the authors of the Constitution intended that each State should choose its most distinguished citizens as electors. Once the electors had been selected, by whatever means the State legislature desired, it was expected that they would deliberate and vote as individuals in choosing the President.

With the emergence of strong political parties, it early developed that electors were chosen to represent the parties. Designation as a candidate for elector by the party leadership was given as an honor to those who had served the party well. From 1800, independent voting by electors almost disappeared. In the few cases where electors have not voted for their party's nominee, they have normally given advance warning to the voters -- as did the Bull Moose Republicans in South Dakota in 1912 and the States' Rights Democrats in certain Southern States in 1948.

In response to pressure in favor of popular control, the practice quickly developed in the several States of choosing electors by popular vote. Until 1800, most State legislatures retained the func-

tion for themselves, but by 1804 the majority had provided for direct popular election. By 1832, direct election was the rule in all States except South Carolina, which made the change at the time of the Civil War. Subject to certain Constitutional limits, the States retain the right to say who is authorized to vote in these direct elections.

The practice of giving all the electors to the party which wins the most votes in the States -- i.e., the "general ticket" system -- is also a product of the early 1800's. At first, most "popular election" States provided that electors should be chosen in districts similar to Congressional districts. Under this system, different districts were able to return electors representing different parties. Dominate parties in State legislatures soon realized, however, that they could furnish more electoral votes for their candidate -- and prevent minority parties from getting any votes -- if the party with the most votes in the State won all the electors.

By 1804, 7 out of 10 "popular election" States were using the general ticket; by 1824, 13 out of 18. Since 1836, there have been only two exceptions to the general ticket rule. In 1876, the Colorado electors were chosen by the State legislature. In 1892, the Michigan electors were selected under the district system.

The Movement for Reform

From the start, the method of electing the President has been a subject of debate and discussion. At the Constitutional Convention,

a few key members, including Madison, Franklin and Gouverneur Morris, favored direct popular election. Others would have preferred to see the President elected by Congress or by State Governors. One of the main arguments for the electoral college system was that through the provisions for two electors regardless of population, it gave small States some protection against domination by large States. It was felt that if we were to preserve our Federal system of Government, this was an important consideration and this argument may have gone far in swaying the Convention. Another important argument was that it placed the choice of the President in the hands of persons presumably able, as the mass of the people at that time were not, to become acquainted personally with the various Presidential candidates.

Since January 6, 1797, when Rep. William L. Smith of South Carolina offered in Congress the first Constitutional Amendment proposing reform of our procedure for electing a President, hardly a session of Congress has passed without the introduction of one or more resolutions of this character. In the 57-year period between 1889 and 1946, 109 Amendments were proposed; in the period from 1947 to 1963, 150 Amendments were introduced. It is claimed that more Amendments have been proposed concerning the Presidential election than concerning any other single provision of the Constitution.

"Minority" Presidents

The term "minority" President has been loosely used, sometimes creating an erroneous impression.

Actually, we have had only three minority Presidents; that is, a candidate who was elected President after having received a smaller number of popular votes than his closest opponent.

In 1824, although Andrew Jackson received more electoral votes and more popular votes than did John Quincy Adams, the election fell into the House of Representatives, which gave a majority of its votes to Adams, and Adams was elected President.

In 1876, although Samuel J. Tilden received a majority of more than 250,000 popular votes over Rutherford B. Hayes, the returns from Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina were contested. An electoral commission created by Congress to settle the dispute decided the contested returns in favor of Hayes, and Hayes won the election by one electoral vote.

In 1888, although Grover Cleveland received a popular plurality of about 100,000 votes over Benjamin Harrison, he obtained only 168 electoral votes, and Harrison with 233 electoral votes, was elected President.

We elected eleven other Presidents who failed to obtain a majority of the popular vote; but all these men did receive a plurality. Following is a table showing the percentage of the popular vote which each received:

	Elected	Opponents				
1844	Polk	Clay	Birney			
	49.56	48.13	2.3			
1848	Taylor	Cass	Van Buren	Smith		
	47.13	42.47	10.13	.09		
1856	Buchanan	Fremont	Fillmore	Smith		
	45.63	33.27	21.08	.01		
1860	Lincoln	Douglas	Breckenridge	Bell		
	39.79	29.40	18.2	12.6		
1880	Garfield	Hancock	Weaver	Dow	Phelps	
	48.32	48.21	3.35	.11	.01	
1884	Cleveland	Blaine	Butler	St. John		
	48.5	48.26	1.74	1.5		
1892	Cleveland	Harrison	Weaver	Bidwell	Wing	
	46.04	43.01	8.53	2.25	.18	
1912	Wilson	T. Roosevelt	Taft	Debbs	Chafin	Reimer
	41.85	27.42	23.15	5.99	1.39	.19
1916	Wilson	Hughes	Benson	Hanly	T. Roosevelt	Reimer
	49.26	46.12	3.16	1.19	.19	.08
1948	Truman	Dewey	Thurmond	Wallace	Thomas	Others
	49.51	45.13	2.4	2.38	.29	.29
1960	Kennedy	Nixon	Faubus	Hass	Decker	Others
	49.72	49.66	.31	.067	.067	.28

Arguments in Favor of Retaining Present System

Those who favor retaining our present electoral system advance the following arguments:

1. The existing system which became effective in March of 1789 (see Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420, 422-423 (1820)), has, with minor amendments, successfully withstood the test of almost two centuries.

2. The electoral college method has produced only three "minority" Presidents, that is, candidates who were elected as President even though they received less popular votes than their principal opponents (Adams in 1824, Hayes in 1876, and Harrison in 1888). In only one of these cases (1876) did the winner's chief competitor receive an absolute majority of the popular vote. In the other two cases, they argue, since the winner's principal opponent received only a plurality rather than a majority of the popular vote, it cannot be stated categorically that he had more popular support than the winner; for, if a run-off election had been held between the two, all other candidates excluded, the distribution of the third or other minority party votes in the run-off election, might have defeated the candidate who had received the plurality of popular votes.

3. By weighting the composition of the electoral college to give adequate representation to the small and sparsely settled States, the authors of the Constitution helped to reconcile these States to the idea of federation. It cannot be doubted, proponents of the present system claim, that at various times during the history of our nation, this concession has substantially contributed to the stability of our Government; and, even if this provision is not now considered as essential to the survival of our federal union, it must still be a contributing factor to the feeling of equality which smaller states have with regard to the large industrial states in our Union. Moreover, the fact that under the present system these smaller states have this direct representation and vote in the electoral college results in their obtaining a significant voice in selecting the parties' candidates for President because the political parties recognize that in a close election their electoral vote may be crucial.

4. On only two occasions since 1789 has the election of the President fallen into the House of Representatives (in 1800 and again in 1824), and it was only in one of these instances that the election by the House resulted in the selection of a "minority" President. That was in 1824 when John Quincy Adams was elected although he received fewer popular votes than Andrew Jackson.

5. Our country has not been troubled by the problem of "splinter" parties, a situation which has plagued many European countries and which might plague us if the electoral college system were altered.

6. A time-proven system for choosing the President should not be lightly discarded, particularly when there is so much uncertainty as to what is a better method, as is demonstrated by the sharp differences of opinion as to what method to change to among those who desire a change, and when there are doubts as to what the effects of a change would be on the campaigns for the nominations and election under any of the methods proposed.

Arguments Against Present System

The arguments of those who oppose our present electoral system are discussed below generally in the form of arguments which have been advanced in favor of a change to some other method of electing a President and will be found under the discussion of these new proposals:

Proposals to Reform Present System*

The proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States which would provide new methods for the election of the President

---

*See American Enterprise Association Inc. Analysis of proposals to amend the Constitution to revise procedure for election of President and Vice-President. Washington, 1956 (Its Report No. 616); Electoral reform. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1956, pp. 448-451.

fall into three general classes: (1) direct election plans, (2) district plans, and (3) proportional plans.

The direct election plan would abolish the electoral vote altogether and would provide for the election of the President by a plurality of the total popular vote in the United States.

The district plan, popularly known as the Mundt-Coudert Plan, would preserve the Electoral College but would eliminate the present procedure of giving a State's entire electoral vote to one candidate. Electors would be chosen by the voters, one for each Congressional, or other district, and in addition, two for each State at large. These electors would vote and the candidate who received the highest number of such electoral votes would be President providing he had a majority. Failing a majority, the Senate and the House, meeting jointly, would elect a President from the top three candidates.

The proportional plan, generally referred to as the Lodge-Gossett Plan, would abolish the Electoral College, but would retain the electoral vote. The electoral vote in each State would be apportioned among the Presidential candidates in accordance with the number of popular votes they receive, so that the candidate who receives a plurality of the popular votes will not receive the State's entire electoral vote as he would under the present system. In case of a tie between two candidates, various proposals contain different solutions (see page 61, post.)

Detailed Study of the Various Proposed Plans

Direct Election Plan

As has been stated above, the direct election plan would abolish the electoral vote entirely and would provide for election of the President by a plurality of the total popular vote in the country.

This plan was first introduced by Rep. William McManus of New York in 1826. Between 1826 and 1946 there were about seventy-five similar proposals. Since 1947 the following such proposals have been introduced:

80th Congress (1947-1948) -- S. J. Res. 91, Sen. Lodge; S.J. Res. 106, Senators Langer and Taylor; H.J. Res. 87, Rep. Lemke.

81st Congress (1949-1950) -- S.J. Res. 10, Sen. Langer; and H.J. Res. 118, Rep. Lemke.

82nd Congress (1951-1952) -- S.J. Res. 33, Sen. Langer; and H.J. Res. 205, Rep. Burdick.

83rd Congress (1953) -- S.J. Res. 55, Sen. Humphrey; and S.J. Res. 84, Sen. Langer.

84th Congress (1955-1956) -- S.J. Res. 10, Sen. Langer; S.J. Res. 53, Sen. Humphrey; and H.J. Res. 279, Rep. Hyde.

85th Congress (1957-1958) -- H.J. Res. 237, Rep. Udall.

86th Congress (1959-1960) -- H.J. Res. 116, Rep. Matthews; H.J. Res. 123, Rep. Udall; H.J. Res. 614, Rep. Staggers.

87th Congress (1961-1962) --S. J. Res. 1; Sen. Smith of Maine and others; S.J. Res. 23, Senators Mansfield and Keating; H.J. Res. 24, Rep. Baldwin; H.J. Res. 28, Rep. Broomfield; H.J. Res. 36, Rep. Collier; H.J. Res. 55, Rep. Matthews; H.J. Res. 76, Rep. Udall; H.J. Res. 84, Rep. Zablocki; H.J. Res. 125, Rep. Merrow; H.J. Res. 128, Rep. Monagan; H.J. Res. 369, Rep. Farbstein; H.J. Res. 486, Rep. Jarman.

88th Congress (through approximately July 1, 1963) -- S.J. Res. 1, Sen. Smith of Maine; H.J. Res. 74, Rep. Baldwin; H.J. Res. 94, Rep. Jarman.

Action

All of these resolutions were referred to the appropriate committees. In 1950 when the Senate approved the proportional system, Senator Langer of North Dakota offered as a substitute direct popular election along with national nominating primaries. The Langer substitute was rejected by a vote of 60 to 31. Senator Humphrey of Minnesota then offered as a substitute an amendment which provided only for election by direct national vote and it was defeated by a vote of 63 to 28. In 1956, when the Senate considered the proportional - district system

compromise, Senator Langer again offered an amendment for nomination and election by national popular vote. This was defeated by a vote of 69 to 13. Senator Lehman of New York then offered an amendment providing only for election by national popular vote, which was rejected by a vote of 66 to 17.

The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments held hearings in 1961 and 1963, on joint resolutions proposing constitutional amendments to provide for popular election of the President and Vice-President and on other proposals to change the electoral college. Nothing was further done as respects the proposals for popular election.

Arguments in Favor of Direct Election Plan - Those who favor the direct election plan argue as follows:

1. The results of a direct election would give a more accurate picture of relative party strength than do "electoral vote"

results.[1/] When the party with the most popular votes in a State wins all the electoral votes for that State, the strength of the winner (in terms of electoral votes) tends to be exaggerated. The system creates "land-slides". Thus in 1952 Eisenhower, with about 55 percent of the total popular vote, won over 83 per cent of the Nation's electoral votes. In 1936 Roosevelt, with 60 percent of the popular vote, received 98 per cent of the electoral votes.

As already noted in eleven instances since 1824, including the 1948 election, the system has given a majority of the electoral votes to a candidate with only a plurality of the popular vote. In 1912 Woodrow Wilson, with only 42 percent of the popular vote, received 84 per cent of the electoral votes.

1/ On the defects of the present system see: Corwin, Edward S. The President: Office and Powers. History and analysis of practice and opinion. 4th ed., revised, New York, New York University Press, 1957, p. 39f; Lea, Clarence F., Modernize our Presidential election. Ten statements inserted in the Record by Rep. Lea, June 30-July 25, 1947. Congressional Record, July 8, 1947: A3412-3; U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rept. 1011, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rept. 602, 81st Cong., 1st sess.; Lucey, Charles. Electoral College system thwarts will of American voters. Congressional Record [daily] V. 102, Feb. 1, 1956: A1012-1014; Wilmerding, Lucius. The electoral college, New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1958, especially pp. 71-94, and see Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, Hearings, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., "Nomination and Election of President and Vice-President and Qualifications for Voting"; 88th Cong., 1st Sess., "Nomination and Election of President and Vice-President", Committee Print, Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., "The Electoral College", October 10, 1961.

Direct election would give a more accurate picture than "proportionate distribution" of electoral votes (along the lines of the Lodge-Gossett plan)2/ or a "district" elector scheme (as embodied in the Mundt-Coudert plan).3/ Because they would preserve the "weighting" in favor of small states (two electoral votes regardless of population) and would continue to base the remaining electoral votes upon total population, not upon numbers of voters, both of the latter two systems would permit some distortion of results.

2. Direct election would make it impossible for the candidate with the largest number of popular votes to lose to a candidate with fewer popular votes.4/ This can happen under the present system. If the winning party carries many States by bare pluralities or narrow majorities, while its leading opponent acquires most of its electoral

---

2/ See page 61, post.
3/ See page 49, post.
4/ Corwin, Op. Cit.; Lea, Op. cit.; July 8, 1947: A3412-3: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Op. cit; Wechsler, Herbert. Presidential election and the Constitution: a comment on proposed amendment. American Bar Association Journal (Chicago) March 1949, V. 35: 181-4, 270-4. On the advantages of direct election, see Humphrey, Hubert H. Direct popular election of President and Vice-President. Congressional Record [daily ed.] (Washington) March 9, 1953: 1793-5.

votes by wide margins, the candidate with a minority of popular votes may win a majority of electoral votes. A candidate receiving a minority of popular votes may also be elected when no candidate has a majority of electoral votes and the choice is made by the House of Representatives.

As mentioned above (see p. 17), the United States has had three minority Presidents. A "proportionate distribution" or "district" plan would reduce the possibility of a "minority" candidate. Still the candidate with the most popular votes might lose if his opponent won most of his electoral votes in small States and areas where voting was light or restricted.

3. Direct election would be simpler for the voter to understand than the present system.5/ Some voters are confused by the presence of "electors" in the election process. In most States, it is true, the ballots indicate the Presidential candidates for whom each party's list of electors will vote. Thirty-four States and the District of Columbia do not name each individual electoral college nominee. Sixteen States, however, carry slates of electors in addition to the names of the Presidential candidates on the ballot. Some States list

---

5/ On the defects of the present system, see Kallenback, Joseph E. Presidential Election Reform. Paper inserted in the Record by Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Congressional Record, April 13, 1949, Vol. 95, p. 4448-52; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit. On the advantages of direct election, see Humphrey, Op. cit.

only the electors' names and not those of the Presidential candidates.

As the following account indicates, such confusion may have serious effects on election results:

> . . . at a recent election [1948] in Ohio approximately 160,000 more votes were cast in the gubernatorial contest than in the Presidential contest. In that State, because of litigation that delayed final certification of the Progressive Party's slate of electors on the ballot, the electors of that party had to be listed in full on the ballot unaccompanied by the names of the Progressive Party's candidates for President and Vice-President. The names comprising the Republican and Democratic electoral slates were omitted under the normal Presidential short ballot plan. Only the names of their Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates appeared. Because of this peculiar arrangement a large number of voters cast invalid ballots in the Presidential contest by voting for Truman or for Dewey [i.e., for their undisclosed electoral slates) and also for some of the Progressive electors as well. Such invalidated choices accounted in large measure for the discrepancy in the Presidential and gubernatorial vote totals. The invalidated ballots may well have affected disposition of the State's electoral votes, for there was a difference of only about 7,000 votes in the Dewey and Truman totals out of a total of almost 3,000,000 votes cast.6/

Any system eliminating electors as individuals would simplify the election process for the voter. Both the Lodge-Gosset "proportionate distribution" plan and the Norris plan in 1934 would have retained electoral votes only as a counting device. A "district" plan in which individual electors were preserved would leave the way open for confusion.

6/ Kallenbach, Ibid. 95 Cong. Rec. 4449 (1949).

4. Direct election would undoubtedly invigorate the two-party system in sections of the country where oneparty is now so firmly entrenched that no other parties have any incentive to try to win.7/ Instead of Republican votes in certain southern States being relatively useless to the national party, they would be added to the national total. The same would be true for Democratic votes in heavily Republican States.

5. With direct election, party campaigns might be more evenly distributed throughout all parts of the country.8/ Under the present system, campaigns tend to be concentrated in the large "doubtful", so-called "pivotal", States. This is not surprising in view of the fact that a few popular votes in these States may control enough electoral votes to swing the election. Thus a shift of 0.5 per cent of the popular votes in Ohio, Illinois and California in 1916 would have defeated Wilson, and a shift of only 1,200 votes in New York would have defeated Cleveland in 1884. While the pivotal States, with

---

7/ On the defects of the present system, see Kallenbach, Op. cit. (1949); U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.; Wechsler, Op. cit.; Kallenbach, Joseph E. Our electoral college gerrymander. Midwest Journal of Political Science, V. 4, May 1960: 162-191.

8/ On the defects of the present system, see: Ogg and Ray. Introduction to American Government. Tenth ed. New York, Appleton Century - Crofts, 1951, pp. 230-2, 246-55. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Juduciary, Op. cit.: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit, Wechsler, op. cit.

their cities and other highly populated areas, would still be a rich source of votes in a direct election system, they would not be as overwhelmingly important as they are now.

6. Direct election would give every vote, regardless of where it was cast, equal weight.[9/] Now a vote counts for more in a "close" State than in a "sure" State. A few voters in the pivotal States may possess the power to elect or defeat their candidate. In a State where the result is more or less fore-ordained, the possibility of a similar group of voters swinging an election is almost non-existent. A vote may also have greater significance in a small State than in a large State. Small States have more electors relative to population. Fewer voters may control the electoral vote.

7. Direct election would reduce the premium now placed on choosing Presidential candidates from large "key" States.[10/] Under the present system, Presidential aspirants from the "pivotal" States have a disproportionate chance of receiving the nomination. By choosing a candidate from one of those States, a party may attract the few votes it needs to carry the State. Between 1900 and 1949, 16 out of 26 major

---

9/ On the advantages of direct election, see: Humphrey, Op. cit. On the defects of the present system; see: Lea, Op. cit., July 8, 1947: A3412-3; July 16, 1947: A3545-7; U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.

10/ On the defects of the present system, see: Kallenbach, Op. cit. (1949); Ogg and Ray, Op. cit., U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.; Wechsler, Op. cit.

party candidates (17 if Theodore Roosevelt is counted as a major party candidate in 1912) came from New York or Ohio.

Even with direct election, it is true, parties might still find it politically advantageous (i.e., win more votes) to choose candidates from the old "pivotal" States. Also, the Governors of those States would continue to offer the type of political and administrative experience especially fitting for a Presidential candidate. Votes in all States being assigned equal value, however, the possibility that nominees might be drawn from smaller States would probably be increased.

8. Direct election would give the voters a legal voice in the choice of the President, not merely an expression of preference.[11/] It has long been customary for the Presidential electors in each State to vote for the candidate nominated by their party. If those electors were to decide to transfer their votes to some other candidate, however it is doubtful whether existing law can stop them from doing so. Although a number of State laws purport to control the functioning of Presidential electors, they would probably be held unconstitutional.

11/ On the advantages of direct election, see: Humphrey, Op. cit. On the defects of the present system, see: Kallenback, Op. cit. (1949); Ogg and Ray, Op. cit.; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit. On the advantages of direct election, see: Humphrey, Op. cit.

An elector "cannot be compelled either by State law or by national law to register his choice for the candidate regularly nominated by his party at its national convention."[12] This was established by a case arising out of the 1948 election, when States' Rights Democratic electors in four Southern States voted for Thurmond instead of Truman.[13] Attempts to enforce against the Alabama electors a State law requiring Presidential electors to vote for the candidate named at their national party convention were unsuccessful, both in the Alabama Supreme Court and in the Federal courts.

9. Because each vote would count equally, direct election would almost certainly encourage more people to vote.[14] It has been observed that voter participation has tended to be higher in "close" or "doubtful" States, where campaigning is concentrated and the power of votes is known to be high, than in other States.

A "proportionate distribution" plan which divded electoral votes according to popular strength might similarly provide an incentive to vote. The more popular votes a party received, the greater would be

---

12/ Kallenbach, Ibid., p. 449 (1949).
13/ Folsom et al. v. Albritton et al. (335 U.S. 882 Dec. 6, 1948); Adcock et al. v. Albritton et al. (335 U.S. 887, Dec. 6, 1948); also advisory opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court. In re Opinion of the Justices (250 Ala. 399, 34, 50 (2nd) 598 (1948). Cited in Kallenbach, Ibid. (1949).
14/ On the defects of the present system, see: Kallenbach, Op. cit. (1949). On the advantages of direct election, see: Humphrey, Op. cit.

its share of the electoral vote. As long as each State's electoral vote was fixed by the size of its Congressional delegation, however, an absolute limit would remain on the electoral strength which a State could attain. Although increased competition between parties might result in more people's voting, no electoral advantage would accrue from a generally high voting turnout.

10. With direct election, it would be unnecessary to preserve the system of referring a close election to the House of Representatives.15/ The House of Representatives has been called upon twice to elect a President, first in 1800 and then in 1824. In 1800 the House elected the candidate, Jefferson, who had received the most electoral votes, but the political reaction produced the 12th amendment to prevent a recurrence of the circumstances which made it impossible for the electoral college to decide that election. In 1824, as has already been mentioned, it chose John Quincy Adams over Andrew Jackson, despite Jackson's plurality of electoral votes.

Under the existing system it would be possible for a House of Representatives, because of inability to give a majority to one

---

15/ On the defects of the present system, see: Corwin, Op. cit.; Kallenbach, Op. cit. (1949); Lea, Op. cit., July 24, 1947: A3874-5; Ogg and Ray, Op. cit.; U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary; Op. cit.; Wechsler, Op. cit.

candidate, to fail to elect a President by January 20th, leaving the Vice-President-elect to serve in the interim. If Dewey had received "a very few thousand more votes" in Ohio and California, it has been suggested, this might have happened in 1948. With the election referred to the House, the make-up of the State delegations in the House at that time was such that the election might well have been deadlocked -- 21 for Truman, 20 for Dewey, 4 for Thurmond and 3 States ineffective because their delegations were evenly divided between the Republicans and the Democrats.

As noted, the Lodge-Gossett plan for "proportionate distribution" of electoral votes would have abolished the system of giving each State, large or small, one vote in elections placed in the hands of the House of Representatives. It would have allowed each individual Representative and Senator to cast one vote. This would have reduced the chances of a "minority" President being elected. But it would not have eliminated the possibility.

11. The results of a direct election would be little affected by accidents and frauds - fraudulent voting or fraudulent counting. 16/

16/ On the defects of the present system, see; U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.; Wechsler, Op. cit.

Under the present method of election, close States may be won or lost by such extraneous circumstances as rainy days or blizzards. This system is also highly sensitive to frauds. It is unlikely, however, that the results of any nationwide direct election would be so close that minor accidents or small-scale frauds would have a significant effect on the outcome.

12. With direct election there would be no risk of complications arising between the time the people cast their votes and the day the President was legally elected.[17/] When the choice of the President is not final until a meeting of the electors some weeks after the "Presidential election", confusion or uncertainty may arise because of the ineligibility (e.g., because of holding some Federal office) of an elector. If an ineligible elector were discovered too late in a close election to be replaced, the invalidation of his vote might affect the result of the election.

Further confusion may be caused if electors fail to function in the proper place on the proper day, which happened with the Wisconsin

17/ On the defects of the present system, see: Corwin, Op. cit.; Kallenbach, Op. cit., p. 450; (1949), Lea, Op. cit., July 24, 1947: A3874-5; Ogg and Ray, Op. cit.; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.; Wechsler, Op. cit.

electors owing to a blizzard in 1857.

As was observed during President Eisenhower's post-election trip to Korea late in 1952, the situation would be even more complicated if a "President-elect" were to die or be killed between election day and the day the electors meet. If this were to happen, the choice of a President would apparently fall to the individual electors, acting on their own initiative.

13. Direct election would permit the establishment of nation-wide standards for voting in Presidential elections. For elections of the national Chief Executive, it is difficult to justify different voting standards in different States. The privilege of voting for the President should be enjoyed equally by all citizens. It would not be necessary to extend national voting laws to cover State and local elections, which could remain under the control of the States.

14. Direct election would relieve the major parties of having to make excessive concessions to minority groups.18/ Minority groups would not be able to derive undue bargaining strength from their balance-

18/ For arguments that the present system gives undue weight to minorities, see: Kallenbach, Op. cit. (1949); U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Op. cit.; Wechsler, Op. cit.; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Op. cit. On the advantages of direct election, see: Humphrey, Op. cit.

of-power position, from their ability to swing all the electoral votes of key States to one or the other major candidate.

15. Direct election would not necessarily lead to an undue multiplication of parties.[19] The two-party system has generally been preserved in the election of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and State Governors, among others. All these officials are chosen directly by the people, with a plurality of the votes cast required for election. All systems in which victorious candidates must receive more votes than any other candidate would appear to discourage the development of more than two, or at most three, parties. Voters seem to be reluctant to "waste" their votes on candidates who have no chance of being elected.

Arguments Against Direct Election Plan - Those who oppose the direct election plan, argue to the contrary as follows:

1. Direct election would permit the growth of minor parties which would be likely to have a divisive effect on national politics.[20]

19/ On the relationship between the present electoral system and the two-party system, see: Kallenbach, Op. cit. (1949); U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Op. cit.; Wechsler, Op. cit.

20/ On the possibility of party fragmentation, see: Ogg and Ray, Op. cit.; Wechsler, Op. cit.

It would no longer be necessary for a winning candidate to win a majority of votes in the Electoral College or the House of Representatives. As long as a party was able to command a plurality of popular votes, it would not matter how small the section of the country from which it drew its support. The major parties would have less incentive to assimilate new and competing parties.

While a tendency towards the multiplication of parties might be checked by requiring that a successful candidate receive at least 40 or 45 percent of the popular vote, this would pose the problem of determining who should decide the election in which no candidate had the necessary proportion of votes. Thus, Members of the House of Representatives voting individually would only approximate the "popular will."

The fact that parties have not multiplied in Congressional or State Governor elections gives no assurance that the two-party system would not break down with direct election of the President. Even under the restrictive electoral college system now in operation, minor parties are not unknown. In 1948 there were eleven Presidential candidates, three of whom (Truman, Dewey and Thurmond) won electoral votes.

2. Direct election might impair the "unifying" function of the two major parties.[21/] It can be argued that the essential feature

---

21/ On the advantages of the present system, see: Becker, Carl. The will of the people. Yale review (New Haven) March 1945, v. 34: 385-404; U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee of the Judiciary. Op. cit., Minority views by Clifford P. Case.

of our party system is that each major party recognizes and protects the legitimate interest of all substantial economic, social, sectional, religious, racial or other groups in the Nation. The unifying function might be impaired by reducing the pressure upon the major parties to heed the interests of minority, factional or sectional groups.

It would be difficult to prove that minority groups in pivotal States now exert disproportionate influence on major party programs. It is a matter of justice that the legitimate interests of minority groups should be fairly represented. Evidence indicates that "some of those who . . . want the major parties freed from the necessity to give undue recognition to minority groups . . . wish the major parties to give such groups no recognition whatever."22/

In addition, it can be argued, so long as both major parties have regard for the interests of minority groups, few members of such groups feel compelled to form special interest blocs or parties for their own protection. Also, their more extreme demands are moderated.

3. Direct election would deprive small and sparsely populated States of a slight advantage enjoyed through the distribution of electoral votes according to the size of Congressional delegation.23/ No State,

22/ U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Op. cit., Minority views by Clifford P. Case. pp. 30-31.
23/ For a defense of the weighting in favor of small States, see: U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Op. cit.; Lea, Op. cit. July 18, 1947: A3622-3, July 22, 1947: A3729-31.

they claim, would have any more weight than it would be entitled to by its popular votes. At the present time the majority of the voting population is found in some nine States. For the sparsely-populated States, direct election would impose a positive disadvantage. It is easier to "get out" votes in highly-populated urban areas.

By weighting the composition of the electoral college in favor of small States, the authors of the Constitution helped to reconcile those States to the idea of federation. It cannot be doubted that at various times during the history of the Nation this concession has substantially contributed to the stability of the Government. Although the provision has probably ceased to be essential to the survival of federal union in the United States, and has never been the only protection for small States, it may even now help to cement the loyalty of those States, to prevent them from feeling "trodden upon."

4. Direct election would almost inevitably bring irresistible pressure for national laws governing qualifications for voting.[24/] If control over such matters as minimum voting age, educational qualifications or payment of a poll tax were left with the States -- as it supposedly would have been under the Lemke and Langer plans for direct election - they argue that State legislatures would be under pressure

---

24/ On the problems likely to arise with State control of voting, see: U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Op. cit.

to reduce their voting standards to the "lowest" existing level. Thus, to allow their people to cast as many votes relative to population as the citizens of Georgia, all States would have to reduce their voting age to 18 years. There would be a possibility, if not a likelihood, of an indiscriminate "rush" to lower voting standards.

Establishment of a national voting law for the Presidential election would be likely to threaten State control over voting for Representatives, Senators, and State and local officials. While theoretically it would not be impossible for Presidential elections and other elections to be conducted under different voting laws, in fact the voters would probably resist such a division. Lack of uniformity in State laws would be specially difficult to defend in elections for other Federal officials, i.e., Representatives and Senators. Among other things, it would be awkward to have different sets of people voting for different officials on the same election day.

Although uniform voting laws might be more equitable to the voter, it is claimed that they would represent a blow to the State power. If it is intended that the States should continue to possess some independent authority in our federal system, it is fitting that they should retain at least part of their control over voting. Thus, while uniform rules for voting in Presidential elections might not be

incompatible with generally accepted principles of federalism, Federal laws concerning voting in State elections would quite possibly infringe improperly upon State authority.

5. It is possible to exaggerate the risks inherent in the present system of electing the President.[25] As has been stated above, it has been necessary in just two instances to refer an election to the House of Representatives. Both cases occurred early in the 19th Century. In only one case (1824) did election by the House result in the selection of a "minority President" (John Quincy Adams). In 1800, as has been observed earlier, the House elected the person (Jefferson) who had received a plurality of electoral votes.

In no case has a "questionable" electoral result failed to be accepted peacefully, however reluctantly, by the people.

6. With direct election, the States would cease to be "electoral entities" in the choice of the President.[26] Although appeals to State pride would no doubt continue to be effective vote-getters, State lines would almost certainly be less important in the conduct of campaigns than they are now. Returns would no longer be counted by States. The general effect would probably be to emphasize the importance of the central government relative to the State governments. While opinions differ, it can be argued that in a federal system we should

---

25/ Becker, Op. cit.
26/ U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Op. cit.

~~rather~~ reinforce and enhance State authority and prestige in an attempt to avoid over-centralization.

7. Direct election would tend to increase campaign expenditures. Already the costs of electoral campaigning are enormous. To the extent that such campaigning were seriously undertaken in all parts of the country, they would be even greater. It may be that election issues should be put before the greatest possible number of voters, but the major parties could not undertake much more campaigning than they do now without the costs becoming prohibitive. Because highly populated "key" States and large cities would continue to be such good sources of votes, the parties might be tempted to limit their campaigning to those areas only, in order to limit expenses. The principal candidates would be unable to reach all parts of the country.

8. Exaggeration of election results under the electoral college system may not always be undesirable. It has been argued that "illusory" electoral strength is a feeble basis for the exercise of power and may lead to the abuse of authority. However, the appearance of strength may give a President useful, perhaps even necessary, prestige and moral force in leading the country. Such additional prestige may be especially useful during transition periods accompanying changes of administration.

9. Direct election might unduly upset the existing balance of power between the major political parties. The probable effects of the different method of election can only be guessed. Changes in issues and personalities, not to mention number of parties, make it almost impossible to predict these effects with any degree of accuracy. Other things being equal, both the Republican and the Democratic parties would probably poll more popular votes in areas currently dominated by the opposite party. However, the results might be startling and the political repercussions extensive. The net effect might not be beneficial to the national interest.

10. Direct election is the most drastic remedy for the short-comings of the present system.[27] A more moderate solution might remove some of the obvious defects of that method.

"Proportionate distribution"[28] of electoral votes, for example, while leaving control over elections and the distribution of electoral votes undisturbed, would lessen the possibility of "minority" Presidents and would probably invigorate the two-party system in sections of the country where one party is now virtually unchallenged. By changing the method of voting in elections referred to the House of

---

27/ Lea, Op. cit., July 18, 1947: A3622-3; Wechsler, Op. cit.
28/ See page 61, post.

Representatives, we might eliminate the risks inherent in the "one State, one vote" rule. By a simple amendment abolishing electors (as individuals) and requiring popular determination of electoral votes, it would be possible to guarantee the people the voice in elections which is now based simply on custom, tradition and usage.

11. The presumption is against Constitutional amendment unless the general welfare will be clearly benefited. Both the fact that the fundamental law should not be lightly changed and the fact that the effort required to make a change might better be directed elsewhere, make this method of handling the problem impractical -- possibly undesirable. The risks which direct election would introduce into the Presidential election process have been listed above. It is not plain that the advantages of direct election would outweigh the possible undesirable effects of the change.

It would perhaps be particularly unfortunate to set an unessential precedent for altering Constitutional provisions dealing with the Presidential election process. Experience in France and Italy has shown how electoral reform might come to be "manipulated" with the various parties competing for the system under which they were most likely to win.

12. It is doubtful that any amendment providing for direct election would be approved by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and ratified by three-quarters of the States.[29] Three main barriers would appear to stand in the way. First, some States would be unprepared to lose or risk losing their control over voting qualifications. Secondly, some small and sparsely populated States would probably be averse to relinquishing their advantage in electoral votes. Thirdly, the major parties would be likely to fear the change in political power that might result from the introduction of direct election. It is interesting that no major political party seems ever to have supported a proposal for direct election.

One argument in favor of the Lodge-Gossett "proportionate-distribution" proposal[30] was that it would have left control over voting in the hands of the States and would have preserved the electoral vote advantage of the small States. In States where one party was dominant, it would have been possible for the State legislature to use its power over voting to restrict the strength of a potential opposition.--

29/ Kallenbach, Op. cit. (1949); Lea, Op. cit., July 18, 1947: A3622-3; Ogg and Ray, Op. cit.; U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Op. cit.; Wechsler, Op. cit.; Wilmerding, Lucius, Jr. Reform of the electoral system. Political Science Quarterly (New York) V. 64, March 1949: 1 - 23.

30/ See page 61, post.

To the extent that this had happened, the purpose of the amendment -- that minorities should have electoral power comparable to that of the majority -- would have tended to be defeated.

District Plan (Mundt-Coudert Plan)

As has been pointed out above, the District Plan would preserve the Electoral College, but would eliminate the present procedure of giving a State's entire electoral vote to one candidate. Electors would be chosen by the voters, one for each Congressional or other district, and in addition, two for each State at large. These electors would meet and vote and the candidate receiving the highest number of votes would be elected providing he had a majority. Failing a majority, the Senate and the House, meeting jointly, would elect a President from the top 3 candidates.

Casting of electoral votes by district would not be new in the United States. When State legislatures began in the late 1700's and early 1800's to provide for popular choice of Presidential electors, it was normal for electors to be chosen in districts similar to Congressional districts. James Madison has been quoted as saying that the district system was the one "mostly, if not exclusively, in view when the Constitution was formed and adopted." As has been noted earlier in this report, the district method was generally abandoned when dominant parties in State legislatures saw that they could win more votes for their candidates by choosing electors on general, State-wide tickets.

Since 1947 the following amendments to the Constitution containing the District Plan have been proposed:

81st Congress (1949-1950) -- Such a plan was introduced by Rep. Coudert of New York in 1949 (H.J. Res. 192); and again in greater detail, in 1950 (H.J. Res. 414).

82nd Congress (1951-1952) -- Such a plan was again proposed by Rep. Coudert in 1951 (H.J. Res. 11).

83rd Congress (1953-1954) -- In 1953, bills incorporating such proposals were introduced: S.J. Res. 95, Sen. Mundt; S.J. Res. 100, Sen. Smith of New Jersey; H.J. Res. 1 and H.J. Res. 19, Rep. Coudert; H.J. Res. 99, Rep. Machrowicz.

84th Congress (1955-1956) -- S.J. Res. 3, Senators Mundt, Dirksen, and Goldwater; S.J. Res. 59, Sen. Smith of New Jersey; H.J. Res. 4, Rep. Coudert.

This plan, as embodied in S.J. Res. 3 and H.J. Res. 4 became known as the Mundt-Coudert Plan (102 Cong. Rec. 5137).

Rep. Coudert also introduced H.J. Res. 192, which proposed to abolish the Electoral College, while retaining other provisions of the District Plan. It proposed that the person receiving a plurality of the votes cast for President in each Congressional district within a State would be credited with one electoral vote. The person receiving

the plurality of popular votes in the State would be credited with the number of electoral votes equal to the number of Senators and Representatives-at-large to which that State was entitled. The person receiving a majority of the total number of electoral votes in the country would be elected President. In other respects it retained the provisions of the Mundt-Coudert District Plan.

85th Congress (1957-1958) --- S.J. Res. 4, Sen. Mundt; H.J. Res. 27, Rep. Coudert; H.J. Res. 262, Rep. Alger.

86th Congress -- S.J. Res. 12, Sen. Mundt; H.J. Res. 15, Rep. McSween; H.J. Res. 194, Rep. Whitten.

87th Congress -- S.J. Res. 12, Sen. Mundt and others, reported to full Senate Judiciary Committee from Subcommitte on Constitutional Amendments; H.J. Res. 54, Rep. McSween; H.J. Res. 125, Rep. Matthews; H.J. Res. 200, Rep. Whitten.

88th Congress -- S.J. Res. 12, Sen. Mundt and others; H.J. Res. 72, Rep. Abernethy; H.J. Res. 97, Rep. Matthews; H.J. Res. 158, Rep. Whitten; H.J. Res. 232, Rep. Quie; H.J. Res. 246, Rep. Skubitz.

Action

These resolutions were referred to the appropriate committees. For such action as was taken see pages 24-25. The Senate Subcommittee

on Constitutional Amendments reported to the full Senate Judiciary Committee S.J. Res. 12 of the 88th Congress and S.J. Res. 27 (a proportional plan proposal) without recommendation as to either, as possible alternatives for consideration.

If electoral votes had been counted on the district system in Presidential elections from 1916 to 1960; the results would have differed from those under the existing system as follows;

	Under the Existing System			Under the District System			
Election	Dem.	Rep.	Other	Dem.	Rep.	Other	Uncertain
1960	303	219	15	254	280	3 30a/	
1956	74	457	0	116	413	2	
1952	89	442	0	156	374	0	
1948	303	189	39	299	193	39	0
1944	432	99	0	284	163	0	84
1940	449	82	0	311	135	0	85
1936	523	8	0	412	41	0	78
1932	472	59	0	363	85	0	83
1928	87	444	0	104	349	0	78
1924	136	382	13	145	291	15	80
1920	127	404	0	129	311	0	91
1916	277	254	0	267	175	0	89

30a/ 1963 Senate Hearings, Op. cit., p. 110.

Arguments in Favor of District Plan (Mundt-Coudert Plan).[31/]

Note: The pro and con arguments that follow relate to the district system as proposed in H.J. Res. 4, 84th Congress, and other bills also providing for retention of the electoral college.

Those who favor the district plan argue along the following lines:

1. Under the district system, popular vote results would tend to be reflected more accurately in electoral vote results than they are under the present system. Generally speaking, any group of voters capable of electing a Representative to Congress would be able to win electoral votes. Electoral vote results would not distorted -- and the majority of the winner exaggerated -- by the practice of awarding all the electoral votes of a State to the party winning a plurality of popular votes. In at least eight of the nine Presidential elections between 1916 and 1948 (see table above), the district system

---

31/ Krock, Arthur. Electoral system reform is long overdue. New York Times (New York) Dec. 18, 1952: 28; --Good uses imputed to the landslide delusion? New York Times (New York) Dec. 26, 1952: 14; --A substitute for the Lodge-Gossett plan. New York Times (New York) Feb. 9, 1950: 28; Lippmann, op. cit.; Williams, J. Harvie. Electoral college reform. In U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Nomination and election of president and vice-president. Hearings on S.J. Res. 8 and related bills, June 11, July 13, 15, and Aug. 1, 1953. 83d Cong., 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1953. p. 209-225; --Electoral reform; the Coudert amendment. Article inserted in the Record by Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., Congressional Record, Jan. 9, 1953: A75-77; Wilmerding, op. cit. Congressional Digest, April 1956: 122-128 for pro-con. See also 1961 Hearings, Senate, op. cit.; 1963 Hearings, Senate, op. cit.; 1961 Committee Print, Senate, op. cit.

would have reduced the electoral majority of the winning candidate and increased the electoral votes of his opponent.

Under most circumstances the district system would prevent the election of "minority Presidents." To the extent that popular strength was reflected in electoral votes, the possibility of a wide disparity between popular and electoral votes would be reduced. A large popular majority in a State would not be "wasted." The winner of a bare plurality would not "take all."

It does not necessarily follow, as some opponents of the district system have claimed, that Congressional districts would be substantially manipulated, or "gerrymandered", to deprive minorities of electoral votes. Congress could require, as it has sometimes done in the past, "compact and contiguous" districts which "contained as nearly as practicable, an equal number of inhabitants."* A limited amount of manipulation might be inevitable in the future as in the past, but would not necessarily defeat the general purpose of the amendment.

The district system would limit the possible electoral effects of local frauds, bad weather, intense local issues, and other accidental circumstances.

---

*See S. J. Res. 12, 88th Congress, for instance, among others, containing such a requirement.

Similarly to proposals for proportionate distribution, the Mundt-Coudert plan would preserve the present provision for relating electoral votes to population; the total electoral strength of a State would not vary with the relative size of the popular vote. The plan would provide an even more effective limitation of the effects of local frauds, etc., than would proportionate distribution of electoral votes. Under the district system, unusual circumstances in one local area could only determine the disposition of the electoral votes for the district and the State-at-large. With proportionate distribution, it would be possible for such circumstances to affect the total vote of the State.

2. The district system would be more favorable than the present method of election to the establishment and maintenance of the two-party system. In any areas of a so-called "one-party" State which are now sometimes represented in Congress by members of another party, that other party would be encouraged by the Mundt-Coudert amendment to seek electoral votes for its Presidential candidate. The Mundt-Coudert plan would not be likely to encourage any undue growth of third or splinter parties. In order to win any electoral votes, the supporters of a third party would have to carry a Congressional district. The Mundt-Coudert plan would not, as proportionate distribution would, give electoral votes to a minority group thinly scattered through a State.

3. The district system would provide greater protection for the political power of small and sparsely populated States and areas. It would reduce the power of large, "doubtful" States to exert excessive political influences. With the possibility of dividing the electoral votes, it would be less important than it is now for a Presidential candidate to come from one of these "key" States. It would be less likely that the "pivotal" States would carry undue weight in the development of national party programs, or that they would claim disproportionate attention during the campaign.

The district system would place a check on the political power of large cities, and especially of certain pressure groups within those cities. The voters in the cities would not be able to control all the electoral votes in a State. At most they could determine their own electoral vote and the few electoral votes cast by the State as a whole (for Senators and Representatives-at-large).

Small or sparsely populated States would not be deprived of the advantage they now possess in the distribution of electoral votes. Each State would continue to receive two of its electoral votes regardless of the size of its population.

4. The district system would tend to equate the political pressures on the President with those felt by Congress. Votes would be cast for President and Vice-President and for Members of Congress by the same voters in the same district at the same time. The main difference would be that electoral votes would be cast in a body and one-third of the Senate would be chosen at that time. Responsibility to virtually identical constituencies might foster harmony between the President and Congress.

5. As proposed by Senator Mundt and Rep. Coudert, the district system would not involve any unpopular threat to State control over voting qualifications. The present power of the States to set standards for voting would not be disturbed.

6. The Mundt-Coudert amendment would not create any unwanted precedent for proportional representation in Congress. It is unlikely that any party unable to elect representatives to Congress would be capable of winning electoral votes. Electoral votes would be mathematically proportionate to popular votes only if popular votes happened by chance to be distributed among districts in such a way as to produce that result.

7. The district system might well provide an incentive for greater voting participation in States now dominated by a single party. Any invigoration of the two-party system in those States would help, as would the fact that minority votes would not necessarily be wasted.

Arguments against District Plan (Mundt-Coudert Plan.[32/]

Those who oppose the district plan claim that:

1. Election of the President by the district system would not invariably reflect popular vote results more accurately than the present system. The relationship between popular votes and electoral votes would depend partly on the geographic distribution of party strength. A minority without concentrated power in certain districts might not win any electoral votes in a State. The relationship would also vary with the size of Congressional districts. In spite of periodic reapportionments, these districts differ in size. Districts with relatively small populations would be overrepresented in electoral vote results.

The district system would not abolish the inequalities produced by the present weighting of electoral votes in favor of small States. The weight of popular votes in small States would continue to exceed the weight of such votes in large States.

32/ Statements on H.J. Res. 11 and H.J. Res. 19 (82nd Congress, 1st session). In U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Hearings on S.J. Res. 8 and related bills, op. cit., pp. 230-254.

The Mundt-Coudert plan would continue to permit the election of some "minority" Presidents. This would be possible if the winning candidate won most of his electoral votes by bare majorities or pluralities, while his main opponent received large numbers of his votes by huge margins. As with proportionate distribution, it might happen also if the winner drew disproportionate support from low-population States where there were fewer voters for each electoral vote. Where one Presidential candidate won the bulk of his votes in low-population (rural or small town) Congressional districts, the chances of a minority winner might be greater than they are now.* Thus in 1948 the Democrats carried Ohio and California, but the Mundt-Coudert plan would probably have given the Republicans more electoral votes in those States.

It is doubtful whether any known safeguards would prevent excessive "gerrymandering" of Congressional districts for the benefit of one party in the State. The present Mundt-Coudert proposal does, however contain a specific requirement for "compact and contiguous" districts. Even where such requirements exist, they are often difficult to enforce. Coercion of a determined State legislature is likely to be politically unfeasible. In large numbers of cases, finally, several shapes and sizes of districts may all be legitimately claimed to be "compact and contiguous."

---

* - See, Mr. Nixon, 1960, p. 52.

The Mundt-Coudert amendment would not diminish present inequities in State laws relating to voting qualifications. Like proportionate distribution, it would continue to permit States to restrict their suffrage without any loss in electoral power. The State would cast the same number of electoral votes regardless of the size of the popular vote.

2. The district system might tend to overweight the political power of rural and small-town areas. As a rule, less highly populated areas tend to be overrepresented in the apportionment of Congressional districts, while cities have less than their share of seats. It is possible that the Mundt-Coudert plan would permit a Presidential candidate to win an election without the support of any of the major metropolitan areas.

3. The district system might impair rather than strengthen the two-party system. It would not be likely to invigorate second parties in "one-party" States where the minority party has little chance of winning the votes of any Congressional districts. In the South, the Democratic party is so generally dominant that few Republican Congressmen are ever elected from those States. In the absence of a major realignment of parties in the South, it is doubtful that a change to the district system would materially alter the prospects of a second-party Presidential candidate in that area.

The Mundt-Coudert plan would give greater recognition to possible undesirable third parties than the present system. Almost any small party would find it easier to win Congressional districts than to carry whole States. Once such parties won a few electoral votes, they might be encouraged to try for more.

Proportional Plan (Lodge-Gossett Plan)

Since 1947 most of the amendments proposed incorporate some form of the proportional plan. Thus, there were 11 such proposals in the 80th Congress, 10 in the 81st, 7 in the 82d, 13 in the 83d, 13 in the 84th, 7 in the 85th Congress, 10 in the 86th Congress, 18 in the 87th Congress, and 9 in the 88th Congress (as of June 30, 1963).

As has already been stated, the Proportional Plan would abolish the Electoral College, but would retain the electoral vote. In each State, the electoral vote would be apportioned among the Presidential candidates in accordance with the number of popular votes they receive, rather than in accordance with the "winner take all" system which we have at present. The candidate with the most electoral votes throughout the Nation would be elected President if he received a certain percentage of the total electoral vote. In case of a tie between two candidates, some bills proposed that the person for whom the greatest popular vote was cast should be President. Other bills proposed that the election fall to Congress.

80th Congress (1947-1948) -- S.J. Res. 200, Mr. Lodge; H.J. Res. 9, Rep. Gossett; H.J. Res. 21 and H.J. Res. 124, Rep. Lea; H.J. Res 68 and H.J. Res. 69, Rep. Celler; H.J. Res. 107, Rep. Kefauver; H.J. Res. 230, Mr. Gearhart; H.J. Res. 436, Mr. Smathers. H.J. Res. 106 and H.J. Res. 108 by Rep. Kefauver would abolish the electoral system but retain the "winner take all" system.

Action

These bills were referred to the appropriate committees but received no further action by Congress.

81st Congress (1949-1950) -- S.J. Res. 2, Sen. Lodge and others; H.J. Res. 2, Rep. Gossett; H.J. Res. 10, Rep. Cannon; H.J. Res. 11, Rep. Celler; H.J. Res. 51, Rep. Davis of Wisconsin; H.J. Res. 74, Rep. Smathers; H.J. Res. 78, Rep. Hays of Arkansas; H.J. Res. 81, Rep. Johnson; H.J. Res. 82, Rep. Priest; H.J. Res. 121, Rep. Boggs of Louisiana.

Action

S. J. Res. 2 and its companion bill H.J. Res. 2 became known as the Lodge-Gossett Plan.

H.J. Res. 2 (Rep. Gossett) was reported in the House (H. Rept. 1011, 81st Congress) on July 12, 1949, but received no further action.

S.J. Res. 2 (Sen. Lodge) was reported in the Senate (S. Rept. 602) on June 30, 1949. It passed the Senate with amendments on February 1, 1950 (Daily Cong. Rec. February 1, 1950, p. 1307); and was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on February 2, 1950. The Resolution was reported in the House on March 29, 1950 (H. Rept. 1858), and was debated on July 17, 1950 (Daily Cong. Rec., July 17, 1950, pp. 10572-10587). A motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill was rejected (Daily Cong. Rec. July 17, 1950, p. 10587).

As passed by the Senate, S.J. Res. 2 provided for a Constitutional Amendment to abolish the electoral college and to elect the President and Vice President at a general election. Each State should have a number of electoral votes equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which it is entitled in Congress. Each candidate should be credited with such proportion of the electoral vote of each State as he received of the total popular vote therein, fractional numbers less than one-thousandth to be disregarded. If no person received at least 40 percent of the electoral vote for President, the two Houses of Congress in joint session should by majority vote choose the President from the persons having the two highest numbers of electoral votes.

82nd Congress (1951-1952) -- S.J. Res. 52, Sen. Lodge and others; H.J. Res. 14, Rep. Davis of Wisconsin; H.J. Res. 19, Rep. Gossett; H.J. Res. 89, Rep. Hays of Arkansas; H.J. Res. 90, Rep. Johnson; H.J. 109, Rep. Boggs of Louisiana; H.R. 6137, Rep. Rains.

Action

S.J. Res. 52 (Sen. Lodge) was reported favorably in the Senate on July 30, 1951 (S. Rept. 594), but received no further action. H.J. Res. 19 (Rep. Gossett) was reported favorably in the House on October 17, 1951 (H. Rept. 1199), but received no further action. These two resolutions constituted the same Lodge-Gossett Plan which passed the Senate in the 81st Congress.

83d Congress (1953-1954) -- S.J. Res. 8, Sen. Smathers; S.J. Res. 19, Sen. Kefauver; S.J. Res. 85, Sen. Smathers; S.J. Res. 118, Sen. Johnson of Colorado; H. J. Res. 9, Rep. Bentsen; H. J. Res. 33, Rep. Fisher; H. J. Res. 63, Rep. Mason; H. J. Res. 67, Rep. Morano; H. J. Res. 80, Rep. Teague; H. J. Res. 92, Rep. Reed of Illinois; H. J. Res. 97, Rep. Davis of Wisconsin; H. J. Res. 170, Rep. Celler; H. R. 1600, Rep. Rains.

Action

These bills were referred to the appropriate committees but received no further action by Congress.

84th Congress (1955-1956) -- S.J. Res. 9, Sen. Smathers; S.J. Res. 30, Sen. Kefauver; S.J. Res. 31, Sen. Daniel and others; H.R. 573; Rep. Rains; H.J. Res. 5, Rep. Davis of Wisconsin; H.J. Res. 11, Rep. Celler; H.J. Res. 39, Rep. Grant; H.J. Res. 97, Rep. Fisher; H.J. Res. 175, Rep. Reed of Illinois; H.J. Res. 176, Rep. Walter; H.J. Res. 204, Rep. Burnside; H.J. Res. 214, Rep. Johnson of California; H.J. Res. 242, Rep. Hays of Arkansas.

Action

S.J. Res. 31, introduced by Senator Daniel for himself and 19 other Senators, was reported favorably in the Senate on May 19, 1955 (S. Rept. 360). This plan, known as the Original Daniel Plan, contained provisions similar to the Lodge-Gossett Plan, requiring 40 percent of the electoral vote for election of the President, failing which, Congress in joint session would choose a President, as in the Lodge-Gossett Plan, from the persons having the two highest numbers of electoral votes.

The Daniel Substitute Plan (Combination Plan) -- In 1956 those who favored the District Plan and those who favored the Proportional

Plan joined forces and offered an amendment to S. J. Res. 31, which was known as the Daniel Substitute. It was sponsored by 54 Senators: Senators Daniel, Kefauver, Mundt, Thurmond, Wiley, Dirksen, McClellan, Jenner, Ives, Anderson, Chavez, Murray, Mansfield, Sparkman, Stennis, Hill, Williams, Byrd, Butler, Welker, Knowland, George, Smith of New Jersey, Fulbright, Flanders, McCarthy, Kerr, Goldwater, Thye, Ervin, Curtis, Case of South Dakota, Schoeppel, Holland, Smathers, Barrett, Young, Hickenlooper, Capehart, Frear, Dworshak, Hruska, Cotton, Martin of Iowa, Bible, Potter, Beall, Scott, Allott, Bricker, Bennett, Robertson, Morse and Watkins.

The amendment would permit each State to adopt either the District Plan or the Proportional Plan. Under this Substitute Plan, a State could distribute its electoral votes among the three top candidates according to their statewide popular vote; or, if the State Legislature preferred, the electors could be chosen as Senators and Representatives are now chosen -- two by statewide vote and the rest by congressional districts.

After lengthy debate, S.J. Res. 31 as amended in the Senate was recommitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee (102 Cong. Rec. 5674).

85th Congress (1957-1958) -- S.J. Res. 14, Sen. Smathers; H.R. 3503, Rep. Rains; H.J. Res. 8, Rep. Celler; H.J. Res. 112, Rep. Wright; H.J. Res. 130, Rep. Fisher; H.J. Res. 187, Rep. Herlong; H.J. Res. 188, Rep. Hiestand (the Combination Plan).

Action

These bills were referred to the appropriate committees but received no further action by Congress.

86th Congress (1959-1960) -- The following bills were introduced in the 86th Congress. Besides referral to the proper committee, no bill received any further action:

S.J. Res. 4, Mr. Smathers; January 9, 1959 (Judiciary)

Constitutional Amendment -- Provides that the nominees for President for each political party be nominated in primary elections held in the several States. Congress shall by law prescribe the time (which shall be the same throughout the United States), place, and manner of holding such primary elections. The nominee of each qualified political party in a State shall be credited with such proportions of his party's nominating votes in such State as he receives of the total popular vote of his party therein for President.

Abolishes the electoral college system of electing the President and Vice-President and provides that they be elected by the people of the several States and their choice for such offices shall be determined at a general election held in each State. Entitles each

State to a number of electoral votes equal to the number of members it is entitled to in the House and the Senate. Each person for whom votes are cast for President in each State shall be credited with such proportion of the electoral votes thereof as he received of the total vote of the electors therein for President. The person having the greatest number of electoral votes for President and Vice-President shall be the President and Vice-President, if such numbers be at least 40 percent of the whole number of electoral votes. Sets up the procedure for the determination of the President and Vice-President if no person has received at least 40 percent of electoral votes. Such determination shall be by a majority vote of the combined membership of the House and the Senate.

Bills identical to S.J. Res. 4, above, were introduced: S.J. Res. 72; Mr. Kefauver; March 9, 1959 (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 114; Mr. Fisher; January 9, 1959; (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 127; Mr. Bennett of Florida; January 12, 1959 (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 265; Mr. Kilgore; February 25, 1959 (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 533; Mr. Smith of Mississippi; September 12, 1959 (Judiciary); S.J. Res. 205; Mr. Byrd of West Virginia; June 8, 1960 (Judiciary).

S.J. Res. 86. Mr. Sparkman and others; March 26, 1959 (Judiciary).

Constitutional Amendment - Abolishes the electoral college and provides that the President and Vice-President shall be elected at a general election. Each State shall have a number of electoral votes equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which it is entitled in Congress. Each candidate shall be credited with such proportion of the electoral vote of each State as he received of the total popular vote therein, fractional numbers less than one-thousandth to be disregarded. If two or more persons shall have an equal and the highest number of votes, then the one for whom the greatest number of popular votes were cast shall be President. The Vice-President shall be elected in the same manner as the President.

H.J. Res. 308. Mr. Dowdy; March 13, 1959 (Judiciary).

Constitutional Amendment -- Provides that the nominees for President for each political party be nominated in primary elections held in the several States. Congress shall by law prescribe the time (which shall be the same throughout the United States), place, and manner of holding such primary elections. The nominee of each qualified political party in a State shall be credited with such proportions of his party's nominating votes in such State as he receives of the total popular vote of his party therein for President.

Abolishes the electoral college system of electing the President and Vice-President and provides that they be elected by the people of the several States and their choice for such offices shall be determined at a general election held in each State. Entitles each State to a number of electoral votes equal to the number of Members it is entitled to in the House and the Senate. Each person for whom votes are cast for President in each State shall be credited with such proportion of the electoral votes thereof as he received of the total vote of the electors therein for President. The person having the greatest number of electoral votes for President and Vice-President shall be the President and Vice-President, if such numbers be at least 50 percent of the whole number of electoral votes. Sets up the procedure for the determination of the President and Vice-President if no person has received at least 50 percent of electoral votes. Such determination shall be by a majority of the combined membership of the House and the Senate.

H.R. 10301. Mr. Staggers; February 9, 1960 (Judiciary).

Constitutional Amendment -- Abolishes the electoral college and provides that the President and Vice-President shall be elected at a general election. Each State shall have a number of electoral votes equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which it is entitled in Congress. Each candidate shall be credited with such proportion of the electoral vote of each State as he received of the total

popular vote therein, fractional numbers less than one-thousandth to be disregarded. If no person receives at least 40 percent of the electoral votes for President, or if two persons have an equal and the highest number of such votes, the two houses of Congress in joint session shall by majority vote choose the President from the persons having the two highest numbers. The Vice-President shall be elected in the same manner as the President.

87th Congress (1961-1962) -- The following bills were introduced in the 87th Congress. In addition to referral to committee, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments held hearings, as noted, on the Senate bills proposing a proportional system and other Senate bills proposing changes in the existing electoral college system:

S.J. Res. 2. Senator Johnston and others; January 5, 1961 (Judiciary).

Constitutional Amendment - Abolishes the electoral college but retains the electoral votes of the States and provides for proportional division of each State's electoral votes. The candidate receiving the highest number of electoral votes is elected.

Bills similar to S.J. Res. 2, above, were introduced: H.J. Res. 122, Rep. Dingell, January 12, 1961 (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 377, Rep. Berry, April 18, 1961 (Judiciary).

S.J. Res. 4. Senator Dodd, January 31, 1961 (Judiciary)

Constitutional Amendment - Abolishes the electoral college and provides for division of each State's electoral votes in proportion to the popular votes received by each candidate. If no candidate receives 40 percent of the whole electoral vote, the Senate and House of Representatives, assembled together and voting as individuals, elect from the two highest candidates. A majority of the combined authorized votes is necessary for election.

Bills similar to S.J. Res. 4, above, were introduced; S.J. Res. 9, Senator Smathers, January 5, 1961 (Judiciary) (similar as respects election provision); S.J. Res. 17, Senator Kefauver, January 5, 1961 (Judiciary); S.J. Res. 28, Senator Saltonstall, January 11, 1961, (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 46, Rep. Kilgore, January 3, 1961 (Judiciary); H.J.Res. 116, Rep. Smith of Mississippi, January 9, 1961 (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 165, Rep. Fisher, January 25, 1961 (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 169, Rep. Herlong, January 25, 1961 (Judiciary).

S.J. Res. 48. Senator Case of South Dakota, February 9, 1961 (Judiciary).

Constitutional Amendment - Abolishes the electoral college and provides for proportional division of a State's electoral votes where the minority candidate receives at least one-third of the popular

vote. If no candidate receives a majority of the whole number of electoral votes, election is in the House of Representatives with each State having one vote and a majority of the whole number of States being necessary for election.

S.J. Res. 96. Senator Ervin, May 26, 1961 (Judiciary).

Constitutional Amendment - Abolishes the electoral college and provides for the division of each State's electoral votes in proportion to the popular votes received by each candidate. If no candidate receives 40 percent of the whole electoral vote, election is in the House of Representatives with each State having one vote and a majority of all the States necessary for election.

H.J. Res. 25. Rep. Bennett of Florida, January 3, 1961 (Judiciary).

Constitutional Amendment - Abolishes the electoral college and provides for the division of each State's electoral votes in proportion to the popular votes received by each candidate. If no candidate receives a majority of the whole electoral vote, the Senate and the House of Representatives, assembled together and voting as individuals, elect from the two highest candidates. A majority of the combined authorized votes is necessary for election.

H.J. Res. 274. Rep. MacGregor, February 28, 1961 (Judiciary).

Constitutional Amendment - Abolishes the electoral college and provides for division of each State's electoral votes by giving two of such votes to the candidate winning a plurality of the popular votes cast in the State; then divides the remaining total aggregate of all electoral votes among the candidates proportionately to the popular vote on a national basis. If no candidate receives 40 percent of the whole electoral vote, the House of Representatives, each Member voting individually, shall choose the President from the three persons having the highest number of votes. A majority of the whole number shall be necessary for a choice.

88th Congress (through June 30, 1963)

S.J. Res. 13. Senator Smathers, January 14, 1963 (Judiciary)

Constitutional Amendment - Provides that the nominees for President for each political party be nominated in primary elections held in the several States. Congress shall by law prescribe the time (which shall be the same throughout the United States), place, and manner of holding such primary elections. The nominee of each qualified political party in a State shall be credited with such proportions of his party's nominating votes in such State as he receives of the total popular vote of his party therein for President.

Abolishes the electoral college and provides for division of each State's electoral votes in proportion to the popular votes received by each candidate. If no candidate receives 40 percent of the whole electoral vote, the Senate and the House, assembled together and voting as individuals, elect from the two highest candidates; a majority of the combined authorized votes is necessary for election.

S.J. Res. 27, Senator Kefauver and others, January 23, 1963 (Judiciary)

Constitutional Amendment - Abolishes the electoral college and provides for division of each State's electoral votes (plus District of Columbia) in proportion to the popular votes received by each candidate. If no candidate receives 40 percent of the whole electoral vote, the Senate and the House, assembled together and voting as individuals, elect from the two highest candidates; a majority of the combined authorized votes is necessary for election (reported to full Senate Judiciary Committee without recommendation along with S.J. Res. 12 (single-elector districts) as an alternative for consideration).

Bills substantially similar to S.J. Res. 27, above, were introduced (with or without the District of Columbia provision): H.R. 2617, Rep. Rains,

January 24, 1963 (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 32, Rep. Herlong, January 9, 1963 (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 73, Rep. Abernethy, January 9, 1963 (Judiciary) H.J. Res. 95, Rep. Kilgore, January 9, 1963 (Judiciary) H.J. Res. 132, Rep. Fisher, January 17, 1963 (Judiciary); H.J. Res. 286, Rep. Dowdy, February 26, 1963 (Judiciary).

H.J. Res. 478. Rep. MacGregor, June 13, 1963 (Judiciary).

Constitutional Amendment - Abolishes the electoral college and provides for division of each State's electoral votes by giving two of such votes to the candidate winning a plurality of the popular votes cast in the State; then, divides the remaining total aggregate of all electoral votes among the candidates proportionately to the popular vote on a national basis. If no candidate receives 40 percent of the whole electoral vote, the House of Representatives, each Member voting individually, shall choose the President from the three persons having the highest number of votes. A majority of the whole number shall be necessary for a choice.

The following table illustrates how proportionate distribution would have affected the distribution of electoral votes in the 1948, 1952, 1956, and 1960 Presidential elections. In 1948, President Truman would have won by a smaller margin of electoral votes. Dewey's strength would have been increased, and Wallace, whose popular votes

received no recognition in electoral votes under the present system, would have won almost 10 electoral votes. In 1952, President Eisenhower's majority would have been reduced from 353 to 48.7.

1948 Election[33/]

Present System		Proportionate Distribution
Truman	303	258.0
Dewey	189	221.4
Thurmond	39	38.6
Wallace	0	9.4

1952 Election[34/]

Present System		Proportionate Distribution
Eisenhower	442	288.5
Stevenson	89	239.8
Other	0	2.7

1956 Election[34a/]

Present System		Proportionate Distribution
Eisenhower	457	296.683
Stevenson	74	227.224
Other	0	7.093

33/ Totals under proportionate distribution do not equal totals under the present plan because the table does not show fractional votes which would have gone to such minor candidates as the Socialists and others. For the effects in individual States, see Congressional Record, Jan. 18, 1949: A250.

34/ For a State-by-State analysis, see Congressional Record [daily ed.] Feb. 20, 1953: 1346-7.

34a/ Hearings, 1963, op. cit., p. 110.

1960 Election[34a/]

Present System		Proportionate Distribution
Kennedy	303	266.136
Nixon	219	263.662
Other	15	7.202

Arguments in Favor of Proportional Plan (Lodge-Gossett Plan)[35/]

34a/ Hearings, 1963, op. cit., p. 110

35/ Burns, James McG. The Electoral College meets but why? New York Times Magazine (New York) December 12, 1948, p. 14, 74-8; Corwin, Edward S. The President: office and powers. History and analysis of practice and opinion. 3rd ed., revised. New York, New York University Press, 1948. p. 49-72; Kallenbach, Joseph E. Presidential Election Reform. Paper inserted in the Record by Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Congressional Record, April 13, 1949; 448-52; Lea, Clarence E. Modernize our Presidential election. Ten statements inserted in the Record by Rep. Lea, June 30-July 25, 1947. Congressional Record, July 8, 1947; A3412-13; July 16, 1947: A3545-7; Lippman, Walter, Electing a President. Series of 3 articles. Washington Post, March 6, 7, 9, 1950; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. Should the United States abolish the Electoral College? Yes. The Rotarian (Chicago) v. 75. July 1949: 24-5, 52-3; U.S. Congress. House Committee on the Judiciary. Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice-President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949 (81 Cong., 1st sess. House Report No. 1011);
-----Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949 (81st Cong., 1st sess. Senate Report No. 602); Wechsler, Herbert. The Lodge-Gossett plan. Fortune (Denver) June 1949, v. 39: 134-46;
---Presidential elections and the Constitution: a comment on proposed amendment. American Bar Association Journal (Chicago) March 1949, v. 35: 181-4, 270-4; Wilmerding, Lucius, Jr. Reform of the electoral system. Political Science Quarterly (New York) v. 64, March 1949: 1-23; et. al. Congressional Digest, April 1956:106-121 for pro - con discussion. Senate Hearings, 1961, 1963, op. cit.; Senate Committee Print, 1961, op. cit.

Those who favor the proportional plan argue as follows:

1. Proportionate distribution of electoral votes would tend to reflect more accurately the popular strength of the various candidates. As is argued by those who favor direct elections (see page 26, supra), when the party with a plurality of popular votes in a State wins all the electoral votes for that State, as is now the case, the final results usually exaggerate the strength of the winner. In 1912 Woodrow Wilson, with only 42 percent of the popular vote, received 84 percent of the electoral vote. In 1936 Franklin D. Roosevelt received 98 percent of the electoral vote on the basis of 60 percent of the popular vote. "Illusory" electoral strength provides a feeble basis for the exercise of power and may lead to abuse of authority. Distribution of electoral votes in accordance with popular vote would eliminate the distortion which results from allotment of State votes without regard for the relative popular strength of the parties contending.

2. Under most circumstances, proportionate distribution would prevent the election of a candidate receiving a minority of the popular votes. As has been seen, the present system permits nominees with the greatest popular support to be defeated. With proportionate distribution of electoral votes, a candidate with a majority of popular

votes could not lose the election because he won most of his electoral votes by large majorities while his opponent received most of his electoral votes by bare majorities or pluralities. Had there been proportionate distribution in 1876 and 1888, Hayes would have been defeated by Tilden, and Harrison by Cleveland.

3. As far as the present unequal weighting of States permits, proportionate distribution would give equal weight to individual popular votes cast in pivotal States and in States where one party is almost certain to win by a wide margin. Under the present system a single voter in a "sure" State is not likely to affect the outcome of an election, while a few citizens in a doubtful State may hold the power to elect or defeat a candidate. This affects voting participation, which has tended to be higher in doubtful States. Proportionate distribution of electoral votes would give even a hopeless minority of voters in a State a chance of crediting their candidate with some electoral votes.

4. Accidental circumstances and fraudulent voting or vote-counting would be less likely to defeat the choice of the people. As long as the shift of a few popular votes may determine which party wins the whole electoral vote of a State, accidents or frauds, it is said, constitute a disproportionate threat. Close States may be won or lost on account of a rainy day or blizzard. A few stolen votes may decide

who will be President. With division of electoral votes according to voting strength, a small number of popular votes could affect no more than a few electoral votes. Swings due to accident, fraud or other similar causes would be reduced. Unless the electoral vote were exceedingly close, it is unlikely that any such extraneous circumstances would influence the outcome.

5. Through eliminating the position of Presidential elector, proportionate distribution would give the voters a more direct voice than they now have in the choice of the President. At present, no Federal law prevents an elector from violating the long-established custom that he should vote for the candidate nominated by his party. State laws requiring electors to follow instructions have been held unconstitutional (e.g., Adcock et. al v. Albritton et. al [1948] and Folson et al. v. Albritton et al. [1948]).* State legislatures may decide at any time that electors should be chosen, not by popular vote, but by some other means. Incapacity or disqualification may prevent electors chosen by the voters from functioning at the proper place on the proper day. The necessity for voting on individual electors instead of the actual Presidential candidates may confuse enough voters to affect the outcome of an election, especially in the States indicating only the electors' names on the ballot.

---

* - See footnote 13, page 33.

Abolition of the position of Presidential elector would give the people a direct role in the allocation of electoral votes. No complication could arise from the inability of electors to meet and vote as expected. Confusion created by long lists of electoral college candidates on Presidential ballots would be eliminated.

6. Proportionate distribution might strengthen the two party system. First, it might invigorate the second party in States where the dominant party now is so strong that no other parties have any hope of victory. Under the present system, a party has little incentive to devote precious time, money and energy to local campaigning in States where the returns will almost surely be negative. With proportionate distribution, it is said, Republican party activity would probably be encouraged in the South, and Democratic activity in parts of New England and the Middle West.

Secondly, it would free the major parties from having to make any excessive concessions to minorities in key States, and allow them to concentrate on developing separate and distinct programs. The present system, it is argued, allows small minorities to hold the balance of power in pivotal States. Proportionate distribution would prevent pressure groups from bringing undue pressure on the major parties. Powerful minority groups would be deprived of any power they now possess to "throw" all the electoral votes of a pivotal State to whichever major party offers them the best terms.

It is not necessarily true that porportionate distribution would encourage the growth of numerous small parties and undermine the two-party system. By requiring the winning candidate to obtain an absolute majority of the electoral vote or a majority of State delegations in the House of Representatives, the present system does militate against the rise of third or more parties. Voters generally prefer to cast their ballots for the party which has a chance of carrying the election. Under proportionate distribution, small parties could collect electoral votes without winning pluralities or majorities in the States, and a President could be elected by less than half of the electoral vote. However, as long as the winning candidate had to have more electoral votes than any other candidate, parties would not be likely to multiply rapidly. It is interesting that parties have not so multiplied in State, Congressional and other elections decided on the plurality system in the United States. The provision in the proposed amendment requiring election by at least 40 percent of the total electoral vote would help to check any tendency towards breakdown of the two-party system.

7. Proportionate distribution might help to establish a more equitable balance of power among the States in Presidential elections.

On the one hand, proportionate distribution of electoral votes would reduce the excessive importance of large, doubtful States in Presidential campaigns. Because of the stakes involved, parties now concentrate their pre-election activities in the so-called "pivotal" States. Under the proposed amendment the electoral votes of the present "key" States would not be "swung" one way or another by a small shift of popular votes. The parties would be encouraged to extend the scope of their campaigns in other parts of the country.

Proportionate distribution would also lessen the presently disproportionate value placed on Presidential (and Vice-Presidential) candidates coming from the large, doubtful States. In the years from 1900 to 1949, well over half the major party Presidential candidates were drawn from New York or Ohio.

At the same time, proportionate distribution, as proposed in S.J. Res. 31 (84th Congress), would eliminate the political injustice to large States of the present equal vote for all States in the House of Representatives. Under the present system, the House can elect a President supported by a minority of the people. In 1824, as already noted, the House chose John Quincy Adams over Andrew Jackson, despite Jackson's plurality of electoral votes. It is mathematically possible

that 26 small States, with 89 Representatives, might outvote 24 large States, with 346 Representatives. Under S.J. Res. 31, elections would be referred to the House and Senate in joint session, with each Member and Senator entitled to one vote. The decision of such a body would undoubtedly reflect more accurately the wishes of the voters. By reducing the number of votes required for election by electoral votes from a majority to 40 percent, the proposed amendment would reduce to an acceptable minimum the chance that the choice would have to be referred to Congress.

Small and sparsely populated States would continue to enjoy the slight advantage now enjoyed through the distribution of electoral votes according to size of Congressional delegation. This preferential treatment probably has ceased to play an essential role in the preservation of Federal union. However, it is likely that the small States would object to losing their privilege and would block any amendment which would have that effect. The Lodge-Gossett amendment would not raise the issue.

8. Division of electoral votes in proportion to regular votes would not threaten the power of the States to regulate suffrage requirements. Whatever the virtues or disadvantages of leaving the control of voting qualifications to the States, there is reason to

believe that no amendment opening the door to national control would be acceptable to the necessary two-thirds of the Congress and three-fourths of the State legislatures. Proposals for proportionate distribution of electoral votes would not alter existing State authority to determine who may vote.

Arguments Against Proportional Plan (Lodge-Gossett Plan)36/

Those who oppose the proportional plan claim that:

1. Proportionate distribution might not strengthen the structure and powers of the nation's parties, and even could have an undesirable effect on them. It is generally agreed that the two-party system has helped to unify the United States and has enabled Presidents to provide necessary leadership in spite of a high degree of dependence on Congress. By allowing minority groups to win electoral votes,

36/ Becker, Carl. The will of the people. Yale review (New Haven) March 1945, v. 34: 385-404; Burns, op. cit.; Ferguson, Homer. Congressional Record, Feb. 1, 1950: 1062-9; Hermens, Ferdinand A. Flaws in new electoral plan. Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1950; Krock, Arthur. The proposed change in counting electors. The New York Times (New York) Feb. 3, 1950: 22; Lippmann, op. cit.; Patman, Wright. Should the States abolish the Electoral College? No. The Rotarian (Chicago) v. 75, July 1949: 24-5, 54-5; Silva, Ruth. Reform of the electoral system. Review of politics (Notre Dame) July 1952, v. 14: 394-407; Taft, Robert A. Congressional Record, Feb. 1, 1950: 1298-1299; U.S. Congress. House, op. cit.; Minority views by Clifford P. Case; Wechsler, The Lodge-Gossett plan, op. cit.; --Presidential elections and the Constitution, op. cit.; Wilmerding, op. cit. (1949).

proportionate distribution would give minor parties more incentive to build up strength than they have under the present system. The provision requiring the winning candidate to receive at least 40 percent of the electoral vote would provide only a partial deterrent to the rise of new political groups. The fact that the two-party system has generally survived in Congressional, gubernatorial, and other State and local elections does not prove that it would endure indefinitely in national elections. New parties would not have to win the Presidency in order to exercise political power; they could exert great influence by holding the balance of power.

Proportionate distribution might result in less activity by the major parties to unify diverse political groups. The existing electoral system gives the major parties an incentive to seek the votes of minority groups in key States. It helps to assure that the legitimate interests of these groups will be represented. As long as both major parties give recognition to the interests of minority groups, the members of such groups have little incentive to rally behind extremists and form special interest blocs or parties. The Lodge-Gossett plan, by reducing the political importance of minority groups in large, doubtful States, would make it possible for the major parties to give less attention to the interests of minor groups -- whether

economic, sectional, national, religious or racial. Some Democrats have supported proportionate distribution with the explicit hope that the amendment would allow the Democratic party to "free" itself of the influence of minorities in Northern cities. While some of these minorities may now seem to command more than their share of notice, it would be undesirable for national unity if any of these groups were to be systematically underrepresented.

2. Proportionate distribution would provide no assurance that the popular will would prevail in every Presidential election. The system of dividing electoral votes in proportion to popular vote, it is argued, would not equalize the value of popular votes in large and small States. The electoral vote, including the two votes for each Senator, would continue to be weighted in favor of the small States. A single vote in a small State, where the number of electoral votes relative to population was high, would have more influence than a single vote in a large State (in 1948 one electoral vote represented 160,862 popular votes in California, but only 17,821 votes in South Carolina.)

Under some circumstances, the chances of a Presidential candidate's winning an election in spite of having a minority of the popular votes would be greater than they are under the present system. This might happen if one candidate received most of his electoral votes

from States where the number of voters relative to electoral votes was low. In at least two elections since 1860, proportionate distribution would have given the Presidency to a minority candidate who was defeated under the present system. In 1880 Winfield S. Hancock had over 7,000 fewer votes than James A. Garfield, but he would have won by a margin of 6 to 8 electoral votes if proportionate distribution had been in effect. In 1896, William Jennings Bryan won less than 47 percent of the popular vote to William McKinley's nearly 51 percent, but proportionate distribution would have given him an electoral vote margin of 6.

It is argued also that reference of close elections to both Houses of Congress instead of the House of Representatives would not guarantee more accurate expression of the people's wishes. Under the present system, where a majority of State delegations in the House of Representatives is required for election, there can be deadlocks, and it has been suggested that one was only narrowly averted in the 1948 election. By specifying that a majority of the total membership of the House and Senate would be necessary for election, S.J. Res. 31 and similar bills still allow a third party or a faction of one major party to dictate the results of the election, if not to obstruct the decision altogether.

Proportionate distribution would not, as would a system of direct election involving some Federal control of the suffrage, reduce the present inequality in voting qualifications in different States. In the counting of electoral votes, no penalty would be attached to low voting participation. The amendment might lead to increased variations and restrictions. State legislatures in "sure" States might seek to restrict voting by the minority in order to safeguard the power of the dominant party.

3. Some problems might be created by the abolition of Presidential electors. In the past electors have at times introduced a useful element of flexibility into the election process. In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt's electors could declare before the election that if Roosevelt could not win they would vote for Taft against Wilson. If electoral votes were retained purely for counting purposes, it would not be possible to make such commitments.

Abolition of electors, as provided in S.J. Res. 31, would also allow the election of President and Vice-President from separate parties. Now one set of electors is elected to choose both President and Vice-President. It is a practical impossibility for the two to belong to different parties. Under the proposed amendment, the States would be permitted to have separate ballots for President and Vice-President.

The electoral votes for the chief executive and vice-president would be counted separately. To eliminate the chance of having winning candidates from different parties, it would necessary for Congress or the Constitution to require joint balloting for the two officials.

4. Proportionate distribution might give undue political importance to areas having the least population relative to electoral votes. If the present system tends to overvalue the importance of the larger, doubtful States, it at least gives extra attention to the sections of this country where the size of the voting population relative to electoral votes is greatest. In reducing the importance of the large-electorate States, proportionate distribution might turn the emphasis excessively to small States where considerable numbers of electoral votes could be won by relatively few popular votes.

5. Under proportionate distribution, the Statesgenerally would have less importance as units in the election process. Now a State is "carried" by one party or another, and State political organizations may win power and prestige on the strength of having "delivered" a State to their Presidential candidate. It can be argued that this helps to maintain a desirable dispersion and decentralization of political power in the United States. With the electoral votes of the States divided percentage-wise between the various candidates, competing groups in the States would probably tend to be merged in national

groups. State party organizations would be unable to claim credit for any more electoral votes than they could win by their share of the popular vote.

Proportionate distribution might cause campaigns to be organized too exclusively on a national basis. The present system encourages campaigning on a State-by-State basis. This has been only partly qualified by the increase in nation-wide discussion of issues on radio and televion. Presidential campaigns are closely tied in with gubernatorial, Senate and other State campaigns. It can be argued that campaigns oriented around States may sometimes take issues to the people more effectively than campaigns directed toward the whole country.

6. The exaggeration of the winner's majority under the present system may not be an unmitigated evil. After a bitterly-fought election campaign, an appearance of nation-wide backing, counted by States, may help to win general acceptance for the victorious candidate. Under proportionate distribution the winner would almost never have more than a bare majority of electoral votes. In a substantial number of cases he would probably have only a plurality.

7. An amendment providing for proportionate distribution might lead to the introduction of the direct election of the President or to Federal control over voting standards. It is not impossible that

the amendment would prove an "opening wedge" for more drastic changes. Various supporters of the Lodge-Gossett plan have admitted that they would have favored direct election instead of proportionate distribution if they had believed that such an amendment would be acceptable to the necessary number of Congressmen and State legislatures. While either direct election or Federal control over voting qualifications might have certain advantages, there are important objections to both of them.

8. Proportionate distribution of electoral votes might conceivably lead to pressure for proportional representation in Congress. Now almost all Members of the House of Representatives are chosen in single-member districts, with a plurality of popular votes required for election. This system discourages the growth of small parties, gives the major parties an incentive to absorb dissident groups, and makes the elected Representatives directly responsible to a geographically-delimited group of constituents. If the proposed amendment gave electoral votes to a small party which could not elect a Member to Congress, the small party might be encouraged to demand that State Congressional delegations be divided according to the number of popular votes received by various parties in the State. Proportional representation would permit the growth of small and perhaps immoderate parties. It would involve a shift from single to multiple member districts and a less direct relationship between member and constituent.

9. The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the United States government, should probably not be amended unless it is certain that the general welfare will benefit as a result. The present method of electing the President has been reasonably satisfactory. While proportionate distribution would eliminate some of the risks inherent in the existing system, it would introduce new dangers. If the present method must be amended it would be best to devise a clearly desirable alternative.

Popular Interest in Reform

In the fall of 1948 a public opinion poll conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion showed that 58 percent of the American public favored changing the method of electing the President so that each candidate would receive the same proportion of the electoral vote of each State that he receives in the popular vote. Only 15 percent favored maintaining the present system, while 27 percent had no opinion.37/ In 1950 a Gallup Poll showed that 57 percent of the American people wanted the Lodge-Gossett amendment while only 22 percent opposed it (the remainder having no opinion).38/ In April of 1960, Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion released a report showing that 50 percent of the American people favored a change in the electoral college system, 28 percent opposed a change, and 22 percent expressed no opinion.38/

37/ National Municipal Review (New York) October 1948, v. 37: 511-12.
38/ Washington Post, March 5, 1950; Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1960: B3

Automatic System

Two of the bills introduced in the Senate in the 88th Congress would provide for the automatic operation of the existing electoral college system by amending the Constitution to retain the college but abolish the office of elector. This would abolish independent voting by Presidential electors and erase the problem of attempting to create binding systems. A candidate winning the highest number of popular votes in a State would automatically be credited with all the electoral votes from that State. A majority of the whole number of electoral college votes would, as now, be necessary for election to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency.

The two Senate resolutions are: S.J. Res. 8, Senator McGee, January 14, 1963 (Judiciary), and S.J. Res. 24, Senator Kefauver, January 23, 1963 (Judiciary). In respect to the latter bill, provision is made for election of the President by the Senate and House in joint session, if a candidate does not receive a majority of the electoral votes, instead of only by the House of Representatives as at present. A majority of the votes of the combined authorized membership of the Senate and House would be necessary for a choice.

H.J. Res. 71, Rep. Zablocki, January 9, 1963 (Judiciary) is a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives in the 88th Congress similar to S.J. Res. 8, above.

Opponents of this proposal raise two objections: (1) that there should be no tampering whatsoever with the present system, and (2) that while they agree that electors should be bound, this proposal would constitute only a half-way measure which overlooks many other inequities in the present system.39/

39/ "Electoral College Reform", U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1963, p. 20.

Selected References

Adriano, L.E. Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Law J. 22:339 Jl. '57

Aly, Bower, ed. Presidential election; the twenty-third annual debate handbook. Columbia, Missouri, Lucas Bros., 1949. 2 vols. 220 p. each

----Selecting the President: the twenty-seventh annual debate handbook. Columbia Missouri, Lucas Bros., 1953. 2 vols. 220 p. each. [Contains articles by Senators Estes Kefauver, William Langer, and Karl E. Mundt; Rep. Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., former Rep. E. Gossett, Edward S. Corwin, Joseph E. Kallenbach, Ruth Silva, J. Harvie Williams, and others.]

American Enterprise Association, Inc. Analysis of Proposals to amend the Constitution to revise procedure for election of President and Vice-President. Washington, 1956. (Its report No. 616); Its report No. 9, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., June 26, 1961.

Association of the Bar of the City of New York. A Report on the Method of Electing the President and Vice-President. Report by the Committee on Federal Legislation. New York, 1962.

Becker, Carl. The will of the people. Yale Review (New Haven) March 1945. v. 34: 385-404.

Bennett, Emmet S. The reform of Presidential elections. American Bar Association Journal (Chicago) v. 37, February 1951: 89-92, 162-4.

Blanchard, Robert; Meyer, Richard; Morley, Blaine. Presidential Elections, 1948-1960. Salt Lake City, Univ. of Utah, 1961.

The Blank Ballot: South's secret weapon for 1960. U.S. News and World Report, v. 44, April 11, 1958: 67-69.

Burns, James MacGregor. The Electoral College meets but why? New York Times Magazine (New York) Dec. 12, 1948: 14, 74-8.

Congress weighs plans to reform the presidential election procedure. The Congressional Digest (Washington) Special annual debate number v. 28, August-September, 1949: 193-224.

Corwin, Edward S. The President: Office and powers, 1787-1957; History and analysis of practice and opinion. 4th ed., revised. New York. New York University Press, 1957. Pp. 12-13, 39-53, 339-340.

Daniels, Walter M., ed. Presidential election reform. New York H.W. Wilson Co., 1953. (The Reference Shelf, v. 25, no. 4). 200 p.

Dolan, J. F. How we elect our President: an electoral college education in one lesson. American Bar Association Journal, v. 42, Nov. 1956: 1037-1040.

Dougherty, J. Hampden. The electoral system in the United States. New York, Putnam, 1906. 425 p.

Douglas, Paul A. Election of President and Vice-President. Remarks in the Senate, March 26, 1956. Congressional Record [bound] March 26, 1956: 5535-5574.

Electoral College Reform? Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. Washington, D. C., 1963.

The Electoral Process. Law and Contemporary Problems. Vol. 27. No. 2 Spring, 1962.

Electoral reform. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1956. Pp. 448-451.

Ferguson, Homer. Remarks in the Senate on the Lodge-Gossett amendment. Congressional Record, February 1, 1950: 1062-1069.

Goldman, Ralph M. Hubert Humphrey's S.J. Res. 152: a new proposal for electoral college reform. Midwest Journal of Political Science, V. 2, February 1958: 89-96.

Graubard, Stephen R., The President's Electors, The Commonweal. January 20, 1961. p. 431

How Should the President be Elected? American Good Government Society. Washington, D. C., 1961.

Kallenbach, Joseph E. Our electoral college gerrymander. Midwest Journal of Political Science, v. 4, May 1960: 162-191.

Kallenbach, Joseph E. Presidential election reform. Paper inserted in the Record by Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Congressional Record, April 13, 1949: 4448-4453.

Kallenbach, Joseph E. Recent proposals to reform the electoral college system. American Political Science Review (Washington) V. 30: 924-929. (October 1936).

Kefauver, Estes. His address to law students of Vanderbilt University. Congressional Record, February 24, 1948; A1084-86.

Krock, Arthur. Electoral system reform is long overdue. New York Times (New York) December 18, 1952: 14.

---Good uses imputed to the 'landslide delusion'? New York Times (New York) December 26, 1952: 14.

---Many questions raised by electoral reforms. New York Times (New York) March 12, 1950: IV - 3.

---The proposed change in counting electors. New York Times (New York) February 3, 1950: 22.

---A substitute for the Lodge-Gossett plan. New York Times (New York) February 9, 1950: 28.

---The Supreme Court and the electoral college. New York Times (New York) April 25, 1952: 22.

Lea, Rep. Clarence F. Modernize our Presidential election. Ten statements inserted in the Record by Rep. Lea, June 30-July 24, 1947. Congressional Record, June 30, 1947: A3336-7; July 8, 1947: A3397-8, A3412-3; July 16, 1947: A3545-7, A3590-1; July 19, 1947: A3622-3; July 22, 1947: A3729-31; July 24, 1947: A3792-3, A3874-5; A3879.

Lippmann, Walter. Electing a President. Series of 3 articles. Washington Post, March 6, 7, 9, 1950.

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. Change of method of counting electoral votes for President and Vice-President. Congressional Record, March 24, 1949: A1699-1701.

Lodge, Jr., Henry Cabot. Remarks in the Senate on the Lodge-Gossett amendment. Congressional Record, January 25, 1950: 908-20, Feb. 1, 1950: 1303.

Lucey, Charles. Electoral college system thwarts will of American voters. In extension of remarks of Victor L. Anfuso. Congressional Record [daily ed.] V. 102, February 1, 1956: A1012-1014.

Martin, W.L. Election of electors by state legislatures. Ala. Law 19:260. July 58.

---Presidential electors, let the State legislatures choose them. American Bar Association Journal, V. 44, December 1958: 1182-1187.

Morley, Felix. Democracy and the Electoral College. Modern Age. Fall, 1961.

Morley, Felix. Electoral Reform Would Make Your Vote More Important. Nation's Business. Vol. 51, September, 1963. pp. 25-26.

Moves to revise the electoral system. Congressional Digest, V. 35, April 1956: 99-128.

Mundt, Karl E. George Washington: yesterday and today. In Extension of remarks of Hon. Barry M. Goldwater. Congressional Record (Daily ed.) V. 100, February 23, 1954: A1410-1413.

---Remarks in the Senate on Amendment of Constitution relating to election of President and Vice President. Congressional Record. V. 99 June 30, 1953: 7611-7613.

Petersen, Svend. A Statistical History of the American Presidential Elections. New York, 1963.

Purity of suffrage and the Presidential electoral tribunal, Phila. L.J. 32:539 S '57.

Putney, Bryant. Abolition of the Electoral College. Editorial Research Reports, July 10, 1940. V. 2, No. 1. 13 p.

The question of changing the electoral system. Congressional Digest (Washington) Vol. 32, August -- September 1953: entire issue.

Ray, B. F. Electoral College Elects the President. Ala. Law 18:281 July, '57

Roche, John P. The Electoral College. Dissent. (American Notebook). May, 1961.

Silva, Ruth C. The Lodge-Gossett resolution: a critical analysis. American Political Science Review, Vol. 44: 86-99. (March, 1950).

---Reform of the Electoral system. Review of politics (Notre Dame), Vol. 14: 394-407. (July 1952).

South considers independent elector plan. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 1, 1960: 569-571.

Stone, Kathryn. Choosing the President of the U.S.A. Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund, Inc. New York. 1955.

Time. Reforming the College. Vol. 18, p. 21. June 21, 1963.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice-President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949. (81st Cong., 1st sess. House Report No. 1011) 32 p.

---Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice-President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950. (81st Cong., 2d sess. House Report No. 1858) 5 p.

---Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice-President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1951. (82nd Cong., 1st sess. House Report No. 1199) 36 p.

---Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Nomination and election of President and Vice-President. Hearings on S.J. Res. 8 and related bills, June 11, July 13, 15, and August 1, 1953. 83d Congress, 1st sess., Washington U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1953. 259 p.

---Nomination and election of President and Vice-President. Hearings on S.J. Res. 3, 9, 10, 27, 30, 31, and 53. 84th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1955.

---Nomination and Election of President and Vice-President and Qualifications for Voting (Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments). Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and other bills, May 23, 26, June 8, 27, 28, 29, July 13, 1961. 87th Congress, 1st sess. Parts 1 - 5. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961.

---Nomination and Election of President and Vice-President (Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments). Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and other bills, June 4, 1963, 88th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963.

---The Electoral College. Committee Print (Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments), October 10, 1961. 87th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961.

---Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice-President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949. (81st Cong., 1st sess. Senate Report No. 602) 26 p. (Also Senate Report No. 602, Part 2. Individual views of Sen. Homer Ferguson) 8 p.

---Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice-President. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961. (82nd Cong., 1st sess. Senate Report No. 594) 25 p.

---Hearings on S.J. Res. 2, an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice-President, February 23 - May 3, 1949, 81st Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949.

---Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. American Law Division. Analysis of proposal to amend the Constitution, changing method of electing President and Vice-President. In Congressional Record, Vol. 99, July 13, 1953: 8581-8584.

The U.S. election process: how it works and what it needs. The Congressional Digest (Washington) V. 31, March 1952.

Vital Issues, June, 1960. Nomination by Convention - Still the Best Way?

Wechsler, Herbert. Presidential elections and the Constitution: a comment on proposed amendment. American Bar Association Journal (Chicago) March 1949. V. 35: 181-4, 270-4.

Welty, Richard C. Who really elects our Presidents. Midwest Quarterly, v. 2, Autumn 1960: 21-34.

Wilkinson, Jr., Donald M. The Electoral Process and the Power of the States. American Bar Association Journal. Vol. 47, p. 251. March, 1961.

Williams, J. Harvie. Electoral college reform. In U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Nomination and election of President and Vice-President. Hearings on S.J. Res. 8 and related bills, June 11, July 13, 15, and August 1, 1953: 83d Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt Print. Off., 1953. p. 209-225.

---Electoral reform: the Coudert Amendment. Article inserted in the Record by Rep. Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., Congressional Record, Jan. 9, 1953: A75-7.

---Letter inserted in the Record by Rep. Frederic R. Coudert, Jr. Congressional Record, March 8, 1950: A1859-61.

Wilmerding, Lucius. The electoral college. New Brunswick, N.J. Rutgers University Press, 1958. 224 p.

Wilmerding, Lucius, Jr. Reform of the electoral system. Political Science Quarterly (New York) V. 64, March 1949: 1-23.

JK 516 C 3

Focus on Our Electoral System

Should We Change Indirect Method of Balloting?

"The electoral college method of choosing a President is as outdated as the horse and buggy."

"Even though our Presidential election system seems complicated, it has served the nation well and should be continued."

These 2 points of view have long been a subject of debate in the U. S., especially at election time.

OUR Founding Fathers felt the voters should *influence* the selection of the Chief Executive, but not have the *final choice* in this matter. That choice, the framers of the Constitution felt, should be in the hands of a small group of citizens called *electors*. The Constitution leaves up to the states the question of how these electors should be chosen.

The electoral system has changed considerably over the years. For instance, all electors are now chosen by popular vote, whereas most of them were named by state legislatures in our early history. Also, electors in bygone years more often cast ballots for Presidential candidates of their choice regardless of views expressed by voters. Today, electors nearly always carry out the wishes of the voters who choose them.

Nevertheless, the basic form of the electoral system for choosing a President remains much as our Founding Fathers established it.

Choosing electors. Each state names as many electors as it has senators and representatives combined in Congress. Nevada, with 1 representative and 2 senators, has 3 electors. New York, with 41 representatives and 2 senators, has 43 electors.

All states together have a total of 538 electors. This figure is based on the 100 senators and the 435 representatives that our 50 states now have in Congress, plus 3 electors for the District of Columbia. Though Washington, D. C., does not have any spokesmen in Congress, it was granted 3 electors by the 23rd Amendment to the Constitution, enacted in 1961.

So there are now 538 electors in a group known as the "electoral college." Of course, this *college* is not a school. It is a collective name for the electors.

Each of the 2 major parties puts up a slate of electors who are pledged to support that party's Presidential and Vice Presidential nominees. In some states, the names of these electors appear on the ballot along with those of the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. In others, only the names of the top office seekers are listed on the ballot.

Regardless of the kind of ballot used by individual states, a citizen who votes for his favorite standard-

Source: American Observer, November 2, 1964. Reproduced by the Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, February 16, 1965.

bearer is—officially speaking—not voting directly for that candidate. He is voting for the entire group of would-be electors in his state who are pledged to support the candidate of his choice.

This year, all Republican electors on state ballots are pledged to cast their ballots for Barry Goldwater. All Democratic electors—except those from Alabama—have agreed to support Lyndon Johnson. Alabama's 10 Democratic electors are "unpledged." That means they are free to cast their votes for any candidate they wish after the election on November 3.

Actually, even the pledged electors cannot be forced to vote for their party's candidate, but they almost always do. An exception to this rule occurred in 1956, when 1 elector disregarded his promise and voted for a man who was not even running for office.

Electoral system at work. The party's candidates who win the largest number of popular votes in a state receive *all* that state's electoral votes. The candidates who receive a majority of electoral votes for the entire nation win the Presidency and Vice Presidency. It takes a minimum of 270—1 more than half of the 538 electoral votes—to put a candidate in the White House.

Here is an example of how the system works: In the 1960 Presidential race, Delaware citizens cast 99,590 Democratic ballots and 96,373 Republican votes. Since the Democrats won a majority (even though a slight one) of the votes, the state gave all its electoral votes —3—to Democratic candidate John Kennedy.

Alaska, with 3 electoral votes, cast a slight majority of ballots (30,953 for Richard Nixon to 29,809 for John Kennedy) for the Republicans. Therefore, all its 3 electoral votes went to Mr. Nixon.

The electors who are chosen on November 3 this year will do *their* voting December 14. On that date, they will cast the official ballots for President and Vice President. Electors of each state will meet in their capitol or some other building for the balloting. Votes cast by the 538 electors are then sent to the presiding officer of the U. S. Senate.

On January 6, after Congress begins its new session next year, the presiding officer of the Senate will announce the results in the presence of both houses of Congress. At that time, the election of the Chief Executive becomes official.

Thus the job of picking the President is not officially finished until January. Unless the election is extremely close or some other problem arises, however, the nation will learn the name of the winner as soon as the ballots are counted after the November 3 election. By adding up the electoral votes, state by state, citizens can get the total and learn who the victor is.

Elector vs. popular vote. The nation's *electoral* vote does not always give an accurate picture of how the popular vote is divided. In 1960, for example, John Kennedy received 303 electoral votes as compared with 219 for the losing candidate, Richard Nixon. Though Mr. Kennedy won the Presidency by a margin of 84 electoral ballots, his majority in popular votes was only 113,057 out of a total 68,330,005 cast for the 2 candidates.

On 2 occasions in our history, candidates have received a majority of the *electoral* ballots and have become President without winning the largest total of *popular votes*. The most recent time this happened was in 1888. Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, received nearly 100,000 more popular votes than did his Republican opponent, Benjamin Harrison. But Harrison won the electoral count, 233 to 168, and became President.

To see how this happened, let us examine what occurred in 2 states:

Harrison carried Indiana by a margin of slightly over 2,000 votes. He received all that state's electoral votes (15 at the time). Texas gave

Grover Cleveland a majority of 147,000 popular votes, and all its 13 electoral ballots.

In these 2 states combined, Cleveland received 145,000 more popular votes than Harrison, but the electoral count stood at 15 for Harrison, and 13 for Cleveland. A similar situation existed in some other states, thus making it possible for Harrison to win the Presidency even though he received only a minority of the popular votes.

Abolish electoral system? Republican Senator Kenneth Keating of New York suggests that we eliminate the electoral system and replace it with direct popular election of our President.

Supporters of this plan argue: "Every citizen should be given an equal voice in choosing our Chief Executive—a goal that can be achieved only by a direct popular vote for President. At present, a candidate can—by winning slim majorities of the votes in enough states to command more than half of the nation's electoral ballots—become Chief Executive even though he does not receive a majority of the popular votes."

Other citizens say: "The electoral system rightly gives even our thinly populated states an important voice in choosing the President.

For instance, Alaska, with 234,000 people, has only slightly more than a tenth of 1% of our nation's 193,000,000 people. On the basis of popular vote alone, that state would have practically no voice in naming a President. But Alaska's 3 electoral ballots add up to over ½ of 1% of the 538 for the entire nation. This makes it possible for the state to have several times as much influence in choosing our Chief Executive as it would otherwise have."

A second proposal. Other Americans want to keep the present system, but divide up the electoral votes that each state casts for President on the basis of how many popular votes each candidate receives. An example is a state with 10 electoral ballots that casts 1,000,000 votes at election time. If 600,000 of these favored 1 candidate, he would receive 6 electoral ballots. His opponent, if he received the other 400,000 votes, would win the remaining 4 electoral ballots.

Supporters maintain: "This plan would permit each state to keep as much voice in Presidential elections as it has today. At the same time, if electoral ballots were divided among the candidates on the basis of popular votes, there would no longer be the danger of electing a 'minority' President who receives fewer popular ballots than does his opponent.

"It is true that only 2 of our Presidents have been elected by winning the necessary number of electoral ballots despite losing out to their opponent in the popular vote count. But the choice of a President who does not receive majority support at the polls can cause bitterness between those who feel they were 'cheated' out of a victory and the actual winners. If this occurs at a critical period in our history, such bitterness might seri-

ously weaken and divide the nation at a time when a united effort by all citizens is needed to 'pull us through' the crisis."

Critics contend: "Dividing electoral votes among the parties might encourage the growth of minor political groups. Such parties do not grow to any significant size today, since it is nearly impossible for them to win any electoral ballots—which go to the party with most votes in each state.

"The growth of minority parties might lead to the kind of unstable governments that plague Italy and certain other lands today. In these countries, large numbers of parties compete with one another, making it difficult for them to agree on how to govern their lands.

"The United States, on the other hand, provides a shining example of how a 2-party system helps make a stable government possible. In our system, groups with opposing views can effectively work within each of the major parties to get certain of their programs adopted —without having to set up independent political groups of their own." —*By* ANTON BERLE



TALBOTT IN THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

CARTOONIST EXPRESSES view that the electoral college system should join the dodo bird, which has been extinct for nearly 3 centuries. Political leaders are divided as to whether or not the system ought to be kept.

CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS

Technical Studies

Dale
Votes — Presidential Elections

Series P-23, No. 14
April 21, 1965

1960 POPULATION OF VOTING AGE AND VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT, 1964 AND 1960, FOR STATES AND COUNTIES

This report brings together for States and counties the available data on the 1960 population of voting age, and on votes cast in the 1960 and 1964 Presidential elections. Table 1 shows State data; figures for counties are given in table 2. Estimates of the population of voting age for November 1964 are shown for States only; corresponding data for counties are not available. Both tables show figures on the nonwhite population of voting age in each area, as of April 1960.

The voting age population relates to those 21 years old and over in all States except as follows: 18 years old and over for Georgia and Kentucky; 19 years old and over for Alaska; and 20 years old and over for Hawaii. They include members of the Armed Forces of voting age stationed in each area. Counties (and independent cities) which contained more than 1,000 resident military personnel in April 1960 (based on the 1960 Census) are indicated by an asterisk (*).

Except as noted, all areas are as defined in April 1960. For Alaska, the data relate to election districts established as of December 1961. In Virginia, a number of areas were created after 1960. Here, too, the data relate to the newly defined areas. The specific areas involved and their definitions are shown in appropriate footnotes in table 2.

The percent of the population of voting age casting votes for President in 1960 was derived by dividing the number of votes cast in November 1960 by the population of voting age in April 1960. Because of the time differential between the census date and the date of the election, it is possible for the number of votes cast in November 1960 to exceed the population of voting age reported in April 1960, thus resulting in a rate in excess of 100 percent. This situation occurs in about 10 small counties out of the more than 3,000 areas shown in table 2.

Furthermore, in order to maintain comparability with the county data, the percent casting votes for President in 1960 for States shown in table 1 was also computed using the April 1960 voting-age population as a base. These percentages, therefore, differ slightly from those previously published by the Bureau of the Census in release No. CB64-93, issued September 8, 1964. The 1960 State percentages in the latter report are based on estimates of voting age population as of November 1964.

Figures on the number of votes cast for President are those compiled by the Governmental Affairs Institute, Washington, D.C., from official State sources. The 1960 figures on the voting-age population, for States and counties, are from the 1960 Census of Population. The 1964 figures on the population of voting age of States relate to November 1, and are estimates derived by the Bureau of the Census. They are consistent with the estimates of the population of States, by age, for July 1, 1964, published in Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 294.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, 15 cents.
Annual subscription (Series P-20, P-23, P-25, P-27, P-28 summaries, P-60, and P-65, combined), $4.00; foreign mailing, $5.25.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, John T. Connor, *Secretary*
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

Table 1.--POPULATION OF VOTING AGE AND VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT, BY STATES: 1964 AND 1960

(Numbers in thousands. Population includes Armed Forces stationed in each State. Percentages based on unrounded numbers)

State	1964			1960				
	Population of voting age	Votes cast for President		Population of voting age			Votes cast for President	
		Number	Percent	Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent
					Number	Percent		
United States	113,931	70,642	62.0	108,458	10,975	10.1	68,839	63.5
Alabama	1,915	690	36.0	1,834	481	26.2	570	31.1
Alaska	138	67	48.7	134	25	18.6	61	45.5
Arizona	879	481	54.7	732	61	8.3	398	54.5
Arkansas	1,124	560	49.8	1,043	193	18.5	429	41.1
California	10,916	7,058	64.7	9,660	722	7.5	6,507	67.4
Colorado	1,142	777	68.0	1,031	30	2.9	736	71.4
Connecticut	1,698	1,219	71.8	1,591	62	3.9	1,223	76.8
Delaware	283	201	71.0	267	34	12.7	197	73.6
District of Columbia	517	199	38.4	509	247	48.4	(X)	(X)
Florida	3,516	1,854	52.8	3,088	470	15.2	1,544	50.0
Georgia	2,636	1,139	43.2	2,410	613	25.4	733	30.4
Hawaii	395	207	52.5	360	238	66.0	185	51.3
Idaho	386	292	75.8	372	5	1.3	300	80.7
Illinois	6,358	4,703	74.0	6,281	600	9.6	4,757	75.7
Indiana	2,826	2,092	74.0	2,778	150	5.4	2,135	76.9
Iowa	1,638	1,185	72.3	1,664	16	1.0	1,274	76.5
Kansas	1,323	858	64.8	1,322	56	4.2	929	70.3
Kentucky	1,976	1,046	52.9	1,898	135	7.1	1,124	59.2
Louisiana	1,893	896	47.3	1,804	515	28.5	808	44.8
Maine	581	381	65.6	581	3	0.6	422	72.6
Maryland	1,995	1,116	56.0	1,845	284	15.4	1,055	57.2
Massachusetts	3,290	2,345	71.3	3,245	73	2.2	2,469	76.1
Michigan	4,647	3,203	68.9	4,580	405	8.9	3,318	72.4
Minnesota	2,024	1,554	76.8	2,001	22	1.1	1,542	77.0
Mississippi	1,243	409	32.9	1,171	422	36.1	298	25.5
Missouri	2,696	1,818	67.4	2,696	222	8.2	1,934	71.8
Montana	399	279	69.9	389	11	2.7	278	71.4
Nebraska	877	584	66.6	858	20	2.3	613	71.4
Nevada	244	135	55.5	175	11	6.4	107	61.2
New Hampshire	396	288	72.3	373	1	0.4	296	79.4
New Jersey	4,147	2,847	68.6	3,861	304	7.9	2,773	71.8
New Mexico	514	328	63.7	501	33	6.6	311	62.1
New York	11,330	7,166	63.2	10,881	914	8.4	7,291	67.0
North Carolina	2,753	1,425	51.8	2,557	551	21.5	1,369	53.5
North Dakota	358	258	72.2	355	5	1.5	278	78.5
Ohio	5,960	3,969	66.6	5,839	449	7.7	4,162	71.3
Oklahoma	1,493	932	62.5	1,416	115	8.1	903	63.8
Oregon	1,130	786	69.6	1,073	20	1.9	776	72.3
Pennsylvania	7,080	4,823	68.1	7,100	501	7.1	5,007	70.5
Rhode Island	568	390	68.6	540	11	2.1	406	75.1
South Carolina	1,380	525	38.0	1,266	371	29.3	387	30.5
South Dakota	404	293	72.6	392	12	3.1	306	78.3
Tennessee	2,239	1,144	51.1	2,093	314	15.0	1,052	50.3
Texas	5,922	2,627	44.4	5,534	650	11.7	2,312	41.8
Utah	522	401	76.9	468	8	1.8	375	80.1
Vermont	240	163	67.9	231	(Z)	0.2	167	72.5
Virginia	2,541	1,042	41.0	2,313	437	18.9	771	33.4
Washington	1,759	1,258	71.5	1,718	55	3.2	1,242	72.3
West Virginia	1,053	792	75.2	1,083	50	4.6	838	77.3
Wisconsin	2,391	1,692	70.8	2,354	46	1.9	1,729	73.4
Wyoming	195	143	73.2	190	3	1.8	141	74.0

X Not applicable. Z Less than 500.

Table 2.--POPULATION OF VOTING AGE AND VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT, FOR COUNTIES, 1960, WITH COMPARATIVE FIGURES ON VOTES CAST IN 1964

(Asterisk (*) indicates areas with more than 1,000 resident military personnel. Hyphen (-) represents zero; NA, not available; X, not applicable; Z, less than 0.05 percent)

ALABAMA

	County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
			Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
				Number	Percent		
1	Autauga	3,459	10,004	3,651	36.5	2,651	26.5
2	Baldwin	13,400	26,763	4,527	16.9	10,728	40.1
3	Barbour	4,831	13,125	5,787	44.1	3,493	26.6
4	Bibb	3,126	7,797	1,990	25.5	2,757	35.4
5	Blount	6,869	14,746	378	2.6	5,990	40.6
6	Bullock	2,630	6,837	4,450	65.1	1,256	18.4
7	Butler	4,975	13,183	4,820	36.6	4,194	31.8
8	Calhoun*	16,845	53,775	9,036	16.8	14,658	27.3
9	Chambers	7,187	21,866	6,497	29.7	7,154	32.7
10	Cherokee	3,809	9,319	782	8.4	3,987	42.8
11	Chilton	6,847	14,808	1,947	13.1	5,041	34.0
12	Choctaw	2,910	9,174	3,982	43.4	2,148	23.4
13	Clarke	5,384	13,732	5,833	42.5	4,259	31.0
14	Clay	4,014	7,396	926	12.5	3,311	44.8
15	Cleburne	2,828	6,255	385	6.2	2,530	40.4
16	Coffee	6,123	17,206	2,985	17.3	5,884	34.2
17	Colbert	10,840	26,255	4,575	17.4	10,403	39.6
18	Conecuh	3,421	9,542	3,635	38.1	2,667	28.0
19	Coosa	2,718	5,995	1,794	29.9	2,584	43.1
20	Covington	9,175	21,342	2,876	13.5	7,775	36.4
21	Crenshaw	3,824	8,517	2,207	25.9	3,501	41.1
22	Cullman	12,262	26,133	285	1.1	10,616	40.6
23	Dale*	5,933	17,604	2,743	15.6	4,351	24.7
24	Dallas	6,607	29,515	15,115	51.2	5,561	18.8
25	De Kalb	11,694	24,319	441	1.8	11,464	47.1
26	Elmore	7,596	17,318	4,808	27.8	5,522	31.9
27	Escambia	7,551	18,464	5,685	30.8	6,096	33.0
28	Etowah	21,833	56,224	7,661	13.6	21,819	38.8
29	Fayette	4,490	9,568	1,291	13.5	4,218	44.1
30	Franklin	7,135	13,057	645	4.9	7,551	57.8
31	Geneva	5,576	12,963	1,606	12.4	4,670	36.0
32	Greene	1,711	6,650	5,001	75.2	1,155	17.4
33	Hale	2,446	9,593	5,999	62.5	2,123	22.1
34	Henry	3,485	8,333	3,168	38.0	2,745	32.9
35	Houston	11,774	28,994	6,899	23.8	8,100	27.9
36	Jackson	5,875	20,473	1,175	5.7	6,871	33.6
37	Jefferson	138,839	372,479	116,160	31.2	106,798	28.7
38	Lamar	3,775	8,530	1,027	12.0	3,546	41.6
39	Lauderdale	12,571	34,815	3,726	10.7	12,347	35.5
40	Lawrence	3,617	12,980	2,471	19.0	4,315	33.2
41	Lee	7,516	26,460	8,913	33.7	6,150	23.2
42	Limestone	5,404	19,752	3,579	18.1	5,279	26.7
43	Lowndes	1,858	7,022	5,122	72.9	1,329	18.9
44	Macon	4,831	14,704	11,886	80.8	2,223	15.1
45	Madison*	27,496	65,182	10,666	16.4	16,506	25.3
46	Marengo	4,466	13,895	7,791	56.1	3,300	23.7
47	Marion	5,713	13,059	403	3.1	6,068	46.5
48	Marshall	10,140	27,634	637	2.3	10,023	36.3
49	Mobile*	69,981	172,382	50,793	29.5	55,267	32.1
50	Monroe	4,756	11,525	4,894	42.5	3,306	28.7
51	Montgomery*	30,497	95,967	33,056	34.4	22,311	23.2
52	Morgan	12,381	35,114	4,159	11.8	12,183	34.7
53	Perry	2,566	8,643	5,202	60.2	1,901	22.0
54	Pickens	4,162	11,709	4,373	37.3	3,250	27.8
55	Pike	5,176	14,385	5,259	36.6	4,534	31.5
56	Randolph	4,991	11,562	2,366	20.5	4,924	42.6
57	Russell	6,414	24,292	10,531	43.4	5,325	21.9
58	St. Clair	6,802	14,279	2,035	14.3	5,676	39.8
59	Shelby	7,980	17,660	2,889	16.4	6,470	36.6
60	Sumter	2,058	9,875	6,814	69.0	1,685	17.1
61	Talladega	12,658	34,968	9,333	26.7	10,554	30.2
62	Tallapoosa	7,263	20,309	4,999	24.6	7,692	37.9
63	Tuscaloosa	19,263	62,408	15,332	24.6	14,190	22.7
64	Walker	14,692	31,038	2,890	9.3	13,651	44.0

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Washington	3,994	7,590	2,297	30.3	2,940	38.7
66 Wilcox	1,946	8,709	6,085	69.9	1,581	18.2
67 Winston	4,829	8,606	47	0.5	5,108	59.4

Election district[1]	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
District 1	4,595	7,018	1,449	20.6	4,008	57.1
District 2	1,842	2,341	590	25.2	1,439	61.5
District 3	2,396	3,870	1,362	35.2	2,116	54.7
District 4	5,307	5,857	700	12.0	3,950	67.4
District 5	1,306	1,653	510	30.9	1,099	66.5
District 6	1,485	2,873	516	18.0	1,264	44.0
District 7	2,205	2,850	80	2.8	2,008	70.5
District 8*	22,588	50,063	3,861	7.7	19,708	39.4
District 9	938	1,789	142	7.9	1,154	64.5
District 10	2,627	3,458	423	12.2	1,952	56.4
District 11*	1,582	4,379	668	15.3	1,356	31.0
District 12*	855	4,081	1,220	29.9	563	13.8
District 13	1,198	2,175	1,113	51.2	817	37.6
District 14	1,715	2,535	2,162	85.3	724	28.6
District 15	1,966	3,799	1,682	44.3	1,397	36.8
District 16*	10,750	27,615	3,001	10.9	9,098	32.9
District 17	1,401	2,848	2,142	75.2	1,269	44.6
District 18	1,791	3,084	1,991	64.6	1,693	54.9
District 19	712	1,387	1,246	89.8	265	19.1

[1] Areas established as of December 7, 1961.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Apache	3,892	13,045	9,359	71.7	3,030	23.2
2 Cochise*	16,697	30,913	1,098	3.6	15,007	48.5
3 Coconino	11,037	21,108	5,152	24.4	8,944	42.4
4 Gila	10,537	14,164	1,591	11.2	9,065	64.0
5 Graham	5,438	7,126	686	9.6	4,583	64.3
6 Greenlee	4,279	5,951	91	1.5	4,386	73.7
7 Maricopa*	265,326	380,637	18,361	4.8	214,059	56.2
8 Mohave	4,339	4,592	345	7.5	2,952	64.3
9 Navajo	9,649	17,647	8,046	45.6	7,151	40.5
10 Pima*	101,278	153,736	8,762	5.7	89,144	58.0
11 Pinal	16,872	32,294	4,604	14.3	13,684	42.4
12 Santa Cruz	3,460	5,973	96	1.6	3,135	52.5
13 Yavapai	13,556	18,210	484	2.7	11,147	61.2
14 Yuma*	14,410	26,286	2,025	7.7	12,204	46.4

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Arkansas	6,990	13,398	2,809	21.0	5,318	39.7
2 Ashley	6,710	13,270	4,258	32.1	5,026	37.9
3 Baxter	4,891	6,587	3	(Z)	3,879	58.9
4 Benton	11,662	23,372	63	0.3	11,590	49.6
5 Boone	6,646	10,418	4	(Z)	6,233	59.8
6 Bradley	4,102	8,209	2,372	28.9	4,210	51.3
7 Calhoun	2,322	3,552	1,056	29.7	1,598	45.0
8 Carroll	4,110	7,541	8	0.1	3,965	52.6
9 Chicot	4,903	10,372	5,555	53.6	3,051	29.4
10 Clark	6,037	12,144	2,725	22.4	5,083	41.9
11 Clay	5,321	12,648	3	(Z)	4,568	36.1
12 Cleburne	3,875	5,698	1	(Z)	2,282	40.0
13 Cleveland	2,165	4,078	832	20.4	1,715	42.1
14 Columbia	7,533	15,454	4,808	31.1	5,605	36.3
15 Conway	6,602	8,997	1,674	18.6	4,796	53.3
16 Craighead	13,541	26,928	881	3.3	10,738	39.9
17 Crawford	6,852	12,845	340	2.6	5,907	46.0
18 Crittenden	8,302	23,440	12,871	54.9	5,128	21.9
19 Cross	4,580	10,248	2,640	25.8	3,615	35.3
20 Dallas	3,447	6,171	2,049	33.2	2,615	42.4
21 Desha	5,236	10,905	4,802	44.0	3,936	36.1
22 Drew	4,121	8,432	2,506	29.7	3,372	40.0
23 Faulkner	9,417	14,096	1,246	8.8	6,609	46.9
24 Franklin	4,298	6,426	63	1.0	3,751	58.4
25 Fulton	2,557	4,241	4	0.1	1,849	43.6
26 Garland	21,629	30,775	2,964	9.6	13,944	45.3
27 Grant	3,047	5,050	256	5.1	2,269	44.9
28 Greene	7,037	14,846	11	0.1	5,569	37.5
29 Hempstead	5,891	12,050	3,717	30.8	4,759	39.5
30 Hot Spring	7,522	12,851	1,584	12.3	5,854	45.6
31 Howard	3,063	6,877	1,210	17.6	2,735	39.8

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Independence	6,960	12,707	321	2.5	5,289	41.6
33 Izard	2,486	4,385	36	0.8	2,248	51.3
34 Jackson	6,828	12,853	1,736	13.5	5,159	40.1
35 Jefferson	22,969	44,789	17,505	39.1	15,235	34.0
36 Johnson	4,683	7,852	137	1.7	3,523	44.9
37 Lafayette	2,967	6,286	2,447	38.9	2,325	37.0
38 Lawrence	5,538	10,128	112	1.1	4,065	40.1
39 Lee	4,011	10,502	5,957	56.7	2,701	25.7
40 Lincoln	3,882	8,198	3,579	43.7	2,646	32.3
41 Little River	3,194	5,338	1,415	26.5	2,323	43.5
42 Logan	5,896	10,453	163	1.6	4,764	45.6
43 Lonoke	7,477	13,639	2,518	18.5	5,348	39.2
44 Madison	4,726	5,559	7	0.1	4,201	75.6
45 Marion	2,759	3,940	2	0.1	2,008	51.0
46 Miller	9,492	18,617	4,290	23.0	8,117	43.6
47 Mississippi*	14,911	36,377	9,638	26.5	10,585	29.1
48 Monroe.	4,237	9,015	3,914	43.4	3,068	34.0
49 Montgomery	2,202	3,392	20	0.6	1,677	49.4
50 Nevada	3,625	6,559	1,940	29.6	2,751	41.9
51 Newton	2,769	3,405	2	0.1	2,687	78.9
52 Ouachita	10,698	18,184	6,163	33.9	8,192	45.1
53 Perry	2,387	2,974	82	2.8	1,385	46.6
54 Phillips	9,790	22,639	12,208	53.9	6,677	29.5
55 Pike	2,787	4,974	188	3.8	2,102	42.3
56 Poinsett	8,679	16,082	1,446	9.0	5,444	33.9
57 Polk	4,608	7,694	8	0.1	3,632	47.2
58 Pope	7,780	12,801	370	2.9	5,589	43.7
59 Prairie	3,310	6,117	938	15.3	2,636	43.1
60 Pulaski*	79,289	146,633	27,822	19.0	55,788	38.0
61 Randolph	4,009	7,521	94	1.2	3,278	43.6
62 St. Francis	7,038	16,366	8,403	51.3	4,518	27.6
63 Saline	9,313	18,330	1,340	7.3	6,791	37.0
64 Scott	2,964	4,628	3	0.1	2,264	48.9
65 Searcy	3,163	4,943	1	(Z)	3,351	67.8
66 Sebastian	23,493	40,665	2,485	6.1	20,696	50.9
67 Sevier	3,383	6,409	499	7.8	2,835	44.2
68 Sharp	3,047	4,104	-	-	1,786	43.5
69 Stone	2,340	3,719	1	(Z)	1,943	52.2
70 Union	15,580	29,315	7,590	25.9	13,565	46.3
71 Van Buren	3,352	4,621	56	1.2	2,267	49.1
72 Washington	17,070	33,670	311	0.9	15,679	46.6
73 White	11,684	19,831	659	3.3	9,834	49.6
74 Woodruff	3,693	7,488	2,652	35.4	2,535	33.9
75 Yell	4,948	7,648	253	3.3	3,433	44.9

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Alameda*	427,340	569,183	78,375	13.8	402,000	70.6
2 Alpine	215	228	90	39.5	172	75.4
3 Amador	5,098	5,891	92	1.6	4,887	83.0
4 Butte	40,419	51,235	907	1.8	36,175	70.6
5 Calaveras	5,397	6,714	129	1.9	5,361	79.8
6 Colusa	4,606	7,305	234	3.2	4,861	66.5
7 Contra Costa*	178,245	232,243	14,723	6.3	177,123	76.3
8 Del Norte	5,727	9,972	362	3.6	6,294	63.1
9 El Dorado	14,610	18,330	149	0.8	12,337	67.3
10 Fresno	136,308	208,646	14,893	7.1	130,702	62.6
11 Glenn	7,290	10,399	109	1.0	7,356	70.7
12 Humboldt	38,499	60,036	1,574	2.6	38,691	64.4
13 Imperial	21,492	41,215	2,976	7.2	19,806	48.1
14 Inyo	5,915	7,402	510	6.9	5,420	73.2
15 Kern*	109,308	163,963	10,704	6.5	104,705	63.9
16 Kings	18,840	27,677	1,652	6.0	16,522	59.7
17 Lake	8,302	9,622	243	2.5	7,109	73.9
18 Lassen	6,201	8,206	370	4.5	5,877	71.6
19 Los Angeles*	2,730,918	3,830,926	342,637	8.9	2,634,499	68.8
20 Madera	13,862	22,729	1,841	8.1	14,057	61.8
21 Marin*	75,364	91,574	3,525	3.8	65,665	71.7
22 Mariposa	2,968	3,512	77	2.2	2,963	84.4
23 Mendocino	18,227	30,952	1,010	3.3	18,871	61.0
24 Merced*	28,269	50,282	3,636	7.2	27,646	55.0
25 Modoc	3,358	4,998	178	3.6	3,550	71.0
26 Mono	1,516	1,498	79	5.3	1,375	91.8
27 Monterey*	64,844	116,686	9,943	8.5	59,413	50.9
28 Napa	31,210	43,244	949	2.2	28,778	66.5
29 Nevada	11,318	13,741	85	0.6	10,141	73.8
30 Orange*	401,165	400,046	5,340	1.3	287,599	71.9
31 Placer	27,676	36,196	1,380	3.8	23,863	65.9
32 Plumas	5,713	7,149	258	3.6	5,378	75.2
33 Riverside*	141,788	185,468	9,388	5.1	117,276	63.2
34 Sacramento*	227,871	297,301	21,338	7.2	194,756	65.5
35 San Benito	6,237	9,073	314	3.5	5,945	65.5
36 San Bernardino*	215,400	297,092	11,588	3.9	191,313	64.4
37 San Diego*	426,286	601,616	30,268	5.0	395,421	65.7
38 San Francisco*	323,908	531,774	80,702	15.2	342,219	64.4
39 San Joaquin	95,839	152,042	14,244	9.4	91,657	60.3
40 San Luis Obispo	37,186	50,831	1,896	3.7	33,055	65.0
41 San Mateo*	219,191	270,895	10,711	4.0	202,252	74.7
42 Santa Barbara*	86,486	103,084	3,730	3.6	68,402	66.4
43 Santa Clara*	320,527	371,064	11,982	3.2	250,092	67.4
44 Santa Cruz	45,644	56,635	1,878	3.3	41,704	73.6
45 Shasta	28,350	34,846	668	1.9	24,301	69.7
46 Sierra	1,241	1,437	42	2.9	1,231	85.7
47 Siskiyou	14,335	20,413	773	3.8	14,620	71.6
48 Solano*	50,240	79,132	8,881	11.2	45,869	58.0
49 Sonoma*	72,136	91,136	1,596	1.8	64,032	70.3
50 Stanislaus	65,128	94,311	1,331	1.4	60,890	64.6
51 Sutter	14,044	19,391	985	5.1	11,954	61.6
52 Tehama	11,467	15,103	156	1.0	11,052	73.2
53 Trinity	3,439	5,818	112	1.9	3,698	63.6
54 Tulare	56,552	95,540	3,900	4.1	54,582	57.1
55 Tuolumne	7,820	9,464	188	2.0	7,516	79.4
56 Ventura*	93,238	116,970	3,911	3.3	70,723	60.5
57 Yolo	26,274	38,568	1,450	3.8	22,589	58.6
58 Yuba*	11,739	19,374	1,067	5.5	10,233	52.8

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams*	51,454	61,925	1,070	1.7	39,798	64.3
2 Alamosa	3,976	5,452	83	1.5	4,086	74.9
3 Arapahoe*	51,358	62,027	474	0.8	43,916	70.8
4 Archuleta	1,008	1,436	15	1.0	1,057	73.6
5 Baca	2,618	3,666	33	0.9	2,772	75.6
6 Bent	2,696	4,508	57	1.3	2,904	64.4
7 Boulder	40,330	43,487	311	0.7	32,197	74.0
8 Chaffee	3,951	4,983	19	0.4	4,016	80.6
9 Cheyenne	1,283	1,543	1	0.1	1,227	79.5
10 Clear Creek	1,767	1,844	3	0.2	1,652	89.6
11 Conejos	3,076	4,090	21	0.5	3,523	86.1
12 Costilla	1,589	2,053	39	1.9	2,001	97.5
13 Crowley	1,663	2,320	23	1.0	1,805	77.8
14 Custer	767	843	-	-	823	97.6
15 Delta	6,826	9,753	31	0.3	7,343	75.3
16 Denver*	218,288	312,371	19,894	6.4	220,701	70.7
17 Dolores	818	1,185	50	4.2	862	72.7
18 Douglas	2,791	2,888	4	0.1	2,313	80.1
19 Eagle	1,945	2,554	15	0.6	1,871	73.3
20 Elbert	1,785	2,317	9	0.4	1,928	83.2
21 El Paso*	51,807	83,651	3,352	4.0	48,704	58.2
22 Fremont	9,088	13,348	203	1.5	9,454	70.8
23 Garfield	5,488	7,423	9	0.1	5,539	74.6
24 Gilpin	600	478	2	0.4	538	112.6
25 Grand	1,724	2,137	5	0.2	1,763	82.5
26 Gunnison	2,443	3,067	21	0.7	2,343	76.4
27 Hinsdale	201	143	-	-	220	153.8
28 Huerfano	3,634	4,629	34	0.7	4,053	87.6
29 Jackson	741	1,054	3	0.3	865	82.1
30 Jefferson	76,812	73,282	226	0.3	57,204	78.1
31 Kiowa	1,280	1,409	5	0.4	1,364	96.8
32 Kit Carson	3,233	4,092	6	0.1	3,361	82.1
33 Lake	3,051	3,892	21	0.5	2,803	72.0
34 LaPlata	8,007	10,650	314	2.9	8,111	76.2
35 Larimer	24,585	31,918	178	0.6	23,255	72.9
36 Las Animas	8,453	11,450	57	0.5	9,722	84.9
37 Lincoln	2,439	3,214	3	0.1	2,542	79.1
38 Logan	7,731	11,328	41	0.4	8,341	73.6
39 Mesa	21,082	29,693	132	0.4	22,132	74.5
40 Mineral	296	272	-	-	305	112.1
41 Moffat	3,103	4,059	4	0.1	2,957	72.9
42 Montezuma	4,738	7,661	344	4.5	4,900	64.0
43 Montrose	6,709	10,311	58	0.6	6,925	67.2
44 Morgan	7,520	11,895	45	0.4	8,259	69.4
45 Otero	9,636	13,547	191	1.4	10,229	75.5
46 Ouray	820	974	3	0.3	940	96.5
47 Park	1,009	1,188	-	-	1,082	91.1
48 Phillips	2,260	2,767	1	(Z)	2,318	83.8
49 Pitkin	1,504	1,531	12	0.8	1,167	76.2
50 Prowers	5,822	7,486	39	0.5	6,030	80.6
51 Pueblo	48,536	68,699	1,534	2.2	48,582	70.7
52 Rio Blanco	2,152	2,905	9	0.3	2,188	75.3
53 Rio Grande	3,867	5,929	18	0.3	4,312	72.7
54 Routt	2,964	3,548	23	0.6	3,067	86.4
55 Saguache	1,725	2,347	2	0.1	1,949	83.0
56 San Juan	407	470	1	0.2	482	102.6
57 San Miguel	970	1,664	179	10.8	1,139	68.4
58 Sedgwick	1,839	2,503	58	2.3	2,003	80.0
59 Summit	828	1,181	4	0.3	827	70.0
60 Teller	1,264	1,616	-	-	1,349	83.5
61 Washington	2,779	3,847	8	0.2	3,022	78.6
62 Weld	29,679	41,199	496	1.2	28,790	69.9
63 Yuma	4,171	5,561	2	(Z)	4,305	77.4

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Fairfield	320,358	414,664	20,082	4.8	314,226	75.8
2 Hartford	328,882	433,144	18,066	4.2	331,864	76.6
3 Litchfield	61,006	75,173	586	0.8	63,108	84.0
4 Middlesex	45,214	56,229	1,038	1.8	44,204	78.6
5 New Haven	316,399	417,135	18,948	4.5	325,539	78.0
6 New London *	78,942	112,641	3,019	2.7	78,696	69.9
7 Tolland	32,146	39,592	261	0.7	29,961	75.7
8 Windham	34,318	42,883	228	0.5	35,285	82.3

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Kent*	22,054	38,234	5,455	14.3	21,616	56.5
2 New Castle	146,893	185,128	20,458	11.1	142,974	77.2
3 Sussex	32,373	43,887	8,086	18.4	32,093	73.1

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The District	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
Washington	198,597	509,110	246,553	48.4	(X)	(X)

FLORIDA

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Alachua	24,634	40,453	9,898	24.5	19,351	47.8
2 Baker	2,258	4,010	807	20.1	1,867	46.6
3 Bay *	20,695	36,904	4,964	13.5	16,014	43.4
4 Bradford *	4,307	6,925	1,345	19.4	3,666	52.9
5 Brevard	49,384	64,927	6,494	10.0	28,654	44.1
6 Broward	153,670	216,526	27,009	12.5	116,105	53.6
7 Calhoun	2,773	4,016	582	14.5	2,228	55.5
8 Charlotte	8,994	9,086	427	4.7	4,967	54.7
9 Citrus	4,850	6,003	829	13.8	3,591	59.8
10 Clay *	6,919	10,784	1,276	11.8	5,243	48.6
11 Collier	6,458	9,527	1,364	14.3	4,458	46.8
12 Columbia	7,394	11,214	3,122	27.8	5,789	51.6
13 Dade *	326,421	613,021	75,573	12.3	317,620	51.8
14 De Soto	3,763	7,682	1,343	17.5	3,367	43.8
15 Dixie	1,831	2,501	363	14.5	1,368	54.7
16 Duval *	160,481	262,234	58,430	22.3	129,164	49.3
17 Escambia *	57,785	94,729	18,041	19.0	46,213	48.8
18 Flagler	1,658	2,635	846	32.1	1,359	51.6
19 Franklin	2,785	3,965	779	19.6	2,258	56.9
20 Gadsden	9,763	23,972	12,261	51.1	4,353	18.2
21 Gilchrist	1,251	1,667	154	9.2	1,111	66.6
22 Glades	982	1,802	741	41.1	708	39.3
23 Gulf	3,660	5,334	1,138	21.3	3,005	56.3
24 Hamilton	2,460	4,107	1,621	39.5	1,987	48.4
25 Hardee	4,229	7,286	552	7.6	3,701	50.8
26 Hendry	3,002	4,610	1,180	25.6	2,350	51.0
27 Hernando	4,657	6,840	1,151	16.8	3,769	55.1
28 Highlands	8,980	13,248	2,251	17.0	7,491	56.5
29 Hillsborough *	121,905	245,064	31,114	12.7	111,127	45.3
30 Holmes	4,418	6,380	249	3.9	3,605	56.5
31 Indian River	11,313	15,819	2,637	16.7	7,626	48.2

FLORIDA--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Jackson	11,450	19,477	5,390	27.7	8,845	45.4
33 Jefferson	3,188	4,983	2,600	52.2	1,729	34.7
34 Lafayette	1,193	1,688	152	9.0	1,090	64.6
35 Lake	20,670	36,973	6,438	17.4	17,915	48.5
36 Lee	23,090	35,040	4,677	13.3	15,851	45.2
37 Leon	26,108	40,563	12,322	30.4	19,512	48.1
38 Levy	3,566	6,051	1,568	25.9	2,999	49.6
39 Liberty	1,287	1,765	240	13.6	1,105	62.6
40 Madison	4,943	7,447	3,067	41.2	3,236	43.5
41 Manatee	30,221	47,569	5,278	11.1	25,276	53.1
42 Marion	19,991	30,284	9,283	30.7	14,249	47.1
43 Martin	7,913	11,044	1,753	15.9	6,365	57.6
44 Monroe *	13,778	28,431	2,919	10.3	10,388	36.5
45 Nassau	5,915	9,130	2,076	22.7	4,948	54.2
46 Okaloosa *	17,851	32,913	2,097	6.4	12,948	39.3
47 Okeechobee	2,332	3,403	533	15.7	1,756	51.6
48 Orange*	87,132	159,551	21,771	13.6	67,973	42.6
49 Osceola	8,047	12,819	1,122	8.8	6,869	53.6
50 Palm Beach	93,450	148,883	29,541	19.8	75,208	50.5
51 Pasco	15,741	24,720	2,391	9.7	13,020	52.7
52 Pinellas	178,795	273,490	18,121	6.6	159,833	58.4
53 Polk	65,261	116,538	19,224	16.5	55,164	47.3
54 Putnam	10,067	18,184	5,089	28.0	8,695	47.8
55 St. Johns	11,807	18,102	4,331	23.9	9,708	53.6
56 St. Lucie	14,952	23,765	6,527	27.5	11,714	49.3
57 Santa Rosa*	9,553	15,792	1,082	6.9	7,737	49.0
58 Sarasota	35,854	53,658	4,125	7.7	28,282	52.7
59 Seminole *	19,203	31,422	7,050	22.4	13,827	44.0
60 Sumter	3,890	6,919	1,523	22.0	3,399	49.1
61 Suwannee	5,395	8,558	2,149	25.1	4,325	50.5
62 Taylor	4,369	7,178	1,724	24.0	3,120	43.5
63 Union	1,450	3,962	1,082	27.3	1,252	31.6
64 Volusia	59,889	85,824	11,615	13.5	51,744	60.3
65 Wakulla	2,023	2,873	753	26.2	1,525	53.1
66 Walton	6,202	9,044	1,086	12.0	5,126	56.7
67 Washington	4,225	6,385	1,021	16.0	3,328	52.1

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Appling	4,159	7,263	1,401	19.3	2,690	37.0
2 Atkinson	1,968	3,298	812	24.6	1,537	46.6
3 Bacon	3,315	4,739	536	11.3	1,747	36.9
4 Baker	1,514	2,424	1,285	53.0	786	32.4
5 Baldwin	6,170	25,344	9,235	36.4	3,526	13.9
6 Banks	1,806	4,063	213	5.2	1,391	34.2
7 Barrow	4,593	9,197	1,332	14.5	3,336	36.3
8 Bartow	7,448	17,335	2,393	13.8	4,837	27.9
9 Ben Hill	3,612	8,367	2,436	29.1	2,439	29.2
10 Berrien	6,731	7,143	964	13.5	3,155	44.2
11 Bibb	43,472	87,241	26,812	30.7	24,910	28.6
12 Bleckley	3,556	5,908	1,380	23.4	2,384	40.4
13 Brantley	2,140	3,238	384	11.9	1,677	51.8
14 Brooks	3,369	8,770	3,711	42.3	2,265	25.8
15 Bryan	2,290	3,400	1,111	32.7	1,751	51.5
16 Bulloch	7,543	14,438	4,337	30.0	4,879	33.8
17 Burke	4,242	10,958	6,600	60.2	2,189	20.0
18 Butts	2,795	5,294	2,099	39.6	2,055	38.8
19 Calhoun	1,355	4,047	2,393	59.1	934	23.1
20 Camden	3,495	5,506	2,059	37.4	2,271	41.2
21 Candler	2,505	3,914	1,200	30.7	1,376	35.2
22 Carroll	9,778	22,829	3,595	15.7	6,427	28.2
23 Catoosa	7,065	12,542	172	1.4	4,188	33.4
24 Charlton	1,753	2,887	810	28.1	1,022	35.4
25 Chatham*	56,317	115,681	37,563	32.5	34,175	29.5
26 Chattahoochee*	437	9,891	1,830	18.5	256	2.6
27 Chattooga	5,462	12,485	1,025	8.2	5,282	42.3
28 Cherokee	6,587	14,481	517	3.6	5,418	37.4
29 Clarke	12,394	30,635	6,740	22.0	7,062	23.1
30 Clay	904	2,571	1,441	56.0	612	23.8
31 Clayton	16,357	26,452	2,456	9.3	8,845	33.4
32 Clinch	1,790	3,629	1,256	34.6	1,295	35.7
33 Cobb*	37,510	67,859	4,568	6.7	21,146	31.2
34 Coffee	7,111	12,659	2,977	23.5	4,363	34.5
35 Colquitt	9,056	20,063	4,081	20.3	6,082	30.3
36 Columbia	4,003	7,460	2,364	31.7	2,345	31.4
37 Cook	3,395	6,968	1,755	25.2	2,334	33.5
38 Coweta	7,368	17,470	5,579	31.9	5,014	28.7
39 Crawford	1,680	3,207	1,611	50.2	1,000	31.2
40 Crisp	5,093	10,309	3,858	37.4	3,328	32.3
41 Dade	2,605	4,873	70	1.4	1,852	38.0
42 Dawson	1,571	2,149	1	(Z)	1,317	61.3
43 Decatur	7,071	14,584	5,515	37.8	3,698	25.4
44 De Kalb	86,602	160,574	12,407	7.7	48,162	30.0
45 Dodge	5,661	9,720	2,328	24.0	4,764	49.0
46 Dooly	3,133	6,447	2,866	44.5	1,953	30.3
47 Dougherty*	18,024	44,060	14,163	32.1	8,845	20.1
48 Douglas	5,816	9,863	1,268	12.9	3,712	37.6
49 Early	3,169	7,290	3,277	45.0	2,158	29.6
50 Echols	583	1,078	246	22.8	365	33.9
51 Effingham	3,356	5,764	1,756	30.5	1,765	30.6
52 Elbert	5,059	10,879	3,127	28.7	4,281	39.4
53 Emanuel	5,590	10,632	3,005	28.3	3,633	34.2
54 Evans	2,371	4,046	1,308	32.3	1,636	40.4
55 Fannin	6,267	8,142	31	0.4	4,601	56.5
56 Fayette	2,245	4,775	1,190	24.9	1,557	32.6
57 Floyd	18,239	44,179	5,949	13.5	13,458	30.5
58 Forsyth	3,153	7,332	4	0.1	3,150	43.0
59 Franklin	3,622	8,387	776	9.3	3,517	41.9
60 Fulton*	166,745	364,941	117,049	32.1	109,743	30.1
61 Gilmer	4,326	5,438	7	0.1	3,322	61.1
62 Glascock	970	1,632	351	21.5	479	29.4
63 Glynn*	13,053	25,512	6,762	26.5	6,510	25.5
64 Gordon	5,577	12,110	669	5.5	3,301	27.3

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Grady	4,870	10,569	3,364	31.8	3,133	29.6
66 Greene	3,791	6,563	2,998	45.7	2,307	35.2
67 Gwinnett	13,528	26,140	1,841	7.0	8,815	33.7
68 Habersham	5,007	11,194	518	4.6	3,425	30.6
69 Hall	12,299	30,515	2,789	9.1	9,206	30.2
70 Hancock	1,999	5,303	3,576	67.4	1,066	20.1
71 Haralson	5,315	9,213	642	7.0	4,652	50.5
72 Harris	3,106	6,412	3,102	48.4	2,097	32.7
73 Hart	4,308	9,214	1,832	19.9	4,238	46.0
74 Heard	1,868	3,251	590	18.1	1,405	43.2
75 Henry	6,708	9,968	3,539	35.5	3,998	40.1
76 Houston*	10,790	21,970	4,228	19.2	5,790	26.4
77 Irwin	2,757	5,361	1,602	29.9	1,977	36.9
78 Jackson	5,617	11,537	1,309	11.3	4,125	35.8
79 Jasper	1,923	3,630	1,705	47.0	1,220	33.6
80 Jeff Davis	2,620	5,025	909	18.1	1,227	24.4
81 Jefferson	4,203	9,717	4,780	49.2	2,256	23.2
82 Jenkins	2,417	5,195	2,210	42.5	1,667	32.1
83 Johnson	2,622	4,716	1,261	26.7	1,786	37.9
84 Jones	3,185	4,840	2,185	45.1	1,904	39.3
85 Lamar	3,118	6,196	2,118	34.2	1,842	29.7
86 Lanier	1,380	2,914	756	25.9	1,247	42.8
87 Laurens	9,285	19,462	6,284	32.3	6,532	33.6
88 Lee	1,285	3,222	1,795	55.7	595	18.5
89 Liberty*	3,670	8,486	3,176	37.4	2,519	29.7
90 Lincoln	1,296	3,310	1,336	40.4	866	26.2
91 Long	1,582	2,162	635	29.4	1,176	54.4
92 Lowndes*	11,174	29,205	8,459	29.0	6,513	22.3
93 Lumpkin	2,044	4,579	79	1.7	1,370	29.9
94 McDuffie	3,781	7,365	2,740	37.2	2,118	28.8
95 McIntosh	1,988	3,466	1,823	52.6	1,245	35.9
96 Macon	2,799	7,248	4,077	56.3	1,926	26.6
97 Madison	3,531	6,951	989	14.2	2,623	37.7
98 Marion	1,084	2,962	1,609	54.3	799	27.0
99 Meriwether	4,673	11,537	4,990	43.3	3,806	33.0
100 Miller	1,932	4,041	946	23.4	1,178	29.2
101 Mitchell	4,462	11,026	4,971	45.1	3,694	33.5
102 Monroe	3,243	6,259	2,652	42.4	2,223	35.5
103 Montgomery	2,287	3,808	1,288	33.8	1,832	48.1
104 Morgan	3,139	5,884	2,469	42.0	1,861	31.6
105 Murray	3,490	6,260	51	0.8	2,801	44.7
106 Muscogee*	33,471	97,211	22,549	23.2	18,131	18.7
107 Newton	6,298	12,812	3,767	29.4	3,893	30.4
108 Oconee	2,314	3,909	681	17.4	1,515	38.8
109 Oglethorpe	1,990	4,673	1,709	36.6	1,548	33.1
110 Paulding	4,427	7,956	603	7.6	3,208	40.3
111 Peach	3,555	8,212	4,562	55.6	2,061	25.1
112 Pickens	3,885	5,515	251	4.6	3,416	61.9
113 Pierce	2,963	5,567	1,135	20.4	1,993	35.8
114 Pike	2,010	4,227	1,643	38.9	1,283	30.4
115 Polk	7,837	17,507	2,442	13.9	6,097	34.8
116 Pulaski	2,721	4,861	1,843	37.9	1,490	30.7
117 Putnam	2,214	4,501	2,204	49.0	1,409	31.3
118 Quitman	607	1,288	707	54.9	455	35.3
119 Rabun	2,347	4,435	43	1.0	2,016	45.5
120 Randolph	2,618	6,541	3,663	56.0	1,893	28.9
121 Richmond*	35,026	86,100	24,785	28.8	21,846	25.4
122 Rockdale	3,475	6,220	1,512	24.3	2,261	36.4
123 Schley	954	1,864	903	48.4	605	32.5
124 Screven	3,706	8,286	3,729	45.0	2,447	29.5
125 Seminole	1,721	3,903	1,255	32.2	1,656	42.4
126 Spalding	10,229	21,909	5,252	24.0	6,179	28.2
127 Stephens	4,854	11,330	1,355	12.0	3,902	34.4
128 Stewart	1,410	4,146	2,681	64.7	948	22.9
129 Sumter	5,501	14,440	6,710	46.5	3,236	22.4
130 Talbot	1,306	3,944	2,507	63.6	978	24.8

GEORGIA--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
131 Taliaferro	965	1,990	1,073	53.9	803	40.4
132 Tattnall	4,912	10,512	3,135	29.8	2,777	26.4
133 Taylor	2,469	4,771	2,004	42.0	1,566	32.8
134 Telfair	3,786	7,025	2,087	29.7	3,713	52.9
135 Terrell	2,490	7,095	4,057	57.2	1,637	23.1
136 Thomas	9,563	20,823	7,644	36.7	5,511	26.5
137 Tift	6,936	13,724	3,513	25.6	4,387	32.0
138 Toombs	5,228	9,957	2,444	24.5	3,247	32.6
139 Towns	2,429	2,943	1	(Z)	2,324	79.0
140 Treutlen	2,053	3,441	968	28.1	1,143	33.2
141 Troup	11,309	29,156	8,577	29.4	8,553	29.3
142 Turner	2,391	4,957	1,535	31.0	1,873	37.8
143 Twiggs	1,964	4,224	2,255	53.4	1,108	26.2
144 Union	3,608	3,958	1	(Z)	2,722	68.8
145 Upson	6,378	14,774	3,615	24.5	4,263	28.9
146 Walker	11,393	27,899	1,388	5.0	8,593	30.8
147 Walton	5,224	12,468	3,076	24.7	3,498	28.1
148 Ware	10,137	20,434	4,763	23.3	7,334	35.9
149 Warren	1,454	4,135	2,224	53.8	846	20.5
150 Washington	4,126	10,824	5,451	50.4	2,960	27.3
151 Wayne	5,801	10,082	1,878	18.6	4,246	42.1
152 Webster	601	1,750	975	55.7	374	21.4
153 Wheeler	1,829	3,060	824	26.9	1,196	39.1
154 White	2,360	4,216	169	4.0	2,446	58.0
155 Whitfield	11,849	25,522	1,085	4.3	7,752	30.4
156 Wilcox	2,694	4,591	1,282	27.9	2,020	44.0
157 Wilkes	3,089	6,722	3,101	46.1	2,181	32.4
158 Wilkinson	3,135	5,414	2,279	42.1	1,955	36.1
159 Worth	4,019	9,100	3,776	41.5	2,448	26.9

HAWAII

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Hawaii	24,973	34,594	27,876	80.6	23,808	68.8
2 Honolulu*	155,395	285,178	177,104	62.1	134,456	47.1
3 Kalawao						
4 Kauai	10,684	16,351	13,244	81.0	10,291	62.9
5 Maui	16,219	24,070	19,662	81.7	16,150	67.1

IDAHO

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Ada	45,043	53,996	381	0.7	44,720	82.8
2 Adams	1,439	1,793	4	0.2	1,523	84.9
3 Bannock	21,308	26,303	725	2.8	21,743	82.7
4 Bear Lake	3,266	3,823	2	0.1	3,526	92.2
5 Benewah	2,777	3,637	134	3.7	3,030	83.3
6 Bingham	10,595	14,310	809	5.7	10,777	75.3
7 Blaine	2,454	2,806	9	0.3	2,468	88.0
8 Boise	864	957	6	0.6	888	92.8
9 Bonner	7,303	9,167	24	0.3	7,639	83.3
10 Bonneville	20,373	24,288	262	1.1	19,956	82.2
11 Boundary	2,483	3,323	45	1.4	2,738	82.4
12 Butte	1,497	1,838	8	0.4	1,681	91.5
13 Camas	574	529	-	-	606	114.6
14 Canyon	24,067	33,338	429	1.3	25,546	76.6
15 Caribou	2,725	3,068	2	0.1	2,837	92.5
16 Cassia	6,617	8,297	84	1.0	6,742	81.3
17 Clark	448	489	2	0.4	459	93.9
18 Clearwater	3,213	5,104	44	0.9	3,600	70.5
19 Custer	1,434	1,682	5	0.3	1,489	88.5
20 Elmore*	4,167	8,909	262	2.9	4,666	52.4
21 Franklin	3,983	4,317	17	0.4	3,985	92.3
22 Fremont	3,915	4,509	34	0.8	4,117	91.3
23 Gem	4,307	5,315	18	0.3	4,404	82.9
24 Gooding	4,375	5,530	17	0.3	4,528	81.9
25 Idaho	5,178	7,541	138	1.8	5,504	73.0
26 Jefferson	4,801	5,730	40	0.7	4,999	87.2
27 Jerome	4,941	6,320	41	0.6	5,182	82.0
28 Kootenai	14,311	17,638	102	0.6	14,448	81.9
29 Latah	8,724	12,325	82	0.7	9,425	76.5
30 Lemhi	2,563	3,374	30	0.9	2,638	78.2
31 Lewis	2,044	2,601	40	1.5	2,213	85.1
32 Lincoln	1,586	2,066	16	0.8	1,753	84.8
33 Madison	4,050	4,512	52	1.2	4,052	89.8
34 Minidoka	5,938	7,324	63	0.9	5,827	79.6
35 Nez Perce	13,157	15,945	447	2.8	13,147	82.5
36 Oneida	1,879	1,982	8	0.4	1,910	96.4
37 Owyhee	2,384	3,618	131	3.6	2,629	72.7
38 Payette	5,272	7,331	109	1.5	5,605	76.5
39 Power	2,127	2,214	92	4.2	2,025	91.5
40 Shoshone	8,038	11,967	31	0.3	8,433	70.5
41 Teton	1,273	1,290	-	-	1,283	99.5
42 Twin Falls	19,156	24,196	94	0.4	19,584	80.9
43 Valley	2,106	2,127	10	0.5	2,095	98.5
44 Washington	3,682	5,055	122	2.4	4,030	79.7
45 Yellowstone Nat. Park (part)	-	-	-	-	-	-

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams	32,314	43,535	802	1.8	33,529	77.0
2 Alexander	7,658	10,005	2,994	29.9	8,638	86.3
3 Bond	6,873	8,864	59	0.7	7,162	80.8
4 Boone	8,747	12,163	26	0.2	9,162	75.3
5 Brown	3,438	4,044	2	(Z)	3,740	92.5
6 Bureau	18,638	23,705	29	0.1	20,407	86.1
7 Calhoun	3,093	3,790	3	0.1	3,267	86.2
8 Carroll	8,549	12,090	51	0.4	9,418	77.9
9 Cass	7,260	9,238	3	(Z)	7,715	83.5
10 Champaign *	47,802	74,596	4,390	5.9	45,441	60.9
11 Christian	18,051	23,197	76	0.3	19,485	84.0
12 Clark	8,867	10,665	7	0.1	9,273	86.9
13 Clay	8,216	9,964	4	(Z)	8,538	85.7
14 Clinton	12,031	14,151	47	0.3	11,903	84.1
15 Coles	20,255	26,383	143	0.5	20,814	78.9
16 Cook *	2,432,899	3,268,485	500,295	15.3	2,445,269	74.8
17 Crawford	10,458	13,437	5	(Z)	11,058	82.3
18 Cumberland	5,307	6,151	2	(Z)	5,500	89.4
19 De Kalb	22,049	30,105	197	0.7	22,388	74.4
20 De Witt	7,976	10,831	31	0.3	8,689	80.2
21 Douglas	8,918	11,533	6	0.1	9,299	80.6
22 Du Page	165,100	178,120	749	0.4	145,445	81.7
23 Edgar	11,793	14,410	69	0.5	12,376	85.9
24 Edwards	4,253	5,155	16	0.3	4,745	92.0
25 Effingham	11,826	13,687	13	0.1	12,092	88.3
26 Fayette	10,787	14,207	397	2.8	11,504	81.0
27 Ford	8,077	10,142	30	0.3	8,478	83.6
28 Franklin	21,201	26,635	32	0.1	23,266	87.4
29 Fulton	20,815	26,982	85	0.3	22,251	82.5
30 Gallatin	4,239	4,706	48	1.0	4,570	97.1
31 Greene	7,909	11,071	18	0.2	8,344	75.4
32 Grundy	10,768	13,488	25	0.2	11,228	83.2
33 Hamilton	5,694	6,613	2	(Z)	6,454	97.6
34 Hancock	11,756	15,475	17	0.1	12,990	83.9
35 Hardin	2,963	3,611	15	0.4	3,413	94.5
36 Henderson	4,134	4,965	11	0.2	4,273	86.1
37 Henry	22,729	30,659	272	0.9	24,690	80.5
38 Iroquois	16,452	20,520	87	0.4	17,213	83.9
39 Jackson	19,178	25,259	1,790	7.1	19,112	75.7
40 Jasper	6,020	6,966	6	0.1	6,421	92.2
41 Jefferson	15,901	20,502	489	2.4	17,625	86.0
42 Jersey	6,977	9,894	32	0.3	8,343	84.3
43 Jo Daviess	9,425	13,045	10	0.1	10,417	79.9
44 Johnson	3,987	4,466	12	0.3	4,197	94.0
45 Kane	87,094	126,617	2,764	2.2	86,761	68.5
46 Kankakee	36,874	58,764	5,164	8.8	37,452	63.7
47 Kendall	9,140	10,197	9	0.1	8,228	80.7
48 Knox	27,850	38,794	1,180	3.0	29,850	76.9
49 Lake *	121,667	166,086	6,999	4.2	114,899	69.2
50 La Salle	52,139	68,559	247	0.4	55,125	80.4
51 Lawrence	9,312	11,843	123	1.0	9,800	82.7
52 Lee	15,760	23,858	433	1.8	16,739	70.2
53 Liningston	18,715	24,631	675	2.7	19,783	80.3
54 Logan	14,517	21,505	306	1.4	15,090	70.2
55 McDonough	13,051	17,851	81	0.5	13,893	77.8
56 McHenry	40,517	49,182	73	0.1	38,508	78.3
57 McLean	38,670	50,742	710	1.4	38,761	76.4
58 Macon	53,002	71,926	3,026	4.2	53,288	74.1
59 Macoupin	23,657	28,090	37	0.1	24,896	88.6
60 Madison	95,124	135,409	6,236	4.6	97,904	72.3
61 Marion	19,423	24,923	743	3.0	20,250	81.3
62 Marshall	6,770	8,253	10	0.1	7,138	86.5
63 Mason	7,690	9,707	4	(Z)	8,180	84.3
64 Massac	6,474	9,073	596	6.6	7,171	79.0

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Menard	4,813	5,907	9	0.2	5,193	87.9
66 Mercer	8,630	10,550	14	0.1	9,061	85.9
67 Monroe	8,541	9,667	11	0.1	8,133	84.1
68 Montgomery	17,006	20,003	82	0.4	18,007	90.0
69 Morgan	16,475	23,965	840	3.5	17,062	71.2
70 Moultrie	6,226	8,517	5	0.1	6,831	80.2
71 Ogle	17,347	22,920	23	0.1	18,025	78.6
72 Peoria	80,687	117,396	5,165	4.4	84,676	72.1
73 Perry	10,926	12,483	224	1.8	11,672	93.5
74 Piatt	7,038	9,027	1	(Z)	7,399	82.0
75 Pike	10,689	13,243	13	0.1	11,436	86.4
76 Pope	2,446	2,713	41	1.5	2,665	93.2
77 Pulaski	5,048	6,367	2,003	31.5	4,961	77.9
78 Putnam	2,490	2,910	9	0.3	2,619	90.0
79 Randolph	15,002	19,956	1,198	6.0	15,347	76.9
80 Richland	8,140	10,120	8	0.1	8,353	82.5
81 Rock Island	65,473	93,208	2,366	2.5	66,454	71.3
82 St. Clair *	102,231	155,172	24,995	16.1	109,751	70.7
83 Saline	14,028	17,843	519	2.9	15,707	88.0
84 Sangamon	76,166	92,535	3,532	3.8	77,335	83.6
85 Schuyler	4,921	5,627	3	0.1	5,164	91.8
86 Scott	3,579	4,046	-	-	3,814	94.3
87 Shelby	11,369	14,603	6	(Z)	12,603	86.3
88 Stark	3,893	5,021	7	0.1	4,314	85.9
89 Stephenson	20,106	28,864	724	2.5	21,995	76.2
90 Tazewell	45,731	58,534	42	0.1	44,526	76.1
91 Union	8,350	12,295	270	2.2	8,763	71.3
92 Vermilion	44,271	59,743	2,719	4.6	45,342	77.6
93 Wabash	6,626	8,756	-	-	7,278	83.1
94 Warren	9,931	13,283	203	1.5	11,066	83.3
95 Washington	7,510	9,119	7	0.1	8,157	89.5
96 Wayne	9,943	11,935	5	(Z)	10,615	88.9
97 White	9,963	12,484	52	0.4	10,577	84.7
98 Whiteside	25,476	34,534	89	0.3	26,592	76.9
99 Will	88,282	114,758	7,199	6.3	83,712	72.9
100 Williamson	23,743	30,242	421	1.4	25,096	83.0
101 Winnebago	88,754	124,104	4,271	3.4	89,741	72.3
102 Woodford	12,162	14,612	12	0.1	12,509	85.6

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams	10,973	14,066	4	(Z)	11,409	81.1
2 Allen	100,353	136,967	5,964	4.4	99,618	72.7
3 Bartholomew	24,090	27,850	177	0.6	23,026	82.7
4 Benton	5,831	6,824	9	0.1	6,032	88.4
5 Blackford	6,829	8,933	6	0.1	7,009	78.5
6 Boone	14,181	16,682	34	0.2	14,416	86.4
7 Brown	3,544	3,994	2	0.1	3,244	81.2
8 Carroll	8,714	10,272	8	0.1	8,744	85.1
9 Cass	18,978	26,077	231	0.9	19,577	75.1
10 Clark	25,156	35,657	1,554	4.4	27,304	76.6
11 Clay	12,026	15,679	121	0.8	12,834	81.9
12 Clinton	15,582	18,965	42	0.2	16,217	85.5
13 Crawford	4,380	5,224	1	(Z)	5,255	100.6
14 Daviess	12,895	15,893	75	0.5	13,763	86.6
15 Dearborn	13,198	16,928	129	0.8	13,854	81.8
16 Decatur	10,315	11,940	3	(Z)	10,370	86.9
17 De Kalb	13,889	16,784	29	0.2	14,295	85.2
18 Delaware	48,678	64,929	3,192	4.9	49,610	76.4
19 Dubois	13,939	15,421	1	(Z)	13,353	86.6
20 Elkhart	41,914	62,650	1,166	1.9	44,693	71.3
21 Fayette	11,393	14,500	294	2.0	12,023	82.9
22 Floyd	23,638	30,503	1,097	3.6	24,037	78.8
23 Fountain	10,278	11,580	10	0.1	10,429	90.1
24 Franklin	6,995	9,375	1	(Z)	7,645	81.5
25 Fulton	8,818	10,522	30	0.3	9,133	86.8
26 Gibson	16,458	18,738	383	2.0	16,399	87.5
27 Grant	32,494	44,924	1,659	3.7	32,841	73.1
28 Greene	14,570	17,145	7	(Z)	15,239	88.9
29 Hamilton	19,681	23,547	220	0.9	18,984	80.6
30 Hancock	12,993	15,575	24	0.2	12,528	80.4
31 Harrison	9,708	11,279	86	0.8	9,989	88.6
32 Hendricks	20,405	23,304	73	0.3	19,066	81.8
33 Henry	22,697	29,480	276	0.9	23,530	79.8
34 Howard	30,941	40,524	1,433	3.5	31,502	77.7
35 Huntington	16,844	20,615	32	0.2	17,930	87.0
36 Jackson	14,971	18,291	82	0.4	14,861	81.2
37 Jasper	8,516	10,394	12	0.1	8,339	80.2
38 Jay	11,318	13,960	64	0.5	11,492	82.3
39 Jefferson	11,586	14,824	242	1.6	11,492	77.5
40 Jennings	7,811	9,960	151	1.5	7,908	79.4
41 Johnson	20,663	25,059	217	0.9	19,919	79.5
42 Knox	20,411	25,889	159	0.6	21,516	83.1
43 Kosciusko	19,388	24,195	82	0.3	19,591	81.0
44 Lagrange	5,640	9,435	8	0.1	6,422	68.1
45 Lake	209,523	293,316	44,818	15.3	211,358	72.1
46 La Porte	38,594	58,407	2,884	4.9	43,140	73.9
47 Lawrence	16,956	22,232	68	0.3	18,182	81.8
48 Madison	57,729	75,966	2,698	3.6	59,445	78.3
49 Marion*	296,381	424,090	57,704	13.6	288,206	68.0
50 Marshall	16,415	19,082	54	0.3	16,744	87.7
51 Martin	5,146	5,903	14	0.2	5,346	90.6
52 Miami*	14,060	22,524	446	2.0	15,131	67.2
53 Monroe	22,372	34,316	750	2.2	22,184	64.6
54 Montgomery	15,930	19,759	127	0.6	16,511	83.6
55 Morgan	15,428	19,116	14	0.1	14,860	77.7
56 Newton	5,340	6,784	8	0.1	5,401	79.6
57 Noble	13,363	16,706	12	0.1	13,387	80.1
58 Ohio	2,308	2,552	38	1.5	2,336	91.5
59 Orange	8,710	10,509	133	1.3	9,442	89.8
60 Owen	6,160	7,241	14	0.2	6,128	84.6
61 Parke	7,621	9,390	26	0.3	8,046	85.7
62 Perry	9,341	9,914	17	0.2	9,308	93.9
63 Pike	7,272	8,323	17	0.2	7,716	92.7
64 Porter	27,607	33,694	75	0.2	26,474	78.6

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Posey	9,770	11,666	165	1.4	9,857	84.5
66 Pulaski	6,634	7,450	25	0.3	6,771	90.9
67 Putnam	11,630	14,687	285	1.9	11,423	77.8
68 Randolph	13,506	17,536	52	0.3	14,677	83.7
69 Ripley	10,552	12,355	10	0.1	10,818	87.6
70 Rush	9,025	12,071	137	1.1	9,782	81.0
71 St. Joseph	106,346	141,959	7,358	5.2	117,499	82.8
72 Scott	6,203	8,165	4	(Z)	6,301	77.2
73 Shelby	16,455	20,401	249	1.2	16,602	81.4
74 Spencer	8,834	9,686	117	1.2	9,373	96.8
75 Starke	8,321	10,248	23	0.2	8,619	84.1
76 Steuben	8,105	10,592	39	0.4	8,079	76.3
77 Sullivan	11,260	14,061	26	0.2	12,060	85.8
78 Switzerland	3,640	4,433	13	0.3	3,905	88.1
79 Tippecanoe	39,372	51,444	755	1.5	38,668	75.2
80 Tipton	8,316	9,470	6	0.1	8,223	86.8
81 Union	3,005	3,801	43	1.1	3,275	86.2
82 Vanderburgh	73,407	101,805	5,648	5.5	77,635	76.3
83 Vermillion	9,382	11,487	14	0.1	10,227	89.0
84 Vigo	46,751	68,157	2,962	4.3	50,178	73.6
85 Wabash	14,535	19,287	51	0.3	15,297	79.3
86 Warren	4,425	5,068	2	(Z)	4,464	88.1
87 Warrick	11,640	13,920	139	1.0	11,554	83.0
88 Washington	8,573	10,578	4	(Z)	8,913	84.3
89 Wayne	30,724	45,523	2,058	4.5	32,580	71.6
90 Wells	10,055	12,698	4	(Z)	10,242	80.7
91 White	10,455	11,844	2	(Z)	10,612	89.6
92 Whitley	10,747	12,355	8	0.1	10,943	88.6

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adair	4,812	6,946	2	(Z)	5,630	81.1
2 Adams	3,263	4,687	2	(Z)	3,828	81.7
3 Allamakee	7,200	9,351	4	(Z)	7,916	84.7
4 Appanoose	7,856	10,751	78	0.7	8,480	78.9
5 Audubon	4,885	6,620	2	(Z)	5,532	83.6
6 Benton	10,084	14,054	11	0.1	10,601	75.4
7 Black Hawk	50,516	70,279	2,463	3.5	52,551	74.8
8 Boone	11,335	17,766	19	0.1	12,527	70.5
9 Bremer	8,939	12,409	20	0.2	9,742	78.5
10 Buchanan	8,823	12,884	32	0.2	9,433	73.2
11 Buena Vista	8,997	12,951	10	0.1	9,996	77.2
12 Butler	6,832	10,679	3	(Z)	7,616	71.3
13 Calhoun	6,837	9,792	21	0.2	7,615	77.8
14 Carroll	10,207	13,355	3	(Z)	11,721	87.8
15 Cass	8,198	11,402	10	0.1	9,354	82.0
16 Cedar	7,735	10,849	5	(Z)	8,425	77.7
17 Cerro Gordo	21,071	30,098	173	0.6	22,889	76.0
18 Cherokee	7,525	11,485	17	0.1	8,106	70.6
19 Chickasaw	7,182	8,845	7	0.1	7,889	89.2
20 Clarke	4,212	5,374	5	0.1	4,550	84.7
21 Clay	7,749	11,044	1	(Z)	8,604	77.9
22 Clayton	9,550	13,393	6	(Z)	11,057	82.6
23 Clinton	22,533	33,347	218	0.7	24,330	73.0
24 Crawford	8,037	11,206	4	(Z)	8,518	76.0
25 Dallas	11,262	15,071	65	0.4	12,176	80.8
26 Davis	4,402	5,765	8	0.1	4,949	85.8
27 Decatur	4,885	6,484	6	0.1	5,457	84.2
28 Delaware	8,065	10,465	2	(Z)	8,703	83.2
29 Des Moines	19,762	27,720	335	1.2	20,591	74.3
30 Dickinson	5,938	7,784	7	0.1	6,273	80.6
31 Dubuque	33,823	45,196	75	0.2	34,766	76.9

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Emmet	6,103	8,626	3	(Z)	6,853	79.4
33 Fayette	12,482	17,072	28	0.2	13,611	79.7
34 Floyd	9,043	12,854	1	(Z)	9,746	75.8
35 Franklin	6,061	9,605	4	(Z)	6,996	72.8
36 Fremont	4,761	6,583	4	0.1	5,336	81.1
37 Greene	5,986	8,934	3	(Z)	6,954	77.8
38 Grundy	6,808	8,745	3	(Z)	7,166	81.9
39 Guthrie	6,146	8,576	5	0.1	6,949	81.0
40 Hamilton	8,332	12,180	78	0.6	9,174	75.3
41 Hancock	6,133	8,658	11	0.1	6,937	80.1
42 Hardin	9,304	14,090	7	(Z)	10,330	73.3
43 Harrison	7,787	10,723	10	0.1	8,562	79.8
44 Henry	7,482	11,727	84	0.7	8,377	71.4
45 Howard	6,211	7,705	6	0.1	6,784	88.0
46 Humboldt	5,630	7,848	1	(Z)	6,243	79.5
47 Ida	4,884	6,414	1	(Z)	5,241	81.7
48 Iowa	7,102	9,950	3	(Z)	7,790	78.3
49 Jackson	8,205	12,191	7	0.1	9,434	77.4
50 Jasper	15,561	21,460	33	0.2	16,585	77.3
51 Jefferson	6,916	9,770	38	0.4	7,722	79.0
52 Johnson	21,618	31,869	364	1.1	21,508	67.5
53 Jones	8,672	12,309	63	0.5	9,469	76.9
54 Keokuk	7,404	9,716	3	(Z)	8,115	83.5
55 Kossuth	10,674	14,454	12	0.1	12,084	83.6
56 Lee	18,582	27,415	674	2.5	20,701	75.5
57 Linn	62,029	82,441	748	0.9	61,839	75.0
58 Louisa	4,481	6,320	1	(Z)	5,004	79.2
59 Lucas	5,260	7,223	9	0.1	5,865	81.2
60 Lyon	5,935	8,286	2	(Z)	6,676	80.6
61 Madison	5,780	7,736	3	(Z)	6,529	84.4
62 Mahaska	10,205	14,897	50	0.3	10,901	73.2
63 Marion	11,842	16,434	76	0.5	12,008	73.1
64 Marshall	16,176	23,609	176	0.7	17,042	72.2
65 Mills	4,889	7,993	10	0.1	5,256	65.8
66 Mitchell	6,373	8,223	1	(Z)	6,798	82.7
67 Monona	6,187	8,567	7	0.1	7,070	82.5
68 Monroe	4,791	6,591	41	0.6	5,391	81.8
69 Montgomery	6,601	9,376	13	0.1	7,630	81.4
70 Muscatine	13,577	20,818	78	0.4	14,698	70.6
71 O'Brien	8,637	11,382	8	0.1	9,480	83.3
72 Osceola	4,301	5,863	1	(Z)	4,782	81.6
73 Page	9,209	14,025	47	0.3	10,172	72.5
74 Palo Alto	6,647	8,445	3	(Z)	7,249	85.8
75 Plymouth	10,613	13,750	6	(Z)	11,103	80.7
76 Pocahontas	6,072	8,448	1	(Z)	6,859	81.2
77 Polk	111,953	161,554	5,978	3.7	119,234	73.8
78 Pottawattamie	31,799	48,586	376	0.8	33,261	68.5
79 Poweshiek	8,334	11,396	19	0.2	8,904	78.1
80 Ringgold	3,840	5,046	2	(Z)	4,321	85.6
81 Sac	7,302	10,319	1	(Z)	7,904	76.6
82 Scott	51,098	71,143	1,062	1.5	50,671	71.2
83 Shelby	7,137	9,106	1	(Z)	7,644	83.9
84 Sioux	12,323	14,727	15	0.1	12,934	87.8
85 Story	20,610	28,752	220	0.8	21,004	73.1
86 Tama	9,608	13,197	218	1.7	10,486	79.5
87 Taylor	4,942	6,739	7	0.1	5,581	82.8
88 Union	6,263	8,840	10	0.1	7,142	80.8
89 Van Buren	4,257	6,317	9	0.1	4,894	77.5
90 Wapello	19,546	28,532	274	1.0	22,167	77.7
91 Warren	10,351	12,056	20	0.2	10,149	84.2
92 Washington	7,919	11,839	13	0.1	9,089	76.8
93 Wayne	5,062	6,647	2	(Z)	5,715	86.0
94 Webster	19,635	28,461	177	0.6	21,435	75.3
95 Winnebago	6,017	7,897	2	(Z)	6,549	82.9
96 Winneshiek	9,759	12,554	7	0.1	10,530	83.9
97 Woodbury	44,218	64,792	1,043	1.6	48,744	75.2
98 Worth	4,723	6,231	39	0.6	5,048	81.0
99 Wright	7,836	11,687	9	0.1	9,560	81.8

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Allen	6,252	10,520	187	1.8	7,508	71.4
2 Anderson	3,780	5,740	19	0.3	4,274	74.5
3 Atchison	8,229	12,685	826	6.5	9,160	72.2
4 Barber	3,624	5,342	21	0.4	4,066	76.1
5 Barton	12,221	18,899	337	1.8	13,665	72.3
6 Bourbon	7,323	10,807	361	3.3	8,031	74.3
7 Brown	5,636	8,697	267	3.1	6,515	74.9
8 Butler	15,532	22,928	154	0.7	17,232	75.2
9 Chase	1,793	2,566	27	1.1	1,992	77.6
10 Chautauqua	2,640	4,053	52	1.3	3,062	75.5
11 Cherokee	9,497	14,224	224	1.6	10,192	71.7
12 Cheyenne	2,040	3,014	2	0.1	2,271	75.3
13 Clark	1,665	2,164	3	0.1	1,830	84.6
14 Clay	4,873	7,094	10	0.1	5,226	73.7
15 Cloud	6,043	9,206	8	0.1	6,677	72.5
16 Coffey	3,606	5,587	6	0.1	4,197	75.1
17 Comanche	1,524	2,090	-	-	1,652	79.0
18 Cowley	14,797	24,032	705	2.9	16,580	69.0
19 Crawford	16,644	24,737	316	1.3	17,777	71.9
20 Decatur	2,712	3,661	2	0.1	2,892	79.0
21 Dickinson	8,847	13,918	127	0.9	10,055	72.2
22 Doniphan	3,824	5,935	245	4.1	4,277	72.1
23 Douglas	17,353	25,385	1,547	6.1	17,065	67.2
24 Edwards	2,377	3,172	13	0.4	2,584	81.5
25 Elk	2,273	3,496	4	0.1	2,673	76.5
26 Ellis	8,020	11,402	33	0.3	8,977	78.7
27 Ellsworth	3,537	5,048	23	0.5	3,687	73.0
28 Finney	5,883	8,750	115	1.3	6,240	71.3
29 Ford	8,761	12,355	149	1.2	9,017	73.0
30 Franklin	8,221	12,478	223	1.8	9,029	72.4
31 Geary	5,745	16,902	2,320	13.7	6,183	36.6

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Gove	1,813	2,318	3	0.1	1,907	82.3
33 Graham	2,408	3,184	120	3.8	2,497	78.4
34 Grant	1,775	2,806	7	0.2	1,942	69.2
35 Gray	1,793	2,606	5	0.2	1,899	72.9
36 Greeley	866	1,157	6	0.5	914	79.0
37 Greenwood	4,801	7,420	6	0.1	5,571	75.1
38 Hamilton	1,421	1,807	9	0.5	1,481	82.0
39 Harper	3,810	6,182	20	0.3	4,622	74.8
40 Harvey	10,415	15,676	299	1.9	11,404	72.7
41 Haskell	1,409	1,638	7	0.4	1,328	81.1
42 Hodgeman	1,434	1,813	12	0.7	1,507	83.1
43 Jackson	4,336	6,693	213	3.2	4,861	72.6
44 Jefferson	4,485	6,993	85	1.2	5,101	72.9
45 Jewell	3,535	4,817	4	0.1	4,033	83.7
46 Johnson*	69,179	82,296	632	0.8	65,033	79.0
47 Kearny	1,315	1,718	7	0.4	1,362	79.3
48 Kingman	4,175	6,016	13	0.2	4,662	77.5
49 Kiowa	2,130	2,874	2	0.1	2,229	77.6
50 Labette	11,062	16,951	743	4.4	12,807	75.6
51 Lane	1,370	1,790	1	0.1	1,379	77.0
52 Leavenworth*	13,089	31,026	3,270	10.5	14,832	47.8
53 Lincoln	2,703	3,699	10	0.3	2,884	78.0
54 Linn	3,679	5,535	43	0.8	4,024	72.7
55 Logan	1,941	2,292	39	1.7	1,906	83.2
56 Lyon	11,462	16,497	378	2.3	12,266	74.4
57 McPherson	9,826	14,954	63	0.4	10,759	71.9
58 Marion	6,341	9,505	29	0.3	7,172	75.5
59 Marshall	6,822	10,201	13	0.1	7,891	77.4
60 Meade	2,492	3,258	4	0.1	2,591	79.5
61 Miami	7,570	12,870	461	3.6	8,396	65.2
62 Mitchell	3,880	5,647	2	(Z)	4,497	79.6
63 Montgomery	17,416	28,628	1,832	6.4	20,638	72.1
64 Morris	3,323	4,797	37	0.8	3,580	74.6
65 Morton	1,561	1,851	6	0.3	1,513	81.7
66 Nemaha	5,683	7,785	31	0.4	6,267	80.5
67 Neosho	8,296	12,331	204	1.7	9,371	76.0
68 Ness	2,615	3,363	1	(Z)	2,655	78.9
69 Norton	3,736	5,192	24	0.5	4,089	78.8
70 Osage	5,460	8,174	24	0.3	6,061	74.1
71 Osborne	3,401	4,889	13	0.3	3,903	79.8
72 Ottawa	3,052	4,511	12	0.3	3,278	72.7
73 Pawnee	4,074	6,936	169	2.4	4,489	64.7
74 Phillips	4,000	5,539	12	0.2	4,145	74.8
75 Pottawatomie	5,070	7,625	33	0.4	5,804	76.1
76 Pratt	5,129	7,517	163	2.2	5,506	73.2
77 Rawlins	2,261	3,098	-	-	2,527	81.6
78 Reno	23,973	35,550	699	2.0	24,339	68.5
79 Republic	4,674	6,593	3	(Z)	5,117	77.6
80 Rice	6,098	8,645	63	0.7	6,680	77.3
81 Riley*	12,137	23,698	1,431	6.0	12,600	53.2
82 Rooks	3,924	5,646	26	0.5	4,490	79.5
83 Rush	2,901	3,897	7	0.2	3,097	79.5
84 Russell	4,977	7,025	23	0.3	5,501	78.3
85 Saline*	16,357	31,887	1,053	3.3	17,568	55.1
86 Scott	2,177	2,987	3	0.1	2,124	71.1
87 Sedgwick*	120,181	198,687	11,082	5.6	133,084	67.0
88 Seward	5,462	8,950	152	1.7	5,642	63.0
89 Shawnee*	56,625	86,741	5,996	6.9	55,749	64.3
90 Sheridan	1,847	2,386	1	(Z)	2,016	84.5
91 Sherman	3,010	4,086	20	0.5	3,119	76.3
92 Smith	3,871	5,194	2	(Z)	4,192	80.7
93 Stafford	3,641	4,836	22	0.5	3,862	79.9
94 Stanton	970	1,167	16	1.4	954	81.7
95 Stevens	2,020	2,498	39	1.6	2,044	81.8
96 Sumner	10,450	15,663	145	0.9	11,736	74.9
97 Thomas	3,348	4,302	2	(Z)	3,384	78.7

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
98 Trego	2,162	3,160	2	0.1	2,309	73.1
99 Wabaunsee	3,152	4,292	88	2.1	3,331	77.6
100 Wallace	1,018	1,216	15	1.2	1,066	87.7
101 Washington	4,705	6,991	5	0.1	5,444	77.9
102 Wichita	1,197	1,515	1	0.1	1,262	83.3
103 Wilson	5,556	8,492	48	0.6	6,394	75.3
104 Woodson	2,431	3,668	-	-	2,751	75.0
105 Wyandotte	65,351	110,701	17,593	15.9	76,801	69.4
1 Adair	5,927	9,320	474	5.1	6,890	73.9
2 Allen	4,342	8,374	170	2.0	5,073	60.6
3 Anderson	3,586	5,662	238	4.2	4,071	71.9
4 Ballard	3,409	5,662	274	4.8	3,867	68.3
5 Barren	9,380	18,526	1,345	7.3	10,133	54.7
6 Bath	3,587	5,814	279	4.8	3,954	68.0
7 Bell	11,227	20,177	763	3.8	11,986	59.4
8 Boone	8,522	13,070	99	0.8	7,800	59.7
9 Bourbon	5,316	11,762	1,696	14.4	5,535	47.1
10 Boyd	18,437	33,114	618	1.9	20,399	61.6
11 Boyle	6,962	14,355	1,549	10.8	6,932	48.3
12 Bracken	2,819	4,963	54	1.1	3,328	67.1
13 Breathitt	5,383	8,499	34	0.4	5,303	62.4
14 Breckinridge	5,911	9,172	407	4.4	7,115	77.6
15 Bullitt	5,330	9,021	153	1.7	5,120	56.8
16 Butler	3,992	6,004	56	0.9	4,648	77.4
17 Caldwell	4,598	8,769	609	6.9	5,579	63.6
18 Calloway	8,886	15,065	432	2.9	8,049	53.4
19 Campbell	28,264	55,258	544	1.0	32,078	58.1
20 Carlisle	1,853	3,870	58	1.5	2,748	71.0
21 Carroll	3,105	5,186	149	2.9	3,360	64.8
22 Carter	6,987	12,242	8	0.1	8,435	68.9
23 Casey	5,356	8,421	26	0.3	6,224	73.9
24 Christian*	12,630	38,159	7,897	20.7	12,125	31.8
25 Clark	6,237	13,476	1,285	9.5	6,341	47.1
26 Clay	6,343	10,773	232	2.2	6,303	58.5
27 Clinton	3,369	5,392	27	0.5	4,190	77.7
28 Crittenden	3,497	5,764	78	1.4	4,089	70.9
29 Cumberland	3,164	5,020	281	5.6	3,537	70.5
30 Daviess	23,755	42,596	1,934	4.5	23,231	54.5
31 Edmonson	2,647	4,908	59	1.2	3,960	80.7

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Elliott	2,351	3,584	-	-	2,523	70.4
33 Estill	4,102	7,691	32	0.4	4,993	64.9
34 Fayette	44,192	88,217	13,141	14.9	41,647	47.2
35 Fleming	4,352	7,077	235	3.3	4,993	70.6
36 Floyd	14,041	22,460	203	0.9	14,886	66.3
37 Franklin	12,494	19,705	1,841	9.3	11,794	59.9
38 Fulton	3,672	7,271	1,063	14.6	4,275	58.8
39 Gallatin	1,517	2,529	65	2.6	1,784	70.5
40 Garrard	3,935	6,407	556	8.7	4,539	70.8
41 Grant	3,545	6,163	41	0.7	4,062	65.9
42 Graves	12,390	20,545	1,053	5.1	12,543	61.1
43 Grayson	5,894	9,722	51	0.5	7,162	73.7
44 Green	4,286	7,344	347	4.7	5,186	70.6
45 Greenup	10,764	17,120	87	0.5	11,346	66.3
46 Hancock	2,190	3,388	90	2.7	2,506	74.0
47 Hardin*	11,264	46,118	3,376	7.3	11,332	24.6
48 Harlan	13,428	28,489	2,136	7.5	16,696	58.6
49 Harrison	5,246	9,198	378	4.1	5,787	62.9
50 Hart	5,295	8,918	813	9.1	6,739	75.6
51 Henderson	10,785	21,084	2,093	9.9	10,867	51.5
52 Henry	4,363	7,268	497	6.8	4,683	64.4
53 Hickman	2,774	4,507	431	9.6	3,144	69.8
54 Hopkins	11,297	24,904	2,187	8.8	12,010	48.2
55 Jackson	3,597	6,050	3	(Z)	4,342	71.8
56 Jefferson *	227,823	385,494	48,154	12.5	235,755	61.2
57 Jessamine	4,530	8,951	829	9.3	4,809	53.7
58 Johnson	6,157	11,847	1	(Z)	7,939	67.0
59 Kenton	38,795	77,095	2,525	3.3	41,323	53.6
60 Knott	5,230	8,987	89	1.0	5,369	59.7
61 Knox	7,770	14,568	269	1.8	8,770	60.2
62 Larue	3,957	6,524	317	4.9	4,381	67.2
63 Laurel	8,665	14,693	148	1.0	9,794	66.7
64 Lawrence	4,455	7,336	39	0.5	5,540	75.5
65 Lee	2,543	4,222	26	0.6	2,970	70.3
66 Leslie	3,774	5,405	-	-	4,689	86.8
67 Letcher	8,063	16,326	392	2.4	8,666	53.1
68 Lewis	4,294	7,523	13	0.2	5,498	73.1
69 Lincoln	5,277	10,132	581	5.7	6,128	60.5
70 Livingston	2,979	4,680	60	1.3	3,157	67.5
71 Logan	8,494	13,708	1,437	10.5	8,836	64.5
72 Lyon	2,006	4,357	454	10.4	2,403	55.2
73 McCracken	20,808	37,525	3,834	10.2	22,228	59.2
74 McCreary	3,683	6,633	1	(Z)	4,595	69.3
75 McLean	3,755	6,065	34	0.6	3,985	65.7
76 Madison	11,200	22,256	1,668	7.5	12,313	55.3
77 Magoffin	3,853	6,025	4	0.1	5,207	86.4
78 Marion	5,344	9,370	722	7.7	6,495	69.3
79 Marshall	7,668	10,842	11	0.1	6,872	63.4
80 Martin	3,306	5,104	1	(Z)	3,925	76.9
81 Mason	6,952	11,831	1,048	8.9	7,487	63.3
82 Meade *	4,136	10,190	471	4.6	4,211	41.3
83 Menifee	1,401	2,554	10	0.4	1,806	70.7
84 Mercer	5,317	9,708	564	5.8	6,282	64.7
85 Metcalfe	3,252	5,455	205	3.8	3,699	67.8
86 Monroe	5,010	7,453	219	2.9	5,307	71.2
87 Montgomery	4,583	8,366	796	9.5	5,080	60.7
88 Morgan	3,887	6,504	3	(Z)	4,628	71.2
89 Muhlenberg	9,741	17,578	827	4.7	10,395	59.1
90 Nelson	7,296	12,356	985	8.0	7,734	62.6
91 Nicholas	2,378	4,473	117	2.6	2,513	56.2
92 Ohio	6,287	11,551	219	1.9	7,650	66.2
93 Oldham	3,884	8,978	912	10.2	4,181	46.6
94 Owen	3,389	5,486	213	3.9	3,658	66.7
95 Owsley	1,744	3,204	11	0.3	2,515	78.5
96 Pendleton	3,815	6,304	49	0.8	3,884	61.6
97 Perry	9,947	18,588	536	2.9	10,725	57.7

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
98 Pike	21,253	37,317	347	0.9	22,995	61.6
99 Powell	2,625	3,813	66	1.7	2,630	69.0
100 Pulaski	13,278	21,237	389	1.8	14,996	70.6
101 Robertson	1,119	1,678	12	0.7	1,246	74.3
102 Rockcastle	4,476	7,263	2	(Z)	5,123	70.5
103 Rowan	4,396	8,155	26	0.3	4,970	60.9
104 Russell	4,273	6,847	84	1.2	4,866	71.1
105 Scott	4,639	10,397	1,111	10.7	4,798	46.1
106 Shelby	6,333	11,915	1,415	11.9	6,756	56.7
107 Simpson	4,144	7,603	923	12.1	4,569	60.1
108 Spencer	1,954	3,476	214	6.2	2,182	62.8
109 Taylor	5,709	10,434	547	5.2	6,855	65.7
110 Todd	4,091	7,288	1,115	15.3	4,673	64.1
111 Trigg	3,714	5,743	849	14.8	3,911	68.1
112 Trimble	2,178	3,197	4	0.1	2,330	72.9
113 Union	5,181	8,981	785	8.7	5,246	58.4
114 Warren	15,831	30,143	2,757	9.1	16,531	54.8
115 Washington	4,351	6,748	601	8.9	5,023	74.4
116 Wayne	5,144	8,620	217	2.5	5,937	68.9
117 Webster	4,964	9,669	813	8.4	5,677	58.7
118 Whitley	9,599	15,866	107	0.7	10,514	66.3
119 Wolfe	2,597	3,612	1	(Z)	2,813	77.9
120 Woodford	4,213	7,585	974	12.8	4,177	55.1

Parish	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Acadia	16,169	26,956	4,557	16.9	15,084	56.0
2 Allen	6,491	10,667	2,310	21.7	6,215	58.3
3 Ascension	8,076	14,281	4,171	29.2	7,610	53.3
4 Assumption	5,168	9,114	3,237	35.5	4,211	46.2
5 Avoyelles	9,976	20,562	4,717	22.9	10,035	48.8
6 Beauregard	6,398	10,827	2,145	19.8	5,965	55.1
7 Bienville	4,595	9,694	4,077	42.1	3,548	36.6
8 Bossier*	11,759	30,543	6,847	22.4	8,720	28.5
9 Caddo*	52,355	129,523	41,749	32.2	46,301	35.7
10 Calcasieu*	40,331	77,911	14,924	19.2	37,627	48.3
11 Caldwell	3,143	5,004	1,161	23.2	2,041	40.8
12 Cameron	2,447	3,881	239	6.2	2,340	60.3
13 Catahoula	2,947	6,029	1,919	31.8	2,132	35.4
14 Claiborne	4,399	11,447	5,032	44.0	3,854	33.7
15 Concordia	4,831	10,545	4,582	43.5	3,331	31.6
16 De Soto	5,208	13,296	6,753	50.8	4,439	33.4
17 East Baton Rouge	63,116	124,893	36,908	29.6	56,435	45.2
18 East Carroll	1,749	7,173	4,183	58.3	1,524	21.2
19 East Feliciana	2,386	13,124	6,081	46.3	1,927	14.7
20 Evangeline	10,138	16,994	3,342	19.7	9,764	57.5
21 Franklin	6,229	13,387	4,433	33.1	4,039	30.2
22 Grant	4,746	7,633	1,553	20.3	3,882	50.9
23 Iberia	16,337	27,365	7,165	26.2	15,470	56.5
24 Iberville	7,877	15,793	7,060	44.7	6,309	39.9
25 Jackson	6,073	9,142	2,535	27.7	4,100	44.8
26 Jefferson	68,965	113,073	14,970	13.2	62,638	55.4
27 Jefferson Davis	8,639	15,773	2,881	18.3	8,712	55.2
28 Lafayette	26,885	44,986	9,473	21.1	22,684	50.4
29 Lafourche	18,209	28,815	3,078	10.7	16,055	55.7
30 La Salle	5,183	7,648	849	11.1	3,842	50.2
31 Lincoln	7,480	15,334	5,723	37.3	5,109	33.3

Parish	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Livingston	9,017	14,124	1,818	12.9	6,628	46.9
33 Madison	2,478	8,515	5,181	60.8	1,888	22.2
34 Morehouse	7,113	17,519	7,208	41.1	4,780	27.3
35 Natchitoches	8,500	18,772	7,444	39.7	7,060	37.6
36 Orleans*	163,094	383,247	125,752	32.8	175,767	45.9
37 Ouachita	25,198	56,562	16,377	29.0	19,291	34.1
38 Plaquemines	5,679	11,530	2,897	25.1	5,146	44.6
39 Pointe Coupee	4,574	11,358	5,273	46.4	4,112	36.2
40 Rapides*	28,114	62,964	18,141	28.8	23,782	37.8
41 Red River	2,569	5,475	2,181	39.8	1,917	35.0
42 Richland	5,245	12,209	4,608	37.7	3,869	31.7
43 Sabine	6,246	10,394	2,143	20.6	5,889	56.7
44 St. Bernard	14,230	16,941	1,105	6.5	10,949	64.6
45 St. Charles	7,800	10,738	2,621	24.4	6,602	61.5
46 St. Helena	2,025	4,445	2,082	46.8	1,809	40.7
47 St. James	5,681	8,856	3,964	44.8	5,314	60.0
48 St. John the Baptist	5,652	9,261	4,279	46.2	4,720	51.0
49 St. Landry	22,727	40,532	14,982	37.0	20,262	50.0
50 St. Martin	7,468	14,445	4,664	32.3	7,063	48.9
51 St. Mary	12,857	25,167	7,176	28.5	10,832	43.0
52 St. Tammany	14,577	21,070	5,038	23.9	11,063	52.5
53 Tangipahoa	16,841	31,712	9,401	29.6	14,351	45.3
54 Tensas	1,847	5,820	3,533	60.7	1,208	20.8
55 Terrebonne	15,306	29,857	5,464	18.3	13,210	44.2
56 Union	5,689	10,027	3,006	30.0	4,063	40.5
57 Vermilion	14,188	22,139	2,429	11.0	14,595	65.9
58 Vernon	7,260	10,547	1,268	12.0	6,160	58.4
59 Washington	12,263	23,625	6,821	28.9	11,400	48.3
60 Webster	9,932	22,758	7,045	31.0	7,667	33.7
61 West Baton Rouge	3,727	7,476	3,502	46.8	3,141	42.0
62 West Carroll	3,412	7,560	1,389	18.4	2,423	32.1
63 West Feliciana	1,120	7,367	4,553	61.8	891	12.1
64 Winn	5,559	9,380	2,590	27.6	4,096	43.7

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Androscoggin	37,521	52,737	67	0.1	40,751	77.3
2 Aroostook*	27,546	55,787	1,071	1.9	33,497	60.0
3 Cumberland*	73,209	112,100	492	0.4	80,824	72.1
4 Franklin	8,671	11,842	11	0.1	9,440	79.7
5 Hancock	13,719	20,291	43	0.2	15,482	76.3
6 Kennebec	36,120	54,406	121	0.2	39,951	73.4
7 Knox	11,426	18,418	44	0.2	12,899	70.0
8 Lincoln	9,083	11,736	10	0.1	9,899	84.3
9 Oxford	18,956	26,486	29	0.1	20,666	78.0
10 Penobscot*	43,215	73,715	787	1.1	47,634	64.6
11 Piscataquis	7,254	10,640	16	0.2	7,818	73.5
12 Sagadahoc	9,739	13,934	75	0.5	10,351	74.3
13 Somerset	15,235	23,809	38	0.2	17,098	71.8
14 Waldo	8,721	13,349	11	0.1	9,689	72.6
15 Washington	13,128	20,560	280	1.4	13,834	67.3
16 York*	47,422	61,045	185	0.3	51,934	85.1

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Allegany	32,809	52,944	641	1.2	34,190	64.6
2 Anne Arundel*	64,706	118,318	17,086	14.4	56,658	47.9
3 Baltimore*	195,073	290,428	9,454	3.3	190,423	65.6
5 Calvert	5,100	8,124	2,747	33.8	4,708	58.0
6 Caroline	6,406	11,973	2,135	17.8	7,079	59.1
7 Carroll	16,783	33,336	1,296	3.9	17,208	51.6
8 Cecil*	13,184	26,961	1,761	6.5	13,433	49.8
9 Charles*	10,001	16,473	4,564	27.7	10,042	61.0
10 Dorchester	9,891	19,184	5,053	26.3	9,590	50.0
11 Frederick	23,812	43,046	2,709	6.3	23,319	54.2
12 Garrett	7,139	11,659	-	-	7,414	63.6
13 Harford*	23,518	43,698	4,128	9.4	21,383	48.9
14 Howard	15,018	20,831	2,146	10.3	12,465	59.8
15 Kent	6,121	9,369	2,184	23.3	6,343	67.7
16 Montgomery*	155,667	193,991	7,221	3.7	128,704	66.3
17 Prince Georges*	128,219	200,231	16,245	8.1	106,830	53.4
18 Queen Annes	6,007	10,070	2,506	24.9	6,032	59.9
19 St. Marys*	8,709	19,403	3,278	16.9	8,832	45.5
20 Somerset	7,682	12,103	3,972	32.8	7,978	65.9
21 Talbot	8,364	13,672	3,436	25.1	8,457	61.9
22 Washington	32,614	56,038	1,367	2.4	33,460	59.7
23 Wicomico	16,143	30,222	6,068	20.1	16,021	53.0
24 Worcester	6,686	14,598	4,167	28.5	7,323	50.2
INDEPENDENT CITY						
4 Baltimore	316,805	588,395	179,742	30.5	317,457	54.0

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Barnstable*	35,355	44,244	1,333	3.0	33,372	75.4
2 Berkshire	64,331	88,834	919	1.0	68,629	77.3
3 Bristol*	186,636	254,693	2,925	1.1	194,722	76.5
4 Dukes	3,214	3,869	197	5.1	3,286	84.9
5 Essex	282,945	361,671	1,784	0.5	295,081	81.6
6 Franklin	25,624	34,280	125	0.4	28,011	81.7
7 Hampden*	178,219	268,284	8,162	3.0	193,828	72.2
8 Hampshire	43,645	62,624	354	0.6	45,096	72.0
9 Middlesex*	576,810	770,246	9,825	1.3	603,516	78.4
10 Nantucket	1,787	2,424	80	3.3	1,919	79.2
11 Norfolk*	256,012	313,071	1,658	0.5	257,721	82.3
12 Plymouth*	120,335	151,138	2,731	1.8	118,349	78.3
13 Suffolk*	298,254	522,395	40,140	7.7	339,617	65.0
14 Worcester*	271,631	367,293	2,267	0.6	286,333	78.0

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Alcona	2.815	3,813	23	0.6	3,099	81.3
2 Alger	3,755	5,252	28	0.5	3,990	76.0
3 Allegan	23,194	32,434	514	1.6	23,472	72.4
4 Alpena	11,472	15,609	7	(Z)	11,653	74.7
5 Antrim	4,863	6,177	49	0.8	5,052	81.8
6 Arenac	3,852	5,785	37	0.6	4,250	73.5
7 Baraga	3,736	4,211	127	3.0	3,836	91.1
8 Barry	13,650	18,586	23	0.1	13,767	74.1
9 Bay	41,706	60,234	384	0.6	44,011	73.1
10 Benzie	3,662	4,640	52	1.1	3,795	81.8
11 Berrien	60,162	87,825	6,576	7.5	61,506	70.0
12 Branch	13,034	20,446	75	0.4	13,587	66.5
13 Calhoun	52,025	82,390	5,438	6.6	55,793	67.7
14 Cass	14,742	21,363	2,075	9.7	15,117	70.8
15 Charlevoix	6,428	7,863	118	1.5	6,419	81.6
16 Cheboygan	6,381	8,297	56	0.7	6,796	81.9
17 Chippewa*	10,658	18,206	531	2.9	11,751	64.5
18 Clare	5,197	6,716	6	0.1	5,130	76.4
19 Clinton	14,837	20,720	58	0.3	15,072	72.7
20 Crawford	2,160	3,038	122	4.0	2,251	74.1
21 Delta	14,507	19,699	81	0.4	14,413	73.2
22 Dickinson	11,297	15,097	5	(Z)	11,995	79.5
23 Eaton	21,555	28,074	82	0.3	21,149	75.3
24 Emmet	6,937	9,286	350	3.8	7,198	77.5
25 Genesee	148,878	211,602	18,854	8.9	147,457	69.7
26 Gladwin	4,683	6,073	7	0.1	4,712	77.6
27 Gogebic	11,319	15,379	33	0.2	12,659	82.3
28 Grand Traverse	13,693	20,545	214	1.0	13,540	65.9
29 Gratiot	12,778	20,934	51	0.2	13,734	65.6
30 Hillsdale	13,090	20,274	29	0.1	14,340	70.7
31 Houghton	14,791	22,522	49	0.2	15,822	70.3
32 Huron	13,626	19,168	11	0.1	15,386	80.3
33 Ingham	86,829	121,161	4,257	3.5	86,907	71.7
34 Ionia	16,113	24,822	783	3.2	16,834	67.8
35 Iosco*	7,044	9,713	114	1.2	6,866	70.7
36 Iron	8,423	10,730	18	0.2	9,165	85.4
37 Isabella	11,727	18,354	314	1.7	12,335	67.2
38 Jackson	49,247	79,297	5,081	6.4	55,779	70.3
39 Kalamazoo	68,104	98,299	3,069	3.1	67,434	68.6
40 Kalkaska	2,084	2,630	13	0.5	2,039	77.5
41 Kent	153,959	210,461	7,805	3.7	157,296	74.7
42 Keweenaw	1,235	1,622	18	1.1	1,343	82.8
43 Lake	2,770	3,392	978	28.8	2,757	81.3
44 Lapeer	14,624	23,893	248	1.0	15,567	65.2
45 Leelanau	4,451	5,454	121	2.2	4,546	83.4
46 Lenawee	28,260	43,781	220	0.5	30,719	70.2
47 Livingston	16,441	21,735	183	0.8	15,987	73.6
48 Luce	2,331	4,986	64	1.3	2,362	47.4
49 Mackinac	4,717	6,191	138	2.2	5,117	82.7
50 Macomb*	176,521	220,669	3,461	1.6	168,195	76.2
51 Manistee	8,444	11,546	125	1.1	8,999	77.9
52 Marquette	20,696	33,513	935	2.8	21,917	65.4
53 Mason	9,846	13,203	72	0.5	10,326	78.2
54 Mecosta	7,677	11,537	111	1.0	7,703	66.8
55 Menominee	10,682	14,495	77	0.5	10,938	75.5
56 Midland	21,655	26,790	64	0.2	21,071	78.7
57 Missaukee	3,075	3,772	12	0.3	3,171	84.1
58 Monroe	38,111	56,122	1,021	1.8	38,423	68.5
59 Montcalm	14,177	21,000	52	0.2	14,892	70.9
60 Montmorency	2,236	2,637	1	(Z)	2,433	92.3
61 Muskegon	59,034	83,241	6,249	7.5	61,661	74.1
62 Newaygo	10,399	13,675	327	2.4	10,872	79.5
63 Oakland	297,508	388,689	12,296	3.2	298,562	76.8
64 Oceana	6,743	9,514	94	1.0	7,082	74.4

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Ogemaw	4,425	5,697	3	0.1	4,542	79.7
66 Ontonagon	5,150	6,336	9	0.1	5,175	81.7
67 Osceola	5,690	7,926	39	0.5	5,865	74.0
68 Oscoda	1,721	2,088	1	(Z)	1,634	78.3
69 Otsego	3,462	4,351	16	0.4	3,469	79.7
70 Ottawa	44,735	53,989	173	0.3	43,423	80.4
71 Presque Isle	5,337	7,283	6	0.1	5,602	76.9
72 Roscommon	4,074	4,602	8	0.2	3,962	86.1
73 Saginaw	73,582	107,257	9,299	8.7	74,272	69.2
74 St. Clair	41,735	61,779	1,386	2.2	45,774	74.1
75 St. Joseph	16,623	25,520	445	1.7	17,847	69.9
76 Sanilac	13,874	18,903	13	0.1	15,185	80.3
77 Schoolcraft	4,076	5,140	46	0.9	4,298	83.6
78 Shiawassee	21,503	30,412	48	0.2	22,604	74.3
79 Tuscola	16,905	24,735	123	0.5	17,308	70.0
80 Van Buren	19,504	28,640	1,993	7.0	20,096	70.2
81 Washtenaw	67,890	101,815	7,697	7.6	64,986	63.8
82 Wayne*	1,094,724	1,633,815	299,769	18.3	1,171,909	71.7
83 Wexford	7,446	10,825	17	0.2	8,096	74.8

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Aitkin	5,890	7,393	40	0.5	6,113	82.7
2 Anoka	45,005	43,831	170	0.4	34,511	78.7
3 Becker	10,220	13,677	513	3.8	10,389	76.0
4 Beltrami	9,166	12,970	1,164	9.0	9,157	70.6
5 Benton	7,520	9,280	4	(z)	7,515	81.0
6 Big Stone	4,172	5,248	8	0.2	4,282	81.6
7 Blue Earth	18,797	25,714	34	0.1	19,413	75.5
8 Brown	11,937	16,223	7	(z)	12,453	76.8
9 Carlton	12,359	16,412	256	16	12,224	74.5
10 Carver	10,558	12,331	10	0.1	10,227	82.9
11 Cass	7,754	10,059	694	6.9	7,991	79.4
12 Chippewa	7,365	9,681	13	0.1	7,574	78.2
13 Chisago	6,889	8,314	9	0.1	6,754	81.2
14 Clay	16,285	21,428	35	0.2	15,544	72.5
15 Clearwater	3,739	5,236	130	2.5	4,135	79.0
16 Cook	1,742	1,969	89	4.5	1,641	83.3
17 Cottonwood	7,528	9,613	2	(z)	7,872	81.9
18 Crow Wing	14,349	18,968	34	0.2	14,614	77.0
19 Dakota	42,328	42,717	98	0.2	35,273	82.6
20 Dodge	5,620	7,603	9	0.1	5,943	78.2
21 Douglas	10,175	12,877	12	0.1	10,506	81.6
22 Faribault	10,775	13,908	9	0.1	11,287	81.2
23 Fillmore	10,651	14,350	11	0.1	11,444	79.7
24 Freeborn	16,709	22,114	72	0.3	17,010	76.9
25 Goodhue	15,589	20,070	50	0.2	16,073	80.1
26 Grant	4,366	5,378	4	0.1	4,576	85.1
27 Hennepin*	396,727	512,128	9,368	1.8	388,181	75.8
28 Houston	7,326	9,542	14	0.1	7,890	82.7
29 Hubbard	4,843	5,941	42	0.7	4,787	80.6
30 Isanti	6,018	8,220	47	0.6	5,694	69.3
31 Itasca	16,231	21,061	337	1.6	17,408	82.7

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Jackson	7,021	9,175	1	(Z)	7,502	81.8
33 Kanabec	4,024	5,337	8	0.1	4,193	78.6
34 Kandiyohi	13,156	18,307	30	0.2	13,567	74.1
35 Kittson	3,945	4,984	7	0.1	4,165	83.6
36 Koochiching	7,491	9.868	126	1.3	7,656	77.6
37 Lac qui Parle	6,180	8,104	1	(Z)	6,449	79.6
38 Lake	5,925	7,649	27	0.4	6,180	80.8
39 Lake of the Woods	1,765	2,482	17	0.7	1,904	76.7
40 Le Sueur	9,325	11,894	10	0.1	9,670	81.3
41 Lincoln	4,428	5,766	1	(Z)	4,657	80.8
42 Lyon	9,822	12,984	6	(Z)	10,305	79.4
43 McLeod	11,316	14,851	2	(Z)	11,511	77.5
44 Mahnomen	2,619	3,424	338	9.9	2,749	80.3
45 Marshall	6,490	8,357	8	0.1	6,777	81.1
46 Martin	12,126	15,933	10	0.1	12,692	79.7
47 Meeker	8,378	11,085	1	(Z)	8,560	77.2
48 Mille Lacs	6,872	8,618	162	1.9	6,830	79.3
49 Morrison	11,032	14,374	5	(Z)	11,764	81.8
50 Mower	20,140	27,156	25	0.1	21,068	77.6
51 Murray	6,152	7,977	17	0.2	6,377	79.9
52 Nicollet	8,736	13,858	65	0.5	9,255	66.8
53 Nobles	9,960	13,109	11	0.1	10,594	80.8
54 Norman	5,301	6,979	4	0.1	5,586	80.0
55 Olmsted	28,950	37,886	173	0.5	27,065	71.4
56 Otter Tail	20,565	30,323	50	0.2	21,843	72.0
57 Pennington	5,534	7,345	18	0.2	5,759	78.4
58 Pine	7,420	10,310	274	2.7	7,687	74.6
59 Pipestone	5,851	7,842	25	0.3	6,131	78.2
60 Polk	16,111	21,222	47	0.2	16,909	79.7
61 Pope	5,764	7,180	4	0.1	5,958	83.0
62 Ramsey	191,592	250,016	5,340	2.1	186,527	74.6
63 Red Lake	2,450	3,211	1	(Z)	2,549	79.4
64 Redwood	9,277	12,534	69	0.6	9,746	77.8
65 Renville	10,437	13,587	11	0.1	10,857	79.9
66 Rice	14,843	22,194	54	0.2	15,031	67.7
67 Rock	5,287	6,661	-	-	5,297	79.5
68 Roseau	5,293	6,925	43	0.6	5,482	79.2
69 St. Louis*	105,183	138,352	1,014	0.7	109,522	79.2
70 Scott	10,570	11,937	18	0.2	9,743	81.6
71 Sherburne	5,940	7,296	112	1.5	5,417	74.2
72 Sibley	7,436	9,730	3	(Z)	7,542	77.5
73 Stearns	32,166	42,438	87	0.2	32,581	76.8
74 Steele	10,939	14,669	4	(Z)	11,301	77.0
75 Stevens	5,137	6,251	2	(Z)	5,126	82.0
76 Swift	6,524	8,692	1	(Z)	6,928	79.7
77 Todd	9,702	13,481	7	0.1	10,334	76.7
78 Traverse	3,322	4,390	5	0.1	3,590	81.8
79 Wabasha	7,504	9,930	7	0.1	8,197	82.5
80 Wadena	5,334	6,937	14	0.2	5,329	76.8
81 Waseca	7,217	9,542	2	(Z)	7,636	80.0
82 Washington	27,022	29,030	221	0.8	23,133	79.7
83 Watonwan	6,445	8,559	4	(Z)	6,595	77.1
84 Wilkin	4,391	5,923	20	0.3	4,667	78.8
85 Winona	17,770	24,087	34	0.1	17,780	73.8
86 Wright	14,185	17,136	8	(Z)	13,658	79.7
87 Yellow Medicine	7,464	9,312	52	0.6	7,475	80.3

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams	6,993	20,228	9,340	46.2	5,205	25.7
2 Alcorn	5,294	15,103	1,756	11.6	4,475	29.6
3 Amite	2,845	8,009	3,560	44.4	2,276	28.4
4 Attala	4,672	11,784	4,262	36.2	3,268	27.7
5 Benton	1,170	3,933	1,419	36.1	1,091	27.7
6 Bolivar	5,411	25,970	15,939	61.4	3,769	14.5
7 Calhoun	3,518	8,955	1,767	19.7	2,447	27.3
8 Carroll	2,141	5,673	2,704	47.7	1,472	25.9
9 Chickasaw	3,417	9,442	3,054	32.3	2,538	26.9
10 Choctaw	2,246	4,833	1,105	22.9	1,646	34.1
11 Claiborne	1,310	5,657	3,969	70.2	1,036	18.3
12 Clarke	3,844	9,060	2,988	33.0	3,308	36.5
13 Clay	3,074	9,991	4,444	44.5	2,372	23.7
14 Coahoma	5,136	23,312	14,604	62.6	3,867	16.6
15 Copiah	4,745	14,560	6,407	44.0	3,614	24.8
16 Covington	3,425	7,361	2,032	27.6	2,198	29.9
17 De Soto	3,389	11,584	6,246	53.9	2,082	18.0
18 Forrest	10,419	29,926	7,495	25.0	8,632	28.8
19 Franklin	2,302	5,245	1,842	35.1	1,680	32.0
20 George	3,039	5,856	580	9.9	2,071	35.4
21 Greene	2,061	4,377	859	19.6	1,578	36.1
22 Grenada	3,803	10,115	4,323	42.7	2,343	23.2
23 Hancock	4,051	7,942	1,129	14.2	3,353	42.2
24 Harrison *	21,694	64,764	9,670	14.9	16,759	25.9
25 Hinds	41,889	103,974	36,138	34.8	28,983	27.9
26 Holmes	3,225	13,530	8,757	64.7	2,567	19.0
27 Humphreys	1,947	8,905	5,561	62.4	1,422	16.0
28 Issaquena	490	1,721	1,081	62.8	423	24.6
29 Itawamba	3,267	8,986	463	5.2	2,771	30.8
30 Jackson	13,728	29,560	5,113	17.3	9,174	31.0
31 Jasper	3,230	9,002	3,675	40.8	2,435	27.0
32 Jefferson	1,327	5,206	3,540	68.0	1,094	21.0
33 Jefferson Davis	2,586	6,851	3,222	47.0	1,723	25.1
34 Jones	14,104	33,370	7,427	22.3	10,528	31.5
35 Kemper	2,376	6,334	3,221	50.9	1,711	27.0
36 Lafayette	3,922	11,313	3,239	28.6	2,922	25.8
37 Lamar	3,706	7,560	1,071	14.2	2,333	30.9
38 Lauderdale	14,874	39,730	11,924	30.0	10,745	27.0
39 Lawrence	2,609	5,598	1,720	30.7	1,651	29.5
40 Leake	4,513	10,151	3,397	33.5	3,250	32.0
41 Lee	7,574	23,839	5,130	21.5	6,641	27.9
42 Leflore	5,969	23,841	13,567	56.9	4,641	19.5
43 Lincoln	7,187	14,985	3,913	26.1	4,885	32.6
44 Lowndes *	6,668	24,822	8,362	33.7	4,680	18.9
45 Madison	3,534	15,988	10,366	64.8	2,861	17.9
46 Marion	5.974	12,627	3,630	28.7	3,045	24.1
47 Marshall	2,592	11,510	7,168	62.3	1,785	15.5
48 Monroe	6,612	19,036	5,610	29.5	4,860	25.5
49 Montgomery	3,330	7,327	2,627	35.9	1,969	26.9
50 Neshoba	5,724	11,708	2,565	21.9	4,136	35.3
51 Newton	4,973	11,032	3,018	27.4	3,376	30.6
52 Noxubee	2,050	8,169	5,172	63.3	1,489	18.2
53 Oktibbeha	4,185	13,375	4,952	37.0	3,416	25.5
54 Panola	4,415	14,889	7,250	48.7	2,888	19.4
55 Pearl River	4,744	12,238	2,473	20.2	3,483	28.5
56 Perry	2,054	4,655	1,140	24.5	1,344	28.9
57 Pike	6,961	19,099	6,936	36.3	5,357	28.0
58 Pontotoc	3,401	10,291	1,519	14.8	2,704	26.3
59 Prentiss	3,302	10,605	1,070	10.1	2,985	28.1
60 Quitman	2,401	9,849	5,673	57.6	1,556	15.8
61 Rankin	7,873	20,190	6,944	34.4	4,782	23.7
62 Scott	4,967	11,494	3,752	32.6	3,472	30.2
63 Sharkey	1,244	5,034	3,152	62.6	1,007	20.0
64 Simpson	5,220	11,259	3,186	28.3	3,208	28.5

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Smith	4,283	7,890	1,293	16.4	2,946	37.3
66 Stone	1,955	3,833	868	22.6	1,436	37.5
67 Sunflower	4,378	22,309	13,524	60.6	3,451	15.5
68 Tallahatchie	3,381	11,582	6,483	56.0	2,597	22.4
69 Tate	2,673	8,832	4,326	49.0	1,772	20.1
70 Tippah	3,456	8,794	1,281	14.6	2,892	32.9
71 Tishomingo	2,911	8,427	359	4.3	2,427	28.8
72 Tunica	1,044	7,833	5,822	74.3	897	11.5
73 Union	4,176	11,138	1,626	14.6	3,295	29.6
74 Walthall	3,168	7,026	2,490	35.4	2,139	30.4
75 Warren	9,040	24,256	10,726	44.2	6,587	27.2
76 Washington *	7,615	40,456	20,619	51.0	6,655	16.4
77 Wayne	3,815	8,437	2,556	30.3	2,233	26.5
78 Webster	3,121	6,167	1,174	19.0	2,026	32.9
79 Wilkinson	1,576	6,460	4,120	63.8	1,222	18.9
80 Winston	4,159	10,419	3,611	34.7	2,966	28.5
81 Yalobusha	2,644	7,013	2,441	34.8	1,903	27.1
82 Yazoo	5,005	16,317	8,719	53.4	3,340	20.5

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adair	7,808	12,792	81	0.6	8,629	67.5
2 Andrew	5,805	7,162	9	0.1	5,886	82.2
3 Atchison	4,523	5,895	7	0.1	4,826	81.9
4 Audrain	10,703	16,000	924	5.8	11,365	71.0
5 Barry	10,064	12,252	8	0.1	10,625	86.7
6 Barton	5,505	7,387	5	0.1	6,120	82.8
7 Bates	8,676	10,622	76	0.7	9,335	87.9
8 Benton	4,507	6,000	21	0.4	4,980	83.0
9 Bollinger	4,917	5,563	-	-	4,821	86.7
10 Boone	22,453	32,292	2,018	6.2	21,967	68.0
11 Buchanan	35,665	59,367	1,679	2.8	40,796	68.7
12 Butler	13,326	20,907	1,384	6.6	14,157	67.7
13 Caldwell	4,600	6,031	4	0.1	4,851	80.4
14 Callaway	8,899	15,069	1,338	8.9	9,398	62.4
15 Camden	5,129	5,980	14	0.2	5,268	88.1
16 Cape Girardeau	20,207	25,415	637	2.5	19,503	76.7
17 Carroll	7,063	9,141	149	1.6	7,851	85.9
18 Carter	1,993	2,438	-	-	1,732	71.0
19 Cass*	10,323	17,870	214	1.2	12,241	68.5
20 Cedar	4,725	6,285	7	0.1	5,277	84.0
21 Chariton	5,794	8,413	496	5.9	6,652	79.1
22 Christian	5,878	7,739	4	0.1	6,249	80.7
23 Clark	3,883	5,512	9	0.2	4,681	84.9
24 Clay	37,990	50,934	486	1.0	36,273	71.2
25 Clinton	5,398	7,611	188	2.5	6,558	86.2
26 Cole	18,195	25,927	2,192	8.5	18,295	70.6
27 Cooper	7,731	9,681	670	6.9	8,530	88.1
28 Crawford	6,104	7,834	5	0.1	6,452	82.4
29 Dade	3,572	5,079	42	0.8	4,204	82.8
30 Dallas	4,251	6,155	2	(Z)	5,004	81.3
31 Daviess	4,613	6,494	24	0.4	5,411	83.3

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 De Kalb	4,026	4,851	1	(Z)	4,181	86.2
33 Dent	4,648	6,705	1	(Z)	5,805	86.6
34 Douglas	3,873	5,904	2	(Z)	4,625	78.3
35 Dunklin	11,932	22,305	699	3.1	13,276	59.5
36 Franklin	21,777	27,039	315	1.2	21,934	81.1
37 Gasconade	5,798	8,096	3	(Z)	6,505	80.3
38 Gentry	4,875	6,068	5	0.1	5,327	87.8
39 Greene	54,119	78,905	1,605	2.0	57,400	72.7
40 Grundy	5,774	8,465	15	0.2	6,837	80.8
41 Harrison	5,303	7,890	4	0.1	6,366	80.7
42 Henry	8,844	12,818	156	1.2	10,613	82.8
43 Hickory	2,011	3,001	-	-	2,500	83.3
44 Holt	3,597	5,309	5	0.1	4,271	80.4
45 Howard	4,846	6,875	618	9.0	5,377	78.2
46 Howell	9,600	13,475	51	0.4	9,829	72.9
47 Iron	3,780	4,904	30	0.6	3,973	81.0
48 Jackson *	240,056	397,813	49,424	12.4	266,458	67.0
49 Jasper	33,526	50,447	726	1.4	36,766	72.9
50 Jefferson	26,803	37,603	489	1.3	29,964	79.7
51 Johnson *	10,760	17,153	567	3.3	11,682	68.1
52 Knox	3,390	4,321	12	0.3	3,670	84.9
53 Laclede	8,365	11,692	111	0.9	8,961	76.6
54 Lafayette	12,893	16,030	611	3.8	13,566	84.6
55 Lawrence	12,430	15,319	52	0.3	12,889	84.1
56 Lewis	4,520	6,886	255	3.7	5,286	76.8
57 Lincoln	7,264	9,406	360	3.8	7,264	77.2
58 Linn	8,618	11,528	155	1.3	9,620	83.4
59 Livingston	8,023	10,176	195	1.9	8,840	86.9
60 McDonald	6,543	7,605	30	0.4	6,451	84.8
61 Macon	8,226	11,318	183	1.6	9,133	80.7
62 Madison	4,474	5,819	26	0.4	4,834	83.1
63 Maries	3,246	4,358	3	0.1	3,400	78.0
64 Marion	11,919	18,888	968	5.1	13,189	69.8

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Mercer	2,324	3,935	3	0.1	3,500	88.9
66 Miller	6,642	8,550	18	0.2	7,066	82.6
67 Mississippi	5,680	10,921	2,212	20.3	6,484	59.4
68 Moniteau	5,382	6,852	116	1.7	5,724	83.5
69 Monroe	5,031	7,004	284	4.1	5,520	79.0
70 Montgomery	5,899	7,339	319	4.3	6,258	85.3
71 Morgan	5,210	6,334	109	1.7	5,218	82.4
72 New Madrid	9,998	15,929	2,749	17.3	11,578	72.7
73 Newton	14,799	18,404	122	0.7	14,688	79.8
74 Nodaway	10,479	13,786	14	0.1	11,311	82.0
75 Oregon	3,900	6,192	3	(Z)	3,908	63.1
76 Osage	5,320	6,484	8	0.1	5,578	86.0
77 Ozark	2,604	4,213	3	0.1	3,316	78.7
78 Pemiscot	7,741	19,771	4,559	23.1	11,776	59.6
79 Perry	6,293	8,611	11	0.1	6,877	79.9
80 Pettis	14,396	22,436	1,095	4.9	16,063	71.6
81 Phelps	9,531	14,982	154	1.0	10,239	68.3
82 Pike	7,217	10,646	851	8.0	7,996	75.1
83 Platte	9,202	13,931	220	1.6	10,631	76.3
84 Polk	6,641	9,148	4	(Z)	7,289	79.7
85 Pulaski*	5,239	25,454	1,772	7.0	6,381	25.1
86 Putnam	3,031	4,774	2	(Z)	3,771	79.0
87 Ralls	3,583	5,174	120	2.3	3,980	76.9
88 Randolph	9,473	14,810	719	4.9	10,614	71.7
89 Ray	6,923	10,358	257	2.5	8,107	78.3
90 Reynolds	2,365	3,021	4	0.1	2,183	72.3
91 Ripley	4,372	5,707	4	0.1	4,528	79.3
92 St. Charles	23,550	29,645	539	1.8	22,778	76.8
93 St. Clair	4,554	5,743	30	0.5	5,061	88.1
94 St. Francois	16,257	23,096	124	0.5	17,336	75.1
95 St. Louis	348,620	418,554	10,865	2.6	324,500	77.5
97 Ste. Genevieve	5,084	6,799	43	0.6	5,167	76.0
98 Saline	10,943	16,824	941	5.6	12,054	71.6

MISSOURI--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
99 Schuyler	2,521	3,429	2	0.1	3,027	88.3
100 Scotland	3,402	4,340	5	0.1	3,783	87.2
101 Scott	10,724	18,715	1,472	7.9	12,156	65.0
102 Shannon	3,216	4,190	1	(Z)	2,815	67.2
103 Shelby	4,368	6,132	108	1.8	4,932	80.4
104 Stoddard	8,958	16,997	769	4.5	11,683	68.7
105 Stone	4,212	5,157	8	0.2	4,091	79.3
106 Sullivan	4,747	6,032	6	0.1	5,706	94.6
107 Taney	5,285	6,543	1	(Z)	5,131	78.4
108 Texas	7,836	10,811	10	0.1	8,864	82.0
109 Vernon	9,035	14,237	21	0.1	9,573	67.2
110 Warren	4,226	5,575	179	3.2	4,353	78.1
111 Washington	6,194	7,725	68	0.9	6,086	78.8
112 Wayne	5,024	5,344	5	0.1	5,221	97.7
113 Webster	7,165	8,606	8	0.1	7,310	84.9
114 Worth	2,204	2,627	-	-	2,678	101.9
115 Wright	6,758	8,885	56	0.6	7,144	80.4
INDEPENDENT CITY						
96 St. Louis	267,562	490,023	120,970	24.7	303,650	62.0

MONTANA

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Beaverhead	3,231	4,491	20	0.4	3,043	67.8
2 Big Horn	3,993	5,222	1,420	27.2	3,224	61.7
3 Blaine	2,703	4,365	680	15.6	2,876	65.9
4 Broadwater	1,204	1,599	1	0.1	1,311	82.0
5 Carbon	3,633	5,172	13	0.3	3,961	76.6
6 Carter	1,029	1,451	2	0.1	1,075	74.1
7 Cascade*	26,714	42,057	753	1.8	26,090	62.0
8 Chouteau	3,276	4,153	45	1.1	3,389	81.6
9 Custer	5,101	7,769	49	0.6	5,351	68.9
10 Daniels	1,730	2,183	3	0.1	1,724	79.0
11 Dawson	4,637	6,595	13	0.2	4,582	69.5
12 Deer Lodge	6,259	11,315	141	1.2	7,344	64.9
13 Fallon	1,595	2,208	3	0.1	1,516	68.7
14 Fergus	6,293	8,259	38	0.5	6,306	76.4
15 Flathead	14,370	19,322	118	0.6	14,267	73.8
16 Gallatin	11,248	14,852	82	0.6	10,652	71.7
17 Garfield	896	1,133	1	0.1	880	77.7
18 Glacier	3,697	6,044	1,858	30.7	4,039	66.8
19 Golden Valley	604	722	-	-	639	88.5
20 Granite	1,187	1,819	9	0.5	1,323	72.7
21 Hill	6,604	10,057	490	4.9	6,916	68.8
22 Jefferson	1,631	2,555	36	1.4	1,590	62.2
23 Judith Basin	1,502	1,802	5	0.3	1,564	86.8
24 Lake	5,986	7,650	649	8.5	5,709	74.6
25 Lewis and Clark	13,687	16,733	216	1.3	13,285	79.4
26 Liberty	1,155	1,427	5	0.4	1,100	77.1
27 Lincoln	4,709	6,852	25	0.4	4,546	66.3
28 McCone	1,507	1,822	2	0.1	1,515	83.2
29 Madison	2,403	3,211	7	0.2	2,469	76.9
30 Meagher	913	1,594	10	0.6	1,048	65.7
31 Mineral	1,274	1,672	11	0.7	1,240	74.2

MONTANA--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Missoula	21,004	25,769	255	1.0	19,337	75.0
33 Musselshell	2,012	2,945	10	0.3	2,210	75.0
34 Park	5,453	8,110	33	0.4	5,601	69.1
35 Petroleum	401	547	2	0.4	476	87.0
36 Phillips	2,857	3,508	159	4.5	2,925	83.4
37 Pondera	2,877	4,127	255	6.2	3,105	75.2
38 Powder River	1,099	1,427	24	1.7	1,105	77.4
39 Powell	3,040	4,435	127	2.9	3,025	68.2
40 Prairie	1,048	1,311	5	0.4	987	75.3
41 Ravalli	5,662	7,522	35	0.5	5,528	73.5
42 Richland	4,131	5,821	17	0.3	4,269	73.3
43 Roosevelt	4,078	6,095	1,171	19.2	4,132	67.8
44 Rosebud	2,321	3,426	545	15.9	2,399	70.0
45 Sanders	3,013	4,187	178	4.3	2,984	71.3
46 Sheridan	2,754	3,732	26	0.7	2,754	73.8
47 Silver Bow	21,239	28,235	170	0.6	21,190	75.0
48 Stillwater	2,271	3,287	4	0.1	2,491	75.8
49 Sweet Grass	1,514	2,061	-	-	1,617	78.5
50 Teton	3,199	4,173	27	0.6	3,276	78.5
51 Toole	2,874	4,378	23	0.5	3,348	76.5
52 Treasure	536	731	2	0.3	570	78.0
53 Valley*	5,125	9,246	390	4.2	5,346	57.8
54 Wheatland	1,373	1,842	17	0.9	1,518	82.4
55 Wibaux	737	950	-	-	806	84.8
56 Yellowstone	33,239	44,669	430	1.0	32,006	71.7
57 Yellowstone Nat. Park (part)	-	33	-	-	-	-

NEBRASKA

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams	12,027	18,507	165	0.9	12,296	66.4
2 Antelope	4,570	6,234	1	(Z)	5,087	81.6
3 Arthur	369	384	-	-	351	91.4
4 Banner	553	701	-	-	635	90.6
5 Blaine	521	618	1	0.2	533	86.2
6 Boone	3,798	5,412	3	0.1	4,356	80.5
7 Box Butte	4,693	6,852	240	3.5	5,043	73.6
8 Boyd	2,008	2,660	10	0.4	2,161	81.2
9 Brown	2,157	2,808	5	0.2	2,249	80.1
10 Buffalo	10,861	15,723	26	0.2	11,486	73.1
11 Burt	4,533	6,458	27	0.4	4,979	77.1
12 Butler	4,635	6,479	-	-	4,995	77.1
13 Cass	6,922	10,831	19	0.2	7,305	67.4
14 Cedar	5,403	7,284	3	(Z)	5,999	82.4
15 Chase	1,988	2,687	2	0.1	2,139	79.6
16 Cherry	3,672	4,836	87	1.8	3,739	77.3
17 Cheyenne	5,818	8,262	47	0.6	6,394	77.4
18 Clay	3,880	5,546	4	0.1	4,336	78.2
19 Colfax	4,179	6,300	11	0.2	4,479	71.1
20 Cuming	5,329	7,516	3	(Z)	5,773	76.8
21 Custer	7,391	10,325	7	0.1	8,066	78.1
22 Dakota	4,560	6,792	142	2.1	5,304	78.1
23 Dawes	4,087	5,716	124	2.2	4,385	76.7
24 Dawson	8,367	11,630	26	0.2	8,868	76.3
25 Deuel	1,505	1,948	1	0.1	1,674	85.9
26 Dixon	3,757	4,968	2	(Z)	4,097	82.5
27 Dodge	13,543	19,669	54	0.3	14,340	72.9
28 Douglas*	139,093	207,093	14,154	6.8	136,065	65.7
29 Dundy	1,623	2,255	3	0.1	1,731	76.8
30 Fillmore	4,433	6,004	9	0.1	4,652	77.5
31 Franklin	2,650	3,604	1	(Z)	2,801	77.7

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Frontier	1,931	2,688	-	-	2,197	81.7
33 Furnas	3,680	4,979	1	(Z)	3,945	79.2
34 Gage	10,446	17,310	34	0.2	11,615	67.1
35 Garden	1,665	2,169	4	0.2	1,802	83.1
36 Garfield	1,244	1,689	1	0.1	1,352	80.0
37 Gosper	1,059	1,533	-	-	1,193	77.8
38 Grant	503	614	3	0.5	537	87.5
39 Greeley	2,080	2,684	1	(Z)	2,223	82.8
40 Hall	14,988	21,866	75	0.3	15,259	69.8
41 Hamilton	3,991	5,293	5	0.1	4,472	84.5
42 Harlan	2,478	3,259	-	-	2,659	81.6
43 Hayes	865	1,132	-	-	980	86.6
44 Hitchcock	2,095	2,994	4	0.1	2,312	77.2
45 Holt	5,933	8,116	5	0.1	6,588	81.2
46 Hooker	472	649	-	-	514	79.2
47 Howard	3,044	4,131	2	(Z)	3,194	77.3
48 Jefferson	5,079	7,489	10	0.1	5,942	79.3
49 Johnson	2,866	4,028	1	(Z)	3,249	80.7
50 Kearney	3,119	4,227	1	(Z)	3,328	78.7
51 Keith	3,711	4,726	5	0.1	3,891	82.3
52 Keya Paha	826	1,028	1	0.1	887	86.3
53 Kimball	2,815	4,314	13	0.3	3,168	73.4
54 Knox	5,369	8,047	168	2.1	5,969	74.2
55 Lancaster*	58,390	95,165	1,971	2.1	60,289	63.4
56 Lincoln	11,257	16,919	130	0.8	12,497	73.9
57 Logan	563	665	-	-	554	83.3
58 Loup	524	658	-	-	574	87.2
59 McPherson	323	437	-	-	370	84.7
60 Madison	10,816	16,041	93	0.6	11,400	71.1
61 Merrick	3,539	5,163	2	(Z)	3,978	77.0
62 Morrill	2,877	4,198	26	0.6	3,219	76.7
63 Nance	2,478	3,595	1	(Z)	2,711	75.4
64 Nemaha	4,020	5,721	2	(Z)	4,408	77.0
65 Nuckolls	3,727	5,139	4	0.1	4,011	78.1
66 Otoe	6,795	10,323	14	0.1	7,600	73.6
67 Pawnee	2,277	3,526	2	0.1	2,737	77.6
68 Perkins	1,789	2,461	-	-	1,998	81.2
69 Phelps	4,593	6,144	3	(Z)	5,047	82.1
70 Pierce	3,596	5,227	-	-	4,070	77.9
71 Platte	9,865	13,814	6	(Z)	10,516	76.1
72 Polk	3,337	4,599	-	-	3,581	77.9
73 Red Willow	5,156	7,775	14	0.2	5,812	74.8
74 Richardson	6,095	8,987	52	0.6	7,151	79.6
75 Rock	1,211	1,568	6	0.4	1,337	85.3
76 Saline	5,905	8,428	6	0.1	6,404	76.0
77 Sarpy*	9,999	17,067	335	2.0	8,449	49.5
78 Saunders	7,517	10,869	8	0.1	8,258	76.0
79 Scotts Bluff	13,333	19,516	315	1.6	14,374	73.7
80 Seward	5,568	8,218	6	0.1	5,683	69.2
81 Sheridan	3,596	5,309	213	4.0	4,014	75.6
82 Sherman	2,394	3,267	1	(Z)	2,558	78.3
83 Sioux	1,077	1,527	15	1.0	1,160	76.0
84 Stanton	2,313	3,491	2	0.1	2,537	72.7
85 Thayer	4,430	5,936	2	(Z)	4,752	80.1
86 Thomas	531	647	-	-	561	86.7
87 Thurston	2,894	4,153	746	18.0	3,072	74.0
88 Valley	3,202	4,138	1	(Z)	3,293	79.6
89 Washington	5,339	7,393	16	0.2	5,466	73.9
90 Wayne	3,989	5,789	4	0.1	4,299	74.3
91 Webster	2,848	4,027	1	(Z)	3,129	77.7
92 Wheeler	565	747	1	0.1	663	88.8
93 York	6,242	8,604	27	0.3	6,969	81.0

NEVADA

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Churchill	3,172	4,940	284	5.7	3,074	62.2
2 Clark*	64,681	77,377	6,300	8.1	42,146	54.5
3 Douglas	2,137	2,209	119	5.4	1,751	79.3
4 Elko	4,641	7,334	635	8.7	4,922	67.1
5 Esmeralda	318	421	19	4.5	371	88.1
6 Eureka	528	550	35	6.4	462	84.0
7 Humboldt	2,527	3,545	244	6.9	2,330	65.7
8 Lander	729	997	67	6.7	774	77.6
9 Lincoln	1,225	1,388	32	2.3	1,301	93.7
10 Lyon	2,724	3,599	215	6.0	2,503	69.5
11 Mineral	2,367	3,524	440	12.5	2,536	72.0
12 Nye	2,098	2,904	218	7.5	1,756	60.5
13 Ormsby	4,126	4,740	367	7.7	3,229	68.1
14 Pershing	1,224	2,014	93	4.6	1,364	67.7
15 Storey	433	391	6	1.5	370	94.6
16 Washoe*	38,520	53,807	2,041	3.8	34,113	63.4
17 White Pine	3,983	5,625	106	1.9	4,265	75.8

NEW HAMPSHIRE

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Belknap	13,932	18,019	29	0.2	14,786	82.1
2 Carroll	9,015	10,232	11	0.1	9,405	91.9
3 Cheshire	19,584	26,685	36	0.1	20,262	75.9
4 Coos	16,819	22,410	26	0.1	18,252	81.4
5 Grafton	21,027	29,305	58	0.2	22,275	76.0
6 Hillsborough	89,739	110,431	257	0.2	90,565	82.0
7 Merrimack	32,382	43,048	79	0.2	33,673	78.2
8 Rockingham*	46,754	59,557	886	1.5	45,095	75.7
9 Strafford	26,079	35,849	76	0.2	27,874	77.8
10 Sullivan	12,762	17,189	30	0.2	13,574	79.0

NEW JERSEY

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Atlantic	78,019	107,129	17,586	16.4	76,969	71.8
2 Bergen	393,465	495,076	11,554	2.3	381,808	77.1
3 Burlington*	88,945	132,890	8,896	6.7	81,539	61.4
4 Camden	185,761	243,073	19,872	8.2	186,515	76.7
5 Cape May*	26,380	32,091	2,322	7.2	26,222	81.7
6 Cumberland	46,215	66,797	7,287	10.9	44,512	66.6
7 Essex	396,477	613,239	108,204	17.6	393,623	64.2
8 Gloucester	64,052	80,119	6,692	8.4	62,259	77.7
9 Hudson	272,009	408,395	22,996	5.6	291,292	71.3
10 Hunterdon	25,283	33,837	528	1.6	24,731	73.1
11 Mercer	122,214	171,863	19,577	11.4	121,269	70.6
12 Middlesex	215,618	259,358	9,276	3.6	199,556	76.9
13 Monmouth*	157,055	206,648	18,401	8.9	144,060	69.7
14 Morris	128,913	160,951	3,732	2.3	117,883	73.2
15 Ocean*	63,714	68,058	2,141	3.1	51,898	76.3
16 Passaic	179,699	264,252	14,691	5.6	179,402	67.9
17 Salem*	26,545	35,083	4,837	13.8	26,607	75.8
18 Somerset	72,270	89,505	2,638	2.9	64,863	72.5
19 Sussex	26,197	30,076	125	0.4	23,642	78.6
20 Union	249,347	322,690	22,335	6.9	245,008	75.9
21 Warren	28,592	39,944	340	0.9	29,453	73.7

NEW MEXICO

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Bernalillo *	98,317	142,249	4,435	3.1	86,061	60.5
2 Catron	1,208	1,580	32	2.0	1,245	78.8
3 Chaves *	17,112	30,869	1,184	3.8	15,392	49.9
4 Colfax	5,029	7,543	56	0.7	5,528	73.3
5 Curry *	10,378	18,131	981	5.4	9,639	53.2
6 De Baca	1,240	1,726	3	0.2	1,355	78.5
7 Dona Ana*	18,085	30,836	956	3.1	16,755	54.3
8 Eddy	18,032	26,996	564	2.1	16,780	62.2
9 Grant	7,314	10,253	99	1.0	6,868	67.0
10 Guadalupe	2,713	2,765	7	0.3	2,834	102.5
11 Harding	905	1,042	1	0.1	1,012	97.1
12 Hidalgo	1,634	2,689	23	0.9	1,643	61.1
13 Lea	15,948	28,766	1,376	4.8	15,474	53.8
14 Lincoln	3,351	4,537	46	1.0	3,503	77.2
15 Los Alamos	5,688	6,860	44	0.6	5,233	77.0
16 Luna	3,969	5,262	95	1.8	3,306	62.8
17 McKinley	10,000	16,808	8,393	49.9	9,893	58.9
18 Mora	2,527	2,825	2	0.1	2,807	99.4
19 Otero *	9,560	19,292	1,327	6.9	9,426	48.9
20 Quay	4,515	6,829	94	1.4	4,704	68.9
21 Rio Arriba	9,757	11,308	1,130	10.0	9,969	88.2
22 Roosevelt	5,634	9,176	71	0.8	5,804	63.3
23 Sandoval	4,420	6,535	2,511	38.4	4,119	63.0
24 San Juan	13,892	26,028	5,831	22.4	13,185	50.7
25 San Miguel	8,505	12,113	81	0.7	9,514	78.5
26 Santa Fe	18,519	24,516	634	2.6	17,890	73.0
27 Sierra	3,149	4,427	25	0.6	3,117	70.4
28 Socorro	4,181	5,142	226	4.4	4,128	80.3
29 Taos	6,238	7,638	554	7.3	6,257	81.9
30 Torrance	2,635	3,354	14	0.4	2,884	86.0
31 Union	2,401	3,488	2	0.1	2,756	79.0

NEW MEXICO--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Valencia	11,757	19,092	2,411	12.6	11,976	62.7

NEW YORK

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Albany	147,152	174,414	6,154	3.5	153,692	88.1
2 Allegany	18,039	25,264	102	0.4	19,695	78.0
3 Bronx	539,594	965,315	100,255	10.4	574,282	59.5
4 Broome	91,139	132,408	919	0.7	94,991	71.7
5 Cattaraugus	32,933	48,299	813	1.7	36,573	75.7
6 Cayuga	35,566	45,196	1,005	2.2	37,722	83.5
7 Chautauqua	62,056	90,925	776	0.9	66,031	72.6
8 Chemung	41,082	59,614	1,480	2.5	44,396	74.5
9 Chenango	18,952	25,743	121	0.5	20,204	78.5
10 Clinton *	24,492	41,713	2,170	5.2	24,951	59.8
11 Columbia	23,558	30,401	750	2.5	24,664	81.1
12 Cortland	17,270	24,233	46	0.2	18,235	75.2
13 Delaware	20,064	26,445	102	0.4	22,013	83.2
14 Dutchess	79,725	116,036	6,826	5.9	76,004	65.5
15 Erie *	471,576	660,623	43,863	6.6	489,564	74.1
16 Essex	16,585	21,075	118	0.6	17,901	84.9
17 Franklin	17,329	25,951	904	3.5	19,358	74.6
18 Fulton	23,147	33,011	211	0.6	24,883	75.4
19 Genesee	23,841	32,245	705	2.2	25,085	77.8
20 Greene	17,894	20,188	431	2.1	18,320	90.7
21 Hamilton	2,873	2,703	3	0.1	2,964	109.7
22 Herkimer	30,317	41,465	64	0.2	32,768	79.0
23 Jefferson	35,914	53,111	215	0.4	40,115	75.5
24 Kings*	915,503	1,745,408	220,424	12.6	977,306	56.0
25 Lewis	9,779	13,054	14	0.1	10,697	81.9
26 Livingston	20,619	26,598	509	1.9	21,454	80.7
27 Madison	23,180	31,140	199	0.6	24,697	79.3
28 Monroe	285,582	369,189	12,974	3.5	289,948	78.5
29 Montgomery	27,861	37,990	132	0.3	30,827	81.1
30 Nassau *	632,115	765,494	26,784	3.5	588,319	76.9
31 New York *	625,719	1,257,867	287,817	22.9	635,567	50.5

NEW YORK--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Niagara*	95,985	144,912	4,820	3.3	101,765	70.2
33 Oneida*	113,210	164,395	2,632	1.6	122,981	74.8
34 Onondaga*	192,014	258,516	7,431	2.9	198,156	76.7
35 Ontario	30,784	41,599	519	1.2	31,931	76.8
36 Orange*	78,924	116,324	5,089	4.4	80,162	68.9
37 Orleans	14,896	20,872	803	3.9	15,864	76.0
38 Oswego	37,226	50,021	110	0.2	39,568	79.1
39 Otsego	23,859	31,953	111	0.3	25,347	79.3
40 Putnam	21,879	19,748	104	0.5	19,987	101.2
41 Queens*	816,828	1,240,073	93,271	7.5	815,899	65.8
42 Rensselaer	72,060	88,542	1,388	1.6	76,294	86.2
43 Richmond*	92,946	137,461	5,094	3.7	89,123	64.8
44 Rockland	72,442	83,365	4,151	5.0	60,398	72.5
45 St. Lawrence	41,307	62,555	201	0.3	45,302	72.4
46 Saratoga	42,675	53,605	587	1.1	43,250	80.4
47 Schenectady	73,820	99,183	1,374	1.4	77,253	77.9
48 Schoharie	11,391	13,831	52	0.4	12,002	86.8
49 Schuyler	7,256	8,851	56	0.6	7,527	85.0
50 Seneca	13,376	20,232	272	1.3	14,435	71.3
51 Steuben	40,645	58,795	535	0.9	43,549	74.1
52 Suffolk*	325,333	399,989	21,726	5.4	280,945	70.2
53 Sullivan	24,775	29,177	1,009	3.5	25,279	86.6
54 Tioga	17,567	21,754	130	0.6	17,431	80.1
55 Tompkins	25,202	38,397	1,100	2.9	25,733	67.0
56 Ulster	59,326	75,551	2,295	3.0	59,502	78.8
57 Warren	20,620	27,256	132	0.5	21,778	79.9
58 Washington	21,993	29,152	268	0.9	23,317	80.0
59 Wayne	29,342	41,831	862	2.1	30,777	73.6
60 Westchester	393,235	526,518	40,343	7.7	396,663	75.3
61 Wyoming	14,980	21,477	775	3.6	16,307	75.9
62 Yates	8,663	11,339	87	0.8	9,308	82.1

NORTH CAROLINA

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Alamance	30,574	50,184	7,429	14.8	28,417	56.6
2 Alexander	7,482	8,876	506	5.7	8,131	91.6
3 Alleghany	3,941	4,707	119	2.5	4,099	87.1
4 Anson	5,865	13,065	5,218	39.9	5,717	43.8
5 Ashe	9,156	11,391	115	1.0	9,300	81.6
6 Avery	4,179	6,631	124	1.9	5,223	78.8
7 Beaufort	9,685	19,933	6,196	31.1	8,733	43.8
8 Bertie	4,263	12,417	6,261	50.4	4,259	34.3
9 Bladen	6,685	14,320	5,147	35.9	6,207	43.3
10 Brunswick	7,961	10,772	3,170	29.4	7,220	67.0
11 Buncombe	50,995	80,759	8,510	10.5	51,343	63.6
12 Burke	22,896	31,427	1,921	6.1	22,940	73.0
13 Cabarrus	25,099	40,545	5,380	13.3	24,358	60.1
14 Caldwell	19,579	27,243	1,723	6.3	20,275	74.4
15 Camden	1,404	3,042	1,054	34.6	1,352	44.4
16 Carteret *	10,520	17,962	1,932	10.8	9,757	54.3
17 Caswell	4,306	10,155	4,129	40.7	4,104	40.4
18 Catawba	32,930	41,838	3,296	7.9	32,626	78.0
19 Chatham	9,406	15,253	4,026	26.4	8,991	58.9
20 Cherokee	6,929	9,328	226	2.4	7,491	80.3
21 Chowan	2,483	6,332	2,507	39.6	2,453	38.7
22 Clay	2,743	3,149	37	1.2	2,921	92.8
23 Cleveland	18,710	36,830	6,474	17.6	18,802	51.1
24 Columbus	13,475	25,212	7,382	29.3	14,110	56.0
25 Craven *	12,113	31,236	8,242	26.4	10,838	34.7
26 Cumberland *	22,957	77,068	18,789	24.4	19,673	25.5
27 Currituck	2,196	3,921	1,076	27.4	2,115	53.9
28 Dare	2,343	3,704	237	6.4	2,305	62.2
29 Davidson	31,027	45,953	4,491	9.8	31,915	69.5
30 Davie	7,546	9,978	1,080	10.8	7,259	72.8
31 Duplin	10,990	21,432	6,955	32.5	10,222	47.7

NORTH CAROLINA--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Durham	38,138	66,573	19,475	29.3	33,620	50.5
33 Edgecombe	11,766	27,845	12,330	44.3	10,325	37.1
34 Forsyth	61,891	112,171	24,952	22.2	57,409	51.2
35 Franklin	6,651	15,396	5,554	36.1	6,189	40.2
36 Gaston	37,226	72,519	8,365	11.5	41,354	57.0
37 Gates	2,258	5,058	2,344	46.3	1,934	38.2
38 Graham	3,135	3,449	125	3.6	3,056	88.6
39 Granville	7,220	18,580	6,996	37.7	6,743	36.3
40 Greene	3,613	8,061	3,268	40.5	3,543	44.0
41 Guilford	75,604	144,040	27,292	18.9	71,843	49.9
42 Halifax	13,709	30,262	13,766	45.5	11,215	37.1
43 Harnett	13,360	26,211	6,150	23.5	13,193	50.3
44 Haywood	16,239	23,555	500	2.1	16,627	70.6
45 Henderson	14,846	22,232	1,170	5.3	15,446	69.5
46 Hertford	4,947	11,708	6,102	52.1	3,886	33.2
47 Hoke	3,033	7,745	3,747	48.4	2,702	34.9
48 Hyde	1,641	3,301	1,100	33.3	1,628	49.3
49 Iredell	24,123	36,611	5,517	15.1	21,058	57.5
50 Jackson	8,088	10,068	841	8.4	7,917	78.6
51 Johnston	17,849	34,654	6,395	18.5	16,574	47.8
52 Jones	2,905	5,499	2,251	40.9	2,505	45.6
53 Lee	7,483	14,844	2,803	18.9	7,236	48.7
54 Lenoir	13,234	29,553	10,293	34.8	11,784	39.9
55 Lincoln	13,173	16,439	1,546	9.4	13,544	82.4
56 McDowell	10,488	15,448	755	4.9	11,037	71.4
57 Macon	6,674	8,753	180	2.1	6,833	78.1
58 Madison	7,165	9,649	75	0.8	8,968	92.9
59 Martin	6,332	13,735	5,683	41.4	6,563	47.8
60 Mecklenburg	96,171	157,937	34,150	21.6	87,612	55.5
61 Mitchell	4,999	8,006	29	0.4	6,005	75.0
62 Montgomery	7,318	10,194	2,075	20.4	6,946	68.1
63 Moore	11,546	20,536	4,803	23.4	11,363	55.3
64 Nash	15,559	32,334	10,573	32.7	13,982	43.2

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 New Hanover	24,724	42,210	10,569	25.0	22,957	54.4
66 Northampton	6,233	13,482	7,304	54.2	5,434	40.3
67 Onslow *	9,726	39,003	5,015	12.9	8,376	21.5
68 Orange	14,991	24,363	4,978	20.4	12,411	50.9
69 Pamlico	2,900	5,301	1,593	30.1	2,758	52.0
70 Pasquotank	6,649	14,345	4,936	34.4	6,357	44.3
71 Pender	5,166	9,716	4,085	42.0	4,018	41.4
72 Perquimans	2,399	5,110	2,027	39.7	2,097	41.0
73 Person	6,902	14,221	4,227	29.7	6,231	43.8
74 Pitt	16,466	36,196	13,575	37.5	15,984	44.2
75 Polk	5,782	6,870	766	11.1	5,618	81.8
76 Randolph	24,377	36,068	2,591	7.2	25,561	70.9
77 Richmond	11,639	21,533	5,514	25.6	11,578	53.8
78 Robeson	17,387	42,275	21,424	50.7	15,203	36.0
79 Rockingham	20,495	40,836	7,398	18.1	20,663	50.6
80 Rowan	29,738	50,075	7,209	14.4	30,645	61.2
81 Rutherford	16,656	26,592	2,572	9.7	17,547	66.0
82 Sampson	15,701	25,581	8,203	32.1	14,970	58.5
83 Scotland	5,073	12,498	4,686	37.5	4,922	39.4
84 Stanly	16,855	24,220	2,164	8.9	19,339	79.8
85 Stokes	9,562	12,811	1,025	8.0	9,359	73.1
86 Surry	17,780	28,219	1,423	5.0	18,220	64.6
87 Swain	3,828	4,634	756	16.3	4,283	92.4
88 Transylvania	8,030	9,092	405	4.5	7,609	83.7
89 Tyrrell	1,370	2,446	849	34.7	1,275	52.1
90 Union	11,437	24,467	4,423	18.1	11,423	46.7
91 Vance	8,638	17,525	6,520	37.2	7,706	44.0
92 Wake	54,195	99,655	22,856	22.9	44,486	44.6
93 Warren	4,758	9,929	5,490	55.3	3,714	37.4
94 Washington	3,649	7,008	2,643	37.7	3,442	49.1
95 Watauga	7,963	9,765	126	1.3	8,460	86.6
96 Wayne *	17,346	45,103	15,754	34.9	13,330	29.6
97 Wilkes	20,190	25,223	1,444	5.7	21,002	83.3

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
98 Wilson	12,240	31,336	10,770	34.4	11,135	35.5
99 Yadkin	9,498	13,615	576	4.2	10,053	73.8
100 Yancey	5,718	7,932	76	1.0	6,594	83.1

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams	1,888	2,483	1	(Z)	2,064	83.1
2 Barnes	7,008	9,555	7	0.1	7,629	79.8
3 Benson	4,060	5,222	478	9.2	4,443	85.1
4 Billings	688	788	1	0.1	768	97.5
5 Bottineau	4,607	6,385	8	0.1	5,069	79.4
6 Bowman	1,827	2,355	3	0.1	1,888	80.2
7 Burke	2,434	3,426	2	0.1	2,687	78.4
8 Burleigh	15,419	19,096	132	0.7	15,278	80.0
9 Cass	28,669	38,330	123	0.3	29,711	77.5
10 Cavalier	4,231	5,601	2	(Z)	4,743	84.7
11 Dickey	3,630	4,731	4	0.1	3,856	81.5
12 Divide	2,281	3,255	12	0.4	2,595	79.7
13 Dunn	2,432	3,212	178	5.5	2,783	86.6
14 Eddy	2,088	2,806	9	0.3	2,342	83.5
15 Emmons	3,315	4,384	-	-	3,845	87.7
16 Foster	2,244	2,964	1	(Z)	2,533	85.5
17 Golden Valley	1,324	1,695	-	-	1,499	88.4
18 Grand Forks*	18,175	27,552	304	1.1	19,343	70.2
19 Grant	2,488	3,292	8	0.2	2,751	83.6
20 Griggs	2,390	2,938	1	(Z)	2,561	87.2
21 Hettinger	2,465	3,269	1	(Z)	2,762	84.5
22 Kidder	2,151	2,892	1	(Z)	2,443	84.5
23 La Moure	3,755	4,959	6	0.1	4,090	82.5
24 Logan	2,141	2,840	-	-	2,499	88.0
25 McHenry	4,379	6,137	8	0.1	4,948	80.6
26 McIntosh	2,841	3,923	-	-	3,322	84.7
27 McKenzie	2,938	4,002	161	4.0	3,231	80.7
28 McLean	5,547	7,748	272	3.5	6,173	79.7
29 Mercer	2,850	3,859	59	1.5	3,239	83.9
30 Morton	8,138	11,281	48	0.4	8,895	78.8
31 Mountrail	3,683	5,505	244	4.4	4,163	75.6

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Nelson	3,287	4,401	2	(Z)	3,719	84.5
33 Oliver	1,017	1,370	1	0.1	1,198	87.4
34 Pembina	5,167	7,262	14	0.2	5,810	80.0
35 Pierce	3,073	3,950	15	0.4	3,313	83.9
36 Ramsey	5,987	7,670	93	1.2	6,413	83.6
37 Ransom	3,717	4,893	4	0.1	4,131	84.4
38 Renville	1,997	2,663	17	0.6	2,230	83.7
39 Richland	7,955	10,908	62	0.6	8,718	79.9
40 Rolette	3,458	5,093	1,823	35.8	3,615	71.0
41 Sargent	3,033	3,875	3	0.1	3,248	83.8
42 Sheridan	1,911	2,450	3	0.1	2,098	85.6
43 Sioux	1,013	1,650	694	42.1	1,259	76.3
44 Slope	765	982	-	-	906	92.3
45 Stark	7,161	9,538	28	0.3	7,421	77.8
46 Steele	2,203	2,836	11	0.4	2,382	84.0
47 Stutsman	9,474	14,855	43	0.3	10,399	70.0
48 Towner	2,417	3,230	9	0.3	2,703	83.7
49 Traill	4,929	6,420	5	0.1	5,303	82.6
50 Walsh	7,376	10,715	25	0.2	8,047	75.1
51 Ward*	17,735	26,169	333	1.3	17,653	67.5
52 Wells	4,189	5,379	4	0.1	4,535	84.3
53 Williams	8,439	12,072	110	0.9	9,177	76.0

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams	8,707	11,992	42	0.4	9,896	82.5
2 Allen	38,887	61,315	3,788	6.2	42,732	69.7
3 Ashland	15,801	23,218	91	0.4	18,812	81.0
4 Ashtabula	37,287	55,500	1,094	2.0	41,561	74.9
5 Athens	16,844	27,668	587	2.1	18,289	66.1
6 Auglaize	16,586	21,020	30	0.1	17,465	83.1
7 Belmont	37,873	53,355	1,147	2.1	41,951	78.6
8 Brown	10,887	15,063	325	2.2	11,594	77.0
9 Butler	73,691	114,144	5,533	4.8	79,296	69.5
10 Carroll	8,705	11,969	165	1.4	9,583	80.1
11 Champaign	12,726	17,447	677	3.9	13,701	78.5
12 Clark	53,387	78,858	7,032	8.9	53,044	67.3
13 Clermont	29,890	43,504	573	1.3	30,525	70.2
14 Clinton	12,596	17,920	419	2.3	12,962	72.3
15 Columbiana	44,533	64,808	987	1.5	48,451	74.8
16 Coshocton	14,347	19,936	195	1.0	15,309	76.8
17 Crawford	20,938	28,078	207	0.7	21,539	76.7
18 Cuyahoga *	689,347	1,037,892	148,723	14.3	717,086	69.1
19 Darke	21,014	27,222	163	0.6	21,763	79.9
20 Defiance	13,755	17,859	16	0.1	14,119	79.1
21 Delaware	16,475	20,712	474	2.3	16,725	80.8
22 Erie	25,949	40,619	2,311	5.7	26,046	64.1
23 Fairfield	27,091	37,858	126	0.3	26,871	71.0
24 Fayette	10,695	14,939	484	3.2	11,051	74.0
25 Franklin *	285,872	411,819	47,579	11.6	271,461	65.9
26 Fulton	11,577	16,800	23	0.1	12,969	77.2
27 Gallia	9,148	15,634	715	4.6	11,100	71.0
28 Geauga	21,635	26,120	563	2.2	21,013	80.4
29 Greene *	35,847	52,252	3,764	7.2	33,797	64.7
30 Guernsey	15,932	25,174	435	1.7	16,928	67.2
31 Hamilton	360,306	532,571	71,683	13.5	387,283	72.7

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Hancock	23,157	32,089	181	0.6	23,771	74.1
33 Hardin	13,003	17,522	138	0.8	14,038	80.1
34 Harrison	8,087	10,972	255	2.3	8,832	80.5
35 Henry	10,939	14,801	13	0.1	11,666	78.8
36 Highland	13,266	18,314	461	2.5	14,371	78.5
37 Hocking	8,809	11,958	88	0.7	9,319	77.9
38 Holmes	5,665	11,773	3	(Z)	6,385	54.2
39 Huron	18,435	27,160	285	1.0	19,795	72.9
40 Jackson	12,005	17,075	137	0.8	13,522	79.2
41 Jefferson	44,823	60,813	2,936	4.8	48,141	79.2
42 Knox	18,480	23,743	276	1.2	19,276	81.2
43 Lake	61,834	84,170	1,166	1.4	65,463	77.8
44 Lawrence	20,392	32,164	999	3.1	21,815	67.8
45 Licking	38,460	53,865	779	1.4	36,988	68.7
46 Logan	15,167	20,912	388	1.9	16,590	79.3
47 Lorain	82,438	123,790	6,436	5.2	82,848	66.9
48 Lucas	185,892	280,057	23,587	8.4	197,504	70.5
49 Madison	10,209	15,830	1,176	7.4	10,933	69.1
50 Mahoning	124,709	185,503	19,839	10.7	134,070	72.3
51 Marion	24,450	36,355	1,018	2.8	24,808	68.2
52 Medina	24,950	36,980	346	0.9	25,919	70.1
53 Meigs	9,106	13,326	194	1.5	10,448	78.4
54 Mercer	14,454	18,249	16	0.1	15,465	84.7
55 Miami	32,364	43,618	837	1.9	33,921	77.8
56 Monroe	6,720	9,327	5	0.1	7,250	77.7
57 Montgomery *	198,612	314,902	34,708	11.0	207,927	66.0
58 Morgan	5,334	7,735	238	3.1	6,247	80.8
59 Morrow	8,766	11,172	10	0.1	9,093	81.4
60 Muskingum	32,427	47,647	1,868	3.9	34,772	73.0
61 Noble	5,175	6,712	6	0.1	5,987	89.2
62 Ottawa	15,257	20,757	176	0.8	15,872	76.5
63 Paulding	7,719	9,516	159	1.7	7,786	81.8
64 Perry	11,711	16,713	210	1.3	12,849	76.9
65 Pickaway	12,627	21,083	440	2.1	12,691	60.2
66 Pike	7,898	10,436	168	1.6	8,023	76.9
67 Portage	34,150	50,040	1,290	2.6	38,162	76.3
68 Preble	13,413	18,637	85	0.5	14,269	76.6
69 Putnam	12,235	15,347	10	0.1	12,873	83.9
70 Richland	43,632	69,486	3,664	5.3	46,962	67.6
71 Ross	22,327	36,374	1,816	5.0	23,111	63.5
72 Sandusky	21,735	32,610	451	1.4	22,737	69.7
73 Scioto	35,024	50,143	994	2.0	38,418	76.6
74 Seneca	24,054	34,041	442	1.3	25,773	75.7
75 Shelby	15,194	19,171	199	1.0	15,632	81.5
76 Stark	142,336	205,736	9,757	4.7	150,086	73.0
77 Summit	210,319	309,399	21,901	7.1	219,918	71.1
78 Trumbull	81,401	123,201	6,128	5.0	87,652	71.1
79 Tuscarawas	33,585	46,733	454	1.0	36,720	78.6
80 Union	10,489	13,697	257	1.9	10,954	80.0
81 Van Wert	13,889	17,400	67	0.4	14,716	84.6
82 Vinton	4,537	5,722	4	0.1	5,074	88.7
83 Warren	23,388	35,537	500	1.4	22,450	63.2
84 Washington	20,066	30,872	523	1.7	22,053	71.4
85 Wayne	24,696	43,199	604	1.4	30,784	71.3
86 Williams	13,200	17,808	16	0.1	14,363	80.7
87 Wood	28,446	41,172	228	0.6	29,533	71.7
88 Wyandot	9,412	12,681	-	-	10,312	81.3

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adair	5,862	7,507	1,449	19.3	5,558	74.0
2 Alfalfa	4,180	5,690	-	-	4,399	77.3
3 Atoka	3,883	6,183	600	9.7	3,651	59.0
4 Beaver	3,490	4,205	5	0.1	3,329	79.2
5 Beckham	6,672	11,500	219	1.9	6,979	60.7
6 Blaine	5,125	7,574	824	10.9	5,371	70.9
7 Bryan	8,586	15,239	605	4.0	8,273	54.3
8 Caddo	11,171	17,220	1,834	10.7	11,035	64.1
9 Canadian	10,940	15,177	772	5.1	9,931	65.4
10 Carter	15,631	24,200	2,163	8.9	14,729	60.9
11 Cherokee	7,916	9,983	1,602	16.0	6,258	62.7
12 Choctaw	5,687	9,718	1,861	19.2	5,472	56.3
13 Cimarron	2,103	2,581	4	0.2	2,012	78.0
14 Cleveland	21,255	28,365	417	1.5	15,689	55.3
15 Coal	2,334	3,547	260	7.3	2,288	64.5
16 Comanche*	21,521	51,381	5,351	10.4	20,253	39.4
17 Cotton	3,339	5,016	249	5.0	3,253	64.9
18 Craig	6,379	11,220	705	6.3	6,562	58.5
19 Creek	16,191	24,677	2,191	8.9	14,990	60.7
20 Custer	7,826	12,935	845	6.5	7,793	60.2
21 Delaware	6,445	8,172	1,024	12.5	5,921	72.5
22 Dewey	3,055	3,950	98	2.5	3,197	80.9
23 Ellis	2,572	3,585	2	0.1	2,794	77.9
24 Garfield*	22,472	33,047	959	2.9	21,442	64.9
25 Garvin	10,483	17,110	617	3.6	9,920	58.0
26 Grady	11,162	18,431	927	5.0	11,359	61.6
27 Grant	4,112	5,432	6	0.1	4,533	83.4
28 Greer	3,918	5,903	295	5.0	3,856	65.3
29 Harmon	2,267	3,610	200	5.5	2,407	66.7
30 Harper	2,619	3,652	1	(Z)	2,801	76.7
31 Haskell	3,897	5,531	236	4.3	3,570	64.5
32 Hughes	6,169	9,672	1,053	10.9	6,174	63.8
33 Jackson *	8,260	17,181	1,068	6.2	7,136	41.5
34 Jefferson	3,366	5,443	91	1.7	3,288	60.4
35 Johnston	3,435	5,191	434	8.4	3,263	62.9
36 Kay	23,329	31,497	1,267	4.0	23,405	74.3
37 Kingfisher	5,629	6,670	434	6.5	5,322	79.8
38 Kiowa	5,892	9,513	679	7.1	6,153	64.7
39 Latimer	3,146	4,699	425	9.0	2,988	63.6
40 Le Flore	11,009	17,652	948	5.4	10,146	57.5
41 Lincoln	8,900	11,870	673	5.7	8,783	74.0
42 Logan	8,066	11,737	2,022	17.2	7,941	67.7
43 Love	2,526	3,628	232	6.4	2,375	65.5
44 McClain	5,276	7,690	244	3.2	4,912	63.9
45 McCurtain	8,963	14,851	3,231	21.8	7,764	52.3
46 McIntosh	4,925	7,367	1,478	20.1	4,406	59.8
47 Major	3,727	4,982	16	0.3	3,608	72.4
48 Marshall	3,419	4,733	223	4.7	3,118	65.9
49 Mayes	9,578	12,093	857	7.1	8,915	73.7
50 Murray	4,319	6,819	270	4.0	4,122	60.4
51 Muskogee	24,838	37,805	8,054	21.3	23,485	62.1
52 Noble	4,870	6,682	345	5.2	5,108	76.4
53 Nowata	4,786	6,872	538	7.8	5,139	74.8
54 Okfuskee	4,534	7,009	1,776	25.3	4,478	63.9
55 Oklahoma*	174,301	263,823	23,730	9.0	167,640	63.5
56 Okmulgee	14,899	22,782	3,942	17.3	14,369	63.1
57 Osage	13,090	19,852	1,314	6.6	13,309	67.0
58 Ottawa	11,679	17,468	683	3.9	12,225	70.0
59 Pawnee	4,667	7,017	413	5.9	4,792	68.3
60 Payne	16,842	25,837	898	3.5	15,637	60.5
61 Pittsburg	13,458	22,107	2,131	9.6	13,144	59.5
62 Pontotoc	11,615	17,635	993	5.6	10,517	59.6
63 Pottawatomie	17,725	25,879	1,507	5.8	17,488	67.6
64 Pushmataha	3,895	5,632	387	6.9	3,358	59.6

OKLAHOMA--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Roger Mills	2,271	3,213	110	3.4	2,272	70.7
66 Rogers	9,651	12,486	687	5.5	8,579	68.7
67 Seminole	10,258	17,231	2,488	14.4	9,761	56.6
68 Sequoyah	7,150	10,208	1,007	9.9	6,804	66.7
69 Stephens	14,595	23,195	526	2.3	14,983	64.6
70 Texas	5,839	8,191	15	0.2	5,863	71.6
71 Tillman	5,355	8,920	970	10.9	5,414	60.7
72 Tulsa	138,254	208,520	17,554	8.4	142,624	68.4
73 Wagoner	6,797	9,088	1,571	17.3	6,277	69.1
74 Washington	20,953	25,328	1,109	4.4	19,179	75.7
75 Washita*	5,486	10,907	213	2.0	5,623	51.6
76 Woods	5,636	7,591	8	0.1	5,966	78.6
77 Woodward	6,028	9,143	29	0.3	5,672	62.0

OREGON

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Baker	6,585	10,509	36	0.3	7,251	69.0
2 Benton	16,486	22,093	367	1.7	15,125	68.5
3 Clackamas	57,043	67,145	379	0.6	52,319	77.9
4 Clatsop*	12,413	17,662	227	1.3	12,866	72.8
5 Columbia	10,268	13,335	44	0.3	9,908	74.3
6 Coos	21,149	31,910	205	0.6	21,705	68.0
7 Crook	3,586	5,451	11	0.2	3,737	68.6
8 Curry	4,686	8,132	61	0.8	5,153	63.4
9 Deschutes	10,095	13,928	69	0.5	9,944	71.4
10 Douglas	25,717	38,870	165	0.4	25,815	66.4
11 Gilliam	1,220	1,832	17	0.9	1,318	71.9
12 Grant	3,032	4,559	18	0.4	3,135	68.8
13 Harney	2,759	3,992	124	3.1	2,691	67.4
14 Hood River	5,472	8,146	260	3.2	5,555	68.2
15 Jackson	34,084	45,348	175	0.4	32,157	70.9
16 Jefferson	2,938	3,868	404	10.4	2,629	68.0
17 Josephine	13,801	18,504	58	0.3	12,831	69.3
18 Klamath*	17,599	28,047	1,037	3.7	18,023	64.3
19 Lake	2,723	4,289	27	0.6	2,996	69.9
20 Lane	74,200	94,003	645	0.7	68,862	73.3
21 Lincoln	10,323	15,278	180	1.2	10,483	68.6
22 Linn	23,308	33,882	84	0.2	23,934	70.6
23 Malheur	7,983	12,894	712	5.5	8,424	65.3
24 Marion	51,209	73,925	563	0.8	49,970	67.6
25 Morrow	2,097	2,889	2	0.1	2,042	70.7
26 Multnomah*	243,739	335,281	12,647	3.8	251,882	75.1
27 Polk	11,629	15,742	110	0.7	11,298	71.8
28 Sherman	1,353	1,492	5	0.3	1,165	78.1
29 Tillamook	7,573	10,971	43	0.4	8,044	73.3
30 Umatilla	16,859	26,822	618	2.3	17,433	65.0
31 Union	7,489	10,992	71	0.6	7,770	70.7

OREGON--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Wallowa	2,848	4,308	17	0.4	3,125	72.5
33 Wasco	8,597	12,258	260	2.1	8,784	71.7
34 Washington	50,181	53,916	182	0.3	43,186	80.1
35 Wheeler	798	1,566	-	-	1,032	65.9
36 Yamhill	14,463	19,592	98	0.5	13,829	70.6

PENNSYLVANIA

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams	19,860	30,173	223	0.7	20,854	69.1
2 Allegheny *	719,725	1,031,401	79,772	7.7	750,718	72.8
3 Armstrong	31,790	48,252	490	1.0	34,745	72.0
4 Beaver	83,993	125,591	5,972	4.8	84,190	67.0
5 Bedford	17,147	25,139	111	0.4	18,604	74.0
6 Berks	110,646	182,592	2,642	1.4	112,706	61.7
7 Blair	50,531	86,450	658	0.8	54,809	63.4
8 Bradford	21,162	31,973	59	0.2	23,205	72.6
9 Bucks *	129,176	175,212	3,028	1.7	125,116	71.4
10 Butler	44,722	67,517	355	0.5	46,305	68.6
11 Cambria	81,598	121,553	1,880	1.5	89,622	73.7
12 Cameron	3,285	4,441	8	0.2	3,487	78.5
13 Carbon	22,841	34,873	15	(Z)	25,032	71.8
14 Centre	26,195	44,806	645	1.4	27,004	60.3
15 Chester *	88,610	126,713	9,547	7.5	83,373	65.8
16 Clarion	15,389	21,972	11	0.1	15,847	72.1
17 Clearfield	30,652	49,160	171	0.3	33,195	67.5
18 Clinton	14,372	22,715	24	0.1	15,161	66.7
19 Columbia	22,903	33,501	56	0.2	24,651	73.6
20 Crawford	28,991	46,908	547	1.2	30,906	65.9
21 Cumberland	50,525	74,580	794	1.1	51,801	69.5
22 Dauphin *	89,431	140,625	11,612	8.3	96,115	68.3
23 Delaware	259,095	337,811	21,494	6.4	260,783	77.2
24 Elk	14,828	22,332	19	0.1	15,567	69.7
25 Erie	104,886	149,037	3,433	2.3	105,543	70.8
26 Fayette	61,558	103,153	4,247	4.1	68,861	66.8
27 Forest	2,154	2,770	1	(Z)	2,332	84.2
28 Franklin	32,942	53,683	1,076	2.0	34,134	63.6
29 Fulton	3,937	6,069	30	0.5	4,379	72.2
30 Greene	15,327	24,108	217	0.9	17,159	71.2
31 Huntingdon	14,039	23,572	467	2.0	15,864	67.3

PENNSYLVANIA--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Indiana	29,320	44,338	239	0.5	32,013	72.2
33 Jefferson	19,261	28,990	36	0.1	21,694	74.8
34 Juniata	7,235	9,456	11	0.1	7,431	78.6
35 Lackawanna	119,540	155,108	499	0.3	129,783	83.7
36 Lancaster	105,508	158,781	1,988	1.2	111,889	66.3
37 Lawrence	45,207	68,882	1,566	2.3	48,064	69.8
38 Lebanon	33,845	55,911	275	0.5	37,353	66.8
39 Lehigh	93,093	147,829	647	0.4	94,167	63.7
40 Luzerne	152,071	230,990	663	0.3	174,271	75.4
41 Lycoming	44,945	68,252	826	1.2	48,482	71.0
42 McKean	19,007	33,663	73	0.2	21,532	64.0
43 Mercer	50,563	76,442	2,703	3.5	53,480	70.0
44 Mifflin	14,856	26,816	89	0.3	15,203	56.7
45 Monroe	17,019	25,294	390	1.5	17,726	70.1
46 Montgomery	239,075	323,002	12,353	3.8	235,326	72.9
47 Montour	6,214	11,075	44	0.4	6,791	61.3
48 Northampton	80,485	128,313	1,401	1.1	82,306	64.1
49 Northumberland	45,244	67,255	138	0.2	49,841	74.1
50 Perry	11,452	15,797	7	(Z)	11,570	73.2
51 Philadelphia *	913,472	1,311,980	313,551	23.9	915,277	69.8
52 Pike	5,426	6,225	15	0.2	5,683	91.3
53 Potter	6,909	9,758	35	0.4	7,830	80.2
54 Schuylkill	77,042	115,394	240	0.2	88,687	76.9
55 Snyder	9,416	15,318	42	0.3	10,117	66.0
56 Somerset	32,814	47,502	104	0.2	35,335	74.4
57 Sullivan	3,038	3,871	24	0.6	3,284	84.8
58 Susquehanna	14,417	19,741	41	0.2	15,970	80.9
59 Tioga	14,495	21,383	59	0.3	15,173	71.0
60 Union	9,216	15,733	549	3.5	9,472	60.2
61 Venango	23,022	39,920	250	0.6	25,280	63.3
62 Warren	16,657	28,924	93	0.3	18,195	62.9
63 Washington	87,756	134,888	5,186	3.8	92,197	68.4
64 Wayne	12,328	18,483	387	2.1	13,811	74.7
65 Westmoreland	149,416	218,573	3,929	1.8	154,840	70.8
66 Wyoming	8,144	10,101	16	0.2	8,921	88.3
67 York	92,872	147,807	2,738	1.9	95,479	64.6

RHODE ISLAND

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Bristol	18,772	22,665	52	0.2	18,636	82.2
2 Kent	56,773	67,566	250	0.4	55,006	81.4
3 Newport*	27,371	46,587	2,249	4.8	27,619	59.3
4 Providence	262,897	368,682	7,629	2.1	280,042	76.0
5 Washington*	24,265	34,304	940	2.7	24,231	70.6

SOUTH CAROLINA

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Abbeville	4,137	11,948	3,215	26.9	3,909	32.7
2 Aiken	25,089	43,686	10,040	23.0	17,389	39.8
3 Allendale	2,512	5,736	3,205	55.9	1,471	25.6
4 Anderson	20,068	57,140	9,598	16.8	17,746	31.1
5 Bamberg	3,785	8,178	3,807	46.6	2,560	31.3
6 Barnwell	5,052	8,894	3,242	36.5	3,173	35.7
7 Beaufort*	6,179	19,345	7,247	37.5	3,821	19.8
8 Berkeley	9,637	17,741	7,619	42.9	4,964	28.0
9 Calhoun	2,203	5,941	3,318	55.8	1,388	23.4
10 Charleston*	47,073	113,408	35,499	31.3	33,233	29.3
11 Cherokee	7,885	19,397	3,360	17.3	6,956	35.9
12 Chester	6,797	16,836	5,664	33.6	5,922	35.2
13 Chesterfield	7,083	17,318	5,219	30.1	5,822	33.6
14 Clarendon	3,792	12,958	7,735	59.7	2,579	19.9
15 Colleton	6,688	14,383	6,180	43.0	4,483	31.2
16 Darlington	11,727	26,606	9,900	37.2	8,162	30.7
17 Dillon	5,515	14,254	5,529	38.8	4,091	28.7
18 Dorchester	6,713	12,491	5,370	43.0	5,882	47.1
19 Edgefield	3,313	7,867	3,764	47.8	2,294	29.2
20 Fairfield	4,625	10,511	5,536	52.7	3,182	30.3
21 Florence	17,503	42,998	15,951	37.1	11,906	27.7
22 Georgetown	8,128	16,028	7,173	44.8	5,418	33.8
23 Greenville*	46,633	120,970	18,605	15.4	36,633	30.3
24 Greenwood	11,132	25,982	6,764	26.0	8,251	31.8
25 Hampton	3,698	8,763	4,052	46.2	2,112	24.1
26 Horry*	13,737	34,947	7,429	21.3	9,774	28.0
27 Jasper	2,595	6,022	3,333	55.3	1,500	24.9
28 Kershaw	8,785	17,161	5,903	34.4	6,643	38.7
29 Lancaster	9,712	20,975	4,762	22.7	8,470	40.4
30 Laurens	9,446	26,593	6,818	25.6	7,846	29.5
31 Lee	3,645	9,840	5,446	55.3	2,784	28.3

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Lexington	16,848	33,556	4,782	14.3	10,670	31.8
33 McCormick	1,437	4,163	2,248	54.0	1,027	24.7
34 Marion	5,243	15,787	7,684	48.7	4,043	25.6
35 Marlboro	4,286	14,162	5,932	41.9	3,877	27.4
36 Newberry	8,794	17,158	4,954	28.9	5,984	34.9
37 Oconee	8,272	21,992	2,230	10.1	6,214	28.3
38 Orangeburg	16,063	33,736	17,355	51.4	9,123	27.0
39 Pickens	9,391	26,371	2,356	8.9	6,747	25.6
40 Richland *	45,245	111,720	32,670	29.2	32,430	29.0
41 Saluda	3,933	7,900	2,327	29.5	2,621	33.2
42 Spartanburg	38,446	90,364	17,047	18.9	31,074	34.4
43 Sumter *	11,504	37,384	15,380	41.1	7,249	19.4
44 Union	7,707	16,951	4,125	24.3	7,209	42.5
45 Williamsburg	7,058	18,095	10,535	58.2	3,837	21.2
46 York	15,642	41,995	10,196	24.3	14,219	33.9

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Aurora	2,426	2,750	5	0.2	2,537	92.3
2 Beadle	10,019	12,595	21	0.2	9,990	79.3
3 Bennett	1,399	1,668	299	17.9	1,386	83.1
4 Bon Homme	4,278	5,649	40	0.7	4,782	84.7
5 Brookings	7,883	11,567	47	0.4	8,684	75.1
6 Brown	14,631	19,581	97	0.5	15,930	81.4
7 Brule	3,173	3,630	25	0.7	3,003	82.7
8 Buffalo	779	768	347	45.2	628	81.8
9 Butte	3,740	4,962	22	0.4	3,814	76.9
10 Campbell	1,573	1,949	2	0.1	1,692	86.8
11 Charles Mix	5,113	6,442	520	8.1	5,200	80.7
12 Clark	3,282	4,329	4	0.1	3,610	83.4
13 Clay	4,401	6,268	33	0.5	4,650	74.2
14 Codington	8,946	11,499	22	0.2	9,613	83.6
15 Corson	2,362	2,903	755	26.0	2,383	82.1
16 Custer	2,318	2,938	50	1.7	2,411	82.1
17 Davison	7,650	9,855	48	0.5	8,213	83.3
18 Day	5,149	6,353	125	2.0	5,461	86.0
19 Deuel	2,841	3,987	5	0.1	3,080	77.3
20 Dewey	2,240	2,696	899	33.3	2,212	82.0
21 Douglas	2,338	2,899	-	-	2,543	87.7
22 Edmunds	3,150	3,522	1	(Z)	3,337	94.7
23 Fall River	3,732	6,717	223	3.3	3,918	58.3
24 Faulk	2,199	2,552	1	(Z)	2,283	89.5
25 Grant	4,437	5,752	5	0.1	4,725	82.1
26 Gregory	3,639	4,405	132	3.0	3,841	87.2
27 Haakon	1,457	1,818	16	0.9	1,575	86.6
28 Hamlin	3,086	3,910	-	-	3,369	86.2
29 Hand	3,029	3,732	1	(Z)	3,269	87.6
30 Hanson	2,034	2,533	-	-	2,240	88.4
31 Harding	976	1,317	4	0.3	1,058	80.3

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Hughes	5,338	6,971	253	3.6	5,356	76.8
33 Hutchinson	5,073	6,790	2	(Z)	5,505	81.1
34 Hyde	1,402	1,553	20	1.3	1,433	92.3
35 Jackson	928	1,112	60	5.4	947	85.2
36 Jerauld	1,856	2,406	1	(Z)	2,028	84.3
37 Jones	963	1,144	25	2.2	1,067	93.3
38 Kingsbury	4,131	5,460	2	(Z)	4,564	83.6
39 Lake	5,405	6,890	5	0.1	5,744	83.4
40 Lawrence	7,211	9,781	54	0.6	7,695	78.7
41 Lincoln	5,576	7,480	3	(Z)	5,538	74.0
42 Lyman	1,919	2,446	228	9.3	2,018	82.5
43 McCook	3,937	4,787	3	0.1	4,172	87.2
44 McPherson	2,614	3,455	1	(Z)	2,970	86.0
45 Marshall	3,246	3,946	77	2.0	3,378	85.6
46 Meade	4,463	7,171	142	2.0	4,567	63.7
47 Mellette	1,183	1,399	375	26.8	1,284	91.8
48 Miner	2,624	3,182	2	0.1	2,693	84.6
49 Minnehaha	37,695	49,747	362	0.7	38,390	77.2
50 Moody	3,762	4,853	141	2.9	4,037	83.2
51 Pennington*	18,807	31,815	1,300	4.1	18,842	59.2
52 Perkins	2,664	3,458	17	0.5	2,931	84.8
53 Potter	2,214	2,790	20	0.7	2,330	83.5
54 Roberts	5,498	7,561	602	8.0	5,946	78.6
55 Sanborn	2,313	2,742	4	0.1	2,503	91.3
56 Shannon	2,305	2,900	2,349	81.0	1,790	61.7
57 Spink	5,073	7,090	30	0.4	5,301	74.8
58 Stanley	1,299	2,036	64	3.1	1,408	69.2
59 Sully	1,263	1,467	13	0.9	1,347	91.8
60 Todd	1,997	2,325	1,204	51.8	1,813	78.0
61 Tripp	4,178	4,948	223	4.5	4,214	85.2
62 Turner	5,030	6,985	2	(Z)	5,667	81.1
63 Union	4,555	6,035	12	0.2	5,019	83.2
64 Walworth	3,801	4,610	89	1.9	3,874	84.0

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Washabaugh	559	562	165	29.4	473	84.2
66 Yankton	6,955	10,919	166	1.5	7,126	65.3
67 Ziebach	1,001	1,235	443	35.9	1,080	87.4

TENNESSEE

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Anderson	21,006	33,554	1,034	3.1	21,221	63.2
2 Bedford	7,882	14,319	1,603	11.2	7,152	49.9
3 Benton	3,974	6,790	171	2.5	3,923	57.7
4 Bledsoe	2,843	4,098	118	2.9	2,452	59.8
5 Blount	20,335	32,849	1,520	4.6	19,872	60.5
6 Bradley	12,410	21,881	1,047	4.8	11,285	51.6
7 Campbell	8,644	15,414	140	0.9	8,297	53.8
8 Cannon	2,936	5,235	108	2.1	2,487	47.5
9 Carroll	7,790	14,941	1,787	12.0	7,609	50.9
10 Carter	13,798	23,907	238	1.0	15,798	66.1
11 Cheatham	3,553	5,582	344	6.2	2,607	46.7
12 Chester	3,530	5,564	685	12.3	3,060	55.0
13 Claiborne	5,433	10,767	164	1.5	6,056	56.2
14 Clay	1,818	4,102	96	2.3	2,106	51.3
15 Cocke	7,193	13,121	373	2.8	8,095	61.7
16 Coffee	9,849	16,459	583	3.5	7,686	46.7
17 Crockett	3,690	8,519	1,586	18.6	3,013	35.4
18 Cumberland	6,048	10,349	6	0.1	5,804	56.1
19 Davidson	124,722	242,933	44,984	18.5	112,597	46.3
20 Decatur	3,242	5,230	251	4.8	3,075	58.8
21 De Kalb	3,693	6,660	183	2.7	3,026	45.4
22 Dickson	6,005	11,395	729	6.4	5,894	51.7
23 Dyer	9,234	17,940	2,456	13.7	8,203	45.7
24 Fayette	5,558	11,652	7,215	61.9	2,799	24.0
25 Fentress	3,519	6,705	2	(Z)	3,792	56.6
26 Franklin	8,291	14,459	1,131	7.8	7,139	49.4
27 Gibson	12,733	27,791	4,903	17.6	11,329	40.8
28 Giles	6,318	13,762	2,161	15.7	6,513	47.3
29 Grainger	3,943	7,145	100	1.4	3,977	55.7
30 Greene	12,829	25,248	601	2.4	13,276	52.6
31 Grundy	3,461	6,201	10	0.2	2,960	47.7
32 Hamblen	9,803	19,465	1,099	5.6	10,245	52.6
33 Hamilton	78,746	142,979	26,658	18.6	71,277	49.9
34 Hancock	2,204	4,275	51	1.2	2,552	59.7
35 Hardeman	5,125	12,725	4,072	32.0	3,604	28.3
36 Hardin	5,645	10,312	578	5.6	5,098	49.4
37 Hawkins	9,903	17,722	602	3.4	9,672	54.6
38 Haywood	4,697	11,792	6,295	53.4	3,334	28.3
39 Henderson	5,088	9,850	862	8.8	5,128	52.1
40 Henry	8,135	14,406	1,977	13.7	8,213	57.0
41 Hickman	3,896	7,120	324	4.6	3,687	51.8
42 Houston	1,859	2,902	197	6.8	1,533	52.8
43 Humphreys	4,146	6,936	323	4.7	3,766	54.3
44 Jackson	2,842	5,578	27	0.5	2,636	47.3
45 Jefferson	7,523	12,675	516	4.1	7,794	61.5
46 Johnson	3,816	6,284	86	1.4	4,443	70.7
47 Knox	85,260	151,999	13,275	8.7	83,300	54.8
48 Lake	2,403	5,155	1,108	21.5	2,151	41.7
49 Lauderdale	5,727	12,289	4,137	33.7	4,832	39.3
50 Lawrence	10,039	16,137	300	1.9	10,639	65.9
51 Lewis	2,449	3,620	59	1.6	2,312	63.9
52 Lincoln	6,589	14,294	1,673	11.7	6,346	44.4
53 Loudon	7,513	14,054	268	1.9	8,181	58.2
54 McMinn	10,831	19,696	958	4.9	10,766	54.7
55 McNairy	6,103	10,866	631	5.8	5,604	51.6
56 Macon	3,292	7,527	69	0.9	3,782	50.2
57 Madison	21,505	36,033	10,416	28.9	17,693	49.1
58 Marion	6,503	11,437	707	6.2	5,865	51.3
59 Marshall	5,329	10,515	1,042	9.9	5,387	51.2
60 Maury	12,321	25,033	4,710	18.8	10,879	43.5
61 Meigs	1,740	2,759	117	4.2	1,605	58.2
62 Monroe	8,449	12,825	507	4.0	8,452	65.9
63 Montgomery*	12,992	30,419	5,916	19.4	10,270	33.8
64 Moore	1,298	2,158	146	6.8	1,187	55.0

TENNESSEE--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Morgan	3,799	7,921	296	3.7	3,855	48.7
66 Obion	8,474	17,211	1,849	10.7	8,196	47.6
67 Overton	4,413	8,545	44	0.5	4,252	49.8
68 Perry	1,954	3,268	85	2.6	1,737	53.2
69 Pickett	1,663	2,467	5	0.2	1,721	69.8
70 Polk	3,798	6,789	13	0.2	3,751	55.3
71 Putnam	9,302	17,070	306	1.8	8,715	51.1
72 Rhea	5,367	8,918	354	4.0	4,552	51.0
73 Roane	11,843	21,957	878	4.0	11,626	52.9
74 Robertson	7,581	16,404	2,656	16.2	5,891	35.9
75 Rutherford *	13,668	30,347	3,960	13.0	11,052	36.4
76 Scott	4,413	7,795	3	(Z)	4,411	56.6
77 Sequatchie	1,966	3,177	1	(Z)	1,655	52.1
78 Sevier	9,816	14,011	105	0.7	9,192	65.6
79 Shelby *	212,023	359,532	119,033	33.1	176,607	49.1
80 Smith	4,018	7,654	333	4.4	4,060	53.0
81 Stewart	2,885	4,787	150	3.1	2,386	49.8
82 Sullivan	37,199	67,121	1,438	2.1	37,598	56.0
83 Sumner	12,539	21,776	2,304	10.6	10,261	47.1
84 Tipton	6,894	14,912	5,048	33.9	5,917	39.7
85 Trousdale	1,475	3,027	478	15.8	1,356	44.8
86 Unicoi	4,731	8,744	7	0.1	5,336	61.0
87 Union	2,861	4,715	2	(Z)	2,753	58.4
88 Van Buren	1,158	1,956	16	0.8	995	50.9
89 Warren	6,781	13,881	630	4.5	5,841	42.1
90 Washington	20,865	39,287	1,582	4.0	21,236	54.1
91 Wayne	3,688	6,645	124	1.9	3,872	58.3
92 Weakley	7,845	15,710	1,016	6.5	8,109	51.6
93 White	4,186	9,308	275	3.0	3,998	43.0
94 Williamson	7,782	14,535	2,616	18.0	7,228	49.7
95 Wilson	8,974	17,012	2,231	13.1	8,297	48.8

TEXAS

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number/	Percent		
1 Anderson	8,181	17,544	4,430	25.3	6,982	39.8
2 Andrews	3,585	7,148	137	1.9	3,409	47.7
3 Angelina	13,484	23,811	3,762	15.8	12,510	52.5
4 Aransas	2,101	4,075	154	3.8	1,748	42.9
5 Archer	2,207	3,710	18	0.5	2,023	54.5
6 Armstrong	909	1,286	3	0.2	1,621	126.0
7 Atascosa	4,516	9,968	92	0.9	4,361	43.8
8 Austin	3,915	9,016	1,566	17.4	3,738	41.5
9 Bailey	2,562	5,109	179	3.5	2,271	44.5
10 Bandera	1,639	2,596	19	0.7	1,484	57.2
11 Bastrop	5,049	10,428	2,867	27.5	4,080	39.1
12 Baylor	1,794	3,824	112	2.9	1,913	50.0
13 Bee *	4,832	12,264	369	3.0	4,787	39.0
14 Bell*	17,512	55,160	6,228	11.3	15,288	27.7
15 Bexar *	162,520	377,990	27,072	7.2	140,245	37.1
16 Blanco	1,488	2,383	75	3.1	1,394	58.5
17 Borden	419	612	-	-	411	67.2
18 Bosque	3,721	7,509	196	2.6	3,525	46.9
19 Bowie	17,410	36,260	7,684	21.2	15,193	41.9
20 Brazoria	24,497	43,264	5,497	12.7	21,705	50.2
21 Brazos	12,019	24,944	4,957	19.9	10,477	42.0
22 Brewster	1,887	3,550	30	0.8	1,457	41.0
23 Briscoe	1,317	2,041	65	3.2	1,112	54.5
24 Brooks	2,703	4,465	9	0.2	2,511	56.2
25 Brown	7,293	16,380	456	2.8	7,278	44.4
26 Burleson	3,147	6,797	1,871	27.5	3,143	46.2
27 Burnet	3,410	5,848	95	1.6	2,976	50.9
28 Caldwell	4,629	10,236	1,504	14.7	4,222	41.2
29 Calhoun	4,434	8,480	421	5.0	3,594	42.4
30 Callahan	3,037	5,277	3	0.1	2,838	53.8
31 Cameron *	25,659	74,389	725	1.0	22,640	30.4

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Camp	2,577	4,782	1,586	33.2	2,200	46.0
33 Carson	2,621	4,334	20	0.5	2,407	55.5
34 Cass	6,292	14,020	3,509	25.0	5,290	37.7
35 Castro	2,494	4,516	156	3.5	2,382	52.7
36 Chambers	2,956	5,894	1,142	19.4	2,816	47.8
37 Cherokee	8,537	21,319	4,839	22.7	7,882	37.0
38 Childress	2,931	5,460	284	5.2	2,767	50.7
39 Clay	3,020	5,369	51	0.9	2,718	50.6
40 Cochran	1,761	3,411	131	3.8	1,674	49.1
41 Coke	1,269	2,210	4	0.2	1,388	62.8
42 Coleman	4,105	8,347	178	2.1	3,977	47.6
43 Collin	11,193	25,723	2,275	8.8	9,158	35.6
44 Collingsworth	1,872	3,876	244	6.3	1,782	46.0
45 Colorado	5,574	11,022	2,529	22.9	4,247	38.5
46 Comal	5,875	11,573	205	1.8	4,941	42.7
47 Comanche	3,819	8,339	9	0.1	3,830	45.9
48 Concho	1,256	2,334	3	0.1	1,242	53.2
49 Cooke	7,211	13,631	488	3.6	7,176	52.6
50 Coryell*	4,564	13,909	719	5.2	4,192	30.1
51 Cottle	1,353	2,585	175	6.8	1,361	52.6
52 Crane	1,559	2,660	95	3.6	1,568	58.9
53 Crockett	1,211	2,301	80	3.5	1,156	50.2
54 Crosby	2,892	5,629	395	7.0	2,683	47.7
55 Culberson	787	1,465	6	0.4	650	44.4
56 Dallam	1,759	3,863	33	0.9	1,808	46.8
57 Dallas*	304,158	570,267	76,927	13.5	240,299	42.1
58 Dawson	4,868	10,531	501	4.8	4,246	40.3
59 Deaf Smith	3,897	7,054	99	1.4	3,349	47.5
60 Delta	1,960	3,908	422	10.8	1,832	46.9
61 Denton	13,494	27,605	1,594	5.8	11,119	40.3
62 De Witt	5,573	12,712	1,699	13.4	5,029	39.6
63 Dickens	1,667	3,139	137	4.4	1,607	51.2
64 Dimmit	1,688	4,856	17	0.4	1,537	31.7
65 Donley	1,776	2,914	108	3.7	1,720	59.0
66 Duval	4,739	7,155	7	0.1	4,614	64.5
67 Eastland	6,752	13,342	207	1.6	6,449	48.3
68 Ector	22,386	49,494	2,591	5.2	20,672	41.8
69 Edwards	712	1,412	7	0.5	639	45.3
70 Ellis	10,062	26,183	5,114	19.5	9,543	36.4
71 El Paso*	55,927	166,101	5,861	3.5	47,677	28.7
72 Erath	5,498	10,948	108	1.0	5,216	47.6
73 Falls	5,151	13,096	3,630	27.7	4,965	37.9
74 Fannin	7,200	16,277	1,357	8.3	6,138	37.7
75 Fayette	5,677	13,614	1,634	12.0	5,699	41.9
76 Fisher	2,567	4,814	195	4.1	2,655	55.2
77 Floyd	3,621	6,946	379	5.5	3,042	43.8
78 Foard	980	1,999	138	6.9	995	49.8
79 Fort Bend	9,699	22,252	4,373	19.7	7,711	34.7
80 Franklin	1,944	3,417	199	5.8	1,774	51.9
81 Freestone	3,892	7,803	2,531	32.4	3,650	46.8
82 Frio	2,117	5,084	32	0.6	1,790	35.2
83 Gaines	3,201	6,626	156	2.4	3,041	45.9
84 Galveston	43,173	82,515	16,685	20.2	40,828	49.5
85 Garza	1,827	3,703	179	4.8	1,576	42.6
86 Gillespie	3,960	6,526	12	0.2	3,507	53.7
87 Glasscock	363	673	7	1.0	366	54.4
88 Goliad	1,541	3,255	361	11.1	1,455	44.7
89 Gonzales	4,545	10,758	1,752	16.3	4,291	39.9
90 Gray	8,650	18,719	514	2.7	9,013	48.1
91 Grayson*	19,728	46,076	3,712	8.1	17,231	37.4
92 Gregg	20,584	41,449	8,508	20.5	18,737	45.2
93 Grimes	3,247	7,733	2,665	34.5	2,778	35.9
94 Guadalupe	7,308	16,608	1,924	11.6	6,787	40.9
95 Hale	9,594	20,056	898	4.5	8,532	42.5
96 Hall	2,453	4,540	436	9.6	2,133	47.0
97 Hamilton	3,056	5,962	8	0.1	2,737	45.9

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
98 Hansford	2,056	3,502	11	0.3	1,839	52.5
99 Hardeman	2,532	5,229	453	8.7	2,655	50.8
100 Hardin	7,146	14,031	2,126	15.2	6,451	46.0
101 Harris*	382,985	722,957	136,118	18.8	325,399	45.0
102 Harrison	11,930	26,281	10,287	39.1	9,945	37.8
103 Hartley	1,003	1,291	1	0.1	815	63.1
104 Haskell	3,421	6,875	321	4.7	3,650	53.1
105 Hays	5,064	11,011	659	6.0	4,529	41.1
106 Hemphill	1,213	1,934	-	-	1,181	61.1
107 Henderson	6,714	13,521	2,222	16.4	5,970	44.2
108 Hidalgo	33,756	87,533	396	0.5	32,406	37.0
109 Hill	6,696	15,660	1,917	12.2	6,593	42.1
110 Hockley	5,733	11,867	578	4.9	5,358	45.2
111 Hood	2,087	3,624	34	0.9	2,187	60.3
112 Hopkins	5,651	12,326	1,180	9.6	5,357	43.5
113 Houston	5,366	12,247	3,906	31.9	4,383	35.8
114 Howard*	9,367	23,028	889	3.9	8,335	36.2
115 Hudspeth	665	1,815	9	0.5	685	37.7
116 Hunt	9,879	24,758	3,214	13.0	8,242	33.3
117 Hutchinson	10,000	19,416	371	1.9	9,747	50.2
118 Irion	550	741	10	1.3	487	65.7
119 Jack	2,444	4,880	52	1.1	2,432	49.8
120 Jackson	3,952	7,747	907	11.7	3,972	51.3
121 Jasper	5,537	12,640	2,748	21.7	5,123	40.5
122 Jeff Davis	479	891	2	0.2	381	42.8
123 Jefferson	73,594	143,433	30,672	21.4	70,331	49.0
124 Jim Hogg	1,530	2,721	5	0.2	1,479	54.4
125 Jim Wells	8,837	17,515	228	1.3	8,112	46.3
126 Johnson	9,642	21,823	915	4.2	8,431	38.6
127 Jones	4,920	12,045	573	4.8	4,986	41.4
128 Karnes	4,177	8,172	243	3.0	4,085	50.0
129 Kaufman	6,694	19,048	4,637	24.3	5,768	30.3
130 Kendall	2,173	3,756	35	0.9	2,100	55.9
131 Kenedy	146	435	-	-	152	34.9
132 Kent	678	1,087	24	2.2	698	64.2
133 Kerr	5,608	11,541	476	4.1	4,596	39.8
134 Kimble	1,383	2,506	9	0.4	1,253	50.0
135 King	214	377	30	8.0	173	45.9
136 Kinney	594	1,429	98	6.9	569	39.8
137 Kleberg*	6,230	15,403	655	4.3	5,866	38.1
138 Knox	2,216	4,799	273	5.7	2,098	43.7
139 Lamar	8,905	21,918	3,576	16.3	9,076	41.4
140 Lamb	6,349	12,181	747	6.1	6,007	49.3
141 Lampasas	2,970	5,918	175	3.0	2,609	44.1
142 La Salle	1,212	3,063	6	0.2	1,046	34.1
143 Lavaca	5,517	12,732	1,173	9.2	5,522	43.4
144 Lee	2,809	5,611	1,152	20.5	2,451	43.7
145 Leon	3,022	6,168	2,040	33.1	2,684	43.5
146 Liberty	8,257	18,012	3,796	21.1	7,345	40.8
147 Limestone	5,263	13,307	3,120	23.4	5,511	41.4
148 Lipscomb	1,352	2,129	27	1.3	1,209	56.8
149 Live Oak	2,226	4,190	14	0.3	1,822	43.5
150 Llano	2,384	3,627	35	1.0	1,840	50.7
151 Loving	79	135	10	7.4	95	70.4
152 Lubbock*	39,463	84,831	5,989	7.1	35,607	42.0
153 Lynn	3,030	5,952	310	5.2	2,843	47.8
154 McCulloch	2,761	5,745	195	3.4	2,748	47.8
155 McLennan*	39,346	91,322	13,232	14.5	35,156	38.5
156 McMullen	443	667	-	-	481	72.1
157 Madison	1,945	4,395	1,210	27.5	1,552	35.3
158 Marion	2,303	4,681	2,218	47.4	1,691	36.1
159 Martin	1,297	2,798	98	3.5	1,203	43.0
160 Mason	1,535	2,495	10	0.4	1,417	56.8
161 Matagorda	6,555	14,344	2,870	20.0	5,998	41.8
162 Maverick	2,661	7,164	21	0.3	2,139	29.9
163 Medina	4,992	10,214	108	1.1	4,368	42.8

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
164 Menard	985	1,916	16	0.8	1,099	57.4
165 Midland	20,605	37,252	3,282	8.8	17,645	47.4
166 Milam	5,709	13,806	2,120	15.4	5,556	40.2
167 Mills	1,723	3,146	2	0.1	1,887	60.0
168 Mitchell	3,159	6,510	403	6.2	3,350	51.5
169 Montague	4,856	10,018	2	(Z)	4,465	44.6
170 Montgomery	8,196	15,644	3,246	20.7	6,937	44.3
171 Moore	4,159	7,905	25	0.3	4,025	50.9
172 Morris	3,594	7,206	1,591	22.1	3,544	49.2
173 Motley	1,004	1,799	132	7.3	932	51.8
174 Nacogdoches	7,519	16,936	3,843	22.7	6,732	39.7
175 Navarro	8,953	21,909	4,586	20.9	8,901	40.6
176 Newton	2,955	5,750	1,703	29.6	2,590	45.0
177 Nolan	5,162	11,476	400	3.5	5,675	49.5
178 Nueces*	54,558	115,697	5,780	5.0	48,368	41.8
179 Ochiltree	2,737	5,257	13	0.2	2,394	45.5
180 Oldham	670	989	4	0.4	643	65.0
181 Orange*	15,645	32,706	3,111	9.5	14,637	44.8
182 Palo Pinto	5,541	12,853	550	4.3	5,742	44.7
183 Panola	5,437	9,953	2,470	24.8	4,518	45.4
184 Parker	7,458	14,431	268	1.9	7,148	49.5
185 Parmer	2,779	5,144	106	2.1	2,786	54.2
186 Pecos	3,473	6,435	45	0.7	3,167	49.2
187 Polk	3,700	8,152	2,194	26.9	3,360	41.2
188 Potter*	24,419	65,061	4,054	6.2	23,229	35.7
189 Presidio	1,588	3,023	2	0.1	1,248	41.3
190 Rains	1,168	1,997	158	7.9	1,081	54.1
191 Randall	13,881	19,079	54	0.3	10,269	53.8
192 Reagan	1,022	2,106	117	5.6	1,131	53.7
193 Real	743	1,253	4	0.3	653	52.1
194 Red River	4,654	9,913	1,984	20.0	4,389	44.3
195 Reeves	3,595	9,237	307	3.3	3,822	41.4
196 Refugio	3,091	5,892	514	8.7	2,842	48.2
197 Roberts	495	682	7	1.0	445	65.2
198 Robertson	4,247	9,586	3,413	35.6	3,616	37.7
199 Rockwall	1,755	3,534	607	17.2	1,583	44.8
200 Runnels	4,132	9,146	236	2.6	4,075	44.6
201 Rusk	12,033	22,331	5,424	24.3	10,840	48.5
202 Sabine	2,230	4,377	956	21.8	1,843	42.1
203 San Augustine	1,940	4,439	1,437	32.4	1,961	44.2
204 San Jacinto	2,026	3,556	1,678	47.2	1,570	44.2
205 San Patricio	9,384	22,225	452	2.0	8,391	37.8
206 San Saba	2,277	4,256	37	0.9	2,108	49.5
207 Schleicher	903	1,655	30	1.8	809	48.9
208 Scurry	5,137	11,443	288	2.5	5,290	46.2
209 Shackelford	1,424	2,696	78	2.9	1,397	51.8
210 Shelby	5,711	12,493	2,655	21.3	4,993	40.0
211 Sherman	1,092	1,532	1	0.1	993	64.8
212 Smith	25,472	51,573	12,421	24.1	20,821	40.4
213 Somervell	854	1,772	2	0.1	800	45.1
214 Starr	4,742	8,381	7	0.1	4,333	51.7
215 Stephens	2,874	5,973	253	4.2	3,029	50.7
216 Sterling	384	705	10	1.4	375	53.2
217 Stonewall	1,199	1,905	64	3.4	1,173	61.6
218 Sutton	1,051	2,125	18	0.8	911	42.9
219 Swisher	3,230	5,943	168	2.8	3,103	52.2
220 Tarrant*	154,158	320,355	32,995	10.3	132,986	41.5
221 Taylor*	22,620	58,166	2,548	4.4	21,650	37.2
222 Terrell	658	1,476	7	0.5	646	43.8
223 Terry	4,632	8,819	301	3.4	4,162	47.2
224 Throckmorton	1,130	1,888	12	0.6	1,134	60.1
225 Titus	5,219	10,514	1,592	15.1	4,946	47.0
226 Tom Green*	16,443	37,897	1,845	4.9	15,246	40.2
227 Travis*	63,958	123,395	15,284	12.4	49,264	39.9
228 Trinity	2,428	4,843	1,178	24.3	2,264	46.7
229 Tyler	3,037	6,286	1,099	17.5	2,656	42.3

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
230 Upshur	6,262	11,761	2,600	22.1	5,554	47.2
231 Upton	1,604	3,376	150	4.4	1,760	52.1
232 Uvalde	4,326	9,255	104	1.1	3,552	38.4
233 Val Verde*	4,902	12,923	435	3.4	3,603	27.9
234 Van Zandt	5,676	12,404	725	5.8	4,967	40.0
235 Victoria	12,367	25,285	2,328	9.2	10,397	41.1
236 Walker	4,436	13,435	4,308	32.1	3,604	26.8
237 Waller	3,149	6,685	3,158	47.2	2,267	33.9
238 Ward	3,954	8,191	222	2.7	3,852	47.0
239 Washington	4,962	12,186	3,239	26.6	4,489	36.8
240 Webb*	11,182	32,998	155	0.5	11,865	36.0
241 Wharton	9,020	21,117	4,168	19.7	8,458	40.1
242 Wheeler	2,580	5,021	164	3.3	2,444	48.7
243 Wichita*	27,730	72,057	5,055	7.0	27,213	37.8
244 Wilbarger	4,742	11,302	856	7.6	5,129	45.4
245 Willacy	3,388	9,443	60	0.6	3,487	36.9
246 Williamson	9,202	21,248	2,575	12.1	7,870	37.0
247 Wilson	4,195	7,438	132	1.8	4,157	55.9
248 Winkler	3,679	7,388	205	2.8	3,253	44.0
249 Wise	5,241	10,698	70	0.7	5,051	47.2
250 Wood	5,606	11,403	1,504	13.2	5,112	44.8
251 Yoakum	2,280	4,364	49	1.1	2,215	50.8
252 Young	4,996	11,040	165	1.5	4,509	40.8
253 Zapata	1,147	2,325	10	0.4	935	40.2
254 Zavala	2,385	5,964	32	0.5	1,475	24.7
1 Beaver	1,981	2,358	13	0.6	2,127	90.2
2 Box Elder	11,964	12,759	478	3.7	10,428	81.7
3 Cache	15,953	19,017	95	0.5	15,198	79.9
4 Carbon	7,802	11,291	113	1.0	9,006	79.8
5 Daggett	282	633	2	0.3	436	68.9
6 Davis*	28,654	30,729	507	1.6	24,034	78.2
7 Duchesne	2,571	3,494	160	4.6	2,713	77.6
8 Emery	2,537	2,919	22	0.8	2,521	86.4
9 Garfield	1,479	1,853	9	0.5	1,554	83.9
10 Grand	2,275	3,316	11	0.3	1,935	58.4
11 Iron	4,575	5,424	71	1.3	4,818	88.8
12 Juab	2,245	2,554	10	0.4	2,360	92.4
13 Kane	1,124	1,380	9	0.7	1,089	78.9
14 Millard	3,435	4,025	23	0.6	3,676	91.3
15 Morgan	1,407	1,472	1	0.1	1,398	95.0
16 Piute	634	758	3	0.4	700	92.3
17 Rich	761	887	-	-	802	90.4
18 Salt Lake	182,044	207,381	3,025	1.5	166,713	80.4
19 San Juan	2,364	4,107	1,064	25.9	2,245	54.7
20 Sanpete	5,167	6,238	14	0.2	5,505	88.2
21 Sevier	4,565	5,707	35	0.6	4,857	85.1
22 Summit	2,832	3,057	6	0.2	2,824	92.4
23 Tooele*	7,750	9,379	354	3.8	6,688	71.3
24 Uintah	4,579	5,769	486	8.4	4,262	73.9
25 Utah	44,848	53,694	268	0.5	42,708	79.5
26 Wasatch	2,578	2,762	1	(Z)	2,547	92.2
27 Washington	4,323	5,200	63	1.2	4,174	80.3
28 Wayne	812	894	1	0.1	828	92.6
29 Weber	49,872	58,760	1,574	2.7	46,563	79.2

VERMONT

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Addison	8,258	11,175	21	0.2	8,489	76.0
2 Bennington	11,254	15,389	32	0.2	11,602	75.4
3 Caledonia	8,990	13,789	16	0.1	9,597	69.6
4 Chittenden	30,867	41,324	160	0.4	30,031	72.7
5 Essex	2,423	3,582	6	0.2	2,502	69.8
6 Franklin	12,086	16,966	33	0.2	12,472	73.5
7 Grand Isle	1,503	1,799	-	-	1,617	89.9
8 Lamoille	4,412	6,493	4	0.1	4,304	66.3
9 Orange	6,642	9,377	9	0.1	6,944	74.1
10 Orleans	7,907	11,458	8	0.1	8,381	73.1
11 Rutland	20,406	28,509	29	0.1	21,412	75.1
12 Washington	17,763	26,227	38	0.1	17,578	67.0
13 Windham	12,555	18,698	76	0.4	13,486	72.1
14 Windsor	18,023	25,859	53	0.2	18,909	73.1

VIRGINIA

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Accomack	6,683	19,290	6,142	31.8	5,581	28.9
2 Albemarle	6,315	18,246	2,576	14.1	5,272	28.9
3 Alleghany	2,685	6,931	256	3.7	2,488	35.9
4 Amelia	2,239	4,185	1,924	46.0	1,524	36.4
5 Amherst	5,410	13,216	2,693	20.4	3,747	28.4
6 Appomattox	3,791	5,387	1,142	21.2	2,208	41.0
7 Arlington*	54,363	107,578	5,214	4.8	45,977	42.7
8 Augusta	8,372	22,178	864	3.9	5,989	27.0
9 Bath	1,286	3,316	340	10.3	1,277	38.5
10 Bedford	7,914	18,302	3,044	16.6	6,081	33.2
11 Bland	1,570	3,650	146	4.0	1,671	45.8
12 Botetourt	4,476	9,823	778	7.9	3,802	38.7
13 Brunswick	4,446	9,371	4,734	50.5	2,932	31.3
14 Buchanan	7,124	16,790	8	(Z)	6,099	36.3
15 Buckingham	2,733	5,984	2,208	36.9	1,724	28.8
16 Campbell	9,145	18,809	3,291	17.5	5,970	31.7
17 Caroline	3,243	7,003	3,210	45.8	2,367	33.8
18 Carroll	6,146	13,655	41	0.3	5,589	40.9
19 Charles City	1,348	2,708	2,126	78.5	964	35.6
20 Charlotte	3,178	7,514	2,500	33.3	2,635	35.1
21 Chesterfield	25,871	40,717	4,862	11.9	15,859	38.9
22 Clarke	2,206	4,802	786	16.4	1,736	36.2
23 Craig	1,244	2,056	3	0.1	967	47.0
24 Culpeper	3,665	9,032	2,068	22.9	2,971	32.9
25 Cumberland	1,977	3,466	1,647	47.5	1,262	36.4
26 Dickenson	5,639	9,855	64	0.6	4,960	50.3
27 Dinwiddie	4,285	13,799	8,587	62.2	2,686	19.5
28 Essex	1,550	3,906	1,665	42.6	1,117	28.6
29 Fairfax* [1]	84,283	149,715	9,110	6.1	54,219	36.2
30 Fauquier	5,613	13,819	3,093	22.4	4,094	29.6
31 Floyd	2,985	6,325	308	4.9	2,759	43.6

VIRGINIA--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
32 Fluvanna	1,834	4,168	1,378	33.1	1,390	33.3
33 Franklin	5,737	14,529	1,728	11.9	5,016	34.5
34 Frederick	5,474	12,711	232	1.8	3,835	30.2
35 Giles	5,167	9,861	232	2.4	4,327	43.9
36 Gloucester	3,583	7,223	1,882	26.1	2,620	36.3
37 Goochland	2,697	5,433	2,312	42.6	1,749	32.2
38 Grayson	6,352	10,502	329	3.1	6,638	63.2
39 Greene	1,104	2,659	328	12.3	892	33.5
40 Greensville	4,519	8,384	3,885	46.3	2,766	33.0
41 Halifax	6,144	18,146	6,769	37.3	4,508	24.8
42 Hanover	7,751	15,734	3,302	21.0	5,085	32.3
43 Henrico	42,082	70,219	3,397	4.8	29,235	41.6
44 Henry	8,184	21,918	4,113	18.8	5,643	25.7
45 Highland	989	2,056	16	0.8	932	45.3
46 Isle of Wight	4,399	9,308	4,317	46.4	3,177	34.1
47 James City	2,839	6,901	2,056	29.8	1,729	25.1
48 King and Queen	1,489	3,352	1,617	48.2	983	29.3
49 King George	1,729	4,209	1,009	24.0	1,410	33.5
50 King William	1,975	4,355	1,864	42.8	1,549	35.6
51 Lancaster	2,911	5,591	1,978	35.4	2,250	40.2
52 Lee	8,626	14,172	100	0.7	7,265	51.3
53 Loudoun	6,877	14,253	2,239	15.7	4,954	34.8
54 Louisa	3,103	7,399	2,482	33.5	2,458	33.2
55 Lunenburg	2,977	7,145	2,534	35.5	2,379	33.3
56 Madison	1,923	4,781	898	18.8	1,653	34.6
57 Mathews	2,286	4,871	1,062	21.8	1,754	36.0
58 Mecklenburg	8,227	17,098	6,624	38.7	4,534	26.5
59 Middlesex	1,995	3,949	1,363	34.5	1,402	35.5
60 Montgomery	8,489	19,051	960	5.0	6,445	33.8
61 Nansemond	7,415	16,771	9,806	58.5	5,323	31.7
62 Nelson	2,534	7,506	1,813	24.2	2,268	30.2
63 New Kent	1,365	2,554	1,229	48.1	1,018	39.9
64 Norfolk	Now part of Chesapeake city.					

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Northampton	3,103	10,126	4,786	47.3	2,392	23.6
66 Northumberland	2,418	6,088	2,123	34.9	2,211	36.3
67 Nottoway	4,499	9,022	3,458	38.3	3,286	36.4
68 Orange	3,107	7,698	1,429	18.6	2,603	33.8
69 Page	5,419	9,392	271	2.9	4,331	46.1
70 Patrick	3,776	8,692	616	7.1	3,028	34.8
71 Pittsylvania	12,373	31,439	8,604	27.4	7,954	25.3
72 Powhatan	2,152	3,939	1,563	39.7	1,328	33.7
73 Prince Edward	4,064	8,021	2,896	36.1	3,214	40.1
74 Prince George *	3,295	11,280	2,420	21.5	1,725	15.3
75 Prince William *	8,963	26,694	2,217	8.3	5,639	21.1
76 Princess Anne	Now part of Virginia Beach city.					
77 Pulaski	6,726	15,832	1,030	6.5	5,207	32.9
78 Rappahannock	1,127	3,148	540	17.2	975	31.0
79 Richmond	1,540	3,845	1,132	29.4	1,233	32.1
80 Roanoke	19,536	37,225	2,211	5.9	13,532	36.4
81 Rockbridge	4,806	13,789	1,127	8.2	3,585	26.0
82 Rockingham	8,363	23,403	427	1.8	6,872	29.4
83 Russell	7,367	14,180	297	2.1	6,554	46.2
84 Scott	9,269	14,819	193	1.3	8,744	59.0
85 Shenandoah	7,168	13,604	188	1.4	6,199	45.6
86 Smyth	7,952	18,518	327	1.8	7,138	38.5
87 Southampton[2]	6,131	14,674	7,435	50.7	4,125	28.1
88 Spotsylvania	3,367	7,765	1,503	19.4	2,799	36.0
89 Stafford	4,364	9,565	971	10.2	2,965	31.0
90 Surry	2,140	3,321	1,842	55.5	1,443	43.5
91 Sussex	2,775	6,368	3,706	58.2	1,993	31.3
92 Tazewell	9,417	24,308	1,071	4.4	7,574	31.2
93 Warren	4,390	8,798	587	6.7	3,720	42.3
94 Washington	9,226	21,692	546	2.5	8,347	38.5
95 Westmoreland	2,499	6,188	2,352	38.0	2,219	35.9

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
96 Wise	10,539	23,287	685	2.9	9,716	41.7
97 Wythe	5,863	12,822	523	4.1	4,993	38.9
98 York*	6,389	12,024	2,428	20.2	3,795	31.6
INDEPENDENT CITIES						
99 Alexandria*	25,683	56,573	6,025	10.6	18,551	32.8
100 Bristol	3,723	10,045	672	6.7	3,299	32.8
101 Buena Vista	1,153	3,546	156	4.4	918	25.9
102 Charlottesville	9,704	19,273	3,369	17.5	6,628	34.4
103 Clifton Forge	2,102	3,520	600	17.0	1,663	47.2
104 Colonial Heights	3,620	6,066	17	0.3	2,581	42.5
105 Covington	3,206	6,957	751	10.8	3,001	43.1
106 Danville	12,724	28,792	6,388	22.2	7,794	27.1
107 Falls Church	3,707	5,834	114	2.0	3,165	54.3
108 Fredericksburg	3,928	8,188	1,471	18.0	2,915	35.6
109 Galax	1,416	3,225	152	4.7	1,377	42.7
110 Hampton*	22,288	51,620	10,825	21.0	14,808	28.7
111 Harrisonburg	3,590	7,183	436	6.1	3,015	42.0
112 Hopewell	5,691	10,403	1,549	14.9	3,999	38.4
113 Lynchburg	16,834	34,302	6,574	19.2	12,256	35.7
114 Martinsville	4,824	11,056	2,972	26.9	3,517	31.8
115 Newport News*	25,894	65,232	20,974	32.2	18,855	28.9
116 Norfolk*	51,546	174,799	45,376	26.0	39,473	22.6
117 Norton	1,196	2,952	188	6.4	1,076	36.4
118 Petersburg	7,775	22,349	9,821	43.9	5,803	26.0
119 Portsmouth*	24,544	65,341	21,055	32.2	16,980	26.0
120 Radford	3,358	5,365	333	6.2	2,912	54.3
121 Richmond	62,890	144,227	53,719	37.2	45,205	31.3
122 Roanoke	28,496	62,046	9,519	15.3	24,453	39.4
123 South Boston	1,843	3,610	971	26.9	1,287	35.7
124 South Norfolk	Now part of Chesapeake city.					
125 Staunton	5,680	14,578	1,288	8.8	4,032	27.7
126 Suffolk	3,044	8,041	2,769	34.4	2,834	35.2
127 Virginia Beach* [3]	23,442	44,868	6,581	14.7	13,164	29.3
128 Waynesboro	4,531	9,215	548	5.9	3,513	38.1
129 Williamsburg	2,093	4,092	583	14.2	1,220	29.8
130 Winchester	4,437	9,908	708	7.1	3,545	35.8
131 Chesapeake[4]	18,621	39,878	9,428	23.6	12,457	31.2
132 Fairfax	See Fairfax County.					
133 Franklin	See Southampton County.					

[1] Includes Fairfax County and Fairfax city.
[2] Includes Southampton County and Franklin city.
[3] Includes Princess Anne County and Virginia Beach city.
[4] Includes Norfolk County and South Norfolk city.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams	4,273	5,553	69	1.2	4,216	75.9
2 Asotin	5,436	7,746	26	0.3	5,739	74.1
3 Benton	28,372	34,063	278	0.8	26,344	77.3
4 Chelan	17,822	24,696	127	0.5	18,214	73.8
5 Clallam	13,455	17,902	569	3.2	13,080	73.1
6 Clark	41,790	55,815	381	0.7	40,868	73.2
7 Columbia	2,187	2,875	3	0.1	2,094	72.8
8 Cowlitz	24,501	33,746	163	0.5	24,310	72.0
9 Douglas	6,376	8,335	37	0.4	6,346	76.1
10 Ferry	1,459	2,155	360	16.7	1,546	71.7
11 Franklin	10,058	12,837	690	5.4	9,409	73.3
12 Garfield	1,532	1,797	1	0.1	1,607	89.4
13 Grant*	14,427	25,080	867	3.5	15,005	59.8
14 Grays Harbor	23,027	33,377	520	1.6	24,006	71.9
15 Island*	6,999	10,974	228	2.1	6,094	55.5
16 Jefferson	4,456	5,642	161	2.9	4,307	76.3
17 King*	450,640	578,897	29,580	5.1	440,810	76.1
18 Kitsap*	37,714	50,494	1,508	3.0	37,302	73.9
19 Kittitas	8,592	12,267	67	0.5	8,953	73.0
20 Klickitat	5,674	7,793	158	2.0	5,595	71.8
21 Lewis	19,022	25,692	58	0.2	19,480	75.8
22 Lincoln	5,213	6,738	45	0.7	5,464	81.1
23 Mason	8,071	9,841	203	2.1	7,902	80.3
24 Okanogan	10,495	14,922	927	6.2	10,698	71.7
25 Pacific	6,860	9,302	119	1.3	7,090	76.2
26 Pend Oreille	2,965	4,117	87	2.1	2,953	71.7
27 Pierce*	125,973	195,195	8,747	4.5	123,475	63.3
28 San Juan	1,750	1,992	15	0.8	1,740	87.3
29 Skagit	22,328	31,650	437	1.4	23,220	73.4
30 Skamania	2,414	3,079	11	0.4	2,306	74.9
31 Snohomish	81,405	99,911	811	0.8	73,163	73.2
32 Spokane*	111,581	168,083	3,142	1.9	115,369	68.6
33 Stevens	7,578	10,478	385	3.7	7,955	75.9
34 Thurston*	27,021	32,790	301	0.9	25,606	78.1
35 Wahkiakum	1,624	2,091	27	1.3	1,722	82.4
36 Walla Walla	17,594	26,406	536	2.0	18,519	70.1
37 Whatcom	31,422	42,700	606	1.4	31,526	73.8
38 Whitman	13,538	17,925	182	1.0	13,544	75.6
39 Yakima	52,730	82,641	3,006	3.6	53,995	65.3

WEST VIRGINIA

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Barbour	7,291	9,011	108	1.2	7,824	86.8
2 Berkeley	14,085	21,319	875	4.1	15,441	72.4
3 Boone	11,076	15,163	188	1.2	12,162	80.2
4 Braxton	6,654	8,585	68	0.8	7,162	83.4
5 Brooke	13,198	17,166	237	1.4	13,592	79.2
6 Cabell	45,394	68,302	3,082	4.5	47,899	70.1
7 Calhoun	3,901	4,533	6	0.1	3,921	86.5
8 Clay	4,548	5,951	37	0.6	5,265	88.5
9 Doddridge	3,168	4,235	1	(Z)	3,455	81.6
10 Fayette	24,041	34,023	3,766	11.1	25,646	75.4
11 Gilmer	3,948	4,587	1	(Z)	3,521	76.8
12 Grant	3,958	4,767	122	2.6	4,241	89.0
13 Greenbrier	14,661	20,038	1,097	5.5	14,976	74.7
14 Hampshire	4,854	6,767	85	1.3	5,390	79.7
15 Hancock	19,010	23,662	842	3.6	19,207	81.2
16 Hardy	4,304	5,484	137	2.5	4,507	82.2
17 Harrison	35,669	48,632	821	1.7	39,105	80.4
18 Jackson	9,381	10,568	6	0.1	9,150	86.6
19 Jefferson	6,793	10,880	1,480	13.6	7,239	66.5
20 Kanawha	108,894	147,583	8,402	5.7	111,614	75.6
21 Lewis	8,227	13,330	76	0.6	8,806	66.1
22 Lincoln	9,288	10,516	3	(Z)	9,602	91.3
23 Logan	20,775	31,280	2,450	7.8	24,196	77.4
24 McDowell	21,730	36,199	7,761	21.4	26,056	72.0
25 Marion	29,754	40,203	1,647	4.1	32,041	79.7
26 Marshall	17,932	23,993	296	1.2	18,344	76.5
27 Mason	10,978	14,088	472	3.4	10,946	77.7
28 Mercer	27,203	40,050	4,045	10.1	29,008	72.4
29 Mineral	10,145	13,204	364	2.8	10,463	79.2
30 Mingo	15,420	19,879	1,129	5.7	16,162	81.3
31 Monongalia	23,831	33,190	721	2.2	24,626	74.2
32 Monroe	5,752	6,978	198	2.8	6,049	86.7
33 Morgan	3,686	5,029	110	2.2	4,121	81.9
34 Nicholas	9,506	13,638	8	0.1	10,071	73.8
35 Ohio	33,184	44,243	1,239	2.8	35,790	80.9
36 Pendleton	3,794	4,790	71	1.5	3,987	83.2
37 Pleasants	3,626	4,105	-	-	3,724	90.7
38 Pocahontas	5,033	6,180	246	4.0	5,291	85.6
39 Preston	10,279	15,328	63	0.4	11,129	72.6
40 Putnam	11,075	13,158	16	0.1	10,670	81.1
41 Raleigh	30,558	43,194	5,162	12.0	32,536	75.3
42 Randolph	10,996	15,325	178	1.2	12,007	78.3
43 Ritchie	4,961	6,798	3	(Z)	5,563	81.8
44 Roane	7,271	9,682	16	0.2	7,723	79.8
45 Summers	6,999	9,537	742	7.8	7,759	81.4
46 Taylor	6,734	9,245	124	1.3	7,481	80.9
47 Tucker	3,978	4,661	15	0.3	3,977	85.3
48 Tyler	4,797	6,203	11	0.2	5,095	82.1
49 Upshur	7,380	10,589	60	0.6	7,713	72.8
50 Wayne	16,918	21,689	19	0.1	17,268	79.6
51 Webster	4,691	7,143	3	(Z)	5,168	72.4
52 Wetzel	9,454	11,658	5	(Z)	9,487	81.4
53 Wirt	2,185	2,607	10	0.4	2,392	91.8
54 Wood	36,507	47,162	408	0.9	37,527	79.6
55 Wyoming	12,565	17,217	623	3.6	13,686	79.5

WISCONSIN

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Adams	3,489	4,841	18	0.4	3,674	75.9
2 Ashland	7,591	10,432	286	2.7	8,127	77.9
3 Barron	14,056	20,135	41	0.2	15,145	75.2
4 Bayfield	5,777	7,321	200	2.7	6,060	82.8
5 Brown	52,064	68,992	689	1.0	52,952	76.8
6 Buffalo	5,759	8,319	7	0.1	6,256	75.2
7 Burnett	4,463	5,702	113	2.0	4,596	80.6
8 Calumet	9,274	12,238	31	0.3	9,486	77.5
9 Chippewa	17,214	25,656	40	0.2	18,511	72.2
10 Clark	12,704	18,253	52	0.3	13,343	73.1
11 Columbia	16,370	22,345	34	0.2	16,873	75.5
12 Crawford	6,663	9,343	14	0.1	7,071	75.7
13 Dane *	95,426	129,626	1,686	1.3	90,502	69.8
14 Dodge	26,308	38,454	327	0.9	27,295	71.0
15 Door	8,714	12,557	61	0.5	9,414	75.0
16 Douglas	19,839	27,436	116	0.4	21,270	77.5
17 Dunn	10,458	15,490	35	0.2	11,239	72.6
18 Eau Claire	24,521	34,504	30	0.1	25,704	74.5
19 Florence	1,627	2,049	2	0.1	1,791	87.4
20 Fond du Lac	30,778	44,287	95	0.2	32,688	73.8
21 Forest	3,552	4,344	132	3.0	3,514	80.9
22 Grant	17,211	25,178	23	0.1	19,258	76.5
23 Green	10,929	15,740	17	0.1	11,711	74.4
24 Green Lake	7,768	9,826	4	(Z)	7,893	80.3
25 Iowa	7,907	11,316	6	0.1	8,694	76.8
26 Iron	3,480	4,926	9	0.2	4,170	84.7
27 Jackson	6,357	9,019	193	2.1	6,813	75.5
28 Jefferson	22,084	30,854	51	0.2	22,929	74.3
29 Juneau	7,567	10,522	84	0.8	8,246	78.4
30 Kenosha	45,356	59,668	556	0.9	43,011	72.1
31 Kewaunee	7,780	10,416	3	(Z)	8,213	78.8
32 LaCrosse	29,803	43,137	91	0.2	32,665	75.7
33 Lafayette	7,671	10,321	3	(Z)	8,330	80.7
34 Langlade	8,081	11,347	30	0.3	8,655	76.3
35 Lincoln	9,796	13,677	20	0.1	10,089	73.8
36 Manitowoc	31,815	44,330	81	0.2	32,080	72.4
37 Marathon	37,426	50,829	63	0.1	40,025	78.7
38 Marinette	15,013	20,710	23	0.1	15,630	75.5
39 Marquette	3,816	5,495	2	(Z)	4,203	76.5
40 Milwaukee *	439,459	645,747	33,083	5.1	445,807	69.0
41 Monroe	11,524	18,392	95	0.5	12,587	68.4
42 Oconto	10,795	14,494	93	0.6	11,283	77.8
43 Oneida	10,355	12,945	65	0.5	10,666	82.4
44 Outagamie	40,198	55,356	471	0.9	41,522	75.0
45 Ozaukee	18,123	21,684	28	0.1	17,657	81.4
46 Pepin	3,229	4,235	3	0.1	3,380	79.8
47 Pierce	9,666	12,977	20	0.2	9,958	76.7
48 Polk	11,003	15,094	79	0.5	11,565	76.6
49 Portage	16,498	21,193	26	0.1	16,972	80.1
50 Price	6,705	8,826	2	(Z)	5,957	78.8
51 Racine	59,306	83,282	2,562	3.1	60,294	72.4
52 Richland	7,548	10,451	8	0.1	8,229	78.7
53 Rock	48,684	67,212	1,347	2.0	48,945	72.8
54 Rusk	6,405	8,401	13	0.2	6,803	81.0
55 St. Croix	13,458	16,588	25	0.2	13,478	81.3
56 Sauk	15,656	21,573	64	0.3	16,867	78.2
57 Sawyer	4,613	5,877	392	6.7	5,036	85.7
58 Shawano	13,105	20,154	1,213	6.0	14,489	71.9
59 Sheboygan	39,445	53,326	32	0.1	40,221	75.4
60 Taylor	6,898	9,740	3	(Z)	7,237	74.3
61 Trempealeau	9,589	14,364	9	0.1	10,781	75.1
62 Vernon	10,898	15,633	10	0.1	11,760	75.2
63 Vilas	5,679	5,896	354	6.0	5,460	92.6
64 Walworth	24,009	31,502	136	0.4	24,401	77.5

WISCONSIN--Con.

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
65 Washburn	5,062	6,290	25	0.4	5,261	83.6
66 Washington	20,791	26,193	26	0.1	19,991	76.3
67 Waukesha	75,429	88,898	114	0.1	68,419	77.0
68 Waupaca	15,389	22,162	23	0.1	16,867	76.1
69 Waushara	6,441	8,560	6	0.1	6,799	79.4
70 Winnebago	44,835	64,602	139	0.2	46,334	71.7
71 Wood	23,787	33,202	108	0.3	24,930	75.1
72 Menominee[1]	726	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)

[1] Created from Shawano and Oconto Counties within the Menominee Indian Reservation, effective as of April 29, 1961.

WYOMING

County	Votes cast for President, 1964	Population of voting age, 1960			Votes cast for President, 1960	
		Total	Nonwhite		Number	Percent of population of voting age
			Number	Percent		
1 Albany	8,942	12,166	144	1.2	8,638	71.0
2 Big Horn	5,358	6,591	23	0.3	5,493	83.3
3 Campbell	2,802	3,380	16	0.5	2,436	72.1
4 Carbon	6,482	8,881	113	1.3	6,975	78.5
5 Converse	2,809	3,752	13	0.3	2,859	76.2
6 Crook	1,994	2,699	4	0.1	2,110	78.2
7 Fremont	10,794	14,321	1,387	9.7	9,986	69.7
8 Goshen	5,353	6,924	17	0.2	5,592	80.8
9 Hot Springs	2,608	3,804	79	2.1	2,803	73.7
10 Johnson	2,492	3,264	11	0.3	2,604	79.8
11 Laramie*	24,622	35,110	772	2.2	23,723	67.6
12 Lincoln	4,084	4,790	35	0.7	3,958	82.6
13 Natrona	21,302	28,239	333	1.2	20,811	73.7
14 Niobrara	1,965	2,372	7	0.3	1,930	81.4
15 Park	7,443	9,282	33	0.4	7,006	75.5
16 Platte	3,360	4,300	4	0.1	3,329	77.4
17 Sheridan	9,238	11,989	68	0.6	9,476	79.0
18 Sublette	1,691	2,160	6	0.3	1,624	75.2
19 Sweetwater	7,913	10,630	201	1.9	7,943	74.7
20 Teton	2,049	1,807	5	0.3	1,741	96.3
21 Uinta	3,115	4,443	48	1.1	3,206	72.2
22 Washakie	3,408	4,750	64	1.3	3,595	75.7
23 Weston	2,892	4,384	24	0.5	2,944	67.2
24 Yellowstone Nat'l Park (part)	-	267	1	0.4	-	-