

POSITION PAPER

SUBJECT--Goldwater suggests talks with Peking on South Viet-Nam.

REFERENCE--1-Goldwater speech to VFW convention, Cleveland, August 25, 1964

2-N.Y. Times report of Goldwater remarks(Times, 27 Aug. page 1)

1-Background--Goldwater has been bitterly critical of ^{the} Johnson administration as soft ~~in~~ standing up to Communist aggression. Advocates a "win-policy" in place of what he calls a "no-win" attitude by present administration. Has been critical of not carrying war to North Viet Nam, on a large scale.

ISSUES

2- ~~Issues~~---The basic issue is a simple one. Here is the person who has been advocating a strong and unbending policy against communist aggression. Yet, at the very moment of crisis--while the riots were taking place in Saigon and other S. Viet Nam cities, and while our political and strategic position is under world-wide communist propaganda attack, he favors talking with Red China. ("Avalon, Cal. Aug. 26--Sen. Barry Goldwater said today that he had long believed" talks with Red China might be profitable" to end the war in South Viet Nam". NY Times, 27 Aug.)

The Johnson Administration is opposed to ~~such~~ such talks. The reason is simple: Any suggestion of such talks ~~will~~ ^{would} play directly into the hands of the communists. It would seem to support the communist objective for talks leading to the neutralization of South Viet Nam. Neutralization is the means by which the Reds want to get U.S. forces out so that the Communist take-over can proceed by subversion. This the Johnson administration will not tolerate. Furthermore, any indication of willingness on the part of any U.S. leader to talk with the Reds is interpreted by the South Viet Name people as a lack of determination by the U.S. to stand up to the Viet Cong. This leads to suspicion that we will compromise with the Reds, and as all still-free Asians know, such compromise under fire is simply a slow kind of surrender.

What Goldwater did was to indicate that he was siding with the neutralist movement. This creates suspicion and undermines the faith of our South Viet Name allies as to our good faith and determination. It encourages the Communist forces.

It ~~strengthen~~^s de Gaulles efforts which are contrary to the ^{position} ~~position~~ of the U.S. It pulls the rug out from under our people--our troops--in south Viet Nam. By encouraging the Reds--by indicating to them that ~~perhaps~~ if they keep up their terrorist activities they can undermine U.S. determination--then a heavier burden is placed on U.S. personnel who are facing the Red aggression. ~~It~~^U could well mean more South Viet Nameese, and more U.S. casualties.

This strange and shocking ~~statement~~^{by} Goldwater isn't "shooting from the hip". It's throwing down the gun and crawling off the firing line while the fire-fight is still hot.

It's the kind of irresponsible, erratic, and downright dangerous kind of talk that should not be indulged in by one who aspires to the highest position of responsibility in our nation, and on whose judgement lives and national survival would depend.

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3-PROPOSAL-Actively exploit apparent reversal of position by Goldwater; emphasize how it not only could hurt U.S. policy in South Viet Nam, but how it adds to the danger of U.S. troops there--and could thus create the need for more U.S. troops; stress how such statements are irresponsible; how, instead of contributing strength to U.S. policy, as he says is his purpose, he is actually weakening ^{the} U.S. position, and is a disservice to the struggle against communist aggression.

Washington

G.O.P. Unity Breaks Out, Or Does It? 1964

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, Aug. 13—In his speech to the Republican leaders at Hershey this week Senator Goldwater said: "The Eisenhower-Dulles approach to foreign affairs is our approach. . . . A Goldwater-Miller Administration will mean an immediate return to the proven policy of peace through strength which was the hallmark of the Eisenhower years."

This is an important statement if it can be taken at face value, for the Eisenhower years, though marked by much heroic Goldwater talk about "liberating" eastern Europe and "rolling back Communism," were essentially years of accommodation and compromise with the Communist world, and this is precisely what Barry has been condemning in the past.

In fact, it was precisely this tendency of the Eisenhower Administration to limit its risks in the Cold War that led Goldwater himself to be such an outspoken critic of Eisenhower's foreign policy—from 1953-60—and if he has now really come over to Eisenhower, rather than merely saying some agreeable things to make Eisenhower come over to him, then the Republican campaign has taken an important turn.

The Eisenhower Record

Eisenhower did take risks to defend Formosa, and the offshore islands, where American air and naval power dominated the seas and the skies, and he moved boldly in the Lebanon crisis to protect the Middle East, but in general he accepted a series of truces rather than risk war for total victory.

Eisenhower's first major foreign policy act in 1953 was not to press the war in Korea but to end it. He didn't ask "why not victory?" but "why not peace?" and he settled for dividing that country at the 38th parallel.

Ike, and particularly Dulles, was great at talking about "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek to invade the China mainland, but they both quietly leashed him again and kept him that way all through the eight Eisenhower years.

Berlin and Germany were a constant nuisance and even danger in the Eisenhower terms, but he accepted the partition of both rather than risk war for their unification. He compromised with the Communists to secure the freedom of Austria and Trieste. He risked sending the U-2 spy planes over Russia but grounded them when they were caught.

It is difficult to imagine anyone whose approach to foreign affairs was more different from Goldwater's than Eisenhower. He even moved against his two closest allies, Britain and France, when they mobilized for action in the Suez crisis, and despite all the Dulles talk about freeing eastern Europe, Eisenhower let the Red Army tanks crush the Hungarian uprising without making a move.

In his book, *The Conscience of a Conservative*, Goldwater took a different view. "Assume also a major uprising in eastern Europe such as occurred in Budapest in 1956," he wrote. "In such a situation we ought to present the Kremlin an ultimatum forbidding Soviet intervention, and be prepared, if the ultimatum is rejected, to move a highly mobile task force equipped with appropriate nuclear weapons to the scene of the revolt."

"Our objective," he concluded, "would be to confront the Soviet Union with superior force in the immediate vicinity of the uprising and to compel a Soviet withdrawal."

Accordingly, if the Senator has now embraced the General and his policies, he has clearly changed, but this is just the trouble. For after the Summit Meeting at Hershey, where he rejected the support of extremists, supported the United Nations, the Social Security system, and the civic rights bill he voted against, he insisted that all this represented no change in his past positions.

For. Affairs

*Speech
material*

positions.
"This is no conciliatory speech at all," he told reporters later. "It merely reaffirms what I've been saying throughout the campaign."

The fact that Eisenhower's own people had helped draft the statement, that Governors Rockefeller, Scranton and Romney, who had opposed his nomination, now found these views different and acceptable, that every reporter on the scene noted the difference in the tone of his remarks—all this made no difference to Barry.

Talk and Belief

A cynic would say that the Senator merely said what was necessary to get Ike's support, but Barry is more complicated than that. He simply balances the books every day and sometimes several times a day, and the odd thing about it is that he seems to be equally dogmatic about wholly contradictory things.

He has now said almost everything that can be said on both sides of the main questions of the campaign. He is for Ike and for policies Ike opposes. He has been for and against extremists, for and against the United Nations, and compulsory Social Security.

There is a change in him, all right. At the start of the year we thought we knew fairly well from his writings and his votes what he believed. Now we don't know what he believes: All we know is what he says.

MEMORANDUM

File - Foreign Policy

October 9, 1964

TO: Democratic Senators Not Up for Re-election

FROM: Ronald F. Stinnett, Research Director
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee

RE: Questions and Answers on Foreign Policy and Defense

Enclosed is a copy of "Questions and Answers on Foreign Policy and Defense." You may want to use this in preparing any statements you may be making during the campaign in the area of foreign policy.

This booklet will give you a general outline of our position on world affairs.

I hope this may prove to be of use to you.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ON FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE

THE RECORD OF FOUR YEARS

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INTRODUCTION

The American people and the rest of the world have been subjected to a barrage of questions and allegations by the Republican Party and its national candidates regarding the foreign policy of this country and the Democratic Administration's record in defense matters. This pamphlet repeats some of the most frequently heard of these allegations -- and gives the factual answers based on the record of the past four years.

PART ONE: U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

BAY OF PIGS

Question: Didn't this Administration blacken our nation's honor at the Bay of Pigs, bungle the invasion plan and leave brave men on Cuban beaches to be shot down and much later ransom the survivors?

Answer:

1. The Bay of Pigs expedition was a mistake for which President Kennedy and other Administration leaders accepted their full share of responsibility.
2. The expedition failed because of a serious miscalculation about the extent to which the island had been organized as a Communist police state during 1960.
3. A far graver mistake was made by the Republican Administration in permitting Communism to take over Cuba in 1959 and 1960.
4. In the summer of 1960 the Republican Party Platform claimed that the Eisenhower Administration refused to "tolerate the establishment in this hemisphere of any government dominated by the foreign rule of Communism"; nevertheless, when the Kennedy Administration came to office a full-blown Communist regime was in power in Cuba.
5. The Cuban Freedom Fighters went into Cuba voluntarily and fully aware of the risks involved. The "ransoming" of the prisoners was a humanitarian act carried out with private funds and contributed materials through the American Red Cross.

BERLIN

Question: Why did the Administration permit the wall of shame to be built and to remain dividing and weakening Free Berlin?

- Answer:
1. The notion of "tearing down the wall" is characteristically irresponsible -- and equally dangerous to both freedom and peace. Western statesmen in all countries understood this point at the time, and as President Kennedy put it, "No one at that time in any position of responsibility ... suggested that the United States ... go in and tear down the wall." The fact is that the wall was built entirely within that sector of Berlin in which the Soviets, since 1945, have exercised primary control.
 2. The wall is a disgrace, but the disgrace is not to free men. Above all it is a visible symbol of failure and infamy in the Communist system. Even now, thousands are still escaping from East Germany to freedom.
 3. When this Administration took over, Berlin was gravely threatened; its morale was shaken; its future was uncertain. Today it is more viable and prosperous than ever. The city's population began to increase again in 1963 after 7 years of decline. New investments in the city have increased by record levels. The number of persons visiting W. Berlin also shows the restoration of confidence.
 4. In this achievement both President Kennedy and President Johnson have had a great personal share. It was Mr. Johnson as Vice President who rekindled the courage of Berlin after the Soviets built their wall. And it was President Kennedy in 1963 who received from the citizens of free Berlin the most tumultuous and triumphant welcome in the city's history.

CAPTIVE NATIONS

Question: Hasn't the Administration turned its back on the captive peoples of Eastern Europe?

Answer: 1. No. There can be no stronger refutation than the commitment contained in President Johnson's statement on May 23, 1964 at Lexington, Virginia:

"We will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian aid."

2. The basic aim of this Administration with regard to Eastern Europe is to secure for its peoples a fully independent, prosperous, and natural relationship with the Free World. The Administration seeks to capitalize on the unparalleled conditions of fluidity and liberalization, which currently characterize Eastern Europe, in two ways: a) by assisting the Eastern European governments to behave more independently and in keeping with their own national traditions, and b) by fostering political conditions within those countries more conducive to the freedom of the individual.
3. President Johnson, following the example of President Kennedy before him, proclaimed on June 18, 1964 a Captive Nations week honoring the just aspirations of the peoples of the Captive Nations for national independence and the realization of human liberty.
4. Since 1948, Democratic Administrations have encouraged the development of what is today a truly independent Yugoslav state--an example for the other peoples of Eastern Europe.
5. Our material aid to Poland over the past 4 years has nurtured the beginnings of national autonomy and domestic liberalization.
6. We exhibit at trade fairs in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria; and we have supported an expanded exchange of artists, writers, scholars, scientists, and athletes.
7. The Voice of America provides all of Eastern Europe with an increasing flow of information on life and developments in the Free World. Following the cessation this past year of virtually all jamming, VOA broadcasts are reaching more people in Eastern Europe than ever before.

8. By creating opportunities for the captive peoples to escape from their isolation and to increase their knowledge of the West, they are stimulated to assert further their national identity and their desire for improvements at home. Inevitably, the efforts of the Communist regimes to cope with these aspirations mean a loosening of external authority and a reassertion of national autonomy and diversity.

By such deliberate, but sure means -- rather than by the old and cruelly cynical promises of "painless liberation" -- this Administration seeks to increase the range of freedom and national independence available to the peoples of Eastern Europe.

9. Within recent months in Rumania and Hungary we have seen positive evidence of the wisdom of these policies. Rumania has asserted a more independent attitude and has expanded its trade and other contacts with the West while a relaxation of the internal situation in Hungary is evident.
10. We recognize that this is not the work of a week, a month, or a year. We will achieve our ends only if we move ahead with patience and wisdom. But developments in Eastern Europe in the past few years have been encouraging. We remain confident that freedom is the true wave of the future and that heightened contact with the Free World effectively promotes our cause in Eastern Europe.

CONGO

Question: Why didn't we support the pro-Western, anti-Communist Tshombe in the Congo from the start instead of waiting until it may have been too late? How deeply committed are we going to get involved in the mess in the Congo?

Answer:

1. United States policy objective in the Congo today is the same as it was under President Eisenhower and has been since the country became independent in 1960: to help the Congolese Government maintain the independence, national unity and territorial integrity of that nation against internal disorders and communist subversion.
2. In 1961, 1962, and 1963, Mr. Tshombe opposed the goal of a unified Congolese Republic and favored the secession of Katanga Province. When he returned to the Congo in 1964 and dedicated himself for the first time to the objective of a strong central government of the nation, he received US support.
3. Our role in the Congo has been and will remain a limited one. In accordance with UN resolutions and our agreements with the Central Government, we have supplied limited military assistance, principally aircraft, vehicles and communications equipment and some technical aid to increase the mobility and effectiveness of the Congolese Government forces. We are anxious for the African states to assume primary responsibility for assisting the Congo to meet its problems at the earliest possible time.

CUBA

Question: What is the Administration doing to get rid of Castro's communist regime in Cuba? and how do we know the Russians haven't put nuclear missiles back in place there?

- Answer:
1. Administration leadership has played a key role in alerting the Western Hemisphere to the need to isolate Cuba, and many measures have been taken unilaterally and collectively to combat Cuba's effort to export subversion.
 2. Since January 1961:
 - (a) The American Republics at Punta del Este branded the Castro regime as an outlaw and declared his Marxist-Leninist regime incompatible with the Inter-American system.
 - (b) All of the American Republics joined with us in October 1962 in demanding the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and approved the immediate suspension of trade with Cuba in arms and war material.
 - (c) All of the American Republics have terminated the service of any of their airline or shipping lines to Cuba and they have cooperated in denying landing rights to charter flights to and from Cuba.
 - (d) There is no trade of any significance between the American Republics and Cuba.
 - (e) The Central American Ministers of Justice have established a system which tracks down and controls Castro activities, in Central America. We have provided communications and police equipment and training to make this system more effective.
 - (f) Brazil threw out the Communists who were trying to take over that Government and broke relations with Castro.
 - (g) The American Republics in July 1964 branded Castro an aggressor and recommended breaking remaining diplomatic relations with Cuba. As of September 1 only two countries in the Hemisphere retained such ties. In January 1961, 13 governments in the Hemisphere had relations with the Castro regime.

Altogether, in the three and one-half years of this Administration the American Republics have denied Castro moral and material support, have developed strong defenses against him, and have clearly warned him that his subversion and aggression must stop.

3. In contrast, the previous Administration was taken in by Castro in 1959. Even though his Communist connections were clear in 1959, it took no significant action against him until late in 1960. The OAS resolution of September 1960 which was intended to unite the Hemisphere against Castro's aggressive activities did not even mention Cuba.
4. As for the Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba, their withdrawal in the face of President Kennedy's firm demand in October 1962 was an important turning point in recent history. Since that confrontation, the Kremlin has abandoned nuclear sabre-rattling as an instrument of foreign policy. Both Castro and the Chinese Communists have complained bitterly about the Soviet retreat. To assure ourselves that all the missile sites in Cuba were abandoned -- and that no new missiles have been sent in -- we have conducted regular aerial reconnaissance of Cuba since late 1962 in the face of Castro's refusal to permit on-site inspection. We have confirming evidence from other sources. And we intend to continue to do everything necessary to insure that Cuba does not become again a base for Soviet nuclear power aimed at us or our neighbors.

CYPRUS

Question: Why have we been meddling unsuccessfully in the Cyprus dispute and why have we provided arms to both the Greeks and the Turks?

- Answer:
1. Greece and Turkey have been the strong eastern flank of the NATO Alliance. As they have become increasingly involved in the dispute between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island of Cyprus, the threat of a Greek-Turkish war loomed large. Such a war would be a catastrophe for NATO and could escalate into a major power conflict. Plainly, it has been in the interest of the United States to do what it can to prevent and contain the outbreak of violence on the island.
 2. Strenuous last-minute efforts by President Johnson probably prevented a Turkish invasion in June of 1964. Following visits to Washington by the chiefs of state of Greece and Turkey at the President's invitation, the United States offered its good offices, through the efforts of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, to assist the UN mediator in helping the parties at interest find a peaceful solution.
 3. The Administration has supported fully with funds and logistic support the UN Peacekeeping forces on the island.
 4. No responsible American administration could have done less. The weakening of the eastern flank of NATO would only serve to benefit the Soviet Union and could even result in Cyprus becoming a Mediterranean Cuba.
 5. United States military assistance to Greece and Turkey is aimed solely at strengthening our allies to resist possible Soviet aggression. The recipient nations have recognized the purposes for which such aid has been extended and have contracted to limit the use of such arms to objectives covered through the agreement -- principally for use against Communist aggression. To terminate such assistance would only weaken these countries militarily and prevent them from playing their full role in the NATO Alliance.

DISARMAMENT

Question: Hasn't the Administration followed a course of appeasement of communism through unilateral disarmament -- a blueprint for disaster?

- Answer:
1. No Administration, of either party, has sought to "unilaterally disarm America." To suggest otherwise is to impugn either the intelligence or the loyalty, or both, of President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and President Johnson.
 2. All efforts of this Administration to halt the nuclear arms race, or to reduce nuclear or conventional weapons are conditioned on the existence of verification procedures which will assure us of complete and detailed information at all times on the degree of Soviet compliance.
 3. Our inability to arrive at further arms reductions agreements with the Soviet Union results from the Soviet refusal to accept verification and safeguard procedures which we have and will continue to insist upon as the condition of our agreement.
 4. Meantime, our military strength is greater than it ever has been. We are now stronger than any aggressor, or any combination of possible aggressors. We are determined to maintain this dominant position as long as no truly effective, self-enforcing system of disarmament exists.

FOREIGN AID

Question: Hasn't our foreign aid program been -- too costly?
Responsible for our balance of payment problem?
Wasteful?
Competitive with free enterprise?
Promoted socialism or even communism abroad?

- Answer:
1. The present aid program represents less than 6/10 of 1% of the US gross national product, and less than 3 1/2% of the federal budget -- the lowest in terms of percentages since the program began in the 1940's.
 2. More than 80% of all aid dollars are spent for US goods and services (as opposed to less than half 5 years ago). The impact of the program on our balance of payments is thus a relatively minor factor -- far smaller, for example, than tourist expenditures or luxury imports.
 3. The present aid program is a well-run, selective one. Its administration has been streamlined and invigorated. Fourteen recipient countries are now in the process of transition from depending on aid to relying on more normal sources of lending and investment.
 4. The aid program from 1961 to 1964 has placed more emphasis than ever before on private investment in less developed countries and on participation in foreign aid programs of private resources. An advisory committee has been formed to achieve even more effective utilization of private business in aid.
 5. The Administration has continued assistance programs, which were in effect under the Eisenhower Administration, to a few countries where government controls certain industries only when they are vital to the struggle against communism. Aid has never been given to Russia, China and other countries clearly under communist rule, and such assistance is now prohibited by law.

FRANCE AND DE GAULLE

Question: Why have our relations with de Gaulle and France, our great wartime allies, been allowed to fall into such a bad state of repair since 1961?

Answer:

1. There is no significant difference between France and the United States as to the fundamental objective of a free and peaceful world.
2. Since 1961 France has supported our position and cooperated with us fully in the great crises which arose because of the Soviet missile threat in Cuba and Communist obstruction and threats in Berlin.
3. As with all proud and free countries, there are disagreements between us. They are largely ones of means, not of goals.
4. Most of the points in disagreement between us arose before 1961 -- the French still remind us of our failure to support them in Viet-Nam against the Communists in 1954 and our opposition at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 -- under a Republican Administration.
5. The French independent nuclear deterrent program, which we have not supported from its origin, began in 1956.
6. There is no breakdown of communication between us. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have met with President de Gaulle. There has been a regular flow of communications between them by letter, by emissaries and through normal diplomatic channels.

HOT LINE

Question: Why did the Administration alienate proven Allies by opening a "hot line" first to Moscow with a sworn enemy rather than with a proven friend?

- Answer:
1. The question indicates complete ignorance of the purpose and meaning of the Washington-Moscow "hot line."
 2. The "hot line" is needed precisely and only because the Soviet Union is our opponent. Its purpose is to lessen the risk of accidental nuclear war by allowing prompt, precise communications of our purpose and our determination in times of crisis. The need for such a line was demonstrated during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when communications with Moscow lagged dangerously.
 3. None of our allies have been "alienated" by the creation of the line. To the contrary, the proposal was discussed in advance with the NATO Council and received our allies' overwhelming approval.
 4. We are in close and constant contact with our allies through traditional channels as well as the most modern technical means of communication.

INDONESIA

Question: Why have we continued to aid Sukarno?
Why did we help him take over West New Guinea from our old ally, the Dutch?

Answer:

1. We are not supplying Indonesia with military equipment. Economic aid has been curtailed greatly and is now limited largely to people-to-people programs, mostly humanitarian or educational. These have served to maintain valuable ties with the Indonesian people -- not to bolster Sukarno.
2. By quiet and skillful mediation the United States helped to avert a Dutch-Indonesian war and to bring a peaceful settlement in a situation in which The Netherlands had clearly indicated its desire to withdraw from West New Guinea with dignity and appropriate safeguards. Only the Communists would have gained from a war between Indonesia and The Netherlands.
3. The settlement of the West New Guinea dispute has greatly improved relations between Indonesia and The Netherlands, and there is no evidence whatever it has prejudiced the interests of the primitive tribes in West New Guinea.

LAOS

Question: Why did we recognize communist gains in Laos by entering into agreement with the communists at Geneva and then weakly accept communist violations?

Answer:

1. In January 1961, the Democratic Administration inherited an acute crisis in Laos; the communists were advancing steadily across the country and total defeat was imminent. The free forces were badly split between neutralists and anti-communists.
2. The alternatives were to negotiate a ceasefire and establish a tripartite neutralist government, to place American combat troops in all-out jungle war in Laos, or to abandon Laos to the Communists. The Administration wisely chose the first course.
3. When the communist forces resumed open aggression in 1964, Administration support for the forces of freedom was swift and decisive.
4. Despite continued threats of communist aggression the non-communist forces in Laos are stronger today, their political position more unified, and their hopes for the future greater than they were at the end of 1960.

NASSER AND ISRAEL

Question: Why do we continue to aid Nasser in spite of his aggressive policy towards Israel?

Answer:

1. In the Near East, peace is the goal of the Administration. The US opposes aggression or the threat of force against any country. It has been a source of satisfaction to the Administration that the period from 1961 to date has been one of relative calm in the area.
2. Cutting off all aid to the Arabs is no way to help Israel. If we are to pursue effectively our national goal of promoting genuine Arab-Israeli peace, we must try to maintain good relations with the Arab states as well as Israel or our influence would be nil.
3. Our aid program is designed to help the Egyptian people, not Nasser, and it is strictly limited in nature. In the last fiscal year, the program totalled about \$181 million, of which an estimated \$179.6 represents surplus agricultural products for humanitarian purposes to increase the food consumption of the Egyptian people. It would be absurd to think that we could alter Nasser's policies by cutting off this program.

NATO

Question: Has NATO been weakened in the last 4 years by our failure to consult and to support our allies on critical issues and by our willingness to negotiate with the Communists behind their backs?

Answer:

1. NATO is far stronger today than in 1960: (a) NATO combat-ready ground forces in the European heartland have increased more than 50%; (b) overall NATO European defense spending has increased by more than 25% and by the end of 1964, it will be 35% higher than in 1960; (c) tactical nuclear weapons delivery in Western Europe has increased 60%; and (d) land-based missile nuclear delivery systems by more than 100%.
2. No Administration has ever maintained more complete and cordial consultations with its allies. In the first 8 months in office, President Johnson held 33 substantive meetings with 24 officials of 11 European allies.
3. During the most recent full quarter, April through June 1964, the NATO Council consulted on 25 major matters--including such vital questions as Cyprus, Cuba, and Southeast Asia--and the United States, alone or with others, initiated 11 of these discussions. During the same period, the NATO Political Advisers Committee discussed 76 subjects. During the past two years, high policy-level officials of the US have gone to NATO Council meetings on 15 separate occasions to report on and discuss major world problems. In short, consultation with our allies is both extensive and intensive.
4. Berlin has been kept free and strengthened; the Autobahn has been cleared of Soviet obstructions; Soviet missiles have been removed from Cuba, and Castro has been increasingly isolated -- through successful US cooperation with its allies.
5. On all occasions on which we have had negotiations with the Communists, we have kept our allies fully informed at all stages, and each of the small but important steps we have taken to improve the chances of peace has had virtually unanimous support within the alliance.
6. In the United Nations, since 1961, the US has voted more often on major substantive issues with the majority of its NATO partners than has any other member of the alliance.

NO WIN

Question: Why is the Administration following a "no win" foreign policy in its relations with the Communist world?

Answer:

1. The only "no win" policy the Administration has pursued is a policy of "no win for communism or aggression".
2. Twelve new states have achieved independence since January, 1961, and all have chosen freedom over communism.
3. The Communists have failed to take over any state, since Cuba turned Communist in 1959 during the Eisenhower Administration.
4. In the last 4 years the Sino-Soviet split has deepened and led to open feuding between Moscow and Peiping, with resulting splits in national Communist parties everywhere.
5. Those who talk of "winning" and of "victory" in foreign affairs have given the American people neither a definition of what they mean nor any idea of how they would achieve it. Their only prescription seems to be to "get tough," and thus to face the United States and the rest of the civilized world with nuclear devastation.

PANAMA

Question: Weren't riots in Panama earlier this year caused by foolish U.S. policies? and made worse by the vacancy in the post of U.S. Ambassador?

Answer: 1. As the report of the International Commission of Jurists amply demonstrated, the United States was in no way responsible for the riots in Panama last January. Rather, as this report shows, the United States acted properly and with restraint throughout the entire disturbance.

2. The absence of Ambassadors to Panama and the OAS had nothing to do with the violence in Panama or its aftermath. The President acted with dispatch and firmness in dealing with this issue, including the sending of high level U.S. officials to Panama immediately. As a result relations with Panama were resumed and discussions have been initiated, with the interests of the United States completely protected and on a basis that permits full exploration of outstanding issues and their peaceful resolution.

SOVIET WHEAT DEAL

Question: How can we expect others not to deal with Castro, when we sell large volumes of wheat to Khrushchev?

Answer:

1. Khrushchev's need to buy wheat from the United States and the Western countries was a dramatic admission of the failure of Soviet agriculture.
2. This Administration has strongly exerted US leadership in preventing sales of strategic materials to any communist country. Like the Eisenhower and Truman Administrations, it has seen no reason to stop American businessmen from conducting peaceful trade, in cases where the Communists could easily obtain the goods elsewhere anyway.
3. The wheat sales resulted in the transfer of 1.7 million tons of surplus wheat, which cost US taxpayers an estimated annual storage charge of \$8.2 million to store, for \$140 million hard cash, much of it from scarce Soviet gold reserves.
4. While we would have been prepared to extend normal commercial credit guarantees for the purchase, the Soviets did not ask for credit. The deal was made for prompt cash payment. We consider it better for the Soviets to "eat" their gold reserves rather than to turn them into weapons and missiles.
5. Before Castro, virtually all Cuba's imports came from the Free World and represented more than 30% of its gross national product. In 1958, 80% of Cuba's trade was with the Free World; in 1963 only 15%. Cuba now depends on the Soviet bloc to maintain its economic viability. The drain on Soviet resources, already stretched thin, amounts to an estimated \$1 million a day to maintain Cuba as a going concern. The Soviet Union, while it has increasingly entered world markets in recent years, for political and other reasons, is virtually self-sufficient economically, and its foreign trade amounts to only 3 or 4% of its gross national product. Thus, the capability of the Free World to affect internal economic developments through policies of trade restriction are vastly different for Cuba and for the Soviet Union. In Cuba, the effects have been significant; in the Soviet Union, they would be negligible.

STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY

Question: After all the criticism we have heard, how can we be confident of the security of those who work in the Foreign Service and the State Department?
Why is the Department trying to fire its security officer, Mr. Otto Otepka?

- Answer:
1. The State Department's and the Foreign Service's practices and procedures have been continually strengthened under the present Administration. Officers, both in this country and abroad, have become more proficient in all phases of personnel and physical security. Important advances have been made in the safeguarding of intelligence information.
 2. Mr. Otepka, who was brought into the State Department in 1953 by Scott McLeod, Chief of Security, gave the following testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security on November 16, 1961:

"MR. SOURWINE. There was a time when there was a considerable problem respecting subversives in the Department. Has this also become now a relatively minor matter?

"MR. OTEPKA. Sir, I would like to answer that question in this way: I consider myself experienced in and knowledgeable on the problem of Communists, communism, and all forms of subversion. If I thought that there were any Communists or subversives in the Department of State today, I would feel I had not performed my job properly.

"MR. SOURWINE. And your answer is, then, as far as you know, there aren't any?

"MR. OTEPKA. To the best of my knowledge there are no Communists in the Department."

3. Last year Mr. Otepka was charged with violations of State Department regulations and procedures involving unauthorized disclosure of certain classified information to Senate employees. His case is still pending at this time and he is being given all normal procedural safeguards and the usual rights of appeal.

UNITED NATIONS

Question: Why does the US Government foot the bill for the United Nations, when the Russians refuse to pay their share of the costs?

Answer: 1. The US contribution to the UN is fair. The US now produces 40% of the world's goods; pays 32% of the UN regular budget; 37% of current peacekeeping expenses, and 40% of the technical aid program. (The entire UN yearly budget is about one-third of the sums spent for chewing gum in the US annually).

2. The Administration has taken the lead in urging (1) payment of arrearages by the Soviets and other delinquent member states, and (2) invocation of penalties withdrawing voting rights from those states more than two years in arrears. We think these efforts will succeed.

US-USSR CONSULAR AGREEMENT

Question: How can a free America gain by the new consular agreement with the Soviet Union? and doesn't the agreement mean we recognize Soviet rule over the captive nations such as the Baltic States?

- Answer:
1. The consular agreement will afford the first effective protection available to the eight or ten thousand Americans now visiting the Soviet Union each year. At present there is no guarantee of notification by the Soviet government when US citizens are arrested, as in the case of Professor Barghoorn who was arrested in 1963, and detained for days before notice of his arrest was received. Others have been held incommunicado for weeks. The agreement also provides for access to prisoners by US consular officials within four days of arrest.
 2. The agreement has no bearing on the question of recognition. The United States government has always viewed the incorporation into the USSR of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as illegal.

VIET-NAM

Question: Why have we failed to win over communism in South Viet-Nam in spite of the expenditures of billions of dollars and the loss of 200 American lives?

Shouldn't we turn over the problem of winning to our military men?

Is the Administration going to negotiate with the Communists to end the fighting?

Should we turn the problem over to the UN?

Why don't we extend the war or get out?

- Answer:
1. The Administration has stood firm behind the commitment given to South Viet-Nam by President Eisenhower in 1954: "To assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong and viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion through military means".
 2. Since the present communist offensive against South Viet-Nam began in 1959, the US has gradually built up its advisory assistance role to help the Vietnamese people to meet the increasing threat.
 3. The acute crisis in Southeast Asia inherited by the Democratic Administration in January 1961 has not abated.
 4. President Johnson who met the unwarranted attack on our destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin swiftly, effectively and with measured response, has made our objective crystal clear. The President stated on August 4:

... "The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war..."

5. The communist offensive in South Viet-Nam is not limited to military means. It involves social, economic and other appeals. Our response to this challenge cannot be limited to military means if it is to succeed. But victory must depend primarily on the South Vietnamese people.

6. As far as negotiating for an end to the fighting is concerned, President Johnson stated our policy clearly at his July 24 press conference, when he said:

... "Other friends suggest that this problem must be moved to a conference table and, indeed, if others would keep the solemn agreements already signed at a conference table, there would be no problem in South Vietnam. If those who practice terror and ambush and murder will simply honor their existing agreements, there can easily be peace in Southeast Asia immediately. But we do not believe in a conference called to ratify terror, so our policy is unchanged..."

There is no reason to think that a new agreement to guarantee South Vietnam's independence and neutrality would be effective when existing ones are not.

7. The Administration has made clear from the start that it would be delighted to see the UN play a constructive role in Southeast Asia, and there would be an important UN contribution toward that end if the UN effort to settle the South Vietnam-Cambodia dispute is successful. Unfortunately, however, the UN has neither the intent nor the power to take on the job of stopping aggression by the Republic of Vietnam's neighbors to the North. As long as others are unable to do so and so long as our assistance is desired and useful, we will honor our commitment to help South Vietnam defend its independence.
8. Wider military action is not excluded, but if it is undertaken, it must proceed alongside progress within South Vietnam. Any decision to expand the war must take full account of all possible consequences of such action. As the President has stated:

"The US intends no rashness and seeks no wider war. But the US is determined to use its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression. We are a people of peace -- but not of weakness or timidity."

PART TWO: U.S. Defense Policy

ALLIES

Question: Senator Goldwater says we are "demoralizing our allies."
Is that true?

Answer: It is not true. Our Allies have increased their armed strength and the size of their defense budgets under the leadership of this Administration. The Secretary of Defense has emphasized these two points in frequent face to face discussions with the defense leaders of our Allies.

These discussions have paid off in substantial increases in the armed strength and defense budgets of our Allies. NATO is militarily stronger now than when this Administration took office.

Concrete proof that our Allies are not demoralized is evidenced by their increasing contribution to the NATO Alliance. Between the end of 1960 and the present time, NATO's combat equivalent divisions in the European heartland have been increased by more than 50%. Today there are available for the M-Day defense of the NATO area more than 40 divisions contributed by our Allies.

In the last two years West Germany's defense budget has increased by 50%; Denmark's defense budget has increased by 33%; Italy's defense budget has increased 28%; and Norway's defense budget has increased by 26%. By the end of this year, defense spending by all European members of NATO will be 35% higher than it was in 1960.

ANTI-MISSILE MISSILE

Question: Have we endangered security by downgrading efforts to perfect defenses against ballistic missiles?

Answer: No, on the contrary. This Administration has accelerated important ballistic missile defense programs. There are three key elements in defense against a missile attack:

- 1) strategic force that can effectively deter such an attack;
- 2) a vigorous civil defense program;
- 3) an anti-ballistic missile.

In all these areas, this Administration has made major improvements in the past four years.

Our capacity to retaliate with devastating effect against any nuclear attack has been increased significantly.

The first really effective civil defense program was started by this Administration after eliminating the boondoggles carried out by previous Administrations under the guise of civil defense.

A new anti-missile system - the NIKE X - is under development. It will provide major improvements over the NIKE-ZEUS program of the last Administration. NIKE-X will rely on a highly accelerated missile, an advanced aerial radar system, and components hardened to survive surprise attack. Total cost of the project is expected to reach \$1,500,000,000.

APPROPRIATIONS FOR NUCLEAR FORCE

Question: The Republicans says that our appropriations for strategic deterrent forces of all kinds have been declining steadily. Doesn't this mean we are getting weaker?

Answer: Our strategic deterrent forces are immeasurably stronger today than they were in 1961 because we have invested more money in them. This Administration, after reviewing the Strategic Retaliatory Force left us by the Republicans, immediately went to work to strengthen it. It badly needed strengthening, particularly because the force was excessively vulnerable to a surprise attack. We requested a huge increase in funds for Fiscal Years 1962 and 1963 (over \$2 billion more than the amount originally budgeted for FY 1962 by the Republican Administration). With this larger investment in our security we sharply expanded and accelerated vital missile programs such as the POLARIS and MINUTEMAN. We have brought into being a Strategic Retaliatory Force without peer in the world today.

Since 1961, this Administration has increased by 150% the number of nuclear warheads and has increased by 200% the total megatonnage in our Strategic Alert Forces.

By so increasing our Strategic Retaliatory Force budgets in the first two years of the Administration at rates far in excess of the last Republican budget, we added 200 more Atlas/Titans, 600 more Minutemen and 14 more Polaris submarines. This force will continue to increase. In view of our overwhelming strength in being, it has become possible to lower our Strategic Retaliatory Force budgets for the current and past fiscal year.

THE MIGHTIEST ARSENAL

Question: The Republicans are charging that this Administration inherited the "mightiest arsenal for the defense of freedom ever created" but that it has allowed this force to be depleted. How about it?

Answer: It is absolutely false to claim that our defense forces have been depleted.

This Administration has invested a total of \$30 billion more for defense during fiscal years 62-65 than would have been spent if we continued at the fiscal year 61 Republican level.

With this Administration's increased defense program, we have attained:

- A 150% increase in the number of nuclear warheads and a 200% increase in total megatonnage in our Strategic Alert Forces.
- A 60% increase in the Tactical Nuclear Force in Western Europe.
- A 45% increase in the number of combat-ready Army divisions.
- A 44% increase in the number of tactical fighter squadrons.
- A 75% increase in airlift capability.
- A 100% increase in ship construction to modernize our fleet.
- An 800% increase in the Department of Defense Special Forces trained for counterinsurgency.

These increases have enabled us to correct defects in our military forces that were clearly apparent when we took office.

The Republicans had allowed our conventional forces to deteriorate and by placing almost sole reliance on "massive retaliation" our hands were tied in case of limited war.

Our Strategic Forces were excessively vulnerable.

The Republican policy was first to decide our fiscal requirements and then to trim our defense to meet them, rather than to allow our dangers to decide our defense requirements and then fit our fiscal policies to meet them. Strategy under the prior Administration had become the hopeless offspring of an arbitrary budget ceiling.

Each military department went its own separate, often incompatible, way in planning and budgeting. For the Army, the Republicans foresaw a long war and stockpiled some supplies for two years, while for the Air Force, they saw a short war, and gave it supplies for only a few days.

Today our military power is incredibly stronger than it was 4 years ago and our planning is on a rational and coordinated basis.

BOMBERS

Question: What is the status of our strategic bomber force?
Are we weaker than the Soviets?

Answer: We have about a 4 to 1 superiority over the Soviets in bombers.

Today, we have more than 1,100 strategic bombers, many of them equipped with air-to-surface and decoy missiles to help them reach their designated targets. About half of them are maintained constantly on alert, ready to take off and fly to their targets should we be hit with a surprise missile attack.

The Soviet Union could, with difficulty, place over this country on 2-way missions slightly more than 100 heavy bombers, plus 150 medium bombers capable of striking only Canada and the northwestern corner of the United States.

BOMBERS IN THE 1970's

Question: Is it true that we may move into the 1970's without a single new manned bomber?

Answer: We will have manned bombers and plenty of them just as long as they are needed.

Our forward plans now go through Fiscal Year 1972. Those plans include large numbers of strategic bombers at every stage. No decision has been made about our needs beyond 1972 but we are making ample advance provision: (1) for possible extension of the life of the B-52, (2) for research in new manned systems, and (3) for possible strategic use of manned systems now in production, such as the F-111.

This Administration has provided funds and is conducting development studies and projects in the technology associated with a new manned bomber system, in order to have available the option for a new manned bomber if the national security requires it.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, our principal military advisers, have not recommended deployment of a new manned bomber.

They believe it desirable to concentrate on the development of associated technology, reserving the decision for a later date.

Exemplifying the achievements of this Administration in conveying forward the technology associated with a new manned bomber system, should the need for such a system be indicated, the XB-70 will fly this fall, the A-11 is already flying, and the SR-71 soon will be deployed to SAC. These planes are all MACH 3 aircraft built by this Administration for the Nation's defense. No other nation has any comparable planes.

COMPARISON OF U. S. AND SOVIET POWER

Question: The Republicans have charged that the policies of this Administration will lead to a "potentially fatal parity of power" with Communism instead of continued military superiority for the U.S. Are they right?

Answer: They are wrong. The United States today is by far the strongest power in the world. This Administration has taken steps to insure that it shall remain so.

In the past four years, the Democratic Administration has enlarged the United States lead in the nuclear field. It has also corrected major weaknesses in conventional forces left by a Republican Administration that had no answer to Communist threats short of "massive retaliation."

In less than four years, we have achieved:

- a 2,000% increase in the number of strategic missiles on hand in operational forces;
- 150% more nuclear warheads in the strategic alert forces;
- 60% more tactical nuclear forces deployed in Europe;
- 45% more combat-ready Army divisions;
- 44% more tactical fighter squadrons;
- the ability to airlift 75% more equipment and men;
- an 800% increase in Special Forces trained to deal with guerrilla warfare and to counterinsurgency.

Moreover, the Administration has launched a research and development effort without parallel in the world, designed to assure the qualitative supremacy of American arms in the years to come. We have increased our weapons research and development investment 50% over the level prevailing the last term of the Republican Administration. Through this 50% increase we have initiated 208 new weapons research and development projects including 77 weapons programs with cost exceeding \$10 million each.

COST EFFECTIVENESS

Question: Hasn't the budgetary concern of the Defense Department, its misuse of so-called "cost effectiveness", stifled initiative and imagination in the scientific and industrial communities involved in military production?

Answer: On the contrary, the cost-effectiveness program has stimulated the scientific and industrial communities. The program puts a premium on better products at lower costs. It has encouraged, not stifled, creativity. Under our cost effectiveness program, while insuring a dollar's worth of defense for every dollar spent, we have increased the strength and hitting power of our forces in being many fold.

For instance, we have achieved:

- a 150% increase in the number of nuclear weapons available in Strategic Alert forces;
- a 75% increase in airlift capacity;
- a 100% increase in procurement of tactical aircraft;
- a 2000% increase in the number of strategic missiles.

At the same time we have initiated 208 new weapons research and development programs to insure our armament superiority in the future.

DEFENSE BUDGETS

Question: How do recent defense budgets compare with that of the last year of Republican rule?

Answer:

	Fiscal Year	Amount (Billions)	Amount above Republicans (Billions)
Republican Defense Budget	1961	\$43	
Kennedy-Johnson Defense Budgets	1962	\$49	\$6
	1963	\$51	\$8
	1964	\$51	\$8
	1965	\$51	\$8
Increase over Republican levels			<hr/> \$30

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

Question: Is it true that Defense spending has declined in comparison with non-defense spending?

Answer: This Administration has invested a total of \$30 billion more for Fiscal Years 1962 through 1965 than would have been spent if we continued at the Fiscal Year 1961 Republican level.

With this Administration's far-sighted Defense programs, coupled with its insistence on a dollar's worth of Defense for every dollar spent, we have:

- Built the world's most powerful strategic missile force.
- Strengthened and revitalized our limited war forces.
- Initiated research programs to develop the weapons necessary to maintain our superiority in the years ahead.
- Reshaped our air and missile defenses to meet the changing threats, and embarked on the first really comprehensive civil defense program ever undertaken by the Nation.
- Improved the diversity, flexibility, mobility, and control of our military forces.

As a result, the President is no longer faced with only the alternatives of retreat or general war, but instead has available to him appropriate and flexible forces to meet each and every challenge across the entire spectrum of military conflict.

This is a record that needs no defending.

The fact that defense spending represents a slightly smaller portion of our total outlays means only that this Administration has taken positive action to meet pressing demands in civilian sectors of our national life -- for agriculture, education, housing and other fields that were largely ignored during the previous eight years.

DEFENSE POLICY

Question: What did the Democrats promise to do about defense before they took office?

Answer: In 1960, we pledged to the American people that:

"The new Democratic Administration will recast our military capacity in order to provide forces and weapons of a diversity, balance, and mobility sufficient in quantity and quality to deter both limited and general aggression."

In his Inaugural Address, President Kennedy set a goal for our new defense policy:

"Only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they never will be employed."

In his first State of the Union message, three years later, President Johnson reaffirmed this goal:

"We must be strong enough to win any war, and we must be wise enough to prevent one."

We have kept that pledge. As President Johnson stated on June 3, 1964 when he addressed the graduates of the Coast Guard Academy:

"We, as well as our adversaries, must stand in awe before the power our craft has created and our wisdom must labor to control. In every area of national strength America today is stronger than it has ever been before. It is stronger than any adversary or combination of adversaries. It is stronger than the combined might of all the nations in the history of the world.

"And I confidently predict that strength will continue to grow more rapidly than the might of all others.

.....

"Against such force the combined destructive power of every battle ever fought by man is like a firecracker thrown against the sun."

DEFENSE SAVINGS

Question: The Democratic Administration says it is spending more on defense than the Republicans did, yet claims we are saving money on defense. I am confused. How do you explain it?

Answer: We are spending more for our defenses than the Republicans did. And, as a result, we are more powerful than ever before.

At the same time, we are saving more because we are getting more for each dollar spent. The Defense Department has adopted a Cost Reduction program that has paid the taxpayer handsome dividends. It has three aspects:

- Buying only what we need.
- Buying at the lowest sound price.
- Reducing operating costs through standardization, termination of unnecessary operations and consolidation.

Under this program -- and while increasing our military strength -- we saved approximately \$2.5 billion during fiscal year 1964. We spent \$51 billion; we got what would have cost \$53.5 under old procedures. We expect these savings to rise to \$4.6 billion in 1968 and each year thereafter.

DISARMAMENT AND MILITARY JUDGEMENT

Question: Haven't we gone ahead with disarmament talks without taking military judgements into full account?

Answer: Absolutely not. In fact, we have taken significant steps to expand reliance on military judgements and expertise in the disarmament field. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been made a member of the Committee of Principals, the cabinet-level body that advises the President on disarmament. This arrangement assures that the views and technical advice of the Joint Chiefs reach the President directly.

Military officers participate in all phases of development of a U.S. position in the disarmament field. They work side-by-side with others in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Joint Chiefs have a Special Assistant for Arms Control matters. A military officer on the U.S. delegation in Geneva provides expert advice on all military aspects of disarmament.

LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN

Question: The Republicans say that a violation of the Test Ban Treaty would catch us unprepared. They say we haven't taken minimum safeguards, including advanced underground tests. Are they right?

Answer: They are wrong. When the Test Ban Treaty was being considered, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a set of stringent safeguards to reduce any risk to our security. The Joint Chiefs and our intelligence agencies agree that those safeguards have been implemented satisfactorily. In accordance with these safeguards, we have:

- 1) carried out an extensive series of underground tests aimed at adding to our knowledge and improving our weapons; planned an increased number of such tests for the coming year;
- 2) maintained modern laboratory facilities and programs which continue to generate fundamental knowledge of nuclear weapons technology;
- 3) nearly completed preparations for testing in the atmosphere should the President ever decide that such tests are necessary for the national security;
- 4) expanded and improved our system for detecting nuclear tests in the atmosphere or in space by other countries.

In short, we are doing what is necessary to move quickly should any potential enemy violate the Treaty.

MILITARY JUDGMENT IN VITAL SECURITY DECISIONS

Question: Is it true that important national security decisions are taken without consulting our top military professionals?

Answer: No. The stature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense, has markedly increased during the present Administration. The Chiefs have become more and more involved during the present Administration in the key defense areas of programming, budget and disarmament.

Through weekly meetings with the Secretary of Defense and frequent face to face contact with the President, they have been afforded a greater opportunity to present their views than during any previous Administration.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been made a member of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. This is the inner group established during the Cuban Missile Crisis which continues to advise the President on crucial matters, affecting the Nation's security. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is also now a member of the Committee of Principals for disarmament affairs.

President Kennedy clearly stated what this Administration expected and received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said:

"I expect their advice to come to me direct and unfiltered."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have fulfilled this obligation. I think it can be said that the bonds of confidence and understanding between this Administration's top civilian leaders and the Nation's top military professionals has never been stronger. To give you an example, in September 1962 General Lemnitzer stated --

"I have enjoyed throughout my tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a very close personal and working relationship with the Secretary of Defense and the President. My views and those of the other Chiefs have always been carefully considered. I do not pretend that our recommendations have always been adopted but all of us who make up the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had ample opportunity to make our views fully known, and I have personal knowledge that those views have always been thoroughly and most carefully considered."

General Taylor, General Lemnitzer's successor, stated in June 1963 --

"The voice of the American soldier is entitled to a serious hearing in our national councils -- and I am happy to report that today he receives that hearing. "

MILITARY STRENGTH

Question: How does the strength of our armed forces today compare with that of four years ago?

Answer: The regular strength of the Army has been increased by 100,000 men and the number of combat-ready divisions has gone up from 11 to 16, a 45% increase. Also, the regular strength of the Marine Corps has been increased by 15,000.

In the Air Force tactical fighter squadrons have been increased in number by 55 to 79, a 44% increase. Funds for airlift aircraft were increased by an average of 230% during fiscal year 62 through 64 compared to the last Republican budget. Actual airlift capacity has gone up 75%. In a few years actual airlift capacity will be four to five times greater than it was in 1961.

The Navy's active fleet has been increased from the 817 ships proposed in the last Republican budget to 883 now planned by the end of this fiscal year. There has been a 100% increase in ship construction to modernize the fleet.

In addition, special forces trained for counterinsurgency have been increased by 800%. More than 100,000 men have received special training for guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. We now have six Army Special Action Forces as well as Navy and Air Force units with special capabilities for counterinsurgency warfare. There are 344 mobile training teams at work in 49 countries helping local military forces through specialized training.

MILITARY USES OF SPACE

Question: Are the Republicans right -- has the Administration retarded study of space for possible military use while the Soviets move ahead in this field?

Answer: During its last year, the Eisenhower Administration spent \$1.5 billion for its entire space program. During the last fiscal year, the Democratic Administration spent that much on the military space program alone. We will invest \$6.5 billion in our total national space effort this fiscal year.

We have already produced a variety of earth satellite systems for military use -- navigation, communications, detection of nuclear tests, and others. To cite some other pertinent examples of our accomplishments:

- We have now undertaken a new major program, the Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL), designed to explore the military utility of man in space.
- We have well under development the Titan III, a new space booster, at a total cost of about \$800 million. This booster will provide a threefold increase in the payload which can be put in orbit by existing boosters.
- We are participating in the NASA Gemini program, including special experiments of military interest to be carried out by satellites launched in that program.
- We are working on a number of other space vehicles, large solid propellant motors, re-entry and recovery vehicles, and space guidance equipment.
- We have developed and are operating a system for identifying and tracking all objects in space.

We hope that outer space will never be used for military purposes. But if it is, we will be prepared.

There is not a single unmanned military mission in space that we are not either successfully carrying on or have under development. The Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) is designed to determine whether there are manned military missions in space.

By any criteria -- booster capability, number of satellites launched, number of successors -- we are ahead of the Soviets in space and we will stay ahead.

MISSILES

Question: What is the status of our nuclear missile force and how does it compare with that of the Soviets?

Answer: The superiority of our nuclear missile force is overwhelming.

-- We now have more than 800 fully armed, dependable ICBM's deployed on launchers, almost all in hardened and dispersed silos. This is about 160 times the number we had in January 1961. The Soviet Union has fewer than one-fourth this number, and fewer still in hardened silos.

-- Our Navy now has 250 POLARIS missiles deployed in 16 submarines; nine more POLARIS submarines are in commission; and 16 additional are under construction. The Soviet Union's submarine-launched ballistic missile fleet is, by comparison, small and ineffective.

-- Each of our POLARIS missiles is carried in a nuclear powered submarine -- but only a small percentage of Soviet ballistic missile submarines have nuclear power.

-- Each of our POLARIS missiles can be launched from beneath the surface. The Soviet's have no such operational missile.

-- Each of our POLARIS missiles has a range of 1500 miles or more. The range of Soviet submarine-launched missiles is less than one-third as much.

The power of these forces will soon be further increased by the addition of the new POLARIS A-3 missile and the new MINUTEMAN II. The MINUTEMAN II is as great an improvement over the MINUTEMAN I as the B-52 was over the B-47. It will be more than eight times as effective against the best protected military targets as its predecessor.

MISSILE RELIABILITY

Question: Are our missiles reliable?

Answer: The missile force we have programmed can be depended upon to carry out its military missions under all the conditions we can foresee.

The importance of the long-range missile to the defense of this country and the evaluation of their effectiveness by our leading military authorities is indicated by the strong support given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the missile program.

To this should be added the words of that great American, Chairman Carl Vinson, whose House Armed Services Committee made an intensive study of the dependability of our missiles.

Mr. Vinson said:

"...I am going to say at the outset that I, the Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force are all wholly persuaded that our missiles -- and I am particularly referring to our intercontinental ballistic missiles -- are fully capable of doing the job for which they were designed..."

"The Committee during its hearings this year went into the matter of reliability of missiles in great detail. I believe I can say without any hesitation whatsoever that every member of the Committee is of the view that I am expressing. . .

"No one contends that every single one of our missiles would lift from its pad or silo, travel unerringly to its target, and detonate. This would probably be similarly true of a similar number of aircraft, there would be malfunctions in any mechanical device. This is inevitable.

"But a sufficiently large number of our very numerous missiles would lift off, would make the proper trajectory, and would hit the selected target..."

The Republican candidate himself stated on January 30, 1964:

"We've got one that can hit the men's room in the Kremlin."

NATO

Question: What, if anything, has been done to strengthen the NATO alliance?

Answer: With our steady encouragement, our NATO allies have increased their own efforts. Since January 1961, NATO's European members have increased their defense spending by 25%. By the end of this year that increase will be 35% above the level of 1960. Our allies are able to contribute more than 40 divisions for European defense. In four years NATO's combat-ready ground forces have increased by more than 50%.

The United States has reequipped its Army in Europe with the most modern equipment and improved weapons missiles such as the PERSHING, SERGEANT, MACE and HAWK; new planes such as the F-104; and improved artillery such as 175 mm self-propelled howitzer. The equipment for two divisions and 10 supporting units has been prepositioned in Europe and our increased ability to air-lift troops to man this equipment has been successfully tested in exercise BIG LIFT.

We have continually encouraged creation of an effective nuclear deterrent within NATO. We have committed 15 POLARIS nuclear missile submarines to NATO. We have recently proposed the Multilateral Nuclear Force which is now under consideration by all NATO members. We have provided training to our NATO allies in the use of nuclear weapons. Our tactical nuclear weapons deployed to Europe have increased 60% in less than four years. We have deployed much of the increase for support of NATO forces. In the event of war many of these weapons will be made available to our allies whose weapons systems are prepared to deliver them.

The NATO alliance has been greatly strengthened in the last four years by our continual encouragement and accomplishment of increased coordination and cooperation by all NATO members in NATO planning, joint training, and operations. We will continue our firm and successful efforts to strengthen the NATO alliance.

NEW WEAPONS

Question: Is it true that not one new major weapon system has been developed since the Eisenhower Administration?

Answer: It is not true. We have begun a number of new weapons systems in all areas -- strategic, general purpose, and counterinsurgency.

Strategic

In the strategic area, three new weapons systems are the MINUTEMAN II, the NIKE-X, and the SR-71. These are so different in capability from their predecessors as to provide major changes in our offensive and defensive capacities. The MINUTEMAN II intercontinental ballistic missile will be more than 8 times as effective against military targets as the MINUTEMAN I developed under the previous Administration. It will have twice the accuracy and 30% more payload than MINUTEMAN I. It is as great an improvement over MINUTEMAN I as the B-52 over the B-47.

The new NIKE X is almost a completely new anti-ballistic missile system with many times the effectiveness of NIKE-ZEUS.

The SR-71 aircraft reconnaissance system is the most advanced in the world. The plane will fly at more than three times the speed of sound. It will operate at altitudes in excess of 80,000 feet, and use the most advanced reconnaissance equipment in the world. The first operational SR-71 will begin flight testing in early 1965 and deployment of production units to SAC will begin shortly thereafter.

General Purpose

In general purpose forces, major new full-scale developments initiated in the past three years include:

--- The F111A, which will provide the Air Force with a tactical fighter bomber of more than double the range and several times the payload previously available and the F111B which will greatly improve the Navy's fleet air defense capabilities.

---The LANCE surface-to-surface tactical missile, which will replace the HONEST JOHN with a five-fold improvement in accuracy, giving us an effective high explosive as well as nuclear capability at that range for the first time.

---The A7A aircraft, which will give the Navy superior attack capability at more than double the range of the A4E it will replace.

---The MAIN battle tank under joint development with the Federal Republic of Germany, which will provide our forces with better cross-country maneuver capability, weigh less, and incorporate greater fire power than the M-60 tank.

---The SEA HAWK, a new surface ship for ASW, that can be operational in the 1970's.

---The EX-10, a new type of torpedo for use against deep diving fast nuclear submarines.

---The WALLEYE air-to-surface guided missile which will hit targets at ranges up to 25 miles away from the launching aircraft with an accuracy of a few feet -- a vast improvement.

---The TOW, heavy assault weapon, a wire-guided advanced anti-tank missile system, much more effective than the anti-tank weapons now in the inventory.

Space

In the military space program, we have

---Begun and are halfway through the development of the TITAN III standardized space booster which will permit a three-fold increase in the payload which can be put in orbit by existing boosters.

---Developed numerous special payloads for earth satellite systems.

---Started the Manned Orbital Laboratory, a space station program to investigate the need for and the value of a manned military space flight capability.

Counterinsurgency

In counterinsurgency development, new hardware items are measured in the hundreds. A simple measure of activity here is the fact that funding in this area has increased from less than \$10 million per year in 1960 to the \$103.4 million requested for FY 1965.

NEWS MANAGEMENT

Question: We hear that the Administration and the Defense Department try to "manage the news" in military matters. Any truth to that?

Answer: The charge of "news management" is an insult to the energetic, imaginative and able reporters who write on military affairs. More than a score of experienced reporters cover the Department of Defense. Some of them, like Pulitzer Prize winner Mark Watson of the BALTIMORE SUN, have been writing about military affairs for many years. They are as informed, and often better informed, about military matters as many of the Pentagon's official family. It is absurd to think that the Administration could "manage" their efforts to cover the news, even if it wanted to.

There has been no other period when as much information about the Defense Department's activities and operations has been made available to the public. The Secretary of Defense has held scores of news conferences, briefings and other meetings with newsmen. And, for the first time in Department of Defense history, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs has introduced a series of regular press briefings. These have been frank give-and-take sessions at which direct and continuing access to departmental officials is provided.

Moreover, the operations and policies of the Defense Department are regularly exposed and explained by responsible officials to a variety of committees of the U.S. Congress. The major part of that testimony is made public. In 1963, transcripts of testimony by Defense officials covered nearly 40,000 pages.

This Administration believes the American people should be as fully informed as possible in all matters of public interest and concern. It does not consider "news management" either desirable or possible. One of the ablest reporters in Washington, James Reston, of THE NEW YORK TIMES, has described the real situation:

"The official who is informed at point of crises is more available today than he has been at any time in the 20 years I have been in this town."

NON-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN MILITARY PURCHASES

Question: The Republicans claim that non-military considerations, political and economic, have been allowed to reverse professional military judgment on the purchases of weapons and equipment. They cite the TFX, the X-22, and the nuclear carrier. Are these charges well-founded?

Answer: No they are not. Defense decisions are not based on political, economic or other extraneous considerations. Underlying the Secretary of Defense decision on the TFX were these prime factors: which contractor was likely to provide the best plane, in the least time, and at the lowest cost. General Dynamics, in my judgment and in the judgments of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, was the contractor most likely to meet these goals.

Specifically, General Dynamics was selected over Boeing because its proposal gave the most valid promise of obtaining a single airplane to meet both Navy and Air Force requirements with (1) the least expensive, time consuming research and development effort before production; (2) the least reliance upon unknown processes and materials; (3) the earliest delivery to our fighting forces; (4) the highest level of experience in building fighter-type aircraft; (5) the greatest use of proven design techniques and methods; and (6) the best understanding of the requirements and difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and producing a fighter-type aircraft.

In the cast of the X-22, designs of both Bell and Douglas were acceptable. Bell was chosen because that company had experience with the type aircraft under development while Douglas had not built such a plane.

It was decided to defer construction of a nuclear aircraft carrier and use conventional power because:

- experience showed the former would cost almost \$160 million more to procure and annual operating costs would be double that of a conventional carrier.

- full benefit of a nuclear carrier could not be realized until nuclear escorts were available. Nuclear-powered escort ships are also much more costly to procure and operate than their conventionally-powered counterparts.

These factors were recognized by the previous Administration and were used by President Eisenhower in his recommendation to Congress in 1960 that the next carrier be powered conventionally.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Question: Is Senator Goldwater right when he claims that under present policies our nuclear capacity in the 1970's may be 90% less than it is today?

Answer: He is completely wrong. First, this allegation is based not only on inaccurate figures, but also on an incorrect view of our current strategic force plans, which provide for continued operation of bombers as far ahead as our plans extend. Second, but all important, raw megatonnage is not and never has been the measure of destructive power. This power is measured in terms of warheads, of sufficient size to destroy the targets for which they are intended, and actually delivered on that target. The fact is that many of our earlier nuclear weapons, though offering larger yield, were inefficient and more vulnerable to surprise attack. They were also more difficult to deliver on target. For these reasons, they gave us less usable destructive power.

For example -- in 1960, there was a substantial number of obsolete nuclear bombs of large yield in our stockpile. The bombs had to be delivered from bombers flying at high altitude because of their tremendous blast, but as the Soviets improved and added to their surface-to-air missile defenses, our bombers had to change their tactics to reach their targets. Our military planners also found that by loading our bombers with several smaller bombs we could destroy not only the original targets but other targets as well, even though the total megatonnage of the bomb load was a fraction of the single large bomb.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended unanimously that the obsolete large bombs be eliminated and replaced by modern weapons. The recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was approved by Secretary of Defense Gates and by President Eisenhower in the summer of 1960 and reaffirmed by President Kennedy in 1961.

The retirement of these obsolete large bombs and their replacement by a larger number of more modern but smaller yield weapons resulted in a large decrease in the megatonnage of our nuclear stockpile. This reduction did not, however, decrease our nuclear strength. On the contrary, it resulted in a substantial increase in the nuclear destruction which can be visited on enemy targets.

The crucial question about a nuclear arsenal, in short, is not the number of megatons it contains but the kind and number of delivery systems able to get the warheads of required size to their assigned

targets. In this regard, the portion of our bomber force on constant alert has increased from less than one-third to one-half. More than 200 Atlas and Titan ICBM's have been added, two-thirds of them in dispersed underground silos. Most important, more than 600 Minuteman ICBM's have been added, all in underground silos and widely dispersed. Fourteen more Polaris submarines have been deployed with the fleet. The net result is a 150% increase in alert weapons and a 200% increase in the explosive power on alert. Above all, a vulnerable force has been replaced with a balanced force, much of which we can count on to survive a nuclear attack and be able to retaliate and destroy an enemy's military forces and society. These improvements will be continued. In 1970, we will be capable of delivering on target $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as many warheads as we had in 1961 and a greater number than we have today.

PUBLIC RELATIONS "GIMMICKS" IN DEFENSE

Question: Senator Goldwater has indicated that this Administration has used "public relations gimmicks" in presenting versions of a single reconnaissance plane as a series of new weapons systems. What is the story?

Answer: The Senator undoubtedly is referring to recent announcements concerning the A-11 and SR-71. The A-11 is a development project for a missile-carrying interceptor. The SR-71 is a development, production and deployment program at a total cost in excess of \$1 billion for an aircraft for the Strategic Air Command. They are not the same plane. The SR-71 is about 20% heavier and can fly 70% farther than the A-11. They are two different weapons systems.

QUALITY VS. QUANTITY IN MILITARY POWER

Question: Has quantitative strength in military power been used to conceal qualitative weakness?

Answer: In addition to our overwhelming quantitative superiority, the armed might of the United States is now and will remain qualitatively superior to that of any enemy. For example, our intercontinental missiles are fast-reacting, solid fuel Minutemen compared to the slower reacting liquid fuel missiles of the Soviet Union. Polaris submarines are vastly superior in performance to Soviet underwater craft; moreover their armament -- the Polaris missile itself -- is more dependable and has greater range than anything the USSR can put to sea in the foreseeable future. American strategic bombers are superior in most performance characteristics to their Soviet counterparts.

In addition, we are spending large sums for additional research and weapons development to insure that qualitative improvement continues.

By raising false alarms over alleged qualitative weakness, the Republicans seem to be trying to draw attention away from the hard fact that the military weaknesses of 1960 have been corrected in four short years of Democratic rule.

In the absence of a reliable and generally accepted program of disarmament that is self-enforcing, we propose to insure continuing American superiority in the military, in quantity and quality.

REDUCTION IN U. S. MILITARY POWER

Question: Has there been any reduction in strength of "the most powerful military force of all time" inherited from the previous Administration?

Answer: Our military strength has never been greater than it is today. As President Johnson has said: "In every area of national strength, America today is stronger than it has ever been before. It is stronger than any adversary or combination of adversaries. It is stronger than the combined might of all the nations in the history of the world. Against such force the combined destructive power of every battle ever fought is like a firecracker thrown against the sun."

When the present Democratic Administration took office in January, 1961, our Nation's defense had been weakened by the Republican "More Bang for the Buck" philosophy which had substituted a slogan for strength and left the Nation:

1. Alarmingly weak in combat-ready ground and air forces to meet challenges less than all-out nuclear war. It was as if we had a fire department which could put out a fire only by blowing up the house.
2. Our strategic aircraft and a limited missile force were exposed, vulnerable, and therefore less credible as a deterrent to aggression.
3. National strategy and defense power were the neglected stepchild of arbitrary budget ceilings imposed by the Republican policy makers.
4. Each military department was left to develop its own planning and budgeting, which was incompatible with the planning of the other services.

The United States has spent \$30 billion more for defense in the past four years than would have been invested if the level of defense outlays during the final year of Republican administration had been maintained. As a result of this increased defense spending, the Democratic Administration has:

1. Increased the superiority of our Strategic Forces, thereby deterring a Soviet nuclear attack.

Items: 150% more nuclear warheads in our Strategic Alert Force with an explosive power 200% greater;

An intercontinental missile force 4 time as large as that of the Soviet Union;

More than 1,000 ICBM's and Polaris missiles, compared with less than 100 four years ago.

2. Eliminated major weaknesses in our conventional forces, thereby discouraging lesser forms of Communist aggression.

Items: 45% more combat-ready Army divisions;

44% more tactical fighter squadrons;

a tactical nuclear force in Europe 60% larger than before;

75% more in airlift capability;

ship construction and conversion up 100%.

3. Increased by 800% our Special Forces trained for counterinsurgency.
4. Assured weapons superiority for the future by increasing research and development funds by 50% over the level prevailing during the last four years of the previous Administration and starting 208 new programs.

Items: SR-71 - long-range, manned strategic military reconnaissance aircraft capable of speeds exceeding 2,000 miles per hour;

Minuteman II - ICBM eight times more effective than its predecessor;

NIKE-X - anti-missile missile;

F-111 - fighter-bomber with double the range and several times the payload of existing models.

(See also replies under Research and Development)

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Question: Why has the Administration neglected the development of new weapons?

Answer: It hasn't. The fact is that this Administration on an average has spent 50% more for military research and development than the previous Republican Administration during its last four years. In the past four years, this Administration has initiated 208 major new research and development projects, 77 of which have costs exceeding \$10 million each. Some important new military systems started under the Kennedy-Johnson Administration are:

-- The MINUTEMAN II intercontinental ballistic missile, which will be more than eight times as effective against military targets as the MINUTEMAN I developed under the previous Administration.

-- The SR-71, a long-range, high altitude, manned supersonic strategic military reconnaissance aircraft, which employs the most advanced observation equipment in the world and flies at over 2,000 miles per hour and over 80,000 feet.

-- The new NIKE-X, which will give us the option to deploy -- if the national security requires it -- the best antiballistic missile yet conceived by any nation.

-- The revolutionary variable sweep winged F-111 fighter-bomber, a supersonic aircraft which was double the range and several times the payload previously available in fighter-bomber aircraft.

-- The new A7A aircraft, which will give the Navy superior attack capability at more than double the range of the A4E that it will replace.

-- The LANCE surface-to-surface tactical missile, which will replace the HONEST JOHN with a five-fold improvement in accuracy, giving us an effective high explosive as well as a nuclear capability at that range for the first time.

-- The new MAIN Battle Tank, under joint development with West Germany, which will provide our forces with better cross-country maneuver capability, weigh less, and incorporate greater firepower with a higher first-round probability than the M-60.

-- The SEA HAWK, a new surface ship for anti-submarine warfare that can be operational in the 1970's and will incorporate greatly improved sonar, propulsion, and data-processing capability.

-- The EX-10, a heavy, new type of torpedo for use against deep diving, fast, nuclear submarines, which will replace the MARK 37-1.

-- The WALLEYE air-to-surface guided missile, designed to hit targets at ranges up to 25 miles away from the launching aircraft with an accuracy of a few feet -- a vast improvement over current weapons.

-- The TOW heavy assault weapon -- a wire-guided advanced anti-tank missile system accurate both at short and very long ranges and suitable for infantry use will be much more effective than the anti-tank weapons now in inventory.

-- The MANNED ORBITAL LABORATORY (MOL), designed to explore the military utility of man in space.

-- The TITAN III, a new space booster, which will provide a threefold increase in the payload which can be put in orbit by existing boosters.

-- The new hardware items for counterinsurgency, largely ignored by the previous Administration, are now measured in the hundreds. A simple measure of progress in this field is the fact that funding in this area has increased from less than \$10 million per year in 1960 to the \$103.4 million requested for Fiscal Year 1965.

Moreover, this Administration has concentrated our research and development effort in those areas most important to our military strategy by eliminating from the program a large number of expensive projects which had long since been overtaken by events or had long since lost their promise of success.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (2)

Question: The Republican candidate says that our military research and development has increased by less than 15% in each of the past three years and by only close to 10% this year. Does this mean we are falling behind in military research?

Answer: Quite the contrary. This Administration is pursuing a vigorous Research and Development Program, unparalleled in the world today.

208 major research projects have been started, including 77 weapons programs costing more than \$10 million each.

The research and development expenditures of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration compared to those of the last four years of the Eisenhower Administration are as follows:

<u>Eisenhower Administration</u>		<u>Kennedy-Johnson Administration</u>	
<u>FY</u>	<u>Millions \$</u>	<u>FY</u>	<u>Millions \$</u>
1958	2,504	1962	6,319
1959	2,866	1963	6,376
1960	4,710	1964	6,943
1961	<u>6,131</u>	1965	<u>6,580*</u>
Total	16,211	Total	26,218
Average	4,053	Average	6,554

Percent increase FY 1962-1965 over FY 1958-1961 equals 61.7

*Estimates based on FY 1965 Budget (U)

In other words, as Secretary McNamara stated in his letter of April 18, 1964 to Congressman Laird:

"In fact our expenditures on research and development since 1961 have averaged well over 50 percent higher than in the four preceding years."

SOVIET NUCLEAR STRENGTH

Question: Is it true that we are falling behind the Soviets in the strength of our nuclear forces?

Answer: Nothing could be further from the truth. We have widened the lead we had. Right now, the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile force is more than four times as large as that of the Soviet Union.

Some key items of comparison between U.S. and Soviet strength:

the U.S. has over 800 ICBM's deployed in launchers, almost all in hardened and dispersed silos; this is more than four times the number the Soviets have;

we have more than 1100 strategic bombers; we estimate the Soviets could with difficulty send slightly more than 100 heavy bombers over this country on 2-way missions, plus 150 medium bombers capable of striking Canada and the northwestern corner of U.S.;

we have 256 POLARIS missiles deployed in 16 nuclear submarines, with 9 more subs in commission and 16 more are under construction; the Soviets have substantially fewer submarines capable of launching missiles, which cannot be launched from underwater and, in any case have a range less than one-third that of the POLARIS missile.

At no time during the 1960's or 1970's do we foresee circumstances in which our forces will be less than sufficient to absorb an initial surprise attack and still be capable of destroying the Soviet Union.

UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

Question: The Republicans say we are disarming ourselves. Are we?

Answer: We are not. Defense expenses have been \$30 billion more than they would have been if the rate of spending of the last Republican budget had been followed. With its increased defense program, this Administration has attained among other things:

- 150% increase in the number of nuclear warheads and a 200% increase in the total nuclear power in our strategic alert forces;
- 60% increase in the tactical nuclear force in Europe;
- 45% increase in the number of combat-ready divisions;
- 44% increase in the number of tactical fighter squadrons;
- 100% increase in ship construction;
- 800% increase in the special forces trained for counterinsurgency.

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*In aid
W.F. Pop.*

COPY

December 7, 1964

Mr. Henry J. Mali
257 Fourth Avenue
New York 10, New York

Dear Mr. Mali:

Thank you for your interesting letter relating to the question of planned parenthood.

The question of ever-expanding world population is indeed a most serious one. I appreciate having your thoughts and observations on the subject.

Best wishes.


Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey

HENRY J. MALI
257 FOURTH AVE.
NEW YORK 10, N. Y.

November 27, 1964

Senator Hubert Humphrey
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.



Dear Mr. Humphrey:

I have recently finished reading your interesting book "War on Poverty". As a conservative business man who has lived in New York City for sixty years, I am in agreement with a number of your conclusions; even though they call for sizable expenditures.

However, I thought it might be of interest to call your attention to a field of remedial action which is completely ignored in your book. In the very beginning you quote several cases described by an experienced social worker in which one unfortunate person says (in part) -- "I have two children in high school. The rest of my children ... can't go to school because they are unable to have shoes" -- and another unfortunate person who says (in part) "when I left home this morning there were five children who were hungry, etc." Just who decided how many children these unfortunate people were going to have? And do you really think that they wanted each and every one they got? Those of us who have been vitally interested in the field of planned parenthood for many years know that this is definitely not the case. The intelligent people plan their families within reason -- the poor, the stupid, the ignorant do not know how. So they get the unwanted children in droves; very, very often against their wishes or better judgment.

It has undoubtedly been a risky thing for a politician to even mention Planned Parenthood in any direct or indirect fashion in the past, but I would like to submit to you that the tide in recent years is changing very fast, in fact it has changed. I think that it is now more than likely that

HENRY J. MALI

Senator Hubert Humphrey

November 27, 1964

any courageous politician who takes a bold position on the question -- after careful study -- will get a very large following -- at least of the more thoughtful and articulate taxpayers. I believe many of us are not as uneasy at the proposal to make large expenditures, as we are disturbed by the question of who will make these expenditures and how wisely, fairly and constructively will they be distributed when they are made.

My favorite Planned Parenthood story goes something like this -- "In the old days before psychiatry and all the new arts were discovered there was an insane asylum that tested its patients from time to time in the following manner. They were given a mop down in the cellar where a spigot of water was quietly flowing in one corner, and told to mop up the water on the floor. If the patient tried to turn off the spigot before he started to mop up the mess, he was deemed to be sane -- if not, he continued to be rated insane."

No one contends that birth control alone will solve the problems of the poor, but I believe there are now millions who are sufficiently educated in this field to agree that the poor should at least be given the opportunity to help themselves by having knowledge and assistance in limiting their family if they wish it; and many do wish it. It is clear that you yourself are a strong advocate of helping the poor to help themselves.

You have shown great courage in advocating the cause of Civil Rights -- surely an unpopular subject in many places, but I am certain it has added to your political stature with a vast majority of people. If Planned Parenthood is judiciously promoted, I submit that you could also gain additional stature in the eyes of many thoughtful men. Mr. James Reston of the New York Times made a statement concerning Planned Parenthood some years ago that I like to remember. He wrote -- "Probably never in history has so obvious and significant a fact been so widely evaded or minimized by the government of men."

HENRY J. MALI

Senator Hubert Humphrey

November 27, 1964

Why not join the many millions that are now interested in this idea to "turn off the spigot." It has taken a long time for the idea to become respectable, but the time appears to me to have now arrived.

Respectfully yours,

Henry J. Mali

HJM:cl

Henry J. Mali

CORNELL IN LATIN AMERICA - 1966

Projects of Study and Involvement

Sponsored by Cornell United Religious Work

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- I. Central America - Honduras and Guatemala
 - A. Project - '66
 - B. Sample Report - 1965 Team in Milparada, Honduras
- II. South America - Brazil
 - A. Project - '65 Report
 - B. Brazil Project Study Program 1966
 - C. Sample Application Form

Appendix: Rationale for Interfaith Involvement in Areas of Social Responsibility.

For further information:

Hollis E. Hayward
Project Director, Central America
Phone: (607) 275-4224

William W. Rogers
Project Director, South America
Phone: (607) 275-4226

W. Jack Lewis, Director
Cornell United Religious Work
Phone: (607) 275-4214

Address:

Cornell United Religious Work
Anabel Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14850

"CORNELL IN CENTRAL AMERICA"

A Service of Cornell United Religious Work (CURW)

I. INTRODUCTION

Recognized as the Division of Religious Affairs in Cornell University, Cornell United Religious Work is an inclusive inter-faith agency combining the campus service of about 15 denominational and faith traditions representing Jewish, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Moslem bodies. The united program provides opportunities in study, worship, service and fellowship on an open and volunteer basis for the entire university community.

Throughout its history, which is linked with similar work begun in the earliest period of Cornell's life, CURW has pioneered in the development of opportunities for students to combine study and experience, work and worship, discussion and participation, in widely ranged programs of social service. The Central America project is one of many such endeavors characteristic of the CURW idea.

II. HISTORY

In 1961, under the leadership of the then Director, L. Paul Jaquith, a team service project in Honduras offered students a summer in a Honduran village which opened the way for what has come to be an increasingly significant enterprise in community development. For five years to date, the program has continued and grown, both in numbers of students participating as well as in significance and accomplishments. The program may be briefly summarized by the following:

1. Over 100 students involved, in approximately 15 rural villages;
2. Team locations in both Guatemala and Honduras;
3. Local sponsorship and support by interested individuals and groups, especially Rotary Clubs and leading citizens;
4. Education, health, recreation and community organization on a "self-help" basis, represent primary activity of Cornell student teams in the villages.

The pattern which has emerged divides the program in two major phases:

A. The training of teams. Following screening and appointment of students during the first semester, the spring semester at Cornell is devoted to team assignment, study and discussion in carefully delineated seminars. The training includes readings, lectures, research and writing, covering major fields such as social and economic problems of the area, village culture, skills and program for local use, organization of the team itself and its inter-relations with the community, procedures for group living, health and the like. This training is being directed in 1966 by Robert L. Carroll, Professor of Rural Sociology, member of the Cornell faculty, utilizing additional faculty resources with special interest in rural development and the Latin American situation.

B. The summer program. Several teams of eight students each, including a team leader, locate in selected villages or communities. Advance plans include a survey of local needs and opportunities, provision for living quarters, water, sanitation, convenience, health and security. Also, assurance of welcome by the local citizens is necessary, particularly by the leaders of the town. Their help is required to interpret the nature of the team's presence, and to increase understanding by the people as a whole about the project. There must be an indication of willingness by the citizens to cooperate with the team in carrying out its program.

Over the past five years, the program of the teams has varied from place to place, but broadly has included work in these areas:

1. Community Organization. Eliciting interest and skills among the local citizens in serving on continuing committees for projects to be carried out on their own initiative, and setting up the structures to develop community life.

2. Health Services. Counseling and advising on personal or family problems; administration of certain limited medicines; referrals to doctors and hospitals; teaching through lecture, film and discussion, e. g., classes for mothers; surveying community health problems; promotion of better nutrition, health and sanitation practices, including developing interest in installing latrines, boiling water, bathing, baby care, improving the diet, care of the sick, etc.

For the past several years, each team has included one or more students from the Cornell School of Nursing, who have, while gaining invaluable experience for their own careers in nursing, served as the team's own nurses and developed health programs for the benefit of the community.

3. Education. Special group teaching, including health, English, adult literacy in Spanish, citizenship and world affairs, agriculture, and the like. This has sometimes been extended to aiding the staff of the local elementary schools in certain fields.

4. Recreation. Organizing team sports among village children, festival occasions, arts and crafts, club work.

5. Construction. From the beginning, teams have undertaken projects of work which have provided facilities for the villages such as school buildings, desks for the schools, and child lunch rooms. Over 1,000 double desks have been constructed and given to the villages served by Cornell teams in the past five years. One 2-room school has been completed, and about 7,000 bricks have been manufactured toward the construction of another school. In all cases, the joint labor of Cornellians and local citizens has been involved, not only in the construction itself but also in the planning and continuation of the work.

Above and beyond all these specific projects, however, it is well to note that the Cornell teams have devoted themselves fundamentally to the relationships developed with the people. Both one-to-one and as a group, their first concern has been understanding the life of the local folk, nurturing mutual regard and establishing respect and sympathy. They have demonstrated real interest in the local problems, respecting their mores and traditions, while at the same time exhibiting the best in our traditions. By willingness to work, and often to work very hard, at menial tasks, they have tried to off-set the image of the affluent American which tends to dominate the mind of the disadvantaged person in Central America and elsewhere.

III. PURPOSE

CURW conceives this program as a contribution to world need and as a valuable contribution to the education of Cornell students. The service projects must justify themselves in terms of the accomplishment in Central America, despite difficulties, and they must justify themselves in terms of the widening understanding and enlargement of the world vision of the students.

Cornell in Central America is a laboratory experience for students in a proto-type of the under-developed and revolutionary world, in which they bring their skills and interests to bear on a particular locale of human need and seek to develop experimentally a social approach to community problems. They have the occasion to test otherwise untested ideals and views in actual experience, and to know what it is to live in the midst of unyielding circumstances of dis-inheritance and grinding poverty. That this is done by calling on students to identify with the poor, enjoying relatively few privileges above the common level, is a stirring experience, and on the basis of the record of our program, it can have decisive consequences in the students which significantly influences their self-understanding, their political and social outlook, their attitudes toward their own student life, and frequently their own vocational goals. Some students return to the program a second, and even a third year, and many seek similar opportunities under other sponsorship. A significant number look toward permanent careers related to the Latin American world. The purpose, then, is soundly educational, and it is also productive in the development of community life in Central America.

IV. PROGRAM OUTLOOK - 1966

For 1966, CURW has planned a continuation and expansion of the program much as in the past, and with a few modifications and extensions.

The recruiting, selecting and training of volunteer teams has proceeded, both at the Ithaca campus and at the School of Nursing in New York, looking ahead to the 1966 summer program. Arrangements have been made as follows:

A. Magdalena Milpasaltas, Guatemala - A team of 8 will be in this new location. This team will develop its own program, with the counsel of local leaders

and the Rotary Club of Antigua, from among several community needs including school desk contraction, school room construction, feeding program, nutrition and health services, community organization, and the like.

B. Chiquila, Honduras - A team of 6-8 will be located here for the first time. This village formally invited a Cornell team following the successful experience of a 1965 team at Milparada, near by. The great need in Chiquila is additional school classrooms, and the village men have agreed to design a building and prepare bricks, which then the villagers and Cornellians will unite to transform into a new school. The team will develop other programs as time and facilities permit.

C. Milparada, Honduras - A team of 4-6 will be located here at the site of a 1965 team, near enough to Chiquila for mutual aid and to be serviced by one team leader. The second-year team will concentrate on home and social services, particularly health, sick care, home-making and foods, directed toward younger women. This team will consist principally of nursing and home-economic students, plus students skilled in agriculture, and will carry out limited projects (Teams B and C, with common sponsorship in the hub city of San Pedro Sula may be regarded as essentially one team.)

D. Colonia Divanna, Honduras - A team of 8 will be located for the first time in this isolated community on the edge of Tegucigalpa, the national Capital of Honduras. More than 1,200 people live in crowded huts constructed one above another up the slope of a precipitous hillside. Lacking in all social services and rampant with malnutrition, unemployment, disease and delinquency of all kinds, Colonia Divanna presents the team a raw challenge to undertake suitable tasks out of nearly infinite possibilities. The people of Divanna are peasants recently moved to the city from rural villages, finding the promise of urban security mainly a disappointment and their conditions no better and often worse than village life. The urban setting will make possible the relating of the Cornell team to a few selected students in the National University of Honduras, in Tegucigalpa, on weekends and special occasions.

Looking ahead, the program will evolve and develop, as our resources permit, not necessarily to increase greatly in numbers of students or teams, but to expand and enlarge the areas of service. We project, for example, the possibilities of work which would emerge into (a) specialized functions and (b) continuity of service in the same village perhaps as much as 3 to 5 years. The work could be:

1. Public health, sanitation, surveys, establishment of public clinics, latrine programs, drainage, motor-powered water supply, health education.
2. Developing producers and consumers cooperatives and credit unions, for marketing and buying.
3. Developing cooperatives for water supply, electricity, latrines, pumps, oil stoves and lamps.

4. Home service, principally through first-baby mothers, including home demonstration, nutrition, diet, child care, household economics, clothing, sanitation.
5. Soil conservation, irrigation, fertilization.
6. Bricks, including a manufactory for needed community structures.
7. Livestock work on improving breeding and feeding.
8. Crop diversification and marketing, including model gardens, demonstration of green vegetables, chickens and eggs, dairying, preservation of foods, along with nutrition education.
9. Literacy, on the Laubach or Alfalit method, mainly for adults, individually and in classes.
10. Village newspaper and distribution of usable literature.
11. Milk and school lunch program for children.
12. Children's program; organized sports and games, clubs, arts and crafts, nature and field lore, hobbies, music, tutorial work, supplementary diets, English.

We are persuaded that student interest will continue to grow. Today's students eagerly pursue opportunities to know their world first hand. They are able to master the skills and techniques needed for this work to proceed successfully. They are quickly capable of exhibiting the necessary attitudes of humility and cooperation to enter the impoverished world, and to serve unselfishly in the midst of discouraging circumstances. They can be equipped with the necessary tools of mind and hand to do this work. Each year's experience provides essential insights which facilitate the increasing depths and values for the next year.

V. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Family and community support. The work is so meaningful for students that they assume a substantial responsibility in underwriting a major fraction of the expense themselves and with their family and community support. With educational expenses so high (tuition and fees at Cornell: \$1,900), it is not feasible to expect students to provide the full cost themselves. It is impressive, nonetheless, that they should give themselves so freely and generously for a semester of intensive training and a summer of hard unremitting work, often discouraging and frustrating, and also pay (often sacrificially) for the privilege!

B. Campus support. Beginning in the spring of 1966, procedures are being initiated to raise a significant fraction of the project cost through benefit

performances sponsored by students and by a monthly salary-withholding plan authorized by interested faculty members. It is expected that this type of support will eventually cover about one third of all CURW summer service project expense

C. Gifts and general support. Individuals, foundations and corporations are being asked to provide 55% of the project expenses for 1966. This percentage should be reduced to 45% in 1967 and 33% by 1968 as campus fund raising develops more fully. It is not expected that any one foundation or corporation will be asked to make an annual grant to this project for more than a three-year period. Full reports will be submitted to the supporting organizations upon completion of each summer's project.

VI. PROPOSED BUDGET - 1966

The following is a schedule of costs projected for the 1966 Central American program. The amounts will vary depending on the total number involved. The following budget is based on thirty persons' participation. This would allow 3 teams of 8 persons, 1 team of 6 persons, plus a Field Director, to serve eight weeks in Honduras and Guatemala during the summer, 1966.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PER PERSON</u>	<u>TOTAL OF 30</u>
TEAM EXPENSE:		
Transportation:		
Between U. S. A. and Central America	\$ 215	\$ 6,450
Local in Central America	40	1,200
Food and Lodging	75	2,250
Medical:		
Preparatory	15	450
On the field	5	150
Equipment and Supplies	25	800
Insurance	5	150
Miscellaneous and Contingency	10	300
Sub-total, net Team Expense	\$ 390	\$11,750
ADMINISTRATION:		
Team leaders' expense (3)	60	1,800
Field Director's expense and stipend (1)	60	1,800
(Stipend, 750; expense, 1,050)		
Equipment for first-year team	5	150
Advance field preparation	25	750
Nursing School travel and training	10	300
Development	10	300
Sub-total, net Administration	170	5,100
TOTAL	\$ 560	\$16,850
Distribution:		
Individual student, family, local sources:	245	7,350
(45%)		
Gifts and general support: (55%)	315	9,500
	\$ 560	\$16,850

R E P O R T

of the

1965 MILPARADA TEAM

of the

Cornell - Central America Project

Edited by Richard Galbraith
October 8, 1965

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INTRODUCTION

This is the report of one of three groups of Cornell student volunteers who took part in the fifth year of the Cornell Central America Project. The project is sponsored by the Cornell United Religious Works, and its purpose is

"...to extend its concern in morally responsible involvement in the world; to seek to enhance the dignity and welfare of the disinherited; to struggle for the humanization of man's social and political relationships...through corporate action in the area of human rights, international projects, and service programs."

(from Fall '65 CURW brochure)

There is no cookbook recipe for accomplishing this goal. The students were pretty much on their own when it came to selecting and executing their program. (The main project, building a comedor infantil, was not selected until after the team arrived in Milparada.) So, this is the story of what we tried to do and what we think we accomplished. It is not the whole story; it emphasizes our program, barely mentioning our informal contacts, discussions, and friendships, and the possible effects thereof. In choosing between discussing the tangible and the intangible, I have leaned heavily toward the former. That is one of my personal biases. Fortunately, this report contains sections by the other team members. There are some contradictions between parts of the report; each one of us sees the project differently. To deny this uncertainty of what the most effective method is, and what the results of a given project are is to deny the nature of community development work.

R. G.

1965 Milparada Team Report

Milparada is a village of 395 squatters in northwestern Honduras. The economy of the town is almost entirely subsistence farming, raising corn and beans on plots which average about 5 acres for a family of six. All but five of the houses are bajareque, adobe plastered against a wood frame, with tile or thatched straw roofs. One of the others is a frame house-store, and the rest are jacas, made of upright poles lashed together. The town boasts two small stores, a water system with two public faucets, and a two-room schoolhouse built through the efforts of Cornell students living in Quimistan (three miles away) in 1964. There are 54 students enrolled in the three grades (compared to 32 students enrolled in the old school in 1963). Other than the two schoolteachers and the alcade auxiliar, a post that is passed around among the young men in town, there are no representatives of the government in the village. In addition, the town has no church or patron saint, and had never been visited by a priest, doctor, or nurse.

In June, 1965, a group of eight Cornell students moved into Milparada to spend eight weeks living and working with the people, sharing their problems, and helping to solve a few of them. The team was composed of the following members:

NAME	MAJOR	AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	HOME
Juan Castro '65	Ag. Economics	team leader & agriculture	Costa Rica
Katrina Clark '67	History	recreation	Conn.
Melissa Dougall '65	Nursing (R.N.)	health & nutrition	N.Y.
Douglas Dugan '67	English Lit.	construction	Colo.
Mary Englerth '67	Nursing	health & nutrition	N.J.
Richard Galbraith '68	Mathematics	treasurer & entertainment	Ariz.
Susan Porter '66	Economics	literacy	N.J.
Edward Seeger '67	Spanish	literacy	N.J.

The areas of responsibility were designated for organizational purposes. Each person was in charge of his area for setting up and organizing programs, and for the reports. However, the execution of the programs was very much a team effort. To a large extent, our projects would have been impossible if the members had stuck to their own areas instead of pitching in wherever they could. In fact, much of what we did didn't fit into any of our prearranged categories.

The team lived in two small houses, each with one room plus a kitchen. The larger house served as our headquarters, containing our kitchen, dining-meeting room and the girls' sleeping quarters (separated from the dining room by a curtain). The dining room also served as the clinic. The boys lived in the other house. The kitchen of the boy's house was used for storage and desk building. Cooking and dishwashing were done on a rotating basis. Most of the other chores were done on an "I feel like it" or an "I guess it ought to be done" basis. Laundry was done in the river or our backyard, depending on the mood of the person doing it. Indeed, had we gained nothing more from the summer, the experience of living together in such a close, freely cooperating (in spite of huge differences in backgrounds, beliefs interest, etc.) group would have made it worthwhile.

The first week was spent getting acquainted and fixing up the houses. The town's first latrine was built for us before we arrived. The team made three further improvements. We put a water tap and an open air shower behind the girls' house, added a few crude shelves, and laid cement floors in both houses. The latter was done in lieu of rent, and wasn't at all necessary from the standpoint of team comfort. Beginning with the second week, the team was able to get down to its intended business: constructing a comedor infantil, organizing a committee to run it, building school desks, and running a committee to run it, building school desks, and running a health program, a recreational program for the school, and literacy and English classes. This program was modified throughout the summer to meet changing conditions. The actual course of the projects is described in the next section.

PROJECTS

Construction. A brief summary of Milparada construction during the summer of '65 would be appropriate to this paper. After reviewing the basic projects the underlying trials and tribulations, etc. of our work will be discussed in greater detail.

Perhaps the first material improvement in Milparada was the extension of the water system to one of the houses occupied by the team. This extension provided two outlets outside of the house, one which served as the kitchen and dishwashing outlet, the other which served as a shower. Both tapes were subsequently used by members of the community who were conveniently located around these water sources.

Following the installation of the water system, our next concern was preparing the houses so that we might move out of the school (where we lived for the first week, during the vacation for the fiesta of San Pedro). It was decided that we would put cement floors in both houses. Altogether this project took about one week, and was very helpful in acquainting us with the techniques of laying cement, etc., which we later employed in our work on the comedor. It must be noted here that most of our work was done on a trial and error basis, as previous experience in these fields was limited.

Once settled in our new and permanent living quarters, we began work on the comedor infantil, of child feeding center. This, of course, was our primary project for the summer, and for the most part our efforts were devoted towards its completion until the hour we left Milparada. We began by digging out a 2½ foot deep foundation on the perimeter of the floor. This depth of stone and cement would make it possible to add walls in the future. The foundation was also extended about one foot above the ground, thus enclosing the area which would later be the floor. While waiting for roof materials, etc., to arrive, we put down about one-third of the floor. At the same time, we began work on the kitchen, which is a very substantial lean-to extending off one side of the comedor. This work entailed cutting large timber for supports and roof poles and carrying the material out of the forest by oxcart. Also, during this time, pine needles were secured for the adobe bricks for the oven. A small latrine project behind the school likewise kept the team occupied as we waited for necessary materials to finish the comedor. Three separate units were made--one for boys, one for girls, and the third for school teachers.

When the required materials arrived, we resumed the comedor construction by building the cement columns which were to support the roof. The forms for these columns were borrowed from the near-by town of Quimistan. The roof, which was an extension of the roof of the school built the previous year by a Cornell team, was of corrugated asbestos which was screwed to wooden beams running between the four A-frames which were placed about six feet apart on top of the columns. The roof of the kitchen was made from the red tiles which are used on most of the local buildings.

Our role in Milparada was one of supervision with regard to construction and general planning. Although we constantly participated in the physical labor, the major part of this work was done by the town's people. Two men were selected daily by the auxiliary mayor to work as our assistants, and fortunately this policy was kept up the entire summer. For some reason or another our work inevitably attracted attention, so that it was not unusual to have at least five or six men helping by the end of the day. Some of these men would work day or night if the need arose. For example, when it became evident that we would need sustained and abundant help during our last week in Milparada, one man left his fields for seven straight days to help us finish up the project. The town leaders also helped by keeping materials like wood and cement locked in their homes as a security measure against theft.

In spite of our crash program of the final week, the comedor was not finished when we left. One of our boys stayed a couple of extra days to supervise the construction of some tables. Three 14-foot picnic tables with benches attached were made from two inch rough pine stock. Meanwhile, other townspeople laid the rest of the cement floor and built an enlarged version of the standard adobe stove.

As foremen of projects which were relatively new to members of the team, we were forced to do much of the work on a purely common sense basis. It was forever necessary to maintain an atmosphere of confidence in the eyes of the community, assuring them that we could handle any problem which might confront us. Many times we used the suggestions of people outside of the team. A very fortunate situation arose with respect to transportation of materials, as a man from nearby Pinalejo carried lime into San Pedro daily, usually returning with an empty truck. Thus, he was persuaded to haul our building materials and other required items from San Pedro.

The San Pedro Sula Rotary Club bore most of the financial burden with respect to expenses for the comedor and other necessities for the construction. However, their hesitance during the latter part of the summer, combined with problems in actually securing materials, did cause a delay in the progress on the comedor.

Our presence in Milparada attracted the attention of the Alliance for Progress Mobile Health Unit, and as a result, they initiated the small latrine project which we worked on during the last four weeks. They supplied the forms, etc. for the cement stools and periodically came by to help with the program. Apparently they are in charge of a relatively extensive latrine project in the country, but according to the people of Milparada, this was the first time that the Unit had bothered to come to the town. It is hoped that their concern for Milparada will outlast our stay there.

We were also able to help the schoolteachers build a school vegetable garden. This project had been impossible because of a lack of materials. We got a pick-up to take some people to a sawmill and bring back scrap wood for a fence. We also provided tools and nails, and our agriculture student helped devise the watering system. The Alliance for Progress provided the seeds. The teachers and kids did most of the planning and all of the labor. We did little, but it was enough to let them do something for themselves. Had we done more, we would have accomplished less.

Concluding, one can honestly assert that the construction program in Milparada was successful, and that the original intentions were fulfilled. At times the work was slow due to inexperience, delays, etc., but everything was eventually completed, and was operating by our departure. Even this much was perhaps a stroke of luck, and one could certainly ask for no more than this, with due consideration to the situation and circumstance.

The Comedor Committee. We came to Milparada with a list of twelve possible projects, none of which involved setting up a committee. However, we soon came to realize that, in the long run, we would do almost nothing for the town unless there was a permanent group of townspeople who would continue to work for civic betterment. Also, it was obvious that the comedor the people wanted would not run itself. So we organized a committee.

It all started with a town meeting with a hundred people in the school. The purpose of this meeting was to explain the benefits of the comedor, stressing the need for a democratic (the word is popular, but its real meaning needed to be explained) cooperative committee to run it, if it were to be a success. At the end of the meeting, we asked for volunteers to work on the committee. Ten people responded.

During the next two weeks, various combinations of these volunteers, ourselves, and a friend from San Pedro met to plan the organization. Our role was mostly handing out encouragement and making arrangements with CARE and the Alliance Health Team. The structure of the committee¹ turned out to be very bureaucratic and hierarchical, but so are the structures of all of the organizations (government and church) which they could use as models. Also a lot of time was spent on unimportant details, and the discussions showed a great deal of mistrust of other people. Nevertheless, it was their committee, and they decided they wanted to do things like plaster the school, etc. in addition to running the comedor.

A second town meeting was held, at which the proposed constitution was approved with two small changes. Then, the mechanics were worked out. A safe place was found to store the food. The Alliance Health Team volunteered to transport the supplies from San Pedro. A local woman volunteered to cook (the committee decided to pay her \$5 a month, if and when it could raise the money) with the other women helping her on a rotating basis. The children would wash their own dishes.

Of course, there were problems. The food came before the comedor was ready. So service had to be started in the school with the food being prepared in the kitchens of our house and that of another family living near the school. The excitement was high enough that nobody minded the inconvenience. There were a lot of proud parents watching their children eat the best meal of their life. There were also problems in figuring out how much food should be prepared each day, and getting the kids used to some strange food (notably the vulgar wheat). These problems have been worked out, but new ones will arise. There is no guarantee that they will be solved, or even that the "Comite Milparada Hacia el Progreso" won't collapse. However, the outlook is hopeful. The latest word we have is that the comedor has passed a CARE inspection, and is serving seventy-five kids daily.

Literacy. The Honduran illiteracy rate is generally accepted at about 65%. Neighboring Nicaragua, with roughly as many schools (3.5 thousand), has a rate of 50%, and Guatemala, with one fifth the number of schools, has a rate of 725, only slightly higher than that of Honduras. This anomaly is undoubtedly explained in terms of the relative progressiveness of the political regimes in power and their emphasis on education.

Part of our job this summer in Milparada was to expose the illiterates to their language in the form of oral exercises through the use of the Alfalit series of instruction books, published for that purpose by the Evangelical Association.

Interest in our language instruction was by and large satisfying, but a team member had many of those who would otherwise have been reading, sneaking off to audit her English classes, held at the same time as the literacy classes, but in the next room. We had one regular pupil, age 25 or so and president of the comedor committee. I think he fully realized the necessity of being able to read and regretted having to work in the fields as a child, and thereby having received little or no schooling. His progress was gratifying and gave an aura of success to the program.

1. See Appendix D

In addition to the Alfalit books, the CARE village library came in very handy for oral practice. There were a number of townspeople who could already read a little bit and who welcomed the opportunity to read aloud three times a week. As far as can be determined, there were no books of any sort in town before we arrived, so practice was understandably slow and difficult at first. The pupils were encouraged to choose their own books from a selection of forty titles or so, and then to read them aloud at their own pace, each to his own teacher. They had been taught to read any Spanish word phonitically, but did not understand a lot of what they read. A question such as "What does that mean" would bring only a shrug or "I don't know" when a particularly difficult word was encountered. Nevertheless, they did practice enthusiastically. An excerpt from a team member's journal should illustrate this point:

I just took over literacy for Mary and found her student can read more than Alfalit. We began reading a book on the contents of the world and stopped when he became tired. What a joy when he asked me to lend him the book and two others as well! Then his friends asked for the same. We've lent out some dozen books from the CARE library till Wednesday. I'd say this has been the most gratifying experience so far in Milparada.²

Many of the books were returned; a few were not. It doesn't really matter. They will stay in town and be read and reread till their covers are worn off--those, and the several dozen more we donated to them. The people know they are poor and recognize their illiteracy, but as long as Nicolas Cruz and all like him keep asking for books and retain the desire to learn and improve themselves, what is there but hope for Milparada? What can ultimately result but a better Honduras?

But Why Teach English? This question has been raised by many Americans--both of Honduras and of the United States. We wondered ourselves about the value of an eight week course in the very basics of the language, even questioned the necessity and purpose. But, we had no choice. The people immediately requested an English program, they were enthusiastic and excited about learning our language.

Method: "How are you? I am fine." Three times a week from 7:00 to 7:45 in the evening; listen, imitate, repeat, listen, imitate, repeat. One person led the class of eight to ten students, while several "pronouncers" worked with individuals on difficult words. We found no books that were absolutely basic enough for such a short term project, so we used the blackboard and the students copied from it.

We taught important phases (greetings, weather, requests) and pertinent words and numbers. We taught by identification, rather than direct translation. Instead of asking, "How do you say casa?" we would point to a house and let them make their own transposith.

2. From the personal journal of Edward Seeger.

We laid our largest stress on review. The rationale being that if they were going to receive any satisfaction from the classes, it would come from being able to say a few things well, rather than a lot of things poorly.

Participants: Adults and one teenager, all male except for the female school teacher who dropped out after about three weeks made up the class. It varied in size from up to 15 during the first couple of weeks, down to seven or eight towards the end of the summer.

RESULTS: Isn't the word "rewarding?" Yes, it was very exciting to see these simple campesinos smile shyly with pride when they realized they had said something correctly and without prompting. One student was very conscientious, and although self-deprecating, was the best student. He admitted that he might never get a chance to use his English, but this was a good way to get to know the "gringos" better.

Admittedly, there is the fault that they will probably never use their few acquired English phrases; they hold only short term prestige value. But it gave us a way to meet more people and to work with them on an equal basis, for they knew that by our teaching English, we were required to improve our Spanish. It was just a short way to repay them; to thank them for cooperating with us, and providing us with houses and making us feel comfortable.

I suppose every single one of the students, in a far off drea, would want to come to the United States; therefore, he wants to learn English. We and they knew that this wasn't a possibility. But by teaching English, we were able to encourage an intellectual path into the new world, into a new knowledge. At least they were reading something, they were thinking about their minds and the gaps that divided us, but they also realized that it was possible to learn our language, and perhaps could understand a little better the problem of not being able to speak better Spanish. They are simple people, with limited (or no) opportunities, but they were appreciative. Yes, there was a good to teach English, because for several hours a week they shared and learned with us.

Desk building. In Milparada the girls built 15 desks for the school. CARE had provided the pre-cut wood parts with one completed sample desk. The Rotary financed the purchase of the materials, which was quite nominal. After the initial confusion of a variety of opinions on just what was the best method for assembling the desks, the project settled down and went smoothly. Each completed desk was given 2 coats of varnish for protection. To best utilize our time and available tools, one person would assemble desks while another varnished. We were able to finish three weeks before we left, and thereby were able to help the boys on the comedor when the materials arrived and they needed a lot of help to finish in time.

These desks were a good project for the girls. The Hondurans saw us doing physical work which was not part of their concept of a woman's role. They gradually accepted it and began to realize that the girls as well as the boys wanted to get out and work hard to accomplish something. Often, village men offered their help, either out of courtesy or of genuine interest; and although they usually botched the job, it was an important step in the direction of cooperation and understanding our intentions. It was also a more tangible result with a more immediately obvious practicality than our larger project,

the comedor, the purposes of which were more long range and complex.

From our point of view, the desk project was also purposeful. It provided a tangible feeling of accomplishment for the girls who otherwise would be totally occupied with the more frustrating and remote tasks of teaching and housework.

Toward the middle of the summer, The Alliance for Progress Health Team told us about another village which was interested in assembling desks for their school. We went there to teach them how to do it. This was very interesting because we had shown them how to help themselves (they did all the actual construction themselves) and their enthusiasm carried through even farther, to looking into the possibilities of building a new school. From these various factors, the desk project seems to have played a successful role in the context of the whole project.

Recreation. PURPOSE: Everyday, twice a day, fifty running, screaming children would emerge from the Milparada school, anxious and excited for recess. They had been taught a few games by past teachers, but for the most part were accustomed to unsupervised, individual scampers. We hoped that by establishing some sort of organized sports and games, we could increase a sense of cooperation, sportsmanship and constructive exercise.

METHOD: For the first week, during recess (½ hour each morning and afternoon) we had the kids clear the field in front of the school, level it, and get poles to construct a volleyball court.

Once a volleyball court was constructed, and the field cleared, the boys would viciously play soccer and the girls would attempt to play volley ball. The sports equipment we had was a CARE kit provided by the Synchronized Swimming Club of Ithaca High. Yet with the girls, even more important than the fancy equipment (which would break), was learning to jump rope. Every recess, several groups of girls would be jumping, learning to share and take turns turning the rope and jumping. As the summer wore on, our position as "recess leaders" wore off. The boys could play an organized game of soccer alone, and the girls could play volleyball or jump rope alone.

One criticism that is occasionally heard of the Cornell Project is that we go down there to "play with the kids." It wasn't so much that, but rather that we were helping them to learn how to play games. By lessening the burden on the teachers, we were able to gain their appreciation and cooperation in other areas. By gaining a friendly rapport with the children, we were able to send home messages to the parents about meetings, vaccinations, etc. By the end of the summer, I think there was a greater degree of cooperation and "team spirit," especially when the team beat Pinalejo and Quimistan in soccer (they even managed to raise money to buy a soccer ball). They also saw that we didn't try to act superior or above them, but rather would enter in and instruct and play at the same time.

Town Health. The first week of our stay in Milparada, the people were naturally shy and did not really know our function. Perhaps news spread of our medical equipment as a result of Soila, a young girl who had cut her foot badly on a rock. Noting the dirty rag tied around her foot, we offered to bandage it, and she agreed. She returned every day for a week or more for dressing changes.

On Sunday, following our first week, patients sprang up rapidly--women with breast abscesses, children with chickenpox (then in epidemic form in the village), pregnant women with swollen legs, children with minor eye infections resulting from the small flies always at their eyes, etc. And again as word spread of our medicine, each day ten or twelve persons (some, women with three infants) would come to the house for medicine (and some "gringo-watching" to be sure). The medicine we had consisted of cough medicine, antibiotic ointments, penicillin for injection and in tablet form, eye and nose drops, gentian violet, iodine, alcohol, some vitamins, grippe pills, and of course aspirin, plus a great conglomerate supply of medicine for everything from gall bladder medicine to vaginal suppositories which we could not and did not use.³ Most of these medicines as well as some of our bandage supply were gifts from members of the San Pedro Rotary Club.

The mystery is not to see the people coming daily for medicine, but to wonder what they do when no nurse or doctor is available. There is a nurse in Quimistan, but she won't practice elsewhere. On Tuesdays, each week, the Alliance for Progress doctor holds clinic in Quimistan. However, Quimistan is an hour walk for these people who have no car at all, and the 50¢ charge at the clinic is beyond the villagers' pocketbook.

The most common maladies sprang from the living conditions. As already explained, small ghats caused eye infections; impure water and food, intestinal parasites and diarrhea; poor nutrition, weakness, muscle and joint pains; temper, machete wounds; uncleanness, abscesses and boils. It was, of course, possible to give the people eye drops, but the gnats would come again; Kaopectate, but the impure food, etc. would be eaten again; vitamins, but they would be used up and the pains would come again; bandages, but they would get cut again. It would be no wonder if the people felt their own medicine did as well. Their medicine?--they have a sort of preparation which is used as an all-purpose applicant: rubbed into wounds and sore areas. Aspirin are not unknown, but they cost money. There is a type of bug which is supposedly remedial for ear trouble when dried and crushed into a powder. And still farther from the realm of the twentieth century is a remedy for fever: open a pigeon from sternum to tail after twisting off the head, then place the open pigeon over the arms.

The task of seeking for medical change here would seem insurmountable; yet, when we see a baby with Kwashiorkor crying for more of a bitter medicine from the doctor which a well fed baby would spit out, we know we must surmount.

The Alliance for Progress has recognized the need and has entered small Honduran towns to build latrines, to hold vaccination clinics and health classes. Our team had the only latrine in Milparada this summer, and yet it was used by us alone. However, as we left, the Alliance was at work constructing pit latrines. Vaccination clinics were held, unfortunately, most because of our presence; the Alliance vaccinated for DPT, the "Amigos de Honduras," cooperating with the Health Center of San Pedro, vaccinated for smallpox and used BCG against tuberculosis. It is worth mentioning the excellent technique of executing the campaign against smallpox and TB. On the day the vaccinating team was to arrive, a loud speaker truck came and drove throughout the town blaring forth a warning against the two dread diseases and offering the free vaccine. The Health Center representative went into the school and

3. These medicines and all but a few basic first aid supplies were given to the Alliance for Progress doctor in Quimistan when we left.

explained the two vaccines to the children. He told them that surely if they saw a snake, they would their machete to kill it, and just so, these vaccines would be machetes in their bodies to kill the harmful diseases. The vaccinations themselves were performed with the new high speed "Pistol of Peace," which is so rapid that two hundred persons can be vaccinated in an hour. Furthermore, the technique is sterile. However, when the Alliance nurses came to vaccinate for DPT, although they did use sound truck publicity and had records of who had previously been vaccinated, their method was un-aseptic: one disposable syringe was used for two children, the needle being wiped with alcohol between uses.

Perhaps we should mention that we attempted to hold health classes; we meaning the student and graduate nurse on the team. First, we advertised by word of mouth only; but finding this drew no one, we sent hand printed invitations into the homes via the schoolchildren. The response was good; following these first invitations, seventeen mothers came to our house to hear a lesson in Spanish utilizing material used by the Peace Corps workers for such classes. The first class was how to boil water for drinking purposes and maintain its purity; and secondly, how to observe proper body hygiene. After this first class, neither word of mouth nor invitation would draw the women. Two or three faithful and outstanding were willing and did continue to come. They explained that the other women were just too lazy and occupied with other things to be bothered. We had hoped to rule out the occupation with other things by questioning the women as to which hour of the day would suit them best, but it was to no avail. Looking back, we can only question ourselves whether we would have better made a plan to visit every home to issue personal invitations, or more importantly, to be sure we knew all the people and that they knew us well enough to come to our classes. Our language made us hesitant in such approaches at times. Certainly, we realize how foreign health classes are to the women of Milparada.

We were saddened by many things: when women wipe their children's noses on the shawls used to wrap the children; when babies urinate on their mother's lap; when barefoot children and adults romp through the human and animal waste plentiful in the soil; when women fear a boy as good as dead when he has obtained an injury near a male gland which might impair his masculinity; when houses are dark and close inside from lack of windows and keeping the doors closed. Yet, surely these very sad living conditions are the norm in Milparada. Children grow up in an uncomfortable world as will their children in turn. To ask these people to change is asking much. We must realize that if the women of the village had, for instance, been able to "modernize" the extent that living chores took less of their time, they would likely be dismayed at what to do with extra time; they are totally work-oriented--again, all phases of life are very much inter-related.

Yet, it is quite unfair to say that there are only problems in an existence of the sort found in Milparada. The people have found happiness in many ways: children still play, people still love. Nor can we close our minds to the positive aspects in the area of health. While most certainly not done for health reasons, the corn used to make tortillas is soaked in lime water, thus supplying calcium in the diet. Also, at present, the progressive schoolteachers have the kids planting a garden behind the school. Planting of gardens is little done in Milparada--perhaps the people haven't

learned how easily good nutrition could be had. If they lack seeds, CARE or AFP will supply them. There was only one woman who asked us for seeds to plant. Another woman explained that while they liked vegetables when they had them, it was too much work to plant them--a rather "que sera, sera" attitude.

Also on the positive side, our team was able to leave with the school-teacher, a first aid kit consisting basically of gauze, cotton, tape, mercurochrome, phisohex, and a thermometer. This is very basic, but it may be the start for the village. Reasons for leaving the kit with the teacher were: she is a central figure in town, well-known and respected; she is in contact with all families through their kids; and she is educated enough to use the first aid kit wisely,

Looking back over the summer, I see the child feeding center standing in Malparada as a symbol of what we, as a group stood for--an attempt to begin toward a better way of life, a more sound life, and perhaps a longer life (the current average life span in Honduras is forty years). And to carry the symbol farther, we could state that the juxtaposition of the comedor and the school indicates the inter-relatedness of progress and education.

Team Health. To say a word on team health, we were most thankful to find our health for the most part very good. There were only occasional one day bouts of diarrhea, one sore throat, one eye infection, blisters on hard working hands, and two cases of probable intestinal parasitism (fever of 102, prostration, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea for one or two days). The latter was treated with Mexaform, anti-emetic and Kaopectate plus aspirin in one case and Enterovioform in the other. We used isopropyl alcohol, calamine lotion, etc. for insect bites. One fungal type foot infection was treated with gentian violet and Tinaderm. For unusual rashes, phisohex wash was the treatment. All members developed what was likely multiple chiggers around their waists (affectionately called "galloping Chinese rot" by the team). The treatment was anything that might stop the itching. The eye infection was helped by neo-delta-cortef eye drops. Diarrhea was combatted with Mexoform, Kaopectate, or a powder preparation called Leoddahl.

We were able to shower every night after the erection of the shower pipe, except when the water pressure failed. Our water for drinking was either iodized or boiled. Dishes were washed in tap water, but rinsed in boiling water and also put in boiling water following our absences for weekend trips, etc. All team members were conscious of hygiene and foods were carefully prepared--and boiled if need be. Cooking with a pressure cooker was a true health measure aside from its convenience.

We were careful not to accept gifts of milk or pork (though we did eat native cooked chicken and bread). In the restaurants of San Pedro and Tegucigalpa, we were careful about the water, salads, etc. Our garbage was emptied into a pit behind the house following each meal and dishes were washed immediately after eating. A cake of soap was always by the water spitot (except when the cow ate it) for hand washing.

Our nutrition was adequate--largely because of vegetables and fruits brought nearly weekly by friends from San Pedro and Cofradia. Meat was not plentiful, but protein came through beans, eggs, and powdered milk. Daily vitamin tablets were taken as a supplement.

We were generally able to have seven of eight hours of sleep and sometimes a rest period following lunch. With the team as a whole health conscious, and everyone doing his part, we had a very healthy summer.

ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE MILPARADA

San Pedro and the Rotary Club. A vital part of the program was the time spent in San Pedro Sula. From a material standpoint, our work would have been impossible without the resources⁴ available in San Pedro. Beyond this, the contact with the businessmen and professionals, the upperclass of Honduras, gave the team a much more balanced view of the country than they could get in Milparada alone.

One of the original aims of the project was to get the rich and the educated Hondurans involved in helping the poor of their own country. To a certain extent, this has worked. The San Pedro Rotary Club has been the project's host in Honduras for five years. This year, they spent over \$600 to help our work. However, less than half the members were really involved in the project. In an effort to improve on this, we tried to get Rotarians to come out and see what was being done. We had a qualified success. Only seven of the forty odd Rotarians came (two of whom either had no previous contact with the project or were opposed to it, but this was still seven more than had visited Cornell teams the previous year...In addition, local enthusiasm reached a point where several people, Rotarians and others, decided that they ought to continue the project, at least nominally, throughout the year. Therefore, we helped organize the "Comite Honduras y Cornell," a ten member coordinating committee to make advance arrangements for Cornell teams and to continue to assist the towns after the team leaves.

Travel. A total of one week was spent in team travel. This served four basic purposes: 1) It broadened the participant's view of the country. 2) It brought the team into contact with other groups (the other Cornell team, Peace Corp workers, and Sr. Montes's Christian Democrats) who were doing community development work in Honduras, thereby providing for an exchange of ideas and giving the team a better perspective for evaluating their own work. 3) By visiting five sites of past teams and talking with the people, a limited amount of continuity was established. And 4) It gave the team members a chance to relax.

NEXT YEAR?

A Plan for the 1966 Project in the North Coast Region

The 1965 Milparada Team recommends that a 12 man team be sent to the North Coast region of Honduras to work in the villages of Milparada and Chiquila during the summer of 1966.

Four students, a boy with training in agriculture and one with experience in accounting, a registered nurse with training in public health, and a student

4. See Appendix A.

of either the School of Nutrition or of Home Economics, will live in Milparada to expand on the work done by previous teams. The program is designed to make the village less dependent on Cornell for future improvements. The following are suggested projects:

1. Organize an agricultural co-op to improve farming techniques and to buy local corn for storage until prices go up. Help is available from Fernando Montes and the Christian Democrats, from CUNA for organization problems, from STICA for technical aid, and perhaps from U.S. Ambassador Jova for initial capital.
2. Set up a "Club de Amas de Casas" (homemakers' club) through which instruction in health, nutrition, child care, cooking (the comedor can serve as a model kitchen), etc. This group could also start a campaign for family vegetable gardens (seeds available from SCIDE).
3. Assist the "Comite Milparada Hacia el Progreso" in any projects they desire (eg. expanding the water system), and introduce its officers to the resources (staff of CARE, etc.) available in San Pedro.
4. Administer necessary medical treatment.
5. Work with the Alliance Health Team to initiate an extensive latrine building program.

A group of eight students, similar to the 1965 Milparada Team will live in Chiquila, a small town West of Milparada. Their main projects will be to build a new school, similar to the one in Milparada, and to convert the old one into a CARE comedor. Secondary projects, like a literacy program and recreation classes will be operated on the basis of perceived need and available time.

SUMMARY

The eight members of the team invested about \$400 each, a semester of preparation, and an entire summer vacation to receive eight weeks of hard work, poor living conditions and numerous frustrations. Yet, if we had it to do over again, everyone of us would choose to go down again. Why? It is partly because of the friends we made, partly because we feel that we have done something worthwhile, and partly because we know the experience has improved us. In evaluating the project, we should look at two components, what we gave, and what we got:

The Value to Milparada. Milparada received some concrete benefits--the comedor school desks and supplies, medical service, etc. Worthy achievements? Yes, but not enough to justify the effort. The key accomplishment of the summer was the formation of the "Comite Milparada Hacia el Progreso." For the first time, townspeople were joined together to help themselves. We had planned for the committee to run the comedor, but the town wouldn't stop there. They had some models for civic improvement: the comedor, the new school, the garden, the teams' way of living, and the progressive village of Pinalejo. They had a few resources: they had been introduced to CARE and the Alliance for Progress, and they had the materials we would leave them.

And, they had dreams, which now they think they can make come true. Time will tell to what extent they succeed, but in any event, Cornell has left behind a new way of fackling problems, and a new hope...a higher horizon.

The Value to the Participant. The Cornell-Central America Project is educational beyond any measure of grades and credit hours. In a sense, it comes much closer to the ideal Liberal Arts education that any college in the U.S. The participant is freed from the artificial breakdown of the world into Government, History, Anthropology, Sociology, Agriculture, etc.; all of these are bound together in the curriculum of a new environment, with a different economy, a different set of values, and a different way of thinking than any the student has encountered before. He may have read of them, but it is much more valuable to grapple with problems head-on than to intellectualize about them in protected seclusion (which is why Stanford, for example, maintains four campuses overseas). The student is forced to realize the extent to which he has been culture bound. He learns how many "necessities" he can live without, and he learns how much he can do on his own. He gains a new perspective, added self-confidence, and increased intellectual independence. From a more purely academic standpoint, he attends a Spanish class about 10 hours every day, and through the combination of preparatory readings, seminars and discussions and first hand experience, he learns a great deal about the history, government, and economy of Honduras, and about the culture of the campesino.

Also, the student is well paid, not with money, because the people in the villages don't have much, but with love and appreciation. To cite one of innumerable examples, the day I left Milparada, I was "forced" to eat three lunches (of beans, tortilla, and coffee), was offered several more, and was escorted for the hour's walk to Quimistan by ten kids who wouldn't let me touch my baggage.

Our work this summer didn't change the world, or even Honduras. It wasn't supposed to. But it did change each one of us, and it did start the people of Milparada on a road to betterment which, hopefully, they will continue to travel.

Acknowledgments

The Milparada Team wishes to express its appreciation for the following people of Honduras, without whom the Cornell-Central America Project could not have succeeded.

To the more than 150 Milparadans who took an active part in one or more of the teams activities, especially to Pedro Hernandex and Antonio Machado who helped the team in almost every conceivable manner.

To Don Lelo Paz, organizer, and president of the Comité Honduras y Cornell, who made the advance arrangements in Milparada, spent almost the entire summer helping the team in both Milparada and San Pedro, and has, thus far, spent 8 days in Milparada since the team has left, providing a strong continuity to the program. He is the one man most responsible for the success of our project.

To Nelly Duarte, Cornell's best friend and co-ordinator for the Comité Honduras y Cornell, who hosted members on over night business trips, took the team to Puerto Cortez, helped the team with transportation, and gave the team large quantities of fresh fruits and vegetables which were not available in Milparada.

To the Rotary Club of San Pedro Sula, our official hosts, who provided over \$600 for coordination and materials; and especially to the following Rotarians who gave of their valuable time and money:

Rafael Davila, "our man in San Pedro," a member of the Comité Honduras y Cornell who helped in 1001 ways.

Arnulfo Guitierrez, vice president of Comité Honduras y Cornell, host during orientation, and extremely helpful.

Gabriel A. Mejia, head of Cementos de Honduras which donated 60 bags of cement to the project.

Lic. Virgilio Moncalda, president of Rotary 1964-65.

Beverly Kipps, President of Rotary Club 1965-66.

Guillermo Swanson, who provided housing for team members whenever they were in San Pedro.

Alfif Saybe, vice president of Rotary and orientation host who visited Milparada and donated a soccer ball to the school.

Jorge Larache, who gave a 20% discount on all hardware items the team needed.

Jacobo Larache, extremely helpful, donated writing materials to the school children.

Dr. Guillermo Bandano, head of the Rotary International Committee, visited the town and donated medicines.

Armando Guitierrez, visited the team and donated medicine.

Dr. Jesus Bandano, donated medicines.

Shibly Canahuate, donated medicines.

Guillermo h. Gutierrez, orientation host and member of the Comité Honduras y Cornell.

Claus Schnau, treasurer of Rotary and president of the Rotary Committee for the Cornell project.

Guillermo Weidner, who assisted team members in San Pedro.

To CARE, John Moran and Dick Madison, for providing materials and advice for the comedor, school desks, and various tools.

To Mirta Torres de Mejia, orientation hostess who gave the project good publicity coverage in La Prensa.

To the Aliance for Progress Mobile Health Team for help in numerous ways:

Charles Garcia, a member of both the Comité Honduras y Cornell and the Comité Milparada Hacia el Progreso, who helped the team with transportation, latrine building, and hauling the food for the comedor, and who introduced the team to Chiquila.

Guillermo Rivera, a member of the Comité Honduras y Cornell who was a great help in organizing the Comité Milparada Hacia el Progreso.

Dr. Moreno, who helped our nurses' health program.

Blanca Castro, nurse stationed in Quimistan.

To Fermin Aplicano, who hauled the materials for the comedor.

To Sr. Arita, bus owner who gave the team free message and small freight service.

To Raul Fernandez, for his interest and help with emergency transportation.

To Abelardo Castillo, mayor of Quimistan, for his general helpfulness.

To Antonio Bogran, mayor of San Pedro, for taking part in the orientation program.

To John Will, of the Evangelical Mission for taking part in the orientation program and providing literacy materials.

To James Channing of the bicultural center, for taking part in the orientation program.

To Thomas Killoran, American Consul, for taking part in the orientation program.

To Constanio Barletta, for medicines.

To Sra. de Kipps, secretary-treasurer of the Comité Honduras y Cornell.

To Lic. Luis Beltran, Comité Honduras y Cornell.

To Sra. Tula de Guel, director of San Pedro High school and member Comité Honduras y Cornell.

To Sra. de Ramirez Ortega, wife of chief of Honduran Armed Forces, and a member of the Komite Honduras y Cornell.

To Sra. Aida de Gutierrez, member Komite Honduras y Cornell.

To Sr. Don Manuel Cano, Sr. Panting, Sr. Elias Murillo, Don Chayo Belisardo, Hernan Sabillon, and Rolando Mendoza and other employees of the Banco de Fomento, for their general interest and cooperation.

Calendar of Events

June

- 23 Leave Miami-arrive San Pedro Sula 11:00 a.
- 24 Three members visit Milparada to check arrangements
- 25-26 Orientation: U.S. Consulate, CARE office, San Pedro Mayor, etc.
- 27 Team moves to Milparada
- 28- Fixing up the team houses

July

- 2 Two members go to San Pedro for materials
- 4 Team moves into houses
- Welcoming dance given by the town
- 5 Start literacy & English classes, and recreation program for the school
- 6 Nurse goes to San Marcos for a vaccination program
- Two members go to San Pedro
- 7 Volleyball court erected
- Wood obtained for school garden fence
- 8 Work begins on the comedor
- 9 Desk building program started
- 10 Four team members visit the village of Cordaderos
- 11 Team visited by San Pedro Rotarian-plans for comedor finished
- 12 Work started on the school garden
- 12-13 Team visited by Mr. Jaquith
- 13 Alliance for Progress latrines started for the school
- Organizational meeting of "Comite Milparada Hacia el Progreso"
- 14 Team member takes a Milparadan boy to San Pedro for errands
- 16-18 Trip to Tegucigalpa-meet with Lepaterique team, talks with US Ambassador and Fernando Montes - Visit La Venta and Ojojona, sites of previous Cornell teams
- 22 First successful health class
- 23 Medical emergency-pregnant woman with history of caesarians taken to hospital in San Pedro after desperate search for transportation
- 24 Comedor construction bogged down because of lack of materials
- 25 Team visited by a group of Rotarians
- 27 Election of officers for "Comite Milparada Hacia el Progreso"
- School garden & flower boxes planted
- 28 Three members go to Chiquila to start a desk building program
- Two members go to San Pedro for materials
- 29-30 Team visited by Mr. Jaquith and Mr. Hayward
- 30 Three members go to San Pedro for the organizational meeting of the "Comite Honduras y Cornell."
- Sick boy taken to San Pedro hospital

August

- 1 Team and two town leaders visit Omoa, site of a previous Cornell team, and Puerto Cortes.
- 3 Last desk finished
- 3-4 Team member substitutes for a sick teacher
- 4 Two team members go to San Pedro for materials, one stays over

August

- 5 Half of team visits Chiquila as possible site of a future team
- 6 225 villagers vaccinated for smallpox and/or TB by "Amigos de Honduras" and Cornell team members
Truck load of materials for comedor arrives at 10:30 p. m.
- 7-8 Trip to Copan ruins-conference with Lepaterique team and Mr. Hayward
- 11 Team visited by the entire Quimistan School (100+)
- 12 Food and utensils for the comedor arrive
- 13 Temporary comedor service begins in the school
- 15 Picnic for Rotarians, etc. in Milparada
- 16 Packing starts
Last of materials of the comedor arrive
Farewell dance thrown in honor of the team
- 17 Comedor roof is finished
Team (except one member) leaves
- 19 Comedor (floor, tables, and kitchen) completed
- 20 First day of regular comedor service
- 22 Last team member leaves
- 24 Town visited by Rotarians

Sept.

- 16 Comedor passes CARE inspection-service expanded to include pre-school children

Summary of Field Expenses

Food *		total	per person
		\$272.40	\$34.05
in Milparada (45 days)	\$157.93		
Other (11 days)	\$114.47		
Travel		\$320.70 1/2	40.09
Tegucigalpa trip	\$231.20 1/2		
Copan trip	66.00		
Business trips to S. P. S.	23.50		
Medicine		28.02	3.50
Equipment and supplies		75.06 1/2	9.38
for the team	38.88 1/2		
for the town	36.18		
Miscellaneous		<u>23.81</u>	<u>2.98</u>
TOTAL		\$720.00	\$90.00

* Includes detergents and other supplies incidental to preparing and cleaning up after meals.

Constitution and Proposed Projects
of the
"Comite Milparada Hacia el Progreso"

July 27, 1965
Milparada de Quimistan

Plan for the Committee of the Comedor Infantil Cornell (possibly to be called "Comite Milparada Hacia el Progreso.")

1. Composition of the Executive Commission:

President.....	Eduardo Dubon
Vice President.....	Laura de Machado
Voters	
First.....	Juan Z. Hernandez
Second.....	Taurino Orellana
Third.....	Ma. Rosario Lopez
Fourth.....	Jose Orellana Torres
Fifth.....	Leonidas Pinto
Comptroller.....	Prof. Maria
	Luisa Perdoma
Treasurer.....	Antonio Machado
Vice-Treasurer.....	Lesby Gaido
Secretary.....	Pedro Hernandez O.
Vice-Secretary.....	Prof. Jacobo Munguia

2. Ex-officio members:

Sr. Abelardo Castillo, Mayor of the Municipality of Quimistan
 Sr. Guillermo Rivera, Coordinator
 Sr. Carlos Garcia, Coordinator
 Sr. Desiderio Paz, Coordinator
 Sr. Herberto Alcantara, District Supervisor of Schools

3. Commission in charge of storing the CARE food:

Juan Z. Hernandez.....	Depositor
Prof. Jacobo Munguia.....	Controller
Prof. Maria Luisa Perdomo.....	Controller
Ester Salvidar.....	Controller
Lesby Gaido.....	Controller

4. Scheduled meetings of the Executive Commission will need a quorum of seven members, four of these constituting a sufficient majority for making decisions.
5. In the basence of a quorum, a special meeting will be called for a later time. At this meeting, five will constitute a quorum and three will be a sufficient majority.

6. If it is not possible to summon a quorum, the meeting will be postponed until at least five members can meet.
7. The Executive Commission shall be elected yearly by the General Assembly, which consists of all of the members of the community.
8. The General Assembly, by a majority of one more than half, shall elect a new member in the case of resignation of a member of the Executive Commission because of health or other reasons.
9. If a vote of the General Assembly fails to yield a majority, a new vote will be taken.
10. The General Assembly, that is the entire community, ought to contribute for possible expenses for maintaining the "Comedor Infantil," such as trips to San Pedro Sula to obtain the supplies which CARE graciously provides whenever there is a responsible committee to operate the comedor.
11. The Executive Commission shall have the power to appoint, without the vote of the General Assembly, any necessary commissions, such as a commission in charge of maintaining the kitchen in working order, of bringing the food from San Pedro, etc.
12. As is characteristic of the democratic process, the General Assembly, that is the community, may ask that the Executive Commission meet to consider any matter of importance to the functioning of the comedor or the well being of the community.
13. The outgoing Executive Commission should, at the end of its term (one year), call a meeting of the General Assembly to elect a new Commission. Also, in this meeting, the Treasurer and the Comptroller should give a financial report. Also, the outgoing Commission should, at this time, present or summarize the that they have carried out during their term and the plans for the future which for various reasons they have not been able to put into effect before this date.

August 20, 1965

Proposed Projects of the "Comite Milparada Hacia el Progreso"
(In addition to running the comedor)

1. Finish the latrines for the school.
2. Construct a serving table for the kitchen of the comedor.
3. Construct a wash stand, with a water tap, near the comedor for washing dishes.
4. Construct a shower near the school.
5. Fence the school and comedor (if it is possible to get wire).
6. Plaster the outside of the school, and construct a cement patio in front of it.
7. Obtain books and build bookstands for a school library.

8. A program of latrine construction - with the assistance of the Aliance for Progress Mobile Health Team.

No. 1, 2, and 3 should be completed by the 15 of September.

No. 4, and 6 should be completed before June 1966. (It will probably be best to do them during the dry season, when the townspeople have more free time).

No. 5, 7, and 8 can be done whenever the committee is able to secure the necessary materials or assistance.

"Esta Tierra"

The chorus of this Spanish version of a popular American folksong has long been the theme song of the Cornell Central America Project. The two verses were added this year by a member of the Milparada team.

Choro:

Esta tierra es tuya,
Esta tierra es mia,
De los Estados Unidos
Hasta Honduras,
De las ciudades grandes,
A los pueblos chicos,
Esta tierra se hizo para
ti y para mi.

Versos:

Es Milparada
mi pueblo amado,
Donde cada uno es amigo
De cada otro;
Donde los de Cornell viven,
Con sus hermanos hondureños
En esta tierra que se
hizo para ti y para mi.

Somos todos ciudadanos
De las Americas nuestras.
En mucho somos similares,
Aunque parecemos diferentes
Podemos ayudarnos,
Cada uno a los otros,
En esta tierra que se hizo
para ti y para mi.

Chorus:

This land is your land,
This land is my land,
From the United States
To Honduras
From the big cities,
To the small villages,
This land was made for you
and me.

Verses:

Milparada is
my beloved town,
Where each person is a friend
of everyone else;
Where the Cornellians live,
With their Honduran brothers
In this land that was made
for you and me.

We are all citizens
of our America
We have much in common
Although we appear to be different.
We can help ourselves,
Each one helping the others,
In this land that was made
for you and me.

BRAZIL '65 PROJECT REPORT

A Program of Study and Involvement

Sponsored by
Cornell United Religious Work and
The Ithaca Westminster Foundation
in Cooperation with
The Latin American Studies Committee of
Cornell University

William W. Rogers, Director

PREFACE

This report has been written for members of the Cornell Latin American Studies Committee, the Boards of Directors of Cornell United Religious Work and the Ithaca Westminster Foundation, the Board of Trustees of the Dyson Foundation in New York City, the Director of Foreign Area Studies of the University of the State of New York, and other individuals, boards, and commissions both in the United States and Brazil which have had some part to play in the development of the CURW Brazil '65 Project.

The purpose of the report is to compare the results of this program with its stated objectives and to do so with an economy of words. As a result of this specific and limited objective, considerable information on the background and development of the project has been eliminated, together with many financial and programmatic details. Consequently, the report does not give credit to many individuals and groups who have made invaluable contributions.

I take this opportunity, therefore, to mention just a few: Professors Richard Graham and Charles Ackerman of the project staff (Cornell); Professors Tom Davis, Charles Eastlack, Bert Ellenbogen, Rose Goldsen, and J. Mayone Stycos of Cornell; Professor James Crouthamel of Hobart College (staff); Miss Janice Perlman (a member of the project staff through her junior and senior years at Cornell); Mssrs. William MacLeish, Ben Stambaugh, and Edward Trethaway of Cornell; Mr. Bruce Allen (formerly of Cornell); Mssrs. Charles and John Dyson of the Dyson Foundation; The Reverend Mssrs. W. Jack Lewis and John Lee Smith and Miss Marion Howe of the staff of Cornell United Religious Work; Mr. Ward Morehouse of the University of the State of New York; Mr. Edir Cardoso (Brazilian Co-director) and the staff of the União Cristã de Estudantes do Brasil; Mr. James Cowperthwaite of the New England Student Christian Movement (serving on the staff of Mr. Cardoso and the UCEB); Father Geraldo Bastos of Ponte dos Carvalhos, Brazil; Mr. Estanislau de Oliveira of the University of Recife; Miss Eunice Pereira of the Catholic School of Social Work (Recife); the thirty-nine American and Brazilian project participants; my secretary, Mrs. Helen Meade; and--of first importance to the morale and well-being of us all--my wife, June Rogers.

Ithaca, New York
January, 1966

BRAZIL '65 PROJECT REPORT

Introduction

Cornell United Religious Work has recently completed a pilot study and involvement program designed to interest North American students in the development problems of Latin America by giving them a comprehensive view of the problems of an underdeveloped area of one country, together with direct experience of these problems in the company of student counterparts in that country. The program, initiated by the Ithaca Westminster Foundation and carried out under the sponsorship of the Board of Directors of Cornell United Religious Work in cooperation with the Cornell Latin American Studies Committee, was conducted during the spring semester of 1965 on the Cornell University campus and in northeastern Brazil during the following summer.

Objectives

The primary purpose of the Brazil '65 Project was educational. The program was designed to assist a carefully selected group of American students achieve the following specific educational objectives:

1. The correlation of general academic knowledge of the conditions of underdevelopment in a particular region with an understanding of the concrete human problems created by those conditions.
2. The correlation of a general knowledge of development theories with a consideration of the value judgments that underlie specific development decisions.
3. The comparing and testing of American and Brazilian approaches to problems of modernization and change as reflected in the ideas and actions of students committed to these ends.

A secondary objective of the program was to be of some assistance to Brazil by:

1. Deepening the understanding of Brazilian problems by American students who will enter professions in government service, business administration, teaching and research relative to Latin American and Brazilian affairs.
2. Assisting Brazilian counterparts and local sponsors to carry out limited stages of long-range, locally sponsored community-development projects.

I. General study

A. Study at Cornell

The Brazil '65 Project officially began in February, 1965, after the selection of fourteen Cornell and four Hobart-William Smith students. The project, in its first phase, consisted of an academic studies program in four basic parts: language study, seminar work, prescribed reading, and the writing of a thirty-page paper. It should be emphasized here that the

studies program at Cornell was neither simply an orientation program for a trip to Brazil nor a training program for a summer project. It was, rather, the first phase of a three-phase study program which, in its total sweep, had as its major objective the stimulation of responsible, morally sensitive, and creative intellectual work on the problems of underdevelopment. One basic assumption here is that the vocation of a student is to become a competent, experienced, and responsive professional who is moved to participate in the vital issues of his time and who seeks to bring knowledge to bear on the solution of human problems. A further assumption underlying this program is that the most important contribution that students are likely to make to international development, or any other type of human betterment, will be the result of competency and moral sensitivity exercised in the conduct of their professional careers. Hence, the orientation of this program toward academic study and personal involvement with a formal emphasis on problem solving: How do you get development?

1. Seminars. The project seminars were held on campus every Monday evening from February through May and dealt with such topics as Brazilian political history, current politics, student organizations, the role of the Church (especially Roman Catholic), movements of the Left, ideology, geography, demography, community structure, economic development, and the Alliance for Progress. Each of these study sessions was led either by a faculty member or a Brazilian with special knowledge of the subject under study.
2. Language study. The language study was handled by Professor Charles Eastlack of the Department of Modern Language. It consisted of eight hours of classroom work per week, six of which were conversation drill with a native speaker.
3. Reading. All participants were provided with a basic reading list, and several books of special importance were purchased in quantity and sold to the students at cost, such as Charles Wagley's Introduction to Brazil, Carolina Maria de Jesus's Child of the Dark, and Irving Horowitz's Revolution in Brazil (especially valuable for certain documents not otherwise available). A total of eighteen books and articles were recommended, but not all were required reading.
4. Term papers. Each student was required to write one thirty-page paper on a topic relating to social change in Brazil. In most cases the topics were within the field of the student's academic major. A student in Child Development, for example, wrote on "Brazilian Family Structure and Achievement Motivation," another in Economics on "Industrial Development," and another in Political Science on "The Revolution of April, 1964." Some papers, especially those which were also written to fulfill an additional requirement in an academic course or an honors program, were excellent. Most ranged between good and acceptable. By and large, the discipline exercised by the students in preparing these papers--the specialized reading, the need to relate specific information to the resolution of a problem, and commitment of their own perception of these problems to writing for later review--was a valuable exercise.

These papers also served to prepare the students for more perceptive observation of the problems about which they wrote and on which they were to gather data during their time in Brazil. "Disciplined observation" or "research" on these topics while on the project was an additional requirement of the program as preparation for a second thirty-page paper due by the following Christmas vacation.

B. Orientation program in Brazil

1. Arrival in Rio

Project participants and staff arrived in Rio de Janeiro on June 20 and spent three days testing their language skills, visiting university students, government officials, the United States Embassy, the favelas (slums), the beaches, and generally getting acquainted with Brazil and Brazilians.

2. Study and orientation in Recife

On June 23 the group arrived in Recife and spent the next ten days in a private villa to pursue an intensive program of study and orientation. Orientation sessions included lectures on Recife and surrounding areas, the geography of the region (including field trips through the area), local and regional politics, religious institutions and their relation to social change, Brazilian student movements, and programs of social change in the Northeast, especially work in the area of basic literacy. In one sense the lectures and discussion at the villa were an extension of the seminar work done at Cornell and dealt with some of the same areas of study. The difference, of course, was that these lectures were by Brazilian university professors, politicians, students, churchmen, and others and were more specifically related to the immediate area under present circumstances. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of this part of the program was the increased understanding which the students began to get of the cultural, economic, and military-political milieu in which they were to function.

3. Arrival of the Brazilian students

During the orientation program there was frequent contact between the Americans and students from the University of Recife. While many of the Recife students maintained an active interest in the work which was later to be done in the outlying villages, they were generally not the students who joined the projects and lived with the Americans. The twenty-one Brazilian students who joined the projects and comprised the "Brazilian counterparts" were from universities to the south: Bahia, São Paulo, Rio, Curitiba, and Porto Alegre. They were recruited by the União Cristã de Estudantes do Brasil, a student movement of Protestant origins with which Professor Richard Graham of Cornell (in Brazil on a research leave) was able to make connections through personal acquaintances and friends. The UCEB, through its national council and director, Sr. Edir Cardoso of São Paulo, selected students from varying economic, social, and religious backgrounds (Catholic, Protestant, and non-Christian) who were committed to modernization and change.

These students arrived by bus at the end of the orientation period. They were an outstanding group, and their arrival marked the beginning of a

decisive new phase of the program. Up to this point the project had, in effect, been an American project with English the prevailing language and under American leadership. Now the project was manifestly a joint enterprise with Portuguese prevailing and under the field direction of Brazilians.

II. Direct involvement

As has been indicated, the first phase of the Brazil Program was the study done at Cornell and continued during the orientation period in Recife. The second phase began with the arrival of the Brazilian student counterparts in early July and continued through the project activity in the outlying communities. In this part of the program, the students were challenged to correlate general academic knowledge of the conditions of underdevelopment with an understanding of the concrete human problems created by those conditions; to correlate a general knowledge of development theory with a consideration of the value judgments that underlie specific development decisions; and to compare and test their own theories of social change and development with those of their Brazilian student counterparts.

On July 5 the American and Brazilian students were assigned to project teams and moved to the project sites. There were two projects: one located in the town of Pontezinha some ten miles south of Recife, the other located in the nearby town of Ponte dos Carvalhos.

A. Strategy--Why these towns?

Since one of the important objectives of the program was to study the effects of industrial development on economically marginal people, project sites were chosen in the one area of northeastern Brazil where the greatest amount of government-sponsored industrial development is presently taking place. That area is the industrial axis formed by approximately twenty-five miles of modern highway running south of Recife to the town of Cabo. It is an area of huge, antiquated sugar plantations existing side by side with some of the most modern industrial plants in Brazil. Along this highway are several small towns, which are, in effect, rural industrial slums. Pontezinha, population 3,000, and Ponte dos Carvalhos, population 5,000, are two of the largest of these towns. They are old communities in the process of change.

B. Project activity

Flexibility was a byword of the Brazil Project. The project was experimental, and much stress was placed on the necessity to plan well but to be ready to respond to new situations as they arose. Construction and research were planned as catalysts to interaction and were to give way successively to increased attention to Brazilian-American student interaction and to concentration on local problems.

1. Construction and research

Construction: Two schools were built during the month of July: one in Pontezinha using common wattle and daub, and the other in Ponte dos Carvalhos of stone and brick.

In Pontezinha the construction project received considerable attention from a few students. Most of the students, especially the Brazilians, could not have cared less about building a school out of mud and sticks. Furthermore, not many people could work on the framing of the building at one time. After the initial framing, however, many hands were needed to put on the tile roof and to pack the mud, or taipa, into the waffle-like structure of the walls. At this point there were several almost festive occasions when both students and townspeople joined in the work. In spite of the fact that construction work turned out not to be the best focus for Brazilian American student action (due largely to Brazilian antipathy for such work),* basic construction was completed. The work was done under local supervision with local interest and commitments to finish the job and expand the school.

In Ponte dos Carvalhos the construction project was somewhat more ambitious but had the advantage of fitting into a locally conceived community-development plan and having wide support in the community. The project in this town was sponsored by the local Roman Catholic Church whose priest, in cooperation with the Catholic School of Social Work in Recife, had already completed a community study and had made a significant start on a modest educational program, the development of a cooperative and the construction of a small, strikingly modern church. When approached about the possibility of assistance from American and Brazilian students, the priest and his assistant (an unusually able young woman from the School of Social Work) decided to implement plans for the building of a school in one of the poorest and least accessible areas of the community. The school would serve also as a community center, a warehouse for the cooperative (which made straw covers for bottles), and, on occasion, as a chapel.

For the first week or ten days the major focus of the project in Ponte dos Carvalhos was on getting the building started--rebuilding the road to the site (which was on top of a hill), assembling materials (most of which were donated), clearing the land, and laying the foundation. The priest, however, did a remarkable job of enlisting the enthusiasm and support of the community. One memorable occasion, for example, was the night the priest led a procession of three hundred people up the hill to the project site, each carrying a granite rock to be used for the foundation of the school. When the last stone was placed on the heap, Father Geraldo climbed to the top, made a speech exalting Brazilian-American cooperation, the Ecumenical Movement, and, above all, the need for the poor to join the poor in the fight against poverty. He succeeded not only in putting the students in solidly with the community but also in putting the community solidly behind the project--to such an extent that once the construction was under way, there was a lack of neither talent nor manpower to see it through. The students did considerable work on the building, but they principally served as a catalyst to get the project going.

* This was not simply a distaste for manual labor but also the result of their convictions as to what constitutes relevant social involvement.

Research: The team in Pontezinha was also assigned a community research program. The purpose: to gain useful information on the structure of the community; to gather statistics on employment, family size, housing, economic activity, health, and mortality rates; to find out what were considered to be the major problems of the community; and to discover leadership potential. Brazilian and American students interviewed in teams of two, making use of a prepared interview schedule and covering some 150 living units. The study was under the direction of a young sociologist from the University of Recife.

2. Student interaction

After an initial stage of emphasis on construction and research, the attention of the project was shifted to a prearranged program of study and discussion. This shift was valuable as a stimulus to interaction between the Brazilians and Americans over a wide range of issues. The first issue, however, was the question of what constitutes a suitable study program.

Both the Brazilians and the Americans came to the project expecting to engage in some kind of study program. This had been agreed in advance. But what kind of study? The Americans had understood that at least part of their study time would be spent gathering data for papers which would be required of them after the project. They expected, further, that there would be some kind of seminar and discussion program organized around the reading of papers or the presentations of various speakers invited by the group. And, of course, they expected considerable unstructured discussion and debate throughout the project.

The Brazilians, while expecting to engage in discussion (in fact, they were highly oriented towards theoretical discussion), had certainly not come to engage in individual research projects or to gather data for papers. In fact, some of the Brazilians, though not all, reacted negatively to the research interests of the Cornell group--feeling that they were being "used" by the Americans and that some of the research topics were "trivial." In any event, they were not much interested in accommodating the Americans (again, there were exceptions) when it came to arranging the project schedule.

On the matter of seminars or discussion groups, there appeared to be further differences. Here we can only report impressions, but our impressions were that some of the Brazilians regarded the formal study sessions primarily as a time to help the Americans see, understand, and come to terms with the "Brazilian Reality." This not only required considerable discipline in order to accomplish the necessary reading (in Portuguese) and cover the material in discussion but also appeared to be something of a one-way street. The Americans were interested in the "Brazilian Reality," but they were less theoretically oriented than the Brazilians and more inclined to approach the real world, whatever it was, in an inductive and analytical manner than to accept Brazilian conceptions of what that reality was. Furthermore, they were more interested in testing their own ideas in debate than in being shown.

The important thing was that interaction should take place on issues of some substance. A project schedule, of course, is not a substantive issue,

but differences over what constitutes study or over whether it is meaningful to speak of "reality" are substantive.

Let us elaborate one example of substantive interchange. One of the first of the formal study sessions of the group in Ponte dos Carvalhos involved an analysis and interpretation of a research paper which the Catholic School of Social Work had done on that town. The analysis was done by Professor Charles Ackerman of Cornell, one of the project staff. Ackerman commented very bluntly on the serious poverty of the town, the disproportionate number of inhabitants under fifteen years of age, its widespread unemployment (a small fraction must support an almost overwhelming majority), its lack of social cohesion ("This is not a 'community,'" said Ackerman, "but a human trash heap."), its critically high birth rate, and its similarly high rate of infant mortality.

"Now," said Ackerman, "I must speak with my head and not with my heart. Thank God the children die!" The shock was intended, for if, in these circumstances, priority were given to public health programs aimed at saving the children (as some were advocating) and such programs were successful, a critical situation could eventually become intolerable. The point was that Ponte dos Carvalhos needed public health which would first benefit the breadwinners and mothers (those who must support the overwhelming numbers of children and disabled) and which would cut into infant mortality only as alternate methods of population control (alternatives to high infant death rates) were effectively used, or as development advanced to a stage capable of supporting a greater population.

This is a familiar and widely accepted argument among American intellectuals. Not so among the Brazilian students on this project. To these students "birth control" is an American scheme to control Brazil--to limit its potential as a great (populous) power and frustrate its "revolutionary hopes." What appeared rational and humane to the Americans appeared ideologically motivated (imperialist) and aggressive to the Brazilians.

Such was the stuff of student interaction--interaction which was to deepen as the project progressed.

C. The problem of the fishermen

About halfway through the project, in about mid-July, a group of men who fished in the nearby rivers came to one of our project staff to ask for help. For several years, it was claimed, a large distillery had periodically dumped wastes in the Pirapama River and killed many of the fish and crabs on which they depended for their subsistence. The distillery, they thought, was once again about to pollute the Pirapama and the larger Jaboação into which it flowed. Furthermore, a large synthetic rubber plant was being built on the Pirapama, and the fishermen believed that it, too, was dumping wastes in the river and killing the fish. Could anything be done?

We knew from our surveys that there were at least five hundred men in Pontezinha and Ponte dos Carvalhos who depended on subsistence fishing, primarily from the Jaboação, which flowed between the two towns. And we knew further, though unofficially, that when the rubber plant began

operations, it expected to dump as much as 70,000 liters of toxic wastes per day into the Pirapama. Said one of the engineers at the rubber plant, "When we begin to dump our wastes, we will pollute the river one hundred per cent." These wastes would enter the Jaboatão near the sea but would be carried upstream to Pontezinha and Ponte dos Carvalhos by the tides.

1. Response to a plea

The fishermen's plea was considered very carefully by the staff, and a decision was made to shift the attention of the project to this problem. There was considerable discussion. All agreed that the issue was important and that a response from the project was in order. It was possible that the project could be of some help to the fishermen, and, in any event, the students probably would learn more about "the effects of industrial development on economically marginal people" by working at this than by anything else they were doing.

First, of course, the students needed some documented facts. Were the plants actually polluting the rivers, or was this a debatable point? How many fishermen by count were actually affected, and what economic alternatives did they have? What were the laws of the state relative to water pollution? Had the Pirapama and the Jaboatão been officially declared "industrial rivers?" What responsibilities and/or programs did the appropriate government agencies have relative to this problem? What were the political implications involved? What legal alternatives were there for remedial action if such were needed?

Five committees were set up and put to work getting the facts in each of the relevant areas. A research committee interviewed all of the fishermen who could be located in the towns in which the students lived plus a small fishing village near the sea which was also affected by the wastes. A technical committee visited the President Vargas Distillery and "COPERBO," the synthetic rubber plant, to find out exactly what they were putting into the rivers. A legal committee checked on statutes and executive decrees. A committee on government policy visited the headquarters of SUDENE (the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast) and SUDEPE (Superintendency of Fisheries).

What the students learned was essentially this: there were between 800 and 1,000 fishermen who were to some degree economically dependent on the rivers. Most of these men were extremely poor, had large families, preferred some other type of work, and were barred from alternate occupations because of illiteracy (a barrier to most industrial jobs), age (some factories allegedly would not hire men over thirty-five), an inability to own land (an inhibition to subsistence farming), and a widespread lack of job opportunities of any kind. They further learned that the synthetic rubber plant, COPERBO, would go into limited operation sometime within the next month and would, by official estimates, pour sufficient amounts of untreated toxic wastes into the Pirapama to end all fish and plant life in its waters.

They learned that pollution of the Pirapama River was clearly illegal. They learned, further, that the managers of COPERBO had, for economic reasons appearing good to them, scrapped previous plans to neutralize

their wastes before dumping them in the river. And, finally, they learned that neither government nor industry was making any provision for the threatened fishermen--if indeed they even knew of their existence. The salient facts were established: eight hundred fishermen were in imminent danger of economic disaster. Worse still, they were in a situation of almost total vulnerability. They were virtually without any effective means for the redress of grievance.

Even with an apparent "moral imperative" to act, however, other considerations were weighed before any additional moves were made. Was it not inevitable that these streams become "industrial rivers" in the wake of greater economic progress? Would not more jobs be provided in the long run by industrial development? Was it rational to oppose the interests of pre-industrial fishermen to the economic development of the entire region? And, in any event, could eight hundred illiterate, disfranchised, and poverty-stricken fishermen effectively oppose the interests of a \$33,000,000 rubber plant tied as it was to development plans of SUDENE, United States AID, foreign and domestic industry, and the vital interests of the plantation owners? (COPERBO will provide a major new market for sugar alcohol.)

Needless to say, no simple answers could be given to these questions. Nor will they be attempted here. Not only are these issues exceedingly complex, they frankly demand of those who are forced to evaluate them some basic ethical judgments. Whose welfare is to be preferred, whose is to be deferred, and why? These questions were carefully weighed. But like all men who must respond with deliberate speed to urgent questions and who must do so on the basis of what they believe to be just, and before all of the relevant facts can possibly be gathered and evaluated, these students were forced to decide. Their decision was to help the fishermen.

2. A decision to act

Their first move was to contact the well-known and progressive archbishop of Recife, Dom Helder Camara. The archbishop was sympathetic and offered to come to Ponte dos Carvalhos and discuss the problem with the students and the fishermen if the students would bring representatives of the fishermen from the three communities together. This was done, and Dom Helder kept his promise. The meeting was well attended, and the archbishop was visibly moved by the plight of the fishermen.

The next step was a meeting at the SUDENE headquarters in Recife, presided over by the archbishop, at which representatives of the fishermen, the managers and engineers of COPERBO and the distillery, government personnel, and the students were present. This meeting was the dramatic highlight of the project. Here the fishermen and the plant managers confronted one another face to face. The managers said they thought the problem could perhaps be solved in a year and a half. The fishermen said they would be dead by then. Dom Helder stood by the fishermen. But little came of the encounter except to refer the problem to a commission to be made up of the contending parties.

By this time the calendar read July 20. In a little more than a week the project would officially be ended as the Brazilian students would return to classes on August 1. After the project ended, however, several Brazilian and American students from the two sites stayed on with the

priest in Ponte dos Carvalhos. Two attempts were made to organize the commission of plant managers and fishermen to which the pollution issue had been referred, but both attempts ended in frustration. The difficulty, as reported by the students, was in getting representatives from COPERBO to attend the meetings and in getting SUDENE to take the matter seriously. The second failure is reported to have had a particularly disastrous effect upon the morale of the fishermen. The opening of COPERBO was imminent, and their hope for a democratically achieved solution was badly shaken.

Once it became evident that little could be expected from the commission, the fishermen and those who remained to work with them turned to the archbishop. There had been talk among the fishermen of a march on COPERBO, and some of the fishermen apparently had approached the army for permission to demonstrate. But demonstrations were illegal, and permission was denied. At this point the archbishop asked for and received permission to conduct a "religious procession" from Ponte dos Carvalhos to the COPERBO plant. In the mind of the archbishop, we have been told, this was not simply a political ruse but a legitimate expression of religious concern. The archbishop had in mind the non-violent activity of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The procession took place on August 16, only hours before the opening operations of COPERBO. According to the press reports (Diário de Pernambuco) some 2,000 fishermen, wives, and children marched in an ecumenical procession from Ponte dos Carvalhos to the COPERBO plant. They followed a cross draped with a fishermen's net. Some carried fish in their hands. A few carried placards with religious quotations: "Blessed are they who seek after justice and righteousness," "The river is our bread," and "Give us this day our daily bread." At the gates of the plant a speech was made by one of the fishermen, and sermons were preached by the priest and the archbishop extolling the moral force of non-violence and urging faith and restraint.

According to one report, COPERBO responded by promising to make provision to neutralize its wastes before dumping them in the river. What will finally come of this remains to be seen.

3. The issue of complexity

Work with the fishermen raised basic questions which went far beyond the immediate issues of river pollution and economic dislocation. The best that could be hoped for the fishermen in the face of advancing industrialization was a temporary reprieve, and the students knew it. But the problem was more profound.

COPERBO was planned to play a major role in the salvation of the dominant and badly ailing sugar industry of the Northeast. The plant, we were told, would buy sugar alcohol from plantations covering the entire eastern portions of the state of Pernambuco and its neighboring states. Thus, not only would the sugar plantations of the rich coastal areas be provided a new and stable market at a time when world sugar prices were falling, but they would also be strengthened in their almost total control of the arable lands of the coast and in their domination of an almost feudal social order outside the major cities of the area. Or so it appeared.

Albert O. Hirschman quotes Josué de Castro in his Geography of Hunger as follows:

The Brazilian Northeast...once had one of the few really fertile tropical soils. It had a climate favorable to agriculture, and it was originally covered with a forest growth extremely rich in fruit trees. Today, the all-absorbing, self-destructive sugar industry has stripped all the available land and covered it completely with sugar cane. As a result, this is one of the starvation areas of the continent. The failure to grow fruits, greens, and vegetables, or to raise cattle in the region, has created an extremely difficult food problem in an area where diversified farming could produce an infinite variety of foods.*

Hirschman points out that many social or agrarian reformers regard the existing pattern of land use as a major obstacle to economic development--at least of development that will benefit those of economically marginal status--and that they further convey their opinion that "the patterns of land use and of ownership are indissolubly linked and that it is impossible to change the one without the other."**

These points are, of course, debatable, but many respectable planners regard some modification in the land tenure system as essential for the economic health of the Northeast. Professor Ackerman of Cornell, a member of the project staff, suggests that there are possibly two effective ways in which "land reform" can be brought about in this area: 1) By the eventual use or threat of violence on the part of the peasants (as threatened by Julião and the Peasant Leagues) or 2) By allowing the economic pressures created by a) falling world market prices for sugar and/or b) the growth of new urban markets for horticultural products more typically associated with small land holdings to force the selling off of unused or underutilized lands to more profitable ventures. If these men are right and non-violent alternatives are preferred, it appears that the creation of COPERBO may have been a mistake--as it was apparently regarded by Celso Furtado, former director of SUDENE.

We do not claim to know the answers to these questions. Rather, we admit to having been thrown up against the disconcerting complexity of the issues surrounding economic and industrial development. How well our students understood this complexity and how well they resisted simplistic and/or ideologically motivated answers from the right, left, or center (American or Brazilian) will perhaps best be revealed in the papers which they are now producing.

4. The issue of moral ambiguity

It is difficult enough for issues to be complex. It is more troublesome

* In his Journeys Towards Progress, Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York; p. 111.

** Op cit.; p. 112.

yet to find that they are shot through with moral ambiguity. When people become involved in situations of conflict, it is very easy for them to assume that they are entirely on the side of justice and that those who oppose them are morally deficient: good guys versus bad. It is doubtful, however, that such is ever the case.

Let us return to the issue of river pollution. Who were the bad guys? The managers of COPERBO? Possibly. This was a feeling which crept into the attitude of the students when they took their stand with the fishermen. But one certainly does not get the impression that he is in the presence of evil men when visiting with the engineers and managers of COPERBO. Rather, they appear to be capable, decent, and dedicated men struggling against nearly insuperable odds to set up a highly sophisticated chemical plant under the most frustrating conditions imaginable. Like all good engineers, they are achievement-oriented relative to a highly complicated set of technical problems. And, like all good engineers or professionals of any kind, no doubt they are motivated both by the challenge of their job and by the satisfactions of material reward. Do they have a moral rationale for their work at COPERBO? Certainly. They are assisting with the industrial and economic development of the Northeast--providing new markets for sugar and new sources of rubber for Brazilian industries, improving Brazil's balance of payments, protecting old jobs and creating new ones. One may be critical of their judgments beyond their professional expertise, but one is seriously misled if he assumes that they lack a sense of decency and good will.

Moral ambiguity meets one in almost every concrete, ethical decision he must make or contemplate--public health versus high birth and infant mortality rates--business versus public interests--long-term revolutionary solutions (the present suffering of the masses must be allowed to get worse before they will rise up and set things right) versus long-term developmental solutions (the present suffering of the masses must be tolerated while gradual solutions are allowed to take hold). Worse still is the moral confusion and demoralization one feels when he senses that there may indeed be no solutions to the pressing social evils that surround him. And yet he lives in a changing world where even his inaction is a moral choice.

5. The possibility of progress

The greatest tribute to the resiliency and courage of these Brazilian and American students was the fact that they were never overcome by demoralization, though at times they were driven close. They did, in fact, demonstrate a considerable amount of dedication to the achievement of proximate solutions to some very specific problems, and it may well be that their labors in the Northeast this summer will continue to bear fruit.

As this report is written, word comes that Father Geraldo and the students from the University of Recife are helping the fishermen organize a cooperative through which they can more effectively protect their interests and make the adjustments which may be forced upon them.

The experience of the fishermen's procession has inspired the archbishop--or so we have been told--to explore much further the relevance of non-violent, direct action to the explosive and potentially violent social

problems of the Northeast. Dom Helder must not be underestimated--nor his bishops and priests--nor the students who will work with him--nor the considerable resources of leadership and skills which he can bring to bear upon these issues.

Events and actions were set in motion this summer which may be of some consequence in the months ahead. They were by no means the result of the project alone--and certainly not of the Americans alone--but the project was the catalyst which brought them about.

Some important things can happen for the good of "the people" as the result of a project that is oriented primarily towards the education of students through "study and involvement." We believe that the students' work with the fishermen makes such a claim plausible, though we admit that this work, like any other form of social, political, or developmental action, involves ambiguity and risk.

III. Follow-up and evaluation

A. Post-project activity

1. Travel

As indicated above, for the majority of the students the project necessarily ended by the first of August. The Brazilians traveled to their universities, and the Americans followed a pre-arranged plan with Varig Airlines to visit some of the major cities and regions south of Recife. The value of the added travel was twofold: 1) It gave the students a more comprehensive picture of Brazil as a whole, and 2) It provided an invaluable opportunity for the Americans to visit the Brazilian students in their homes and on their respective campuses. Some of the most productive discussions of the summer came out of the ad hoc evaluation sessions carried on in Bahia, Rio, and São Paulo.

2. Follow-up work in the United States

The Brazil '65 Study and Involvement Program officially ended for the American students at Christmas when their second paper was due. Their work on these papers and the considerable reflection, sorting through of experiences, and evaluation they have gone through can be considered the third and final phase of this pilot project.

B. Evaluation

1. Results compared with objectives

a. Educational goals

- (1) Correlation of general knowledge with understanding of concrete human problems

It is our judgment that the students learned a great deal about the general conditions of underdevelopment in northeastern Brazil and that they learned even more about the concrete human problems created by those conditions through their daily contact with the people, through their community research, and through their work with the fishermen of Pontezinha and Ponte dos Carvalhos.

(2) Correlation of development theory with consideration of value judgments

Perhaps the most poignant learning experience of all arose from the involvement of the students in the social problems created, in part, by SUDENE and the developing industries in the region south of Recife. Not only did the students see the human results of the decisions made by the planning agencies of the Northeast, but they were also forced to make decisions of their own in which the technical complexity and moral ambiguity of development programs were thrown into bold relief.

(3) Comparing of American and Brazilian approaches to problems of modernization and change as reflected in the ideas and actions of students committed to these ends

The summer brought many shocks--the shock of a new language and culture, of crushing poverty and disease, of the operations of an illiberal political regime, and of baffling complexity and ambiguity. But the deepest shock came when American and Brazilian students tried to comprehend each other's ideological biases and commitments. There were barriers to cross that were much deeper than semantic and linguistic differences.

Throughout this project the American students tended to be pragmatic and gradualist in their approach to the problems of underdevelopment and, at least in the beginning, to regard almost all problems as capable of solution by technical means. Their Brazilian counterparts, on the other hand, were often skeptical of development programs which, in effect, took the social and economic status quo for granted, and they were prone to speak of the need for "revolutionary" change. Basic political, social, and economic structures had to be altered, they felt, if any substantial progress were to be made in the struggle against poverty and its pantheon of evils.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to give an objective account of the contrast between these points of view since one, obviously, must write from within his own frame of reference. There did appear, however, to be agreement between the Americans and the Brazilians that the two groups did, in fact, have different perspectives. Ackerman suggests that this difference in perspective may be analogous to the "figure-ground" problem in psychology where some people find it difficult to perceive a figure in a picture because their attention is drawn to the background, while others more readily see isolated details without reference to their context. It is the problem, he suggests, of the forest and the trees. Some Americans have difficulty seeing the overall, or contextual, "forest" because of their preoccupation with the immediate technical problems at hand (the trees), while the reverse seems more often true of the Brazilians. The problems of "the third world," for example, are likely to be more challenging to the Brazilians than the problem of how to fix the priest's jeep.

It is our judgment that both groups profited from the interchange which took place over these issues. At least we felt that some "theoretically oriented" Brazilian students came to have a somewhat higher regard for the disciplines of modern social science and their practical application (partly, perhaps, because of their contact with American students and faculty, but possibly more because of their contact with the Northeast and

its immediate problems). And we are rather certain that the American students came to see much more clearly that technical solutions to immediate problems may, in the long run, be irrelevant if serious attention is not paid to the national and international political and economic context in which these "solutions" are worked out. A concern for theory is not necessarily irresponsible or escapist, for, in one sense, nothing is more practical than a good theory.

The entire summer was a long and painful struggle toward understanding. And, of course, what made the struggle often poignant was the fact that these students (and the staff, to be sure) were attempting to work together on specific problems of social change where issues had to be faced and decisions made under circumstances that often exposed raw nerves of feeling and prejudice on both sides.

One thing we know with certainty is that the students did learn in this vital area. For all that the Americans were told and read beforehand about what to expect of Brazilian students (perhaps because of it), they still went to Brazil with stereotyped expectations. These stereotypes were tested by Professor Ackerman before the Americans and Brazilians met. By the end of the project these images were checked again, and it was found that each of the American students moved significantly away from his stereotype to an accurate appreciation of the value priorities and commitments actually held by the Brazilian students.

b. Assistance goals

(1) Effect on future professionals

Any long-term benefits which may accrue to Brazil as a result of this project are likely to come from the professional careers of these students. Many of these American students will enter professions in government service, teaching, research, journalism, and business administration relative to Latin America; and some will doubtless advance to positions of leadership in their respective fields. There is an even greater probability that the Brazilian students on this project will so advance, since the student population in Brazil is much smaller in relation to the general population than is true of the student population in the United States. Again, it is our judgment that what these students have been able to learn at this stage in their lives about the values, commitments, and hopes of their future professional counterparts will be of the greatest long-term significance for relations between the United States and Brazil.

At a time when ideological differences and misunderstandings may well be increasing, it may be of vital importance to have professional leaders in this country who are better able to understand both the roots of these differences and the legitimate aspirations of Latin American leaders and their people.

(2) Local assistance

Brazil '65 was not in any professional sense a development project nor even primarily a service program. It was basically an educational project with long-range humanitarian goals to be realized during the future careers of the project participants. Still the formal academic focus of the project

was on the effects of underdevelopment on the lives of the people and on learning through participation in programs of social change.

The project was planned, therefore, to assist locally conceived and initiated programs of community development and was able to give these projects a considerable boost. Follow-up and continuity is assured by the same indigenous leaders who initiated these projects.

Finally, we point to the fact once again that this project also performed a catalytic function through its response to the fishermen and the events which this action set in motion. Again we admit that both the possibilities of positive change and of continued frustration are present in these unfolding developments. Which of these antithetical possibilities may be realized we cannot say, but it is possible that the continuing relationship of this project to these particular Brazilian students and to the archbishop of Recife may help to determine the answer.

2. Ecumenical relations

Much was learned by Cornell United Religious Work and its supporting denominations, and by those with whom the Church shares a concern for human dignity, about the possibilities for ecumenical cooperation in social action. A Jesuit priest has given voice to this emerging spirit.

In a world that has become conscious of the disequilibrium caused by development, the sign of the Church of Christ, visible to the world, will be her social concern and social action....

It is no longer enough to build schools and hospitals; we must understand the new forms of development, enter into an effective planning which will force us to break through our 'parochialism' and our 'congregationalism,' work out unheard-of collaborations with Christians of other faiths or with non-Christians, and promote social transformations which can fearlessly be called revolutionary.*

In Brazil's Northeast this summer there was an unheard-of collaboration which included American and Brazilian students of Christian, Jewish, and humanist backgrounds, the União Cristã de Estudantes do Brasil (UCEB) the New England Student Christian Movement (which has a supportive relationship to the UCEB and which provided a staff member for the project), the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Recife, and the whole range of North American religious groups represented in Cornell United Religious Work.

This must be seen as much more than "interfaith good will." The new ecumenical spirit comes from a growing sense that the Church has a humanizing mission which must be expressed in "secular" terms. This was not an "interfaith" project (no religious criteria were used in selecting either the American or the Brazilian students). It was rather, for want of a better term, the Church engaged in a "secular mission." This may be a confusing notion to many, but it must be taken seriously by those who care to understand the spirit in which this project was carried out.

* Houtart, Francois and Pin, Emile, The Church and the Latin American Revolution, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1965; p. 209.

Eduardo Frei, president of Chile, expressed something of this emerging spirit when he commented in 1964 on the aims and the "call" of "Christian Democracy:"

The central tenet of Christian Democracy is the belief that we are witnesses to the crisis of a world exhausted, to the death of paternalism, and to the birth of a civilization of work and solidarity with man at its center, rather than the pursuit of monetary gain that has pervaded the bourgeois society....

Christian Democracy is...non-confessional...its call goes to all: to Catholics, to those of other faiths, and to those with no faith at all. To accept the program is sufficient to belong to the movement. Indeed...many Protestants, Jews, and agnostics have joined Christian Democracy, and their company does us honor.* **

Conclusion

The staff and student participants in the Brazil '65 Study and Involvement Program consider this pilot project to have been a success. We found that we were able, contrary to some predictions, to get politically sensitive and articulate Brazilian students to work with us, thanks to the very sensitive and able work of Professor Richard Graham and Sr. Edir Cardoso of the União Cristã de Estudantes do Brasil. Furthermore, contrary again to some predictions, we found that we were able to take American and Brazilian students into the Northeast, a very difficult area, and engage in a successful project.

We found that significant interaction took place between the American and Brazilian students, that these students learned much as they worked with their counterparts on problems relating to economic and social change, and that certain positive contributions could be made to locally initiated development programs.

It is, therefore, our conclusion that the original three-year experimental program, of which Brazil '65 was the pilot project, should be carried through to completion.

We continue to recognize the experimental nature of this program both as a special venture in Church-University cooperation and as an attempt to correlate academic study with personal involvement in the issues of the world beyond the campus. Since this program is still experimental, basic questions about its effectiveness and validity are open to continuing evaluation and discussion.

* Frei, Eduardo, "The Aims of Christian Democracy," The Commonweal (Issue of October 9, 1964).

** In deference to the Brazilian students, it is important to point out that this quotation from Frei is used only to illustrate an ecumenical spirit and is not intended as an endorsement of "Christian Democratic" solutions in Brazil.

Specific plans for follow-up projects in 1966 and 1967 are going forward since commitments were made by the responsible boards and committees involved to do so, provided the pilot project were judged a success and adequate funds could be raised. As we move ahead, however, this experiment should be observed, tested, and carefully evaluated both as to the validity of its assumptions and as to the effectiveness of its operation. And all who read this report are invited and encouraged to comment.

Respectfully submitted,

William W. Rogers

William W. Rogers
Director, Cornell United Religious Work
Brazil Study and Involvement Program

WWR:hm

BRAZIL PROJECT STUDY PROGRAM 1966

SUMMARY: each student is expected:

- (1) to write either one long term paper or three shorter ones on assigned topics during the spring semester;
- (2) to be prepared on three occasions to discuss in an informed manner the subject of the seminar with the invited speaker;
- (3) if on campus in the fall to be prepared as a result of summer investigation to conduct one session of a CURW seminar or, if not on campus then, to write a paper to be used by the same group;
- (4) to do the assigned reading;
- (5) to participate actively in the seminar discussions;
- (6) to attend, whenever possible, lectures given on campus by visiting scholars and political leaders which are of interest to the project.

I. PAPERS: Each person is to write and submit one of the following:

- (a) Either one long term paper (can be done in conjunction with another course) to be handed in by the last day of the semester at the very latest;
- (b) or three shorter papers dealing directly with the topics to be discussed in particular seminars. Suggestion: do these in connection with the same seminars for which you are expected to be prepared for discussion. The list of topics for seminars is attached. The deadline for submission of these is one week subsequent to the seminar to which the paper is related.

II. DISCUSSIONS

Each person is expected to prepare questions and to be able to discuss intelligently with the speaker the topic for three evenings, i.e. there should be three or four persons prepared for each seminar in this way. Indicate the seminars for which you will be so responsible on the sign-up sheet. For obvious reasons this must be done no later than February 14.

III. SUMMER INVESTIGATION

Each person, except seniors, will prepare by assiduous inquiry during the summer to conduct one session of a seminar entitled "Modernization in Brazil: Problems and Possibilities" which will be held at Cornell in the fall of 1966. Specifically, answers should be suggested to the question "How does one get modernization?" Topics will be assigned by mid-spring. Seniors or others who will not be on campus this fall, will write a

paper addressed to the same question to be used as a resource reading in that seminar.

IV. READING ASSIGNMENTS

These are of two sorts: Some are to be read religiously by every student but are of limited extent; others are more lengthy and of special interest to those preparing to deal with the seminar speakers (of course, they will be useful for any project participant).

(a) Assignments to be read by every student for a specific date will be given in advance. They will be short articles or a chapter of a book. When limited copies are available, the material will be placed on reserve at Uris library or will be kept in Bill Roger's office. Therefore, no one should have failed to read the assignment by each seminar. The success of the seminars will surely depend on this.

(b) A bibliography is attached which is designed to provide a deeper understanding of modernization and of Brazil. There are indications, where possible, as to which seminar(s) the book or article relates more specifically.

CORNELL BRAZIL PROJECT
STUDY PROGRAM BIBLIOGRAPHY
"MODERNIZATION IN BRAZIL"

MANDATORY READINGS TO BE FINISHED BEFORE LEAVING FOR BRAZIL

- C. L. Wagley Introduction to Brazil
A general account of Brazil's regions, social classes, mores, religion, government, and rural-urban composition
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
- C. L. Wagley Brazil: Crisis and Change
Headline Series Pamphlet - October 1964
Location: Anabel Taylor Hall
- A. O. Hirschman 'Brazil's Northeast' in Journeys Towards Progress
A sophisticated historical narrative of attempts by various administrations, regional and national, to solve the persistent problems of the Northeast. His critical approach offers valuable insights into the uncoordinated, short-sighted decision-making process and the lack of effective enforcement of policies.
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
- I. Horowitz Revolution in Brazil
A significant and controversial documentation of the indeterminate, inharmonious modernization of Brazil. Looks at historical, political, social, economic, international and ideological aspects. Includes lengthy extracts by important Brazilians.
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
- H. W. Hutchinson Village and Plantation Life in Northeastern Brazil
A vivid description of the stable social relations which underpin the economic and political structure of the rural northeast
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall

CORNELL BRAZIL PROJECT

SEMINARS

TOPIC: "MODERNIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN BRAZIL"

Part I - "The Brazilian Reality"

- | | | |
|---------|---|-----------------|
| Feb. 7 | 1. Introduction to the Project and to the Project Study Program.
Introduction to the North-East. Bill Rogers, Dick Graham, Eric Kruger | |
| Feb. 14 | 2. Historical trends | Dick Graham |
| Feb. 21 | 3. Politics in the last 30 years | Celso Lafer |
| Feb. 28 | 4. Class structure in the North-East | Manoel Berlinck |

Part II - "Aspects of Modernization Relevant to Brazil"

- | | | |
|---------|--|---------------|
| Mar. 7 | 5. Demography, population, migration, urbanization | Prof. Stykos |
| Mar. 14 | 6. Land tenure, monoculture, industrialization | Prof. Davis |
| Mar. 21 | 7. The rural community in transition | Prof. Carroll |

Part III - "Values and Theories of Social Change"

- | | | |
|---------|---|-------------------|
| Apr. 4 | 8. Approaches to the theory of social change | Prof. Lewis |
| Apr. 11 | 9. The ideology of revolution | Prof. Ackerman |
| Apr. 18 | 10. The U. S. in the developmental process | Prof. Dowd |
| Apr. 25 | 11. The role of the Church | Prof. Schaul |
| May 2 | 12. Problem solving by the Brazilian intellectual | Miss Barbara Hall |
| May 9 | 13. United States foreign policy | Prof. LaFeber |
| May 16 | 14. United States domestic problems | Prof. Dowd |
| May 23 | 15. Techniques of action in community development | |

These seminars will usually be held in Bill Rogers' office, Room G29, Anabel Taylor Hall, or in the Edwards Room, Anabel Taylor Hall, every Monday evening at 7:30 p.m.

These seminars are subject to change. There may be additional or substitutional seminars whenever a special guest speaker or special lecture is available.

MANDATORY READINGS TO BE READ BEFORE EACH SEMINAR

PART I. THE BRAZILIAN REALITY

- Feb. 7 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE NORTHEAST
S. Bobock Brazilis Developing Northeast
Ch. 3, Recent Economic Trends in Northeast Brazil
pp. 45-69
Location: HC 187 R66 OLIN CARRELL
- Feb. 14 2. HISTORICAL TRENDS
C. Furtado The Economic Growth of Brazil
Ch. 5, The Economy of Transition to an Industrial
System, pp. 193-258
Location: HC 187 F99 1963 OLIN CARRELL
- Feb. 21 3. POLITICS OF THE LAST 30 YEARS
Galeano, Eduardo "Brazil, The Coup and After" in
Studies on the Left, Fall 1964.
Location: HS 1 S93 OLIN LIBRARY
- Harding, T.F. "Revolution Tomorrow: the Failure of the Left
in Brazil, in Studies on the Left, Fall '64.
Location: HS 1 S93 OLIN LIBRARY
- Current History: J. Johnson, "Brazil in Quandary" Jan '65
Location: D 410 C97 OLIN LIBRARY
- Current History "Interim Regime in Brazil" (Political
Events since the Coup)
Location: D410 C97 OLIN LIBRARY
- C.L. Wagley Brazil: Crisis and Change: pp. 32-54
Headline Series, No. 167.
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
Monthly Review "Brazil and the U.S. The Role of the
Military in Brazil." March 1965
Location: 4X 1 M78 OLIN LIBRARY
- Feb. 28 4. CLASS STRUCTURE IN BRAZIL'S NORTHEAST
L. Horowitz Revolution in Brazil, Ch. 8, pp. 232-271
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall

MANDATORY READINGS TO BE READ BEFORE EACH SEMINAR

PART II. ASPECTS OF MODERNIZATION RELEVANT TO BRAZIL

- March 7 5. Population, Demography, Migration and Urbanization.
- C. Wagley, Introduction to Brazil
 I. Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil
 Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
 Assignment: Read all selections referred to under these four topics in the index of both books.
- J. Mayone Stycos, "Population Growth and the Alliance for Progress", Reprint.
 Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
 J. Mayone Stycos, "Latin American Opinions on Population Problems and Birth Control. Reprint
 Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
- March 14 6. Land Tenure, Monoculture and Industrialization
- W. Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development of Brazil.
 Ch. 7, "Imbalances and bottlenecks in the Brazilian Economy" pp. 150-192
 Location: HC 187 B14 OLIN CARRELL
- C. Furtado, "Political Obstacles to Economic Growth in Brazil" Reprint
 Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
- March 21 7. The Rural Community in Transition
- C. Prado Junior
 "The Agrarian Question in Brazil" Studies on the Left,
 Fall 1964
 Location: HS 1 S93 OLIN LIBRARY
- A.O. Hirschman (editor)
 See Latin American Issues, Last Chapter
 Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall.

MANDATORY READINGS TO BE READ BEFORE EACH SEMINAR

PART III. VALUES AND THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

- Apr. 4 8. Theories of Social Change
Reading to be announced three weeks before.
- Apr. 11 9. The Ideology of Revolution
I. Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil
Ch. 2, "The Ideology of Peasant Revolution"
OR Ch. 3, "The Practice and Preaching of Revolution"
AND Ch. 12, "American Capitalism, Soviet Communism and
the Brazilian Mix"
D. Nasatir, Student Action in Latin America, Reprint
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
- Apr. 18 10. The U.S. in the Developmental Process

A.D. Frank, "Exploitation or Aid? U.S.-Brazil Economic
Relations". Reprint
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall

The Alliance For Progress
Location: OLIN LIBRARY

Hans Morgenthau, "Globalism: Johnson's Moral Crusade"
Reprint from New Republic, July 3, 1965
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall

R. Schaul, "Latin Ferment-Challenge to us all"
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
- Apr. 25 11. The Role of the Church

Abbe F. Houtart, "Present-day trends in the Roman Catholic
Church in Latin America", Reprint.
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall

Hiber Conteris, "The Role of the Church in Social Change in
Latin America"--A Protestant Appraisal, Reprint.
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall

Lemuel C. Nascimento, "Brazil-Problems and Christian Res-
ponsibility", Reprint.
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall

Barbara Hall, "Portrait of a Revolution", The Inter-Collegian,
April 1965, Reprint.
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall

MANDATORY READINGS TO BE READ BEFORE EACH SEMINAR

- May 2 12. Problem-solving by the Brazilian Intellectual
- A.O. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Ch. 1; "Brazil's
Northeast.
I. Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil, Ch. 5; pp. 271-278.
"Colonialism, Hunger and Progress"
Location of both: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
- May 9 13. United States Foreign Policy
- A.O. Hirschman (ed.) Latin American Issues
See three relevant chapters, especially
by Lincoln Gordon
- May 16 14. United States Domestic Problems
- Michael Harrington, "Poverty Politics and Social Justice".
Reprint.
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall
(More readings to be announced)
- May 23 15. Techniques of Action in Community Development
- D. Dowd, Step by Step
Location: The Commons, Anabel Taylor Hall

Do Not Write in This Space

Date Received: _____

Interview Scheduled: _____

Preliminary Evaluation: _____

Final Acceptance: _____

A P P L I C A T I O N F O R M

BRAZIL '66 WORK-STUDY PROJECT

Name _____ Telephone _____

Campus Address _____

Home Address _____

Home Telephone _____ Area Code _____

Age _____ Sex _____ M _____ F Are you Married or single? _____

Year in School _____ Academic Major _____

Will you be in attendance at Cornell during the academic year 1966-67
(the year after the Brazil '66 Project)? _____ Yes _____ No

ACADEMIC BACKGROUND

- 1) List Latin American content courses which you have taken, professor in charge of the course, grade received, period in which you were enrolled:

(Example: Economics 325, Economic History of Latin America, Davis,
85, Fall - 1964)

- 2) List courses which you have taken in the area of modernization and development, professor in charge of the course, grade received, period in which you were enrolled:

(Example: Sociology 362, Society and Economic Growth, Ackerman,
87, Fall - 1964)

3) Language Competence:

Name of Language		Fluent - ^{near} native	Good	Fair	Minimal
(Example)					
French	Speaking		x		
	Aural comprehension		x		
	Reading		x		
	Writing		x		
(Example)					
Lithuanian	Speaking	x			
	Aural comprehension	x			
	Reading			x	
	Writing			x	
a)					
b)					
c)					
d)					

- 4) State how language competence acquired (give grades for formal course work):

(Example: Lithuanian -- parents' native language, spoken at home

French -- three years in high school, two college, straight A's
summer spent in Paris)

a)

b)

c)

d)

5) I understand that in order to qualify for participation in the Brazil '66 Project, I must have passed the course, Portuguese 101, or its equivalent. Equivalent language training can be obtained in a number of ways, such as being born into a Portuguese speaking family, going to high school in New Bedford and studying Portuguese there, growing up in Rio while one's father is working for the National City Bank of New York, spending two years in the Peace Corps in Brazil, etc. Intensive summer courses in elementary Portuguese are available on several campuses in the United States and may give training equivalent to that received in Portuguese 101.

Check this box ☐ if you have read the above statement and agree to obtain the necessary language training before December, 1965, when the final selection of participants for the Brazil '66 Project will take place.

- 6) I agree to take at least one course in Latin American content during the coming academic year.

_____ Yes _____ No

- 7) I agree to take at least one course in the area of modernization and development during the coming academic year

_____ Yes _____ No

EXTRA-CURRICULAR STUDY:

1) I fully understand that participation in an extra-curricular study group during the coming academic year forms a part of the Brazil Project, and I agree to give this group study program my full support and to attend every session to the best of my ability.

_____ Yes _____ No

2) I understand that I shall be expected to write one thirty-page paper on a selected problem faced by Brazilians, and that this paper will be due by the end of spring vacation in 1966. (List of possible topics: Race Relations, Land Tenure, Economic Development, Political Parties, Foreign Policy, Brasilia)

_____ Yes _____ No

3) I also understand that I shall be expected to write an additional thirty-page paper upon my return (due Christmas vacation, 1966) on some aspect of my observations in Brazil, e.g., Brazilian student reactions to the project; problems to be faced by Brazilians at the local level, etc. List of possible topics:

The pre-scientific world view (a threatening world) as reflected in:
health care
folk tales
superstitions
child-rearing practices

Lack of achievement motivation, cooperative and competitive spirit as reflected in:
children's games
attitudes toward other villagers
attitudes toward the project itself

The urban-rural dichotomy, anti-Americanism, and the developmental ideology of the new elite, as reflected in Brazilian university student reactions to the projects

_____ Yes _____ No

TRAVEL AND EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES:

Have you had any experience traveling or living in another country?

(Example: Summer, 1964, in Mexico
Occasional brief trips across the border at Matamoros,
Nuevo Laredo, Montreal
Summer, 1965, in Paris)

_____ Yes _____ No

SPECIAL INTERESTS AND SKILLS:

Do you have any special interests, or skills, which are not common to all college students (e.g., do you play the trombone in the Big Red Band, have you been a member of the corps de ballet at the City Center in New York, do you build models of clipper ships in bottles as a hobby?)

_____ Yes _____ No

RECOMMENDATIONS:

List below the names and addresses of three people (not students) who can give an evaluation of your potentialities as a participant in this program:

a)

b)

c)

PARENTAL APPROVAL:

Do you know whether or not your parents would approve of your participation in this project?

SIGNED _____

DATE _____

Please return to Room G29, Anabel Taylor Hall.

The Brazil Work-Study Project is sponsored by Cornell United Religious Work, in cooperation with the Cornell Latin American Studies Committee.

SIDE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Dona Marina Bandeira

Article Prepared for
The Bulletin of the Cyberculture Research Institute

(For Private Circulation Only)

The Northeast of Brazil has been looked upon during the last decades as a "problem area," subject to droughts, slow starvation, demographic explosion, and social unrest.

This region was the original setting of the industrialization of sugar cane in the Americas in the sixteenth century. As the centuries passed, other agricultural resources were developed (without great success), but in the area close to the east coast, sugar still prevails and is now facing the risk of a total collapse caused by obsolete methods and the fall of the international price of sugar.

The structure of society in this region follows the typical "plantation" pattern with an acutely stratified dual-society.

In an attempt to correct this imbalance a regional development plan has been established for the area and is being carried out by SUDENE (Superintendence for the Development of the Northeast) aiming at channeling funds and "know-how" for the quick industrialization of the area.

The quick change-over from an archaic social and economic structure suddenly faced with advanced technology has provoked clashes caused by conflicting interests and by the unpreparedness of the existing semi-starved masses to participate in the effort for development and benefit from it.

The following episode is typical of this situation:

In the Cabo, district of the state of Pernambuco, near its capital, Recife, many hundreds of people survive by catching fish and crab from the Pirapama River, near the ocean. The result of their work barely keeps them alive. They have no chance of obtaining adequate employment, owning land, or earning income by any other way. Nor can they travel to the more developed South of Brazil, since they cannot pay the fare, and the number of shanty-towns inhabited by people of similar origin is increasing every day.

In 1965, new factories representing staggering efforts were being inaugurated in the Cabo district: a large distillery, a vegetable protein industry, synthetic rubber. The synthetic rubber factory, COPERBO, was a symbol of the development of the area, a symbol of hope. It cost 33 million dollars, was financed by Brazil, the United States, and France, and had the most modern equipment to transform alcohol into rubber, using refined electronic devices, employing 32 young Brazilian engineers who studied in the United States and in India. The whole factory is kept in operation by three men in each of the three daily shifts.

But the effects of the new factories on the lives of the fishermen were negative.

The waste thrown by the new factories into the river poisoned the fish. Besides the pollution caused by the distillery, the rubber plant cast 70.000 liters of toxic waste per day into the river. About 1.000 fishermen dependent on the river for their livelihood were about to die of hunger.

At this time in the district of Cabo, the Cornell United Religious Work of the University of Cornell (USA), was carrying out a two-month project of research on the effects of industrial development on economically marginal people. This project had the participation of North American and Brazilian university students.

The students decided to take the problem to the Catholic Archbishop of Recife, Dom Helder Camara, who went to Cabo to look into the problem. As a result of the analysis of the problems, Dom Helder asked for a meeting at SUDENE, with the participation of all concerned; and the details of the problem were explained by Dom Helder, the fishermen, and the students. COPERBO and the representatives of the other factories said that in two years' time the situation would be changed since they would industrialize the waste. But, until then, the fishermen had to be patient. The existence of the fishermen had not been foreseen.

It was obvious that the pollution of the river was illegal. It was obvious that the whole situation was sad, but nothing could be done about it.

As no solution came from the meeting, the fishermen, the students, the Archbishop, the local Protestant pastor, and the priest of the local parish decided to make a public demonstration.

On the 16th of August, 1965, a march, or procession, was organized. The 1.000 fishermen and their families walked six kilometers under a scorching sun carrying a cross with a fishermen's net and big fish in their hands. In front of the gates of the COPERBO plant, sermons were preached by a fisherman, the pastor, the priest and the Archbishop from the top of a truck. All spoke about the need to use non-violence, but stressed the injustice of the situation and the need for a concrete solution.

At first it was thought that the demonstration had been useless, but later it became known that COPERBO was desperately looking for a solution.

This episode is only one instance of an infinite number of similar happenings and portrays the result of development when it only takes into account the economic and technological aspects of development.

In the Northeast of Brazil, with a population of almost 40 million, the vast majority has a standard of living similar to that of the fishermen. The arrival of new roads, electricity, and highly developed technology is a necessity and will benefit the region, but the big challenge remains: what is the majority of the population to do, if it is not prepared to participate in the effort for development and, in many instances, will suffer from it?

New methods of education for development, based on participation through cooperation, are being devised with fairly good results, but these are met by the resistance of the vested interests of the beneficiaries of the dual-society who denounce as Communist all efforts to awaken the masses and transform them into people. But this is another story.

CORNELL UNITED RELIGIOUS WORK

ANABEL TAYLOR HALL ♦ ITHACA, NEW YORK

A RATIONALE FOR PROGRAMS IN THE AREA OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

"Acknowledging the variety and diversity of institutional loyalties, historical traditions, and theological perspectives represented in CURW, there are nevertheless basic objectives which are shared in common and which provide the foundation for functional unity and historical continuity:

....to extend its concern in morally responsible involvement in the world; to seek to enhance the dignity and welfare of the disinherited; to struggle for the humanization of man's social and political relationships...through corporate action in the area of human rights, international projects, and service programs."

(Excerpt from Fall '65 brochure)

As defined by its statement of objectives and delineated in its organizational structure, CURW is and will continue to be committed to the implementation of its ministry in programs of social responsibility. During the past few years these programs have evoked substantial interest and elicited impressive support from faculty and students. Such projects as Cornell-in-Central America, Brazil '65, Nova Scotia Project, East Harlem Project, and voluntary service at MacCormick Youth Camp, Willard State Hospital, and Ithaca United Fund agencies attract increasing enthusiasm and participation. All signs point to an accelerated demand for such opportunities in the future; concomitantly, changing social and cultural needs and attitudes enhance their relevance and appropriateness.

Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, misunderstanding and disagreement regarding the purposes of such programs have confused the meaning of CURW's commitment to social responsibility in the minds of some members of the Cornell community. Therefore, for the sake of increased clarity regarding objectives, more unity regarding purpose, and greater efficiency regarding function, attention needs to be directed toward the appropriateness of such programs relative to 1) the function of CURW, 2) the mission of the Church, and 3) the purpose of the university.

I. As the point of intersection and place of interaction between the "community of faith" and the "community of learning", CURW has a long history of social action and community service.

The first service projects were instituted by the student Christian Association (the precursor of CURW) in 1884 (providing assistance and service to the prisoners in Tompkins County Jail). During the next twenty years,

primarily through the influence of John R. Mott, this type program was greatly expanded and assumed international proportions through the Student Volunteer Movement and the World's Student Christian Federation. Never in the history of the Christian Association or CURW has there been lacking a significant commitment to social responsibility. The decision of the Board of Trustees of Cornell University to incorporate CURW into the University structure in 1956 inadvertently and ironically distorted the image of CURW's function in the minds of some faculty, administrators, and students. It was never assumed by those who made the decision that the establishment of CURW as a division of the University was intended to emasculate CURW's passion for and commitment to social responsibility. Indeed, the united program is the obvious legacy of and successor to the original religious program on this campus, and, as seen clearly from a cursory examination of the historical record, an appropriate and faithful expression of the original genius of the student Christian Association. It is apparent that CURW's commitment to social responsibility is no radical innovation nor experiment; it is a new expression of a perennial commitment.

II. The Mission of the Church. For whatever else it might represent, CURW is an institutional expression of the life and mission of the community of faith. It would seem strange indeed if--given even a rudimentary knowledge of the prophetic tradition of Israel, the social teachings of the Christian churches, the total commitment of men and communities of faith to the cause of human rights, peace, the Freedom Movement, the war against poverty, social and economic transformation in developing countries of the world, the fight against hunger, disease, and physical destitution, the struggle for human dignity and self-esteem--CURW, as an institutional embodiment of this concern, were to remain indifferent and inert. It is becoming progressively clearer that the corporate life of the community of faith, its worship, and its theological reflection are contingent upon and are an expression of its mission to the world. Consistent with this new understanding of its mission is the emergence of a radically approbative attitude toward the university itself. The Church enthusiastically affirms and encourages the humanistic tradition of the academic community and supports its efforts, directly and indirectly, to enhance the dignity of man. It unambiguously applauds its search for new knowledge and deeper wisdom. It stands ready to enter into all alliances that would serve to implement more effectively its concern for social justice and the improvement of man's spiritual and material welfare. New strategies and tactics are devised to meet new circumstances, yet CURW in its concern for "social responsibility" is simply expressing the perennial concern and commitment of the community of faith.

III. CURW is not only the institutional embodiment of the community of faith at Cornell; it is equally an expression of the community of learning. Within the limits of its mandate, its competence, and its vision, it performs the task of "education". It does not covet academic status or faculty prerogatives. Nevertheless, within the perimeters of its concern and commitment, it seems to become an honest and effective extension of the purposes of the academic community.

a) Teaching and Learning. Substantial evidence supports the assumption that certain learning experiences are enhanced by involvement in practical action. Both knowledge of the world and knowledge of oneself are tested, refined, and reappropriated in practical confrontation with concrete problems and issues. That which is subject to academic disinterest can become the object of the most profound concern. The interdependence and inextricable interrelationship obtaining between economic, sociological, political, historical, and philosophical enterprises often become frustratingly transparent. Simplistic

moral judgments are confounded by the most complex ethical ambiguities. And in many cases the abstract world of intellectual discourse is translated into life-and-death issues of flesh-and-blood realities. All programs sponsored by CURW in the area of social responsibility are designed to serve this function, not duplicating needlessly what can be done more effectively by others but providing those possibilities for better understanding and deeper awareness which otherwise would remain inaccessible. A disciplined program of reading and study, contextually planned and conducted, provides the structural foundation for this educational experience.

b) Research. Programs and projects sponsored by CURW in the area of social responsibility are obviously not geared for research as such. To append an ostensible research project to the program often simply confuses its purpose. Nevertheless, there are dimensions of the educational experience which are relevant to the task of research. Problems are encountered, curiosity is stimulated, and ideas are evoked which encourage interest in research. As attested by previous experience, these programs have provided a context in which research has been indirectly benefited. In addition, relative to the practical concern for community development, certain forms of practical research are necessary conditions for the success of the project. In this more limited sense, every action project presupposes a research function.

c) One of the most interesting and portentous developments in public life has been the emergence of business, academic, and ecclesiastical communities from narrow parochial preoccupation into a wider concern for the health and progress of society as a whole. Like the Church, the University has recognized its dependence upon and responsibility to the world. With increasing acceleration the academic community--its students, faculty, administration, physical and financial resources--is mobilizing itself to aid the world through socially responsible programs of service. An increasing number of teachers and students has become dissatisfied and impatient with the notion that the University's responsibility to the local community, the nation, and the world is indirect, oblique, and marginal to its essential task. They are insisting that the academic community become directly involved in and contribute toward the solution of the practical problems facing mankind. Given their unique skills and resources, the centers of higher education are in an enviable position to play a constructive role in clarifying and resolving some of the major problems that inhibit and stultify man's material and spiritual aspirations. CURW has been in a position to mobilize this interest in and embody this commitment to action in behalf of social change. Hopefully, what has been done heralds the emergence of new energies and new programs of service to the community by the University, as an expression of one of its essential and intrinsic goals.

In summary:

- 1) CURW's commitment to programs of social action is (a) consistent with its own historical tradition and contemporary self-understanding, (b) appropriate to the mission of the community of faith, and (c) relevant to the purpose of the University;
- 2) the purposes of Church and University, with CURW serving conditionally and contingently as an expression of their common concerns, can be accommodated and harmonized;
- 3) all policies, strategies, and tactics of implementation must presuppose this basic agreement and conform to this rationale.

[Jan. 31, 1966]

THE HEART OF THE MATTER IN VIET NAM

I. The Fact of Aggression

The simple fact is that tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese regular army, have been sent by Hanoi into South Viet Nam for the purpose of imposing Hanoi's will on South Viet Nam by force. It is this external aggression which is responsible for the presence of U.S. combat forces. Indeed, it was not until the early summer of 1965 that the number of U.S. military personnel in South Viet Nam reached the number of those which have been infiltrated by Hanoi. If this aggression from the outside were removed, U.S. combat forces would not be needed.

II. The U.S. Commitment

The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Viet Nam against external attack. This commitment is based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and South Viet Nam, upon the SEATO Treaty (whose obligations are both joint and several), upon annual actions by the Congress in providing aid to South Viet Nam, upon the policy expressed in such Congressional action as the August 1964 resolution, and upon the solemn declarations of three U.S. Presidents. At stake is not just South Vietnam, nor even Southeast Asia: there is also at stake the integrity of a U.S. commitment and the importance of that commitment to the peace right around the globe.

III. Initiatives for Peace

A. We are not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past five years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. Reports of "peace feelers" have to do with initiatives by third parties. Hanoi has denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers." We ourselves know of none. During 1965 Hanoi has consistently insisted that its four points must be accepted as the sole basis for peace in Viet Nam. The third of these four points would require the imposition of the program of the liberation front upon South Viet Nam, whether the South Vietnamese wanted it or not.

B. The initiatives for peace undertaken by our side, and by many other governments, would be hard to count. They began with President Kennedy's talk with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and have not ceased. The publicly known initiatives have been multiplied many times by private initiatives not yet disclosed. On the public record, however, are the following instances:

1. Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in June 1961;
2. Geneva Conference on Laos;
3. U.S. reference of Gulf of Tonkin matter to the UN Security Council in August 1964;

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4. The Polish proposal to convene the two Co-Chairmen and the three members of the ICC (India, Canada and Poland) to take up the question of Laos;
5. The call of 17 non-aligned nations for negotiations without preconditions;
6. Attempts by U Thant to visit Hanoi and Peiping;
7. President Johnson's call for unconditional discussions;
8. The British Commonwealth Committee on Viet Nam;
9. Attempted or actual visits by Patrick Gordon Walker, Mr. Davies (MP), and Ghanian Delegation.

IV. U.S. Contributions to the Basket of Peace

The following statements are on the public record about elements which the U.S. believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions.
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet Nam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Viet Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Viet Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet Nam could participate in a

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regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views. represented if for a moment Hanoi decided we wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."
14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

In other words, we have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Viet Nam.

January 3, 1966

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