

1964

EAST: TRYING CONTAINMENT AGAIN

by  
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On June 1st and 2nd this year the highest civilian and military officials of the U.S. government met in Honolulu to chart U.S. policy in the Southeast Asian crisis. A consensus of informed views, here at the U.N., holds that the Administration apparently has chosen neither the best path open to it, nor the worst.

In the opinion of most observers a choice of four options existed. These were: first, complete unilateral withdrawal; second, escalation--that is, broadening the present war by carrying it into the North, attacking alleged privileged sanctuaries directly with U.S. arms and personnel, and accepting all the implications that would result from such a policy; third, containment--or stalemating the present balance of forces. This would include increasing present commitments, but, however transparent, would require operating through client states, largely with native forces; and fourth, negotiation and settlement through a broad neutralization of Southeast Asia as a whole, utilizing U.N. machinery for implementation and border control. This neutralization would include not only North and South Vietnam as separate entities, but also Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. Malaysia and Indonesia could be brought into this regional arrangement if it proved viable.

Observation and deduction since Honolulu seem to confirm that options one and two--withdrawal and escalation--have been rejected. The first was probably never seriously considered, despite its support by Senators Morse, Gruening, and a section of the informed electorate. At the present juncture its unbalancing effect on power relationships in the area and the humiliating effect on the U.S. world position rule it out of consideration in any powered-centered analysis. The second, although it has known supporters, entails the risk of a massive conventional ground war under conditions even more unfavorable than the ill-starred Korean War.

Assuming the correctness of the above assessment, what, then, are the basic assumptions of American policy? Simply stated, option no. 3--containment and stalemate--appears to be the dominant emerging policy, coupled to a Cuban crisis methodology. The difference today is that the confrontation is U.S.-Chinese rather than U.S.-Russian, and the clinically acute phase of the crisis may last six months instead of six days as in the Cuban crisis.

It is logical, on its own assumptions, that the Administration should choose this policy. For some time past, its leading intellectuals (McGeorge Bundy, April '64 Foreign Affairs, "The Presidency and the Peace"; W. W. Rostow, October '63 Foreign Affairs, "The Third Round") have set out the concept that change in the international climate--especially the reduction of East-West tensions--is the product of the successful application of the doctrine of containment. That is to say, Soviet mellowing is a result of our blocking Soviet expansionism. Probably nowhere else in diplomatic circles is this view held in greater dubiety than at the United Nations. Western Europeans, more familiar than most with the flimsy nature of the NATO deterrent, have a storehouse of sardonic jokes about the deterrent that succeeded because the force it contained (Soviet expansionism into Western Europe) did not exist. However, irrespective of this estimate, there is an apparent internal consistency in the theory and the practice of American foreign policy. For the reality cannot be doubted. Tensions are reduced in Europe and there is a liberalization taking place on an even larger than expected scale in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Therefore,

theorists argue, shifting the focus of a successful policy of containment to Southeast Asia, after first stabilizing the political and military front in Europe, should produce similar results.

Even if one accepts its assumptions, the containment policy is a dangerously ambiguous tactic in the Southeast Asian situation. In a fluid situation where stable governments hardly exist, misinterpretation of intentions is a constant possibility. An unsubtle provocative approach could lead to irreversible and dangerous responses. Only a total policy which would include not merely stalemate but settlement would remove the ambiguity. To the overwhelming majority of informed observers this means option no. 4--neutralization--whether or not the United States today finds it acceptable.

#### Establishing the Credibility of Stalemate

The ambiguity in U.S. public statements and military acts since Honolulu appears deliberate. A stalemate which might halt the headlong political and military deterioration of the U.S. position in South Vietnam, could, once achieved, lead to either escalation or neutralization. The character of official statements and military steps are apparently designed to demonstrate a bellicosity more consistent with a policy of expanding the war. But private assurances have been given widely that the American program is not aimed at broadening the war, and American leaders are fully aware of the trap that a full scale conventional war 8,000 miles from home would represent for this country.

The contention is made that the obvious brinkmanship is designed to intimidate the adversary, to disabuse him of any notion of U.S. pusillanimity, rather than to inflict military damage on him. However, the gross inconsistency--blowing hot and cold, as one reporter inelegantly put it to Secretary of State Rusk--has been so great that at times it took on the appearance of disarray. More than one observer has pointed out that the obsessive involvement with gamesman's credibility may be more dangerous than the real conflicts of interest that exist in Southeast Asia.

For example, the actual military reinforcement of bases surrounding the entire area, including enlargement of an airfield in South Vietnam 350 miles north of Saigon, and the increasing flow of emergency arms and supplies to Thailand and the Philippines, all suggested real preparation for eventual enlargement of the war. Not least in creating a crisis atmosphere were the hawk-like statements of Admiral Felt and those of other military commanders. The appointment of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a specialist in counter-insurgency, as the new Ambassador to South Vietnam fits the developing pattern.

The President himself, on June 29th, put South Vietnam in the orbit of vital American interests comparable to the commitment to defend West Berlin. He said, "We will use the force necessary to help them," and "if this means risking war, the United States will take that risk." Interpreted as even more ominous was a similar position taken by the Secretary of State in an off-the-record briefing. Paradoxically, what is said off the record is usually considered a more accurate reflection of policy than the public statement, which it sometimes contradicts. In this case, however, the entire hierarchy spoke as with one voice. The total effect was frightening.

The combination of bellicose military steps--including bombings in Laos--provocative appointments, and threatening statements led to a state of alarm around the world, and especially in Western Europe. If the gamesmanship was not sufficiently impressive to the adversary, it was scaring the life out of the United States' allies. The London Observer quotes a powerful official as "confirming that the Administration was considering hitting the North in some fashion that would cause Hanoi to get out of Laos and South Vietnam." The New Statesman, speaking of Rusk's deep background briefing, "remarked: "It may still be bluff directed as much to Messrs. Goldwater and Nixon as to Mao Tze-tung and Ho Chi Minh. Even so the domestic device of trying to outbid Goldwater lunacy is self-defeating." The left Labour Tribune says: "There is no need for further speculation about the foreign policy that Barry Goldwater would pursue if elected President of the United States. As far as South-east Asia is concerned, he would carry on what the Johnson Administration has begun."

The British reaction was representative of the continent as a whole. U.S. press spokesmen Walter Lippmann, James Reston and many others expressed serious misgivings with the crisis atmosphere being created. Within a few days Secretary Rusk "softened . . . the tone of recent warnings from the Administration on the risk of war in resisting communism in Southeast Asia" (New York Times, July 2). He said Washington's objective "ought to be possible in Southeast Asia without any extension of the fighting," and Max Frankel of The New York Times observed: "For the second time in a month, the Administration has called off its warnings of war in Southeast Asia, revising its utterances to emphasize a passion for peace, and blamed the newspapers for the confusion."

By the beginning of July some balance was being struck between the presumed need for making credible a tough stance and recognition that, as the London Economist put it:

Sooner or later the balance of power in Asia will have to be maintained by Asians and Asians alone. . . . The majority of sensible men in American and British Government know this to be true and what it implies; . . . most people . . . except for a handful of absolutists who cling to the Apocalyptic vision of "defeating" China (but by what means? and what happens then?) recognize that the mess in Indo China will have to be settled by negotiation, not by armed force.

#### The Difficulty Inherent in Settlement and Negotiation

Southeast Asia is more intractable of solution than almost any other area in the world, because it is the crossroad of conflicting interests of every major power grouping. The British, French and Chinese still retain considerable economic interest, and the Russians and Americans have a dominantly political one. More importantly, since Southeast Asia is mainland China's soft underbelly, her sensitivity to the type and character of regimes established there is obvious. But there is even more involved than this. Southeast Asia, rich and large, lies between two big land masses, China on the one hand Malaysia and Indonesia on the other. Some American and British strategists had hoped that a balance could be maintained between these Asian powers which might stabilize the area, permitting the development of an independent zone of the Southeast Asian mainland capable of being run by Asians without interference by China, Russia, the Western Europeans or the United States. This, of course, is the prescription sought for in neutralization proposals and embodied in the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and the Laos Agreements of 1962.



Why, then, the difficulty in establishing a genuine neutralization which would make this possible? As abstract terms, "settlement" and "neutralization" are simple to agree on. For example, the Russians for some time have expressed privately the opinion that a zonal neutralization is the only solution (publicly they still state the U.S. should simply withdraw), and in principle so have the Americans. The difficulty, however, is in spelling out the character of the neutralization, and accepting what would issue from it. To the Russians, neutralization means securing the borders of all countries in agreed areas against outside interference, but this would permit internal political fluidity and change. To the United States, this type of "open" neutralization would very likely be unacceptable, and their hesitation today is understandable. For given the actual situation, even a fairly executed and controlled neutralization very possibly might lead to left regimes in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and ultimately Burma and Thailand. Assurances by friends and allies of the United States that this does not inevitably mean Chinese domination are apparently unheeded in Washington. Also ignored are admonitions that the very process of trying to impress the political structure into a Western framework militates against the development of independent regimes which might be of a quasi-left character.

What is at issue here is the basic question of the structure and institutions of all the developing nations--nations involving two-thirds of the world's people. There has not been even the beginning of an exploration of this question in American politics or statesmanship; yet it promises to be the biggest political issue of the next twenty years. Only the barest start has been made in considering the staggering economic problems of development, while the political arena has been left to the sloganeering of the ideologues. This much, however, seems clear to many economists and political scientists who have worked in these new countries. Neither the cliches of the advanced democracies nor the mechanical transferring of the Soviet experiment are going to work or be accepted by the people. The probable socialist or public ownership forms of economy and the centralized political regimes which are likely to be established in the Third World are not going to satisfy fully those in either the developed East or the West who look for imitation of their own systems.

A research report of the U.S. Information Agency, The New York Times reports, has ruefully discovered that the more our propaganda advertises the virtue of "Capitalism" and attacks "Socialism," the less the world likes us. Leopold Senghor of Senegal says: "Socialism is a sense of community which is a return to Africanism." Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika insists: "No underdeveloped country can afford to be anything but Socialist." Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba claims Mohammed's companions "were Socialists before the invention of the word." And controversial Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia contends: "Our Socialism (Royalist) is first and foremost an application of Buddhism." If this is not enough variety, Algeria's Premier Ben Bella says: "We solemnly reply here that our Socialism stems from Islam. We repeat . . . we are not Communists." If all this talk will not make Washington happy, neither will it please Moscow.

At this stage, at least in Southeast Asia, the best contribution the contending big nations could make would be to allow the greatest room for independent experimentation and to supply social and economic development aid without which the promise of independence could be a mockery. The time is fast approaching, as will be developed below, when this issue can no longer be postponed. But before considering this, some assessment of the Chinese actions and reactions are in order.



### Chinese Miscalculations and the "Paper Tiger's" Response

The present crisis was precipitated by two possibly related events. First, the rapid deterioration and overthrow of two governments in South Vietnam, with the growth in influence and size of the Viet Cong to the point where it is virtually an alternative government; and second, on April 19th, the overthrow of the neutralist Souvanna Phouma government in Laos by the Rightists. Up to that point an uneasy coalition existed, a product of the willingness of the Pathet Lao, the left wing, not to take military advantage of their superior position.

The Rightist coup, the precipitating cause of the crisis, has been allowed to disappear in a miasma of confused press concern over the military victories of the Pathet Lao on the Plain of Jarres. In actual fact the coup began with the assassination, earlier this year, of the neutralist Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena. Political power slipped into Rightist hands in the capital in Vientiane, although military power elsewhere in the country remained with the Left. The Left's victory on the Plain of Jarres was the result of a revolt of the neutralist Kong Le's troops (who were guarding the Plain) in protest against neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma's moving to the Right.

Whose miscalculation was responsible, one can only guess. Either Rightist illusions of a strength that did not exist or C.I.A. incompetence may have led to a breaking of the truce which held the neutralization in force since 1962.

The Chinese can hardly be accused of taking advantage of the situation, except in vituperative verbosity. It is generally agreed that the Pathet Lao could have driven to the Mekong River any time it wished, cutting the country in two. In actual practice, the Chinese and the Pathet Lao have taken no openly provocative steps; and if there have been covert ones they do not begin to compare with the shrill American response. The nature of the Chinese miscalculation has an earlier derivation. It stems from the fundamental Chinese analysis of world power relationships which is, in itself, a massive challenge to U.S. policy.

The theory (Article no. 7 in the Chinese reply to the Soviet Union) is that U.S. imperialism is rotten at the core; that it is dependent upon the exploitation of the underdeveloped world for its existence; and that it is the sole exploiter of all other nations including the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe (the Theory of the "Intermediate Zones"). This analysis leads the Chinese to their doctrine of protracted warfare and the right and obligation to initiate and support armed revolts all over the world.

With this view of international affairs, the Maoists and their European friends, the Novotnys and the Ulbrichts, logically conclude that the continued existence of world tension aids their cause. Their policies are of course the mirror image of the American extremists, and play directly into the latters' hands.

Chinese attacks on the United States as a "paper tiger" are unremitting and difficult to ignore, but the idea that this accounts for the bellicose American response is questionable. The judgment to engage the Chinese seems to have been a carefully calculated one. For, viewing the situation from the Chinese side, it is

difficult to believe that they sought a confrontation at this time. Their political break with Moscow, their loss of foreign aid from the entire Eastern bloc, their inability to modernize their armed forces except out of their own inadequate resources, all make it doubtful that the initiative was China's.

Moreover, the Chinese are just in the process of recovering from a series of economic disasters--natural and man made. They still live under the threat of periodic agricultural failures which will continue until modernization is possible. As a result of their self-isolation, the Chinese themselves speak of the need for 25 or 50 years or even longer before full modernization is possible. When one realizes that there are today 110,000 tractors in operation in the whole of China, approximately one fourth of a single year's production in the Soviet Union, and even less as compared with the United States, the long economic road ahead is clear.

From a military point of view, China is beset on all sides. She has herself opened a new front on the North with the Soviet Union. Her Western front must continue to be protected from Taiwanese and U.S. forces. And to the South lies the whole restless area from South Korea to the borders of India.

In short, China's theory and practice have led to her provoking, or, as is more likely, to allowing herself to be provoked into, a protracted confrontation with the United States at exactly the wrong time for her. The view that the United States cannot win a war in Southeast Asia or China is true. It is also true that the United States is now entangled in Southeast Asia with no easy exit in view. But this is not the whole story. The trap against which many warned the United States may be transformed by Chinese miscalculation into an entrapment of the Chinese themselves. American hardliners can argue to good effect that this is the time for a showdown, Cuban style, the purpose of which would be to force a humiliating political defeat on the Chinese and apply economic pressure which might well weaken her for a long time to come. This proposal must be examined, not because it is a good one, but in order to consider the alternatives. In short, what policy should the United States adopt and what can we expect from it?

#### After the Crisis: Stalemate, Settlement and Neutralization

It is easy to make a case for the imperative necessity of a tough stand in Indo China. Historically, for almost 300 years under the Manchu Dynasty, the entire area was either tributary to the Middle Kingdom or within its constantly shifting borders. Or, as O. Edmund Clubb has pointed out in Twentieth Century China, whenever China was united, she was expansionist. On historical or on contemporary political grounds it is simple to justify the hawks' line. The difficulty arises in the consequences of such a policy.

Virtually every important ally of the United States is convinced that an American policy of stalemate makes sense only if it will lead to a resumption of diplomatic negotiation and its logical consequence--zonal neutralization.

Time in Southeast Asia is not on anyone's side, and least of all the United States'. In a little more than a year, at the 26th session of the U.N. General Assembly in October, 1965, Mainland China will, in the opinion of many U.N. observers, be accredited to the seat now held by Nationalist China. (A shift of only nine votes will accomplish this.) Time for the two-China solution considered possible in 1955 has run out. Only deference to the United States and clumsy Chinese diplomacy will keep China out this year.

The United States cannot fully determine by its policies the nature of the impact China will have when she becomes a veto power. But by effective diplomacy, America can blunt the sharp edges of Chinese power as it emerges out of its isolation. It will of course be China's choice how she joins the world community of nations: as an outlaw power attempting to seize leadership through hoped-for influence on the small nations' majority, or one who accepts the burden of responsibility in a complex changing world, realizing the assets as well as the liabilities of cooperation. But the United States can, by a series of acts, influence China's decision. It can, in the first place, make much clearer that the American purpose in Southeast Asia is to negotiate a settlement and not to win or establish a cordon sanitaire against China. Second, U.S. policy can make clear that it is ready to go beyond settlement on Southeast Asia to the resolution of all outstanding differences, including diplomatic recognition; and third, the United States could make clear that American and other Western resources are available to China on at least the same terms and conditions as they are to other Communist countries.

To those who predict in advance the failure of such a reconciliatory policy, the only possible answer is that this is a time when adopting the right policy is not only morally and legally desirable but politically expedient. Even if every cooperative effort of U.S. policy is rejected by Communist China--and it could be--it will convince our allies and the world's neutralist majority, many of whom are far from convinced, of the willingness of the United States to introduce rationality and collectivity into world affairs.

In short, coexistence, like peace, may be indivisible. To meet the problems, possibilities and dangers of the next two decades may require nothing less than world settlement. There is no assurance that such an American initiative will guarantee positive results. But a new approach to coexistence, and an attempt at its codification is so clearly in the national interest of all countries that it is surely worth a try.

#### Addenda

The above was written following the June crisis in Laos. Recent events and new disclosures do not appear to have altered the main conclusions. On the contrary, the U.S. government release of a CIA evaluation report on South Vietnam (after discovery of a leak) seems to confirm an aspect of the hypothesis suggested above: that U.S. policy, while not rejecting settlement, made it absolutely contingent upon achieving "stalemate." The report stated that there is "serious doubt that victory can be won," and that at best "a prolonged stalemate" might be achieved looking toward "some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."



In releasing the report, the government contended that it did not represent official policy. The New York Times Washington correspondent, Jack Raymond, reported, however: "Qualified officials now confirm what has been long suspected--it [the report] reflects a view widely held in the government and the subject of recurrent official discussion."

The squalid picture in South Vietnam--after the U.S.'s panicky over-response in the Gulf of Tonkin--of three new governments being formed in one week-end, confirms the "descent into desperation." By this time hardly anyone expects the new South Vietnam Government, whose composition defies description, to last out much more than its agreed two months truce period.

The tragedy of the situation may be that it is already too late to opt for a policy of negotiation. Having bet on the military's ability to stalemate the situation, and probably having failed, American policy is now faced with two unpleasant new alternatives. One, settlement on terms far less favorable than might have been achieved a few years ago; or two, a humiliating withdrawal on the invitation of a neutralist South Vietnam government.

A third alternative--escalation--is fast becoming illusory, since there soon may be no one to escalate with.

Mainland China's recent denunciation of the Soviet Union and the United Nations as lackeys of United States imperialism is an unpleasant augury of the tough negotiations ahead, if, indeed, negotiations are still possible. It seems clear beyond doubt that the South Vietnamese people are no more interested in this war than if it were being fought in Antarctica. And it grows daily more sordid, as unscrupulous politicians and generals, corrupted by U.S. aid, scramble for power and possessions.

President Johnson's first act as the new president--if he can wait that long--should be a call for the 14 Power Geneva Conference to reconvene. This move would be ironical, since we were not signatories, but necessary if we wish to participate. Better still it would be an act of political courage and superb politics if the President were to make a pledge to do so during the campaign. For presented correctly, the promise to seek an end to this war could be almost as popular as Eisenhower's dramatic commitment in 1952 to "go to Korea."

1964

## THE TOP OF THE AGENDA FOR THE JOHNSON-HUMPHREY ADMINISTRATION

The votes are counted, and the results can be interpreted as an overwhelming mandate for the positions Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey stressed throughout the campaign -- nuclear responsibility and the patient search for lasting peace. It is our belief that a period of intense diplomatic activity is about to begin. There are a few dark clouds in this picture, however. They are the Administration's proposed Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) and the continuing war in Vietnam. SANE's campaign for neutralization of North and South Vietnam has been under way for some time, and we will be calling on you again as the moment approaches for a confrontation across the bargaining table instead of the battlefield.

In this memo we ask you to begin the mobilization of your members to deal in the most constructive way with that other dark cloud, the MLF, by directing your comments to President Johnson and Vice President-Elect Hubert Humphrey on the occasion of their election.

Please ask all of your members to send personal letters to President Johnson and to Vice President-Elect Hubert Humphrey (1313 New Senate Office Building, Washington 25, D.C.), congratulating them on their electoral victory and expressing the hope that they will use their mandate to help lead the country out of the cold war and the hot war in Vietnam and toward a lasting peace. Each letter writer should emphasize some specific goal of his own choosing. All should mention, however, our concern over the MLF proposal. Letter writers should not mention SANE. They should make the letters as warm and constructive as possible. Other national organizations will be joining in this campaign with slightly different emphases, but all expressing concern about the MLF.

As the man who championed disarmament in the Senate during the lonely years when it was still a dirty word and who has privately exercised his influence with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson on behalf of peaceful settlements, Hubert Humphrey is now in a position to play a more direct role. His personal relations with President Johnson are extremely warm. The two remained in unprecedented daily telephonic communication throughout the campaign. As Vice President, Humphrey will automatically attend meetings of the National Security Council. A democratic politician in the best sense, Humphrey is at his best when fighting for a cause with a popular base in the country. We know now that this base includes the majority of the American voters. We want Hubert Humphrey to know that we look to him for leadership.

The Administration is considering sending Mr. Humphrey to discuss NATO unity with European leaders toward the end of November. Letters to him should arrive in Washington before November 20.

You may want to use all or some of the following information on MLF as background for your members.

MLF: NATO Cement or German Trigger Finger?

The MLF is a proposal to establish a fleet of 25 vessels with 200 Polaris missiles. The fleet would be manned by mixed forces from the U.S. and other participating NATO countries, and operated jointly by them. Participating nations would exercise a veto on the use of the nuclear-tipped missiles.

None of the NATO countries except West Germany has shown any enthusiasm for the plan. France and Norway are openly opposed. The new British Labor Government has reportedly asked for more time to consider the plan, during which it is expected to draw up an alternative proposal.

The MLF concept is backed vigorously only by elements in the State Department. While they do not say this publicly, their underlying concern seems to be an anxiety that West Germany will seek reunification under neutralism and, ultimately, that a reunited Germany will make a deal with the USSR. Even if the MLF proposal is altered or shelved, that underlying anxiety will continue to exist in the State Department. It has marked U.S. policy since the cold war began. The State Department has continually attempted to bind West Germany to the West by a military alliance.

The MLF is merely an extension to the nuclear level of the military arrangements worked out under NATO after German rearmament was permitted. It is proposed by officials who fear that West Germany, following France's example, will inevitably seek its own nuclear weapons as a means of gaining political leverage. Yet, the Treaty of Paris of 1954 prohibits the West Germans from manufacturing their own nuclear weapons and the nuclear test ban treaty prohibits them from testing these weapons. A decision by the West Germans to "go it alone" would thus be an open slap in the face to the rest of the world and would provoke immediate repercussions. If we don't trust West Germany to live up to existing treaties, why trust it with a finger on the nuclear trigger?

As a solution to the unspoken, nagging worry about German intentions, the MLF creates its own separate drawbacks:

1. The MLF has already hurt the chances for arms control agreements. The U.S. has proposed draft treaties at Geneva to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which do not have them, and to freeze the production of nuclear arms. But we have maintained that the nuclear-armed fleet should not be affected by these proposals. The Russians have refused, understandably, to accept these measures unless the MLF is abandoned. We cannot move in two directions at once -- toward halting the spread of nuclear weapons and toward sharing them with NATO.

2. The MLF would constitute a spread of nuclear weapons not the non-proliferation which the State Department claims. A new fleet of missile-carrying ships under the control of nations which do not now have nuclear weapons does spread control to new hands. Secretary of State Dean Rusk speaks of the participants in the MLF as "owners and managers of nuclear weapons systems."

3. A German finger on the trigger worries Europe. None of our NATO allies except West Germany has shown any interest in the MLF. Yet the world is still paying for the ravages of two World Wars begun in Germany. "The Germans are very, very much interested," Defense Secretary Robert McNamara told the House Armed Services Committee. And on October 6th Chancellor Erhard intimated that his government is



considering setting up the fleet alone with the U.S. if other countries will not come in. A nuclear fleet in which the Germans play a major role would not reassure Europe, East or West. Many observers are convinced that German military leaders look on the MLF as the first step toward gaining control over nuclear weapons.

4. MLF won't improve our security. The U.S. now has 1,100 long-range bombers, 800 ICBM's deployed on launchers, and 256 Polaris missiles in 16 nuclear submarines, according to the Defense Department. This amounts to a tremendous "overkill" nuclear capacity -- more explosive power than would be required utterly to destroy all possible adversaries. Adding a nuclear fleet operated by mixed crews subject to remote control would in no way improve U.S. security.

5. MLF runs counter to the detente. Since the Cuban missile crisis, the two sides have eased tensions and avoided military confrontations. But how will the Russians, who have long feared a German finger on the nuclear trigger, react to the MLF proposal at a time when new leaders have taken power in the USSR? The Soviet power struggle may not be over, and the role of the armed forces in this struggle is unclear. The conclusion of a treaty establishing MLF in the near future could well provide ammunition to the less conciliatory elements in the Soviet hierarchy. By the same token, the Eastern European countries, which have recently succeeded in securing greater freedom of action for themselves, may be driven back to a closer dependence on Moscow by the prospect of a nuclear fleet in which West Germany plays an important role.

The timetable for establishment of the MLF has probably been thrown off by the Labor Party victory in Great Britain. Originally, the proponents hoped to line up enough participants by the end of 1964. The British counter-proposal will take some time to prepare. It is expected to include joint operations of a fleet half the size of the one proposed by the U.S. and of national nuclear forces such as British bombers and Polaris missiles.

The delay will at least provide a chance for public discussion and close scrutiny by Congress. To date there has been neither. On October 30, Robert Kennedy stated: "The doubts that I have about MLF cannot be resolved on election eve. If I am elected, I will urge a full and public discussion of the policies involved so that the concerns that we share can be answered to our mutual satisfaction." On October 23, his opponent, Senator Kenneth Keating, expressed opposition to the MLF because it serves no necessary military role, is dividing NATO rather than drawing it together, and is not supported by most of the NATO countries.

Most members of Congress have said nothing on the issue, nor have they been asked to. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which would have to examine any treaty, has not been briefed. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has apparently held some discussions, where many questions were raised about MLF. There is almost no support for the proposal in Congress, while a number of Senators and Members of the House have privately expressed their misgivings to the President or are expected to do so soon. Even the Executive Branch is divided on this issue, and the Defense Department shows a singular lack of enthusiasm.

### The Alternatives

It is very difficult to argue the case against the MLF without suggesting a means of keeping West Germany from developing its own nuclear force. Germany's treaty commitments not to produce or test nuclear weapons are the beginning of an answer. But there is also a continuing fear that at some future date West Germany might join with France in a separate nuclear force. Until the present, the U.S. has attempted to seek solutions within the framework of a Western Europe (including West Germany as a major component) militarily united against a Soviet attack. Yet, no one seriously believes any longer in the likelihood of such an attack.

It is our conviction that alternatives to the MLF must be proposed within the framework of European-wide security, guaranteed by both the U.S. and the USSR. One approach suggested in a forthcoming book by Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin includes a package which balances the following political settlements and arms reductions measures: (1) freedom to travel and trade in East and West Germany; (2) an International Access Authority to guarantee freedom of movement to Berlin; (3) a U.N. presence in Berlin; (4) recognition of the Oder-Neisse order with Poland; (5) a German confederation including the two present separate states; (6) elimination of the more than 700 Soviet IREMs targeted at the USSR; (7) a freeze on nuclear weapons production; (8) bomber disarmament; (9) a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons; (10) a joint declaration against the first use of nuclear weapons, and (11) a European security treaty guaranteed by the U.S. and the USSR under which aggression against any participant would be met by the retaliation of all the others.

This approach, although sweeping, impresses us as having the necessary ingredients for a real settlement. It would be very difficult to reach agreement on arms reduction in Central Europe without agreement on political questions. Likewise, it would be difficult to reach agreement on political questions while large nuclear forces face each other in Europe. Moreover, this approach has the advantage of seeing the problem as a whole, sensitive to the security needs of the Germans and their neighbors, the Russians and the Americans. It seems to us the best framework yet suggested to encourage the continued evolution of what Walter Lippmann calls the "Europeanization" of Europe -- the growing movement of people and goods across boundaries which formerly separated them, from the Atlantic to Russia.

A more modest proposal has been made by Arthur Waskow of the Institute for Policy Studies. Waskow suggests a quid pro quo by which the Russians agree to freedom of travel in East Germany and destruction of the Berlin Wall in return for a non-proliferation agreement and abandonment of the MLF. The Germans would acquire the advantage of free movement across their divided country; the U.S. would gain West German compliance with a treaty forbidding the West Germans from acquiring nuclear weapons from third parties, without having to exercise additional diplomatic pressure, and the Russians fear of a German finger on the nuclear trigger would be overcome.

A still more modest proposal is simply the achievement of a non-proliferation pact.

However, such an agreement has been blocked by the Soviets' insistence that groups of nations as well as individual nations must be covered by the pact, and by U.S. insistence that groups of nations (as in the case of the MLF) be excluded. Thus, without new elements introduced into the bargaining situation, there seems to be little hope of agreement unless one side or the other changes its position.

The most limited alternative of all would be to expand the role of NATO nations in strategic targeting. This approach could offer them a greater voice in how nuclear weapons would be used in the case of war without allowing ownership to extend beyond the present nuclear powers.



## EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE MLF

In recent years a divided Europe has been slowly knit together by an increasing exchange of people and goods between East and West. The Iron Curtain has begun to disintegrate in the face of this two-way movement. The Eastern European Communist states have loosened their bonds to Moscow and are multiplying their contacts with the West. Their economic and political systems have abandoned many of the rigid controls imposed more than a decade ago. In Western Europe, growing prosperity has encouraged a spirit of greater independence from Washington, of which Gaullism is but one manifestation. The NATO and Warsaw Pact nations no longer confront each other in Central Europe as the hostile, cohesive blocs of yesterday.

This evolution toward the "Europeanization" of the Continent can be encouraged through a new framework of all-European security. Yet, at the moment when this prospect is brighter than at any time since the cold war began, the U.S. is promoting the one measure capable of reversing the trend --- a nuclear fleet with the possibility of a German finger on the trigger.

Not only are memories of World War II still vivid in Eastern Europe, but West Germany remains the only European nation with unresolved territorial claims. In view of this situation, nothing could do more to move the Eastern European countries into a closer alliance with the USSR and to encourage the least conciliatory elements in the Communist leadership than to give West Germany real or even apparent control of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has already stated that it "would draw the proper conclusions and take steps for the protection of its security and the security of its allies." The Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) thus represents a major threat to the detente.

In seeking the establishment of the MLF, in which only West Germany has shown any measure of enthusiasm, the U.S. maintains that it is working to give its allies a bigger role in their own defense. It is suggested that the Allies seek this larger role as a means of securing additional commitments of U.S. strategic retaliation against any attack from the East. It is further suggested that other nations would follow France in developing their own independent nuclear forces unless the MLF is established.

Yet there is no evidence that any of these nations, including West Germany, is prepared for such a move. West Germany would have to violate the treaties of 1954 and 1963 which prohibit her from manufacturing and testing nuclear weapons. Nor is it likely that France would share nuclear weapons with the Germans. There is evidence, however, that some West German senior military officers seek expanded control over nuclear weapons as an instrument of political blackmail.

An unspoken anxiety of U.S. policy planners seems to be that West Germany will one day seek reunification under neutralism, and that such a move would be followed by a German deal with the Soviet Union. While such a prospect seems very remote in view of the evolution of recent years, even if it were more plausible the solution would not be to bind the West Germans to NATO with nuclear cement. It is this effort to tie West Germany to the West by military means which seems to be the tacit goal of the MLF. Yet if we trust the Germans so little that we fear they will ultimately move into the Soviet orbit, there is no reason to trust them with increased control of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, there can be little doubt that the MLF, by spreading control over nuclear weapons to additional nations, creates the very danger which it claims to avoid. The Secretary of State has spoken of the role of MLF members as "owners and managers of nuclear weapons systems." As conceived by the U.S., the MLF would be a totally new weapons system consisting of 200 strategic missiles targeted on the USSR. No amount of semantic juggling can make the joint operation of such a fleet by the U.S. and its allies appear to be anything but the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union was quick to point to the inconsistency of the American position at Geneva, where two of the five proposals put forward by the U.S. in January, 1964, consisted of a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and a non-proliferation agreement. In proposing to establish a wholly new fleet of missile-firing ships under joint control, the U.S. has dimmed the chances of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons through international agreement.

The U.S. has maintained that it will exercise a veto over the firing of the MLF missiles. If so, those West Germans who may now claim the U.S. is insufficiently committed to retaliation in case of a Soviet attack on Europe cannot possibly be satisfied. A U.S. veto would deprive the West Germans of any real increase in decision-making in the use of these weapons. If, on the other hand, the U.S. veto is eliminated or eroded over time, West Germany very clearly would have its finger on the nuclear trigger, a prospect which is reassuring neither to Eastern Europe nor to Western Europe.

The time has come for the U.S. to replace its outmoded assumption of the need for a tightly-knit military alliance (with West Germany at its core) to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe by a policy which encourages the "Europeanization" of all Europe.

#### An Alternative to the MLF

A new framework for all-European security can be achieved by combining political settlements in Central Europe with mutual arms reductions. The new relationships thus achieved could be institutionalized through a security agreement between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers, guaranteed by the US and the USSR. There are many possible combinations within this framework, which would require carefully-balanced quid pro quos among the participating nations.

Among the issues which might be resolved through political settlements are: recognition of the present German-Polish border; guarantees of access to Berlin; and a more formal relationship between East and West Germany, such as a loosely-knit confederation, which would permit the Germans to work out their own internal problems.

The arms reduction measures should be designed to establish a phased and balanced withdrawal of conventional forces and nuclear weapons from all of Central Europe, and to dismantle the Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles targeted on Western Europe in return for comparable concessions by the NATO countries.

This series of measures, admittedly difficult to achieve, would help promote the reunification of Germany within a peaceful framework, give the Germans themselves an opportunity to knit together the democratic, capitalist West and the authoritarian, socialist East, remove fears of German revanchism, encourage the continued and augmented interchange between East and West Europe, and give the United States and the Soviet Union a legitimate role as guarantors of European security.

SUGGESTED ADA POLICY ON CHINA  
by  
Roy Bennett and O. Edmund Clubb

In view of the recent explosion of a thermonuclear device by the mainland Chinese and what it represents in terms of increased danger to world peace and regional harmony, ADA strongly urges the mainland Chinese being brought into the framework of existing disarmament negotiations, such as the Geneva disarmament conference.

In the past too many of our diplomatic actions, such as our policy on Formosa, the off-shore islands, attitude toward U.N. membership, and diplomatic recognition have served Chinese xenophobic foreign policy rather than American interest.

ADA urges that the United States drop its opposition to accreditation of the Peking regime as the legitimate government of China for purposes of U.N. representation, and permit democratic processes to govern the pertinent decision of the United Nations.

Pending determination of the future status of Formosa by either the signatories of the 1951 peace treaty with Japan or the United Nations, the United States should maintain unaltered its existing treaty pledge to defend Formosa and the Pescadores against attack. However, since that pledge does not include the "offshore islands", Quemoy and Matsu, and they are patently an obstacle to our obtaining broader international support for our position as well as a danger to the peace, ADA urges that the United States should now, when there is no "crisis" in the Formosa Strait, endeavor to persuade the Taipei government to evacuate the Nationalist garrisons from those islands, in the way Nationalist forces were evacuated from the Tachen Island in 1955.

ADA believes that the United States should begin consultations immediately with sympathetic concerned governments with the aim of evolving a plan for settlement of "the Formosa Problem."

Acknowledging the impracticality of attempting a regularization of relations between the United States and China without prior solution of certain outstanding problems (including that of Formosa), ADA nevertheless strongly recommends the taking of certain concrete steps leading in that general direction, particularly 1) the removal of passport barriers to travel of Americans to China and 2) the lifting of our self-imposed embargo on trade with China and the placing of American trade with that country on the same basis as trade with other countries of the Communist bloc, as our international friends and allies already have done.

The explosion of a mainland Chinese nuclear device opens a new era in United States-Asian relations. The danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons is immeasurably increased unless bold and imaginative initiatives are exercised by the nuclear powers.



March 20, 1964

John Newhouse

### WEIGHING THE RISKS IN THE MLF

A curious side of the effort to create a multilateral naval nuclear force is the diversity of argument that is made for the project. As the so-called MLF develops momentum -- as in recent months it has -- the rationale for its creation is broadened but also clouded.

As of the moment, nobody can say whether the MLF is a feasible prospect. All that is clear is that the MLF proposal, in the face of doubt and skepticism on either side of the Atlantic, has hardened into official United States policy. The general public, the press and the Congress are only just starting to become involved with the MLF and the inner debate whipping around it. Within the bureaucracy and the defense community, there is difficulty, even now, in finding agreement on the degree of United States prestige that can be safely committed to the MLF; also, on the degree to which certain other governments can safely support the project (example, Italy) as well as the degree to which others actually oppose it (example, Britain). There is also disagreement on whether the MLF is in conflict with the trend toward easement in relations between the West and the Soviet Union and whether it collides directly with United States arms control proposals.

The idea of a sea-based NATO nuclear force was first broached by the United States during the December 1960 NATO Ministerial meeting. It represented a substitute for a proposal from NATO's military commander, General Lauris Norstad, for stationing a force of medium range ballistic missiles in Western Europe itself. The missiles would have been targeted against Soviet missiles and airfields which, then as now, constituted a threat to European cities. In addition, the United States was seeking a means of diffusing some measure of control of the nuclear weapons under NATO command through the Alliance without disrupting the ultimate United States control of most of the West's nuclear weapons. It was Washington's hope that a NATO nuclear force would discourage further national nuclear programs within the Atlantic Alliance.

The in-coming Kennedy Administration repeated the invitation to the Alliance to develop a jointly financed, jointly controlled sea-based nuclear force, provided adequate "guidelines" for such control could be worked out.

The Europeans were manifestly unable to develop the necessary guidelines for such a fleet, but by the fall of 1962 United States refinements of the idea had reached the point where it was decided to send a small party of experts to Europe to take confidential soundings with some of the NATO governments. Then came the meeting at Nassau in December which produced an Anglo-American agreement allowing Britain, in effect, to continue indefinitely her independent nuclear force in the form of Polaris submarines assigned to NATO for targeting purposes.

A few weeks after the Nassau Conference, General De Gaulle, in the famous January 14 news conference, revealed his intention to bar Britain from the European Community and to diminish "Anglo-Saxon" influence on the Continent.

To counter De Gaulle, the United States felt obliged to assert its leadership, especially in the ultra-sensitive politico-military area, where De Gaulle himself might move. At this point, the MLF made the long leap from the technical to the policy level. Only days after De Gaulle had shattered the grand design, President Kennedy named Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant to head a United States mission authorized to open official talks with NATO governments.

What has been proposed is a mixed-manned force of 25 freighter-type ships, each bearing eight Polaris intermediate range missiles. The ships would be manned by crews representing at least three nationalities, one of the elements American in each case.

The cost estimates have fluctuated dramatically, usually reflecting the degree of opposition to the MLF inside the Pentagon. But it is generally believed that the cost of the fleet would fall somewhere between \$3 and \$5 billion over an 8 to 10 year period. The United States and Germany would be expected to bear the brunt of the cost, between 75 and 80 percent; their respective contributions would be roughly equal, with neither's presumably exceeding 40 percent. Italy would be expected to pledge between 10 and 20 percent of the balance, depending on whether Britain chose to become an original member of the club. Greece and Turkey wish to participate but would be limited by lack of resources to token contributions. The Benelux countries, although deeply suspicious of the MLF, have participated in the technical level talks, and the Dutch have agreed to participate in a mixed-manned demonstration exercise scheduled to take place this summer aboard an American destroyer

equipped with guided missiles. Together, Belgium and Holland might contribute about 5 percent of the cost. Canada, Denmark and Norway have no interest in the enterprise.

The MLF would operate on the unanimity principle in the sense that each of the chief contributors -- the United States, Germany, Italy and Britain, if she joins -- would have a veto over firing the force. The ships would presumably fly an international flag; the crews would presumably wear a NATO uniform and be subject to a uniform code of military justice. They would presumably be paid at uniform levels, although the American units would clearly have to be compensated over and above these levels by the United States government.

The Commander of the MLF would be responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR). In order to prevent accidental or unauthorized use, the weapon systems on each of the ships would be remotely controlled by an electronic permissive link system. A missile presumably could not be physically prepared for firing until this system had transmitted a coded "arming" order; an order to fire would be similarly transmitted.

The ships would ply the trading routes of the Mediterranean and Atlantic seas. They would be difficult to track by air, though efforts would surely be made by the Soviets to monitor their activities by submarine and ship, and with ground observers assigned to piers and harbor facilities.

President Kennedy never made a full commitment to the MLF. Although he did make clear his intention to submit any MLF agreement to the Congress (probably as a treaty), he refused to engage his own prestige to the point of permitting normal Congressional consultation on the diplomatic and technical discussions that he did allow to go forward. Moreover, when asked about MLF at news conferences the President was careful to reply that the proposal was only one of a number of possible approaches to the question of nuclear weapons control within the Alliance; that it was a useful approach only to the extent that Europeans responded favorably.

The rationale for the MLF is political. Almost nobody, American or European, suggests that it would meet any military requirement that is not being met, or could not be met, in another form. The MLF, at bottom, was designed as a means of satisfying supposed German requirements in the nuclear weapons

field. The theory is that the Federal Republic, if not now, will at some point assert such requirements. It is unrealistic, argue the advocates of MLF, to assume that the Germans will continue to contribute the largest share of NATO's manpower (its conventional strength) while standing aside idly while Britain and France proceed with the development of independent national nuclear forces.

Furthermore, it is clear, both to friends and foes of the MLF, that an independent German presence in the nuclear weapons field would have serious, possibly explosive, repercussions in Moscow. Thus, the MLF represents a means of defusing German intentions (such as they are or may become) in this forbidden realm.

Although it is in this light, as an anti-proliferation measure, that the MLF is normally put forward, its rationale, as indicated, has become considerably more complex. For example, numerous Europeans are gaining the impression that the MLF is intended as a precursor to a European nuclear force, operating either free of United States participation and control, or, at a minimum, under a voting procedure that would allow any three of the four key governments (United States, Germany, Italy and Britain) to take critical decisions by qualified majority. A number of Americans concerned with the general problem believe that the creation of a European nuclear force would offer the least hazardous and most compatible means of satisfying European requirements. They profess to view the MLF as a means of promoting this objective. The MLF agreement would contain no self-executing provision for an evolution of this kind; Congress would reject -- initially, at least -- such a departure. The idea is that the preamble, or some part of the agreement, would set forth the willingness of all parties to reopen the so-called "unanimity" provision at a later date. Thus, the then Vice President Johnson, speaking in Brussels last November 8 said: "Evolution of this missile fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded."

The MLF is defended on still other grounds. It might, for example, provide an alternative and more satisfactory arrangement for Britain and France at such time as either or both finally decide to discontinue national nuclear programs. The two could merge their nuclear weapons with the MLF, to which each could thereupon commence assigning a large portion of the costs of these weapons.



The MLF would also serve to introduce Europeans to the complexities that underlie a strategic nuclear weapons program. The real European need in this field is education; the MLF would offer Europeans participation in the operation and control of nuclear weapon systems; it would acquaint them with procedures out of which target assessments and assignments are made; it would encourage a firmer awareness of the need for a realistic balance between nuclear and non-nuclear resources. The MLF provides for a considerable European investment -- hence, a stake -- in the enterprise.

It is argued further that the MLF is an integration program and that any integration within the Alliance would be vastly beneficial, especially now. Also, it is pointed out that, while the MLF may be unnecessary from a military standpoint, it would be coordinated with United States strategic forces, would have the political advantage of operating in the European theater and would cover targets now covered by American weapon systems. This presumably would permit the retirement of at least some United States weapons.

Finally, some argue that the MLF would isolate France, chiefly by weakening the Franco-German rapprochement and aligning Germany more firmly with the United States. This in turn would contribute to thwarting the Gaullist design for Europe. It would also further reduce the possibility of a Franco-German undertaking at the nuclear weapons level.

The first and last of these pro-MLF arguments, since both concern Germany, can be discussed together. With regard to the German question, the available evidence indicates an absence of serious interest at any level of German society in possessing nuclear weapons. Leaving aside the Christian Democratic leaders of Bavaria (Strauss and Guttenberg), none of the leaders of Germany's principal parties has indicated the likelihood of a "German problem," which, at a minimum, must be unambiguously resolved by providing Germany with a substantial share of the control of a large force of strategic nuclear weapons located in or near the European theater. However, the party leaders do, in varying degrees, support the MLF. This support stems from several considerations. First, the United States has pushed hard on the MLF in the past year, and many Germans, otherwise cool to the project, have acquiesced. Second, German leadership is understandably sensitive to SACEUR's long-stated MRBM requirement. From a military standpoint these Soviet missiles can clearly be as

well covered by United States strategic forces located in North America and at sea; however, the psychological advantage of satisfying the MRBM requirement with an Allied force in which Germany has a large role is obvious. Third, to the extent that the MLF should serve to strengthen the Federal Republic's defensive links with the United States it draws German support.

For all these reasons, it is difficult for a German political figure of either the CDU or the SPD to oppose the MLF outright. But a great many if not most approach the project with mixed feelings. Few seem to share the largely American apprehension that failure to solve the "German problem" through the instrument of a multilateral force would eventually induce a German decision to launch a national nuclear weapons program (or to press for the equally hazardous Franco-German nuclear venture). First, the reaction of the German public to nuclear weapons, including the MLF, appears to range between indifference and scepticism. Second, responsible German leaders are keenly aware of the dangerously unsettling effect a national nuclear undertaking would create in Moscow and within the Alliance. Germans renounced the right to develop nuclear weapons on their territory under the Paris Treaty of 1954. It is true that nations often denounce treaties that have ceased to serve their interest, but, as Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor have observed: "...to denounce a treaty with a potential adversary is one thing, to denounce one with allies with whom one must continue to cooperate is quite another, and if Germany were ejected from the NATO system no independent nuclear weapons could protect her... Assuming she exploded a nominal bomb in five years, and became an operational nuclear power in a shorter time than her predecessors, say three years later, she would have to traverse eight dangerous years during which she would be exposed to constant Soviet hostility and threats, and enjoy the minimum of allied confidence, before she had a force to bargain with..."\*

To its critics, American and European, the MLF would be a leap into the unknown. Whatever the claims that are made for it, the effects of the project cannot be foreseen. It might, for example, promote difficulties with the Soviet Union,

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\* Arms and Stability in Europe, Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, Chatto & Windus, London, for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963, P. .

thus deepening Cold War tensions and complicating efforts to develop a detente. The Russians are being told by Washington that the MLF is aimed against proliferation. To the charge that the MLF is in conflict with the United States-anti-dissemination proposal, Washington argues that the MLF is perfectly consistent since the United States veto will assure its control over the force. But Europeans are being told that the MLF does represent a devolution of control and in time could become an independent European force, provided Europe draws together and will make the investment. M. Jean Monnet, a recent convert to the MLF, told the European Congress of the German Parliamentary Social-Democratic Party on February 25 that "When our countries have set up a common authority capable of administering and controlling nuclear resources...the multi-lateral organisation can then be transformed and make way for a common European force in association with the American force."

It can be further argued that the MLF might conflict with another of the recent United States proposals -- for a verified freeze on the level of strategic nuclear vehicles. If the Russians were to accept such a proposal -- a not entirely improbable prospect, since it would seem to suit their long run interests -- the United States might have to choose between abandoning the MLF, or assigning to it elements of our strategic forces (most unlikely) in sufficient number to hold the overall United States figure to the level stipulated by the freeze. Its advocates argue that since the MLF would replace many obsolete American weapons all or most of the force might be "included" under the freeze. There remains the question whether the Soviets would accept such a definition, assuming they did become actively interested in the freeze proposal. From the Soviet point of view, the MLF would be essentially a German-American undertaking, one that far from defusing possible latent German aspirations might rekindle German nationalism by whetting the German appetite for progressively greater control over a force to which Germans make by far the greatest proportionate contribution.

A critical test of the MLF would seem to be the degree to which it may serve the basic, long-run interests of the German Federal Republic. Very generally, these can be summarized as German reunification, European unity and Atlantic solidarity. Reunification is perhaps the preeminent national objective. In pursuing this and other long range objectives, Germany obviously requires a close and durable relationship with Washington, first because the United States is the guarantor of German security now and at the least for the foreseeable

future; second, because the United States is leader and presumptive architect of the movement toward an outward looking partnership of the industrialized Western countries, which over the stretch of time might grow into an Atlantic Community. Such a movement is clearly suited to the political and economic interests of modern Germany.

Yet Germany must also pursue rapprochement with France, the sine qua non of reentry into Europe and the European unity movement. Germany is deeply involved in the delicate, complex and necessarily slow process of building a European Community, closely integrated, enlarged beyond its present membership and aligned with North America for common purposes. It is not likely that Germany could play the expanding role in European politics to which her leaders reasonably aspire, except as an integral part of a European Community moving toward some degree of political unity. Such a community might, for example, provide a strong attraction to the East European countries and help to allay the suspicion of an independent Germany bent on forcibly revising its eastern borders. As part of a benign European political formation, Germany's problem in normalizing relations with the East European states and improving the climate for reunification could be eased considerably.

It bears repeating, though, that the rate of progress in the "European" movement in the days immediately ahead will probably appear glacial by comparison with that which was achieved between the signing of the Rome Treaty and the collapse of the Brussels negotiations. For West Germany, this would seem to dictate a waiting game -- a cautious policy of balancing the requirements of its Atlantic policy against the achievement of rapprochement with France. It would seem to mean short steps and modest undertakings, and avoiding the trap of having to "choose" between Washington and Paris. Some Germans wonder whether the MLF might amount to such a trap.

A paper delivered by Dr. Helga Haftendorn, of the German Society for Foreign Policy, before the 2nd Arms Control and Disarmament Symposium at Ann Arbor,\* articulates some of the doubts of informed Germans:

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\* Dr. Haftendorn's paper is described as "based on a paper by Wilhelm Cornides, editor of EUROPA-ARCHIVA, BONN.")



"...the position of Bonn remains particularly delicate...vis-a-vis Washington and Paris as long as the United States and France do not see eye-to-eye with each other. It would become untenable if either side makes a conscious effort to force the Germans to a 'choice' between competing mystiques of a 'third force' and an 'Atlantic Community'...

"It is an illusion to believe that France will give up its claims for an independent nuclear deterrent altogether. She may accept one day a European nuclear force growing out of the British and French national deterrent. This could be closely coordinated -- but not integrated -- with the American deterrent. Since such a solution is only possible if Western Europe becomes a federal state, some people expect that a European nuclear force may become a means of uniting Europe. Some American proponents of the MLF support it for that very reason. Others however support it for the opposite reason that it should stabilize a bipolar system of deterrence. Clearly it cannot do both at the same time: lead to a truly European nuclear force and stabilize nuclear bipolarity. The decision will have to be made sooner or later, and the sooner the better. Because there is also the possibility that the Federal Republic could become a member of the MLF and thereby getting alienated from France without increasing its influence on nuclear strategy or its freedom for negotiations with the Soviet Union. She would then fall between all chairs and her apparent 'special position' in the Alliance would vanish overnight."

Dr. Haftendorn goes on to observe that the Federal Republic supports arms control measures "which do not entail a discrimination of Germany." These might include a ban on underground nuclear tests, space arms control measures, and a non-dissemination agreement. What German authorities oppose are de facto concessions which are not reciprocal and thus might not serve overall German interests. "How," asks Dr. Haftendorn, "could Bonn ever be able to negotiate about reunification in the framework of a German peace settlement if it has nothing more to offer, neither denuclearization, nor reduction of troops, nor disengagement -- all this having been decided beforehand?"

What then would be the net effect of the MLF on German interests? Obviously, this is a complex question, one upon which equally informed persons can and do differ. But for at least some Germans the MLF, as a largely German-American enterprise of significant scope, bears the hazards of estrangement from France, a crippling of the European unity movement, and further complications to the almost mystical cause of German reunification.

The assumption that the MLF is a means to an independent European nuclear force seems a precarious and vulnerable one. The question is somewhat academic -- at least, for the time -- since the operational and political control of such a force would have to rest with a tightly organized and invincibly supranational European agency. In any case, it has not been decided as a policy matter that a European force, even under the control of a fully unified European political formation, would serve the overall interests of Atlantic solidarity. Some high American officials have suggested that a movement toward an exclusively European force would lead to a withdrawal of American forces from Europe and that, inevitably, the paths of the Atlantic partners would diverge. It is with this in mind that many Europeans, notably Britons and Germans, have expressed concern that a European force would induce an American disengagement from Europe's problems.

Assuming, however, for discussion's sake that a European force was deemed a generally desirable objective and a natural expression of the partnership concept, there is then the question of whether the MLF would encourage such a development. First, it seems clear -- at least, to this observer -- that a European agency capable of unitary decision and unitary control of nuclear weapons will come at the end, not at the beginning, of the European movement. In short, such an agency might be the fulfillment of the movement, but not the means to fulfillment. Second, the European movement, as it develops, will have a rhythm and tempo of its own. It seems doubtful that the United States could do anything to hasten the process. Third, it would be difficult to imagine anything more disruptive than the emergence of a so-called European force, which was actually a loose grouping of two or three national forces, any one of which could be withdrawn for national purposes.

Furthermore, it would seem that once the goal of European unification had been achieved and a European Community had opted for an independent nuclear force, the MLF would not be necessary. Such a force could be built on the nucleus of the British and French forces. Perhaps more important is the possibility that the MLF, by deepening political divisions

within the Alliance, would retard the movement toward European unity. Finally, it would seem unwise for Americans to convey to Europeans the impression either that the MLF could be transformed into a purely European force, or that the unanimity principle could yield to a qualified majority arrangement. In either case, the approval of Congress would be required; obviously, that would not be true if a European force, based on a merger of the Franco-British forces, were to be agreed upon.

Turning to another aspect of the case for the MLF, it is possible, but not very likely -- not at least in the foreseeable future -- that such an enterprise would attract Britain and France as an alternate arrangement for their nuclear forces. Despite comments made during political campaigns, Britain is unlikely to give up its independent program as long as France has one. Also, the British seem to be intrigued by the role that even a modest nuclear power may be able to play in disarmament negotiations. In any case, it seems likely that Britain would dispose of its independent nuclear capability only within the framework of a broad agreement that would significantly advance some fundamental British purpose, either in the Atlantic or European policy area, or in the area of arms control.

Admittedly, the MLF would have the advantage of operating in or near the European theater, and would cover targets now covered by American systems. However, the cost estimates are such that it could scarcely be described as a more efficient or economic means of covering these targets. More important, the MLF, coming as it does with Europe confronting strong inflationary pressures, could further complicate the problem of persuading Europeans to make the essential qualitative and quantitative improvements in their non-nuclear forces, which, after all, must satisfy explicit military requirements. In Europe, there is said to be some confusion as to whether Washington assigns first priority to the MLF, or to the strategic requirements it has conceived for the Alliance. It is by no means certain that Washington can have it both ways.

This underscores one of the possible hazards of the MLF: it could distract the parties from the fundamental problem of finding a common strategy for the Alliance based on a realistic balance between conventional and nuclear forces, and on reaching a common understanding of the character and the demands of existing threats. Whatever happens to the MLF, resolution of this problem will remain a central requirement of the Alliance.

Of perhaps more general and immediate interest will be the effect of the MLF negotiations on the political fortunes of the various parties. The Federal Republic of Germany, *faute de mieux*, could emerge as arbiter between the United States and Europe. Italy is embarked on a useful political experiment, which surely needs time and the patient understanding of her Allies for fulfillment. Whether the fragile Italian undertaking could survive the additional burden of the MLF is questionable. It would certainly seem unwise for Italy to enlist in a multilateral force from which Britain (as well as France) remained absent. Washington, however, is ready to push ahead, if necessary without Britain, provided Italy is willing to sign. Thus, Italy, with some understandable reluctance, holds a key.

As for the United States, Washington has responded to the doubts and scepticism voiced about the MLF by crowding on more sail. Over the past few months, eight NATO governments have participated in working level talks, during which a number of technical problems were dealt with on a "no commitment" basis. The tempo at the diplomatic level has been sharply picked up; there is talk of an agreement in the fall which would be submitted to the new Congress in January, 1965; the selective briefing of Congressmen has begun; a campaign to generate favorable press comment has involved extensive briefings of domestic and foreign newspapermen, individually and in small groups, with the result that the MLF is becoming more widely known. This reached some kind of peak when the New York Times printed a story on November 28, 1963, three days after President Kennedy's funeral, which said that "President Johnson has reaffirmed United States support for the early organization" of the MLF; that Britain, "a late and reluctant participant in discussions, is now playing a full part...the British are said to be increasingly 'enthusiastic.'" More recently, the New York Times reported that the United States is using the Voice of America "to explain to the Soviet Union that the proposed allied nuclear fleet is a means of preventing an increase in national nuclear forces."

It is clear that United States prestige is deeply engaged in the MLF. Yet it is not at all clear that the project, as proposed, can succeed. Insufficient support either in Europe or on Capitol Hill could defeat it. What such a defeat would mean in terms of American prestige as leader of the Alliance would depend -- in part, at least -- on the ability of the United States to provide a reasonable alternative -- a strong fall back position.



One of the strengths of the MLF is simply that it exists. It is a proposal on which a good deal of original and useful staff work has been done and which, at the diplomatic and political level, has gradually gained considerable European acceptance. Since it is the only proposal about which a substantial record of intergovernmental consultation has been made, it has tended to focus discussion of the NATO nuclear riddle. Thus, if the MLF were to collapse a vacuum would be created.

Admittedly, a number of more modest steps could be taken to improve the quality of consultation within the Alliance. This has been an essentially British approach -- to broaden and upgrade European participation in the various processes that underlie nuclear strategy, including the targeting and deployment of centrally controlled U.S. nuclear weapons; ideally, but not necessarily, this would be done in the context of reorganizing NATO's institutions. Americans closely involved with the problem have conceded the utility of this approach, but by and large have viewed it as a device, which, however imaginatively and scrupulously applied, would not fully satisfy the German requirements. There is also some question of the degree to which Europeans could reasonably expect to participate in United States planning processes without having made an investment, large or small.

If the so-called British approach would not go far enough and if it should turn out that a fleet of jointly controlled ships bearing heavy political liabilities as well as missiles is rejected, what then is the answer? What for the United States would be the best alternative proposal? The answer may be that the MLF concept should not -- and need not -- be abandoned; that a multilateral force of less elaborate design can and should be offered to the Alliance if the proposal now under consideration should fail. In the past year, the idea of a multilateral force composed of Minuteman missiles located in sparsely settled areas of the North Central and North Western United States has attracted a good deal of interest.

Secretary McNamara told the House Armed Services Committee in January that by June of this year, "we expect to have 600 (Minuteman missiles) in place, and by June 1965, 800." Mr. McNamara added that the annual operating cost per Minuteman missile would be only about \$100,000. These missiles -- soon to be the principal United States deterrent force -- are emplaced in individual underground silos widely separated from each other and designed to withstand thermal and pressure

effects of nuclear weapons detonated at relatively close range. Minuteman control posts are also "hardened," and the "redundancy" being planned for this control system includes the capability of launch by radio from an airborne command post.

Some have considered a multilateral force of Minuteman missiles as an augment to the Polaris surface ship fleet; others view it as an alternative. In either case, it merits close attention. The report of the Military Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union, issued last October 30, had this recommendation:

"Your Rapporteur proposes that the NATO mixed-manned force should take over initially one (Minuteman) squadron (50 missiles), and subsequently a wing (150) of these missiles on United States territory, the cost being shared on a proportionate basis in accordance with present NATO practice for infrastructure projects. Not only will this proposal avoid duplicating the present-planned and already sufficient United States strategic force but it will have considerable political significance in demonstrating -- to Americans as well as to Europeans -- full NATO participation in the strategic deterrent based on the American continent, which hitherto has been a purely American preserve.

"Published references to the cost of a Minuteman installation range from \$3.5 million to \$5 million per missile complete in silo, so that the capital cost of this project would be small compared with the projected Polaris-carrying surface ship force -- between \$750 million and \$525 million for the wing of 150 missiles, which, if spread over, say, three years, would amount to between 1% and 1.4% of present defence budgets."

If the sea-going MLF should fail, the Minuteman idea could be put forward as an alternative intended to reach the same principal objectives while bearing fewer risks and liabilities. To take some examples:

Since a Minuteman force would comprise missiles already in being, there would be no question of creating a separate force for which there is not really any existing military requirement.

The Minuteman force would be less disturbing to those who worry about the disproportionately heavy German involvement in a mixed-manned force adrift at sea, and tend to view the MLF as an addition to, instead of a substitute for, national forces. The fact that the missiles would remain located in the United States would be psychologically reassuring. A permissive link system may be as effective in a sea-based force as on United States soil, but in the popular mind would be less credible.

For the foregoing reasons, a Minuteman MLF would represent less a change in the existing situation, and hence would be less incompatible with arms control proposals and the effort to reach a detente with the Soviet Union.

Since the force would be cheaper and less troublesome politically, it could attract broader participation and a greater spreading of the cost; hence it would be less a German-American enterprise.

Its lower cost would mean that it would be less competitive with non-nuclear resources, hence less disruptive in terms of seeking a strategy for the Alliance based on a proper balance between nuclear and non-nuclear resources.

It would presumably be less objectionable to European neutrals, other nonparticipants and even elements among participating countries -- left wing Italian Socialists, for example -- since it would not introduce into the coastal waters of European seas a new and possibly destabilizing element in the form of Soviet trawlers, submarines (and possibly airplanes) seeking to sort out and track the ships of the MLF. The Minuteman alternative would also eliminate the problem of finding ports of entry for the ships. One danger is that the ships may be detected and then provoke Communist or other left wing demonstrations in port cities; local governments would be made aware that the presence of any of these ships in their harbors would automatically transform their cities into Class A targets for Soviet missiles for that period.

It would avoid forcing the pace of Europe's nuclear development, and would seem to offer Europeans time in which to be able to make a realistic and informed choice between a transatlantic and European solution to the nuclear weapons puzzle. However, it would appear to encourage the "Atlantic" solution.

Weighed against the MLF of surface ships, it can be argued that the Minuteman alternative would have significant disadvantages. First, it would be a considerably more modest undertaking, and thus to many, less acceptable.

Second, the fact that the missiles were located in North America instead of in and near the European theater, however reassuring to some, would be far less acceptable to others, especially those who feel that the MRBM requirement should be met by NATO nuclear forces based in European seas, if not in Europe itself. For military purposes, the distinction might be virtually meaningless. But for psychological reasons, the credibility of the NATO nuclear force would be virtually in proportion to its nearness to the Soviet MRBMs and airfields in Eastern Europe -- at least, in many eyes.

Third, a Minuteman force would obviously require far fewer personnel and thus would mean far less integration. This is an important consideration for many who feel that the mixed-manning is one of the most useful features of the MLF. However, those who favor the Minuteman approach also believe that a number of other measures could be taken in the direction of multilateralizing NATO's strategic operations. Short of reforming NATO's institutions, a difficult task, the United States could offer to enlarge the European participation in various operations of the Strategic Air Command. Indeed, for targeting purposes, the United States could consider assigning all of SAC to NATO. This would not relinquish American control of the various forces, but could significantly broaden the European role. Also, the United States could take the initiative in pledging to renew its commitment to NATO for an additional 20 years after 1969, when members may withdraw from the treaty on a year's notice. The United States could also substantially increase the flow of classified data relating to nuclear warfare and planning.

To summarize, strong claims have been made for the concept of a multilateral force of surface ships. During the past several months, its advocates have grown in number and include many distinguished and thoughtful persons on either side of the Atlantic. Opposition continues, much of it based on a recognition of the clear political risks inherent in the enterprise, some of it less well founded. Thus far, the MLF is the only operative proposal designed to cope with a problem for which there is no really "good" or risk-free solution. As such, it deserves the highest consideration. In addition, given the degree of commitment to the venture (and the unaccept-



ability of most alternatives), it can be argued persuasively that the MLF should not be permitted to fail. Nevertheless, the possibility of failure must be recognised, and the effects of possible failure should be anticipated and minimized by having available for the consideration of interested governments an alternative which, so far as possible, would achieve the same objectives as the present proposal, while, hopefully, presenting fewer liabilities.

The problems of devising a common strategy for NATO and of making a rational arrangement for the control of strategic nuclear weapons have hung over the Alliance for nearly a decade. History may judge us harshly if we fail to deal realistically with the problems and opportunities of the nuclear age. Too often, our ideas have had a belated or anachronistic quality that sets them against underlying currents.

The test of the MLF, or of any related undertaking, will be not only whether it can meet certain current requirements within the Alliance, but whether it can help members to catch the fresh political currents and the opportunities that lie ahead.

# COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



## STUDY PAPER

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### SHOULD THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE?

John Silard

In 1960 Secretary of State Herter first proposed creation of a NATO multilateral strategic nuclear force. When Premier de Gaulle made manifest his break with the United States and his determination to develop a French nuclear capacity, the Administration's response was a strong espousal of the Multilateral Nuclear Force. The MLF was intended as a face-saving device for the United States, which would quiet claims in England and Germany for independent nuclear capability by the offer of a nuclear "partnership" among the allies who hold out against de Gaulle's unilateralist policy.

The initial lukewarm reaction among our NATO allies and here at home, has induced the belief within the last year that the MLF is a dormant proposal. That belief is erroneous. Having won the formal approval of the Administration, plans to activate the MLF have progressed under the leadership of a contingent in the State Department for whom MLF is a major commitment. The Navy, too, has become interested because of the potential accretion to its operations with the fleet of nuclear vessels contemplated by the MLF. Meanwhile, President Johnson's proposal for a nuclear freeze to be negotiated with the Soviets has been stalled at Geneva by the Russians who point out that we cannot coincidentally activate a freeze and build a strategic nuclear fleet. Moreover, while it was anticipated that the opposition of the Labor Party in Great Britain would preclude activation of the MLF, there is growing doubt whether the Labor Party will hold to its present position if it wins the elections. In sum, MLF plans are proceeding in the face of disinterest both among our allies and at home, while opponents within our own Government cannot effectively exert their influence as long as our official policy remains wedded to the MLF.

What is the MLF? Essentially, it is a "partnership" in the operation of a fleet of vessels equipped with strategic nuclear weapons. The Polaris-armed vessels would be manned by mixed forces from various NATO participants, with a veto by anyone of the major participating nations on the firing of the weapons. Of course, the veto renders the "partnership" unequal, since the United States with its nuclear forces in Europe thereby remains the only country which can independently of its allies activate a nuclear exchange. Accordingly, some German advocates of the MLF hope that ultimately the veto will be removed, and Germany will thus obtain its own nuclear force through the MLF. We have encouraged this hope by assurances that MLF is only the beginning of a "true European" force. That was the suggestion made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Schaetzel in a presentation in September 1963 in Oxfordshire, England. Yet such a veto-free MLF would be quite contrary to our present proposals at Geneva for a nuclear freeze and an agreement against further proliferation, with the result that there exists a present inconsistency in our overt representations to the Soviets and our thinly veiled promises to NATO countries.



This memorandum examines the principal arguments advanced by the proponents of the MLF, reviews countervailing considerations, and suggests some alternative courses of conduct for the Administration, should it be determined that the present insistent United States advocacy of the MLF is not in the national interest:

A. THE PROPONENTS' MAJOR ARGUMENT: STOPPING NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE DEVELOPMENT.

A principal argument advanced by proponents of the MLF is that England, Germany, and possibly other nations will follow de Gaulle's independent force example unless we can offer these nations a larger nuclear role within the NATO Alliance. Initially, it might be questioned whether the modest nuclear capability which France will attain is more troublesome in its military and political implications than the prospect of a large European strategic force with Germany a predominant participant. Exposition of the view that such a development would be less disturbing than the political and military implications of the MLF, appears in the March 1963 issue of The Reporter in an article by Henry A. Kissinger, and it will not be repeated here. We examine here in its short and its long-term implications the "anti-proliferation" argument made for the MLF:

1. MLF in the Short Run. It is clear that for the 1960s, MLF proponents vastly over-estimate European desire for a larger nuclear role. It is said that without MLF the Germans would soon follow the example of de Gaulle in developing an independent nuclear capacity. But with respect to Germany, not only would an independent nuclear force violate the existing treaties, it would cause a reaction by the Russians, as well as the United States, of a dimension which would give the Germans serious pause before entering on a provocative and expensive nuclear program.

There is, in fact, no evidence that the Germans presently desire a nuclear force of their own. What the Germans do desire in the short run is assurance that the United States is committed to employing its nuclear forces in Europe to forestall any form of aggressive action from the East, and that our weapons are targeted so as to assure that a nuclear exchange would also involve Russian territory, not just German soil. Yet for this modest German concern, the MLF goes too far. Bringing technical personnel from European nations into a second-level role in the targeting and deployment of our existing strategic missiles, would go most of the way towards meeting existing German concern about the United States nuclear umbrella. The MLF, on the other hand, will create an entirely new nuclear force at sea, which is both expensive and unnecessary in strategic military terms. Moreover, it may kindle rather than quiet nuclear aspirations among our European allies, and thus propel the very sentiment it is claimed the MLF would foreclose - the aspiration for independent nuclear capability. If we espouse the view that our allies' self-respect requires parity of nuclear participation with us, it will not be long before they espouse the same view. By contrast, without our active salesmanship, nuclear arms development may remain unpopular in Germany, England, and other nations.

2. MLF in the Long Run. While the MLF is more than is needed to meet the present concern of our allies, on the other hand it is inade-  
*quate* to meet what are likely to be the long-term aspirations of NATO nations. As Kissinger's analysis points out, the force of de Gaulle's

position for independent nuclear capability is based upon the realization of some fundamental differences of outlook between the United States and European nations. Thus, as much as our nuclear posture in Europe serves to preserve our close relations with allies and to hold the line for our positions vis-a-vis the Soviets, we may yet be increasingly disinclined actually to use these weapons in an exchange which could precipitate an all-out war of annihilation between the United States and the Soviets.

Moreover, the glue in the NATO alliance has been the existence of the common enemy in the East, but a predictable progression of closer relationships with the Soviets, fear of a resurgent Germany, and conflicting economic interests such as those reflected in the split over the Common Market, may radically alter the present community of interest between the United States and some of its NATO allies.

To the extent that anticipations of such changes exist in Europe, there will be growing interest in independent nuclear forces or a European nuclear force not subject to a United States veto. In the case of Germany, there will be the added incentive of the role of swing-nation which the pseudo-partnership will not satisfy. In sum, as much as the MLF exceeds the presently manifested desire for NATO-nation participation in the nuclear deterrent, it will fall short of the long-term European demand for independent nuclear capability.

It may therefore be anticipated that the strongest pressures will ultimately arise for abandonment of the United States veto on the use of the MLF, and that such pressures may in time succeed with the result that the MLF will have paved the way for the very proliferation of nuclear weaponry which it is supposed to forestall. Alternatively, if NATO countries cannot attenuate or force abandonment of the United States veto, they may then proceed with the development of their independent nuclear forces, with the added stimulus and know-how which we ourselves have provided through the MLF. It seems clear, therefore, that the MLF is not a proper answer either to the existing or to the longer range nuclear aspirations of our NATO allies, and will more likely hasten than retard the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe.

B. SUBSIDIARY ARGUMENTS FOR THE MLF.

1. MLF As a Bargaining Device. Some Administration officials who are not advocates of the MLF would nevertheless continue on our present course on the theory that in future bargaining with the Soviets over arms control in Europe, the MLF would provide an additional pawn for trading. Yet as an experienced negotiator knows, one may bargain with assets, but it is difficult to bargain to an advantage with liabilities. If MLF is a free world liability, it cannot become a bargaining asset with the Soviets.

Even more importantly, the "bargaining pawn" argument disregards the fact that if the MLF actually comes into being, it may be impossible to convince our own allies to give it up for an arms control agreement. Once a strategic European force is in existence, our NATO allies may say with



some credibility that if it was worth creating for the collective security, it is worth keeping and ought not to be surrendered short of a complete and general disarmament agreement. It is therefore probable that while creation of the MLF may provide an additional pawn for trading with the Soviets in an European arms control agreement, it would represent a pawn which our own allies will refuse to trade.

## 2. MLF As a Mere Multilateral Substitute for Bilateral Controls.

Proponents urge that the MLF multilateral control with vetoes by major participants, is not materially different from the existing bilateral control over tactical and medium range nuclear weapons in Europe. These proponents argue that with respect to the present nuclear weapons in Europe there is already a system of shared control with the situs nation, and that all the MLF will do is to add more trigger fingers whose concurrence would be necessary for the firing of the weapons.

Apart from some question whether the MLF controls will in fact not give increased leverage to other nations with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, this argument blurs the critical distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. The decision that our NATO allies should share in the deployment and control of tactical weapons located in Europe may have been right or wrong, but it was a radically different decision from that posed by the MLF. For a decision to fire the missiles in the MLF would be to launch an attack on the Soviet Union with weapons of medium range so deployed as to be able to reach Soviet targets. In such an event there would ensue a nuclear war in which countless millions of Soviet and American citizens would perish. By contrast, the decision to give our NATO allies bilateral controls over tactical weapons was only a determination that a nuclear exchange initiated within the boundaries of NATO nations properly requires their participation in the decisional process. Accordingly, the MLF cannot be passed off as a mere extension of a bilateral control system to a multilateral control system, for the weapons of strategic war deployed in the MLF have radically different significance for the United States from the Nuclear weapons over which we presently share controls with NATO allies.

3. MLF as Step Toward a Western European Strategic Force. A final argument made by some proponents, is the converse of the principal "non-proliferation" rationale for the MLF. Under this argument, it would be desirable to move toward a Western European alliance possessing its own strategic nuclear weapons free of United States control and United States responsibility. The proponents who welcome such a force, urge that the MLF is desirable not because it will end the spreading of nuclear weapons but because it will promote it.

To the extent that this view rests on the desire for a Western European unity it may, for sake of argument, be conceded that such a force would in fact promote some accretion in the unity of the NATO alliance. Yet the chief reason for such unity would be not fear of the Soviets, but fear of the Germans - the anticipation that without participation by other allies, the MLF would be a German-American nuclear alliance. Certainly, this is a fragile base for European "unity."

Moreover, the price paid in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries and the destabilization of the nuclear balance between the Soviets and the United States by this third force, is a price too high to be paid. In the last analysis, the integrity of the MLF proposal itself becomes subject to question when it is advertised simultaneously as a device which will contain and a device which will promote strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

## C UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR MLF SUPPORT.

There are five major unfavorable aspects to the continuing United States insistence upon creation of the MLF:

### 1. Nuclear Freeze and Non-Proliferation Agreements Imperiled.

President Johnson's proposals at Geneva for nuclear freeze and non-proliferation agreements, have been imperilled by our support of the MLF. The Russians quickly seized upon the MLF, pointing out that we could not both stand still and move ahead at the same time, and would have to abandon the MLF if we are serious about the proposed agreements. The Russian claim of inconstancy is somewhat confirmed by William Foster's quoted statement in the Herald Tribune of January 24, 1964 that the United States freeze proposal would not include the MLF. And as the editorial in the Washington Post of February 12, 1964 points out, there is some inconsistency between our offering NATO the MLF as the beginning of a European force and our asserting to the Soviets that it is consistent with a nuclear freeze.

2. De-emphasis of Conventional Force Expansion in Europe. Replacement of nuclear with conventional defensive capability in Europe has been a major policy of the Administration. To the extent that the MLF will be costly to our NATO allies and emphasize their continued protection through nuclear response, it militates against the Administration's stress on the need for conventional capability among our NATO allies.

3. Production of European Rift Rather Than Unity. Our European allies are not requesting the MLF but are having it forced upon them by our insistence<sup>1</sup>. With the exception of some element in Germany, the MLF is not welcomed among the other nations, who must join it from fear of German predominance. The MLF is thus a rift-producing issue among our allies. And it is also causing serious internal political friction in NATO countries since it requires them to cast their lot unequivocally either with the United States or de Gaulle. Such a sharp choice situation

<sup>1</sup>USIA Research and Reference Service report, dated April 5, 1963: "The reaction of the Western European press to U.S. Ambassador Merchant's recent trip indicated an overwhelming rejection of the kind of multilateral nuclear force (MLF) envisaged by the United States. Editorial comment was heaviest and most negative in West Germany. The rejection of the multilateral nuclear force within the NATO framework was commonly based on the belief that the United States was offering a hastily improvised and confused politically motivated and exorbitantly expensive device which would afford West Europe neither increased security nor increased voice in nuclear decisions. Supporters of the United States suggestion, for the most part a minority of Italian, British, and Scandinavian voices, saw it as the lesser of two evils and a possible starting point for discussions. By the end of the Merchant trip, most papers were openly speculating that the multilateral nuclear force plan in its present form would be scrapped with the debate continuing on the central issue of nuclear interdependence within the Western Alliance. Hopes were also expressed that the United States would find a way to dispel the confusion aroused by its original multilateral force proposals."



has unfavorable consequences upon West Germany, and by drawing another divisive line among our allies, disservices the European unity and settlement aspirations entertained by many within our Administration. As the Kissinger analysis in The Reporter pointed out: "The effort to isolate France by developing in the nuclear field a structure in which West Germany would be the key European member may in fact overstrain the fabric of European cohesion and Atlantic solidarity, and also undermine the domestic stability of West Germany. It is in nobody's interest - least of all West Germany's - to set in motion events that can only end with suspicion and concern in most of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role. This is bound to aid the Soviet thrust to divide the West through the fear of Germany. A divided country, which in the space of fifty years has lost two wars, experienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme inflation and the trauma of the Nazi era, should not - in its own interest - be placed in a position where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy."

4. Political Repercussions in the Congress. It also seems clear that the MLF is not presently favored in the Congress, or likely ultimately to win its support. It probably violates or strains the McMahon Act by giving nuclear information to other countries. It gives concern to those who have worried about a re-emerging Germany as a predominant European power which controls European fortunes. It is not favored by those who value our nuclear monopoly and the direct controls which we have retained upon the strategic weapons of potential annihilation. Meanwhile, the Administration has completely by-passed the Congress. The closer we approach activation of MLF, the larger will be the cumulative weight of these Congressional concerns.

5. Nuclear Race Escalation. Following the test ban, there have been widespread hopes that a way would be found to reach a plateau in the nuclear arms race in which there would be a leveling off of nuclear forces within present limits, and no expansion of weaponry to countries which are nuclear-free today. Apart from the additional numbers of strategic weapons and nations with such weapons which the MLF would involve, it is today the single proposal for a new advance which stands in the way of a leveling off of the nuclear arms race. This is a serious new ground for a reassessment of the MLF proposal.

D. THE LARGER CONTEXT: ENDING THE EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY OF ARMAMENTS.

Almost all current debates about the MLF are limited to the existing political and military relationship in Europe. All are predicated upon the assumption that there remains a military threat in Europe from the East which requires degrees of nuclear capability in Western Europe. First, however, it must be noted that except for the special problem of Berlin, conventional forces are demonstrably adequate for the defense of Western Europe against conventional force attack. Moreover, the very hypothesis of an attack upon Western Europe becomes less and less credible as the years pass. Without Soviet participation, such an attack would be

meaningless in military terms and therefore unlikely of initiation; with Soviet participation it would unquestionably initiate a world war, which again provides a highest level deterrent. Nor is it clear just what Soviet hope would impel such an attack. Our present military posture in Europe is based on a threat which no one believes.

The fact is that we have continued to give a preemptive position to military policy and nuclear power in Europe, in an era when the real problems of Europe are economic and political rather than military. Our continuing diplomacy of weaponry, both against the Soviets and vis-a-vis de Gaulle, stands in the way of the traditional diplomacy, prevents desired economic and cultural exchange, and other normal adjustments between countries as well as the necessary political developments within them. The MLF perpetuates obsession with military response to rifts with the Soviets and between the Allies, in an era which calls not for an arms polemic but for the progression of relationships between sovereign states.

Those who would promote a detente and ultimately a settlement in Europe, must look beyond such merely military alignments such as the pseudo-partnership of the Multilateral Nuclear Force. For the nuclear arms race and the diplomacy of armaments in Europe will not cease as long as the United States itself is the chief promoter of new nuclear weapons systems. On the other hand, a return to the traditional international diplomacy in Europe would foster a climate in which national possession of nuclear arms would appear less vital either for national prestige or national security. As long as the United States remains ready to employ its nuclear strength against a nuclear attack in Europe, there is in fact no security necessity for national nuclear forces. And the demand for nuclear arms in NATO countries attributable to the desire for national prestige and self-esteem, reflects a desire which we ourselves are fostering when we proclaim by devices such as the MLF that our NATO allies must have a first-ranking role in the operation of a strategic weapons system. In short, the only way in which our NATO allies can be induced not to strive for a strategic nuclear system of their own is if we ourselves cease our obeisance to nuclear power as the cornerstone of European policy and European defense.

Today we welcome agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Latin America and other areas where they are not presently deployed. One may hope that tomorrow we may recognize that in Europe, too, the proper goal is not an accretion in nuclear armaments but the replacement of the nuclear confrontation by political and economic settlements and conventional forces adequate to assure that they are honored. At a time when we should seek to move away from the nuclear arms race, the multi-lateral nuclear force is a move in precisely the wrong direction.

E. ALTERNATIVES TO UNITED STATES PROMOTION OF THE MLF.

There are essentially three alternatives to the present United States position:

1. Abandoning the MLF. While this may constitute long-term wisdom for the United States, it is unlikely that we would renounce the MLF in the near future without at least a serious quid pro quo from the Soviets. It should be noted that if the United States abandons the MLF, it may continue to adhere to its opposition to the independent development of nuclear capability by Germany, and other nations, and we may expect some success in holding our allies to that position at least for the next few years.

2. Initiating a Slow-Down of MLF Activation. This seems the most desirable immediate step, but there is always difficulty in taking the first step away from an established course. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings might serve as a temporary brake. A slow-down should pave the way toward ultimate recession by the United States from the MLF proposal.

3. A Replacement for MLF. A more modest nuclear "partnership" might be proposed to meet the present concerns of NATO allies. Second level technical people could be brought into the targeting and planning phases of our existing strategic nuclear force, to give added assurance of our readiness to employ the nuclear umbrella. To the extent that we are, in fact, ready to employ that umbrella, it seems highly desirable that our allies be assured that this is so. By this means we may satisfy some present concerns among our NATO allies without creating a new strategic striking force in Europe and opening the door to an independent European nuclear "third force" with its troublesome political and military implications.



# After Containment

## WINNING WITHOUT WAR

By Amitai Etzioni

Doubleday

271 pp. \$4.95.

Reviewed by

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

U.S. Senator, Minnesota

PROFESSOR AMITAI ETZIONI of Columbia University has long been dedicated to the cause of peace. He is not as unique in this respect as he is in his understanding of the complexities of world power relationships and the tangled web of history in which they have developed. Etzioni is idealistic but not visionary. He is cautious but not conservative. In short, he is "reasonable." He reasons with us again in his latest book, *Winning Without War*, and amplifies his theme of a "gradualist approach to peace."

The central theme of this volume is that the time has come for new strategies by the United States in conducting the cold war. Since 1947, U.S. policy has been one of "containment." That is, our policy has aimed "to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon a peaceful and stable world." The long-run aim of this policy of containment has been "to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." These are the words of George Kennan, who has provided the most succinct definition of "containment" that we have.

Containment as a policy recognizes only two powers in the world. The general confrontation has been labelled "Free World vs. Communist Bloc." For practical purposes, it has been the U.S. vs USSR.

Western power (U.S.) has attempted to confront and give credible deterrence to the threat of Soviet aggression; it has not attempted to challenge the East in its own sphere. In this containment strategy, our power has been met by some Soviet restraint. But neither side, according to Etzioni, has recognized a goal of freeing the world to develop the competition of many power centers. This preoccupation of the two major powers only with each other in matters of strategy and political concern Etzioni calls a state of "duopoly."

Americans have always been restive about the policy of containment. It has seemed to be both too defensive and too static. Further, it has appeared to offer the Communists a deal—stay on your side of the fence and out of third countries, and we will be satisfied. As a strategy, containment is limited to buying time. Unless one is clear about what one is buying time for, it is inadequate. The standard answers have suggested that we must hold fast until the Soviets either grow weaker or more mellow. But the Soviets have not become weaker. And if they are to mellow, some new strategy must be developed.

Yet if containment has been lacking as a strategy, it has been brilliant tactically. It has in fact "contained." John Foster Dulles proclaimed the idea of a new policy, but the Eisenhower Administration continued the old one; it merely practiced it with a more threatening rhetoric. In those years the Administration expected the Communists to weaken. That the Soviets would mellow, or could be induced to, lay outside the options. The Kennedy Administration continued the policy of "containment." Indeed, it broadened the range of forces with which to accomplish this policy. But it also began to look for initiatives that would induce a mellowing.

We are on this threshold at the

present time. Etzioni urges us to go further in this direction. He recognizes that the policy of containment was necessary, and that it has worked. I do not even understand him to be counselling that we really eliminate it. At least he does not suggest that we sacrifice any of our military power to implement it as a tactic, if Communist threat requires it. He is, rather, advocating a supplement to containment.

Three main factors dictate a new approach: 1) the dangers in the thermonuclear arms race; 2) the break-up of the bi-polar power world; and 3) the evolution of neutralism in new nations toward a non-alignment that wants to be independent of both the Western and the Communist blocs.

Etzioni discards "disarmament," in any general and complete sense, as a remote goal. This is realistic. He is likewise skeptical about arms-control when it is conceived only as arms-balancing. He welcomes agreements here as first steps, but he counsels against stopping with that. Arms-control must proceed to some substantial arms-reduction if it is to be hopeful. I agree with this too.

In these matters, Etzioni essays the difficult but necessary task of striking a balance between complacency and fear. He properly rejects apocalyptic theses which assert that we have a very short time in which to make the world completely safe, or have it completely destroyed. One of these is C. P. Snow's, with its warning that if there is any possibility of thermonuclear war, there is then a statistical certainty of it. This is bad statistics—there is no possibility of predicting, one way or another, the "unique" event. It is also, I believe, a poor psychology with which to motivate policy.

There are others, of course, who are breathing too easily about the stability of deterrence since the Cuban confrontation. That cliff-

hanger could have gone the other way. Some new crisis of a similar type might end in disaster. We must accept the fact that in our time we will have to live dangerously, with an urgent concern to try to lessen the danger, but also to make plans without panic.

Etzioni is also good on the political background of the breakup of the bi-polar world. There is much current literature on this development, but little of it gives the necessary perspective. Etzioni clarifies both the Sino-Soviet split and the developing disarray among the Western allies.

The Sino-Soviet split is deep and sharp. In the quasi-religion of Communism, this has taken on the proportions of a heterodox-orthodox split, than which none can be more bitter. Etzioni doubts that this split has gone so far that Russia would not extend its atomic umbrella in the event of some vital threat to China. He expects, however, that Russia will continue to check China in other respects, as indeed it has been doing since 1959. To be sure, this cautiously optimistic view admits that there is much that remains inscrutable to us in the Communist riddles.

Etzioni doubts that the developing independence among members of the Western Alliance will ever breach the unities these nations have as members of a common culture. The European nations are seeking a greater share in political decisions affecting the operation of U.S. military strategy. They are also exercising independence in other areas. Still, argues Etzioni, the West has unities which are deeper than its divisions.

I agree with the tone of this. I believe that the so-called disarray in NATO is oftentimes blown up out of proportion. In terms of actual power relationships, polycentrism is more of an ideal than a fact; the world is still a bi-polar power world. For either Russia or the U.S. to share power with its allies would

threaten the capacity of each to deal with the other. Neither great power can share its thermonuclear power with its respective allies, nor negotiate its reduction over the heads of its allies. I have hope for growing Western maturity on the nature of the dilemma here.

Etzioni reminds us that the French desire for independence in military power antedates de Gaulle. Whatever one thinks of the way in which de Gaulle is responding to historical forces, he is certainly not blind to them, nor did he originate them. The problem is that Europe does not want to be hostage to the use of U.S. thermonuclear power. It wants a voice in how, when and where that power is to be used.

Yet we, on the other hand, do not want to increase the number of fingers on the atomic trigger. Etzioni presents a clear picture of the problems involved in the Multi-National Force—the fleet of surface ships, armed with Polaris missiles and manned by crews representing the NATO powers. None of our allies, except West Germany, has much enthusiasm for this force, although some of them are participating in discussion and in the manning of the U.S.S. Biddle, a missile-destroyer, to see what problems may be involved. The Russians charge that the whole idea is simply a way to proliferate the control of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, American opponents echo this Soviet charge.

Certainly there are problems with a Multi-National Force idea, but they are of a different sort, and our allies understand these problems. They see that our motives are psychological and political. The Force has little, if any, military meaning. We will not give our allies a finger on our atomic trigger in NATO. In a MNF, we seek to provide an illusion of participation while still keeping a final veto on control of use. Our allies see no advantage in this.

When one adds the technical difficulties of administering a multi-lingual naval command, and various other problems, we may turn out to have a Rube Goldberg invention on our hands. That is, we may have an unnecessary contraption to achieve a point we are already making in asking our allies to trust us and our use of thermonuclear power. We have *not*, in any case, been devious on the point, as the Russians charge.

Etzioni is intriguing and worth listening to on his expectation that in the next 10 years, Germany is likely to present more problems to the NATO alliance than France. Germany has enormous built-in pressure for reunification and may for that reason be tempted to deal independently with Russia. This thought has been suggested elsewhere, in the writings of realists like Hans Morgenthau.

All of these factors add up to a fluid situation which makes it desirable for the major powers to channel their conflict into constructive measures for peace. There will continue to be a power conflict; peaceful coexistence will not eliminate that. What we must achieve, ideally, is a way to conduct this conflict under rules which do not contemplate burying anybody.

Etzioni believes that the rules should permit the free play and development of other powers in the world. His focus here is upon the "Third World" of the developing nations. The evidence is that most of them desire to develop in their own way and be fiefs of nobody. To accomplish this, Etzioni calls for a policy of "remote deterrence." The essence of this policy is that the U.S. and Russia agree to stay out of these countries, and not ship in arms or military force to any side of a conflict within them. Should such a conflict arise, a UN "flashlight" team would inspect the situation. Any violation by either side would call off the agreement and put us back where we started.



Outside powers could thus compete in the Third World on matters of foreign aid, technical assistance, contracts for airlines, etc. They would not interfere militarily. The U.S. should not be concerned about some of the Socialist schemes and Leftward tendencies in some of these countries. Such tendencies do not make these countries Communist or instill in them any desire to be controlled from either Moscow or Peking.

In short, Etzioni asks for "neutratization" on a grand scale throughout the whole uncommitted world. There would be a truly peaceful competition to show the better political and economic way, and the new nations would be able to judge for themselves. Meanwhile, measures toward arms reduction could be pursued by the major powers. Etzioni calls this a "minimum regret" policy. We have nothing to lose and everything to gain by it.

It is indeed a minimum regret policy, and I believe we have been trying to initiate something like it. Without claiming perfection for the U.S. or suggesting that we have always done everything right, it is the Communists who must give up the idea of supporting "wars of national liberation," not us.

Where we are compromised in involvements with other nations, Etzioni does not give us a clear idea of how we may extricate ourselves. This is apparent in his discussion of foreign aid. He is good on the difficulties in foreign aid. But he really advocates more—not less—interference by the U.S. in the internal affairs of other nations. He wants foreign aid to build free and democratic societies. I agree.

Etzioni does not approve our supporting any Right-wing governments, and he wants us to bring pressure on them. This pressure should go all the way to engineering their "toppling," and in the event that we do not get a good succession, to "multi-toppling." I am not clear on how this will square with "remote deterrence," and why the Communist bloc will agree to stay out of it.

This latter issue constitutes the main weakness in an otherwise useful book. The ideal of having other nations develop in freedom and independence, in a manner and idiom of their own choosing, and toward democratic institutions is sound; and as far as U.S. policy is concerned, it is not new. But Communist policy has a lot to do with keeping us focused on "containment."

Some other minor questions might be raised about the book. It makes too sharp a distinction between verification and inspection on arms reduction. At first Etzioni seems to think much can be gained by a verification process using open sources that do not require inspection. But then he admits candidly that not much can be done this way. Inspection, which the Soviets are only slowly admitting "in principle" but not yet much in practice, is still the key to progress.

The development of the role of the United Nations also might have been further amplified. The policy which Etzioni advocates for U.S. strategy in military terms is in fact our policy: acceptance of a second-strike deterrence, declining to build a thermonuclear capacity beyond the point of diminishing returns, unilateral cut-back of unnecessary capability, seeking meanwhile to find agreement on concrete, negotiable steps in disarmament. Perhaps some of this has become clearer since this book was written. In that sense the book is a solid support for the policies of the Johnson administration.

# Prolix Theorist

## WAGNER ON MUSIC AND DRAMA

Edited by Albert Goldman  
and Evert Sprinchorn  
Dutton. 447 pp. \$5.95.

Reviewed by

HERBERT LEIBOWITZ

Contributor, "New Republic"

WAGNER'S MUSIC, tracts and personality have always roused partisanship or antipathy. Yet to understand the cultural history of the 19th century, and its legacy to our confused age, we must understand Wagner. From Nietzsche to Hitler and Thomas Mann, he has served as a touchstone of all that is ailing and alive in European culture. In his vices and strengths, in his genius and charlatanism, and most important, in his equivocal relationship to Romanticism, Wagner rehearses the *Realpolitik* of the art and history of the last 150 years.

Reading through this useful compendium of Wagner's writings on music and drama—alternately astonishing, boring and appalling—one is reminded of Nietzsche's characterization of Wagner as a "transposed actor." His polemics, like his conversation and his music, are grandiloquent self-dramatizations. Whether as poet, composer, prophet or theorist, he is the tireless performer bent on overwhelming the listener with the sheer size and force of his personality.

The performance, mercurial and dull, inflated and humorless, ends up just a bit commonplace. As in *The Ring*, where the words without the music are second-rate, so in his writings; despite the encyclopedic reach, the mind is derivative and the style prolix. Not surprisingly, Wagner is at his best when he discusses musical matters—interpreting his own works or Beethoven's, ex-

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**THE NEW LEADER**  
7 E. 15th St., New York 3

July 10, 1964

MEMO to Senator

From John Rieilly

Subject: MLF

JER  
I. I am attaching to this ~~brief~~ memo a short article on MLF by Henry Kissinger. This piece, together with the two you already have by Newhouse and Osgood, gives you three samples of the best thinking on the subject. Kissinger and Newhouse are opposed, Osgood is for. Both of those opposed concentrate on the essential substantive question: whether this device will really solve the problem of nuclear sharing with our allies. Unlike many opponents of MLF, these authors are not anti-German. Therefore their objections are rational ones -- rather than passionate ones.

II. Appraisal: I will confine myself here to a brief summary of my views on the issue itself and outline more fully the current status of the MLF question within the U.S. Government and the political ramifications of the issue.

My current view is the following:

1. Although I accept the multilateral principle as originally defined as valid means of permitting German participation in the defense of Europe and German participation in world affairs, in practice the MLF concept is not developing according to the original conception. Because of the opposition of the French and that of the British Labor Government expected to be chosen in October, plus the reluctant acquiescence of the Italian Government, it is developing in something other than a "multilateral" force. Without Britain or France, it

would probably develop into a bilateral arrangement between the U.S. and Germany. Both the U.S. and Germany each are now scheduled to pay 40 percent of the cost which would result in German-American control.

2. If MLF in practice is not multilateral but bilateral, it would mean in effect the proliferation of nuclear weapons to one country, Germany. If this were the result, the consequences in terms of reaction in Europe and the Soviet Union might not be worth the benefits gained. This would widely be regarded, both by our allies, the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, as just a convenient way to give nuclear weapons to Germany.

3. The MLF scheme does not really meet the demands of the Europeans for a share of nuclear control so long as the U.S. holds a veto. Any proposal to give up the veto would require Congressional action -- and would in all likelihood be decisively rejected. To propose at this time that we consider giving up the veto would provoke an immediate noisy debate in the Congress.

4. Some way of acceding the nuclear participation that is essential to modern major power status must be found for France, Germany and probably Britain. Since MLF seems currently unacceptable to France and Britain, in its present form it does not seem to be the answer.

### III. Status of MLF Proposal: U.S. Government.

Since the time in May 1961 when President Kennedy announced in Ottawa our willingness to consider a NATO multilateral force, the proposal has made steady if irregular progress within the U.S. Government. It has been systematically and relentlessly pushed by a small group of true zealots in the State Department, including Walt Rostow and his deputy on the Policy Planning Council, Henry Owen;



Bob Shaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs (a protege of George Ball); Gerald Smith, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on NATO problems; and one admiral over in the Pentagon. As of today, 1964, the MLF group has the firm backing of George Ball and McGeorge Bundy.

Under Kennedy the proposal continued to advance, but only at the rate dictated by the President, who followed it closely and kept a pretty tight rein on the zealots. Kennedy favored it in principle but obviously had some serious doubts about how it was developing in practice - given the lack of enthusiasm for it in Europe.

When Johnson came in, the MLF group became bolder and could operate more freely. Johnson was not well acquainted with the issue (You will recall that at his first press conference he did not understand a question raised about MLF and gave an evasive answer not relevant to the question.). In December, when Dean Rusk was out of the country, Shaetzel, Rostow and Ball got inserted into a speech by the President a statement about MLF that went beyond anything Kennedy had said about this. Rusk was reported to have been miffed by this.

This reference in the President's speech, plus numerous speeches by the State Department officials and an intensification of their campaign within the government between January and July 1964, has encouraged our NATO people in Europe to push ahead and to keep the pressure on the Europeans. Finletter and his group in Paris are pushing hard and the project is moving. Training exercises are being prepared, as are the ships. There is talk of proposing a treaty to the Senate early next year.



With this treaty in mind, the MLF proponents have begun to lobby on Capitol Hill. Kennedy never permitted them to do this in a formal way.

#### IV. Status of MLF; Europe.

As I understand it, Germany, Greece and Turkey will definitely come in. The Netherlands and Belgium supposedly will stay in so long as Italy does. In Italy the Moro coalition which recently fell was always very shaky on this issue. The Nenni Socialists that formed the left wing of the coalition always opposed it and will continue to do so. The Christian Democrats were never enthusiastic, but were willing to acquiesce under strong U.S. pressure. The Italians are worried about the Germans however, and probably would be more enthusiastic about MLF if Britain and France were in.

In Britain, as you know, the Conservative Government, though indifferent, will not say no. The Labor Government, if Harold Wilson can be believed, is flatly opposed. Whether he would change his mind after he is in power is a question you can answer much better than most people in the U.S. Government.

France is flatly opposed and probably will remain so long after de Gaulle is gone, so long as the U.S. retains the veto.

With an election campaign about to begin in full swing in Britain, with the Italian coalition in current disarray, with the Turks fighting the Greeks over Cyprus, with the Straus-Adenauer pro-Gaullist faction fighting the Erhard-Schroeder group over Germany's European and Atlantic policy, the situation in Europe in late July and early August will be very delicate indeed. A speech in Europe

by a Senator in your position that discussed the really delicate issues such as MLF would have wide political consequences.

V. Political Consequences of a Speech Taking a Definite Stand on MLF.

A. United States. A speech delivered in Europe on Atlantic partnership which did not discuss MLF would really dodge the most crucial question of the hour. If you discuss it and take a position other than that expounded and pushed by Ball, Bundy, Rostow, etc., you will infuriate some influential people here -- including some who see the President regularly, if not daily. So far as I know, the President himself does not have any fixed views on this question. He has, according to Fred Dutton and others, an open mind -- but has never really thought about it too much. Therefore he just goes along with his advisors. Rusk and McNamara apparently go along also, but without the enthusiasm of Bundy and Ball. If you do not adhere rigidly to the Bundy-Ball line, you can expect that there will be an immediate strong reaction and that the President will be told every other day for the next month by Ball, Bundy and others: "Why did that damn fool Humphrey go off to Europe and stir up trouble?" In short, there are some very high officials who see the President regularly who feel very strongly about this issue and who will not hesitate to cut up any opponents of their view.

On the other side of the fence, you have a large group within the Government and outside the Government who oppose MLF and who will be very unhappy if you take a public position in favor of MLF in its present form. The opposition includes a variety of groups:

1) Those primarily concerned about peace, arms control and disarmament, who feel that MLF would both proliferate nuclear weapons and jeopardize the easing of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union;

2) Those who believe de Gaulle is right and that MLF is not the solution to the problem of giving Europe a share in the control of nuclear weapons;

3) Those who are opposed to any scheme in which the U.S. might give up the nuclear veto;

4) Those who don't like the Germans.

Of these four, the last is the largest, the most powerful and the most passionate. The anti-German group of course includes many of the other three.

*these are*  
Within the U.S. Government, people like Averell Harriman, Bill Foster, Adrian Fisher, Fred Button, Jerome Wiesner (I don't know the position of his successor - Horning), and some of the people at the Atomic Energy Commission <sup>who</sup> ~~will~~ feel strongly on the question of the veto. There is supposed to be some opposition in some quarters in the Pentagon, and little actual enthusiasm anywhere outside the Navy. People in ISA like Arthur Barber are opposed -- and some others. However, most all of these people are very discrete in voicing opposition to what is an official policy.

In the Congress, there are a number of Senators who are either flatly opposed ~~or~~ or very skeptical. This includes Joe Clark, Phil Hart, Frank Church, George McGovern, Tad Moss, and Clairborne Pell.



How the more influential Senators on the Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Atomic Energy Committees stand, I do not know, Fulbright as you probably know is in favor.

Outside the Government, there are some influential newspapers that are skeptical, not so much of the principle, as of the emerging bilateral (German-American) character of MLF. The press is becoming more and more interested in this ~~Q-~~ and a number of articles will appear in the next three or four weeks. This present week I have been approached by Murray Marder of the Washington POST who is doing a piece, and Max Frankel of the New York Times -- who is writing several articles. The issue therefore is likely to be thrust more and more into public discussion in the weeks ahead.

From a strictly political point of view, the reaction of the anti-German group outside the Government would pose the most delicate question for you. This group includes a very large number of your good friends, financial supporters and people in the communications world. To be blunt, MLF in its present form~~x~~ is not very popular among most American Jews. Before making any public statement supporting MLF, you might well want to consider having Max Kampelman make a few soundings in New York, Pennsylvania and California.

Inside the Executive branch of the U.S. Government, the anti MLF people are in a much weaker position. None of them can match the influence of Bundy and Ball. Fred Dutton will probably be able to prevent any pro-MLF statement in the Democratic platform because he can rally support outside the Government for his position.



## VI. Recommendations.

A. After discussing this question with many people, reading most of the relevant literature pro and con, and thinking about the political consequences of a public speech on the subject now, I have pretty well reached the conclusion that it would be inadvisable to make a speech discussing it before the date of the Democratic Convention, unless you have received some definite indication from the President himself that he personally wants you to do this.

Aside from the question of Vietnam, which is indisputably the most important and most controversial foreign policy question confronting the U.S. Government today, the question of the MLF is certainly among the most delicate and controversial foreign policy issue facing the Government.

When you are considering therefore <sup>to</sup> ~~is~~ make two speeches on two of the most controversial and delicate issues that are current. In the case of Vietnam, the President has clearly indicated that he wants you to do this. In the case of MLF, so far as I know he has not. Therefore it seems to me that the political risks of a public speech outweigh the advantages to be gained by making a speech before August 27.

2. Just because the issue is controversial, I don't think you should avoid it. You might well consider having a private talk with the President about the question, not opposing the Administration's position, but conveying to him the concern felt by some of your colleagues in the Senate and others outside the Government about the way the MLF proposal is developing. By implication, you might

suggest, not that we abandon our present position, but that we slow down a bit in implementing the proposal, that we hold back any further developments until after the situation in Europe becomes more clear and the response of the British and Italian Governments less uncertain. If you did decide to talk to the President, you probably should discuss the issue beforehand with Bill Foster and Adrian Fisher on the one hand and Rusk (who is a supporter but not a zealot) on the other.

3. If you have reason to believe that the President would be offended by your raising the question, you might just hold off until after the Convention and then discuss it with him.

(See attached brief memo on related question).

July 17, 1964

Dr. Bernard T. Feld  
4200 Arlington Street  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Bernie:

I have spent considerable time in the last five weeks on the MLF situation. Outlined below are the steps which have been taken and the details of those which remain to be achieved.

1. Publicity and public discussion have not been a chief thrust of our efforts, but we are making much headway here. I have given the Washington Post much material and they are covering it this Sunday, hopefully in detail and with a negative emphasis. Pieces are appearing in the New Republic and Commentary and Lois Gardner is trying to get Commentary to take a piece from Frank Church. My article and John Newhouse's are in the September Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. I lunched with Max Fraenkel who is sympathetic and will use the Times news columns when possible. At my request he asked the Sunday Times Magazine Editor to cover MLF, but was rejected.
2. A principal effort has been to alert influential people. We have further activated John Newhouse in the Senate and some friends in the White House and elsewhere in the Administration, as well as Jerry Wiesner. Of course, John cannot do much until Fulbright makes up his mind and administration people are precluded by present policy. Continuing work with the better press people, including an effort to get to Lippman if possible, and reliance on inside-outsiders like Wiesner, Long, Barnett, etc. seems feasible. Today I am meeting with Herman Edelsberg and Joe Borkin to get the Jewish groups activated. Can Kasin be brought in on this?
3. We have worried about the Democratic Platform and have alerted Senators Clark, Hart and McGovern who will be on the Platform Committee. Lois Gardner will get the full Platform list on



August 10 and alert others of our friends from the Senate who may be on the Committee.

4. We have concentrated on the Senate. In addition to the Seminar with Frank Long, you and I have visited, between us, McGovern, Clark, Hart and Nelson and a number of administrative assistants, including those with Cooper and Javitts. In the Senate the most actively useful sympathizers we have are John Newhouse on the Committee, Gar Alperovitz with Nelson, Bryce Nelson with Church and Harry Schwartz with Clark. I had breakfast with Frank Valeo but there is not much hope of making Mansfield useful on this.

5. Our chief effort has been to have Humphrey see the President this month and to get a letter from Senators to the President for delivery by Humphrey.

The Humphrey situation is as follows: He has read our material and chances are good that you can see him during the week of July 20 or July 27. John Stewart of Humphrey's staff will call you. Since some people are telling Humphrey not to jeopardize his immediate political chances by doing anything like this right now, it is important that you get in and be persuasive. To add to your own persuasiveness it would be well if you could take along Wiesner, John Newhouse or some other person the Senator knows and respects. Frank Long might do here. At our request, Wiesner and Phil Hart have already written to ask Humphrey to see the President. If, however, relations with Humphrey do not progress by the end of the month or if he finally says "no" to our request to see the President, someone else will have to be found. In this event you should talk directly by phone with both McGovern and Clark for their advice and possibly they will take over finding the right Senator (Phil Hart?). McGovern himself is willing to take a group to see the President on this but, in my opinion, there are others who are better choices.

A key Senator would be Pastore but our contacts with him are practically non-existent. Unless Muskie becomes so persuaded on the merits that he will approach Pastore, I doubt we will reach him. The proposed letter from Senators is attached hereto. It has gone with requests for signatures to McGovern, Clark (staff member Ralph Widener), Hart (staff member Welsh), Church (staff member Nelson), Muskie (staff member Nicol) and Nelson (staff member Alperovitz). Church looks dubious on signing at this time



unless we can get him to write the Commentary article and thus make up his own mind. Responses from those who have been asked will come in this coming week. The remaining Senators who should be asked to sign, with a suggestion of the person to do the asking, are as follows:

*Carthy*  
McGovern (Feld)  
Gore (Phil Hart)  
Pastore (Muskie)  
Metcalf (McGovern)  
Monroney (*Phil Hart*)  
Neuberger (McGovern)  
Kennedy (Phil Hart)  
Bayh (McGovern)  
McGee (Feld)  
Ribicoff (Clark)  
Williams (Clark)

Before leaving Washington I will have asked each of the persons in the parenthesis above to make the approach to this remaining list of Senators.

The problem is how to coordinate the completion of the work on the letter in my absence. Dan Singer had agreed to do it but now, obviously, cannot. I think the coordination should be done between yourself, Lois Gardner, Gar Alperovitz (who has promised to help) and Bill Welsh. Where a Senator has to be approached directly for an answer, you might do this. Lois and Gar could check with the administrative assistants on the answers. I would think that any Senator who has not said "yes" by August 1 should be scratched and the letter should be gotten ready to go. Lois should keep the tally and know the status of the responses on each of the 17 Senators. If Humphrey will take the letter, the signed copy should be delivered to John Stewart.

6. Ruth Adams has the draft letter from scientists to the President and presumably will get about a dozen signatures and get the letter out in early August.

P.S. Copies of this letter are going to Lois Gardner, Ruth Adams and Gar Alperovitz.

Sincerely,

J.S.

John Silard

The Honorable  
The President of the  
United States  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Recent statements by Administration representatives have implied that before the beginning of next year the United States may join in the creation of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. We take this means of communicating our concern about any hasty implementation of the MLF proposal before it has been subjected to initial Senate examination and expression of views.

When in 1961 the late beloved President Kennedy declared the serious interest of the United States in a possible MLF, there were reasons for hoping that such a proposal might help to create an educative dialogue with our allies and thus serve to slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons and deter NATO allies from following de Gaulle's example of independent nuclear armament. But in intervening months and years, not only have we had the test ban agreement and the resulting new and hopeful mood, but recent arms control negotiations in Geneva are most promising. Apparently our chief negotiators there are convinced that the Soviets will not agree to arms control in Europe if we insist upon pushing to fruition a fleet of nuclear vessels cruising in areas heretofore free of nuclear arms.

Moreover, Mr. President, we are also much concerned that instead of cementing the Alliance, the MLF might create further rifts and tensions within it. It is now clear that France and Scandinavia will not join the MLF, and Italy is incapable of present participation because of internal problems. Thus the proposal could at best be an Anglo-German-American force. But with the Labor Party in staunch opposition to the MLF, and the present Government only slightly more favorably disposed, British participation is at least uncertain. To coerce Great Britain into participation out of fear of a German-American pact is hardly consistent with an Alliance of sovereign and friendly states sensitive to mutual interests and viewpoints. Alternatively, without British participation, the MLF would become a German-American force whose potential implications would decidedly be drastic.

Finally, Mr. President, we are informed that the Department of Defense has never put much value upon the creation of this

proposed naval force, which would be highly exposed and vulnerable as contrasted with Secretary McNamara's policy of hardening our strategic nuclear capability.

In sum, it may be that MLF would further imperil the prospects of arms control and divide the NATO Alliance, all without adding to the defensive security of the United States. No one can be positive on a subject as difficult and sensitive as this; but at the least it seems to us appropriate that so fateful a decision not be made until Senate sentiment has been probed and the pros and cons subjected to careful examination. Accordingly, we urge that no definitive decision on the MLF be taken until the proposal has been brought to the appropriate committees, including the Foreign Relations Committee, for a preliminary expression of views.

Respectfully yours,



[1964]

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Honorable  
The President of the  
United States  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.

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## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.  
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Respectfully yours,

Joseph S. Clark

Philip A. Hart

George McGovern

Max Baucus

Lee Metcalf

Gaylord Nelson

Engelhardt

Gale McGee

C  
O  
P  
Y

COPY

MCF Cor.

November 25, 1964

Mr. Edward F. Snyder  
Friends Committee on  
National Legislation  
245 Second Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002

Dear Ed:

Thanks so much for your letter of congratulations on my election to the Vice-Presidency.

I'm sure you recognize that my long-standing concern for a more peaceful and secure world will not diminish in the years ahead. We face many difficult and baffling problems but I'm confident that President Johnson and his administration will work unstintingly toward resolution.

Let me express my thanks to you and the Friends Committee on National Legislation for your fine help and assistance in the past.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey





# FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

245 SECOND STREET, N.E. • WASHINGTON D. C. 20002 • LINCOLN 7-4343

CHARLES J. DARLINGTON  
Chairman, General Committee  
26 Bowen Avenue  
Woodstown, New Jersey

SAMUEL R. LEVERING  
Chairman, Executive Council  
Ararat, Virginia

November 5, 1964

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20025

Dear Senator Humphrey:


Along with your many other friends, we want to extend to you our warmest congratulations on your election as Vice President. It is most heartening to know that you will be playing a leading role in the decisions which will be made by our government in the coming months and years.

We hope you and President Johnson now feel you have a mandate to work actively toward ending the cold war entirely. Friends increasingly see United States - Chinese relations as central to the whole question of world disarmament and a stable situation in the Far East. We hope that our government can make constructive and affirmative responses to any indications of Chinese willingness to negotiate, as well as to seek for initiatives which the United States might take.

Regarding better relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we see the MLF as crucial. If it is adopted it could well blight the blossoming détente. The enclosed letter which we have been sending to Senators and Representatives attending the NATO Parliamentary meeting gives the background on our thinking. You will note that we believe MLF to be an inadequate and hazardous response to the admitted need to inject a new element in United States relations with Germany. We hope you will use your influence to press for an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the abandonment of MLF.

With all best wishes to you in your new office we are,

Sincerely yours,



Edward F. Snyder

EFS: tp1  
Enclosure



# FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

245 SECOND STREET, N.E. • WASHINGTON D. C. 20002 • LINCOLN 7-4343

CHARLES J. DARLINGTON  
*Chairman, General Committee*  
26 Bowen Avenue  
Woodstown, New Jersey

SAMUEL R. LEVERING  
*Chairman, Executive Council*  
Ararat, Virginia

We are pleased to learn that you will be attending the NATO Parliamentarians Conference in Paris later this month.

One of the issues which will undoubtedly come before that Conference is the question of the multilateral force (MLF). We have some grave reservations about this proposal which we want to share with you as a U.S. delegate.

It is generally conceded that the primary purpose of the MLF is political rather than military. In our view, that political purpose is to create a stronger relationship between the United States and Germany. A strong U.S.-German tie would prevent a resurgent West Germany from pursuing a dangerous independent course, or from joining in a neutralist alliance with France under General de Gaulle or even aligning itself at some future time with the Soviet Union.

While we can appreciate these aims and the State Department's concern, it seems to us that the MLF is a particularly inappropriate device because it will interfere with other crucially important U.S. foreign policy goals.

Specifically, if the MLF proposal for "common ownership and manning" of nuclear weapons (Secretary Rusk's words) is consummated we may expect a worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations, a set back in U.S. efforts to build bridges of friendship to countries in Eastern Europe, and a near insuperable roadblock to an international agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This summer I had the opportunity to travel for four weeks in Eastern Europe, two and a half weeks in the Soviet Union. One of the major unexpected impressions I came away with was of the still intense distrust of West Germany. Even the remote prospect of West Germany emerging on the world stage as a nuclear power sends cold fear through these countries. While we may term their view irrational, it is extremely difficult for us Americans to comprehend their terrible experience in World War II which

is still fresh in the minds of nearly everyone in Eastern Europe. Nor have the statements which have been made by U.S. policy makers about the possibility of MLF resulting in eventual European control of nuclear weapons been reassuring.

What is the alternative to MLF?

In our view it would comprehend:

- a) the development of closer political and economic arrangements among the NATO countries and especially between the United States and West Germany in lieu of shared control over nuclear weapons. This might include proposals for bimonthly NATO meetings at the ministerial level to discuss a wide range of political and other issues, as well as additional proposals.
- b) a vigorous drive by the United States for an international agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This certainly seems to be a propitious time to reach agreement on this vital issue. The addition of China to the nuclear club highlights the possibility that others can also join. The negotiators are quite close together on this issue and agreement appears quite likely if the MLF issue can be resolved.
- c) the development of a new approach to Europe as a whole, which would seek to break down the physical, political and economic walls between Western and Eastern Europe and encourage contacts, trade and commerce all across the continent. Such an approach would also include a fresh U.S. look at proposals for denuclearization of Central Europe, looking toward a reunified Germany on a basis acceptable to both the Soviet Union and the United States.

Sincerely yours,

Edward F. Snyder



COPY

WF-MLF

November 29, 1964

Professor Amitai Etzioni  
324-M Fayerweather  
Columbia University  
New York, New York

Dear Amitai:

Thanks for a copy of your letter to the President.  
Your conclusions are most interesting and should be  
helpful to the Vice-President Elect as the whole  
question of MLF is evaluated and re-evaluated.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

John G. Stewart

*File*

324-M Fayerweather

November 20, 1964

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. President:

*West German  
Commandance*

I just returned from a day at the German War College in Hamburg (see enclosed excerpt from The New York Times). I have the distinct impression that, if the pressure of your work were to allow you to devote more time to a review of the MLF, some serious questions would be raised as to whether or not it is still desirable to continue pushing for the initiation of this force. I could write you a long memorandum on the various points which came to my attention on this subject in West Germany (as well as during my visit to London), but I do not believe that such a memorandum would be valuable. What is really needed is that someone submit the information to your searching questioning and be able to be on the spot to answer the replies and counter-replies your aides might wish to give in support of the MLF.

I have never written such a letter before. But I consider the efforts to set up the MLF the most critical development which might take place in the next ten years regarding our Alliance and our relationship with the Soviet Union. I would feel that I had neglected my duty as a citizen if I did not call your attention to this information which I happened to stumble upon.

Sincerely yours,

Amitai Etzioni

AE:bk

Enclosure

cc: The Honorable Hubert Humphrey  
Vice-President Elect of the United States

## 'BLACKMAIL' PLAN BY GERMANS SEEN

Officers Said to View Atom Arms as Anti-Soviet Lever

By M. S. HANDLER

Prof. Amitai Etzioni of Columbia University, who lectured last Monday at the West German staff college in Hamburg, has reported on his return here that in his view a majority of the senior staff and command officers see in nuclear weapons a political instrument that should be used to compel the Soviet Union to permit the reunification of Germany.

Dr. Etzioni, an associate professor of sociology and research associate at the university's Institute of War and Peace Studies, was invited to address the most recent seminar for senior officers of West Germany's armed services.

The official German name of the staff college is Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, which may be roughly translated as leadership Academy of the Federal Defense Forces. Senior officers attend special sessions on military-political problems.

### 'Political Blackmail'

Dr. Etzioni said his conclusion about the majority of the officers who had attended his lecture were based on questions put to him after the lecture and on informal discussions with the officers. Dr. Etzioni is the author of "Winning Without War," which was favorably reviewed by Vice President-elect Hubert H. Humphrey in the July 6, 1964, issue of *The New Leader*. He is also the author of "The Moon Doggle."

Dr. Etzioni said the senior officers fell into three groups on the question of a nuclear-armed fleet manned by mixed crews from participating Western nations. One-third, the most senior group he said, saw in West Germany's participation the possibility of "political blackmail" to compel the Soviet Union to permit the reuni-



DISCUSSES GERMANY: Prof. Amitai Etzioni, who lectured at German Military Academy in Hamburg.

fication of Germany on West German terms.

Another third, Dr. Etzioni said, was composed of officers who believed membership would be used to obtain dismantling of the Berlin Wall and guarantees for the status of West Berlin.

Dr. Etzioni said the third group opposed the mixed-manned nuclear force because they believed it would ultimately destroy the European integration movement, put an end to French-German cooperation and open up the dangerous prospect of French-Soviet rapprochement aimed at Germany. This group, Prof. Etzioni said, holds that the Germans cannot and should not be trusted with nuclear weapons.

The Columbia University professor said the higher the rank of the officer, the more ardent was his support for the nuclear force. It is this type of officer, Dr. Etzioni added, who is most influential in the Government councils in Bonn.

Dr. Etzioni said that in their discussions with him in Hamburg the German military supporters of the nuclear force reasoned as follows:

The West Germans have

agreed to contribute the biggest share of European financing for the force and this would give them 67 per cent of the votes. The force, like all organizations, would develop its own dynamics and in the end the West Germans would "buy out" the United States veto on the use of the nuclear weapons. This would give the West Germans control of the force.

Dr. Etzioni said he had noted in his lecture that such a possibility would not only wreck the Western alliance but also create the danger of the West Germans' triggering a nuclear war in the absence of any restraints upon them.

The professor said the response of West German officers to this observation was that use of nuclear weapons as a political instrument in dealing with the Soviet Union was not only defensible but also useful. The officers also believed, he said, that the United States would give serious consideration to surrendering its control after the nuclear force came into being.

### Portuguese Goods Banned

DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania, Nov. 6 (UPI)—Tanzania banned all imports from Portugal and her African territories of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea Friday. The imports last year totaled \$84,000. The largest item was wine.



[Nov. 11, 1964]

Walter Goldstein

RESTORING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN WESTERN EUROPE

There are two immediate problems of foreign policy facing the new Administration: the war in Viet Nam and the crumbling of the European Alliance. Brief memoranda have been requested by the Foreign Policy Committee on both of these two issues for discussion during the National Board meeting on November 21st.

I

It is easy at this stage to take a highly negative view of recent developments in Western Europe. General DeGaulle can be castigated for his divisive tactics within the Alliance; the German interest in nuclear weapons can provide reason for alarm; and worst of all, the United States' proposal for a Multi-lateral Nuclear Force (MLF) has provided some very wrong answers for a series of contentious problems. Rather than rehearse the popular discussion about the sad status of NATO at present, this memorandum will seek to advance some positive recommendations for U.S. foreign policy.

At the outset it can be suggested boldly that the United States needs to worry itself more than its allies in Western Europe over how best to preserve the Alliance. The concerns of the United States can be summarized as follows: First, without the survival of NATO, it would be more difficult to contain the proliferation of nuclear weaponry, especially in Europe. Second: there are many outstanding and potentially destabilizing problems that still need to be resolved in Central Europe and it is arguable that these problems (such as German reunification, the status of Berlin, and implementing nuclear disengagement) can better be resolved through collective Western action than through separate nationalist striving. Third: if progress is to be made towards an inspected and multilateral disarmament, conceivably it will be easier to negotiate this between the two Alliance systems of the present than if one or both were to fragment. Fourth: there is a strong United States interest in furthering the political and economic integration of "the Atlantic Community". Not only will this stabilize European politics and provide a stronger basis for U.S. leadership, but such integration is likely to benefit the United States economically as well.

The basic problem that the United States will have to face in 1965 in Western Europe is that of a relative loss of hegemony. The old patterns of the Cold War were founded upon a tight bi-polarity in European affairs and this system is now disintegrating. The United States must seek a new style of diplomatic flexibility if it is to work with allies who are less dependent and more assertive than we have expected in the past. However, since American diplomats have learned to adjust to a multi-polar system of bargaining in the General Assembly of the United Nations, there is no reason why an equally effective mode of diplomacy cannot be developed for dealing with our European allies.

The following recommendations, therefore, are based upon a series of exclusively short-run considerations. No attempt will be made to deal with the more complex and long-run implications of economic integration (such as the joining of the EEC to the

EFTA), or the development of East-West trade, or the projections for a political confederation of western Europe. The basic thrust of these recommendations is that of discouraging our European allies from developing their own independent, national, nuclear striking-forces. It will be suggested that even if France has to be isolated from the "Atlantic Community" or from NATO it is more worthwhile to take this risk than to resort to a policy of bribing our allies with "nuclear sharing" in order to maintain an alliance that has outlived its usefulness. The goal of U.S. policy in Europe is that of lowering tensions, increasing stability and integration, and eradicating the lingering strains of aggressive nationalism. The recommendations made here will be judged in the light of these goals.

## II

The apparent character of contemporary American policy towards Europe is that of fearing the caprices of our allies more than we fear the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Bloc. More precisely, it can be suggested that the State Department has exaggerated:

- A. The nuclear and security fears of our allies;
- B. Their aspirations to attain nuclear independence; and
- C. Their economic and technical competence to build separate deterrence forces.

A. There is a grave distinction to be made between the loudly-proclaimed security fears of our European allies and their own, realistic appreciation of their situation. It is true that the Soviet Union maintains a sizeable capacity for MRBM and tactical nuclear strikes against Western Europe. Against this though, it is generally agreed that the probability of a "central war" erupting in Europe is a very low one indeed. During the first ten years of NATO's existence the assumption prevailed that the Soviet Bloc clearly outnumbered the troop strengths of NATO; Secretary McNamara insists today, however, that NATO now enjoys a numerical superiority of ground troops and fire-power over its adversary. (In 1961 the CIA revised its estimate that there were 175 Warsaw Pact divisions close to the Iron Curtain and suggested that, in reality, there were no more than 25. Today the West has almost 27 divisions and the Soviets only 22.) Second: the great density of population and of industrial resources located in Central Europe makes it highly unprofitable to serve as a battleground for a nuclear confrontation. Both East and West share a profound interest in avoiding conflict at all costs, as they demonstrated so vividly during the 1962 Cuban crisis.

B. The nuclear aspirations of the European allies are considerably less threatening than we often envisage. Though there are still revanchist mutterings on the right-wing of German politics and even among the General Staff of the Bundeswehr, a strong consensus prevails in Germany that nuclear independence is not a primary or even a desirable policy goal. When General DeGaulle offered to assist the Germans in establishing a nuclear deterrent last summer, the Ehrhard cabinet bluntly rejected the offer. Although Ehrhard may conceivably be undermined by new Gaullist factions led

by Dr. Adenauer and Franz Joseph Strauss before next year's elections, Dr. Ehrhard and his policies of moderation will probably survive. The S.P.D. has backed his position strongly and it is improbable that the irredentist forces in German politics will gain an ascendancy. Similarly, public opinion in Britain and France is not united over the expensive modernization of their nuclear striking-forces. Since the cost of building a "credible" deterrent is likely to be exorbitant, it is conceivable that both nations will as easily surrender their nuclear independence as they were prepared to surrender their colonial empires a decade ago.

[C.] The technical competence of our allies to build a truly credible deterrent force must be strongly questioned. First, the 180 British V-bombers are likely to become obsolete within three years and no replacement for them can be afforded. Second, the British fleet of Polaris submarines will be pitifully small, based upon American engineering, and will not become operational until 1972 at the earliest. Given the economic hardship that Britain is now experiencing, it just cannot afford to maintain both strong conventional forces (for deployment in Cyprus, East Africa, and Southern Asia) and an up-to-date nuclear force. Indeed, Britain's proposal to redesign the MLF is motivated partly by its desperate need for outside financing of its new strike aircraft (the TSR-2) and of its medium-range missiles. In exactly the same manner, France presently finds itself unable to afford the grandiose plans of its maximum leader. Despite recent successes in expanding the economy, France can afford to spend only eleven billion dollars on armaments over the next six years. (This is 1/30th of what the United States is likely to spend). The French will only be able to build, just like the British, only a few Polaris missiles within the next eight or ten years. Its 60 Mirage IV bombers are already out-dated in comparison to the B-70 that the U.S. has decided not to build! The French inability to independently finance a supersonic aircraft program or missile program will eventually limit their nuclear pretensions, too. Although the French defense program is hell-bound for nuclear status rather than for nuclear security, it is now obviously unprofitable for any of our allies to reject the American "nuclear umbrella" in order to side with DeGaulle. Finally, although West Germany has an atomic reactor in operation and a considerable technological background to draw upon, there are many reasons why the Germans might choose to forego building their own nuclear capacity. First, it is impossible in the constrained living space of Germany to test nuclear weapons on German soil; second, in any frontier conflict with the Soviets or East Germans the independent use of nuclear weapons would be totally inexpedient; third, economic and manpower costs of developing both a warhead program and a delivery system might strain the already over-employed West German economy; fourth, the political disutility of embarking upon a nuclear program might effectively deter any German government since it would be logical for the East European neighbors to take pre-emptive action before the program could get fully underway.

### III

The following eight recommendations are based upon the assumption, therefore, that the nuclear fears, aspirations, and technical competence, of our allies in NATO can still be contained within the structure of the Alliance if only adequate revisions are quickly implemented.



1. The maintenance of the United States' commitment to the defense of western Europe must remain as the central pillar of the Alliance. Considering that any war in Europe is likely to begin and remain as a limited and non-nuclear confrontation, it is vital that the United States should maintain a large proportion of the ground troops garrisoned in Western Europe. Although the costs of maintaining this garrison are heavy, especially at a time when the United States faces an imbalance in its international trade, this conventional commitment is indispensable. The strength and unity of the Alliance depends almost exclusively upon its non-nuclear capacity and willingness to engage in limited confrontations and frontier warfare.

2. A functional separation of defense must be introduced into NATO if nuclear rivalry and political instability are to be suppressed. It is suggested that all strategic range nuclear weapons should be withdrawn to this side of the Atlantic in order that the perils of crisis "escalation" or of proliferation of nuclear weapons should be formally curtailed.

3. If all strategic weapons were removed from Europe, our allies should be afforded the greatest possible participation in the targeting, deployment, procurement policies, and command systems, of our U.S.-based ICBM's and Strategic Air Command bomber forces. If it were possible to jointly finance and jointly staff the strategic deterrent maintained within the United States, our European allies could be brought effectively into our planning councils and weapons discussions. If a sizeable number of these joint activities were moved to and encouraged within the United States, the strategic deployment of NATO's stockpile would be more secure and less divisive than today. Today the assumption prevails that decisions can be taken in Europe that are independent of the formidable back-stopping of the Strategic Air Command. If SAC were partly merged with NATO's command systems, decision making within the Alliance would be highly improved.

4. If strategic weapons systems were excluded from Europe (such as the proposed MLF), a tight form of bi-lateral control of tactical and low-yield nuclear weapons could be devised between the United States and Britain or West Germany. There are today 10,000 of these nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe (with a total yield of 400 megatons) and it is vital that these weapons should be effectively and tightly controlled. Since any calculated war in Europe would surely be limited, it is indispensable that a "pause" or "fire-break" should be clearly established between the immediate front-line and the first use of nuclear weaponry. This would insure that in any border violation or limited encroachment into western territory that no tactical nuclear weapons would be used until it was first established that the violation was the precursor of a major offensive. At present the Bundeswehr insists upon a policy of Forward Defense which involves the deployment of nuclear weapons very close to the front-lines. Since Britain and Germany are now free to deploy low-yield and tactical nuclear weapons (under a bi-lateral control with the United States), every effort should be made to move these weapons back from the River Elbe towards the Rhine. This would not only increase the security of western responses to Soviet probing tactics but it would also facilitate the limitation of conflict or of crisis-bargaining.

[5.] A joint, tactical command in Western Europe could govern the use of both the conventional and tactical nuclear forces deployed in the area. This integrated command structure could be based upon the allied Task Force that has been in charge of the security of West Berlin for some years now. A high level of consensus has been observed in this Task Force and there is no reason why a similar level of agreement could not be formed within a newly revised European Defense Command established along these lines.

[6.] The risk must be taken that France will react to these proposals either by quitting the Common Market or by becoming a totally inactive member of NATO. Even if NATO should be deprived of the two divisions and the limited aircraft strength that France presently contributes, or denied the use of all the gigantic NATO installations that have been built upon French soil, the resignation of France should not cripple the Alliance. On the contrary. If United States policies were re-directed from the task of fighting DeGaulle to the more serious task of restructuring the Alliance, the isolation of France would not pose any insuperable problems. DeGaulle's bid to achieve a demarche with the Soviet Union at a summit conference, or his bid to lead a Third Force in the world, need not be taken seriously since France does not enjoy the economic or political power to carry through successfully with these initiatives.

[7.] Through the use of the Kennedy Round of tariff agreements and of other diplomatic initiatives, the United States could actively promote the political and economic integration of Western Europe. If it should gain even marginal success in doing so there are two immediate benefits that would result. First: if economic expansion results from these measures, our NATO allies would at last be able to afford a more equitable distribution of the man-power and infrastructure costs of NATO. Second: the 20-years old problem of promoting German reunification without resort to the use of violence could be clearly re-appraised. The West German people would more likely accept their lot as a permanent and national component of a western Alliance, even if this means formally recognizing the division of Germany, if they could be guaranteed a high rate of political and economic benefit. Should these benefits materialize, their yearning for nuclear independence or for an irredentist recovery of the "stolen territories" would be effectively curtailed. Better yet, Germany might abandon its potential veto power over East-West arms control agreements.

[8.] The long-range pursuits in Europe of both the United States and its allies must focus primarily upon a further exploration of the present East-West detente. Great progress could be made in promoting East-West trade, in implementing the various arms control proposals suggested at the Geneva Conference (including the exchange of ground observation posts, or a nuclear disengagement along the lines of the Rapacki Plan), and in exploring a United Nations resolution of the Berlin problem. These long-range proposals aim at establishing stable conditions on both sides of the Iron Curtain and at minimizing the present emphasis upon nuclear status-seeking and war preparations both in the East and West. If the bi-polar formulae of nuclear confrontation and Cold War in Europe have been largely (but not completely) dismissed, then new plans must be devised in order to cope with the long term prospects for an ideologically divided but economically integrated Europe. The prestige and utility of owning nuclear weapons will be greatly devalued as concern for the development of economic or political integration increases. No longer should the United States need to think, then, of bribing its allies with schemes for "nuclear sharing" just in order to preserve their loyalties to an outworn alliance.

IV

If the U.S. still seeks the leadership of the West's collective security arrangements, its diplomacy must adjust to the multi-polar power balance that is now emerging. There is no longer a "cement of fear" to clamp NATO together. In its place there must be a new form of collective action, capable of dealing with complex but rewarding opportunities for economic expansion, political integration, military disengagement, and nuclear disarmament. These are the big issues of Europe upon which American initiative is vital. NATO might yet fiddle a while over the MLF and the State Department burn, but Europe's problems will not be resolved with such inconsequential panaceas. The powerful necessities of Europe are still those of stabilizing the detente, of increasing the interdependence of East and West, and of eradicating the divisive strains of aggressive nationalism. These purposes, not the whims and incredible threats of our allies, must remain as the basic criteria of U.S. policy choices.

New York, N.Y.  
Nov. 11th, 1964.



COPY

jes/mme  
WF-MCF

December 17, 1964

Mr. Marion Krebsler  
Assistant to Professor  
Seymour Melman  
Columbia University  
New York, New York

Dear Marion:

Thank you for the material relating to Congressional  
attitudes and MLF. This will be useful to us.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

John G. Stewart

245 2nd St., N.E.  
Washington, D. C.  
December 5, 1964

Senator Hubert Humphrey  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

ATTENTION: John Stewart

Dear John Stewart:

I am enclosing the list of Congressmen, Senators, and Legislative Assistants seen on the MLF. No one was asked for an absolute commitment; i.e., would you vote against a treaty proposed by the President?, but their general reactions pro or con were noted.

I hope that this information can be passed on to Senator Humphrey and to any other people you might feel are appropriate.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours sincerely,

*Marion Krebser*

Marion Krebser  
Assistant to  
Professor Seymour Melman  
Columbia University

MK/mw  
Encl.

## Negative Reaction to Proposed MLF

### Senators:

Sen. Frank Church  
Sen. Steve Young  
Sen. Joe Clark  
Sen. George McGovern  
Sen. Lee Metcalf  
Sen. Eugene McCarthy  
Sen. Phillip Hart  
Sen. Maurine Neuberger  
Sen. Gaylord Nelson  
Sen. Gale McGee  
Sen. Bayh  
*Sen. Everett Jordan*

### Congressmen:

Charles Bennett, D., Fla.  
George Huddleston, D. Ala.  
Mel Price, D., Ill.  
William Fitts Ryan, D., N. Y.  
Bob Kastenmeier, D., Wis.  
Phillip Burton, D., Calif.  
George Brown, D., Calif.  
Don Edwards, D., Calif.  
Chet Holifield, D., Calif.  
Ben Rosenthal, D., N. Y.  
William Bray, R., Ind.  
Bill Bates, R., Mass.  
Seymour Halpern, R., N. Y.  
Jack Westland, R., Washington

### Legislative Assistants:

Sen. Bartlett, Mrs. Smith, L.A.  
Sen. McClellan, Jim Westbrook, L.A.  
Sen. Ribicoff, Gerry Sonofky, L.A.  
Sen. Ellender, Mr. Finley, L.A.  
Sen. Bayh, Dr. Norton, L.A.  
Sen. Hartke, Dr. Cook, L.A.  
Sen. Sparkman, Mr. Sherrod, L.A.  
Sen. Mansfield, Mark Fasteau, L.A.  
Sen. Symington, Earl Mackey, L.A.  
(somewhat skeptical)  
Sen. Morse, Phyllis Rock, L.A.  
Sen. Lausche, Mr. Shotwell, L.A.  
Sen. Smathers, Mr. O'Keese, L.A.  
Senator Russell Long, Bill Leonard, L.A.  
Sen. Clark, Harry Schwartz, L.A.  
Sen. McGovern, Ronn Hobbes  
Sen. Pell, Mr. Potter, L.A.  
Sen. Ted Kennedy, Mr. Turner, L.A.  
Sen. McIntyre, Alan Novins, L.A.

Sen. Stennis, Bill Kendall  
Sen. Humphrey, John Stewart, L.A.  
Sen. McNamara, Mr. O'Donnell

Sen. Dominac, John Tracy, L.A.  
Sen. Boggs, Mr. Flood, A.A.  
Sen. Pearson, Rex Beach, L.A.  
Senator Javits, Al Lesser, L.A.  
Sen. Morton, Mrs. McElroy, L.A.  
Sen. Saltonstall, Mrs. Pigman, L.A.  
Sen. John Williams, Mr. Peters, A.A.  
Sen. Mundt, Mr. Kreager, L.A.

*Sen. Jordan, Mr. Whitely*



Positive Reaction to MLF

Congressman Craig, Hosner, R., California  
Congressman Don Fraser, D., Minnesota

~~Senator Everett Jordan, D., N.C.,~~  
~~Mr. Whitely~~



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