Preventing Nuclear Weapons Spread and
Maintaining the Peace

Tonight I want to speak of foreign policy. The world is moving through a stage of development that must be understood by all of us so that our policies can reflect the changes occurring. In World War II the United States met the challenge of the threat of Nazism and Fascism. In the immediate aftermath of that war our people responded to the needs of world-wide reconstruction with large amounts of Marshall Aid funds and shipments of goods under UNNRA. We saw and forestalled the threat of Communist expansion and this shaped many of our policies from the late 1940's until the present. And we sensed some of the problems that would have to be met by the many new and developing nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Our policies responded to the desires of colonial peoples for independence and freedom and for assistance to improve their material and social well-being.

Now in the mid 1960's there are urgent problems ~~and~~ where solutions ~~which~~ cannot be delayed. There are opportunities to grasp, and soon, lest through inattention we lose them to eternity. My remarks are directed to one of the urgent problems on the international scene - preventing the spread of nuclear weapons - and to one of the opportunities for progress on the international scene - strengthening the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations.

Let me first talk of the threat of nuclear weapons. In the past twenty years we have witnessed the rise of five nuclear powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and China. It is perhaps not a coincidence that these five powers are the same five powers with permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council - and I say this although the question of China's seat is one still to be the subject of further international discussions.

History seems about to record that the number of nuclear powers will not remain at five. Countries such as India, Israel, Sweden, Japan, Pakistan, and possibly several others contain in their governments and among their peoples

strong advocates of joining the nuclear weapons club. As the membership of this club grows the danger of war waged with nuclear weapons increases. Why should this be so? It is so simply because nations threatened may feel they have to use nuclear weapons as their best means of defense. Each nation, as it makes the decision to use nuclear weapons, will reason that it will not be hurt as much as the enemy will be hurt by using nuclear weapons. And so the decision may be made.

There are other dangers likely to result from enlargement of the number of nations with nuclear weapons. Just the possession of nuclear weapons tends to increase tension and distrust among nations, primarily those that are currently antagonistic. Naturally the increased tension and distrust will make the resolution of outstanding problems more difficult. We are likely to see the international situation boiling up in the Middle East, East Asia, South Asia, Central Europe, and possibly in other areas if the nuclear weapons club includes members from these areas.

Nuclear weapons are expensive and a nation possessing them will be required to postpone other projects. These projects will be ones that would improve the economic lot of the people. Nuclear weapons, therefore, will impede economic development. It will slow down the rate of economic growth. Countries embarking on expensive nuclear weapons development programs may appeal to the United States and other more industrialized nations for additional economic help. They will argue that their economies need additional capital and one of the reasons will be that the nuclear weapons development program is absorbing precious resources.

Once having embarked on a nuclear weapons program a country is likely to decrease its interest in disarmament and arms control. It will not want to do anything to jeopardize completion of its nuclear weapons program. Hence it will become even more difficult than it is today to reach arms control and disarmament agreements.

The United States, the Soviet Union and most of the other nations have a mutual interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. All of us would stand to lose in the long run if nuclear weapons proliferated. What then, can be done to stop the spread? The Johnson Administration has a program which the President is urging upon other nations. This program contains steps that have been on the negotiating table, so to speak, for several years. But the program has some new features which I want to present to you this evening.

First, we want to sign a multilateral treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would pledge the nuclear powers not to place nuclear weapons into the hands of any non-nuclear power. Non-nuclear powers would be pledged not to produce or to receive nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union both want such a treaty. The question is to find language to express our interests. This language can be found and I believe will be found. The Soviet Union has claimed the treaty is being held up by the Federal Republic of Germany because it wants the United States to place nuclear weapons into German custody. The Soviet Union is wrong in this contention. The Federal Republic of Germany does not want to possess, control, or make nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic, on the contrary, is interested in improving relations with the Soviet Union, of decreasing tensions, of reaching arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and other powers, so that the number of armaments and armed forces on the continent of Europe can be reduced. The Federal Republic of Germany is interested, and rightfully so, in being consulted on questions of Western defense; and the United States is working closely with West Germany and other states in NATO to improve our consultative arrangements, especially in the planning of any nuclear defense of Western Europe.

The second step pursued by the United States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to broaden the test ban agreement to cover underground tests.

All of you know that by the partial test ban agreement of 1963 nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space is prohibited. But for the past three years underground testing has gone on. The United States has improved its nuclear weapons program by conducting several dozen underground tests. The Soviet Union has also improved its weapons program by conducting underground tests. But a complete test ban would add another obstacle to the spread of nuclear weapons. Not only could non-nuclear powers not test underground under a complete test ban treaty, but such powers would be more likely to agree to a treaty on non-proliferation if they knew that the nuclear powers were also prepared to take steps to curb their own nuclear military power.

One might argue that a complete test ban might be harmful to U.S. security because we should continue to develop our weapons arsenals. That argument can always be made about any weapon. But your U.S. government today does not believe that security comes simply through armaments. In fact security may be endangered more by the growth of armaments throughout the world than by their reduction through international agreements carefully negotiated.

A complete test ban agreement would stop nuclear weapon testing by every nation signing the agreement. If the United States thought any clandestine testing was going on it could ask for an explanation from the country in question including a request to check the site of an unidentified underground event. If the other country gave an inadequate explanation or refused to permit any check, then the United States could get out of the treaty by relying on an escape clause placed in the treaty for that purpose. Our security would not be endangered by such a treaty; it would actually increase our security because the nuclear weapons testing program of the Soviet Union would cease, as would that of any nuclear power signing the treaty. Non-nuclear powers signing would be denied the possibility of developing nuclear weapons through a testing program.

In past U. S. proposals for a test ban we have wanted a guaranteed right of a certain number of inspections to be included in the treaty. I must say a word as to why this right can be omitted from the treaty language provided an escape clause is present.

Whether the Soviet Union will grant the U.S. an opportunity to investigate a suspicious event depends in part on whether the U.S. can make a good case for wanting to inspect. It also depends on whether the Soviet Union would rather have the treaty continue by allowing an inspection, or whether it would prefer the treaty to die by refusing one. No matter how the language of the treaty is worded we cannot know the answer on inspection ahead of time. The best course of wisdom, if we believe a treaty is more to our interests than continued tests, is to let the treaty ~~approved~~ be tried.

A third step proposed by the United States to help stop the spread of nuclear weapons is a treaty that would be negotiated by the nuclear weapons powers in which they would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against any nation not possessing nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would take away much of the incentive of non-nuclear powers to develop nuclear weapons. A treaty against the first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states would remove most of the world as a potential battleground for nuclear weapons. It would mean that in the event of a local conflict in any part of the world, except for the territories of the nuclear powers, nuclear weapons would not be used. Such a treaty would go a long way to make nuclear weapons the useless weapons they should eventually come to be throughout the entire world.

A fourth step proposed by the United States is the adoption of a resolution by the United Nations Security Council that would make clear the full support of the United Nations to come to the assistance of any country which was the victim of an aggression by nuclear weapons. There are countries - non-nuclear powers - which have thought they needed a special defense guarantee from one or more of the nuclear

weapons powers. Such countries sometimes suggest that they be guaranteed support in the event of a nuclear attack. But such unilateral guarantees by one power or another are not as reassuring as would be a unanimous resolution of the U.N. Security Council. This would assure support of the world agency responsible for maintaining world peace. It would be a means of obtaining the necessary cooperation to repel a nuclear attack by the major powers. The members of the Security Council would be taking the step of declaring themselves in advance, before a nuclear attack came on a non-nuclear power. This is the proper use of the United Nations and the most effective way to carry out a system of guarantees to non-nuclear powers.

A fifth step proposed by the President to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons would prohibit nuclear weapons from being implanted in the sea bed. We have already adopted a treaty whereby the nations of the world have agreed not to test or station nuclear weapons on Antarctica. We are close to a treaty which states that nuclear weapons cannot be tested or stationed on celestial bodies or placed in orbit. We have a treaty which states nuclear weapons cannot be tested under water. What remains is to have an agreement to prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the sea bed. Nuclear weapons powers have not yet started to implant nuclear mines in the sea, but they might be prompted to do so if the international situation worsened and technology advanced to this state. The sea bed should be an international area in which no nation should be allowed to use it for destructive purposes. A treaty to keep the sea bed free of nuclear weapons would definitely be a major step in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and all other oceans and seas would be freed of a nightmare whereby ships could be destroyed by nuclear mines. Nations could easily check with sonar and other sensors to assure that the agreement was being observed.

There is a sixth step proposed by the United States to help halt the increase in nuclear weapons throughout the world. This concerns the broad efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve progress toward general and complete disarmament. Negotiations toward a treaty on general and complete disarmament have almost completely bogged down. Seldom are they discussed at the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference meeting in Geneva. The problem seems so difficult and so immense in its ramifications that apathy, skepticsm and cynicism have almost won their fight against effort, energy and conviction that progress toward a genuine world order can be made. Is there no way to break this impasse? I believe there is a way.

The President proposes that a small committee of the U.S. National Academy of Science and of the Soviet Academy of Science meet in more or less continuous session throughout the next year with one agenda item. That agenda item is to explore ways to fit together the United States and Soviet stage 1 of their respective plans on general and complete disarmament. If stage 1 of the three stage plans could be agreed to it should not be difficult eventually to resolve the differences over stages two and three. We propose the selection of the Academy of Sciences of the two countries in order that the discussions can take place outside the official framework of the two countries. In this way neither government would be automatically committed to the results of the work of the group. At the same time each government would influence the selection of the group representing its Academy of Science. The scientists should not be directly in the employ of the government but they should be ones who are knowledgeable about the problems, as are many gifted physical, biological and social scientists in these matters. I see no harm in the group having governmental advisers but such advisers should not have a veto. A group such as the President has asked me to propose should have enough freedom from past government positions to seek genuine compromise positions. They would be close enough to the realities of past

government positions not to be totally irresponsible in what they would propose.

These steps would constitute a Johnson Round of arms control negotiations. They may not all succeed at once or even succeed eventually. But they should be tried. Just as the United States five years ago got itself prepared to negotiate a Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations, which is still going on and which promises to be successful in most of its particulars, so now the United States must gear itself for a Johnson Round of arms control negotiations if we are to save ourselves and the world from a nuclear armaments race of untold proportions.

I now wish to turn to the second area, that of strengthening the United Nation's ability to maintain international peace. It has been true since the founding of the United Nations that the control and reduction of armaments and the strengthening of the ability of the U.N. to maintain peace must go hand in hand. To concentrate on one to the exclusion of the other courts disaster. If nations reduce their arms but prevent the development of peaceful ways to solve international disputes, then soon nations will be rearming. And if nations are prepared to solve their disputes in peace but build larger and larger stocks of arms, sooner or later they will be disposed to use those arms if they think a peaceful settlement to a dispute cannot be achieved. So along with this Administration's proposals on arms control there must be proposals to strengthen U.N. peacekeeping machinery.

The United States along with 13 other U.N. members, including the Soviet Union, has been quietly working in a Special U.N. Peacekeeping Committee to determine whether sufficient international consensus exists to increase the role of the U.N. in international disputes. There is consensus growing in this committee that ought to be translated into the reality of international agreement.

Much of the heavy responsibility of maintaining peace in those parts of the world where peace has been threatened has been borne through the United Nations by the smaller powers. Several of these powers have indicated willingness to make available to the U.N. part of their armed forces to be used when the U.N. decides peacekeeping functions must be performed. The United States not only welcomes the

generosity of these nations but would support such nations making formal agreements with the U.N. Security Council, as envisaged by Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, about the availability of their troops to the U.N. The United States would support such action in the Security Council.

The number of countries making such agreements need not be large at first, but they should represent different parts of the world and countries with different social systems. I mean, therefore, that such countries as Canada, The Netherlands, Sweden, India, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, and Mexico might be among those countries to start the process of making agreements. In each case this would be an agreement between the individual country and all of the members of the U.N. Security Council. The United States for its part would be prepared to make a contribution to offset certain costs in the event that some of these countries could not pay the cost of maintaining their troops when on peacekeeping missions. The United States would hope that the Soviet Union and the other permanent members of the Security Council would also make a contribution toward the costs involved. Should some nations be prepared to take this step the United Nations would move toward realizing one of the aims of the U.N. as envisaged by the founders of the Charter.

There is another step that could be taken to strengthen the U.N.'s peacekeeping functions. That is in the investigatory area. One of the fears of smaller nations is that they may be subject to intervention of various types by agents of the major powers. We have long heard about infiltration in order to disrupt the economic and political life of newly developing countries. The United States is opposed to this or any other type of intervention. Last year at the United Nations the United States voted for a resolution intended to register the full force of the United Nations against attempts at military or armed intervention of many kinds. The United Nations should be willing to put some teeth into that resolution.

How wonderful it would be if the small powers could believe that the major powers as well as hostile neighbors were prepared to leave them alone and allow them to develop their institutions as they see fit. How secure too they could feel if the major powers said they would be willing to have the United Nations investigate any nation's charge of intervention and infiltration. It is possible that the Soviet Union after these long and sometimes bitter twenty years of cold war is interested in easing tension in areas where new nations are struggling to find themselves. It is possible that the Soviet Union sees no gain in fomenting revolution and strife when it knows that the United States is prepared when necessary to help protect the sovereignty and independence of the weak. It is useless to speculate whether the Soviet Union will or will not do a certain thing until we make an agreement and then watch to see how it is observed. Therefore, the United States proposes that the United Nations, preferably the Security Council but not necessarily exclusively, undertake to send an investigating team at any time a nation appeals to it, that it is the subject of intervention. The United States for its part would be willing to have this team sent automatically providing the Security Council can agree ahead of time on the composition of such teams. The investigating team would have no enforcement authority. It would investigate, thus providing any troubled small nation assurance that the United Nations was prepared to help deter intervention from starting.

These two steps would mark a turning point in the ability of the United Nations to act as the protector of those nations that might otherwise fall to evil influence from outside. They would demonstrate that the United Nations was not the impotent body some would charge it is. And if these steps are meticulously observed by the major powers another step toward removing vestiges of the cold war will have occurred.

Arms Control and National Security: A Look at the Future

In October 1965 Pope Paul VI came to the United Nations to utter a memorable plea before the world's statesman

Lall

A. 1) ^nuc spread^ increases tensions and destruct

2) divert resources and impede econ. development

3.) provisions of non-proliferation treaty

4). Germany — Mc Namara Committee

B. 5) 2nd aim is to broaden test ban agreement to cover underground tests. would encourage non-nuclears to join; up of nuclears adhered to underground test-ban.

6) Check on complete test-ban - site check request + escape clause

C) third aim:
treaty against first use

D) Fourth
UN Security Council res pledging support of UN + come to defence of ~~non-nuclear~~ any nation which is victim of nuclear aggression

E) Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons from being implanted on the Sea-bed.
p.6

F. General + Complete Disarmament — Johnson Rounds of negotiations — then general meetings of Natl Academy of Sciences + Soviet Academy of Sciences.

G. Proposals to strengthen peace-keeping machinery.

1. US supports small powers making available part of their troops to UN.
   US would support offset costs for peacekeeping missions

Goldberg

Progress at ENDC - 4 pts p. 2-3

Last basis for hope situation
on non-proliferation treaty

3 - Glassboro - LBJ meeting
on non-proliferation

5th question / attitude of non-nuclear
states toward non-proliferation treaty

p. 7 - steps most urgently needed

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

1/19/67

Miss Ettinger
Office of the Vice President

Attached is a copy of the Pope's address to the UN in Oct. '65, per your telephone request of yesterday.

IO - William L. Clark

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media - not an official record)

CAUTION: ADVANCE TEXT

Press Release GA/3074

4 October 1965

Not to be used before 3.30 p.m. EDT,
today, 4 October 1965

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

ADDRESS BY HIS HOLINESS, POPE PAUL VI, AT THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

65-23607

/...

As We begin Our address to this audience, which is unique in the world, We wish first to express our profound gratitude to U Thant, your Secretary-General, for the invitation which he extended to Us to visit the United Nations, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of this world institution for peace and for collaboration between the peoples of the entire earth.

Our thanks also to Mr. Amintore Fanfani, the President of the General Assembly, who has used such kind language in Our regard from the very day of his election.

We thank all of you here present for your kind welcome and We extend to each one of you Our cordial and deferential salutation. In friendship you have invited Us and admitted Us to this meeting; and it is as a friend that We appear before you.

In addition to Our personal greetings, We bring you those of the Second Vatican Oecumenical Council now meeting in Rome and represented here by the Eminent Cardinals who accompany Us.

In their name and in Our own, to each and every one of you, honour and greeting!

This encounter, as you all understand, is of a twofold nature: it is marked both with simplicity and with greatness. With simplicity, because you have before you a man like you, your brother, and even one of the smallest among you who represent sovereign States, for he is vested if you wish to think of him thus, with only a minuscule and almost symbolic temporal sovereignty, only as much as is necessary to leave him free to exercise his spiritual mission and to assure those who deal with him that he is independent of every other sovereignty of this world. He has no temporal power, nor any ambition to compete with you. In fact, We have nothing to ask for, no question to raise. We have at most a desire to express and a permission to request: namely, that of serving you in so far as lies within Our competence, with disinterest, humility and love.

That is Our first declaration. As you can see, it is so simple that it may seem insignificant to this Assembly, which is accustomed to deal with most important and most difficult matters.

We said also, however, and all here today feel it, that this moment is also a great one. Great for Us, great for you.

/...

For Us, first of all. You know well who We are. Whatever may be the opinion you have of the Pontiff of Rome, you know Our mission. We are the bearer of a message for all mankind. And this We are, not only in Our own personal name and in the name of the great Catholic family but also in that of those Christian brethren who share the sentiments which We express here, particularly of those who so kindly charged Us explicitly to be their spokesman here. Like a messenger who, after a long journey, finally succeeds in delivering the letter which has been entrusted to him, so We are conscious of living through a privileged moment, however brief, which fulfils a desire nourished in Our heart for nearly twenty centuries. For, as you will remember, We have been journeying long, and We bring with Us a long history; we here celebrate the epilogue of a wearying pilgrimage in search of a conversation with the entire world, ever since the command was given to us: "Go and bring the good news to all peoples." Now, you here represent all peoples.

Allow Us to tell you that We have a message for you all, a happy message, to deliver to each one of you.

1. We might call Our message, first of all, a solemn and moral ratification of this lofty Institution. This message comes from our historical experience. As "an expert in humanity", We bring to this Organization the suffrage of Our recent Predecessors, that of the entire Catholic Episcopate and Our own, convinced as We are that this Organization represents the obligatory path of modern civilization and of world peace.

In saying this, We feel We are making Our own the voice of the dead and of the living; of the dead, who fell in the terrible wars of the past, dreaming of concord and world peace; of the living who survived those wars, bearing in their hearts a condemnation of those who would try to renew them; and of the living who go forward confidently, the youth of the present generation, who legitimately expect a better human race. And We also make Our own the voice of the poor, the disinherited, the suffering, of those who long for justice, for the dignity of life, for freedom, for well-being and for progress. The peoples of the earth turn to the United Nations as the last hope of concord and peace; We presume to present here, together with Our own, their tribute of honour and of hope. That is why for you, also, this moment is great.

/...

2. We know that you are fully aware of this. Listen now to the continuation of Our message. It looks entirely towards the future. The edifice which you have constructed must never fall; it must be perfected and made equal to the needs which world history will present. You mark a stage in the development of mankind: from now on retreat is impossible, progress essential.

To the plurality of States, which can no longer ignore one another, you offer an extremely simple and fruitful formula of coexistence. First of all, you recognize and distinguish the one and the other. You do not confer existence upon States, but you qualify each single nation as fit to sit in the orderly congress of peoples: you grant recognition, of high ethical and juridical value, to each sovereign national community, guaranteeing it an honourable international citizenship. This in itself is a great service to the cause of humanity, namely, to define clearly and to honour the national subjects of the world community, and to confirm their juridical status, which entitles them to be recognized and respected by all and from which there may derive an orderly and stable system of international life. You give sanction to the great principle that relations between peoples should be regulated by reason, by justice, by law, by negotiation; not by force or by violence, not by war, not by fear or by deceit.

So it must be. Allow Us to congratulate you on having had the wisdom to open this Assembly to the young peoples, to the States which have recently attained independence and national freedom. Their presence is the proof of the universality and magnanimity which inform the principles of this institution.

So it must be. This is Our praise and Our wish, and, as you can see, We do not bestow these as from outside. We derive them from inside, from the very essence of your institution.

3. Your Charter goes further than this, and Our message advances with it. You exist and operate to unite the nations, to bind States together. Let Us use this formula: to bring the one together with the other. You are an association. You are a bridge between peoples. You are a network of relations between States. We would almost say that your chief characteristic is a reflection, as it were, in the temporal field of what our Catholic Church aspires to be in the spiritual field: unique and universal. In the ideological construction of mankind, on the

/...

natural level, one can conceive nothing superior to this. Your vocation is to make brothers not only of some, but of all peoples. A difficult undertaking? Indeed; but this is your undertaking, your most noble undertaking. Is there anyone who does not see the necessity of coming thus progressively to the establishment of a world authority, able to act effectively at the juridical and political levels?

Once more We reiterate Our wish: Advance always! We will go further, and say: Strive to bring back among you any who have left you, and seek a means of bringing into your pact of brotherhood, in honour and loyalty, those who do not yet share in it. Act so that those still outside will desire and merit the confidence of all; and then be generous in granting such confidence. You have the good fortune and the honour to sit in this assembly of peaceful nations, hear Us as We say: Ensure that the reciprocal trust which here unites you and enables you to do good and great things may never be undermined or betrayed.

4. The logic of this wish, which might be considered to pertain to the very structure of your Organization, leads Us to complete it with other formulas. Thus, let no one, as a Member of your union, be superior to the others: Never one above the other. This is the formula of equality. We are well aware that there are other factors to consider besides simple membership of this institution. But equality, too, belongs to its constitution. You are not equal, but here you make yourselves equal. For several among you, this may be an act of high virtue; allow Us to say this to you, as the representative of a religion which accomplishes salvation through the humility of its divine Founder. Men cannot be brothers if they are not humble. It is pride, no matter how inevitable it may seem to be, which provokes tensions and struggles of prestige, of predominance, of colonialism, of egoism; it is pride that disrupts brotherhood.

5. And now Our message reaches its highest point. Negatively, at first. You are expecting Us to utter this sentence, and We are well aware of its gravity and solemnity: Never one against the other, never again, never more! Was it not principally for this purpose that the United Nations arose: against war, in favour of peace? Listen to the lucid words of a great man, the late John Kennedy, who declared four years ago: "Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind". Many words are not needed to proclaim this loftiest aim of your institution. It suffices to remember that the blood of millions of men, that

/...

numberless and unheard-of sufferings, useless slaughter and frightful ruin, are the sanction of the pact which unites you, with an oath which must change the future history of the world: No more war, never again war! Peace, it is peace which must guide the destinies of peoples and of all mankind.

Our thanks to you, glory to you, who for twenty years have laboured for peace and who have even suffered the loss of illustrious men in this sacred cause. Thanks and glory to you for the conflicts which you have prevented and for those which you have brought to an end. The results of your efforts in favour of peace, continuing until the present day, even if they are not yet decisive, are such as to deserve that We, presuming to interpret the sentiments of the whole world, express to you both praise and thanks.

Gentlemen, you have performed and you continue to perform a great work: the education of mankind in the ways of peace. The United Nations is the great school where that education is imparted, and we are today in the Assembly Hall of that school. Everyone taking his place here becomes a pupil and also a teacher in the art of building peace. When you leave this hall, the world looks upon you as the architects and constructors of peace.

Peace, as you know, is not built up only by means of politics, by the balance of forces and of interests. It is constructed with the mind, with ideas, with works of peace. You labour in this great construction. But you are still at the beginnings. Will the world ever succeed in changing that selfish and bellicose mentality which, up to now, has woven so much of its history? It is hard to foresee; but it is easy to affirm that it is towards that new history, a peaceful, a truly and fully human history, as promised by God to men of goodwill, that we must resolutely set out. The roads are already well marked out for you, the first is that of disarmament.

If you wish to be brothers, drop your weapons. One cannot love with offensive weapons in hand. Those weapons, especially those terrible weapons that modern science has given you, long before they produce victims and ruins, cause bad dreams, foster bad feelings, create nightmares, distrust and sombre resolves; they demand enormous expenditures; they obstruct projects of solidarity and useful work; they falsify the psychology of peoples. As long as man remains that weak, changeable and even wicked being that he often shows himself to be, defensive arms will, unfortunately, be necessary. You, however, in your courage and valour, are

/...

studying the ways of guaranteeing the security of international life without recourse to arms. This is an aim worthy of your efforts, this is what the peoples expect of you, this must be achieved! Let unanimous trust in this institution grow, let its authority increase; and this goal, one may hope, will be attained. You will win the gratitude of all peoples, relieved as they will then be from the crushing expense of armaments and freed from the nightmare of an ever imminent war.

We rejoice in the knowledge that many of you have looked with favour upon the invitation that, in the cause of peace, We addressed from Bombay last December to all States, to use for the benefit of the developing countries at least part of the savings which could be realized by reducing armaments. We here renew that invitation, trusting in your sentiments of humanity and generosity.

6. In speaking of humanity and generosity, We are echoing another fundamental principle of the United Nations, which is the high point of its positive side, namely, that you work here not only to avert conflicts between States, but also to make States capable of working one for another. You are not satisfied with facilitating mere coexistence between nations; you take a much greater step forward, one deserving of Our praise and Our support - you organize brotherly collaboration among peoples. In this way a system of solidarity is set up, so that lofty civilized aims may win the orderly and unanimous support of all the family of peoples for the common good and for the good of each individual. This aspect of the United Nations is the most beautiful; it is its most truly human aspect; it is the ideal of which mankind dreams on its pilgrimage through time; it is the world's greatest hope; it is, We presume to say, the reflection of the loving and transcendent design of God for the progress of the human family on earth - a reflection in which We see the message of the Gospel which is heavenly become earthly. Indeed, it seems to Us that here We hear the echo of the voice of Our Predecessors, and particularly of Pope John XXIII, whose message of "Pacem in Terris" received so honourable and significant a response among you.

You proclaim here the fundamental rights and duties of man, his dignity, his freedom - and above all his religious freedom. We feel that you thus interpret the highest sphere of human wisdom and, We might almost say, its sacred character. For you deal here above all with human life; and human life is sacred;

/...

no one may dare offend against it. Respect for life, even with regard to the great problem of the birth rate, must find here in your Assembly its highest affirmation and its most reasoned defence. Your task is to ensure that there is enough bread on the tables of mankind, and not to encourage an artificial birth control, which would be irrational, in order to diminish the number of guests at the banquet of life.

It is not enough, however, to feed the hungry; it is necessary also to assure to each man a life that befits his dignity. This too you strive to achieve. We may consider this the fulfilment before our very eyes, and by your efforts, of that prophetic utterance so applicable to your institution: "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks" (Is.II,4). Are you not using the prodigious energies of the earth and the magnificent inventions of science, no longer as instruments of death, but as tools of life for humanity's new era?

We know how intensive and ever more effective are the efforts of the United Nations and its related world agencies to assist Governments which need help to hasten their economic and social progress.

We know how ardently you labour to overcome illiteracy and to spread culture throughout the world; to give men adequate and modern medical assistance; to employ in man's service the marvellous resources of science, technology and organization - all this is magnificent and merits everyone's praise and support, including Our own.

We Ourself would like to set an example, even though the smallness of Our means is inadequate to the practical and quantitative needs. We intend to intensify the efforts of Our charitable institutions to combat the hunger of the world and to meet its chief needs. It is thus, and in no other way, that peace can be built.

7. One more word, Gentlemen, one last word: this edifice which you are constructing does not rest upon merely material and earthly foundations, for if so it would be a house built upon sand; above all, it is based on our own consciences. The hour has struck for our "conversion", for personal transformation, for internal renewal. We must get used to thinking of man in a new way; and in a new way also of men's life in common; in a new way, too, of the paths of history and the destiny of the world, in accordance with the

/...

words of Saint Paul: "To put on the new man, which after God, is created in righteousness and the holiness of truth." (Eph.IV.23). The hour has come for a halt, a moment of recollection, of reflection, almost of prayer. A moment to think anew of our common origin, our history, our common destiny. Today as never before, in our era so marked by human progress, there is need for an appeal to the moral conscience of man. For the danger comes, not from progress, nor from science - on the contrary, if properly utilized, these could resolve many of the grave problems which assail mankind. The real danger comes from man himself, who has at his disposal ever more powerful instruments which can be employed equally well for destruction or for the loftiest conquests.

In a word, then, the edifice of modern civilization must be built upon spiritual principles, which alone can not only support it, but even illuminate and animate it. We believe, as you know, that these indispensable principles of superior wisdom must be founded upon faith in God. That unknown God of whom Saint Paul spoke to the Athenians in the Areopagus? Unknown to them, although without realizing it they sought him and he was close to them, as happens also to many men of our times? To us, in any case, and to all those who accept the ineffable revelation which Christ has given us of Him, He is the living God, the Father of all men.

J. Reilly

Excellent - use for my arms control SP.

November 1, 1965

MEMO

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Ted Van Dyk

I call your attention to the attached article on Arms Control by Alastair Buchan.

Excellent Article

Arms Nobody Wants To Control

by Alastair Buchan

The fear of nuclear proliferation has now become one of the prime forces shaping American and British foreign policy, though there is as yet no clear agreement on how it should be confronted. In the attempt to isolate and study this problem, relatively little attention has been paid to proliferation of non-nuclear weapons. Yet in at least two big confrontations, between India and Pakistan, and between Israel and her Arab neighbors, this has directly influenced consideration of national nuclear weapons. It is ironical that the industrial powers of the northern hemisphere, Western and Communist, have in the past decade spent tens of billions of dollars in the attempt to stabilize the balance of power among themselves, but elsewhere have pursued policies leading to local arms races which by committing them increasingly to their client states have risked the destabilization of their own precarious relationship.

It is important not to inflate this proposition. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, Britain and France or Czechoslovakia can be held directly responsible for the fact that any rebel leader in the third world war can lay his hands on enough small arms to start a guerrilla war. This is partly the result of the vast dumps of military equipment that were left scattered all over the world twenty years ago, or disbursed, like those in the enormous Suez base, in the process of decolonization. It also derives partly from the fact that they can be manufactured so easily, as the Viet Cong, fashioning water pipes into mortars, have shown. The laxity of some countries – notably the United States – about personal weapons has not helped. But the private trade in arms, the grubby activities of the men in Alexandria and Monaco, Milan and Hamburg, who can supply a plane load of rifles or a couple of old aircraft to a rebel leader, are not a serious threat to international peace. It is the sober policy of sober governments which is the root of the trouble.

The pattern of military aid and trade over the last ten years since the Soviet Union entered the picture is an exceedingly complex one, and is difficult to plot with any accuracy since most governments conceal essential information in their figures. But one can identify two pressures which seem to have operated with roughly equal force on Western and Warsaw Pact countries.

The first is the enormous thirst for major armaments in the third world. It is a by-product of decolonization itself, the emergence of over 50 new states, to whom arms, fighter aircraft, frigates, tanks bearing their own national emblems are as much a sign of sovereign independence as they are to the historic nation states. It is not at all surprising that the industrial powers, locked in an ideological struggle of their own, should have seen this eagerness for arms as a source of influence in the areas outside the direct East-West conflict. The supply of even relatively simple weapons necessitates a training mission and ties the country umbilically to the supply of spare parts. The military establishment is bound to play a part in the politics of a new country and is thus an important source of influence. There is an implicit competition for its favors. The British for years sought this sort of relationship with the Middle Eastern states as well as with the new Commonwealth countries. The French have tried, unsuccessfully, to maintain a monopoly of military aid to former French Africa. The Soviet Union has scattered its favors on a purely opportunist basis to Egypt and Indonesia on a grand scale, to Cuba, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Somalia and Afghanistan, as well as providing MIGS for India. Most of the $21 billion spent in American military aid over the past ten years has, of course, gone to her allies in the Far East and Europe but, under the notion of "free world orientation" it has also been scattered among a wide range of smaller countries.

The second pressure for military aid and trade derives from the hectic pace of the central arms race, which clutters the inventories and depots of the industrial powers with hardware which is obsolescent for their needs but is still quite serviceable. They have gone through three generations of fighter aircraft and tanks in the last 20 years, two of anti-aircraft missiles and one of almost every type of ship. Treasury officials in Moscow as well as in Washington view with less gloom the scrapping of equipment which has cost so much to develop if it can be written off the books by aid or trade to another country, even at a modest value. Ever since the 19th Century the major powers have steadily offloaded obsolescent ships on to the minor ones (an acquaintance of mine who was due for retirement after serving as naval attaché in a Latin American country was offered retention and promotion if he could sell a cruiser to its government). However, the United States

MR. BUCHAN *is director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London.*

has shown greater self-restraint than the Soviet Union, even if its military aid programs are much larger. It has sent its obsolescent medium bombers, the B-47s, to the scrap heap while the Russians have cheerfully offloaded Badgers on the Egyptians and the Indonesians to the detriment of the local balance of power. The most obvious fallacy in the American military aid policy has been the theory that arms could be given to a country like Pakistan or India for use against a Communist threat without upsetting local balances or local quarrels.

In the past five years a new factor has been complicating an already complex situation. When the Kennedy Administration decided to offset the very large balance of payments deficit, incurred by reason of US military expenditures in Europe and Asia, by an increase in sales as opposed to gifts of military equipment, the assumption may have been that this would be primarily to countries like Germany, Belgium or Japan which were part of the central East-West balance of power. But this deliberate American decision to dominate the arms market within her own alliances had two secondary effects. First, it forced those countries who were determined to compete with the United States in the field of advanced technology, aircraft, electronics and computers, and who, even more than the United States, cannot maintain a broad enough research and development base to support them without military orders, to seek military markets in the third world. Thus, France, denied a fair share of the European arms trade, increased her sales of fighter-bombers to Israel and India and would probably sell them Mirage IVs if asked. Britain did the same to South Africa until second thoughts caused a change of policy. Second, the American desire to sell *new* equipment to Europe has created a problem of obsolescence among America's customers in Europe and a need to offload elsewhere. This wholly disastrous American policy is, in addition, now one of the driving forces of anti-Americanism in Europe, and ensures a growing support for a generally Gaullist position from influential Europeans.

The explosive situations that exist in the third world illustrate different facets of the same problem. The Somali-Ethiopian conflict shows the effect that a relatively small amount of arms can have upon a local conflict in Africa, a continent where there are 20 non-African nations involved in the supply of arms or military training to the 33 African countries. The Arab-Israel confrontation suggests that once the externel powers get on each side of a fierce local conflict they become obliged to give or sell increasingly sophisticated armaments to their own client: it becomes an extension in miniature of their own arms race. Egypt now has MIG 21s and the latest Soviet missile-firing PT boats. Israel has got Hawk missiles and Patton tanks.

Indonesia's conflict with her neighbors now pins down 50,000 British troops, a large part of the Royal Navy, and virtually the whole of the Australian defense effort, and thereby distorts the priorities of the West in Asia. Her power to do this derives largely from earlier American and Soviet efforts to buy more influence over her policy through gifts of sophisticated hardware.

Finally, the Indo-Pakistan conflict: For 11 years first India then Pakistan used the supply of Western arms to one side or the other as a pretext for refusing to settle the cause of conflict, Kashmir; and finally for conflict itself. And the outcome of this conflict appears considerably to have accelerated the prospect of an Indian nuclear weapons program.

Obviously this is not a state of affairs to which there is an easy answer. There have been many second thoughts about military aid and trade in Washington, and some signs of rethinking in Moscow. But efforts at Geneva and elsewhere to plumb the chances of an agreement on the restriction of military aid – President Johnson's proposal for a "bomber bonfire" for instance – have met Soviet indifference. Moreover, a concerted policy on the part of the super powers, even if attainable, would need much wider support to be effective. If the US, the Soviet Union and Britain were to agree to make the replacement of the tanks and aircraft destroyed in the Indo-Pakistan conflict conditional on a Kashmir settlement, France, which regards arms sales as simply good business, might step into their place, as she has stepped into Britain's place as the supplier of South Africa. There are some countries (e.g., the US, Soviet Union, Britain, France, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and Italy) whose active support for a conventional arms control agreement is vital.

There are palliatives worth considering. A reversal of the American decision to finance its European military costs by arms sales, to be replaced by some form of direct European financial contribution to them, together with the active encouragement of an integrated European arms basis, would absorb European technological energies and remove some of the pressure for sales to the third world. A more pragmatic approach to the Soviet Union, suggesting a coordinated policy on the supply of arms to countries which may be in conflict or cahoots, with China, India, Pakistan and Indonesia for a start, might be more successful than an attempt at a formal and universal agreement. Undoubtedly the dangerous implications of a great power arms race by proxy in the Middle East can only be averted by direct negotiation. But perhaps the most important step forward would be the recognition, in public as well as in official thinking, that arms are not just another form of engineering exports, and that the dividends and employment rolls of Lockheed or Vickers, Boeing or Dassault, Hughes or Oerlikon are trivial considerations by comparison with the damage which their products can inflict in a world bedeviled by the problems of immature nationalism.

SATURDAY REVIEW 9 JULY 1966 (7)

The U.S.: Supplier of Weapons to the World

How our foreign policy is being undermined by $35 billion worth of armaments exports—while industry and the Pentagon lobby for even larger shipments.

By EUGENE J. McCARTHY, *United States Senator, Minnesota.*

> In the Thirties, companies that sold weapons to foreign nations were called "Merchants of Death." Politicians reviled them. They were the subject of a sensational Senate investigation headed by former Republican Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota.
>
> Times have changed. The U.S. Government is now encouraging defense manufacturers to sell arms overseas.
>
> —*Forbes* Magazine

OVER THE PAST fifteen years, the United States has given or sold to other countries some $35 billion worth of military assistance as part of our foreign aid. The major share of Defense Department arms supplied under our military assistance program has gone to industrialized countries in Europe and the Far East.

We have provided arms, equipment, and training to countries who are allied or associated with us through treaties—NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS—which are the legacy of the early years of the containment policy and of the John Foster Dulles era. In addition, we have provided military aid to a wide range of countries in such categories as: "forward defense" areas, including the Republic of China (Taiwan), Iran, Philippines, South Korea, Greece, and Turkey (the last two countries are also allied to us through NATO); countries that have given us military base rights such as Ethiopia, Libya, Spain and our NATO ally Portugal; "Alliance for Progress Security" countries—virtually every country in Latin America; and some twenty-three countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East that are regarded as having "free world orientation."

Our interest and concern over the threat of nuclear proliferation should not distract us from giving careful attention to what may be an even more serious threat to peace—the proliferation and distribution of non-nuclear weapons. Supplying non-nuclear arms has become a major activity—not only for the modern merchants of death or for illegal gunrunners, but for the governments of the major industrial countries.

France, long a major supplier of arms to the Middle East, is reported to be exporting nearly 40 per cent of its total aerospace production. The Soviet Union is also a major supplier of arms. Great Britain is actively engaged in the arms competition. But today the United States is the world's leading producer and supplier of arms.

In recent years, sales of arms have been taking the place of grants and gifts in U.S. military assistance programs. In 1950, the fourteen countries that obtained U.S. arms and military training all received these on a grant basis. In 1966, of the seventy countries that received any combination of grant aid, direct sales or credit assistance for arms, sixty-two were receiving grant aid, thirty-four were buying arms directly, and eighteen were the beneficiaries of credit assistance.

The principal purpose of most military aid, whether it be in the form of grants or sales, is, of course, to strengthen recipient countries against Communist aggression and subversion.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 20, 1966, stated:

> The governing principle of our military assistance program has been and is that the vital interests of the United States and the defense of the Free World are dependent upon the strength of the entire Free World and not merely upon the strength of the United States.

Over the past decade, however, intergovernmental trade in arms with the developing countries has involved more complex motivations and considerations. Several pressures have combined to increase the arms supply.

First, newly independent countries are frequently anxious to acquire arms for prestige purposes. Lions on golden chains no longer satisfy. To many nations, these arms are status symbols—the tangible manifestation of their nationhood and newly acquired sovereignty.

SECOND, supplying arms opens the way to influence on the military and also on the political policies of the recipient countries. Experience has demonstrated that when an arms deal is concluded, the military hardware is only the first step. Almost invariably, a training mission is needed and the recipient country becomes dependent on the supplier for spare parts and other ordnance.

Since the Cuban missile crisis, there has been an increasing inclination on the part of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to compete in supplying military assistance in areas adjacent to the sphere of influence of the other power. Thus, we tend to concentrate our military assistance to developing areas in those countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, which are on the "forward-defense arc" that borders the Communist heartland. Almost three-fourths of the program proposed for 1967 is for countries adjacent to the borders of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China.

The importance of influence on the military can be seen in Africa. Of the five nations of sub-Saharan Africa where military governments have come to power in recent months, only one, apparently, the Central African Republic, has *not* been the recipient of U.S. military assistance. The other four—Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Nigeria, and Upper Volta—have all received at least minimal amounts of military aid. Indonesia, where military elements appear to have taken *de facto* control of the government in the wake of the recent turmoil, received, in addition to Soviet military assistance, nearly $64,000,000 in military-grant aid from the United States between 1959 and 1965. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, tries to increase its influence by assistance to, for example, Cuba, close to our shores.

THE third reason for increasing arms sales, and a relatively new one for the United States, is financial and budgetary. Our balance of payments deficit is, in large measure, the result of military expenditures overseas—money that leaves the United States to support our military forces abroad, in Europe, and, particularly now, in Vietnam. The Vietnam war effort is costing the United States some $16 billion this year. By encouraging other countries to buy arms from us, we can offset to some extent the outflow resulting from these programs. Now, for instance, the Pentagon reportedly is "encouraging" additional purchases of U.S. arms by Germany by threatening transfer of U.S. troops from Europe to Vietnam.

Secretary of Defense McNamara proudly describes the efforts of his department in the arms sales field. In May 1965 he presented the Meritorious Civilian Service Medal to Henry J. Kuss, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations, the Pentagon's top arms salesman. The record of Mr. Kuss and his salesmen—"negotiators," the Pentagon calls them—is impressive. Military export sales since mid-1961 total more than $9 billion, from which U.S. industry will realize a profit of nearly $1 billion. For this achievement, the Pentagon credits "the intensive sales effort undertaken . . . in cooperation with U.S. industry."

Forbes magazine recently stated:

> Arms and military equipment are one of the U.S.' major export items. Without them, few defense companies would be earning the kind of money they do.

Secretary McNamara cites the "obvious balance of payments benefits" of the arms sales program, noting that the U.S. defense expenditures and receipts entering the balance of payments in fiscal 1961 left a net adverse balance of nearly $2.8 billion. By 1965, the net deficit had been reduced to just over $1.4 billion, in spite of rising defense expenditures in Southeast Asia. Arms

CONTINUED PAGE 8-F

sales by the Pentagon increased from about $300 million in 1961 to more than $1.3 billion in 1965; 1967 receipts are expected to exceed $1.5 billion.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk has stated that his department is in "very close touch with the Defense Department on the sale of arms." The State Department's Office of Munitions Control coordinates arms sales by issuing or denying applications for the export or import of all articles on the United States Munitions List. Export licenses for Munitions List items are denied for areas under Communist control. But the State Department approves the shipment of arms to other states to meet what are considered to be legitimate defense needs and the requirements of internal security.

SECRETARY McNamara appears to believe that there is no reasonable alternative to intensified sales of U.S. weapons and, with the traditional rationalization of arms salesmen through history, states that if nations cannot buy them from us they will buy them elsewhere—from Britain, France or the Soviet Union, at higher prices.

But what is the effect of this policy?

The outbreak of war between India and Pakistan is a prime example which was of great concern to this country. Pakistan, which has recently been receiving military assistance from Communist China, is formally allied to us through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and is reported to have received from $1.5 to $2 billion in military assistance in the last decade. India, the largest democratic nation in the world, refused United States military aid until its borders were attacked, but it had been receiving arms from England. When it became clear that United States-supplied weapons were being used in the Indo-Pakistani war, many Americans must have wondered how our government could have allowed itself to become caught in such a contradiction. Nor was it any comfort when John Kenneth Galbraith, former Ambassador to India, stated before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 25, 1966:

> The arms we supplied . . . caused the war between India and Pakistan . . . If we had not supplied arms, Pakistan would not have sought a military solution [to the Kashmir dispute].

Also of growing concern in the past several months has been the spiraling arms build-up in the Middle East, where tensions among the Arab states and between the Arab states and Israel have long threatened to explode.

Between 1950 and 1965, we supplied relatively small amounts of grant military assistance to the area: to Iraq $46,500,000, to Jordan $33,000,000, to Saudi Arabia $31,000,000. Now, however, Saudi Arabia is buying $400,000,000 worth of British supersonic jet fighters and U.S. Hawk missiles. Jordan has received U.S. tanks, and on April 2 the State Department announced that the United States had agreed to sell Jordan "a limited number" of supersonic fighter-bombers, reportedly Lockheed F-104s. It is not clear how Jordan, which has an annual per capita G.N.P. of $233 and which has been dependent on U.S. military grants and economic aid, will pay for these planes, which cost some $2,000,000 apiece. The availability of U.S. credit for arms purchases is undoubtedly an important factor.

(The State Department has been under special pressure in the case of Jordan because of our sale to Israel of weapons that had previously been promised by Germany under an arms deal cancelled last year.)

Secretary Rusk on January 28, 1966, stated, "We have tried over the years . . . not to stimulate and promote the arms race in the Near East and not to encourage it by our direct participation." But it is difficult to reconcile the State Department's policy of refraining from becoming a major supplier of arms with the aggressive arms sales program conducted by the Pentagon.

The United States appears to be abandoning its traditional policy of non-involvement in the Middle East arms competitions in favor of trying to maintain an arms "balance" in the interest of political and military stability. But it is difficult to believe that the increasing supplies of sophisticated weapons in the area will contribute to the maintenance of peace or the reduction of tensions.

Tensions between Latin American states are not high at present, but our military assistance through grant aid or sales to some countries appears to be increasing, with Argentina agreeing several months ago to buy fifty jet attack planes from the Douglas Aircraft Company. At the same time, the Chileans are attempting to buy planes from us for defense against Argentina.

One may well question the desirability of strengthening military elements in countries that are, to a greater or lesser extent, trying to move away from a tradition of dominant influence of the military on political affairs, and endeavoring to develop democratic societies dedicated to freedom and social progress.

Among President Johnson's recent proposals to the Disarmament Conference meeting in Geneva is a suggestion that "countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige." On April 19, 1966, the U.S. delegate to the Disarmament Conference elaborated further the principles by which nations might undertake, on a regional basis, to limit conventional arms. If such regional arrangements could be concluded, potential suppliers should pledge to respect them and not deliver arms to the area.

But the Defense Department's guidelines for its arms salesmen give little encouragement to those who would favor restraint. Its pamphlet, *Information and Guidance on Military Assistance*, states:

> The Department of Defense has embarked on an intensified military assistance sales program. . . .
>
> Achievement of . . . objectives calls for a very substantial increase over past sales levels. Success in this endeavor will be dependent in large measure upon effective sales promotion. The DOD has taken several steps to assist in the successful conclusion of military sales. . . . Foreign customer preference for U.S. material is being generated by developing an appreciation of its technical superiority, price, availability, and the offer of follow-on support through U.S. logistics systems.
>
> In many cases, credit arrangements may be made to facilitate military sales, on short or long term basis as needed.

It seems to be a case of the left hand of the government trying to control what the right hand is busily promoting.

Former Ambassador Galbraith has stated:

> The policy of arming the indigent . . . has long since acquired a momentum of its own. It owes its existence partly to habit, partly to vested bureaucratic interest, partly to the natural desire to avoid thought and partly because to stop doing what is wrong is to confess past error.

He suggests limiting arms aid to countries that have an annual per capita income of more than $200, except by specific Presidential determination.

At a minimum, one would hope for some rationalization of the United States policy on arms sales. There is evidence that the Soviet Union might welcome an opportunity to disengage from arms competitions, at least in the Middle East. The United States should pursue any such possibility and, at the same time, use its influence to persuade other major suppliers to agree to some form of conventional arms moratorium. Such a moratorium would be a further step in the direction of the general disarmament and nuclear weapons control which most of mankind so earnestly desires.

Newsweek, July 11, 1966 (7)

Half Life

Contrary to rumor, SEATO—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—is not dead. And to prove it, Secretary of State Dean Rusk last week met in Canberra with the representatives of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan and France in the eleventh ministerial council of the alliance.

During the three-day meeting in the Australian Parliament building, the delegates hashed over a number of things: the Indonesian swerve away from Communism, the improved relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the troubled Thai-Cambodia border. But the thing that interested everyone most, of course, was the war in Vietnam.

In his 28-minute speech, Rusk devoted twenty minutes to Vietnam, praising the SEATO members who have sent assistance (Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines). A trifle hurt, the British and Pakistani delegates sat silent—as did the French observer, Achille Clarac, who watched quietly throughout most of the conference.

In the end, the meeting issued a communiqué (from which Clarac disassociated France) backing—verbally—the American effort to defeat "Communist aggression" in Vietnam. "We are very pleased with the result of SEATO this year," commented a U.S. diplomat after the meeting disbanded, but perhaps a more honest commentary came from a reporter who read over the jargon-rich communiqué and asked: "Who cares?" Even more damning was the reaction of an Australian girls' choir taking a tour of the Parliament building. Stopped by the carbine-toting security guards, their indignant leader sniffed: "No one told us SEATO would be here."

John - This will give you some of the basic data on the proposals, and a start at the end as to where we may go. I leave it to you to put it in H&H speech form. DB

On November 10, 1966, Secretary McNamara stated that the Soviet Union has initiated deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system.

What would the pursuit of Soviet deployment mean in the context of nuclear proliferation? If it proceeds unchecked, it could mean the addition of a senseless dimension to the arms race. As Secretary Rusk commented on this problem at a news conference last December 21:

> "We would regret very much the lifting of the arms race to an entirely new plateau of major expenditures.
>
> "As you know, we made earlier to the Geneva Conference proposals for freezes and limitations on the further production of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.
>
> "We would like to see some means developed by which both would not have to go into wholly new and unprecedented levels of military expenditure, with perhaps no perceptible result in the total strategic situation.

The freeze proposal referred to by the Secretary was the U.S. suggestion to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament

Conference for a measure designed to freeze the numbers and types of both offensive and defensive bombers and missiles for delivering strategic nuclear weapons.

This proposal was formally advanced by the United States in 1964. If it had been adopted then, it would have had approximately the same result as would a reduction of 50% in strategic delivery vehicles today. But there is no point in reflecting what might have been done in 1964. We must consider what we can do today to prevent another mad spiral in a race to nowhere. For, as Mr. Adrian Fisher said last August in speaking for the United States at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference:

> "IF we do not reach an agreement soon on a freeze, the strategic arms race will probably continue. If one power deploys an anti-missile system in addition to existing offensive systems, other nations might fear that their relative strategic capability was being eroded and therefore undertake one or more counteractions, such as the parallel deployment of an ABM system, increased offensive deployments, or the introduction of new or improved types of weapons capable of penetrating or bypassing ballistic missile defenses. The

resulting arms race would be self-defeating. Higher and higher destructive potentials would be reached and, despite the presence of defensive systems costing billions of rubles or dollars, greater casualties could result if nuclear war should occur."

Such a race would not increase our security. And it would divert vast resources which might otherwise be spent meeting the needs of the poor, the hungry, the unclothed and the uneducated.

The Soviet Union has thus far rejected the U.S. "freeze" proposal. While it remains open, the United States is considering other ideas which might pave the way toward agreement to halt the expensive and dangerous buildup of missiles and antimissiles. We will leave no stone unturned in an effort to find a solution to this problem.

ACDA draft [1966]

p. 2 - McNamara definition of security

5 - LBJ quoted to Geneva Conf

6. global defense expenditures - calendar year 1964
130 billion
$140 per capita - per world population

comparable figures - education and health - 125 b.

7-8 history of progress - atoms for Peace
Int Atomic Energy Comm.
antartic Treaty

US
Berlin - 1961
Cuba

hot line - 1963
test-ban treaty 1963
Outer space treaty

produced change in atmosphere - E-West

p 9. peace-making is a tidal condition - must be exploited when time is ripe. Description of consequences that followed in the "tide" of test-ban

JFK - past - largely - E-W - US-Soviet context
Space Treaty agreed to by US-Soviet - at UN.

11 Signing of non-proliferation treaty would have important effects on creating the conditions for peace.

13– Non-proliferation of conventional weapons
Statistics on number killed thru conventional conflict

LBJ – quote on econ impact of conventional arms spending.

regional approach – LBJ.

16– Standard for giving conventional mil aid to developing countries – "shield for development – not external aggression"

17– arms control amendment to For Aid Act of 1966 – encourages regional arms control – disarmament

17 – Regional arms control – nuclear free zones – L Am – Africa
Quote – LBJ – L Am
Nyerere – Africa

20 – Non-proliferation of biological weapons
Chemical
quote – Lederberg on bio. weapons

effects of proliferation of biological weapons

DRAFT #2
October 4, 1966

PERSPECTIVES FOR PEACE

Introduction

Perhaps it can be said that security has always been the primary concern of mankind. As human civilization has evolved, however, security vistas have broadened. In addition to individual and family security, new dimensions have been added to the pursuit of national security. In addition, our concerns now extend in a very real way to international, global and space security. And the problems of dealing with all of these areas of security in a growing and developing world are infinitely more complex. But the problems are not insoluble. If the genius of man contributed to these problems, that same talent should be capable of solving them.

An essential prerequisite to the best solution of any problem is the perspective necessary to a sound, balanced judgment. Viewed in perspective, what objectives will best serve our over-all security interests? In this context, I would like to address myself to the quest for world peace--the most compelling challenge the ingenuity of man has ever faced.

After looking at the general problem in perspective, I will discuss some initiatives to deal with the problem insofar as they relate to the non-proliferation of nuclear, conventional and biological weapons.

The General Problem

Last spring in Montreal, in an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Secretary of Defense McNamara eloquently expressed his concept of security in perspective when he said:

> " . . . The plain, blunt truth is that contemporary man still conceives of war and peace in much the same stereotyped terms that his ancestors did. The fact that these ancestors, both recent and remote, were conspicuously unsuccessful in avoiding war, and enlarging peace, doesn't seem to dampen our capacity for cliches.
>
> "We still tend to conceive of national security almost solely as a state of armed readiness; a vast awesome arsenal of weaponry."

But, he continued:

> "Security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is not military force, though it may involve it. Security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it."

Certainly, as things stand today, military force sufficient to deter aggression is an essential element in maintaining peace. But in a world which faces the possibility of instant destruction, the pursuit of security demands a perspective beyond the stereotyped concepts of our ancestors. Basic to this pursuit is arms control and disarmament. I have been convinced of this for a long time. I was convinced of it during the time I was Chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during the time I fought for the establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and when the Senate approved the limited test ban treaty of 1963. I am even more firmly convinced of it today.

It is not just weaponry in itself that poses the danger. It is the arms race--both nuclear and conventional. The competitive arms spiral must be brought under control or it could propel us into an oblivion in which human civilization would leave no legacy.

Unilateral disarmament, of course, is out of the question. We have learned some sad lessons in this respect. The control and reduction of world armaments, to serve our security and that of all people, must be effected in a way that will not upset the military balance. This is the essence of United States arms control and disarmament policy. Our immediate objective,

as I see it, is to control both nuclear and conventional weapons and then reverse the arms spiral so that we can reduce the risks of war and its attendant devastation. Ultimately, this could lead to our declared national goal of general disarmament--a goal that presupposes a substitute for armed might in settling differences among men. We may not yet have reached such a stage of development, but I, for one, believe it is possible.

A century ago, these United States pitted brother against brother in a blood bath of fraternal slaughter. But now, the rule of law governs our lives under a bond of common interest we all recognize and respect. The world community today is smaller than this country was at the time of the Civil War. I only hope that its perspective is broader, so that we can have peace in our time without the need of global conflict to accelerate a consensus. Otherwise, there may be nothing to salvage. It is imperative that we find ways towards disarmament and an international rule of law which can be an effective substitute for the use of force in settling disputes. This path, to be sure, is tremendously complicated and involves risks, but these risks, in perspective, are minimal compared to the ones we face in the absence of such goals.

The situations in Viet Nam and in other parts of the world demonstrate the importance of striving for these goals now--with all the resources we can command. In his message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference this year, President Johnson expressed this thought when he said:

> " . . . It is true that our meeting is shadowed by continuing aggression against the people and government of South Viet Nam. There are differences among the members of the Conference on Viet Nam, but these differences make our common interest in preventing nuclear spread and curbing the nuclear arms race all the more important to pursue. Even While our nation is engaged in necessary resistance to aggression in Southeast Asia, it must continue to pursue every avenue for a stable peace, both in Viet Nam and throughout the world. That great general effort has no more important set of goals than those of disarmament. . . ."

The control and reduction of arms on a world-wide basis can also release vast economic resources that could be applied

towards the unmet social and economic needs of mankind. In calendar year 1964, global defense expenditures exceeded $130 billion, an average of more than $40 for every man, woman and child on the face of the earth.

In the less-developed countries, average per capita incomes were less than $150, compared to over $1700 in the developed countries. Relative to per capita income, the cost of defense per person was almost as large in the less-developed countries as it was in the developed countries. It is particularly in countries with relatively low per capita incomes that the diversion of scarce resources from non-defense to defense sectors may be expected to affect adversely the attainment of economic goals.

World-wide expenditures on public education and health in 1964 were equivalent to $125 billion, less than the total defense expenditures for the same year. Taking public education alone, world outlays were only two-thirds of those for defense.

World defense expenditures have, of course, increased since 1964, but I have used that year as an illustrative example because the data base is well documented.

Dealing with the Problem

The questions arise: What have we done? What are we doing? And what more should we do to deal with the threat of weapons proliferation and this disproportionate global preoccupation with allocating resources to the arms race?

Our achievements are not inconsiderable but they are only a beginning -- and even the beginning suffered a long and terrible interruption. These first achievements began with President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal, and with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Then, in 1959, the first major step towards preventing expansion of the arms race into new environments was taken in the Antarctic Treaty, which reserves that continent to peaceful pursuits only.

But these early agreements were followed by the resumption of the Cold War, which culminated in the Berlin Wall of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis a year later. It is worth noting that only when we had reached, and then passed, the zenith of danger and tension were we brought back to hack away at the relatively undramatic process of building a safe peace. We will always come back to this -- assuming we

survive the danger, as we must. And each time we will advance--at least a little. That is what happened after Cuba. A few months after the crisis the United States and the Soviet Union signed the "hot line" agreement, which has improved and speeded up vital emergency communications between Washington and Moscow. It was a small crack which quickly widened enough to let a big agreement through -- the limited test ban treaty. Less than a year after Cuba, and almost immediately after the "hot line", the treaty was negotiated in Moscow.

As it developed, the test ban treaty did much more than stop deadly fallout over the world's surface. The wave of the world's relief produced a political backwash of incalculable importance. The fact that the two great nuclear powers had finally reached agreement on testing was the first sign that tensions between East and West were beginning to ease. And that process -- in spite of Viet Nam -- has yet to play itself out. In late 1963 Andrei Gromyko called it "this favorable wind." That wind immediately picked up another agreement, when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a resolution under which they and the entire membership of the United Nations pledged not to orbit weapons

of mass destruction in outer space.

These are what might be called the conditions of peacemaking. It is a tidal condition -- the ebb at the Cuban crisis, the flow beginning with the signing of the test ban treaty. The tidal nature of our opportunities is something we must understand and exploit. For the conditions of peacemaking are not always present, and when they are we must make the best of them. The settlement of differences often comes in clusters -- the conclusion of one agreement makes another possible.

The test ban treaty caught the tide. There followed a period in which the nations of the world pledged not to extend weapons to space; the recurrent Berlin crises receded; the cultural and scientific and commercial exchanges between East and West picked up muscle and momentum; the more than 90 nations of the International Atomic Energy Agency agreed on a system of safeguards over nuclear reactors to prevent their diversion to military uses; the situation in the Soviet satellite countries eased sufficiently so that those countries began to look toward the rich markets of the West and to their own independent role in an increasingly

prosperous Europe. Tensions in that part of the world became markedly less acute. The threat is not gone; it will be there for a long time. But what is also there -- what in fact has been created -- is a situation in which there is great potential for further movement.

It is rather like a long corridor of doors, each locked with a different key. The doors are opening. We are patiently looking for the key to the next one. It could be a non-proliferation treaty or a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The President is deeply aware of this. He has said that the heart of our concern in the years ahead must be our relationship with the Soviet Union. The nature of that relationship and the extent of our cooperation will inevitably influence these same factors among all the other countries of the two separate alliances.

a. The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

A new relationship was created at the Geneva disarmament conference after the limited test ban treaty was signed. For the first time since the conference began in 1962, our two countries were able to get down to work in an atmosphere free of polemics and the pressure of propaganda. And we have been working determinedly to harvest the fruits

--and both being currently negotiated--are a treaty insuring that the arms race will not extend to celestial bodies and a

of that atmosphere. The ripest of these ~~xxx a~~ treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The President has been unrelenting in his search for a solution to the differences which exist between this country and the Soviet Union over a non-proliferation treaty. Our negotiators are in a single-minded race with time to barricade the door against the sixth nuclear power, and to catch the opportunity in the tide before it ebbs too far.

I do not believe there is anyone here who does not by now understand what will happen if we don't have a non-proliferation treaty. What we may not have understood so well is what will happen if we do have a non-proliferation treaty. An agreement of this magnitude would be a great prize indeed. This is not only because of its inherent value in helping stop the spread of nuclear weapons, but also because it carries with it the potential for creating the conditions of peace we observed after the test ban treaty. It would not be unfair to expect that the conclusion of such a treaty would promote a relaxation of East-West tensions surpassing anything we have so far experienced -- and at a time when it has never been more needed. We do not need to

catalogue, or even to identify, the possibilities which may be opened up. But one thing is clear: an agreement, now, of such high importance would come as balm to a sorely wounded world.

b. The Non-Proliferation of Conventional Weapons

So much for nuclear non-proliferation efforts. What about the proliferation of so-called conventional arms to the developing areas of the world? Increasing public and political sentiment has reflected the feeling that this facet of the arms race must also be controlled. For conventional weapons proliferation is dangerous in itself as a source of conflict. But more importantly, these weapons can be the kindling for the fire of nuclear conflict.

Since the end of World War II there have been 379 military conflicts in which over 1,278,000 persons have been killed, not one by a nuclear weapon. This figure does not include those killed in the civil wars in China, estimated by Chiang Kai-shek to be 3,000,000. Neither does it include those killed in the Congo, in Cyprus, or in the Kashmir battles, since reliable statistics are not available. But it nevertheless illustrates the importance of the problem.

In his message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference this year, President Johnson said:

> ". . . as we focus on nuclear arms, let us not forget that resources are being devoted to nonnuclear arms races all around the world. These resources might

better be spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick, and teaching the uneducated. The cost of acquiring and maintaining one squadron of supersonic aircraft diverts resources that would build and maintain a university. We suggest therefore that countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige. The initiative for arrangements of this kind should of course, come, from the regions concerned. The interested countries should undertake not to acquire from any source, including production of their own as well as importation from others, military equipment which they proscribe. If such arrangements can be worked out and assurance can be given that they will be observed, the United States stands ready to respect them."

The President's suggestion for a regional approach as a means of controlling the acquisition of weapons was a practical one. There are many developing areas and new nations are emerging. Some of these nations are, in fact seeking arms for reasons of illusory prestige. Others are desirous of

spending their limited resources on economic development.

Because of the differences among various regions of the world, a common set of rules to control the flow of arms to all the developing areas--if indeed such a set of rules could be agreed upon--would be impracticable. Weapons that may be classed as "sophisticated" or "offensive" in one region may be "unsophisticated" or "defensive" in another. This distinction is important not only to regions trying to achieve stability but to the supplier in determining the legitimacy of military aid.

There are, of course, those "merchants of death" whose unconscionable practices are motivated by mercenary gain regardless of the consequences. Greater effort must be made to control these practices in the countries where they originate and a greater public awareness of the tremendous harm they are doing will help foster such control. But there are also legitimate spheres of military aid, which, although they might bear closer scrutiny, do not constitute an abuse of arms.

It is important to realize, in this regard, the distinction between our own military assistance to <u>developed</u> countries and

aid to developing countries. In the former, we are helping our allies meet their defense needs to our mutual advantage. These military assistance sales do not conflict with the necessary economic development of such countries.

Some developing nations, on the other hand, have not yet met the minimum needs of their people for social and economic progress. They are nevertheless inclined to divert a disproportionate amount of badly needed resources to defense.

Secretary McNamara has advocated military aid to developing nations with such training and equipment as is necessary to maintain the protective shield behind which development can go forward. The dimensions of that shield vary from country to country and from region to region but, as he pointed out, "what is essential is that it should be a shield and not a capacity for external aggression". Through our military assistance program to some of these countries we try to help them put their real defense needs in perspective. Secretary McNamara has cited case histories in point. In one case, we insisted that the country reduce its military strength by 20 per cent as a condition to receiving military assistance. In another, we required the country to reduce by 35 per cent

its foreign exchange budget set aside for military procurement from foreign nations over a five-year period.

Congress, in the military assistance chapter of the recently enacted "Foreign Assistance Act of 1966", gave additional perspective to the need of controlling the proliferation of conventional arms. It added a new section which provides: "Programs for the sale or exchange of defense articles or defense services under this chapter shall be administered so as to encourage regional arms control and disarmament agreements and so as to discourage arms races." This mandate is consistent with the stated policy of the Executive Branch.

Although we should, of course, cooperate with all regions of the world seeking to control the arms race within those regions, there are two that deserve special consideration today. In both Latin America and Africa, proposals have been initiated for regional nuclear free zones. During the past year, representatives of Latin American countries have been meeting in Mexico City and elsewhere trying to work out the terms of an agreement. We have declared our support for

these efforts. I believe that we should also do everything we can to work with countries in these regions to control the conventional arms race.

Last August President Johnson, in addressing a meeting of the Organization of American States, pointed out that military budgets in Latin America are not exceptionally large by general world standards. But, he said "in these Americas, where by solemn treaty and by established practice our governments are bound to resolve disputes by peaceful means, we just must find a way to avoid the cost of procuring and maintaining unnecessary military equipment that will take clothes off the backs and food away from the stomachs and education away from the minds of our children".

As for Africa, President Nyerere of Tanzania recently said in an address in Somalia: "the net result can only be the weakening of Africa as each nation spends its resources buying arms instead of buying machinery for new factories, or uses the arms it has been given in order to destroy the progress made in another part of the continent". He pointed out that Africa needs arms sufficient to uphold law and order. "But", he continued, "our real security and freedom

does not depend on large national armies. It depends on economic progress, on our unity in Africa, and on our united diplomacy."

It would be sad indeed if these noble sentiments fell on deaf or indifferent ears.

c. The Non-Proliferation of Biological Weapons

Finally, I would like to address myself to the question of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

Not long ago, a group of distinguished American scientists called for a cessation of the use of chemical antipersonnel and anticrop weapons in Viet Nam. They alleged such restraint would spare civilian suffering and help prevent a "chemical and biological arms race."

The concerns of these scientists about a CW/BW arms race is a valid one. It is an area that could well lend itself to control. But let us look at the problem in perspective. Non-lethal tear gas, which is used around the world by police forces to control riots, and non-lethal herbicides, available to home gardeners, are really what we are talking about. These chemical agents are being used in Viet Nam, but our military experts tell us they accomplish necessary objectives with less suffering and effort. They point out that flushing the Viet Cong out with tear gas is more humane than bombing them out in many instances where women and children could be fatalities. Certainly no one

would advocate the latter instead of the former in quelling domestic riots. This is not "poison gas" warfare in the context of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, as some Communist propagandists would have us believe.

But what are the possibilities of arms control initiatives in this field?

For a number of years, we, in common with many other nations, have considered it necessary to keep up with scientific developments in the rapidly expanding fields of the chemical and biological sciences and to inform our defense leaders of the consequences of these developments in order that proper attention can be given to our defenses and countermeasures. With such a policy, the prospects of a chemical or biological warfare attack are kept at high risk for any would-be aggressor. It is important in this connection, however, to distinguish biological warfare from chemical. Joshua Lederberg, Professor of Genetics at the Stanford University School of Medicine and recipient of the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1958, recently pointed out: "Biological

warfare should be carefully set apart, particularly for the initiative in international negotiations." He gave several persuasive reasons with which I have long concurred.

In 1960, as Chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I pointed out the need to institute studies of ways and means in which these weapons could be controlled. I am pleased to report that since that time studies of this nature have been initiated by this Administration.

Let me point out just two of the reasons why I believe that biological weapons should be brought under international control.

First is the uncertainty of their effects. Meteorological factors have such a complex effect on their use that the results of a mass attack with these weapons are virtually unpredictable. Once an epidemic of some disease is started, its development cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy. Professor Lederberg said, "The large-scale deployment of infectious agents is a potential threat against the whole species: mutant forms of viruses could well develop that would spread over the earth's population for a new

Black Death." Therefore, the very existence of biological weapons poses a threat to the entire fabric of human society.

My second reason is related to the problem of proliferation. As with other weapons, the risk of the spread of biological weapons to an ever-increasing number of countries is a real threat. In contrast to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is to some extent constrained by technological and economic factors, biological warfare weapons would be relatively simple to produce even for countries with only a small fund of economic and scientific resources. A world in which this sort of power was available to virtually any nation or group that wanted to use it would be unthinkable. In a negotiating context, therefore, it would seem that, in the CW/BW field, the most important place to start instituting control mechanisms is where the greatest threat lies -- in the field of bacteriological warfare.

In my judgment, the time has come to do something more about the threat of such warfare than merely preparing oneself to fend off possible attack. We should earnestly explore the possibilities of assuring that the efforts of biologists are devoted exclusively towards an all-out war against disease. There are many diseases of the world for which no

adequate vaccine or measures of protection are available. What a magnificent thing it would be if the solution of serious disease problems could be pursued at the expense of any effort to perfect means for biological warfare.

Regardless of nationalities or ideologies, we in this world have a common interest in defeating the universal enemies of disease and famine. What better way to start than to abolish the threat of biological warfare. Such an effort, like other arms control objectives, would broaden the perspective with which we should view security.

* * *

In conclusion I would like to emphasize that no one man and no one government can unilaterally bring peace to the world. The days of Pax Romana and Pax Britannica are past. But the individual resources of men and governments, collectively applied, can and must evolve a consensus on how best to promote peace in our time. And leisure or indifference in the pursuit of peace is a luxury none of us can afford -- for our future and that of our children are hanging in the balance.

To Halt Nuclear Spread

The newly formed Educational Committee to Halt Atomic Weapons Spread may be right in believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a greater danger to world peace and security than the war in Vietnam.

The committee may be accurate in asserting that the main obstacle to agreement with the Soviet Union on a nuclear freeze is the unresolved question of whether the United States will ever share ownership and control of atomic weapons with West Germany.

It is questionable, however, whether the dramatic declaration the committee asks President Johnson to make—that the United States will never give up its veto over the "ownership, control and use" of its nuclear weapons to West Germany or anyone else—would unblock the road to a workable treaty.

And for the President abruptly to notify Dr. Erhard of such a proclamation during the West German Chancellor's imminent visit to Washington—as Committee Chairman Arthur Larson urges—would be bad tactics, bad diplomacy and bad manners.

* * *

No responsible West German leader now advocates acquisition of national nuclear arms. But short of universal disarmament, no Bonn Government could renounce even a voice in the shaping of alliance strategy—including nuclear strategy—for the defense of Germany and Western Europe.

In its exposed position, any Bonn government, in fact, will find it increasingly hard to accept denial of any meaningful role in nuclear strategy while its British and French allies continue to maintain independent nuclear forces.

Neither West Germany nor any other country involved can be asked to forgo the eventual political union of Europe. That union, however distant, could embrace the nuclear forces of both France and Britain. As a member of the union, Germany might then come into a measure of "control" over nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union has every right to an ironclad guarantee against acquisition of a national nuclear arsenal by West Germany. The Soviets may demand a bar even to the limited German role projected for a nuclear multilateral force. The United States could accommodate Moscow on these points in return for agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. But the cause the committee seeks to advance could be set back if Washington, in haste to satisfy Moscow, created an intolerable political problem for West Germany, without whose participation a non-proliferation treaty would be meaningless.

Needed Crackdown

The ticketing and towing of illegally parked cars in midtown is overdue and should be expanded to a broader area—with no favorites played—until the parking and towaway zone signs are believed everywhere, parking regulations are obeyed, and traffic moves more freely. Anonymous charges attributed to policemen that the crackdown is a mere plot, to make the police unpopular before the election referendum on the Police Complaint Review Board, are absurd. It is actually a plot to enforce the law and make the business district a zone of activity, not stagnation. It benefits infinitely more people than it hurts, and those it hurts know how to avoid future penalties.

JER/bje FOR-REL:VP's speech on arms control

September 27, 1966

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. George Bunn - ACDA

FROM: John E. Rielly

I mentioned to you that the Vice President wanted to include in his speech on arms control not only a discussion of the question of nuclear proliferation, but also the subject of proliferation of conventional arms. The attached two articles by Alastair Buchan and Eugene McCarthy illustrate the theme he would like to discuss. I realize it is difficult to do this without openly attacking U.S. Government policy, but he would like to try. I think these articles would be useful for whoever on your staff is working on this.

Attachments (2):
1- The U.S.: Supplies of Weapons to the World
by Eugene McCarthy
2- Arms Nobody Wants To Control
by Alastair Buchan

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

file Arms Control Speech Autumn 1966

September 9, 1966

Memo for John R.
cc: Ted
From The Vice President

Note attached on nuclear weapons. As I told you before, I want us to prepare a first-class speech on arms control and the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons. I want it for one of our university audiences.

L.R

January 12, 1966

MEMO

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Ted

I call to your attention the attached article from the New Republic re proliferation of nuclear weapons. I think it is worth reading.

military buildup which many think is contrary to the war-outlawing Constitution. A conservative paper, the Japanese *Economist*, says forthrightly that "there is probably no one who does not know it is the US which is demanding the increasing and strengthening of Japan's defense power." The journal criticizes the "attitude of trying to determine all matters with the sense that America's enemies are naturally Japan's enemies," and says this has strained US-Japan relations. American authorities, it adds reproachfully, "do not really understand that Japan is not a part of the US."

The Japanese *Economist* says there is decidedly a "great chasm" between public opinion in the US and in Japan toward China and toward Communism in Asia and because of this, US officials are descending on Tokyo hoping to bring the Japanese around to the American way of thinking. But it warns that the mentality that equates freedom with anti-Communism may fail to perceive that the cooling of US-Japan relations would be more perilous for American policy than any reversal in Southeast Asia, including the Communization of South Vietnam.

Such a cooling is in prospect. The *Yomiuri Shimbun*, a mass circulation newspaper, says the US "should stop bullying the weak" and that the affairs of Asia should be settled by the Asians themselves.

Keeping the Lid on Nuclear Weapons

by Carl Kaysen and Jeremy J. Stone

In "What About a Nuclear Guarantee for India?" (*NR* December 25), Roger D. Masters suggests a nuclear armed India as the best way to contain China. The essence of his argument seems to be: that the purpose of nuclear guarantees has been to establish an Indian check on Chinese ambitions; that these guarantees will not work; that a nuclear-armed India could do the job; that proliferation is inevitable; hence that we should acquiesce in it, and endorse an Indian nuclear capability, rather than maintain ourselves on the Asian mainland. This argument has a great many problems.

First of all, nuclear guarantees for India have *not* been proposed as a "way of establishing an Asian power that could balance China"; hence arguments against such guarantees do not "force one to consider alternative means of checking China." The guarantees were proposed to slow the spread of nuclear weapons to India. This initial misconception makes of Mr. Masters' later discussion a sustained non sequitur.

Second, the arguments against extending nuclear guarantees that seem to Mr. Masters to be "persuasive" are: that such guarantees did not prevent Britain, France and China from becoming nuclear powers; that they are not "truly credible" against subversion or conventional attack; and that China has promised not to use nuclear weapons first. None of these can be persuasive arguments against extending a nuclear guarantee, because none ascribe any costs to so doing. In any case, the guarantees possessed by Britain, France and China were not provided in exchange for nuclear restraint; on the contrary, Britain and China got assistance in developing nuclear weapons from their protectors! "Truly credible" or not, nuclear guarantees have been useful in NATO for 15 years. And invocation of the Chinese no-first-use announcement is hardly relevant.

Third, he argues that "in the long run, Indian military forces equal to those of China" would provide us with a "neutral India capable of checking Peking without the direct intervention of . . . the United States." In this fashion does the argument slide from supposing Indian nuclear weapons to supposing, as well, an enormous conventional force; this implicitly concedes that Indian nuclear weapons would not suffice to permit us to stand aloof from Indian-Chinese conflicts. But even with such a force, India would not be able to "check" China in Vietnam, Taiwan or Thailand, or fill our commitments to Japan, the Philippines, Australia or anyone else – except India. Whatever it means to "check" China, India can't possibly do it. A nuclear-armed India is not an alternative to a US presence in Asia – on the mainland or off.

In general, Masters' ideas about deterrence are strikingly simple, *e.g.*: "Peking could hope to deter American assistance to India by threatening to trigger a Russo-American nuclear exchange, thereby leaving the field open to a possibly successful limited war"; "Because

CARL KAYSEN, *former Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, is the Lucius N. Littauer professor of political economy at Harvard;* JEREMY J. STONE *is a Research Associate at Harvard's Center for International Affairs.*

September 19, 1966

SECRET

Non-Proliferation Agreement

The discussions which have recently been held in the Geneva disarmament conference have raised a real possibility that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could come to an agreement in the near future to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. I believe an agreement could be negotiated which would not prevent the consultative arrangements like the McNamara Committee and which would not interfere with the existing bilateral arrangements which we already have with various of our NATO allies.

Such an agreement could not be reached, however, until we have reached a decision not to press forward with the MLF, the ANF or the various other "hardware" solutions of nuclear sharing which have been considered from time to time. I think the time has now come when it is in the best interests of the United States to drop further considerations of these possible solutions. None of our NATO allies, except possibly the FRG, wants even to consider them further. The FRG is more interested in keeping them available for consideration as a theoretical matter rather than ever actually putting one of them into effect. With a very few exceptions, sentiment in the Congress and the country at large is very strongly against them.

I think that, under the circumstances, the time has come when we should drop further consideration of these "hardware" solutions and come to an agreement on a non-proliferation treaty with the U.S.S.R. I realize that this will present Chancellor Erhard with a real problem but it is one which is going to get worse rather than better if we put off coming to a clean solution of it. If we continue to assert that we are actively considering "hardware" solutions we are not only putting a needless impediment in the way of negotiating a non-proliferation agreement with the U.S.S.R., but we are really misleading the FRG as we know there is very little likelihood that any such agreement will go into effect.

I think we would be better advised to tell Chancellor Erhard that we don't think a hardware solution is in the cards, work with him as to the best way to solve his political problems and then, as quickly as we can, come to a non-proliferation

agreement with the USSR while we still have the time.

Test Ban

My analysis of the reports from the disarmament negotiators at Geneva has persuaded me that we will not be able to achieve a comprehensive test ban as long as we insist upon on-site inspections on Soviet territory. However, new studies by the agency of the Air Force now responsible for monitoring Soviet tests show that we can identify with high confidence all Soviet tests above a few kilotons with the addition of tamper-proof automatic stations in the Soviet Union to the present excellent U.S. monitoring system.

The United States is therefore faced with the choice as to whether or not concern over cheating in the area of very small tests should require us to forego a test ban with the probable result that Soviet progress in nuclear weapons development and the possible testing by other countries would have a greater adverse effect on U.S. security interest than any possible cheating could have.

The Eisenhower Administration in 1958 decided that the risk of continued testing in all areas was greater and was prepared to assume the relatively smaller risk of cheating with nuclear explosions of a few kilotons.

I, therefore, recommend that you consider a new initiative in the test ban field based on the addition of tamper-proof, automatic stations in the Soviet Union to the present U.S. system.

Reprinted from
THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW
Volume 42, Number 4, Autumn 1966

THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

Volume 42 AUTUMN 1966 Number 4

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTAINMENT

BY MASON WILLRICH

IN the late spring of 1963 President Kennedy, in an historic address at American University, called for a basic re-examination of our attitudes toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the Cold War. This was at a time when negotiations with the Soviet Union on a nuclear test ban appeared to be stalled on dead center. The question was rapidly becoming not whether, but when, the United States should begin another large-scale series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. But it was also a time when the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis were still fresh in our minds. In October, 1962, as never before nor since, nuclear restraint was demonstrated to be imperative for both the Soviet Union and the United States.

President Kennedy's speech in 1963 was climaxed by the announcement of a last-ditch effort to obtain agreement with the Soviet Union to stop further nuclear testing, if not in all environments including underground, then at least in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, where the risks of clandestine tests were minimal. The ensuing negotiations

resulted in a breakthrough. The treaty was aptly characterized by Kennedy as "a shaft of light cut into the darkness." However, the bright light in 1963 of the nuclear test ban treaty was soon reduced to a glimmer by conflict and chaos in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

In this atmosphere since the nuclear test ban treaty was achieved, efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons—or nonproliferation—have occupied top priority among United States arms control objectives. Two major factors, one political and the other technological, will have a determining effect on future possibilities for nonproliferation.

A salient feature of international politics today is the trend toward decentralization. Alliances on both sides of the Iron Curtain are loosening. While formally adhering to the substance of the North Atlantic Treaty, France has declared her independence from the organizational framework for its implementation. On the other side, Rumania is charting an increasingly independent course for itself within and outside the Warsaw Pact. Western analysts have scrutinized the polycentric tendencies in Eastern Europe for years. It would seem, however, that similar forces have been growing and are now even stronger in the West. Therefore, few problems can be analyzed today in the simple bipolar terms possible in the late 1940's and early 1950's.

Furthermore, the United Nations has been virtually transformed by the recent doubling in its membership into a new organization with different emphases in purposes and procedures. This institution, too, reflects the trend toward decentralization and multiplication of power centers.

What has happened to the relative positions of the United States and the Soviet Union in the process of international decentralization? It is one of the ironies of politics that the gap between the superpowers and other nations in raw military might has continued to widen even as the difference in political weight has narrowed. The military forces of each superpower serve largely to cancel out the other's. More-

over, much of the armament on each side is not useful other than in a nuclear confrontation. Therefore, both the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves in a political environment where their usable power has at most a marginal and perhaps diminishing influence on the broad course of international events.

The outstanding technological trend is that plutonium is destined to become a common industrial commodity. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the discovery of plutonium was recently celebrated. This synthetic fissionable material which does not exist in nature is one of the basic ingredients of nuclear weapons stockpiles. As such it is in superabundant supply in the United States and Soviet Union.

Plutonium is also an inevitable byproduct of burning nuclear fuel in the reactors which are used for producing electric power. The amount of plutonium that will shortly be available, for good or ill, as a result of production in civil nuclear power plants is staggering. It is estimated that by 1970 nuclear power stations in the world will be producing plutonium at an annual rate of 8000 kilograms per year. On the basis of 5 kilograms per bomb this amounts to the equivalent of 1600 crude Nagasaki-type bombs. By 1975 the annual plutonium production rate will have increased to between 23,000 and 35,000 kilograms, or several thousand bombs per year. Of course, the accumulated totals of plutonium spread around the world as a result of past production will be much larger. Even though much of it will become commercially important for recycling as fuel in advanced types of reactors which are being developed, the mere presence of such vast amounts of fissionable material in so many countries will create a potential threat to international security, if uncontrolled.

II

These political and technological trends supply the background for discussing the possibilities and prospects for a policy of nuclear weapons containment.

The nuclear test ban treaty, by restricting to the underground environment the nuclear testing programs of the 116 signatories, has itself a marginal effect in retarding the spread of nuclear weapons. However, the restraints imposed by the treaty on *potential* nuclear powers seem to have been largely offset by pressures in the opposite direction generated by the nuclear achievements of Communist China, one of the two major countries (France being the other) which have refused to adhere to the treaty.

We should bear in mind that the test ban treaty recognizes the right of any party to withdraw if it decides that "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." Moreover, the vigorous underground nuclear test programs conducted by both the United States and Soviet Union since the test ban treaty have resulted in an occasional accidental venting of radioactive material into the atmosphere. These slips by the major nuclear powers cannot but erode the prohibition on any nuclear explosion which "causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted." While the limited nuclear test ban treaty, therefore, made an initial contribution toward nonproliferation, its effects in this regard were neither sufficient nor necessarily lasting.

Since the test ban, the major political effort in the arms control field has been directed at the achievement of agreement on a broad treaty which would, on the one hand, prohibit states possessing nuclear weapons from transferring them to states not already having such weapons, and, on the other, prohibit states not already having nuclear weapons from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring them. Both the non-transfer and non-acquisition sides of the agreement raise serious difficulties. Moreover, international restraints on the proliferation of nuclear weapons are interwoven with other security issues.

We should recognize at the outset that a tacit agreement among the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons already exists. It is true that prior to 1960 the Soviet Union gave Communist China nuclear reactors, fuel, and other assistance which was valuable in China's initial development of nuclear weapons. But Soviet nuclear aid to Communist China is the one probable exception thus far to parallel policies among the nuclear powers against direct assistance for a nuclear weapons program in a non-nuclear state.

The difference between the United States and the Soviet Union on the non-transfer obligation of a nonproliferation treaty is illustrated by the language of their respective draft treaties. The Soviet proposal, by prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons "indirectly . . . through . . . groups of states" and of "control over . . . their emplacement and use," would clearly bar West German participation in a variety of proposals for sharing nuclear defense responsibilities among NATO members, and conceivably existing "two key" arrangements as well. The United States proposal, however, by prohibiting transfer "into the control of any association of non-nuclear-weapons states" would still permit transfers to an association of states in which a present nuclear power and West Germany participated.

A multilateral nuclear force (MLF) was initially put forward in 1960 to meet the NATO Supreme Commander's requirement for a European-based missile force to counter the more than 700 Soviet missiles targeted against Western Europe. The MLF, it was argued, would also contribute to the further integration of NATO forces and avoid the creation of additional national nuclear capabilities. However, critics of the MLF have asserted that the effect of the proposal on NATO has been divisive, since it tended to drive West Germany and France apart. Moreover, it is argued that its effect on proliferation has been to stimulate rather than mollify German nuclear aspirations, and that the insistence of the United States on keeping the NATO nuclear

sharing option open has been the one obstacle to a nonproliferation agreement with the Soviet Union.

Critical decisions in foreign policy are frequently concerned with priorities and timing rather than substance. At any given moment a foreign ministry is pursuing many different lines of policy which potentially conflict. Conflicts in substance are frequently resolved by according one policy priority over another. Therefore, a switch in priorities can signify a definite change of direction.

Up to now United States policy dealing with NATO nuclear defense has taken priority over United States policy to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. However, a reversal of this priority may now be in order. President Johnson, by a series of astute maneuvers centered around his meetings with Britain's Prime Minister Wilson in December, 1964, and with West Germany's Chancellor Erhard in December, 1965, managed to pass the initiative for nuclear sharing proposals back to our West European allies. This has reintroduced enough flexibility into the United States position so that a switch in priorities should not now be precluded simply because of the prestige the United States has committed to the MLF project.

Furthermore, in July, 1966, President Johnson expressed the hope that "the Soviet Union will meet us and find an acceptable compromise in language we both can live with." The President's characteristically obscure press conference remarks may, in this instance, have been directed as much at contending factions in his own Executive Branch as at policy makers in the Kremlin.

It is arguable that in the past a nonproliferation agreement should have taken a back seat because a strong Atlantic Community, including an integrated Western Europe, was the top priority objective of United States foreign policy. Moreover, once the NATO nuclear force was afloat and the Soviets had learned that they could live with it, their objection to United States proposals for a nonproliferation agreement would disappear.

However, the essential ingredient of an Atlantic Community—a Western European desire for such a Community—has not become a dominant force in European politics. In fact, the present trend toward a loosening of the NATO alliance is one which, whether desirable or not, the United States seems incapable of reversing. The prerequisite for integrating West Germany into NATO—a cohesive NATO structure—no longer exists. It would be a mistake to believe that the United States can now use a close bilateral association with West Germany as the nexus for an Atlantic Community.

Given the irresistible drift in European politics, in which General de Gaulle is probably as much a catalyst as a moving force, we should also re-examine the French position. France may have disrupted the orderly growth of supranational European institutions and destroyed the vision of a close-knit Atlantic Community. But French policies have also introduced a fluidity into European politics that has been badly needed, particularly in relations between the Eastern and Western halves. The increased fluidity offers opportunities as well as problems for the United States.

A look at France and the Soviet Union with the German problem in mind may be revealing. A Germany armed with nuclear weapons would destroy any possibility for balance and stability in Europe for the foreseeable future. This is true for either a divided or a reunited Germany. On this essential for the long-term security of both halves of Europe, Washington should recognize fundamental agreement with Moscow and Paris.

It may be argued that West German confidence in the United States would be destroyed and that the risks of resurgent German nationalism and emulation of French nuclear policies would be increased. But there are signs that the West Germans are more in tune with the political realities of their own position than that. It was only after a strong United States sales pitch that the West German government began to take interest in "hardware" solutions to

the NATO nuclear sharing problem. The establishment in 1965 of a Select Committee composed of the Defense Ministers of ten NATO members (Belgium, Denmark, Canada, Greece, Italy, Turkey, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States, in addition to West Germany) to discuss ways to improve allied participation in nuclear policy and planning should help satisfy German desires for increased consultation in this field. Even now it is probable that many West German officials view the MLF option as primarily a counterweight for bargaining purposes in future reunification negotiations. Moreover, the Social Democrats are becoming more vocal in favor of a less rigid West German policy toward reunification, as well as nuclear arms control.

Finally, we should note that, aside from West Germany, the general sentiment of the balance of our NATO allies is increasingly in favor of further steps toward a liquidation of the Cold War. Although the Soviet missile threat remains, the presence of substantial numbers of United States troops in West Germany will probably continue to be the most effective practicable guarantee that the United States will defend Western Europe against a Soviet nuclear attack.

In the present atmosphere in Europe, what would be the effects of the United States giving up the option of creating a multilateral nuclear force in NATO and moving ahead with a nonproliferation agreement with the Soviet Union? Such a shift could answer the aspirations of the majority of our allies for infusing into NATO a positive policy of accommodation to supplement its negative premise of deterrence. Even France has publicly favored nonproliferation as a policy concept. While the present West German government might not warmly receive a move in this direction, it would be hard pressed not to subscribe to the non-acquisition clauses of the treaty. Moreover, a nonproliferation agreement with the Soviet Union might well facilitate the creation of a political situation in which broader questions concerning the future shape of Germany could be more fruit-

fully discussed than at present, and in this sense the West Germans would not be giving up something for nothing.

III

Non-transfer of nuclear weapons is only one side of a nonproliferation treaty. The other side is non-acquisition on the part of nations without existing nuclear weapons capabilities. NATO nuclear sharing problems aside, the United States and Soviet Union would have little trouble agreeing on suitable language to encompass the obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons by manufacture or otherwise. However, it is not on them that these provisions will bear.

Nonproliferation is an inherently discriminatory concept. It seeks to perpetuate the status quo of a world with five states possessing nuclear weapons and the rest without. In taking the pledge of nuclear weapons abstinence, a state would be renouncing its right to acquire what some believe to be the ultimate ingredient of sovereignty in the nuclear age. Furthermore, several nations may be reluctant to relinquish their nuclear options when they believe they may require nuclear weapons in the future to offset either a nuclear threat from one of the five, as with India, or the growing conventional superiority of a hostile neighbor, as with Israel.

Several non-nuclear nations, therefore, look on nonproliferation with decidedly mixed feelings. On the one hand, East-West accommodation is in their broad general interest; on the other, a pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons may create some very specific feelings of insecurity as well as arouse vague notions of being placed in a permanently inferior status.

The nuclear powers, and in particular the United States and Soviet Union, must be responsive to these sentiments if nonproliferation is to be a viable political concept. The notion that the major nuclear powers could simply guarantee

the security against nuclear attack of nations subscribing to a non-acquisition pledge has been suggested as a possible quid pro quo for a pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons in the future. However, such commitments would have a profound impact on existing United States security guarantees, and to be effective they may well require nuclear force deployments which could make the cure worse than the disease. Moreover, acceptance of a nuclear guarantee from either the United States or the Soviet Union alone would largely compromise the position of any nonaligned nation, while a joint United States-Soviet guarantee would require a degree of East-West co-operation that is below the horizon of political reality today.

But the problems on the non-nuclear side are not confined to finding satisfactory solutions to the more immediate security problems of non-nuclear nations. In addition, civil nuclear power industries in many non-nuclear countries are creating problems of regulation and control which affect the feasibility of nonproliferation as a continuing policy. A two-part division of the world into states which have nuclear weapons and states which do not is, therefore, perhaps too simple. The civil nuclear industry in a country which already has a nuclear weapons program may be little cause for concern in a nonproliferation context. The genie is already out of the bottle in these nations. However, for sound economic reasons many countries without nuclear weapons, such as Japan, India, Israel, and Sweden, are looking to nuclear energy as a primary source of electric power in the future.

As previously indicated, the worldwide plutonium production rate for civil nuclear reactors will reach the equivalent of thousands of crude fission bombs per year in the 1970's. Moreover, a single medium-size power reactor produces enough plutonium for tens of bombs per year. Therefore, unless comprehensive accountability and control of nuclear materials in nations which do not already have nuclear

weapons is achieved in the near future, other efforts to prevent or retard the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities will become meaningless.

Various internationally administered systems of control, or "safeguards," to ensure that the nuclear materials utilized in research and industrial programs are not diverted to any military purposes are being applied on an increasingly widespread basis. The European Atomic Energy Community has safeguards responsibilities with respect to civil nuclear programs on the territory of the six members of the Community. The European Nuclear Energy Agency, composed of members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), also administers safeguards on certain joint nuclear projects of its members.

However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957 with a global membership, offers the only practical organizational approach in the long run to the international control problem presented by the growing use of nuclear energy as a source of electric power. The development of detailed safeguards procedures, which consist of a system of records keeping, reports, and on-site verification by international inspectors, has kept pace—barely—with progress in the development of an international nuclear market. Utilization of the IAEA as the instrument for administration of safeguards on civil nuclear industries has increased markedly. This can be largely attributed to the United States policy, firmly adopted in 1962, of transferring to the IAEA the safeguards responsibilities with respect to its bilateral agreements with other countries under the Atoms for Peace program.

Under trilateral safeguards transfer agreements the IAEA had, as of March, 1966, agreed to apply safeguards to fourteen United States (Argentina, Austria, Brazil, China, Greece, Iran, Israel, Japan, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Thailand, and Vietnam), two United

Kingdom (Denmark and Japan), and one Canadian (Japan) bilateral nuclear supply agreements. The United States had also voluntarily placed four of its own reactor facilities under IAEA safeguards, including one commercial power reactor, and the United Kingdom had invited the application of Agency safeguards to two power reactors in Great Britain. In addition, the IAEA had agreed to administer safeguards on nuclear projects in eight countries (Argentina, Congo (Leopoldville), Finland, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia) which had obtained assistance through the Agency itself, rather than directly from a supplier nation. Furthermore, Canada, a country which is among those having the largest known uranium reserves, declared in June, 1965, that it would make no future sales of uranium without a peaceful-uses guarantee and appropriate verification measures.

Acceptance of safeguards on a few nuclear facilities in the United States has not had a significant direct impact on the proliferation problem since the quantities of safeguarded nuclear materials here, although substantial in absolute terms, are insignificant when compared with the size of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile. Nevertheless, implementation of safeguards in the United States has demonstrated to other countries that the procedures involved neither interfere with the economic operation of nuclear power reactors, nor result in disclosure of commercial secrets. Moreover, such a demonstration may serve to undercut vague notions articulated by some governments that acceptance of safeguards infringes national sovereignty.

The Soviet Union has supported the development of a strong system of safeguards procedures by the IAEA. However, it has thus far not requested the IAEA to apply the system either to any of its bilateral nuclear assistance agreements or to any of its own civil nuclear facilities.

Despite the reluctance of the Communist states, except Yugoslavia, to participate actively, remarkable progress has

clearly been achieved in bringing Atoms for Peace programs under international inspection. Looking to the future of safeguards, however, three broad problem areas are discernible.

The first is economic. The world market for nuclear materials and equipment is expanding. The requirement for safeguards as a condition of export of nuclear materials or equipment is presently a matter left up to each individual nation to decide. As the number of sellers and buyers in the nuclear marketplace increases, the temptation for a seller to bargain away safeguards in order to make a deal will increase and perhaps become irresistible in some cases. Therefore, it is imperative that a common understanding be reached among nuclear exporters to require safeguards so that this item will be taken off the commercial bargaining table. Because of the complexity of the nuclear market and number of countries involved, some centralized system of administration will probably be necessary.

The second problem area is technological. We are moving from a period of scarcity to one of temporary overabundance of plutonium for commercial purposes. The commercial demands for plutonium will increase substantially if plutonium can be recycled in the kinds of reactors now being built and if breeder reactors, which produce more fissionable material than they consume, are successfully developed as expected. However, the breeder concept implies both the production and utilization of huge quantities of plutonium, while relatively small quantities of this material are sufficient for a militarily significant weapons stockpile. In these circumstances, the technical accuracy and allowable margin of error of any system of accountability and control will become increasingly important. A two or three per cent diversion rate from a large plant for the chemical processing of irradiated nuclear fuels, if undetected by an international safeguards system, could have substantial military significance. Therefore, as the amounts of nuclear materials in-

volved are increased, the accepted operating tolerances in a safeguards system must be lowered and the efficiency of the system refined.

The third major problem area, probably the most difficult of all, is political. Safeguards must be accepted on a comprehensive basis by countries without nuclear weapons capabilities. If the outside world is to have assurance that the civil nuclear industry in a country does not cover a clandestine military aspect, not only nuclear projects built with imports, but also nuclear facilities built out of indigenous resources must be subject to inspection. This requires countries without nuclear weapons to believe that voluntary submission to international inspection or even the "home grown" parts of their nuclear industries is in their national interest.

IV

Today we are at a crossroads in the nuclear age in some ways comparable to the period 1946-1949. Then it was still not clear whether there would be several nations possessing nuclear weapons or none. The Baruch Plan of 1946 would have made none a possibility, but an explicit requirement of the proposals was supranational control of nuclear energy, and implicit was the idea of world government.

Twenty years later there are five nuclear nations, happily the same five that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, although the representation of one is contested. The spread of national nuclear weapons capabilities has reached a possible, and in some ways realistic, stopping place. Beyond the present five, where can the line be drawn?

The issues raised by a policy of nuclear weapons containment are at least as complex, and perhaps as intractable, as those raised by the Baruch Plan. A permanent division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear nations would require change in our traditional concepts of sov-

ereignty and new approaches to collective security in a world of nuclear plenty. Moreover, we must ask ourselves whether such a division can be really permanent, or whether the number five must be reduced, if it is not eventually to be increased.

The technological forces at work give us perhaps a year or two, but not decades, to evolve a solution to the problem. Fortunately, political developments in Europe have created a rare opportunity for the United States to move toward agreement with the Soviet Union in a way which can improve relations with our NATO allies, including France, and perhaps lead to a more viable German policy.

It may yet be said that the time is wrong as far as Asia is concerned. But the stakes are at least as high in containing nuclear proliferation as they are in containing wars of national liberation.

While we must not overestimate the power of either the United States or the Soviet Union, acting unilaterally, to affect the course of international events, we must not underestimate the political force of the United States and the Soviet Union acting in concert. The common interest between the United States and Soviet Union which underlies nonproliferation is more fundamental than the common interest on which the nuclear test ban treaty is based.

The relationship of the United States to the Soviet Union is a hinge which could anchor a more stable world. We must not become so preoccupied with Vietnam and containment of Communist China that this essential political possibility becomes completely obscured.

MEMORANDUM

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

non-prolif speech

October 25, 1966

Memo for John Rielly
cc: Ted
From The Vice President

On the nuclear proliferation speech, consult with Butch Fisher. I want this one to be really good, and we can give it almost anytime. There are many platforms suitable for this.

The decade of development speech would be good for the National Council of Churches, which I am to address December 7.

And the Alliance for Progress speech for any one of several universities that we are looking forward to.

On that decade of development, we want to emphasize the war on hunger theme plus the political and economic development.

So get these speeches in shape so that I can review them. I would like to have them on my desk for purposes of discussion with you and others.

JER/bje FOR-REL:non-proliferation speech for VP '67

Non-prolif speech 1967

December 27, 1966

MEMORANDUM

TO : Ted Van Dyk

FROM: John Rielly

I have been holding a draft speech on non-proliferation since September which ACDA sent over. It is a mediocre job and needs to be revised completely. I have not been successful in my efforts to line up a platform suitable for a speech on this subject.

I have no strong views as to whether this should be a speech or an article. However, I am absolutely certain that Foreign Affairs would have no interest whatsoever unless it contained something more than a presentation of US official policy. The Vice President will not be permitted by the President to go beyond our official policy in this most delicate area. However, I do think that the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists might print such a piece even if it only is an elaboration of current policy. I would prefer, if possible, given the limit of circulation of that journal, that the Vice President give this as a speech and then have it reprinted in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. If this is not possible, we can of course just offer it to them as an article. I am going to try once again to get the scheduling group to select a considerable platform in January for a speech on this subject and would appreciate any help you can give along that line.

I am going to be away from December 23rd to January 2nd, but I can write this either for a speech or article purposes any time we need it in January. I understand that you will be away until January 2nd so we can confer on this when we both return.

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

December 15, 1966

TO: John R.
FROM: Ted

Did Butch Fisher ever draft up that non-proliferation piece? If not, I think we ought to get him underway on it. I think we would do well either in Foreign Affairs or Bulletin of Atomic Scientists with a good non-proliferation text. Let's get together on this.

Sec Bunn.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1/5/67

Romney - ABM - Sf.

Would HH want to latch on to anti-ABM issue as lead to liberals

Some are encouraging

McNamara - will hold off for another year

NEW YORK TIMES JUL 24 1967

all these arms
clipped
J.R.

Anonymous Loans by Pentagon Financing Arms to 14 Countries

By NEIL SHEEHAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 23—The Defense Department has been using anonymous loans from the Export-Import Bank to finance arms sales in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia.

Informants have disclosed that the $591-million the Pentagon obtained from the bank between mid-1965 and last June 30 through so-called "country-X accounts" was lent to 14 countries for purchases of American armaments.

Under the country-X device, the bank opens a line of credit to the Defense Department arms salesman, Henry J. Kuss Jr., which Mr. Kuss lends to the country involved for the arms purchase.

The loans are guaranteed by the Defense Department through its $383-million revolving arms sales credit fund under a law that requires that only 25 per cent of the loan must be covered by the fund.

The extent of the bank's involvement in the arms traffic brought vigorous protests in Congress last week and has

Continued on Page 3, Column 1

PENTAGON LOANS FINANCING ARMS

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

held up action on legislation to extend the life of the Government-owned institution for five more years and expand its lending authority.

In closed hearings before the House Banking and Currency Committee last Monday, Harold Linder, the bank president, asserted that until that day he had not known nor wanted to know the names of the countries that had received the loans.

Five of the countries are in Latin America—Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Chile and Venezuela. Four are Middle Eastern countries—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. Three are in South and Southeast Asia—Pakistan, India and Malaysia. The North African country is Morocco. Taiwan is the 14th recipient.

In addition to the country-X loans since mid-1965, the Defense Department is believed to have outstanding about $60-million in loans to underdeveloped countries that the Pentagon made directly from the revolving credit account or obtained from commercial banks.

The Export-Import Bank has also directly lent at Defense Department request since the fiscal year 1963, $1.1-billion more to a number of developed countries, including Austria, Italy, Britain and Australia, for arms purchases from Mr. Kuss.

Over the last two fiscal years, arms loans have constituted more than 39 per cent of the bank's lending business, and senior administration officials have testified that the bank has made further commitments to lend $1-billion more for weapons during the current and future fiscal years.

The exact amounts of the country-x loans to each of 14 aforementioned nations are unknown. It is also believed that some of the loans as of last June 30 were increments of large arms purchases that will require future loans to complete financing of the sales.

The informants, however, supplied some regional and local breakdown.

About 75 per cent of the country-x loans, they said, approximately $450-million, went to the four Middle Eastern countries and Morocco.

The five Latin-American countries reportedly obtained about $100-million. Brazil is understood to have received about $43-million — Argentina about $21-million and Venezuela approximately $29-million, with the remaining $7-million divided between Peru and Chile.

Approximately $24-million, about 4 per cent, was lent to India and Pakistan, and the remainder of the $591-million went to Malaysia and Taiwan.

Iran apparently obtained its loan as at least partial credit towar da $200-million purchase in 1966 of F-4 Phantom jets, the most advanced of American operational fighter-bombers, and ground equipment. The loan to Saudi Arabia was apparently financed toward a purchase of $120-million in Hawk antiaircraft missiles and assorted other hardware.

Israel is believed to have obtained its loan for Hawk antiaircraft missiles and tanks that Mr. Kuss sold the Israelis in 1965 and 1966. Jordan was apparently lent the money for the tanks and armored personnel carriers it obtained last year from the United States.

Argentina purchased 25 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers from the United States in 1965 and Venezuela has reportedly been sold helicopters for use against the pro-Communist guerrillas there.

Morocco has been sold a squadron of F-5 Freedom fighters and Malaysia reportedly obtained a loan of about $15-million for jet trainers and other equipment.

The loan to India is somewhat mystifying because until last May the Administration officially imposed an embargo on the shipment of so-called lethal military equipment to India and Pakistan. Shipments of what the Administration calls nonlethal equipment, such as radar and trucks, had been allowed.

Some military specialists consider the distinction specious because an armed force needs support equipment as well as guns and tanks to be effective.

A sizable number of Democrats and Republicans on the House and Senate Banking Committees are angry about the use of the bank to finance arms business, but they are even more disturbed by the fact that its funds have been employed to sell arms to countries involved in disputes with their neighbors.

They point out that the major portion the loans within the last two fiscal years, about $450-million, went to the Middle East and North Africa, the most explosive areas.

Minnesota
Historical Society

www.mnhs.org