Yogi

(1) U.S. Troops engaged in Asia for the third time in a generation - w.w. II, Korean War, Vietnam.

(2) 3/5 of human race lives in Asia

(3) Japan - an Asian Country led the world in rate of economic growth over the past decade.

Geo Bunn
7/17

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1) Kennedy — talk about
non-proliferation

2) President have approved
AEC test — on the
50% chance of radiation
that will be picked
up in Canada. by
normal health devices.
50-50 Chance of violation

3). But said no for a cycle.
President approved Sec 5
memo.

Name
Fiddler on the Roof - Climbed - Sat. after.
Met. Opera

Staying City Square ~~Hotel~~ Motor Inn
Caelfors from american

Fri - Fri nite
Sat nite
Sunday -

Check on Monday - Mr & Mrs
James Murray

Ball

3. Vietnam - Greek analogy — war of national liberation

7 indigenous result vs Communists Hanoi-controlled

p. 9. - contrast between competence of NLF-VN. - and NLF-Algeria. NLF-SVN called for boycott-election - failed..

p. 14 — no ambition to stay no territory.

ADDRESS OF VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES FORDHAM UNIVERSITY,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK, JUNE 9, 1965

Because the "greatness of our institutions" has not matched "the grandeur of our intentions," we are witnessing both in our nation and in our world a revo-

In this contemporary era -- where technology has led to a rapid multiplication of social relationships -- interdependence has replaced solitary individualism as the central fact of our lives.

As Barbara Ward has noted: "In a world society in which hate is institutionalized in war and self-interest in our web of economic relations, we can hardly survive unless we also institutionalize the moral needs of man for community, for compassion, for dedication, and, let us not fear the word, for love."

end moral indignation has been decisive in bringing recognition of the validity of the Negro revolution in the United States.

Pursuit of justice has triumphed over narrow self-interest. Justice has triumphed because modern prophets -- from John LaFarge to Martin Luther King -- have aroused our consciences and incited our action against an "established" disorder based on racism, the most pernicious form of injustice to arise in our time.

In pursuing justice -- the supreme virtue in the political order -- an equally important challenge for a man of our time is that posed by the growing disparity between

rich nations and poor, the widening gap between the affluent minority and the impoverished masses of the human race.

A central fact of this decade -- which will loom larger and larger for graduates of the class of 1965 -- is that Western societies are exceedingly rich -- and almost all others are exceedingly poor.

A small fraction of the human race living around the North Atlantic enjoys per capita incomes of 1,000 to 2,800 dollars per year. Two-thirds of humanity subsists on a per capita income of less than 200 dollars per year.

It may be accidential -- but it is surely not irrelevant -- that most of the first group are white and most of the second are colored.

Since 1960, the gap between the two groups has accelerated. To understand why it has been growing, one need only recall that in 1964 the United States added 30 billion dollars to its gross national product -- the equivalent of 50 percent of the total national income of Latin America and 100 percent of the income of Africa.

The relevance of this problem to the university graduate of today, and the obligation of nations that are rich and advanced toward those that are poor and undeveloped, was spelled out in bold language by Pope John XXIII in his encyclical Mater et Magistra. He stated:

"The solidarity which binds all men and makes them members of the same family requires political communities enjoying an abundance of material goods not to remain indifferent to those political communities whose citizens suffer from poverty, misery, and hunger, and who lack even the elementary rights of the human person.

This is particularly true since, given the growing interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic and social inequality among them persist."

He concluded:

"We are all equally responsible for the undernourished peoples. Therefore, it is necessary to educate one's conscience to the sense of responsibility which weighs upon each and everyone, especially upon those who are more blessed with this world's goods."

Just as our generation has inherited the responsibility for bringing to fulfillment the Negro revolution at home, it lies with your generation to insure the triumph of the revolution against crushing poverty around the world.

We who live in the Western world have a special responsibility for it was we who launched the technological revolution that has produced dazzling wealth in the midst of squalor.

We not only initiated the technological revolution but we have spread it to the world at large. And today we tolerate -- by limited exertion if not by inaction -- inconceivable disparities of wealth and destitution.

As we in the United States are among those "more blessed with this world's goods," to use the Pope's phrase, we have a special obligation to take the lead in reducing these inequities.

It is obvious that problems of poor nations will not be solved by external efforts alone. No transfer of resources from the rich nations to the poor will alone be sufficient.

It requires a massive effort by local leaders in a country to end the shocking inequality between privileged and impoverished, between glittering capitals and festering slums, between privileged urban enclaves and neglected rural areas.

It requires not only the availability of technical resources -- but vision and will and determination on the part of those who would break the tyranny of poverty and bring to their peoples the wonders of the modern world.

But our recognition of this fact should not blind us to the compelling truth that nations that are poor and undeveloped stand little chance of success without the help of those which are rich.

It is not necessary here to engage in a detailed analysis of the process of development in undeveloped nations. Once we recognize the existence of a universal common good and of international social justice -- and show a willingness to commit ourselves to it -- the technical problems of assistance can be solved. Not without difficulty -- but they can be solved.

Trade, aid and private investment all will be needed to meet the requirements of developing nations -- that is, if the poor nations of the world are to have a chance of breaking the ancient cycle.

Despite our efforts since World War II to accelerate economic and social development, we are just standing still.

During the past three years we have failed to progress at all indeed, we are slowing down.

Yet each day we learn anew that the disorder which persists cannot be ended by political maneuver or military power alone.

We learn anew of outbreaks of violence and turbulence, of peaceful revolutions turned into violent ones. We learn anew of disorder which invites Communism -- which so often comes as the scavenger of ruined revolutions.

We now know that peace can be threatened by other forces than armies crossing borders and bombs and missiles falling from the sky. Peace can be threatened by social and economic deprivation, by destitution and hunger. If we are concerned about "peace-keeping" in all its aspects, then we dare not ignore this explosive threat which can erupt at any time.

And it is time we learn that peace-keeping pertains not only to military forces and United Nations machinery. Peace-keeping pertains to every force that disturbs or threatens to disturb the peace of mankind.

We must strengthen every economic institution we have -- and develop new ones if need be. If our existing financial and development institutions -- all formed two decades ago with the establishment of the United Nations -- need to be supplemented or modified, we should not hesitate to do so.

In our interdependent world, disorder due to economic deprivation and underdevelopment is the concern of all -- the rich nations and the poor. When a crisis erupts -- whether in the Congo or in Santo Domingo -- the fate of all is affected.

Only by a massive assault -- carefully planned and superbly orchestrated -- can social and economic progress be made. Only by a massive assault can the

burden of hunger and disease which brings disorder later be lifted from the peoples of mankind.

Congress must be convinced of this. The doubts about the foreign aid program in recent years must be replaced by a new insight into our obligation, a new resolution to do the job that needs to be done.

Our European friends -- though they have expanded their programs during the past decade -- still do far less than their capacity allows.

Similarly, unless we and the other wealthy nations of the northern hemisphere are willing to do our part to revise world trading patterns to take into account the problems of new developing nations, they stand no chance of achieving economic viability through peaceful means. And as we know better each day, if peaceful revolution is impossible, violent revolution is inevitable.

Once we recognize the dimensions of the problems, we must then resolve to do the job that needs to be done -- to expend the resources necessary. And we need to do this -- not just because it is in our own interest, not just because of the Communist challenge -- but as President Kennedy said in his inaugural message -- "because it is right."

When one looks back on the landmarks of the Negro revolution in our time -- such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 -- some of the causes can now be clearly delineated. There can be no doubt that justice triumphed over injustice . . .the conscience of the present over the memory of the past because men and women with consciences formed

by a Juda-Christian tradition took their convictions seriously and translated them into action. This in the end was the difference between failure and success.

If a peaceful revolution against world poverty and the chaos that follows from it is to be won, it will require the same aroused action from men and women of religious inspiration -- and all developed countries. It will require men and women who are determined to lead the rich peoples of the world to fulfill their obligations to the poor.

It is the task of both the graduation class of 1965 and of our generation to convince the legislatures and the executives -- not only of the United States but of Europe as well -- that moral imperatives as well as physical security require a substantial commitment to long range economic and technical assistance to the developing nations of the world.

We must do this out of compassion -- for we <u>are</u> our brother's keeper. And we also do it out of self-interest as well -- for our lot is their lot, our future their future, our peace their peace.

In pursuing the global war on poverty, we must remember that it is not just a matter of satisfying physical needs and raising material standards of living. What is equally important is to inspire hope among both the leaders and the mass of the people, hope of a better day to come.

In approaching the problem of poverty and chaos in an interdependent world, we should be guided by the vision of a great man who died here in New York ten years ago, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

Through this vision we can come to understand that the growing interdependence of mankind caused by the technological revolution can lead to a world civilization in which both persons and nations find their individuality enhanced, find their mutual dependence and mutual fate a condition to be welcomed rather than a threat to be feared.

Our concern about economic chaos and disorder, about world poverty and deprivation is a part of our larger concern about world peace. All men profess to seek peace. But peace is like a flower -- it needs fertile soil to grow. It cannot grow in the rocks of bitterness and poverty, in the dry sands of backwardness and despair. It needs the fertile soil of education and food, of health and hope.

Peace is too important to be the exclusive concern of the great powers. It requires the attention of all -- small nations and large, old nations and new.

The pursuit of peace resembles the building of a great cathedral. It is the work of generations. In concept it requires a master architect; in execution, the labors of many.

The pursuit of peace requires time -- but we must use time as a tool and not as a crutch.

We realize that the hopes and expectations which may be aroused cannot all be satisfied in the immediate future. What can be accomplished in a limited time will always fall short of expectations.

This should not discourage us. What is important is that we be prepared to give some evidence that progress toward peace -- progress in the global war on poverty -- is being made, that some of the unsolved problems of peace can be met in the future.

It is the challenge to your generation to convert the hopes for peace, the hopes for progress, the hopes for social justice for all into reality. With the benefit of four years in a great university, I am confident you will succeed.

FOR MONDAY A.M. RELEASE, MARCH 7, 1966

Office of the White House Press Secretary

March 3, 1966

TO: The President

FROM: The Vice President

At your request, I visited South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Pakistan, India, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea. I was accompanied by Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President Jack Valenti, Ambassador Lloyd Hand, members of the National Security Council staff and of my own staff, and other American officials. We departed Honolulu on February 9 and returned to Washington on February 23.

We talked with chiefs of state and heads of government, cabinet ministers, government officials (and in some cases, leaders of the opposition), our own embassy staff and Peace Corps volunteers, labor leaders, teachers, students, rural workers, U.S. voluntary agency representatives, and the ordinary people of the countries visited.

On your instructions, I reported on the Honolulu Conference to those governments not present at the conference, listened to

(OVER)

the views of those we visited, and exchanged ideas and opinions about the problems and opportunities of Asia.

I have already reported to you in detail my extensive conversations with foreign leaders within the countries we visited. I have also briefed most of the Members of Congress in general and in particular those Committees of the Congress which have jurisdiction in these matters.

I submit to you a summary of my conclusions:

1. In Vietnam, the tide of battle, which less than a year ago was running heavily against the Government of South Vietnam, has begun to turn for the better. A series of defeats of main force units of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces has greatly encouraged the South Vietnamese and our forces. head lies a long and costly struggle -- one which will test our patience and perseverance; yet I am confident that we can revent the success of the aggression in South Vietnam.

2. The war being waged in Vietnam and in most of Asia is two-fold:

the struggle of nations to chart their own destinies and maintain their national independence while threatened by Communist subversion and aggression;

and the struggle to bring about a social and economic revolution for the people.

There is a growing appreciation by Asian leaders that successful resistance to Communist-backed subversion and/or aggression depends on the success of a social revolution that improves the lives of people, as well as on armed defense.

3. The significance of the struggle in Vietnam is not simply the defense of a small nation against powerful neighbors. Vietnam is, in a larger sense, the focus of a broad effort to restrain the attempt by Asian Communists to expand by force -- as we assisted our European allies in resisting Communist expansion in Europe after World War II.

4. The Honolulu Declaration emphasizing the defeat of aggression and the achievement of a social revolution could represent a historic turning point in American relationships with Asia. The goals agreed upon by President Johnson and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam at Honolulu are taken very seriously:

to defeat aggression,

to defeat social misery,

to build a stable democratic government,

to reach an honorable, just peace.

(OVER)

5. Most Asian leaders are concerned about the belligerence and militancy of Communist China's attitudes. None wishes to permit his country to fall under Communist domination in any form. All are dedicated nationalists.

6. Among the leaders with whom I spoke, there was repeatedly expressed a concern as to whether our American purpose, tenacity and will were strong enough to persevere in Southeast Asia. I emphasized the firmness of our resolve but also our dedication to the rights of free discussion and dissent.

7. Free Asia is astir with a consciousness of the need for Asian initiatives in the solution of Asia's problems. Regional development and planning are increasingly being recognized as necessary for political and economic progress. The power of nationalism is now tempered by a growing realization of the need for cooperation among nations. Asians seek to preserve their national identity. They want gradually to create new international structures. But they want to pursue such aims themselves. They want foreign assistance when necessary, but without foreign domination.

8. The future of free institutions in Asia will be reinforced if India and Pakistan can (1) meet the social and economic needs of their people, and (2) avoid fighting each other. To do this will

require internal discipline and careful allocation of resources, combined with large and sustained economic and technical assistance from the free world.

9. Most Asian leaders believe that Hanoi and Peking are blocking efforts for peace in South Vietnam. Deeply concerned over the continuing conflict in Vietnam, several reaffirmed their offers of good offices to bring about negotiations.

I. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We must pursue two objectives in South Vietnam:
   to help preserve their independence, which is threatened by Communist subversion and aggression, and
   to help achieve a social and economic revolution in the lives of the Vietnamese people.
2. A second "Honolulu Conference" could usefully be held sometime later this year in order to evaluate progress being made on the goals set at Honolulu in February. Our partners participating in the struggle in South Vietnam should be invited to such a conference. In particular, such a review would be useful in moving forward the program of social and economic development.
3. We and the government of South Vietnam must do everything we can to check inflation there. Such measures in

Vietnam as increased taxation, commodity and construction control, improved transport and distribution of goods must be put into effect promptly.

4. A special effort should be made both in the United States and in other free nations to help the South Vietnamese with additional volunteer medical teams (at least 400 people this year), and with the dispatch of hospital and ambulance and immunization units for rural areas. Free world nations can also contribute by training Vietnamese as auxiliary medical personnel in greater numbers. Consideration should be given to making available to the South Vietnamese a number of packaged emergency hospitals which are being released by the civil defense units of various American cities.

5. The continued plight of the refugees in South Vietnam who have fled to the areas under government control is one that demands not only our increased attention, but also the cooperative and humanitarian efforts of all nations. The refugee problem arose with extraordinary speed and on a large scale and overtaxed existing resources. In particular, the most pitiful victims of war -- the sick, the elderly and the children -- deserve the assistance of men and women of good will everywhere.

A vigorous effort should be made internationally to help these people, in addition to the effort now being made through United States and South Vietnamese resources.

6. The United States and other friendly nations should give high priority to assuring India and Pakistan the economic and technical assistance required to implement their development programs while these nations honor the provisions of the Tashkent agreement.

7. We must continue our vigorous efforts to pursue every possibility to an honorable peace in Vietnam and Asia. We must continue to seek the assistance and good offices of all other nations, the United Nations, the Pope and other religious leaders in this effort.

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Re China Hearings

er $100 of valuation, may have to be hiked o meet operating expenses.

Mr. Hanks conferred by phone with Representative WHITE today and expressed hope he budget cuts can be restored by Congress.

Superintendent H. E. Charles of the El Paso district noted that while about $1 million is coming to the schools under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, this money cannot be used in place of the Public Law 874 funds, which are for federally impacted districts.

"The last time these funds were threatened was in 1963 at the time of our last bond issue," Dr. Charles said. "We told the public frankly that their local school taxes would have to be raised to pay for the school bonds unless Public Law 874 was continued by Congress. Fortunately, Congress did extend the bill and we did not have to raise taxes at that time."

El Paso district school tax rate is $1.50.

Superintendent Charles said the Public Law 874 funds being received reimburse the schools only one-fourth to one-half of the actual cost of educating a pupil, and that local and State funds make up the difference. "A school district's eligibility for State funds is governed by law," he said. "The district's only recourse would be to turn to local sources for needed funds, or else reduce its educational program in keeping with the reduction in revenue."

Superintendent Charles cited figures showing that more than one-fourth of El Paso's school children are federally connected (27.3 percent in 1964–65), and that nearly half of the school district is nontaxable military land (101 of the 212 square miles).

Superintendent Charles and the school board are to discuss the proposed cutback and ways to combat it at a board meeting at 7:30 p.m. today.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD RED CHINA

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, the Committee on Foreign Relations yesterday, March 8, held its first hearing on U.S. policy toward China. The witness was Prof. A. Doak Barnett, of Columbia University, a widely recognized authority on China.

In my opinion, and I think the opinion of virtually every member of the committee, Professor Barnett's prepared statement, which he read at the beginning of the hearing, was one of the finest statements on the subject of China that I have ever heard. His analysis and recommendations were sound and sensible. How could there be a better statement of how we should deal with China now than Professor Barnett's opening remark that the question "will demand not only firmness, determination, and commitment, but also flexibility, understanding and patience."

Professor Barnett also had some very wise words to offer on the subject of the changes that should be made in our policy toward China. He said that he believed that the time had come for the United States "to alter its posture toward Communist China and adopt a policy of containment but not isolation, a policy that would aim on the one hand at checking military or subversive threats and pressures emanating from Peiping but at the same time would aim at maximum contacts with, and maximum involvement of, the Chinese Communists in the international community."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Professor Barnett's statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations on March 8 be inserted in the RECORD at this time. I urge all of my colleagues who are interested in the crucial question of our future relations with this most populous country on earth to read Professor Barnett's statement carefully.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF A. DOAK BARNETT BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MARCH 8, 1966

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to express my appreciation for this opportunity to meet with you to discuss some of the problems of U.S. relations with China and to examine policy alternatives which, in my opinion, our Government should consider.

The question of how to deal with China is now—and certainly will continue to be during the decade ahead—one of the most crucial foreign policy issues facing us. It will demand not only firmness, determination, and commitment, but also flexibility, understanding, and patience. Rigid dogmatism cannot point the way toward sound policies. We need creative and imaginative thinking about a wide range of questions—not only about how to contain and check China's pressures on its neighbors and how to achieve a more stable military balance in Asia, basic as these questions are, but also about how to avoid war, minimize conflict, and reduce tension, how to meet the multiple nonmilitary challenges which China poses, how to evolve policies which can exert a moderating influence on Peiping's leaders, how to accommodate to Communist China's legitimate interests as a major power, how to reestablish a reasonable basis for contact and discourse between the United States and mainland China, how to create a broader consensus among non-Communist nations on reasonable approaches to dealing with the Chinese, and how over time to involve Communist China increasingly in more responsible roles in the general international community.

Mr. Chairman, you suggested to me that when initiating these hearings I attempt to outline briefly some of the broad areas of inquiry that the committee, the American Government, and the American people might well consider in any systematic effort to reexamine the problems of U.S. relations with China, and I will try to do this.

It is my understanding that while the committee does intend, during the course of these hearings, to probe the interconnections between our policy toward China and the pressing problems that we now face in Vietnam, the intention is to examine China policy also in a broader and longer term perspective, and that is the kind of perspective which I have adopted in formulating my remarks this morning.

You also invited me to present some of my own views on key issues and problems, and I consider it a privilege to have this opportunity to do so.

I would like, right at the start, to state my own belief that there is a need for basic changes in the overall U.S. posture toward Communist China. For almost 17 years, we have pursued a policy that might best be characterized as one aimed at containment and isolation of Communist China. In my view, the element of containment—using this term in a broad sense to include both military and nonmilitary measures to block threats posed by China to its neighbors—has been an essential part of our policy and has been, in some respects

at least, fairly successful. Our power has played an important and necessary role in creating a counterbalance to Communist China's power in Asia, and we have contributed significantly to the task of gradually building stable non-Communist societies in areas that lie in China's shadow. But the U.S. attempt to isolate Communist China has been, in my opinion, unwise and, in a fundamental sense, unsuccessful, and it cannot, I believe, provide a basis for a sound long-term policy that aims not only at containing and restraining Chinese power but also at reducing tensions, exerting a moderating influence on Peiping, broadening the areas of non-Communist agreement on issues relating to China, and slowly involving Communist China in more normal patterns of international intercourse.

I strongly believe, therefore, that the time has come—even though the United States is now engaged in a bitter struggle in Vietnam—for our Government to alter its posture toward Communist China and adopt a policy of containment but not isolation, a policy that would aim on the one hand at checking military or subversive threats and pressures emanating from Peiping but at the same time would aim at maximum contacts with and maximum involvement of the Chinese Communists in the international community. Such a policy would involve continued commitments to help non-Communist regimes combat Communist subversion and insurrection, as in Vietnam, and continued pledges to defend areas on China's periphery, including Taiwan. But it would involve changes in many other aspects of our policies. While continuing to fulfill our pledge to defend Taiwan against attack, we should clearly and explicitly acknowledge the Chinese Communist regime as the de facto government of the China mainland and state our desire to extend de jure recognition and exchange diplomatic representatives with Peiping if and when it indicates that it would be prepared to reciprocate.

We should press in every way we can to encourage nonofficial contacts. We should, instead of embargoing all trade with the China mainland, restrict only trade in strategic items and encourage American businessmen to explore other opportunities for trade contacts. And within the United Nations we should work for the acceptance of some formula which would provide seats for both Communist China and Nationalist China. In taking these steps, we will have to do so in full recognition of the fact that Peiping's initial reaction is almost certain to be negative and hostile and that any changes in our posture will create some new problems. But we should take them nevertheless, because initiatives on our part are clearly required if we are to work, however slowly, toward the long term goal of a more stable, less explosive situation in Asia and to explore the possibilities of trying to moderate Peiping's policies.

Some people believe that a policy combining the differing elements I have suggested—that is, containment but also increased attempts to deal directly with Peiping—would involve contradictory and inconsistent elements. I would argue that, on the contrary, in terms of our long term aims the seemingly contradictory elements would in fact be complementary and mutually reinforcing. Others argue that a change of posture such as the one I have suggested might be interpreted as a sign of weakness and irresolution on our part, and therefore be dangerous, particularly if taken while we are engaged in a major struggle against Communist insurrection in Vietnam. I would argue that our commitments and actions in Vietnam make it wholly clear, to both friend and foe, that we are not acting out of weakness and that while we search for areas of possible agreement and accommodation we will also continue in our determination to protect the interests of ourselves and our friends, to oppose violence as a means of political change, and to assist in the growth of viable, progressive, non-Communist regimes, in Asia as elsewhere.

I hope that later in our discussion we will have an opportunity to examine in more concrete terms some of the detailed aspects of our China policy. But before proceeding further perhaps I should try to outline briefly, in response to your suggestion, Mr. Chairman, some of the broad areas of inquiry that it would be desirable to cover in any examination of U.S. relations with China that attempts to probe background factors as well as immediate issues. Briefly stated I think it is necessary to examine: the historical background to the Chinese revolution, including both the general characteristics of the historic confrontation between China and the West and the causes of the rise of communism in China; the internal situation in Communist China since 1949, including the domestic political situation, recent trends, and possible changes in the future, and the state of the Chinese economy; and Communist China's general international position and foreign policy, with special attention to the Sino-Soviet split and China's military strength and potential. I can do no more than make a few comments on each of these complicated subjects, but if time permits I would like to do that much.

It is important, I think, to view recent developments in China and the present state of American-Chinese relations in some kind of historical perspective. The perspective of the policymaker must, of necessity, be very different from that of the historian, and analysis of the past does not necessarily provide answers to the urgent policy issues of the present. But unless one has some understanding of the broad forces that have been at work over time, it is difficult to evolve a rational or coherent framework even for policies designed to meet immediate problems.

For roughly 2,000 years prior to the mid-19th century, China was the center of one of the great world civilizations. It was relatively isolated from comparable centers in Europe and elsewhere; it considered itself superior to all of its neighbors, and it played a role of unchallenged primacy in the world as Chinese leaders knew it. Then, in the mid-19th century, its isolation was shattered by the restless, expanding, technologically superior nations of the West, and it became an arena for, and pawn of, competing imperial and colonial powers. The "Chinese revolution", if one uses this term in a broad sense, started at that time, in response to the traumatic impact of the West as well as to mounting domestic problems. It has been underway, therefore, for over a hundred years. In this revolution the Chinese people have been groping, painfully and slowly, to find effective means to modernize and develop their country, to build a strong modern nation-state, and to reassert China's role in the world.

It is worth noting that to date there has been no extended period of peaceful relations between China and the Western world on the basis of reasonable equality. Before the mid-19th century, the Chinese held a superior position and attempted, unsuccessfully, to fit the Western powers into its traditional imperial system of relations with subordinate states. During the next hundred years, the Western powers held a superior position and attempted, also without great success, to fit China into the modern international system of relations. The still unresolved problem for the future is whether both China and the West can, in time, reach an acceptable peaceful accommodation within the modern nation-state system, on the basis of relationships in which the rights and obligations of both will be recognized.

Part of the legacy of the past hundred years is the intense nationalism and self-assertiveness that all Chinese—whatever their ideology—now feel. All Chinese, non-Communist as well as Communist, are now determined to end China's recent position of inferiority and see their country achieve recognized major power status. There seems little doubt that in due time it will. The question is whether both China and the West can discover and accept roles for the Chinese in the international community as a whole—or whether China and the West must face an indefinite period of dangerous confrontation and high risk of major military conflict.

One obviously cannot look at the Chinese historical background simply in the terms I have suggested, however. China has been, and still is, undergoing not just a revolution, but more specifically a Communist revolution, led by men dedicated to promoting their own pattern of revolutionary struggle and change abroad as well as at home. It is important for us to understand the reasons for Communist success in China and the impact of their success elsewhere.

The explanations for Chinese Communist successes in the 1930's and 1940's are numerous, but I would say that the most important ones were the following: One was the Sino-Japanese war, which had a shattering effect on China and helped to create a revolutionary situation. Another was the failure of the non-Communist leaders in China to achieve unity in their own ranks, to define and pursue effective programs designed to cope with such basic problems as landlordism, inflation, and corruption, or to build a firm grassroots base of support—a failure which in effect created a vacuum into which the Communists moved. Still another was the Communists' success in building an unprecedently disciplined and strong revolutionary organization, in appealing to nationalism and reformism especially during the war, in developing a shrewd revolutionary strategy, and in implementing their programs with determination and, whenever necessary, ruthlessness.

Peiping's leaders now maintain that their experience provides a primary model for revolutions throughout the underdeveloped world. It is a model calling for the creation of Communist-led peasant armies, the establishment of so-called liberated areas as bases for reovlutionary struggle, the creation of broad anti-imperialist united fronts, and the overthrow of existing non-Communist regimes by violence. There is little doubt that the Chinese model has had, and will continue to have, an impact far beyond China's borders; revolutionary leaders in many parts of the world look to it for inspiration. We need, therefore, to understand it, and to grasp not only how it helps to explain Communist success in China, but also how it may influence events elsewhere.

We should not, however, magnify its significance. Careful analysis indicates, I think, that the particular constellation of factors and forces which make it possible for Mao Tse-tung's strategy to succeed in China are not widely duplicated, and there are many reasons to believe that the Chinese model cannot be exported as easily as Mao and some of his colleagues have hoped. The available evidence also suggests that while the Chinese leaders would like to see their model widely emulated, their capacity to promote, and willingness and ability to support, Chinese-style revolutions elsewhere is definitely limited.

The historical background is important, but obviously the primary focus of any inquiry into current problems must be on developments in China in the 17 years since

Communist takeover. Communist China in 1966 is a very different country in many respects from China in 1949.

Perhaps the first thing that should be noted about the political situation in China is that the Communists have created a very strong totalitarian apparatus that has unified and exercises effective control over the entire China mainland, and they have used their power to promote uninterrupted revolution aimed at restructuring the nation's economy, social structure, and system of values. While the impact of the regime has been harsh and painful for millions of Chinese, the Communists have built a strong base of organized support, partly on the basis of appeals to nationalism as well as promises of future accomplishments. They have also demonstrated a remarkable capacity to make and implement decisions and an impressive ability to mobilize people and resources. Not surprisingly, however, there are many tensions in the society and, in my opinion, fairly widespread—even though largely unarticulated—dissatisfaction with numerous Communist policies and methods of rule. But there is no significant organized opposition and no foreseeable prospect of its developing: In short, the regime is not a passing phenomenon. In time it may change its character, but it will continue to exist, as we will continue to have to deal with it, for the predictable future.

There are some important questions one can raise, however, about the future. I believe that among the leaders in China there are significant differences on policies, under the surface—especially differences regarding domestic policies but some of them are relevant to foreign-policy issues as well—and that one can differentiate between groups that might be labeled the technical-bureaucrats and the specialists in power, politics, and ideology. I further believe that these differences are reflected, even today, in the complex mixture of policies in China, and that in the future they are likely to become increasingly important, especially after the death of Mao.

The biggest question about the future arises from the fact that Communist China is on the verge of an historic transition period in which virtually the entire top leadership will pass from the scene in a relatively brief period of time. To date the unity as well as longevity of the Chinese Communist leaders has been remarkable, but what has been an asset to the regime in the past is now becoming a liability, as the leaders steadily age and resist bringing younger men into the top inner circle. When Mao and other top leaders die, therefore, I would expect China to enter a period in which there could be a great deal more fluidity and uncertainty about both leaders and policies than in recent years. It would be reasonable to expect, I think, that the outcome of the competition between leaders and policies that is likely to occur, and the resulting balance between radicals and moderates will be definitely influenced by the perceptions that the new leaders have of the international environment as it affects China. While it may not be possible for outsiders to exert very much influence on the outcome, our hope, certainly, should be that the balance will in time shift in favor of technical-bureaucrats promoting relatively moderate policies.

The economic performance of the Chinese Communist regime to date has been a very mixed one, characterized by some notable successes, some serious failures, and some basic unanswered questions. When the Chinese Communists first came to power they were impressively successful in bringing order out of economic chaos, and in initiating an ambitious development program. During their first 5-year plan, under a Stalinist-type program, China's annual increase in gross national product—about 6 or 7 percent—was as rapid or more rapid than that of any other important underdeveloped nation at the time. But the momentum of growth started to decline by 1957, the last year of the first plan—as a result of the lag in agricultural output, the steady increase in population, and the ending of Soviet credits. And in 1958 Peiping's leaders embarked on their radical and reckless "great leap forward" and commune program, hoping to achieve the impossible by unprecedented political and ideological mobilization.

The failures of the "leap" produced an economic crisis of major proportions in China, which lasted from 1959 through 1961. The result, in effect, was a Communist version of a great depression. It compelled the regime to abandon many of its most extreme policies and ambitious goals, and Peiping redefined its economic policies to include some sensible elements, showing realism and pragmatism. Emphasis was placed on the need to promote agriculture, various sorts of incentives were restored, needed food was imported from the West, major industrial projects were postponed, and in general more modest goals were adopted.

Since 1962 there has been a slow but steady recovery of both agricultural and industrial production in China, and today overall Chinese output is comparable to what it was just before the "leap"—although it is still not that high in per capita terms. The primary stress on developing agriculture continues, and its results, plus continuing grain imports, have greatly eased the food situation. This year a new 5-year plan, the third, has begun, and even though no details on the plan have yet been published, undoubtedly there is renewed growth in industry—although at a more gradual pace than in earlier years.

In any overall assessment of the Chinese economy since 1949, several things would have to be noted. The Communists have not yet converted China into a major industrial power, but they have begun to build a significant industrial base. At one point, in 1960, steel output was claimed to be 18 million tons; production now is below peak capacity but is probably between 8 and 10 million tons. Moreover, since the regime decides how output will be used, current production fully supports the nation's military power and further industrialization. There has been no appreciable overall increase in living standards in China since 1949, but, except during the worst post-leap years, the regime has met the population's minimum requirements, distributed available goods fairly equitably, and kept the economy running—a not insignificant accomplishment in China. However, the Communists have not found panaceas capable of rapidly solving the nation's most basic economic problems. Agriculture continues to lag, and it will take time for present improvement programs to change the situation. And the population steadily rises; a birth control program has been initiated, but quick results cannot be expected.

As a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split, and the ending of Soviet technical assistance as well as credits, the Chinese Communists, have decided to glorify the virtues of economic "self-reliance". On a more practical level, however, they have pragmatically adapted to the changed situation and have done all they could to expand trade with Japan and a variety of Western nations. As a result, Communist China's international economic orientation has fundamentally changed, and now a majority of its trade is with the non-Communist world. Even though to date this fact has not greatly affected Peiping's overall foreign policy, the shift has slowly created new and diversified patterns of relations which could be of some significance over time.

In examining Peiping's general foreign policy, the first thing to note is that China's leaders obviously have very ambitious long-term goals. Moved by intense nationalism, they aim to build a strong base of power at home and to strengthen China's security; they also hope to recover what they consider to be "lost territories" (including Taiwan); and they are determined to play the role of a major power on the world stage. At the present time, they view the United States as the major obstacle and threat to many of their aims and interests—and call, therefore, for the removal of American power from Asia—but they also regard the Soviet Union at present as a serious obstacle to Chinese aspirations and therefore compete with it too, whenever and wherever feasible.

As first generation revolutionary leaders, and true believers in the Maoist version of Marxism-Leninism, Peiping's leaders are also dedicated to the promotion of revolutionary struggles, especially in the underdeveloped world. Their public pronouncements now tend to concentrate on this aim and in at least some areas, such as Vietnam, they are prepared to give significant support to revolutionary forces, even though they have avoided direct Chinese military intervention.

While it is important to recognize Peiping's ambitious goals, it is equally important to note that, on the basis of available evidence and Communist China's performance to date, the Chinese Communists do not appear to think primarily in terms of spreading their influence through direct military and territorial expansion; they appear to recognize the limits to their capabilities for military action outside of China's borders; they have usually been quite realistic in assessing the power balance in concrete situations; they have generally been calculating and even cautious in avoiding military adventurism and limiting their risks; they have tended to think in long-range terms about their most ambitious goals; and they have repeatedly been flexible and pragmatic (at least until recently) in adapting their strategy and tactics to fit changing situations in pursuit of their shortrun goals.

If one analyzes the Chinese Communists' overall foreign policy strategy since 1949, one can identify at least three major periods in which their approach to the outside world has been distinctive. In the period immediately after 1949, Peiping—like Moscow at the time—adopted a militant posture of struggle against the entire non-Communist world and called for revolutions wherever possible in the underdeveloped countries. By contrast, in the mid-1950's, during the so-called Bandung period, it adopted a much more moderate and flexible strategy and promoted friendly relations with a wide variety of non-Communist countries, especially in the underdeveloped world. Then, in the late 1950's it shifted back to a militant posture and renewed its calls for world-wide revolutionary struggle. Further shifts of this sort are certainly possible, in the future as in the past.

Even in the recent period of militancy, moreover, Peiping's doctrinaire and rigid ideological statements have not fully represented Chinese Communist policies, which in practice have included a variety of elements. In fact, even its major ideological statements on strategy have not been wholly consistent. For example, while Peiping's leaders have sounded the trumpet for "people's wars" wherever feasible and for the mobilization of the rural areas of the world (the underdeveloped nations) against the cities of the world (North America and Western Europe), at the same time they have called for closer links with many countries in the so-called intermediate zone—including Japan and many Western countries—since their practical requirements, dictated by economic considerations, make it seem desirable to promote trade and other contacts with these nations.

On balance, nevertheless, Peiping's primary stress in the most recent period has been a revolutionary militancy. But developments of recent months must have raised questions in the minds of at least some of the policy planners in Peiping as to whether they should continue present policies or consider a new shift in overall foreign policy strategy. Where the Chinese Communists have been dogmatically and rigidly militant in the recent period, they have suffered a series of major setbacks and policy defeats—in relations with the Soviet Union, at the Algiers Conference last fall, and in such widely scattered countries as Indonesia, Cuba, and Ghana. It seems probable, also, that Peiping's leaders misestimated the probable extent of American involvement and commitment in Vietnam.

Recent events demonstrate, in short, that Peiping's ability to manipulate or control even those situations where receptivity to Chinese influence has been greatest is severely limited. It remains to be seen whether Peiping's leaders will grasp this fact and modify their policies as a result. Mao and some other top leaders may well resist doing so. But changes in Chinese policies are certainly within the realm of possibility—after Mao's death if not before.

What is required, it seems to me, to maximize the possibility of a desirable sort of shift in Peiping's posture and policies, is a combination of two elements: developments in Vietnam as well as elsewhere that will help to convince Chinese Communist leaders that excessive militancy is counterproductive, but at the same time indications in the general international environment, as they see it, that there are other reasonable and promising policy options—that they can see some possibility of expanding China's role in international affairs and achieving at least some of China's legitimate aspirations by moderate rather than militant means.

In any careful examination of Communist China's international role, two subjects certainly deserve special attention: the Sino-Soviet dispute and its implications for the rest of the world, and China's military position and potential.

The Sino-Soviet dispute as it has evolved in recent years is clearly one of the most important developments in the international politics of the 1960s—just as the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance was in the 1950s. There can be no doubt that the conflicts between Peiping and Moscow now are very real, very bitter, and very deep. The dispute has involved basic clashes of national interests as well as major ideological differences, and it has resulted in worldwide competition between the two countries.

In a fundamental sense the Sino-Soviet dispute has weakened Peiping's international position, which has been to our advantage in many respects, since it imposes increased restraints on the Chinese Communist regime. But not all of the results of the dispute have been good from our point of view. It appears, for example, to have been a significant factor reinforcing Peiping's tendency in recent years to maintain a highly militant posture. We cannot, moreover, rely on the dispute to solve our own basic problems in relations with the Chinese. In certain situations, Soviet interests and policies may run parallel to ours, as appears to be the case even in Vietnam today, to a very limited degree. But we cannot expect such parallelism to be dependable or believe that it will result—as some suggest—in a kind of Soviet-American anti-Chinese axis. Even when a degree of parallelism does exist, it cannot be expected to resolve all the difficult problems of dealing with the Chinese. Furthermore, although it is difficult to see in the predictable future any full restoration of the type of Sino-Soviet relationship that existed in the early 1950's, it is certainly possible that Communist China, particularly under new leaders, might decide to try to repair at least some of the damage that has been done to the alliance in recent years. In any case, the United States will itself have to work toward a solution of at least some of our problems with Communist China; the Sino-Soviet dispute will not solve them for us.

Turning to the question of Communist China's military position, several things should be noted. First of all, the Peiping regime has developed; China into a significant military power, with large, modernized, conventional land forces and a sizeable air force. However, these forces appear to be designed mainly for defense, and Peiping lacks many of the prerequisites for successful operation outside of China against the forces of a major power such as the United States. The strength of Communist China's military establishment far exceeds that of its Asian neighbors, though, and its mere existence argues for the maintenance of adequate counterbalancing forces in Asia, which at the present time must be provided largely by the United States.

Despite Peiping's formal entrance into the nuclear club, and despite the fact that Communist China will probably acquire some sort of missile delivery system in the not distant future, the Chinese Communists are not close to achieving superpower status. For the predictable future, therefore, Peiping's leaders are likely to use China's limited nuclear arsenal primarily for political purposes—although they doubtless also hope that they will be able to deter and cancel out the significance of American nuclear power in Asia.

Peiping's leaders will probably continue to be sensitive to the actual balance of military strength, and reluctant to take excessive risks; for a while, in fact, the vulnerability of their embryonic nuclear establishment may actually impose additional restraints on them.

However, it would be a dangerous error to conclude that Communist China would not risk major war if it genuinely felt that its vital interests were threatened. In regard to Vietnam particularly, there is considerable evidence, I believe, that while Peiping hopes to avoid any major conflict with the United States, it fears that American escalation will create situations demanding escalation on the Chinese side, which could lead to major conflict. In recent months, in fact, Peiping has repeatedly warned its own people of the dangers of American attacks and major war, and there appears to be a genuine apprehension that this may take place. No one can say with certainty what actions might provoke an increased Chinese response. Since Peiping appears to view North Vietnam, like North Korea, as a vital buffer area, it is likely that if the Chinese concluded there was a major threat to the existence of the North Vietnamese regime, the result could be large-scale, direct Chinese intervention. There is no guarantee, however, that even less drastic forms of American escalation—such as bombing of North Vietnam's major cities—might not impel the Chinese to escalate their involvement in smaller ways which might lead to much higher risks of direct American-Chinese clashes that are not desired by either side. In view of this uncertainty, it is essential that the United States exercise great restraint in the use of its power, especially in North Vietnam, and demonstrate by deeds as well as words that we are determined to avoid provoking any direct American-Chinese conflict.

Let me, at this point, return again to questions relating to U.S. policy.

On February 23, President Johnson clearly stated that our desire is to avoid major conflict with China. "Some ask," he said, "about the risks of wider war, perhaps against the vast land armies of Red China. And again, the answer is no. Never by any act of ours—and not if there's any reason left behind the wild words from Peiping. We have threatened no one, and we will not. We seek the end of no regime, and we will not." He declared that we will employ a "measured use of force," with "prudent firmness," and that "there will not be a mindless escalation."

This is a wise posture for us to adopt—although to insure against major war resulting from miscalculation we must firmly hold the line against further escalation in practice as well as theory. This stand is excellent, as far as it goes. But in my opinion we should go still further, especially in regard to policy toward China, and, as I suggested earlier, we should alter our basic posture toward the Chinese Communist regime from one of containment plus isolation to one of containment without isolation.

I indicated earlier that such a change of posture would call for reexamination of many specific aspects of our current policy toward China, and I would like now to make a few comments on some of these.

The China issue in the United Nations is in many respects an urgent question, since unless we can soon evolve a new and sounder position on this issue, we are likely to be defeated in the General Assembly, and then our entire policy of isolation of Peiping will begin to unravel as a result of a major political defeat, even before we can, on our own initiative, attempt to redefine our posture.

Last fall, we were barely able to get enough votes to sustain our position. Conceivably we might do so once or twice again; but it is equally conceivable that next fall the General Assembly might, despite our opposition, vote to seat Peiping in the present China seat occupied by the Chinese Nationalist regime. If this takes place there is little likelihood that the Nationalists could later be brought back into the United Nations, since this would then be a question of admitting a new member, which is subject to the veto.

It would be to our interest, therefore, to take the initiative in the General Assembly in promoting a solution in which the Assembly would declare that there are now two "successor states" ruling the territory of the original China which joined the United Nations when it was formed in 1945, and that both should have seats in the Assembly. Neither the Chinese Communists nor the Chinese Nationalists is presently willing to accept such a solution, and conceivably both might boycott the United Nations for a period of time, if such a solution were adopted. Nevertheless, it is a realistic and reasonable position for the international community as a whole to adopt, and I believe that, if it were adopted, there would be numerous pressures operating overtime to induce Peiping and Taipei eventually to reexamine their positions and consider accepting seats even under these conditions.

If and when Communist China does assume a seat in the United Nations, its initial impact is likely to be disruptive, but I firmly believe that over the long run it is nonetheless desirable to involve Peiping in this complicated political arena, where it will have to deal on a day-to-day basis with such a wide variety of countries and issues. It will soon learn, I think, that dogmatic arrogance will result only in self-isolation and that even a major nation must make compromises to operate with any success in the present world community.

A shift of American policy on the United Nations issue—and, in fact, any significant change in our posture toward Peiping—will inevitably require some modification of our policy toward the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. For many reasons—political, strategic, and moral—we should continue defending Taiwan against attack and should firmly support the principal of self-determination in regard to the 13 million inhabitants of the island. But we will not be able to continue sustaining the fiction that the Na-

tionalist regime is the government of mainland China. Our view of the Nationalist regime should be one in which we recognize it as the legal government of the territories it now occupies, essentially Taiwan and the Pescadores, rather than as the government of all China; this, one might note, is the position which the Japanese Government already maintains in regard to the Nationalists. We should do all we can to obtain representation for the Taipei regime in the United Nations and to urge the international community to accept and support it as the government of its present population and territory. But we cannot indefinitely sustain the fiction that it is the government of all China.

The desirability of increased unofficial contacts with Communist China has already been accepted, at least to a limited degree, by the U.S. Government, and there is now a sizable number of American newsmen, and some doctors and medical scientists, who would be permitted to visit mainland China if the Chinese Communists would grant them visas. The present obstacles to limited contacts, in short, are created by Peiping, not by us. But, despite Peiping's current intransigence, we should continue searching for every possible opportunity for contact, in the hope that Peiping will eventually modify its present stand, and should encourage scholars, businessmen, and others, as well as newsmen and doctors, to try to visit mainland China.

As a part of our effort to increase unofficial contacts with Communist China we should end our embargo on all trade and permit trade in nonstrategic items. The present significance of our embargo, it should be stressed, is wholly symbolic, since no other major trading nation maintains such an embargo, and Peiping is able, therefore, to purchase in Japan, Germany, England, or elsewhere any goods that are denied to it by us. The ending of our embargo might well be largely symbolic too, since the Chinese Communists are likely to prefer trading with countries other than the United States. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that over time some limited trade contacts might develop, and be desirable from our point of view.

The question of de jure recognition of Communist China—which in some discussions of China policy is given more attention than it deserves—is really a question for the future rather than the present. Until Peiping indicates a willingness to exchange diplomatic representatives with us, there are no strong arguments for our unilaterally extending official recognition that would not be reciprocated. Our aim, certainly, should be to work toward eventual establishment of normal diplomatic relations, but it is likely to be some time—even if we alter our own overall position—before that is possible. We can and should, however, clearly indicate now—in much more explicit fashion than we have to date—that we do recognize the Peiping regime in a de facto sense. One might argue that our frequent ambassadorial meetings with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw already constitute a form of de facto recognition, but officially we have refused to acknowledge any sort of recognition—de jure or de facto—and we should now do so.

No discussion of China policy would be complete without at least a word on American public opinion. Although there are many persons in the United States—in the Government, in universities, and elsewhere—who are relatively well informed about Communist China, there is no doubt that the American people, as a whole, know far too little about China, or about the problems of evolving effective policies to deal with it. At the same time, issues relating to China policy have been among the most emotional in American public life ever since the late 1940's. It is probably fair to say that there has been less responsible public discussion of China policy than of any other foreign policy issue of comparable importance. I believe, therefore, that the holding of these hearings is of very great importance, and I hope that they will stimulate nationwide interest and will encourage widespread discussion of U.S. policy toward China.

It is sometimes assumed that, because issues relating to China policy have tended to be viewed emotionally, it has not been politically wise to discuss them. I do not know to what extent this has been true in the past, or to what extent it has inhibited responsible public debate. I do believe, however, that public opinion has been slowly changing and is increasingly receptive to a reexamination of China policy. In support of this view, I would like to call your attention to a book just published, called "The American People and China." It is written by A. T. Steele, formerly of the New York Herald Tribune, and published by the Council on Foreign Relations as part of its broad study, which will result in almost a dozen books, on the United States and China in world affairs. Steele concludes that "American public opinion would, on the whole, welcome a public reappraisal in Congress and among the people, of our China policy," and that public opinion would respond to both congressional and presidential leadership on this issue. I believe he is right, and I hope, therefore, that these hearings will mark the start of the most important public reexamination of China policy since the Communist takeover of China in 1949.

SOVIET TRAWLERS IN U.S. TERRITORIAL WATERS

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, Navy magazine has printed a most perceptive article about the problem of Soviet trawlers frequenting U.S. territorial waters. I commend this article by Raymond Schuessler to the attention of other Senators and ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET TRAWLERS—FREQUENT ENTRY INTO OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS BY THESE ELECTRONIC-LADEN SHIPS CALLS FOR TIT-FOR-TAT RESPONSE BY UNITED STATES, AUTHOR SAYS

(By Raymond Schuessler)

Early on the morning of January 22, 1963, a U.S. tanker radioed the Coast Guard that five Russian trawlers equipped with radar and electronics antenna were proceeding south, 11 miles off the coast of St. Lucie Inlet on the east coast of Florida. Eight hours later the merchantman *Keibe* radioed the Coast Guard that a flotilla of six Russian trawlers, with electronic equipment, was heading south in diamond-shaped formation 3 to 4 miles off Lake Worth Inlet, 40 miles south of the position reported by the tanker.

Since this incident many Russian vessels have been seen off our Florida coast, often within our territorial waters. As Capt. W. K. Thompson, Jr., Chief of Public Information of the U.S. Coast Guard told us, "During the past year and a half there have been about 60 Russian trawler passages and entries into U.S. territorial waters."

ABOUT 5,000 ARE OCEANGOING

What are these Russian ships doing so close to our shores? Are they engaged in harmless fishing expeditions, or are they threatening our security with espionage work and preparing the way for a successful attack in case of war?

The size of Russia's fishing fleet has been variously estimated at from 23,000 to 25,000 steam- and diesel-propelled vessels of modern design and capabilities. About 20 percent or about 5,000 of these ships are classified by our Navy Department as oceangoing trawlers and support ships.

The Soviet oceangoing fishing fleet is scattered around the world, equipped both for fishing and for gathering scientific data, including intelligence of military value. Photographs by U.S. Navy planes show that many of the ships have special electronic capabilities not normally required on fishing boats.

Most of the northbound sightings positioned the trawlers several miles offshore, so it appears that the sailing pattern of those trawlers observed was to avoid the Gulf Stream southbound and to ride it on the passages north. The exception occurred on May 27, 1963, when a trawler was reported 3 miles off Miami Beach, a course not recommended. Within 5 minutes, a 40-foot Coast Guard boat was dispatched to chase it. Although the U.S. craft with a speed of 18 knots had only to close a gap 7½ miles, it gave up persuit without getting close enough to identify it. Adm. I. J. Stephens, of the Miami Coast Guard District, agreed that the trawler had no reason to follow a northern course so close to the shore.

On May 14, 1963, the Navy reported that the destroyer tender U.S.S. *Sierra* had sighted what was described as a hydrosurvey ship of the *Okean* trawler class 3 miles south of Molasses Reef. The trawler did not answer the *Sierra's* signals. On the same day a Coast Guard boat reported the sighting of a trawler 2½ miles off Molasses Reef.

MATTER OF CONCERN

On June 8, 1963, the Lake Worth Light Station reported sighting a Russian trawler 2 miles off Palm Beach southbound. A Coast Guard boat sent located it about a mile and a half off Delray Beach.

In view of their adaptability to purposes other than fishing, the presence of these Russian trawlers within our waters is a matter of some concern to our Government.

Russia maintains a fleet of about 200 to 400 fishing vessels operating off the Grand Banks and Georges Bank in the North Atlantic. More than a dozen of these Russian trawlers make regular trips between the North Atlantic fishing banks and Cuba, according to Rear Adm. A. L. Reed, Acting Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Operations and Readiness.

Admiral Reed explained that in July 1962, several Soviet fishing trawlers began activities in Cuba for the announced purpose of training Cuban fishermen and rehabilitating the Cuban fishing industry. In September 1962, the Castro regime announced a Soviet-Cuban agreement where the Soviet Union would assist in the construction of a large fishing port in Havana Bay committed to provide services to Soviet trawlers in the North Atlantic for 10 years or longer.

WITHIN OUR 3-MILE LIMIT

On their trips south these vessels hug the south Florida coastline for a distance of about 150 to 200 miles and at times are well within (1½ miles) the 3-mile limit of our territorial waters. Although this route is recommended by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey publication U.S. Coast Pilot to avoid the northerly current of the Gulf Stream, it is, according to the Coast Guard, neither the shortest nor fastest for ships moving from the North Atlantic fishing banks to Cuba.

This raises the possibility, according to the Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services:

"That the trawlers may be using the pilots' recommended course as an excuse for moving in our territorial sea * * * a cover for operations of a military or paramilitary nature."

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CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT

"A CONVERSATION WITH HUBERT HUMPHREY"

as broadcast over the

CBS TELEVISION NETWORK

and the

CBS RADIO NETWORK

Tuesday, April 19, 1966 - 10:00-10:30 PM EST

GUEST: HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
Vice President of the United States

CBS NEWS CORRESPONDENTS: Eric Sevareid
Martin Agronsky

PRODUCER: William J. Small

ASSOCIATE PRODUCER: Sylvia Westerman

DIRECTOR: Robert Vitarelli

MR. AGRONSKY: This is the desk of the Vice President of the United States in the Executive Office Building. From this desk he can see the White House across the way.

A view of the West Wing which contains the office of the President.

The office of Hubert Humphrey has the expected memorabilia, photographic reminders of a busy political career spanning several Presidents, F.D.R. on the entrance wall, Johnson, Kennedy, Truman and photographs of the family, Mrs. Humphrey, his parents, his children, grandchildren, and a rye bit of philosophy.

Sometimes I grow tired of a dedicated people, community minded people, great endeavors, things that some things should be done about, eager beavers. And when I grow tired of such things I look with fondness on gentle philosophies, the light of heart, children.

ANNOUNCER: From Washington, CBS News presents a conversation with Hubert Humphrey. With him are CBS News Correspondents Eric Sevareid and Martin Agronsky.

Their discussion with the Vice President begins after this message.

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MR. SEVAREID: Mr. Vice President, this administration seems to have given the American people several explanations as to why we are in Vietnam, beginning with the letter from

Mr. Eisenhower about aid, and all the way up to the SEATO Treaty.

Do you think this has been well done in terms of persuading the people that there is a clear and consistent policy?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: It is always easier, of course, to persuade people, or to get a message to the American people, if there is a sudden development.

For example, it did not take much persuading of the American people when Pearl Harbor happened. And, indeed, it didn't take a great deal of persuading of the American people after Dunkirk. These were dramatic events that compelled everyone's -- well, that compelled everyone to know what was going on, the information was there, the drama was there. It was rather -- it was simple, even though horrible. And a declaration of war, for example, surely compels people to know what is going on.

In this situation, though, it is much more complex. The war is different itself. It is a political war. It is a guerrilla war. It is an area of the world that is in revolution -- instability of government, the gragility of the -- the fragile nature of the political institutions. All of this makes it very complicated to find any simple, direct answers to the problems in Southeast Asia, or to give simple, direct, understandable statements as to what we are seeking to do.

And it is, as you have indicated -- we sort of approached the Vietnamese situation by walking up and putting our toe into that trouble -- into those troubled waters, and then going in just a little deeper, starting back in 1965, where we made some commitments, economic commitments at that time.

But I think our objectives are rather clear -- to defeat the aggression, to stop the aggression, to prevent the success of aggression, we have said, and to give the peoples of South Vietnam their opportunity to make their own choice, to design their own government, to have free elections for the establishment of their own government, and ultimately to make a decision as to whether or not they wish to unite in one country or to have two countries.

MR. AGRONSKY: Mr. Vice President, to use your own figure of speech, we began by putting our toe in the water, and certainly now we are in it up to our neck.

How wise and how fair is it for the American people to be involved to that extent without a declaration of war?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I personally believe that a declaration of war would only exacerbate the situation. I think it would create a highly emotional fever in this country that would truly escalate the struggle.

MR. AGRONSKY: Why do you think that?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Because the whole attitude of the people changes. The organization of your country changes.

The activities of your government change.

One of the things that we have tried to do in this period is to continue to operate an economy on a rather normal basis without the strict controls that come in by the declaration of war or a national emergency.

Furthermore, you trigger a whole series of events once there is a delcaration of war. It is a matter of telling the rest of the world -- join up. It really is putting up a signal that you are not only in trouble, but trouble is everywhere, and you may want to join in that trouble.

MR. SEVAREID: It looks to a lot of people as though the troubles of Marshall Ky in Saigon more or less date from the Honolulu Conference, when he came to see President Johnson. Is there a direct connection?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Not at all. I wouldn't think there was any direct connection. There, of course, this is the sort of a base line for American journalism, because Prime Minister Ky took on added significance in the American mind, in the American communication media, from the Honolulu Conference. He had high visibility at that particular time because the President of the United States was at the conference, and because the conference was a very important conference.

There had to be some identification with individuals becuase individuals make up government and the only government that was available at that time in Saigon was the government

representatives that the President met with in Honolulu.

I would never want anyone to underestimate the meaning of the Honolulu Conference, and the Honolulu Declaration. If that is studied carefully, I think it has as much significance for the future of Asia as the Atlantic Charter had for the future of Europe.

MR. AGRONSKY: What do you have in mind when you say that?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Because the Honolulu Declaration that came from that conference, while in terms of current history was directed towards Vietnam, it was a much broader declaration. It was directed towards an Asia, a modern Asia, an Asia with abundance, an Asia with social justice, an Asia at peace, an Asia with tremendous programs of social, economic betterment. That is the way I read the Honolulu Declaration. And I have studied very carefully and frankly have been very much moved by it.

I regret that more attention has not been given to that declaration, and a little less attention to the personalities involved.

MR. AGRONSKY: This was the articulation of a Johnson doctrine for Asia?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Yes, I think it was. I really believe that, sir. I had not heard it put quite that way, but as you have said it, that would be as I would envision it and see it.

Now, what was said in this declaration was a pledge to ourselves and to posterity to defeat aggression, to defeat social misery, to build viable, free political institutions, and to achieve peace.

Now, those are broad terms, but these are great commitments. And then you add onto this, sir, our relationships with India and Pakistan, but particularly now India, where the discussions between our two governments have gone far beyond just food; they have gone into the whole matter of development of the economy, the social, political structure.

I think there is a tremendous new opening here for realizing the dream of the Great Society in the great area of Asia, not just here at home. And I regret that we have not been able to dramatize it more.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. Vice President, there are immense implications, it seems to me, in what you are saying here.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Yes.

MR. SEVAREID: You seem to me to be saying that the Johnson doctrine, if we may call it that, is proposing a relationship between this country and Asia, far away as it is, and sprawling and diverse as it is, a relationship as fundamental, as long-lasting, intimate, and possibly expensive as our historic associations with Europe. Is it of this scale, of this magnitude?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I think so.

MR. SEVAREID: Then the American people have not really been told that we are taking on another half of the world as our intimate and chief responsibility.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, I don't think they ought to be called that, because that is not the case. It is not our responsibility. I think the American people have been told, again by the cruel facts of war in Vietnam, that we are involved in Asia. Whatever one may think about the struggle in Vietnam -- and there are honest differences of opinion about how it ought to be conducted, whether we ever should have been there and how we are going to get out -- and I don't want to spend my time arguing the details of that.

We have our problems there; but I do know this, that we are there and that it is almost like the first voyage of an explorer into a new land. The ship has almost been cast, has almost been tossed -- storm tossed on the shore and on the beach, but we are there. And we are going to be in Asia for a long, long time. That is what these hearings are all about, about our relationship with Communist China. There is no way that we can really ignore this part of the world, or should we.

We can't be a great power like America with a half world or, as I have said so many times, a world power with a half world involvement, or a world power with a half world knowledge.

Our first objective, it seems to me, should be to be

better acquainted with this part of the world in depth, to know more. And I suppose one in public life should not admit his own inadequacies, but it is very difficult for anyone to conceal them, so you might just as well admit them. How little we know, how regrettably how little I have known about Asia -- even though I thought I was a student of government and of international politics, if not a good practitioner, at least a student of it. But now Vietnam has compelled us to take a good look at where we are and whether we -- and what we are going to do about this part of the world.

It does not mean that we manage it. The one thing that I learned on my visit to Asia, the one impression that I came back with was that Asians themselves want to make Asian policy, they want to take their own initiatives, they want our help, they want our cooperation, they desperately need it. They need our know-how. They need our technical assistance.

When I returned I said to many of my associates in government, this is going to really challenge us. This will be the test of our leadership capability. We have great military men in our nation. We have powerful weapons. I think we can be very proud of their achievements and their competence. The question is do we have the same statesmanship quality to help build nations.

We are literally being called upon to help a people build a whole new society. And I have said to many of my good liberal

friends in government -- I said, "Look, we ought to be excited about this challenge, because here is where we can put to work some of our ideas of how a -- nation building, of new concepts of education, development of local government, the improvement of the health standards of people, and really the achievement and the fulfillment of social justice.

MR. SEVAREID: This Vietnam war seems to have become a kind of a measuring rod for a person's general political philosophy in this country, and we are told now, in the press and by many speakers around the country, that you are losing your liberal identification and your liberal following, after a lifetime of enjoying it, because of your support of this war.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Did you say a lifetime of enjoying it?

MR. SEVAREID: You have enjoyed their support. No doubt much pain with it.

Do you feel this is true?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I think it is fair to say that a number of my old friends disagree with me on my position on the struggle in Vietnam. I respect their right to do so and I respect their point of view.

But I must say in all candor that if a lifetime -- and you are right -- if a lifetime of service to progressive and liberal causes and legislation is to fall by the wayside because of a disagreement over an action in Vietnam, then the reliability

of friendship is found wanting.

I have disagreed with many a man in public life on a particular issue, and yet joined with him again with great respect and admiration in another struggle.

I used to lose friends because I was for medicare. I lost a lot of them. I lost many good supporters. They called me all kinds of things. I lost a host of friend when I advocated civil rights. But I was right, and I felt it deeply. It was not politically popular. I want to make it quite clear, that was a political albatross for years. I carried a heavy load but I felt it.

MR. AGRONSKY: You feel it is unfair, then, to take away your liberal credentials as a result of the Vietnam --

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, I don't think a man ought to say it is unfair. Everybody is entitled to their own peeve. But I have not really found too many people that dislike Hubert Humphrey for one particular issue. There are apprently quite a few that are not too fond of him, both conservative and liberal.

MR. SEVAREID: I think we might interrupt at this point, Mr. Agronsky and Mr. Vice President; we will be back with this discussion with Vice President Hubert Humphrey in just a moment.

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MR. AGRONSKY: Do you and the President feel, as so many

seem to feel, that abroad the whole American policy system seems to be unraveling, with the NATO problem which you have mentioned, with the crisis in Vietnam? Are we going to be forced to re-evaluate our whole foreign policy position, are we in the process of doing that?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I heard the Secretary of State say the other day, gentlemen, that there had been in the past I think two years over fifty changes of government. This necessitates constant re-evaluation of your policies, a readjustment of your relationships, new forces come into being -- the situation in the Congo, for example -- two years ago it was entirely different than it is today. The situation in Rhodesia today is entirely different than it was even six months ago. Obviously the situation is Brazil is much different than it was two or three years ago.

All I am saying is that a big power such as the United States, or a large power such as the Soviet Union, constantly has to readjust and re-evaluate its endeavors, its diplomatic, its economic programs, and its overseas endeavors.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. Vice President, you make these changes sound more or less like a normal process. But surely the change in Europe is a breakup of the fundamental patterns of European power and its balance as we have known it for twenty years. I am at a loss to see what conception this government has of the new Europe that is going to arrive, what we want to

see.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, I don't suppose that I am capable of giving you a blueprint of the kind of new Europe that will arise, and I must say that I doubt that you build -- I doubt that societies are created out of blueprints. They generally come out of the pragmatic approach of experience and sometimes even sad experience.

We learned a great deal out of the sadness of and the tragedy of war, and out of depression.

MR. AGRONSKY: What are we going to do about living in a Europe without France, which is deliberately excluding itself from participation in Western European life and policy and defense?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I think what the Secretary of State has indicated is that it is possible to have a NATO, that is, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization, without France. And, of course, it is. The other fourteen members can have an integrated command, can have political consultation, that is, the NATO consultative body or the NATO Council. These things can be.

Now, if you ask me, will it be as strong as if you had France within it, my answer would be, in candor, no. Western Europe with France an integral part of a Western European alliance or a Western European treaty organization like NATO, is a better Western Europe -- that is, it is a stronger one.

It is stronger politically, it is stronger militarily, and I think it is stronger economically. But I don't think we ought to say that if any one country drops out, that this is the end of the road.

I do think it is fair to say that NATO without France will make Germany a much more significant power. It will place a greater power emphasis upon Germany. But we are going to move ahead, to preserve NATO, if France -- and France will, under de Gaulle, pursue its independent course.

France wants, under President de Gaulle, wishes to pursue an independent policy, but at the same time to have the umbrella of American power and Western European integrated power as her protection. She wants total defense without total commitment.

MR. AGRONSKY: Would it be fair to say, Mr. Vice President, that the American view of France today might be predicated on the feeling that de Gaulle, after all, is not immortal?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: It is my view that France will come back into a Western European alliance, an integrated alliance. I think France is needed. As long as President de Gaulle is the leader of the French Republic, she will pursue a very independent course. And I think we have to be prepared for that.

By the same token, I do not expect France to be unaware of her own defense, and she knows that her relationships with the United States are very important. She will want to have

bilaterals, that is, treaties with the several Eiropean countries. She just doesn't want to have her so-called sovereignty touched.

MR. SEVAREID: What kind of a treaty do you think de Gaulle wants with the Russians?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I don't think we have any real evidence yet as of this moment what the President of the Republic of France will do. But I am sure of one thing, that he will attempt to convey to all of Europe his idea and his dream of a Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals, a Europe of peace, and as he thinks of it, a Europe more closely allied, more closely -- not integrated -- that word doesn't fit into his picture or pattern -- but a Europe of non-aggression. There has even been talk of non-aggression pacts.

These things are not particularly frightening to anyone. I think that you ought to look with some favor upon creative thought about political arrangements in Europe.

MR. SEVAREID: Is this a time for President Johnson to go to Europe?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: The President has never suggested that I should be his tour director or to outline his travel program. I think it would be better to put that question to the President, and you will have that opportunity some day, I am sure.

MR. SEVAREID: I make the personal assumption that you

would like to be President some day and on that assumption, may I ask you, wouldn't you have a freer and easier track towards that ultimate ambition, assuming it is yours, if you were still a Senator and not Vice President?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: There are those that feel that way and have said so.

MR. SEVAREID: I was asking about your feelings.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I am the Vice President. I wanted to be Vice President. I feel that I can offer something to my country in this position. I am at the center of the decision-making processes of our government. I make some contribution. I would not want anyone to think that the Vice President is a man of great power. He has responsibility without authority. He has prestige without power.

I would like to believe, gentlemen, that I have read history and studied American government. I used to teach it. And I want to say that there are very few professors of political science that spend one lecture on the Vice Presidency. And maybe that is all it deserves.

But I think from here on out -- not from the day of Hubert Humphrey, but going into the 20th Century, particularly the -- starting in the thirties, that the office of the Vice President will command much more attention.

MR. AGRONSKY: Mr. Vice President, Eric has raised the question of your own personal ambition for the Presidency,

which we do not ask that you accept or deny.

But there is a consensus in the country that the major obstacle in the path of that personal ambition -- and we speak now of course in terms of 1972 -- would be the Senator from New York, Robert Kennedy.

Now, what do you think of the press pre-occupation with that particular issue? How does it affect you? Does it damage you in any way politically? Is it important?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, you men of the media must have something to write about and talk about, and there is nothing better than people.

Of course, the Senator from New York is an extremely able man, a fine family, well-known American family.

The Vice President is a political officer.

I am somewhat flattered, I might say, because most Vice Presidents didn't get written up quite that much.

But to predict 1972, that is really quite a ways off. And I venture to say that both the Senator from New York and the Vice President cannot make any safe predictions about what will happen by 1972. There may be many other people on the political horizon that will over-shadow us all. That is entirely probable.

Who knows what those days ahead will offer.

Now, to answer your question -- how does this affect me; it interests me. But it really does not upset me. It surely does not impede my activities. And, quite frankly, I don't

sit around day and night plotting and planning how I am going to better my political position.

MR. SEVAREID: Perhaps part of your problem, a continuing one, is that one-half the American population is about twenty-five years of age or under, and memories are short.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: That is right. I am young of heart. I understand that fully well.

MR. SEVAREID: And the young heroes are the popular heroes.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, heroes come and go.

I must say that one of the observations of politics is to remember that popularity is sometimes short-lived. Also that your stand on a particular issue can change your acceptance or can give you acceptance or rejection.

I don't think you can make long-term predictions.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. Vice President, you have given us a lot of time. You have been very responsive. We are very grateful.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Thank you.

MR. SEVAREID: I think this might be the point to terminate the conversation.

ANNOUNCER: A Conversation with Hubert Humphrey was pre-recorded and edited under the supervision and control of CBS News.

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A 'Johnson Doctrine'

Humphrey Says Meaning of Honolulu Talks Is a Sweeping U.S. Commitment for Asia

By PHILIP GEYELIN
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — Vice President Humphrey had stunning news for those in the U.S. Senate and elsewhere who have been bitterly condemning this country's past commitment to Vietnam and sharply questioning the future Asian role of the U.S.

Even while debate on these issues was raging before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee two months ago, it seems, President Johnson was propounding a new "Johnson Doctrine" as sweeping in its implications for Asia as was the U.S. commitment to Europe almost two decades ago. Or so the Vice President reported in a transcript issued in advance of a television interview to be aired last night on the Columbia Broadcasting network. Mr. Humphrey was discussing the results of the Honolulu meeting between Mr. Johnson and South Vietnamese leaders in early February.

"I would never want anyone to underestimate the meaning of the Honolulu conference or the Honolulu declaration," the Vice President declared. "If that is studied carefully, I think it has as much significance for the future of Asia as the Atlantic Charter had for the future of Europe."

At the time, no such interpretation was read into the joint statement issued by Mr. Johnson and the South Vietnamese. Mr. Johnson didn't talk of an Asian "doctrine" and neither did the document itself, whose precise terms dealt strictly with Vietnam. But it actually was intended as "a much broader declaration," the Vice President insisted last night. "It was directed towards an Asia, a modern Asia, an Asia at peace, an Asia with tremendous programs of social, economic betterment."

Illustrative Excerpts

Excerpts from the exchange that immediately followed are illustrative, at the very least, of how "doctrines" come into the geopoliticial lexicon. But they also bear heavily on the very question currently disturbing Sen. Fulbright (D., Ark.), Foreign Relations Committee chairman: How is it that the U.S. gets committed to large international undertakings with hardly anybody being aware of it. In the CBS interview, which was taped last Wednesday, Mr. Humphrey says it would have been obvious if "more attention (had) been given to that declaration and a little less attention to the personalities involved."

This, then, was the "articulation of a Johnson Doctrine for Asia?" Mr. Humphrey was asked. "Yes, I think it was," he replied. "I hadn't heard it put quite that way, but as you have said it, that would be as I would envision it and see it." The Vice President noted that the declaration pledged the U.S. in general terms to "defeat aggression, to defeat social misery, to build viable, free institutions and to achieve peace." These are "great commitments," he went on. "I think there is a tremendous new opening here for realizing the dream of the Great Society in the great area of Asia, not just here at home. And I regret that we haven't been able to dramatize it more."

Q. (from CBS commentator Eric Sevareid). Mr. Vice President, there are immense implications, it seems to me, in what you are saying here.

A. Yes.

Q. You seem to me to be saying that the Johnson Doctrine, if we may call it that, is proposing a relationship between this country and Asia, far away as it is, and sprawling and diverse as it is, a relationship as fundamental, as long-lasting, intimate and possibly expensive as our historic associations with Europe. Is it of this scale, of this magnitude?

A. I think so.

Regional Approach

The Johnson Administration's plans for exporting the Great Society to Asia and elsewhere, with emphasis on a regional approach to Asian economic and social development, aren't new. The U.S. played a major role in promoting the recently created Asian Development Bank, subscribing $200 million in capital out of the $1 billion total. The President has talked up plans for joint development of the Mekong River Basin in Southeast Asia and pledged heavy U.S. outlays to that end, too. Next week, former World Bank President Eugene R. Black is off on another Asian tour as the President's special representative to examine new projects on which the U.S. and Asian nations might collaborate; yesterday, Mr. Black conferred with the President on plans for this excursion.

But nothing as formal and high-flown as the Vice President's "Johnson Doctrine" concept had yet been put forth. Nor had the U.S. mission in Vietnam ever been described in quite the terms used by Mr. Humphrey last night—terms certain to sharpen the Congressional debate over this country's future Asian policy.

Vietnam, Mr. Humphrey declared, is "almost like the first voyage of an explorer into a new land. The ship has almost been storm-tossed on the shore, but we are there." And he added:

"We are going to be in Asia for a long, long time."

That, of course, is what the debate in Congress and in the public arena has been all about. Sen. Fulbright and others have been arguing heatedly that the U.S. had no business getting bogged down in Vietnam in the first place, that it ought to disentangle itself as rapidly as possible, and that it shouldn't take on similar commitments in the future, especially in Asia.

Earlier this week, in committee hearings on foreign-aid legislation, Chairman Fulbright hammered hard at the need to put foreign aid on an "impersonal" basis through wider use of multilateral agencies, just to avoid having broad political and military obligations grow out of seemingly narrow commitments to economic assistance. Sen. Fulbright contended this was how the U.S. got drawn into Vietnam, and that Mr. Humphrey saw a "Johnson Doctrine"; his March report to the President, on his return from an Asian tour after the Hawaii meeting, did make vague reference to something grander in scope than a commitment to Vietnam. In that report, Mr. Humphrey said the Honolulu declaration "could represent a historic turning point in American relationships with Asia." He argued that Asian leaders were taking the Honolulu goals "very seriously."

But the notion that this amounts to a "doctrine" or a "great commitment" is new, and almost certain to raise the question of whether the Administration isn't once again reading profound obligations retroactively into documents that weren't billed as obligations, commitments or high policy at the time.

One practical effect could be more far reaching than the anticipated difficulty for the Johnson foreign-aid program. Mr. Fulbright has already threatened to oppose it. The Foreign Relations Committee's second ranking Democrat, Sen. Morse of Oregon, has promised to battle for deep reductions, centering on funds for Vietnam. Conscious of this developing opposition, atop the usual Congressional resistance to foreign aid, most Administration officials have been taking a low-key, once-removed approach to Asian aid, playing up multilateral methods and the importance of Asian self-help. The Vice President's pronouncement last night may make this line somewhat more difficult to maintain.

and to achieve peace." These are "great commitments," he went on. "I think there is a tremendous new opening here for realizing the dream of the Great Society in the great area

of multilateral agencies, just to avoid having broad political and military obligations grow out of seemingly narrow commitments to economic assistance. Sen. Fulbright contended this was how the U.S. got drawn into Vietnam, and he and others argued that it shouldn't be allowed to happen again elsewhere.

Yet, if the Vice President's statements are to be interpreted as firm policy, the enunciation of a Johnson Doctrine can only "personalize" the U.S. role. As for the thought advanced by Sen. Fulbright and many other critics of the Vietnam War—that the U.S. has no real business being so deeply entangled in Asia—the Vice President seemed almost to be inviting argument. "That is what the (Senate) hearings are all about," he declared in stating categorically that "we can't be a world power with a half-world involvement."

It was impossible to determine precisely how much of a hand, if any, Mr. Johnson may have had in the Vice President's declarations. Late yesterday, officials who might have been expected to know professed ignorance. Some of them also conceded to some surprise that Mr. Humphrey had gone as far as he did in challenging the critics of current Asian policy.

"This will really make Fulbright explode," said one who feared a rapid heating of Congressional and public debate as the result of the Vice President's remarks, whatever the President's role may have been.

Controversy is likely to be all the more inflamed by the Vice President's claim that "great commitments" to all of Asia were contained in a document that seemed to deal almost exclusively with the war in Vietnam.

Ease of Commitment

Already, deep concern is apparent about the ease with which the U.S. Government gets itself committed, as in Vietnam, by such seemingly innocuous documents as former President Eisenhower's original promise of economic assistance to the government of former South Vietnamese Premier Ngo Dinh Diem just after the signing of the 1954 Geneva accords. For years, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was founded on this pledge, which included no reference to military support.

The Honolulu declaration, on its face, is equally innocuous, as far as mentioning the rest of Asia is concerned. Its four parts include a brief preamble, in which the governments of the U.S. and Vietnam jointly declare their "determination in defense against aggression," their "dedication to the hopes of all the people of South Vietnam," and "their commitment to the search for just and stable peace."

The next two parts are devoted to defining, respectively, Vietnamese and U.S. purposes in the war. The U.S. statement makes general reference to U.S. "pledges" to the principle of self-determination and to playing "its full part in the world-wide attack upon hunger, ignorance and disease," in explaining what the U.S. is doing in Vietnam.

In the fourth section, the two governments subscribe jointly to a common commitment to "defense against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of free self-government, to the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease, and to the unending quest for peace."

It was in this last declaration, apparently,

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7/28

June
Tab this and
keep it for
ready reference.
JGP

The essence of the U.S. purpose and policy in Vietnam was restated by the President on July 12, 1966, in his speech to the American Alumni Council:

". . . . Every American must know exactly what it is we are trying to do in Vietnam. Our greatest resource in this conflict . . . .

"We are not trying to wipe out North Vietnam.

"We are not trying to change their Government.

"We are not trying to establish permanent bases in South Vietnam.

"And we are not trying to gain one inch of new territory.

"Then why are we there?

"Because we are trying to make the Communists of North Vietnam stop shooting at their neighbors.

"Because we are trying to make their aggression unprofitable.

"Because we are trying to demonstrate that guerrilla warfare, inspired by one nation against another, cannot succeed. Onee that lesson is learned, a shadow that hangs over all of Asia will begin to recede."

CHINA

Vice President on Meet the Press, March 13, 1966

"It is my view that Communist China today is the militant aggressive force in large areas of Asia and that she is using some of this militancy through her agent in North Vietnam into South Vietnam.

"I do believe that containment of aggressive militancy of China is a worthy objective, but containment without necessarily isolation. Containment of its militancy, of its military power, just as we had to do in the post-war years in Europe, relating to the Soviet Union. But at the same time not trying to isolate from the family of mankind." (p. 10)

* * *

"We have, of course, exercised a policy of containment and restraint on the Soviet Union in the past, and she had nuclear capacity far beyond anything that China has today. The Soviet Union is a powerful nation, and I am happy to say that that program of responsible containment, the building of collective security in the West, but at the same time a probing and trying to find ways of communication has been relatively successful, and I think it is in our interest and in the interest of humanity that the same kind of approach be exercised in Asia where

Communist China today shows not only militancy against the West and against her neighbors, but also against the Soviet Union, sir." (p. 11)

* * *

"We have tried upon several occasions to break into China for the purpose of the visitation with people -- people-to-people. This is the beginning. It could be the beginning of a much better relationship. I am afraid that we are going to have to wait until the men of the Long March, of the Mao generation, are out of positions of leadership. But in the meantime we ought to maintain as best we can a spirit of friendship towards the Chinese people, but recognizing what the regime is and making that regime understand they cannot achieve their purposes by military power." (p. 15)

Vice President at West Point, New York, June 8, 1966

"And finally, we seek and will continue to seek to build bridges, to keep open the doors of communication, to the Communist states of Asia, and in particular Communist China -- just as we have to the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe.

"The isolation of the Asian Communist states -- however caused -- breeds unreality, delusion, and miscalculation.

"Efforts to break that isolation may, for the time being, provoke denunciation and hostility. But we shall persevere and explore means of communication and exchange, looking to the day when the leaders of Asian communism -- as their former colleagues in Europe -- will come to recognize the self-destructiveness and wastefulness of their present bellicose policies.

"Prudence and reason, not the slogans of the past, will guide us as we try to reduce the unacceptable risks of ignorance and misunderstanding in a thermonuclear age.

"Let me underline what we do not seek:

"We do not seek alignment, except from those who choose it. We do not seek economic privilege. We do not seek territory or military bases. We do not seek to dominate or to conquer.

"Our objectives are best served by one result in Asia:

"The emergency of nations dedicated to their own national independence, to the well-being of their people, and to the pursuit of peace." (p. 6)

President's Speech to American Alumni Council, July 12, 1966

"A peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia.

"A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression. A misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside world and toward policies of peaceful cooperation.

"For lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world.

"We have learned in our relations with other such states that the weakness of neighbors is a temptation, and only firmness, backed by power, can really deter power that is backed by ambition. But we have also learned that the greatest force for opening closed minds and closed societies is the free flow of ideas and people and goods." (p. 6)

* * *

"We persist because we know that hunger and disease, ignorance and poverty, recognize no boundaries of either creed or class or country.

"We persist because we believe that even the most rigid societies will one day awaken to the rich possibilities of a diverse world.

"And we continue because we believe that cooperation, not hostility, is really the way of the future in the 20th Century." (P. 6)

DSA

Vice President's Speech at West Point, New York, June 8, 1966

"I come to my final question: Can we achieve sensible goals in Asia?

"What, in simplest form are those goals?

"First, we seek to assist free nations, willing to help themselves, in their deterrence of and resistance to all forms of aggression.

"Second, we seek to assist free nations, willing to help themselves, in the great tasks of nation-building. We must lead other rich nations in the war on poverty, ignorance and disease in Asia.

"Third, we seek to strengthen the forces of regional cooperation on the basis of Asian initiatives.

"And finally, we seek and will continue to seek to build bridges, to keep open the doors of communication, to the Communist states of Asia, and in particular Communist China -- just as we have to the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe." (p. 5)

Vice President's Report to the President on Far East Trip
(released March 3, 1966)

"The war being waged in Vietnam and in most of Asia is two-fold

the struggle of nations to chart their own destinies and maintain their national independence while threatened by Communist subversion and aggression;

and the struggle to bring about a social and economic revolution for the people.

"There is a growing appreciation by Asian leaders that successful resistance to Communist-backed subversion and/or aggression depends on the success of a social revolution that improves the lives of people, as well as on armed defense." (p. 2)

* * *

"The significance of the struggle in Vietnam is not simply the defense of a small nation against powerful neighbors. Vietnam is, in a larger sense, the focus of a broad effort to restrain the attempt by Asian Communists to expand by force -- as we assisted our European allies in resisting Communist expansion in Europe after World War II." (p. 3)

* * *

"The Honolulu Declaration emphasizing the defeat of aggression and the achievement of a social revolution could represent a historic turning point in American relationships with Asia. The goals agreed upon by President Johnson and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam at Honolulu are taken very seriously:

to defeat aggression,

to defeat social misery,

to build a stable democratic government,

to reach an honorable, just peace." (p. 3)

* * *

"Free Asia is astir with a consciousness of the need for Asian initiatives in the solution of Asia's problems. Regional development and planning are increasingly being recognized as necessary for political and economic progress. The power of nationalism is now tempered by a growing realization of the need for cooperation among nations. Asians seek to preserve their national identity. They want gradually to create new international structures. But they want to pursue such aims themselves. They want foreign assistance when necessary, but without foreign domination." (p. 4)

President's Remarks to American Alumni Council, July 12, 1966

"Asia is now the crucial arena of man's striving for independence and order, and for life itself . . . . So if enduring peace can ever come to Asia, all mankind will benefit. But if peace fails there, no where else will our achievements really be secure . . . . The peace we seek in Asia is a peace of conciliation between Communist states and their non-Communist neighbors: between rich nations and poor; between small nations and large; between men whose skins are brown and black, and yellow and white; between Hindus and Moslems, and Buddhists and Christians.

"It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bonds of peace: through international trade; through the free flow of people and ideas; through full participation by all nations in an international community under law; and through a common dedication to the great task of human progress and economic development." (p. 2)

* * *

(Essentials for Peace)

"First is the determination of the United States to meet our obligations in Asia as a Pacific power . . . .

"Second essential for peace in Asia is this: to prove to aggressive nations that the use of force to conquer others is a losing game . . . .

"The third essential is the building of political and economic strength among the nations of free Asia . . . .

"There is a fourth essential for peace in Asia which may seem the most difficult of all: reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies." (p. 6)

Vice President, CBS Interview with Agronsky/Sevareid, April 19, 1966

"I would never want anyone to underestimate the meaning of the Honolulu Conference, and the Honolulu Declaration. If this is studied carefully, I think it has as much significance for the future of Asia as the Atlantic Charter had for the future of Europe.

"Mr. Agronsky: What do you have in mind when you say that?

"Vice President Humphrey: Because the Honolulu Declaration that came from that conference, while in terms of current history was directed towards Vietnam, it was a much broader declaration. It was directed towards an Asia, a modern Asia, an Asia with abuddance, an Asia withsocial justice, an Asia at peace, an Asia with tremendous programs of social, economic betterment. This is the way I read the Honolulu Declaration. And I have studied very carefully and frankly have been very much moved by it.

"I regret that more attention has not been given to that declaration, and a little less attention to the personalities involved.

"Mr. Agronsky: This was the articulation of a Johnson doctrine for Asia?

"Vice President Humphrey: Yes, I think it was. I really believe that, sir. I had not heard it put quite that way, but as you have said it, that would be as I would envision it and see it.

"Now, what was said in this declaration was a pledge to ourselves and to posterity to defeat aggression, to defeat social misery, to build viable, free political institutions, and to achieve peace.

"Now, those are broad terms, but these are great commitments. And then you add onto this, sir, our relationships with India and Pakistan, but particularly now India, where the discussions between our two governments have gone far beyond just food; they have gone into the whole matter of development of the economy, the social, political structure.

"I think there is a tremendous new opening here for realizing the dream of the Great Society in the great area of Asia, not just here at home. And I regret that we have not been able to dramatize it more.

"Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Vice President, there are immense implications, it seems to me, in what you are saying here.

"Vice President Humphrey: Yes.

"Mr. Sevareid: You seem to me to be saying that the Johnson doctrine, if we may call it that, is proposing a relationship between this country and Asia, far away as it is, and sprawling and diverse as it is, a relationship as fundamental, as long-lasting, intimate, and possibly expensive as our historic associations with Europe. Is it of this scale, of this magnitude?

"Vice President Humphrey: I think so." (p. 6)

* * *

"We can t be a great power like America with a half world or, as I have said so many times, a world power with a half world involvement, or a world power with a half world knowledge." (p. 8)

Vice President on Meet the Press, March 13, 1966

"One of the most fruitful procedures under way in this government are the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Asia and China. I think that the American people know far too little about Asia and the countries of Asia. They are all very different, and we need to know much more about them. We are a European-oriented society, and so is our educational structure. We need much more going on in our universities and institutes on China and on Asia." (p. 14)

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
JULY 22, 1966

STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

THE ASIAN DOCTRINE

Except for the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has traditionally rejected policies of unilateral responsibility for entire regions and continents. In the nineteenth century the United States played almost no part in European politics and only a marginal role in Asia, preferring to regard itself as an example of progress and democracy which others might imitate or not as they saw fit. In the twentieth century events beyond our control brought us into two world wars and imposed upon us responsibilities far beyond our borders. Until quite recently, however, our policies for meeting those commitments have been guided by two extremely important qualifying principles: first, that these responsibilities were limited to certain countries and certain purposes; second, that they would be discharged collectively either under the United Nations or in cooperation with our allies.

The emerging "Asian Doctrine" about which so much is currently being said and written represents a radical departure in American foreign policy in that it is virtually unlimited in what it purports to accomplish and unilateral in its execution. Without reference to the United Nations and with only perfunctory reference to the non-functioning SEATO treaty, the United States on its own has undertaken to win a victory for its proteges in the Vietnamese civil war and thereupon to build a "Great Society" in Asia, whatever that might turn out to mean. I think it extremely important that the Senate, which used to be asked for its advice and consent on major foreign commitments, consider some of the sweeping implications of the "Asian Doctrine" before it becomes an irrevocable national commitment undertaken without the consent or even the knowledge of the Senate.

American policy in Europe after World War II consisted of collective measures for the containment of Soviet power. Though financed by the United States, the Marshall Plan was shaped and largely executed as a cooperative program for European economic recovery. Although American military power was preeminent, NATO was created as and remained a system for the collective defense of Europe and the North Atlantic. We did not talk in those days of a "New Deal" or a "Fair Deal" for Europe; we were satisfied to support economic reconstruction and to restrain Soviet power.

The Korean War was fought under the auspices of the United Nations for an ultimately limited purpose. The United States provided most of the forces from outside, but a great many other members of the United Nations sent troops and the United Nations itself took part in the direction of the war. After the abandonment

of the disastrous attempt to occupy North Korea, which brought hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers into the conflict, the war was fought for the limited purpose of repelling a clear act of aggression which had been incited by Stalinist Russia.

In Vietnam we are fighting virtually alone and for undefined purposes in a war which is not an international conflict but an insurrection in one part of a divided country supported by the other part. Aside from the token forces provided by Australia and New Zealand for their own political purposes, the only other outside force in Vietnam besides the American army of 300,000 is a Korean force of 25,000 heavily subsidized by the United States. Except for peace proposals offered by the Secretary General, the United Nations plays no part in the war and is generally ignored by the belligerents; many members of the United Nations are extremely critical of the American involvement in Vietnam and it is most unlikely that, if a vote were taken, the United States could muster a majority in the General Assembly in support of its policy. As for the SEATO treaty, ignored until a few months ago but recently hauled out as the source of an American military obligation to Vietnam, four of its seven members do not support the American military effort and at least one, France, is extremely critical of American policy.

American war aims have escalated with the fighting. A few years ago a handful of American advisers were committed to support a South Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort with the clearly stated stipulation that it was up to the South Vietnamese themselves to win or lose their battle with the Vietcong. When they had virtually lost, the United States changed its policy and sent its own army to take over the war. Since early 1965 our military effort has expanded from counterinsurgency to a large-scale ground and air war and our political commitment has grown into an "Asian Doctrine."

Under the emerging "Asian Doctrine" the United States is taking on the role of policeman and provider for all of noncommunist Asia. Defining Asia as "the crucial arena of man's striving for independence and order," the President, without reference to the United Nations or the obligations of other countries, recently declared "the determination of the United States to meet our obligations in Asia as a Pacific power," denounced those -- whoever they may be -- who hold to the view that "east is east and west is west and never the twain shall meet," and laid down certain "essentials" for peace in Asia, all requiring a predominantly American effort for the shaping of a "Pacific era." 1.

In a television interview last April 19, the Vice President defined the Honolulu declaration resulting from the President's meeting with General Ky as a "Johnson Doctrine" for Asia, "a pledge to ourselves and to posterity to defeat aggression, to defeat social

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1. Speech to American Alumni Council at West Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, July 12, 1966.

misery, to build viable, free political institutions, and to achieve peace. . . ." Acknowledging these to be "great commitments," the Vice President went on to say: ". . . I think there is a tremendous new opening here for realizing the dream of the Great Society in the great area of Asia, not just here at home."

All this must come as a big surprise to Senators who have not even been informed of these sweeping commitments, much less asked for their advice and consent, but the President's close friend and biographer tells us that the "Asian Doctrine" has been in the President's mind for five years, and Mr. White should know.

It is ironic that at the same time that the vestiges of the Monroe Doctrine are being fitfully liquidated the United States should be formulating a similar doctrine of preeminent American responsibility for Asia. One wonders whether the Asian Doctrine will reap for the United States as rich a harvest of affection and democracy as has the Monroe Doctrine. One wonders whether China will accept American hegemony as gracefully as Cuba and the Dominican Republic have accepted it. And one wonders whether anyone ever thought of asking the Asians if they really want to join the Great Society.

The Evening Star

With Sunday Morning Edition

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The Fulbright Doctrine

Senator Fulbright last week came out swinging against something he calls the "Johnson Doctrine" or the "Asian Doctrine." It was an impressive demonstration. His footwork was flawless. He bobbed and weaved with his customary agility. His short, sharp punches positively whistled through the air.

Only one detail reduced the effectiveness of the performance: There was no opponent. And shadow boxing has always seemed a rather pointless exercise.

Senator Fulbright seemed to be particularly incensed by President Johnson's speech of July 12 to the American Alumni Council. In that speech, the President called for closer contacts with mainland China, restated the now-familiar reasons for our involvement in the fighting in South Viet Nam and set forth his hopes for a "peace of conciliation" throughout Asia. He also said that, as a Pacific power, the United States must meet its obligations in Asia.

Not exactly a startling new doctrine. More like a restatement of previously stated positions, with perhaps a dash more conciliation than usual thrown in.

But the senator was not to be untracked that easily. The Vice President, he said, had used the term "Johnson Doctrine" on a television interview last April. And some newspaper writers had used it as well.

In point of fact, the Vice President did not, during the interview in question, ever use the phrase. An interviewer did, and Mr. Humphrey said he thought there might be something to it. And in the second place, neither the Vice President nor his interviewer originates United States foreign policy. Nor do newspaper writers. Nor does Senator Fulbright — although Fulbright made it quite clear that, in Fulbright's opinion, Fulbright should.

Repeatedly, the senator berated the President for not seeking the advice and consent of Congress in the process of evolving his foreign policy. Fulbright, in fact, seemed to have forgotten that the conduct of foreign policy is the President's job and that Congress only gets into the picture when formal treaties are involved.

Perhaps what is really taking place is the formulation of a Fulbright Doctrine, which runs something like this:

"The President shall refrain from acting upon, speaking about or considering any matter concerning the foreign policy of the nation without first clearing it with the Senate — particularly me.

"In addition, be it noted that I reserve the right to change my mind annually and to engage in all-out attacks on positions I once defended."

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER . MONDAY, JULY 25, 1966 PAGE A16

World Power

Senator J. William Fulbright unjustly accused the Administration of a "radical departure in American foreign policy" last Friday in his attack on what he called President Johnson's "Asian doctrine." His accusation produced an unproductive semantic dispute over what is meant by the assertion that the United States is a *Pacific Power* and an *Asian Power*. If these terms mean that the United States is and long has been a nation with enormous interests in the Pacific and in Asia, it has, of course, been a *Pacific Power* and an *Asian Power* for generations. Neither President Johnson nor his immediate predecessors are responsible for that.

The Senator from Arkansas has become so querulous and cantankerous a critic that President Johnson could not state the most obvious truth about foreign policy without inviting the Senator's distempered dissection. His faultfinding started out with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and now he would even repeal the Monroe Doctrine.

His somewhat belated dissent from the Monroe Doctrine, of course, has a certain amount of logic. The great doctrine violated all his precepts. It was a unilateral declaration. It came about without Senate advice. It committed us beyond our shores. And it succeeded. It was, moreover, an initial public assertion of our role as a *Pacific Power*, something the Senator is unwilling to have a President say even now, 143 years later. Of the three major premises of the Monroe Doctrine, the first (declaring the two continents no longer open to European colonization) was called forth by claims of Russia to the Pacific Northwest and by her attempts to found a colony in California.

But the mainland was not the limit of our Pacific interest, even then. A newspaper rumor of American intent to colonize the Pacific areas provoked a bitter quarrel between Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and Minister Canning of Great Britain in 1821. Adams bluntly refused to renounce American ambitions in the Pacific. In 1824, after long controversy, the United States obtained a treaty with Russia giving it "the liberty of navigating and fishing in the Pacific Ocean and the South Sea and of freely trading with the natives at the unoccupied points."

For nearly 150 years the United States has been a *Pacific Power*, if that means publicly proclaimed interest in the region, the possession of territory bordering the great ocean, or concern about events in all the lands washed by its waters. That the President could be criticized, at this late date, for asserting our responsibilities as a *Pacific Power* is quite extraordinary. Such criticism must arouse painful sensations in Hawaii which, someone ought to tell Senator Fulbright, is completely surrounded by the Pacific Ocean.

off the war. But Moscow, afraid of charges of selling out its ally, has hesitated to apply the moderating influence which its aid presumably commanded. Washington is now tightening the diplomatic screws on Moscow. It is saying, in effect: We have allowed you a lever in Hanoi; pull it.

The Soviet government is, in fact, hoist by its own petard. From the U.S. it asks safety for its "merchant" ships in Haiphong harbor and from North Vietnam it asks credit for providing military aid. Washington had no choice, in answering the Soviet protest note, but to expose the hostile intent and military cargo of the Russian ships.

Moscow and Washington have pursued quite similar diplomatic strategies over Vietnam. Each has sought to be faithful to its Vietnam client; to shift the blame for the war and the burden of ending it onto the other, and to persuade the other that the future of East-West relations is mortgaged to its policy in Vietnam.

The United States is deeply pained by the deterioration in Soviet-American relations. But the Soviet government must shed the illusion that it can avoid such deterioration and still support a war of aggression against an American ally. The American Government is unwilling to sacrifice its obligations to a one-way Soviet conception of "detente."

American interests in Asia also have early beginnings. The ship Empress of China made the first American commercial contact with China in 1784. In the year George Washington became President, there were 14 American ships at Canton. In July, 1900, Secretary of State John Hay, in disclosing the open door policy, went far beyond narrow economic interest to assert that the United States desired an Asian solution that "may bring permanent safety and peace to China, and preserve Chinese territorial and administrative integrity." In the words of Nathaniel Peffer, in his book *The Far East*, it was then that "for the first time the United States had broadened its position from the economic to the political and taken its stand: China must survive as an independent country."

To declare, in our day, that we wish South Vietnam to survive as an "independent country" is no "radical departure" in American foreign policy. For nearly 70 years we have been taking political positions in Asia. We have a long established Asian doctrine under which we have frequently denounced and often resisted aggression in Asia.

The Monroe Doctrine developed by John Quincy Adams, the open door policy enunciated by Hay and the Asian doctrine given expression at White Sulphur Springs do not rest on express congressional sanctions. They do not need to do so, because all are merely declaratory of situations acknowledged to exist. They affirm foreign policy proceeding from a long train of decisions by Congress and growing out of the logical imperatives of our history. James Monroe's biographer said of him that he "had the genius of apprehending the opportune moment for the formal enunciation of a principle which previously had been simply a matter of American public opinion and aspiration." That is what Hay did. That is what President Johnson did.

Senator Fulbright may not like it. The White House may shrink from admitting it. But there it is. The United States is a *Pacific Power*. It is an *Asian Power*. This circumstance does not compel it to intervene everywhere in the world, automatically, blindly, violently and stupidly. It does compel it to use the means most appropriate to the situation and best proportioned to the crisis whenever and wherever the vital interests of the United States as a great power are involved. The United States now is, and long has been, a *Pacific Power*, an *Asian Power* and a *World Power*.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

containment
interdependence
multilateralism

Marcos – Asian
umbrella

Algeria – analogy – Carter
support
election results

Other wars

folio: Asia Speech August, 1966

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

M. Reilly

8/2/66

Here is the first cut at the speech we discussed last week.

I am also enclosing the reference materials which you sent me. Thanks very much.

Joe Yager

8/2/66

The United States and Asia

Several times in recent months, I have spoken out publicly about the current struggle in Vietnam. This struggle, I am convinced, is one of the key turning points in modern man's long effort to create a peaceful, progressive world order.

We cannot permit armed aggression to extinguish the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. As President Johnson has made unmistakably clear, we will persist in helping these brave people to preserve that right. And we will succeed.

Tonight, however, I want to look beyond the current struggle and focus on the new Asia which is arising even while the battle continues in Vietnam.

It is commonplace to say that our generation lives in a world of change. But do we realize the strength of the

forces of change which are remaking the face of Asia? Do we understand how those forces may affect us and our children, both for good and for ill?

The answer to these questions, I fear, must be largely in the negative. Even though our troops are engaged in Asia for the third time in a generation, our knowledge of Asia tends to be meager and out of date.

We must gain a clearer appreciation of where Asia is now and where it is going, if we are to have an intelligent view of our fundamental interests there, and if our national policies are to be consistent with those interests.

* * * * *

First, let us look at the Asia of today.

Three-fifths of the human race live in the lands extending from West Pakistan to Japan. This fact alone

makes the future of Asia a matter of concern to us.

Most Asians are poor. Many are illiterate. But the winds of progress and modernization are being felt in many lands.

We can no longer think of Asia as peopled solely by peasants with primitive hoes, or coolies ground down under heavy loads. More and more Asians live in modern cities and work in factories, or practice scientific agriculture in a modernizing countryside.

One Asian country - Japan - led the entire world in its rate of economic growth over the past decade. *

In Asia too we find outstanding examples of nations which have effectively used our economic aid toward achieving sustained economic growth. Taiwan no longer

needs developmental aid, and South Korea, Thailand, and Pakistan are making rapid progress.

In Asia, we find India, the greatest experiment in history in the application of democratic principles to the governing of a vast, tradition-minded and diverse nation. The success of this experiment in its first two decades is one of the most heartening developments of our generation.

In Asia, we also find a new upsurge of interest in international cooperation, in new, multinational ways of attacking common problems. Signs of this new spirit include the formation of the Asian Development Bank, the recent conference of Asian and Pacific nations in Seoul, and the revival of interest in the Association of Southeast Asian states.

These are only some of the more important and more promising aspects of the new Asia of 1966. Others could be mentioned, including the ending or easing of quarrels between old enemies, the expansion of international trade and travel, and an area-wide increase in levels of literary and technical skill.

Today's Asia also has its problems and its darker side.

The favorable developments which I have enumerated are all threatened by the expansionist policies of the present Chinese Communist leaders and their lesser allies in Hanoi and Pyongyang.

Equally important, the peoples of Communist-ruled Asia have been led down a false path and are lagging behind most of their free Asian neighbors in economic

growth and in progress toward creation of political and social institutions adapted to the needs of the modern world. They have also been cut off by their leaders from participation in the upsurge of international cooperation which is taking place beyond their borders.

But the retarded development and the alienation of Communist Asia from the rest of the region is only one of two major problems confronting all of Asia in the second half of the twentieth century.

The other problem, which may prove more lasting and more difficult, is the grim race between food and population. This race is not confined to Asia, but Asia is by far its most critical arena. If this race is lost, all of the encouraging gains which I mentioned earlier may be swept away.

* * * * * *

Let us now consider the question of Asia's future and of our role in it. I do not pretend to any gift of prophecy, but I do believe that it is possible to speculate intelligently about the possible state of Asia, say, ten years from now.

If we and our Asian friends successfully hold in check the expansionist drive of Asian Communism, and if the international community at large does what is needed to keep malnutrition and famine from extinguishing hope for Asia's future, the Asia of 1976 may look somewhat as follows:

Japan will have become the third greatest industrial power in the world and will be making an increasingly effective contribution to the progress of the rest of the region.

India and Pakistan will have moved a step farther out of the shadow of the poverty which has afflicted their peoples for so many generations and will have gained increased stature as members of the world community of free nations.

Indonesia, proceeding from the hopeful events of late 1965, will have at last begun to make effective use of her rich natural endowment and will as a consequence have begun to play a prominent role in regional and world affairs.

Many of the smaller nations of free Asia will have continued their recent encouraging progress and several may have joined Taiwan in achieving self-sustaining economic growth. With the repulse of aggression from the

North, a vital, modern South Vietnam will be emerging and will be following the path of recovery and progress earlier trod by South Korea.

And, finally, throughout free Asia the various ventures in international cooperation will have matured and prospered, contributing to the economic, social and political advances characterizing the entire region.

If this is a fair projection of what can be achieved in free Asia by the mid-1970's, what may we expect of the Communist-ruled areas?

First, progress in free Asia will have a strong impact on the peoples and even on the leaders of Communist Asia, much as progress in Western Europe has contributed to intellectual ferment and political change in Eastern Europe.

This impact will be all the stronger if, as appears more likely than not, progress in free Asia stands in stark contrast to relative stagnation and even failure on the Communist side of the line.

The aging Chinese dictator may be able to swim with the favoring currents of the Yangtze River, but neither he nor his followers can overcome the laws of economics at home or surmount the tides of history which run against them in the outside world.

The discrediting of Maoist doctrine, both as a means of modernizing backward societies and as a means of projecting power abroad, has begun.

Nowhere, expect possibly in tiny Albania, is Peiping's credit and prestige what it was even a year ago. The new nations of Africa have made clear their ability to manage

their own revolutions without any help from Peiping. Indonesia has turned away at the brink from Peiping-linked Communism and is now charting its future by its own nationalist lights. Of greatest importance, Mao's policies have placed China at odds with three of the great nations of the world - the Soviet Union, India and the United States.

The picture at home is little better. Through the Communist regime's grudging relaxation of doctrinaire restrictions on individual initiative, and through the industry of the long-suffering Chinese people, the economy of mainland China has largely recovered from the collapse of the disastrous "Great Leap Forward." Economic margins, however, are now narrower than before the Great Leap, and human tolerances, particularly among the lower Communist cadres, appear to be lower.

In this situation, are the Chinese people offered a new more rational economic policy, giving some hope for a brighter future? No. They are exhorted to engage in an ideological orgy labelled "the great cultural revolution" and to condemn their neighbors and co-workers in a great outpouring of hate. Apparently, one last great effort is to be made to remake the mind of contemporary China in the image conceived by a small band of revolutionaries working and plotting in the caves of Yenan a generation ago.

The tragedy is not that this effort must inevitably fail. It is that it may postpone and make more difficult the change in policy which must come if China is to solve its pressing economic and social problems and enter into a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship with the outside world.

As matters now stand, the prospect is that ten years from now the gap between levels of human welfare and opportunities for individual self-fulfillment in free Asian and Communist Asia will have widened. We can take no satisfaction in this prospect, but we can hope that realization of where present policies are leading them will cause a new generation of leaders to change course and adopt policies better for both their own people and the world at large.

* * * * * *

Now some of you who are here tonight, or who may read what I have said in tomorrow's paper, may say: Suppose the future of Asia does turn out as you predict. What will it cost the American people? And, anyway, what makes you think that the future of Asia matters very much

to us on this side of the Pacific?

These are fair questions, and I will try to answer them.

Let me begin by saying that I believe that the picture I have painted is true -- not in the sense of a literal prophecy, but as a valid projection, first, of free Asia's potentialities and, second, of the way in which already evident pressures may bring Communist Asia into a more constructive, less dangerous relationship to the rest of the world.

As to the cost of moving events in the direction I have sketched out, I can only express my conviction that it would be much more costly to let events drift than to lend necessary support to our Asian friends in their

effort to check expansionist Communism and their even more basic struggle to overcome poverty and fend off starvation. If either of these battles turns seriously against those who now rely upon our help, we may be called upon for a truly monumental effort to reverse the tide, or we may face the prospect of an indefinite, costly and possibly hopeless struggle to maintain our own values and institutions against a largely hostile world.

It is this last danger, remote as it may now appear, which points to the nature of our interest in Asia. We cannot be indifferent to the fate of a majority of the human race.

This fundamental truth may be argued from several points of view.

In moral and philosophical terms, we as a nation, as well as each of us as individual citizens, must make the most of the talents and resources given us. The United States has been blessed with power and wealth on a scale never before seen on earth. If we do not use our power and our wealth to help shape events in a manner beneficial to all men, we have in a fundamental sense failed to realize our potentialities and discharge our obligations to others.

As President Johnson said in his great speech on July 12 of this year:

> "Asia is now the crucial arena of man's striving for independence and order, and for life itself."

This being so, how can we as Americans and as moral human beings fail to fight the good fight in that arena?

In historical terms, we may see our involvement with Asia as part of a continuing effort to build a stable, progressive world order composed of diverse and independent, but open and cooperative national societies.

We have perhaps been most aware of this need for an orderly international society in our relations with Europe, where the break-up of the 19th century order has led to two world wars. We have, however, as much interest in achieving stability in the Eastern end of Eurasia as we have in the Western end. We cannot compartmentalize our interests and involvement in the world.

We must remember that the destruction of the League of Nations began with its inability to cope with aggression

in Manchuria. Also, we cannot forget that our own involvement in World War II began in the Pacific.

In geo-political terms, we cannot be indifferent to events in Asia. If most of Asia were to be dominated by a single, hostile power, our own security would sooner or later be placed in jeopardy. In a fundamental sense, our opposition to Japanese militarism which led to the attack on Pearl Harbor was designed to prevent precisely this eventuality. The security considerations which were valid in 1941 are equally compelling today.

* * * * * *

To me, the conclusions to be drawn from all that I have said are clear. But, to avoid possible misunderstanding, let me first underline what I have <u>not</u> said and what I do <u>not</u> intend to imply.

-- The United States is not and should not be the self-appointed policeman of Asia or of any other part of the world.

-- The fate of Asia is not in our hands, but must be determined largely by the peoples of Asia themselves.

-- I have not propounded, but do not advocate, a unilateral Asian Doctrine. Nor, might I add has President Johnson.

What I do conclude from my consideration of prospects in Asia and Asia's significance for us may be summarized in a few points:

-- We are, because of geography and history, a Pacific power.

-- We have major interests and responsibilities in Asia no less important in the long run than our interests and responsibilities in Europe.

-- And, finally, if we are wise and resolute, one can build upon the favorable trends which are already apparent, both to protect our own interests in Asia and to contribute to the over-all progress of human society.

Mike Creswell

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

9/16/66

1.) Southeast Asia policy is not Johnson policy — but that lost three wars so Ds part of general "containment policy".

2). Emph on "other War" goes good* Dovish Ds liked on international not just killing people

3.) Hatfield: ⊕ is disturbed that we are heading toward

6) resist further escalation - stop bombing

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

c) once said we should blockade Haiphong.

d) Los Angeles Governors Conference - lone dissenting vote.

VP not educating
courage - cut confusion

e) University of Oregon - seat of anti-Vietnam community.

Local Democratic structure loaded

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

with anti - Vietnam
supporters.

Duncan tries to identify
Hatfield & Morse

9/ Wes Batheman

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WASHINGTON, D.C. Craig Duncan

1) Peace Corps Trainy Missions

2) AID Trainy Missions

3) Arthur Fleming is President of Univ of Oregon (former Secretary of HEW).

4) Communists have been hostile to Duncan

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1966

MEMO

TO: June

FROM: John

Would you pull together a set of speeches on Vietnam and China. I would like to get Humphrey's speech before the ADA, West Point, Governor's Conference, George Ball's speech at North Western, President's West Virginia speech, copy of Pacem in Terris speech, and President's American Legion speech.

September 15, 1966

MEMO

TO: John

FROM: June

Per above request, speeches attached.

I have requested three copies of Under Secretary Ball's speech from State, as we do not have any copies here, and they should be here by tomorrow.

KEYNOTE SPEECH

VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY

AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

APRIL 23, 1966

We are gathered here tonight -- old friends and new -- to celebrate the nineteenth birthday of Americans for Democratic Action. As I thought over the events of this period, it first seemed to me that nineteen years had rushed by quite painlessly. Looking around this room I see a number of old colleagues who haven't aged at all. And I trust they will return the compliment. Even though in realistic terms, it may be that we have spent too much time in the same elevator to have much perspective on each other.

Yet, on second thought, when we inject some perspective into our journey together, we must realize that the last nineteen years have been a period of incredible change. The American people have faced great challenges and, despite temporary setbacks, have responded in a fashion which validates our basic faith in the democratic process.

The state of democratic action in America -- and of Americans for Democratic Action -- is good.

The ADA resolutions of the 1950's have become the laws and government programs of the '60's.

The difference between heresy and prophecy is often one of sequence. Heresy often turns out to have been prophecy -- properly aged.

ADA has not only dreamed great dreams, it has helped them become realities.

Those who founded ADA had no illusion that they could simply ride the locomotive of history to a preordained liberal destination.

What organization spoke out earlier or more forcefully on the great moral issues of civil rights and civil liberties . . . or on the test ban treaty . . . or on the right to equal legislative representation . . . or the need to modernize our economic policies . . . or the importance of larger federal investments in education, health services, and housing?

And we not only spoke out on these great issues, we fought hard and effectively for them. We really lived up to our name -- Americans for Democratic Action.

Of course, we have not always been in perfect agreement among ourselves.

Indeed, I recall once when our Foreign Policy Commission came up with four different minority reports and no majority report at all. No other organization can make that statement.

It seems as if hundreds of times over the last nineteen years a newspaperman, or critic, has come up to me with a triumphant look in his eye and said: "How do you explain ADA's position on Madegascar? or Guam? or the Straits of Magellan?"

(I sometimes wonder: Is there anything we haven't taken a position on at least once?)

If, every time any one of us had been outvoted, he had picked up his principles and walked out, there wouldn't be more than a corporal's guard here tonight.

To put it another way, ADA is a political group, not a utopian sect.

We have been concerned with communication, not excommunication. We have practiced self-determination, not self-extermination. We believe in the democratic process, and respect what results from it.

This belief in self-determination, in the right of individuals and of peoples to choose for themselves, has been at the heart of American purposes at home and abroad.

As the author Thomas Wolfe put it a generation ago:

"To every man his chance, to every man regardless of his birth, his shining golden opportunity -- to every man the right to live, to work, to be himself and to become whatever thing his manhood and his vision can combine to make him -- this . . . is the promise of America."

In this spirit, Franklin Roosevelt set forth his Four Freedoms as goals of national and international democratic action: Freedom of speech, freedom of worship,

freedom from want, and freedom from fear -- everywhere in the world.

These are the four pillars on which we seek to build the better world of the future, a world of freedom and justice under law -- yes, a world of security and self-determination for every nation and every human being.

These are the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, which the United States has at all times supported and cherished.

These are the principles on which we acted when we came to the support of the beleaguered nations in World War II . . . the principles underlying too the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and NATO.

We were not afraid to be far-reaching and controversial. ~~But~~ We in ADA vigorously supported these policies, even though some other liberals -- some genuine liberals and some not so genuine -- denounced and opposed them.

Now we face a new test, calling for equal courage -- the need to help the nations of Asia shape their own futures.

Saigon is as close to this ballroom tonight as London was in 1940.

The inescapable agony and pain of Vietnam have compelled us to face the stark realities of an Asia in turmoil and revolution.

Nowhere are the challenges more formidable than they are in Asia, where two-thirds of the human race lives.

Asia is rich in peoples, rich in culture and rich in resources. It is also rich in trouble.

We seek nothing in Asia except to help these nations in their troubles and in whatever way we can to bring about human dignity and material well-being for the hundreds of million who have rarely known it.

What this effort demands is nothing less than an Asian New Deal . . . a doctrine of no less compassion, scope and imagination than that which lifted our country from the depths of the Depression . . . a doctrine embodying the same commitment which helped raise Europe from the ashes of World War II.

We have seen the first steps in the President's historic Johns Hopkins address . . . in the Honolulu Declaration . . . in the beginnings of the Asian Development Bank and Mekong River Development.

But it is not enough to help build nations without helping to protect them.

For physical security without human welfare is little better than a prison and welfare without security is no more than an illusion.

I know that there are differences within this room as to just how we should meet our responsibilities in Asia, and particularly in Vietnam.

The right to differ is one of the basic freedoms we seek to secure and extend. But there is also the right to advocate and, with your permission, I shall exercise it tonight.

We begin with a common set of premises.

No sane human being seeks war -- anyplace.

No liberal can tolerate aggression.

Today in Vietnam we meet aggression -- aggression by Vietnamese communism, a particularly militant strain with its own published program of expansion.

While Peking undoubtedly has a strong strategic interest and great influence in Hanoi, it would be a

gross over-simplification of a complex relationship to consider North Vietnam merely a satellite of Communist China.

But still a basic question: Does the National Liberation Front represent the majority of the Vietnamese people?

The overwhelming weight of the evidence demonstrates that it does not.

Twice in recent months the NLF, in an effort to show its strength, has called for a general strike in South Vietnam. Both these efforts have been total failures. The reason: Lack of popular support.

Some 800,000 refugees have fled to government-controlled areas in South Vietnam during the past year-and-a-half. Like Berliners, they voted with their feet.

In all the years right up to now -- April 23 -- not one single recognized nationalist, religious, labor or student leader in South Vietnam has identified himself with the Front -- not even leaders who were imprisoned by the late President Diem, not even determined and articulate opponents of the present government.

And not one has called for a coalition government with the Viet Cong since Ho Chi Minh's abortive "popular front" efforts in 1946 and 1947.

It is not necessary to explain to an ADA audience how the Communists operate, how the demand for "coalitions" is a staging point in the application of what Rakosi cynically called "salami tactics" -- slicing up the non-Communists. No one here needs to be informed about "transmission belts" or fronts, the standard Communist techniques of infiltration.

The reality is that the NLF is exactly what it was set up to be by Ho Chi Minh in 1959: A front for Hanoi . . . the vehicle for the seizure of power in South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have strong and diverse views about many things, and they do not hesitate to express them -- as we know so well.

But on two things all their leaders are agreed -- and this includes the students, the Buddhists and, notably, Tri Quang himself.

First, they do not want to live under communism.

Second, they do not want us to abandon them.

Yet another question remains: Isn't our intervention in South Vietnam basically wrong, even immoral?

On this point, I will cite an observation by John Stuart Mill which is as pertinent now as when he made it.

"The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments.

The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free States. Unless they do, theprofession of it by free countries comes but to this miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right."

If we had applied the doctrine of non-intervention in Greece after the war, that country would be controlled by the Communists today. If the British had applied it in Malaya, the same thing would have happened there.

In both cases, but for timely outside aid, militant and determined Communist minorities would have seized and held power. In both cases, subsequent elections have conclusively demonstrated that the Communists have indeed a minority -- and a small one, at that.

And, I might add, if we had left South Korea alone in the face of Communist aggression from the North, there would be no South Korea today.

History should have taught us by now that Communists are dedicated to seeking power in whatever way they can get it.

If they succeed in seizing power by force in one country, they will be tempted to try it in others. Indeed, "Liberation Fronts" have already been set up for both Thailand and Malaysia.

I agree with what Adlai Stevenson wrote in a letter answering the Vietnam critics, and made public by his family after his death:

"I do not believe . . . retreat in Asia or anywhere else would make any contribution whatsoever to the idea that violence shall not be the final arbitrator in world affairs."

All of us believe that every people have the right to determine their own future peacefully -- not have it determined for them by the disciplined minority which happens to be adept at guerrilla warfare.

None of us believes that aggression should become an acceptable means of attaining political power -- and that is why we are determined to prevent its success.

The task in South Vietnam is, of course -- as in the rest of Asia -- much more than military.

It is social revolution.

It is helping in the basic institutional development of a modern state, in which all its citizens have a voice and a stake.

In the midst of war, against an adversary who has made terror a science, it is no easy task to achieve social, economic, and political objectives which would be difficult even under the most peaceful conditions.

The birth of a nation seldom comes without pain and suffering. The South Vietnamese, bled white by the calculated assassination of many of their able leaders, are fumbling their way toward a democratic order.

In this there is confusion and tumult. But from our standpoint as liberals: Is the tumult not infinitely preferable to the monolithic silence in Hanoi?

Indeed, on the fundamental level of commitment, we are fighting in South Vietnam to make it possible for the South Vietnamese to quarrel among themselves, to prevent the icy hand of Communist totalitarianism from destroying the diversity of this vital people.

And may I add this: The social, economic and political effort in South Vietnam is difficult. But it is not impossible. The fact is that today we are making progress in helping the South Vietnamese in their basic programs to better the land, the health, the education, the daily life of the Vietnamese people. This progress may not be in our morning headlines. But it is there and it will continue.

And our help in fostering social and economic development will continue at a rising scale, limited only by security and logistic considerations. We seek to give the highest priority to such assistance.

The people of South Vietnam will have the opportunity to elect a constituent assembly this summer. There will be many candidates and a variety of parties. They will hold meetings and make speeches. They will have access to the press, the radio, and TV. Both the campaign and the election itself will be observed and reported by journalists from many nations.

We support the decision of the South Vietnamese government to hold this election and the right of the elected assembly to adopt a constitution. We shall cooperate willingly and gladly with any government the people of South Vietnam freely choose.

Indeed, I challenge the Hanoi regime to hold an election under the same ground rules -- with full freedom for campaigning and full access to the proceedings by the world press. If such an election were genuinely free, and if the Communists should by any chance win it, it would be the first time they have ever won a free election anytime, anywhere in the world. It's no wonder that they don't risk free elections.

Finally, I will say it again: The United States is ready to move this matter from the battlefield to the peace table. We are prepared to go anywhere, under any auspices, to achieve peace -- Rangoon, Tokyo, or anywhere on earth. We are willing to talk to anyone. It is not we who are resisting negotiations for peace.

The prospect for peace in Vietnam . . . for peace in Asia is fundamentally affected by the action and conduct of Communist China.

I have said on a number of occasions that we do not seek the isolation of Communist China, but only her containment. This is the policy of our government. It is the policy we have followed with the Soviet Union -- a policy that has resulted in a growing realism and even moderation among Soviet leaders.

This took a good deal of time, and it will take time with Communist China as well.

The proposals we have recently made have been rejected out of hand. But I am convinced that we should persist in them, prudently and patiently.

World peace requires that the Chinese Communists come to realize that an international course of action based upon force and the threat of force cannot succeed. We would welcome the time when a peaceful China -- willing to accept the responsibilities that go with membership in the family of nations -- might be ready to live in harmony with her neighbors.

Therefore, we are pursuing in Asia a policy of vigilant resistance to aggression and subversion, coupled with an equally vigilant search for every avenue to peace.

It was in this spirit that the late President Kennedy said in his 1961 State of the Union Message:

"Our task is to convince (the Communist powers) that aggression and subversion will not be profitable routes to pursue (their) ends . . . Open and peaceful competition -- for prestige, for markets, for scientific achievement, even for men's minds -- is something else again. For if freedom and communsim were to compete for man's allegiance in a world of peace, I would look to the future with ever-increasing confidence."

Our ability to successfully engage in this competition -- and, indeed, fulfil the responsibilities of world leadership -- rest, in the last analysis, on the strength and soundness of our own society.

We cannot effectively preach self-determination and freedom of choice abroad unless we practice them at home.

Our task at home remains one of providing to each individual maximum opportunity to exercise freedom of choice in the vital aspects of his life.

To provide this opportunity for personal choice surely lies at the heart of our concerns about civil rights, the urban ghetto, the war-on-poverty, education and health services. Examine any aspect of the urban ghetto -- housing, schools, jobs, welfare, public services -- and you discover a highly complex, ingrained, and self-sustaining system which ruthlessly and systematically denies to residents of these areas any opportunity for meaningful choice -- any opportunity to become real persons.

Living in a rat-infested tenement or a rural shanty: Is that meaningful choice?

Attending a third-rate, overcrowded and understaffed school or dropping out in despair: Is that a meaningful choice?

Being the last-hired and first-fired in a low-paying degrading job, or collecting unemployment insurance (if you qualify and until it runs out): Is that a meaningful choice?

Struggling with costly and inadequate mass transit, playing on littered or empty lots: Are these areas of life where the poor exert meaningful choice?

It is this inability to choose -- this denial of the right to chart one's destiny or to be real participants in the social, economic or political life of this country -- which produces the frustration, the bitterness, hopelessness and outrage we encounter today in the urban ghettoes of America.

And it is only as we succeed in breaking this vicious pattern -- in providing better schools, housing, jobs, public services and assuring justice -- that we can expect this outrage to fade away.

Only as persons experience actual freedom of choice in these vital areas of life can we expect them to develop a personal stake in maintaining and improving our society as a whole. For as these opportunities become real, cynicism will be transformed into faith -- apathy into initiative -- and alienation into a sense of community and participation.

To assure each human being the chance to choose -- to become everything that he is capable of becoming -- this is what the American democratic system is all about. And we can never rest until every American has this opportunity.

Much has been done at home and abroad, and much remains to be done. And we have the resources to do the job. As President Johnson has said:

"This nation is mighty enough -- its society is healthy enough -- its people are strong enough -- to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great Society here at home."

We must always remember that democracy is a human means for achieving human ends. It will grow and flourish only as it produces visible and tangible results for the people -- the opportunity for a fuller and better life, freely chosen and freely determined.

This is our purpose in the United States, and this is our purpose in the world.

Finally, a personal note. It has been my privilege, with your help, to play a role in the drama of American democratic action for over two decades.

We've come a long way together and we've been through a good many battles.

But tomorrow will always be the time for us.

Tomorrow could be a cataclysm of nuclear destruction. Or tomorrow can be the opening of a bright new era of human freedom and expression.

If we keep our wits about us . . . if we hold our nerve . . . if we never cease working, we can have a world of brotherhood and peace -- the world we've dreamed of.

# # # # #

FOR RELEASE: Wednesday, PM's
July 6, 1966

REMARKS OF VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
NATIONAL GOVERNORS CONFERENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
JULY 6, 1966

This week we celebrated the 190th anniversary of the adoption, in Philadelphia, by the Continental Congress, of the Declaration of Independence. What a glorious day for the cause of man's freedom.

But in celebration of that day, we should not, I think, lose sight of the events that followed it.

The seat of our government moved in those next months from Philadelphia to Baltimore and then to Philadelphia again; to Lancaster to York and back to Philadelphia; to Princeton to Annapolis to Trenton; to New York City and then to Washington.

The Articles of Confederation were adopted in 1777, but they were not ratified by all the states until 1781.

Then, in 1787, delegates from each state were invited to come to Philadelphia on May 14 to draft a Constitution. But it was not until May 25 that enough delegates had arrived to start the meeting -- 29 in all. Finally, several weeks later, some 55 delegates had arrived, representing 12 states. Rhode Island never did send anybody.

Finally, by September 15, it was time for a vote on a draft Constitution. By then, 13 of the delegates had gone home.

The remaining 42 argued all day, but they reached agreement. Even then, three of the delegates refused to sign. And it was another three years before Rhode Island finally decided to join the Union.

Well, it all came to something -- although it wasn't until 1865 that we really knew we were in business as one nation.

My point is this: We have to take the long view.

I've been told that people who take a long view in public office often take a long rest -- at request of the voters.

Yet we live in a world in which the impetuous act, the grasp for short-run gain, the sudden loss of judgment could plunge us all into disaster. And in such a world, it doesn't seem to make much sense to take anything <u>but</u> the long view.

It isn't always so easy to do it. Mention, for instance, Vietnam, and you get a response which makes me think of the lines from Horatius: "Those behind cried Forward! And those before cried Back!"

I am not here to debate with those who cry either "Forward" or "Back" in Vietnam. But I will give my case for why I think Vietnam must be seen in the long view and in the perspective of history.

I believe our present policy in Vietnam to be part of a coherent, restrained and responsible bi-partisan American foreign policy that has emerged over the past 20 years.

It is a foreign policy directed toward the building, day-by-day, brick-by-brick, of a world of peaceful nations living together in the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

It is a foreign policy that has been successful both in preventing the expansion of Communist totalitarianism and of avoiding nuclear war -- all the while working toward the time when political self-determination, economic well-being, and social justice might be more widely enjoyed through the world.

It is a foreign policy that has combined firm resolve in the face of international bullying with the capacity to do international business in the cause of peace: Resistance to nuclear blackmail in Cuba followed by the Test Ban Treaty; resistance to a Communist "war of national liberation" in Vietnam at the same time we propose a non-proliferation agreement on nuclear weapons and a Mekong Valley development which could include a non-aggressive North Vietnam.

It is a foreign policy that has carefully avoided the dangerous courses either of appeasement or of nuclear risk-taking.

Hubert Humphrey is no "status quo" man. He is for change -- change to meet the needs and priorities of the times. And I believe our foreign policy has, above all, met the need for change while still remaining true both to principle and national self-interest.

The United Nations . . .The Marshall Plan . . .Point Four . . .the Alliance for Progress . . .the Peace Corps . . .the Asian Development Bank . . .the International Monetary Fund and World Bank . . . Food for Peace and Food for Freedom . . .the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty -- all these things come from American initiative since World War II.

Firmness in Berlin . . .aid to Greece and Turkey . . .the founding of NATO, CENTO and SEATO . . .the support of Iran when her integrity was threatened . . .resistance to aggression in Korea . . .the determination that nuclear missiles should not be introduced into the Western Hemisphere -- these things, too, have come from our initiative.

In the past 20 years we have provided some 120 billion dollars of assistance to others. This has included billions of dollars in food -- without which millions of our fellow men would have starved.

And in the past 20 years our armed forces have suffered more than 165 thousand casualties on foreign soil.

We have faced the challenges of the past 20 years with the particular measures required to meet them.

During that time we have met many forms of Communist aggression.

In Greece, for instance, we saw the trial run of the war of national liberation -- that split-level assault which combines external assistance and direction, from a "sanctuary," with internal subversion. We helped Greece face that challenge.

President Truman and Secretary Acheson were abused for getting involved in a "civil war," as our President has been today.

We were told on the highest journalistic authority that the cause was lost, that the Greek people preferred Communist rule, and that, after all, Greece probably belonged in the Communist sphere of influence. They said we should get out.

But we saw it through and one day the Greek insurgency collapsed. The Yugoslavs, having broken with Moscow, closed the border and stopped underwriting the rebels. And subsequent elections showed the Greek Communists to be in a small minority.

To my knowledge, none of his critics wrote President Truman to acknowledge the courage or wisdom of his policy. Many of them were too busy attacking our stand in Berlin. (Other critics, at the same time, were calling for the launching of a preventive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.)

In Korea we faced a different kind of Communist threat to power:

Conventional invasion. We met that challenge too.

There were those who wanted to withdraw from Korea when we were forced back into the Pusan perimeter.

There were others who wanted to drop nuclear bombs on Communist China. But we stuck with the difficult middle course and saw it through, and the Communists saw again they could not work their will by force.

Over the next few years we lived with a dozen threats of a "hail of rockets," but we neither fell back nor responded with our own hail of rockets.

Then, in 1962, Chairman Khrushchev tried to alter the basic equilibrium of world nuclear power with his gamble in Cuba.

In those terrifying days President Kennedy, in the cool exercise of measured power, convinced Chairman Khrushchev to withdraw his missiles. Yet he did not fall victim to the temptations either to destroy Castro's Cuba or to press the Soviet Union into a tunnel of no return.

Our point was made and the peace was preserved.

A year earlier, at the University of Washington in Seattle, President Kennedy set forth, on behalf of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, what remains the position of the Johnson-Humphrey Administration today.

There are in our country, President Kennedy said, "two groups of frustrated citizens, far apart in their views yet very much alike in their approach. On the one hand there are those who urge upon us what I regard to be the pathway to surrender -- appeasing our enemies, compromising our commitments, purchasing peace at any price, disavowing our arms, our friends, our obligations. If their view had prevailed, the world of free choice would be smaller today."

"On the other hand are those who urge upon us what I regard to be the pathway of war: Equating negotiations with appeasement and substituting rigidity for firmness. If their view had prevailed, we would be at war today, and in more than one place". . .

"The essential fact that both of these groups fail to grasp is that diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail. A willingness to resist force, unaccompanied by a willingness to talk, could provoke belligerence -- while a willingness to talk, unaccompanied by a willingness to resist force, could invite disaster."

Pointing out that "while we shall negotiate freely, we shall not negotiate freedom," President Kennedy concluded "we are neither 'warmongers' nor 'appeasers,' neither 'hard' nor 'soft.' We are Americans, determined to defend the frontiers of freedom, by an honorable peace if peace is possible, but by arms if arms are used against us."

It is against this background of twenty years of confrontation, first with the Soviet monolith and subsequently with aggressive national communisms, that the current struggle in Vietnam must be placed. Like the Greek insurgency, it is a split-level attack from a sanctuary.

This assault was undertaken in an area which could not have been more unfavorable from the viewpoint of the defense. We could hardly, however, expect the Communists to attack us at a point of our choice nor do we have the option of moving the war to a preferable spot, say an island in the Indian Ocean.

You can get a good many frustrations out of your system by cursing history. But cursing history is no substitute for facing the options that exist in 1966.

There are, most basically, two options: Stay or get out.

I believe that getting out could only encourage further Communist aggression in Asia and would jeopardize the integrity of the independent nations of that part of the world.

There are those who suggest that we should stay, but be quiet about it; that we should fight, but not vigorously. I am not sure whether they fully support a half-war, or give halfway support to a full war.

I say that we must stay and fight and work in South Vietnam until we have achieved our objectives -- the halt of aggression from the North, the independence of South Vietnam, and peace in Southeast Asia.

President Johnson has repeatedly emphasized -- and said again in Omaha only last week -- that we have no designs against the sovereignty or territory of North Vietnam.

We seek one victory -- self-determination for 15 million South Vietnamese. To seek less would be to abandon these people to the rigid totalitarianism of North Vietnam.

One thing which I think we can all accept -- despite the efforts of a small minority to cloud the issue -- there is nothing "liberal" or "conservative" about turning 15 million people over to communism.

At stake is not merely the independence of the South Vietnamese, but the course of future events in Asia.

For, as the President of Singapore made clear a few days ago to the people of Europe: All the independent nations of Asia feel the pressure from the North; all of them feel they have a stake in what is happening in Vietnam.

I found on my mission to Asia and the Pacific that not one national leader opposed our presence in Vietnam or our role there.

We are fighting in Vietnam to convince the Communists again -- as we have before -- that the price of aggression comes too high . . .to convince them that just as nuclear blackmail failed and conventional invasion failed, wars of liberation too will fail.

The cost of educating them has been enormous over the past generation, but freedom from totalitarianism is hardly an item for cost accounting.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are those who argue we should get out of Vietnam and rely on nuclear weapons to contain Asian communism.

I frankly confess to you that I cannot conceive of a more immoral and potentially disastrous policy.

If we are not able to contain aggression at less than the nuclear threshold, we will continually face in the years ahead this choice: Risk nuclear war or capitulate.

It is a choice we do not -- and must not -- have to make.

Now, for a moment, let us take stock of where we stand in our latest test in these postwar years.

When I returned from Asia and the Pacific earlier this year I reported to the American people that I believed we had reason for measured optimism. I believe that this is more true today than it was then.

Asia is astir with the promise of the future. And there are tangible signs of progress.

In April, the Japanese were host to the economic ministers of free Asia at a conference in Tokyo.

And two weeks ago nine nations of Asia formed a new organization to be known as the Asian and Pacific Council.

This organization was formed to strengthen these nations' cooperation and peaceful development, but also -- as the final communique put it -- "to preserve their integrity and sovereignty in the face of external aggression."

This is but one of the things that can give us reason for encouragement.

Faced with Communist pressure, the independent non-Communist states in Asia are today working together to strengthen themselves and to innoculate themselves against future aggression. Old quarrels and disagreements are being pushed aside.

Our allies, Australia and New Zealand, are working with their neighbors in Southeast Asia on a far greater scale than ever before.

Burma is emerging from her isolation.

Japan -- our second trading partner -- and South Korea, who three years ago were unable to agree on anything, have signed a treaty of friendship and commerce.

Indonesia and Malaysia are today ending their confrontation. The Communist thrust for power in Indonesia has been crushed.

India and Pakistan, less than a year ago at war, are today at peace and dedicated to investment in the works of peaceful development.

Ceylon increasingly looks West and to cooperation with her neighbors.

The Philippines is led by a dynamic new President, Ferdinand Marcos.

South Korea and Taiwan are enjoying startling economic growth -- both above 7 per cent a year.

Thailand, while resisting Communist incursions into border areas of her own country, is enjoying growth that is almost as rapid.

Laos, written off by many people only a few months ago, is gaining stability and is resisting, too, the Communist forces in her country.

Since the first of this year, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand have made new military commitments in South Vietnam.

Communist China still looms as a powerful force in Asia. But today Communist China is being torn by power struggle -- a struggle with other Communist nations, a struggle, too, from within. At the same time her neighbors are achieving a new unity of purpose and action.

In Vietnam we are gaining on all four major fronts -- the economic front . . .the political front . . .the diplomatic front . . .and the military front.

On the economic front, Vietnam is taking the steps and decisions necessary to carry forward a program of economic development, and defeat inflation.

Land is being redistributed. Wells are being dug. Schools are being built. Agricultural production steadily increases. Hospitals and roads are being completed. New leadership is being trained.

These things are not dramatic. But every day the Vietnamese economy -- and the life of the Vietnamese citizen -- becomes a little better, despite calculated Communist disruption and terror.

On the political front, work goes forward toward election this September for a constituent assembly. Representatives of all major South Vietnamese groups have been meeting to prepare the way for democratic government.

The Vietnamese people are finding their way toward self-government, and they are doing it their own way and not under the direction of any Communist commissar.

In all the political ferment in South Vietnam there has been no call for a Communist government.

The people of South Vietnam know the Communists for what they are.

On the diplomatic front, we continue our search for a just and peaceful solution to the conflict.

We have repeated again and again our willingness to come to the conference table anywhere, anytime, under any auspices, in order to bring the violence to an end. Again and again we have said that there is no bar to the inclusion of the Viet Cong in any such negotiations.

But let us be clear about this: The obstacle to peace is not in Saigon or Washington. It is in Hanoi and Peking.

We shall continue these efforts. And we shall maintain our offer to aid in the peaceful development of North as well as South Vietnam if only Hanoi will leave her neighbors alone.

On the military front, we are gaining, each day.

The American troops in Vietnam are the finest men who have ever worn this nation's uniform. They are superbly led. They are superbly trained. They are superbly equipped.

And they perform as brilliantly in civic action, in rebuilding villages, as they do in combat. They are great citizen soldiers.

A succession of smashing defeats has been dealt to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units in recent months. Clearly the initiative has shifted to the allied forces.

The enemy no longer remains undetected.

The jungle or cave is no longer a sure refuge. His supply can be cut off. He can no longer choose his own time and place to fight.

This is a nation trying to create stable, representative institutions in the midst of war and disorder -- a nation with dozens of political, ethnic and religious groups -- all seeking their own place in the future.

In this there is confusion and tumult. But is the tumult in the South not preferable to the icy silence in the Hanoi police state?

And, perhaps most important, he can no longer count on the discipline of his own troops -- the rate of defection has sharply increased.

In the last six months of 1965 more than 8,000 Communist defectors left his ranks. In the first five months of this year he has lost more than 11,000 defectors -- and more and more of them have been squad and platoon leaders and officers.

The recent bombing of the oil storage depots around Hanoi was a military action against clear military objectives. The decision was carefully weighedd It was designed for two purposes -- to slow down the rate of infiltration, which has been taking a toll of allied lives; and to help convince the North Vietnamese leadership that their aggression in the South will be too costly to sustain.

Today there must be some hard thinking taking place in Hanoi.

Our adversary must know that time is <u>not</u> on his side -- that what President Johnson said more than a year ago remains true today:

"We will not be defeated.

"We will not grow tired.

"We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement. . ."

Finally, may I say this: If we indeed take the long view, I think we have good reason for pride, and encouragement, concerning the course of postwar history.

Despite the troubles of our time -- and we read of them everyday -- we have come to the threshold of a new era of opportunity.

In the past 20 years over one billion people have been freed from foreign rule. Over 70 new countries have been born -- but none has turned to Communism.

Western Europe -- with our help -- stands prosperous and secure, while the nations of Eastern Europe restlessly grope their way to new independence.

The Alianza moves forward in Latin America and the Inter-American system grows and matures. The Dominican Republic -- only a year ago the victim of violent revolution -- is today led by a freely elected President and Congress.

I was in Santo Domingo only last weekend, to witness the installation of President Balaguer and to demonstrate the United States's immense

satisfaction at the conduct of the Dominican people in carrying through this orderly change in government.

The difficult decision by President Johnson of May a year ago has been proven right by events.

In the Dominican Republic, as throughout this hemisphere, there is increasing understanding of, and determination to initiate and carry through, the fundamental economic and social changes which have made the Republic of Mexico, for example, such a beacon of hope for others.

In this revolutionary effort, we stand with our friends throughout Latin America.

In Africa, millions of people -- rejecting the lures of communism -- are reaching out for "Freedom Now." And we are with them.

But what of Vietnam?

Vietnam is under attack, yet the great nations of the sub-continent, India and Pakistan, remain at peace; and other nations of Asia and the Pacific -- withoour help -- come together in the cause of hope and progress.

Our own strong, rich land is alive with the great adventure of creation; Creation of a society where the old barriers are being torn down, where every man stands next to his neighbor -- unbowed, proud, healthy, free -- ready to meet the world on its own terms and make it a better world. And to the North, across open, unfortified border, stands our neighbor Canada.

There is good news in the world and, in our concern with crisis, we should not overlook it.

The Communists are wrong -- history is not their ally.

Today, the making of history lies in our hands to a greater degree than has been afforded to any nation before.

No doubt we shall meet in Asia, as in the rest of the world, frustration, disappointment, and disillusionment, time and again. With all of our incredible economic and military power, the qualities which will be of greatest value to us are patience, persistence, courage and tenacity.

We must never lose our perspective in the crisis of the moment. We must exercise American power to help those who cannot defend themselves from aggression -- not in arrogance, not in passion, but in sober determination.

It is the powerful who can most afford compassion and humility.

It is the prosperous who can most afford patience and perseverance.

We are powerful and we are prosperous; we must be both compassionate and patient.

At this time of our history I am reminded of the words of Lincoln, which remain today as a standard of conduct for our international policy: "With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in . . . to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations."

Those are words to live by and they constitute the key to the future of a world in which nations, large and small alike, may live in peace and freedom.

# # # # #

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

This is my only copy, please do not mark it up, and return to me.

Thanks

GE

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY AUGUST 30, 1966

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF THE REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE AMERICAN LEGION NATIONAL CONVENTION AT THE NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY

My fellow Legionnaires:

I am very happy to welcome you to your Capital.

This year you have come -- 60,000 strong, representing posts in every state and 16 countries abroad -- to discuss questions of the greatest significance to your country. Your fellow countrymen -- and particularly your comrade from Memorial Highway Post 352 of Blanco, Texas -- will listen closely to what you say and do here.

You will be discussing matters of concern to every veteran and his family: the laws that some of you wrote years ago, and that now form the foundation of a great medical, educational, and pension system - the administration of those laws - and the improvements that time and experience have suggested.

But your interests range far beyond laws for veterans alone - because you have served our country's flag, because you have left your homes and families in time of danger, you seek the common dream of those who have risked the hell of war: peace among the nations of the earth.

It is about that dream that I want to speak this afternoon -- of peace that is won by the patriot's courage, maintained by his vigilance, strengthened by his imagination, and ennobled by his compassion.

I know that in some quarters today patriotism is regarded with puzzlement or disdain.

There are plentiful reasons for this. Many people feel a deep sense of rootlessness in the swirling currents of modern life. They are strangers to their neighbors and their community, and so they feel estranged from their country.

To others, patriotism too often means patrioteering. It means concealing a world of error and wrong judgment beneath the flag. It means a narrow, provincial view of the world, at a time when mankind should rise above its ancient instincts.

Now let us say what we mean by the word -- as simply as we know how.

Love of country. Not the love that can only be celebrated within the vault of selfishness. Not the love that scorns the devotion of other men for their countries, that demands slavish homage from those beyond our shores.

We mean that love of place, of comradeship and shared experience, of all the suffering and joy that makes a people's history. We mean that confident love that does not require for its security that other men yield to our vision of man's destiny. We mean that courageous love that sees in the oppression of other peoples a challenge to itself -- and that reaches out to meet that challenge.

Inspired by that love, a nation is strong enough for any task. Bereft of it, all the laws it hastens to adopt may not avail. The great Edmund Burke, speaking for the people of America in the English House of Commons, asked this of his colleagues:

MORE

> "Do you imagine, then, that it is the Land-Tax Act which raises your revenue? That it is the annual vote in the Committee of Supply, which gives you your army? Or that it is the Mutiny Bill which inspired it with bravery and discipline? No! Surely, no? It is the love of the people; it is their attachment to their government, from the sense of the deep stake they have in such a glorious institution, which gives you your army and your navy, and infuses into both that liberal obedience without which your army would be a base rabble and your navy nothing but rotten timber."

These words of Burke are useful for any nation in times of peace. They are indispensable in a time of conflict. They tell us where lies our ultimate strength: not in laws, not in industrial power, not in weapons or technology, but in the love of our people for America.

Thousands of miles from this hall, your successors in the uniform of our country are fighting with the courage that flows from that love.

They are the best trained, the best equipped, the best supported army America has ever put onto the field of battle. Their morale is as high as their firepower is great. They have encountered an enemy whose tactics are unlike those a modern American army has every faced before. And they are beating him in engagement after engagement.

Make no mistake about the character of this war. Our adversaries have done us at least one great service: they have described this war for what it is -- in unmistakable terms. It is meant to be the opening salvo in a series of bombardments -- or, as they are called in Peking, "wars of liberation."

And if it succeeds in Vietnam, then, as Marshal Lin Piao says, "The people in other parts of the world will see. . . .that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do too."

It may be that this is only rhetoric -- only the grandiose propaganda of one whose country has not fared so well in other continents this year. But as the newspaper Economist of London wrote last week, "Until and unless there is sdid evidence that China does not intend to do what Lin Piao says it wants to do, or cannot do it, the only safe assumption for the Americans or anybody else to make is that the Chinese mean every word they say. That," says the Economist, "is where any sober Asia policy starts from."

The bravery of young American patriots on the battlefield, and the steadfast determination of our people here at home, will -- in time -- bring an end to this trial of aggression.

And if valor alone were required, there would be no cause for concern for the future. Each generation of Americans in turn has demonstrated that courage is deeply ingrained in the American character.

But the years that lie ahead of us call for our imagination and compassion, as well as our courage.

Even the most narrowly self-interested must see that this is so. Unless we have the imagination to understand what is happening in the world, we may well find ourselves -- together with our friends among the highly developed nations -- facing a series of explosive crises, in which our military involvement is urgently at issue.

Here are the raw data with which we must work:

By 1970 over one-half the world's population will live in the southern half of the globe. Yet they will command only a sixth of the world's total of goods and services.

In forty nations, the annual per capita income is rising by one percent a year, or less. By the end of the century, if this rate continues, their per capita income will have risen to $170 a year. Ours will then be approaching $5,000.

What does this mean for peace in the world? What are the consequences when there is awakened in men the hungry desire for a better life, and no way is opened to fulfill that desire?

One measure of what it means is the incidence of violence, the number of upheavals that stagger the civil order. Recently Secretary McNamara gave us an accounting of these:

In eight years there have been more than 160 such outbreaks. Only 15 have involved military conflict between two nations. None have involved a formally declared war.

The tempo of violence is increasing. In 1958 there were 34 significant conflicts. In 1965 there were 58.

Where did they occur -- 32 took place among the very poorest nations -- where per capita incomes are less than $100 per year.

The lesson could not be made clearer. The poor nations are on a road mined with potential turmoil. Poverty -- and the hatred of poverty -- can detonate those mines. The raging quest for bread may bring on the reality of chaos.

We know that our adversary sees in this situation fertile ground for exploitation. We know it is not in the interest of freedom -- our own freedom, and that of the poorer nations -- that he should succeed.

Indeed, we know now that so interwoven is our destiny with the world's, so intricate are the bonds between us and every continent, that our responsibilities would be just as real in the absence of a communist threat. For every schoolboy senses -- what some statesmen may not yet comprehend -- that responsibility is the price of power and affluence.

Throughout the world -- in spite of the threat or actuality of violence -- there are shining beacons of hope.

In Asia alone, country after country has exceeded its predictions of economic growth. Institutions such as the Asian Development Bank are coming into being. Japan has begun to pour her productive genius and resources into assisting her sister nations of Asia.

Cooperation among the Asians can become the means for liberating hundreds of millions of people -- not the least the people of North and South Vietnam.

Our assistance to these nations, our involvement in their affairs, will be no greater than they choose to have it.

Where we can help, we will. If our assistance is needed for development, for the work of teaching and healing and building, it will be forthcoming.

If our might is needed to help them defend themselves from aggression supported from without, it will be there. And it will remain there, and persevere, so long as it is required -- and not a day longer.

For those of you who have borne arms for our country know that an armistice can end the fighting without ending the war. Only when we root out the very causes of war -- the poverty of man's body, the privation of his spirit, the imprisonment of his liberties -- will there be a final surrender of violence itself.

That is our aim in Asia -- as it has been our aim twice this century in Europe. The vast sums we must spend to stop aggression could, when the aggression is ended, become the means of reconciliation and reconstruction.

"This commitment, in my view, is wholly consistent with that genuine patriotism that places love of country foremost in world affairs. I acknowledge that its dimensions are far wider than those that filled the hearts of our soldiers at Valley Forge, or even on the Marne or the Normandy beaches. But it is a branch from the same tree.

It has grown, because our responsibilities have grown. It has grown, because our understanding has grown. It has grown, because events in the world have compelled it to grow.

Almost a century ago another Englishman, Thomas Huxley, visited our country. Here is what he said to us:

"To an Englishman landing upon your shores for the first time, travelling for hundreds of miles through strings of great and well-ordered cities, seeing your enormous actual, and almost infinite potential wealth in all commodities, and in the energy and ability which turn wealth to account, there is something sublime in the vista of the future.

"Do not suppose that I am pandering to what is commonly understood by 'national pride.' I cannot say that I am in the slightest degree impressed by your bigness, or your material resources, as such. Size is not grandeur, and territory does not make a nation.

"The great issue, about which hangs a true sublimity, and the terror of overhanging fate, is what are you going to do with all these things? What is to be the end to which these are to be the means?

"Truly America has a great future before her; great in toil, in care, and in responsibility; great in true glory if she be guided in wisdom and righteousness; great in shame if she fail."

My fellow Americans, you who love your country, let us not fail her promise for mankind.

Thank you.

# # #

John R.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

13 September 1966

Dear Mr. President:

I submit to you herewith the first comprehensive report on the "other war" in Vietnam. I believe that it demonstrates both real progress and growing momentum in the joint Vietnamese/US effort to move that country forward, even in the midst of war. At the same time as it resists aggression, South Vietnam is increasingly coming to grips with the need to modernize its society, bolster its civil economy, develop its representative institutions, and provide a better life for its people. The US is providing substantial help, technical advice, support and material aid. But this is primarily an effort of the Vietnamese themselves.

A.

This report is mainly a review of accomplishments. It is designed to show how the GVN and US are moving forward on a broad front in an effort to win the "other war." It does not by any means contend that this war is won. Indeed, I would not overstate the progress to date. There are still many shortcomings in our own non-military programs and in those of the GVN. Much more remains to be accomplished. But the cumulative evidence of what <u>is</u> being done is impressive, especially in the light of the tragic problems confronting this embattled Republic of Vietnam.

Aside from all the difficulties which face any new developing country, the Vietnamese people are seeking to build a modern nation against a background of terror, harassment and aggression mounted by a determined enemy--from both within and without. This enemy seeks to throttle Vietnam's economy by systematic disruption of its transport, communications, and commerce. His use of terror and harassment has as its target not just military forces but the soldiers of Vietnam's "other war"--the school teachers and health workers, the village chiefs and agricultural workers, the literate and those who would lead Vietnam toward social justice and modernization. In the last seven months 3015 of these "other war soldiers" have been murdered or kidnapped by the VC. Here is a little known but tragic drama of the war in Vietnam. That steady progress can be made under such conditions is a tribute to the Vietnamese people.

B.

Seven months ago at Honolulu you renewed our pledge of common commitment with the Government of Vietnam to defense against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of free self-government, to the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease, and to the unending quest for peace. You stressed that the war on human misery and want is as fundamental to the successful resolution of the Vietnam conflict as are our military operations to ward off aggression.

Shortly after Honolulu, you gave a new management to our role in this "other war" by appointing Deputy Ambassador William Porter to direct the American efforts in the field under the guidance of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Then, five months ago you designated me as your Special Assistant to supervise and direct these civil side operations from the Washington end. In the last five months, my deputy Ambassador William Leonhart and I have made four trips to Vietnam. Recently we have received from Ambassadors Lodge and Porter a series of detailed progress reports on how we and our Vietnamese allies are faring in the "other war." They and the US Mission in Vietnam have played a central role in the accomplishments cited in this report to you--it is really theirs.

The months since Honolulu have seen a quickening pace of our joint efforts--not just in the well-publicized field of military operations but also in the less dramatic and often overlooked "other war." US civilian agencies--especially AID, USIA, and experts from other departments--are making exceptional efforts parallel to those of our military forces. The latter as well are contributing greatly to the non-military effort, through civic action programs, medical aid, logistic support, and in a host of other ways.

C.

The report that follows lists both the problems we and the GVN confront and some of our accomplishments to date--including the progress made toward achieving the goals set at Honolulu. The statistical record is impressive. But statistics tell only a fraction of the story. The highlights are that the Republic of Vietnam, assisted by the United States and 33 other free nations, has committed itself to:

-- A Revolutionary Development program for constructive change in the countryside. Both governments are mounting a growing effort

to protect the countryside, revive its economic health, and provide it with modern services. Our efforts will not end when Communist aggression ceases, but will remain as the foundation of a modern nation.

-- A campaign to preserve economic stability. In the midst of war, the GVN has courageously sought to bring its economic house in order--devaluing its currency, overhauling its fiscal system, and employing budgetary restraint.

-- New stress on Health, Education, and Welfare. The US has put increasing emphasis on helping to meet the health and educational needs of Vietnam's people, and on caring for the impoverished refugees who are tragic victims of the war. These programs of AID, with help from our military services and private US sources, are among the largest and most impressive inVietnam.

-- Expansion of the already successful amnesty program. In the last eight months, over 12,000 people have voluntarily left the jungles and swamps and returned to the Government, which in turn has given them amnesty and a chance for a new life. The number so returning in 1966 is already higher than in all of 1965.

-- Major steps towards representative government. This month, in unprecedented wartime conditions--and against VC efforts to terrorize and intimidate a free people from voting--the Vietnamese elected 117 members of an Assembly which will draft a democratic constitution for the Republic of Vietnam.

D.

The coming year will no doubt present additional trials. As the American people increasingly recognize this "other war" is a difficult and complex conflict, for the enemy has eaten his way into the fabric of Vietnamese society. But--as pledged at Honolulu--"the leaders of both of the governments are determined that we are going to move forward and we are going to make progress."

We expect in the coming year to focus our efforts on helping the GVN stabilize its economy--increase the pace of Revolutionary Development to recover and reconstruct the countryside--open more roads, railroads, and waterways--and strengthen representative institutions. Many of the specific measures we hope to undertake are outlined in the report.

Mr. President, all Americans can be proud of what many of their countrymen are doing--and our tax dollars are supporting--not only to resist aggression in Vietnam but to wage this constructive "other war." It is in our highest tradition. It is for and with the people of Vietnam. It offers them the crucial assurance that their future will be better than their past. The road ahead may be a long one. We will no doubt encounter setbacks. But I believe that we can and will do better yet, toward helping our Vietnamese allies build a free and modern Vietnam.

Respectfully,

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

THE OTHER WAR IN VIETNAM--A PROGRESS REPORT

MAJOR FIELDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

MAJOR FIELDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

The reports which follow describe the multi-faceted US programs which support South Vietnam's growing effort to win the "other war." They cite both progress and problems. Where possible, they include forecasts of what we and the GVN hope to accomplish over the coming year. In other cases, GVN and US agencies are now formulating plans and budgets for the next Vietnamese fiscal year--beginning on 1 January 1967.

Even these detailed reports hit only highlights of US civil side programs. Many other facets have not been covered in detail. For example, a Joint US Public Affairs Office--a joint informational effort under a single manager--integrates the public information and exchange programs of State, USIA, AID and Defense in Vietnam and provides across-the-board support for all Revolutionary Development activities. Operations include a diversified range of psychological and informational functions such as media support--press, publications, radio and TV; technical assistance to the GVN's Vietnam Information Service; five US and seven binational cultural centers; student and teacher exchanges.

Many other US activities supporting the GVN could not be fully treated, e.g. the labor field, legal reforms, the logistic support needed for a massive wartime aid program, military civic action, and other contributions of the military establishment. But they are by no means unimportant. In particular, our forces in Vietnam have given an impressive helping hand to the civil side--the non-military effort could not have accomplished nearly so much without it.

A word is also needed on the extensive technical assistance and advice which the US has given the GVN over the past year. Aside from the growing number of US technicians on duty in Vietnam, 36 separate civilian advisory or survey teams were sent between August 1965 and August 1966. Some were high level groups such as those led by Secretaries Freeman and Gardner and former AID Administrator Bell at the President's request. Others were teams of technical experts. Many of these teams were led by or included volunteer non-governmental experts. Eight were in the agricultural field, seven in that of health and medicine.

I. BUTTRESSING VIETNAM'S ECONOMY

For the past few years, the bulk of US non-military aid to Vietnam has been designed to help feed the people, keep the civil economy functioning, and forestall runaway inflation. It has served as an essential complement to our military effort to help Vietnam defeat aggression. In FY 1966, as the accelerating tempo of military operations and the build-up of Free World forces posed new threats to economic stability, the US similarly stepped up its economic aid and other measures to cope with these threats.

MEETING VIETNAM'S ESSENTIAL ECONOMIC NEEDS

War has cut harshly into the Vietnamese economy. A prime target of the VC has been to disrupt transport, communications, and commerce. Roads have been mined, waterways blocked. Bridges, railroads and power lines have been destroyed by VC saboteurs. Young villagers have been forced off the land and into the VC ranks. Officials and farm leaders have been killed or driven from rural areas. To meet this attack, the GVN has had to mobilize an extraordinary proportion of the nation's manpower for police or military duties. By 1966, over two-thirds of Vietnam's able-bodied young men of 20-30 years of age were prevented by the exigencies of war from filling their normal productive role. All this has interrupted the flow of food and export crops to the cities from Vietnam's basically agricultural economy.

Hence, an increasing share of maintaining Vietnam's economy has been shouldered by the US through AID's Commercial Import Program and Food for Peace. Neither is a new program. Since 1954, the US has provided aid goods for sale or direct distribution in Vietnam. The piasters received help finance the strained Vietnamese budget, while the goods themselves offset inflationary pressures and prevent losses in living standards that would otherwise result from shortfalls in domestic production.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- During FY 1966, the dollar funding of goods through AID's Commercial Import Program increased to $398 million, more than double the $150 million of FY 1965. Imports financed by the GVN out of its own foreign exchange earnings increased almost proportionately and are expected to exceed an annual rate of $200 million in calendar 1966--as the GVN undertook at Honolulu.

-- The import program is being revised and modified to assure maximum anti-inflationary impact and protect against the misuse of US funds. While mistakes and cases of corruption involving commodities under the commercial import program inevitably occur, what we learn from errors often tends to outweigh the actual cost of the error itself. The Vietnamese and American governments are working continuously to improve the program. Several reforms were instituted in FY 1966:

New licensing procedures for importers were designed to insure that the great bulk of imports are supplied through competitive bidding by suppliers. This economizes dollar costs and prevents collusion between importers and suppliers to circumvent GVN exchange controls.

Certain goods required in large quantity now are being procured through bulk purchases by the U.S. General Services Administration. This will mean lower unit costs and greater efficiency in transport scheduling and port handling.

Increased competition among importers was stimulated by making import licenses available to all legitimate Vietnamese firms satisfying certain minimal requirements. This holds down prices and produces an import flow responsive to the needs of the Vietnamese populace.

Importers must now also maintain larger deposits with their banks as well as full bank guarantees, subject to forfeit if irregularities are discovered.

Arrival checks, to insure that quality and quantity are in accord with sums paid, are being carried out in ever increasing numbers with direct participation by US technicians.

-- Authorized imports under the Food for Peace program rose to about $138 million in FY 1966, as compared with $58 million in FY 1965. These were sold on the market, distributed as assistance in kind, or made available through voluntary agencies as part of their help to the needy.

-- Despite a poor harvest and increased military activity in rice producing areas, heavier VC exactions of rice from the peasantry, and VC disruption of normal rice trading, US-financed imports (mostly under Food for Peace) have provided the people of Vietnam enough of their staple food--rice.

Effort in the Coming Year:

-- Because of the central role in economic stabilization played by imports, priority will be given to increasing the rate at which necessary commodities can move through the ports, whether destined for the commercial economy or war-related programs. GVN and US financing for

commercial imports may have to be increased to assure adequate supplies for stabilization and development.

-- Loopholes which permit abuses of import privileges or limit competition will be closed wherever possible. In these cases, as with all the 1966 reforms, discovering unanticipated weaknesses in the newly instituted measures and making them effective in practice will require a substantial further effort. The principles underlying the reforms are sound. They will yield major returns if--but only if--they are made to work.

-- Issuance of import licenses by the GVN will be speeded up through new processing procedures and US technical assistance.

-- The GVN and US Mission are consulting on how to increase the supply of rice from domestic production. More agricultural specialists will take to the field to help Vietnamese farmers improve their cultivating techniques. Fertilizer and pesticides will be supplied. The farmer's opportunity to sell his output will be increased by facilitating farm-to-market transport through the provision of additional barges and improving security along principal transport routes. It may be possible to encourage the rice market to operate more freely by providing appropriate incentives to producers and merchants. The extension of security in the countryside and the protection of normal commercial activities will free increasing numbers of peasants from VC exactions, permitting them to sell their rice at a profit in GVN-controlled areas. This will also reduce the supply of rice available to the VC to support their military operations.

CHECKING RAMPANT INFLATION

As in all countries at war, Vietnam's economy has come under inflationary pressure. This pressure multiplied with the expanded GVN war effort and the extensive US military buildup over the last 18 months. Vietnamese military and police forces increased by almost 100,000, US and Free World troop strength rose from some 25,000 to over 300,000, and unprecedented construction of military bases and logistical facilities got under way.

These measures--vital to the war effort--demanded resources at a rate which could not be met out of domestic output and normal government revenues. As a result, more money was pumped into the Vietnamese economy than could be readily absorbed. During FY 1966 alone, money in circulation increased nearly 80 percent. Prices rose sharply. In 12 months, the cost of living for working-class families in Saigon rose by over 70 percent. While the flow of real goods and services has increased in Vietnam despite price rises, the pattern has been distorted. For several important groups, such as the military, police and civil servants, money income lagged behind prices.

Spiraling prices and excessive spendable funds also mean waste and economic disruption. They stimulate hoarding of scarce goods. They foster ill-conceived expenditures by businesses and government, diverting scarce skilled manpower and capital to second-priority uses. They permit undertakings that cannot be completed, tying up resources in unfinished projects.

So the GVN and US decided at Honolulu on a massive effort to control inflation before it could undermine the economic fabric of South Vietnam. A broad economic stabilization program aimed at controlling the inequities and economic dislocation produced by monetary imbalance and inflation was given new teeth and purpose during 1966.

Even before Honolulu, the US and GVN sharply increased the flow of imports. As already noted, the sale of US aid goods served to reduce GVN budget deficits and to take piasters out of circulation. Piasters collected in this way accounted for over 60 percent of total GVN budgetary revenues and paid for many US outlays in Vietnam.

Dollar purchases of piasters for other direct US expenditures provided foreign exchange to the GVN, with which it financed additional imports. Sales of goods from these two sources accounted for about 80 percent of total piaster absorption in FY 1966, and required over $500 million in foreign exchange.

While imports remain the principal tool for checking inflation, there are limits on how much can and should be done through imports alone. The capacity of Vietnam's ports is limited. The financial burden to be borne by the United States must be kept within reason. Imported goods can fill only part of domestic Vietnamese demands. Excessive reliance on imports also tends to undermine Vietnam's ability to become economically independent in the future. For these reasons, the GVN and the US also took steps toward the more effective management of the economy by fiscal and monetary measures:

Accomplishments to Date:

-- US military pay in Vietnam is now issued in military scrip instead of US currency to cut down the volume of dollars traded on the black market. Piasters purchased with scrip are channeled to the National Bank of Vietnam. Almost $70 million flowed to the GVN from this source during FY 1966, at a rate increasing monthly with the US buildup. The GVN in turn agreed to finance $200 million worth of imports during calendar 1966, relieving the demands on the US-financed Commercial Import Program.

-- In March 1966 the GVN increased taxes on restaurants, bars, cabarets, beer and other items, and launched a program of more vigorous collection of taxes already on the books.

-- The most decisive single measure to control inflation was the courageous devaluation undertaken by the GVN on 18 June 1966, on the advice of the International Monetary Fund. For each dollar of imports, nearly twice the previous number of piasters are now withdrawn from circulation. The new exchange rates mean that all Vietnamese commodity imports and purchases of foreign exchange, with certain specified exceptions, now take place at 118 piasters to the dollar. As a surgical operation, the devaluation appears to have had marked success. The initial result was to raise prices of imported goods, but by early August import price indices had generally stabilized, total money in circulation decreased slightly, and blackmarket rates for dollars and gold sharply declined.

-- As a major step toward controlling the inflationary impact of US piaster spending in Vietnam, the Department of Defense decided to place a ceiling on all its FY 1967 piaster expenditures at the level reached by the end of FY 1966. These include troop expenditures, contractor outlays, and other construction costs.

Effort in the Coming Year: The GVN and US are determined to check inflation via a multi-faceted program designed to preserve the beneficial effects of devaluation.

-- The US and GVN must continue to finance an adequate rate of imports, further improve the port and internal distribution system, prevent critical commodity shortages, and undertake further fiscal and economic measures to limit demand.

-- The GVN intends to hold down total budgetary expenditures in 1967. The civil and military pay raise granted at the time of devaluation, together with the increasing momentum of social and economic programs, will undoubtedly force the 1967 GVN budget above its 1966 level, but it will still be an austere one.

-- GVN tax collections must be further increased. At GVN invitation, a team of technical experts from the US Internal Revenue Service is being sent to Saigon to assist in further increasing tax revenues. US-assisted efforts to tighten customs inspections and collections will be continued. Tax and customs receipts are expected to be significantly above FY 1966 levels.

-- Control over the rate of piaster expenditure generated by US military programs must be maintained. Given the continuing US troop buildup, this will require offsetting measures to absorb more troop expenditures within official (non-piaster) facilities or outside Vietnam and to limit in-country procurement of materials and wage payments.

-- Wage restraint must be exercised in all sectors of the economy.

BREAKING THE PORT BOTTLENECK

The buildup of US/Free World forces beginning in 1965, coupled with increased non-military aid, created dangerous bottlenecks in the ports of South Vietnam. Only Saigon port could be considered a modern facility. Yet it was run-down and already overcrowded--and designed to handle only 150,000 tons a month. Other ports were small--some limited to shallow draft coastal ships and junks; they could not relieve the burden on Saigon port. As a result warehouses in Saigon became clogged, materials piled up on the docks, and ships backed up awaiting discharge even in other Pacific ports.

Breaking the port bottleneck became a key to successful GVN/US economic stabilization efforts as well as the military campaign. Urgent measures were taken to clear supplies of all types through the ports, particularly Saigon.

Accomplishments to Date: The immediate port crisis has been overcome and port capacity is rising, though not yet rapidly enough to clear up the backlog.

-- The amount of cargo put through Saigon port monthly has more than doubled since last August. Military cargo handled increased from about 60,000 metric tons in August 1965 to over 170,000 metric tons in August 1966. Civilian cargo increased from about 130,000 metric tons to more than 210,000 metric tons over the same period.

-- The Vietnamese Army took over management of the port, with General Lan appointed Port Director, responsible directly to the Prime Minister.

-- In June 1966, the GVN and US signed an agreement making the US military responsible for receipt, discharge, and delivery to first destination holding areas of government-to-government AID cargo as well as military cargo. MACV and AID are advising General Lan on operations involving the entire port area. The US Army 4th Terminal Command is operating US sections of the port and assisting the Vietnamese in their sections. Port management has greatly improved.

-- By agreement with the GVN, seven high-tonnage commodities (e.g., fertilizer, cement, and galvanized iron sheet) will be procured in bulk by General Services Administration and shipped through the military transport system.

-- The Defense Department has agreed to schedule a substantial part of AID cargo from the US, such as the bulk commodities noted above, via the military transport priority system. Thus the worldwide computerized management system of the DOD for regulating movement of supplies will be used to smooth out arrival of cargo at Vietnamese ports. Military and civilian cargo will hereafter use a common priorities system.

-- Commercial cargo, including that financed by the US, is being better regulated. For example, to reduce congestion, the GVN has decreed that all cargo must be removed from port warehouses within 30 days or be auctioned by the government.

-- Physical facilities at Saigon port have been greatly improved:

(1) 14 additional deep draft buoy sites have been prepared, a floating dock for roll-on-roll-off unloading has been put into operation, and a 90-acre depot complex at Thu Duc has been constructed.

(2) Roads and open storage areas have been repaired or constructed. More efficient traffic patterns have been laid out.

(3) More barge discharge and transit facilities were opened.

(4) 5,840 tons of sheet steel piling have been provided for constructing LST and barge landing sites in Saigon and Qui Nhon.

(5) Obstructions to navigation in the Saigon River have been removed.

(6) Five heavy-duty hydraulic dredges for use in port construction have been sent to Vietnam.

-- Cargo handling and terminal operating equipment has been increased in Saigon and at other ports:

(1) AID has procured or contracted for 552 trucks, 156 lighters, 13 tugs and 213 pieces of handling equipment to facilitate port operations. More will be procured.

(2) 32 new barges have been procured; 14 are in SVN and the remainder will be delivered soon.

(3) Steel plate for constructing 47 new barges in SVN and rehabilitating 40 existing barges has recently arrived.

(4) 10 coastal vessels and an 800-ton per month junk fleet have been chartered to help move cargo from Saigon to other ports.

-- Through improvements made, deep draft ships can now discharge directly onto piers at Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay.

-- 12 US Navy pontoon wharfs and 10 Bailey bridges have been procured to provide additional pier facilities at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Quang Ngai.

-- A steel truss bridge is being constructed to provide two-way traffic into the Da Nang port area.

-- As a result of these measures, the capacity of ports other than Saigon has been increased from about 125,000 metric tons in August 1965 to more than 400,000 metric tons--over a threefold increase.

Effort in the Coming Year: Since requirements are still rising in both the military and civil sectors, port capacity may have to double again next year to keep up with demand. Many remaining obstacles to efficient port operation will have to be removed. For example, lack of sufficient deep draft berths requires that most cargo be handled twice; the rate of discharge of civilian cargo is low partly because the civilian port of Saigon operates only 12 hours a day; and unloading slows down in bad weather because much cargo is discharged from anchorage using lighters or barges. Major efforts are under way to cope with all these problems.

-- Plans call for increasing the capacity of the Saigon port system to at least 650,000 metric tons per month by the end of 1967. This growth is necessary to cope with the expected surge in cargo arriving in SVN.

-- Completion of the major Newport project and the Fish Market section of the Saigon port will release deep draft berths now used for military cargo.

-- Additional barge berths and discharge sites will be constructed.

-- A fresh water storage facility for ships in port will be finished.

-- 676,000 square feet of new warehouse space will be erected at Thu Duc, close to Saigon.

-- Port management will be further improved; enforcement of customs and port clearance regulations will be tightened. Lights for night operations are being installed at commercial docks.

-- First destination warehouse facilities will be expanded to expedite port clearance.

-- Integration of AID and military cargo under the military sea transport system will be completed.

-- Documentation practices will be improved to assure more rapid handling of cargo documents, letters of credit, and customs receipts.

-- The feasibility of using high-speed unloading of bulk commodities such as cement, grain and fertilizer will be explored.

BUILDING AN INDUSTRIAL BASE

Although dependent primarily on agriculture, South Vietnam has developed an industrial plant that now contributes one-fourth of its gross national product. Its industries now supply the major part of internal needs for textiles, plastics, and home utensils. US aid, plus that from other countries, has helped to construct or expand some 800 industrial plants employing over 75,000 workers. Further development is handicapped as yet by shortages of long term capital, skilled labor, materials, and transport congestion. Because of insecurity as well as nearness to markets, there has also been heavy concentration of industry around Saigon.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- In FY 1966 private Vietnamese firms were licensed to import $16.8 million of industrial machinery under the Commercial Import Program. This measure of investor confidence included $2 million in machinery for an auto tire plant, $700,000 for two steel pipe plants, $515,000 for a cement products plant and $562,000 for the plastics industry. Other US-made machinery was imported for plants producing chemicals, pharmaceuticals, glass and ceramics, and automotive batteries.

-- Altogether, AID assisted in the establishment of 15 new industrial ventures and the expansion of 70 existing facilities in FY 1966.

-- The GVN has encouraged industrial development through favorable legislation, tax incentives, designation of industrial parks, and establishment of an Industrial Development Center to stimulate and finance new facilities. A 400 million piaster loan from the GVN revitalized the IDC in 1966.

-- Twenty-one American firms have invested a total of $5 million in Vietnam, in partnership with local firms. 100 non-US firms act as agents for US companies in Vietnam. Two American banks are opening branches.

-- To relieve shortage of electric power, aggravated by the Viet Cong sabotage of power lines from the large Da Nhim hydroelectric facility built by the Japanese, work was finished early in 1966 on a 33 megawatt steam generating plant, 12.5 megawatt gas turbine generating plant and a 4.5 megawatt diesel electric plant financed with US loans at Thu Duc near Saigon.

-- Ninety-one smaller power units totalling 5,160 kilowatts were installed in district capitals and larger towns in FY 1966.

Effort in the Coming Year: Additional industrial investments can be expected in such fields as fertilizer, animal feed, paper, building materials, and small engines:

-- Paper production capacity will be expanded from 18,000 tons per year to 35,000 tons in 1967.

-- Construction has begun on a plant to produce concrete blocks and prestressed forms and poles, for completion in late 1967.

-- CIP-funded industrial projects in FY 1967 are expected to approximate $12 million. One major project under consideration is a pipe plant.

-- USAID plans to establish a joint loan fund with the IDC to assist in alleviating the current tight money situation for investment funds.

-- A Bureau of Standards will be developed to test and improve the quality of manufactured goods.

-- An additional 42 megawatts of electrical generating capacity will be placed in operation in Saigon during FY 1967, and design work begun on a 125 megawatt steam generating plant at Thu Duc. Installed capacity of 140 megawatts to meet Saigon's expanding needs is planned for June 1967. 5,800 kilowatts of capacity will be installed outside of Saigon under an urban-provincial program in addition to the rural electrification through cooperatives and under the Revolutionary Development program.

-- The US Marines are assisting the GVN in clearing the An Hoa-Nong Son industrial area a few miles southwest of Da Nang. Within the next year, further progress on this industrial development may be feasible.

-- Further work on surveys, initial plans, and the start of construction is projected for Cam Ranh Bay, which offers attractive postwar possibilities for Vietnamese industry.

-- Overall postwar planning for social, agricultural, economic and industrial development of Vietnam will get under way.

II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT: The "Other War" In the Countryside

The Viet Cong have been able to sink their roots deep into the fabric of rural Vietnam. Insecurity, poverty, low health standards, lack of opportunity, social injustice, and land inequities have enabled the VC to exploit a rural feeling of alienation from the government.

The Revolutionary Development program must change all that -- or else ultimately be judged a failure like its predecessors. As it has evolved, it focusses on gradually securing the countryside, eliminating terror and intimidation, and producing radical and constructive change in the lives of the people. Its aim is to dry up the source of VC local support and build a strong and progressive society from the hamlet up. It is what Ambassador Lodge has called "the heart of the matter".

The first prerequisite of Revolutionary Development is adequate local security and elimination of the remaining VC threat, after main enemy military forces have been driven from an area. This has been primarily the function of the Regional and Popular Forces, support by the RD Cadre and civil police. Behind this shield, measures can be taken to reinstitute government processes and services, restore productive life among the inhabitants of an area, and develop national spirit and good government.

At Honolulu, the Vietnamese and US Governments pledged full support to an intensified program of revolutionary development (then termed rural construction). They sought new emphasis on the effort to build democracy in the rural areas -- an effort as important as the military battle itself. They emphasized the necessity of combining military and civilian plans so that the RD effort would not be made in a vacuum surrounded by Viet Cong.

For many reasons, the Revolutionary Development program has been relatively slow in gathering speed. The task of winning the "village war" is complex and takes time, as shown by the limited achievements of predecessor programs aimed at similar objectives. Among the reasons for the difficulties this program has encountered:

-- It is a dagger pointed at the Viet Cong's heart; thus the enemy is making every effort to thwart it.

-- Adequate training of officials and cadre is essential; this has started, but takes time.

-- In many areas, the farmers have seen too many ill-thought-out programs abandoned in mid-stream; they are watching and waiting before committing themselves to this one.

-- The great buildup in main force enemy units in the last year made it essential that the US and the GVN concentrate troops in the highlands and other danger spots in an effort -- now clearly successful -- to "spoil" the planned VC/North Vietnamese "monsoon offensive".

Nonetheless, there has been over the last several months a modest gain in secure hamlets and population. While "secure" in Vietnam is necessarily a relative term, our best estimate is that about 50% of the population was in reasonably secure areas at the end of 1965. By 31 August 1966 it is estimated that secure population had increased to almost 8,300,000, or over 55 percent of the total population. To take another standard of measurement, it is estimated that as of 1 July 1965 only 3199 hamlets were "secure"; by 30 June 1966 this figure had risen to an estimated 4054. This does not mean that the balance are under Viet Cong control. Much of the countryside is controlled by neither side or is in the process of being recovered by the allied forces. Our best current estimate is that some 24 percent of the population is still under VC domination. The remaining 21 percent is caught in the middle.

The key point is that the groundwork for an accelerated RD effort is being effectively laid, and better results are in prospect. As the ARVN regular army and US/Free World military forces achieve continued success in driving back the North Vietnamese and VC main force units, an increasing proportion of regular units of the RVNAF can help provide the indispensable security base for RD. The GVN's Revolutionary Development program is also gaining momentum. Several facets of this program in the countryside are discussed below, and others in the section which follows.

THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT MINISTRY AND ITS CADRE

Forerunners of the Revolutionary Development program, regardless of their conceptual soundness, failed primarily because the VC/NVA destroyed the GVN ability to provide essential local security. However, management deficiencies also contributed. Interministerial committees were created, found cumbersome and difficult, and abandoned. Councils chaired by the Prime Minister, and composed of top civilian and military leaders, were unable to cope on a daily basis with the breadth and complexity of the problems involved.

In August 1965 a Ministry of Rural Construction was formed to administer the program now called Revolutionary Development. A dynamic new Minister, Major General Nguyen Duc Thang, took over shortly after its formation. On 12 July 1966 he was elevated to Commissioner General for Revolutionary Development and given supervision over ministries for Public Works, Agriculture, and Administration (formerly Interior). An integrated management system at the national level is within sight.

One essential building block in this program is government teams -- called in Vietnam Revolutionary Development Cadres -- working directly with the rural population. The RD Ministry is training them at two centers which the US assists in supporting. This program grew out of the Political Action Teams begun in a few provinces in late 1964. One of the training centers, located at Pleiku, trains only Montagnards; this is a major step forward in the effort to bring these tribal people forward into the 20th century. The second center, at Vung Tau, trains ethnic Vietnamese for work in all provinces.

The RD Ministry, operating through the province chiefs, has also allocated major sums for local self-help projects -- to assist the rural population to help itself. Revolutionary Development Councils, tying together the many aspects of RD, have been created at region, division, province, and district levels. The RD Minister has twice visited all of the provinces to explain the RD concept and eliminate bottlenecks. Working relationships between the field and Saigon have been enhanced.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- Secure population in the four National Priority Areas has increased by about 230,000 since the beginning of 1966.

-- For the first time in years, provincial RD budgets were approved and authorization was given to expend funds at the beginning of calendar 1966 -- the fiscal year for the GVN.

-- 1252 self-help projects were completed during the first half of 1966, compared to 521 during the same period in 1965. The people themselves contributed almost 6 million piasters and over 235,000 man-hours of labor to these projects. In July alone, 449 more self-help projects were completed.

-- One month's statistics -- for July 1966 -- show the accelerating RD pace:

966 more hamlet school classrooms completed;
3651 Vietnamese families resettled (30,736 for the year);
655 Montagnard families resettled (3,995 for the year);
184 kilometers of roads completed;
9 irrigation dams, 13 breakwaters and 8 dikes finished;
39.7 kilometers of irrigation canals dug;
5341 farmers given agricultural extension training;
1637 pigs, 3393 chickens and 4100 ducks distributed as part of the animal husbandry program;
84,161 kilograms of seed distributed.

-- The number of RD Cadre trained is growing rapidly, and the quality of training has been improved by a 13-week training course; Cadre class I of 4518 students completed training in May at the Vung

Tau center. These cadre in 76 teams of 59 men each have returned to their home provinces and are engaged in RD activities. Total cadre strength has reached 28,539, consisting of 24,766 RD Cadre operating in all provinces and 3773 Montagnard cadre in the Highlands.

-- US/Free World military forces have made a major contribution to Revolutionary Development via civic action projects. In July alone a sampling of civic action reveals:

24 bridges built or repaired;
16 medical dispensaries erected;
5 market places built;
33 kilometers of road constructed or repaired;
47 school classrooms built;
308,397 medical treatments given;
3406 surgical operations performed;
8855 immunizations given;
10,134 sewing kits distributed;
4,914,054 piasters contributed.

Effort in the Coming Year: Successful military operations by GVN/Free World forces -- now numbering one million -- are creating conditions more favorable to Revolutionary Development. The VC, however, will do everything within their power to defeat the RD effort, which poses the greatest long-term threat to their existence. Hence to the extent possible military operations will be designed to provide security in and around areas of importance, population centers, vital installations, and critical roads, railroads and waterways. Military success permits Revolutionary Development to proceed. The focus during the coming year will be on overcoming the many problems and deficiencies which still plague the RD effort in the countryside, and on increasing the tempo of operations:

-- Two more cadre classes will graduate from Vung Tau in 1966. The second class, in training now, will provide 38 more 59-man teams, and 158 units of 19 men to reinforce existing 40-man teams already working in the field.

-- Management deficiencies at all levels of the complex RD effort will be tackled. At the national level, better coordination among the many ministries involved is essential; at the local level, district government needs to be strengthened to respond to demands stimulated by RD Cadre operations.

-- Manpower resources for RD, especially for local security forces and RD Cadre, are deficient in quality and in some areas in quantity. A manpower coordinator has been added to the US Mission staff to work out recommended priorities.

-- More attention will be given to securing critical roads, railroads, and waterways. Obstacles such as poor or closed roads, inadequate

transportation, port congestion, etc., impede the flow of materials needed for local RD activities. Use of airlift is being increased to overcome obstacles temporarily. Construction capabilities are being expanded to repair roads and waterways.

-- Efforts to arouse the interest of the Vietnamese peasant in RD are being stopped up through information programs, visits by government leaders, and instructional workshops for provincial and district officials.

-- Tentative 1967 goals for RD are now being developed. At present they call for a substantial increase in the number of secured hamlets; addition of 1 - 2 million people to those in secured areas; a major increase in the number of RD Cadre teams; greater emphasis upon education, health, people's self defense, self-help, rural electrification, RD Cadre and agriculture. Programs will be oriented toward quality rather than quantity. High impact projects designed to reach the maximum number of people will be stressed.

REOPENING THE LIFELINES OF THE COUNTRYSIDE

Basic to the VC strategy has been interdiction of roads and waterways. The VC have sought to cut or control transport routes, prevent surface military movement, disrupt the village market economy and supply of cities, exploit remaining civilian traffic by setting up tax collection roadblocks, and isolate the people. This effort at strangulation included canals and waterways in the strategic delta region, where civilians could hardly travel except at the sufferance of the VC. It is extended to the strategically important Saigon ship canal where ocean-going vessels were vulnerable to VC guerrillas operating in the mangrove swamps along the shore.

Friendly control of roads and waterways had to be improved--for military security units to have a secure base and logistic support system; for revolutionary development to proceed in its efforts to win the people; for government influence to grow in the countryside. This has become a prime indicator of progress in pacification.

Accomplishments to Date: The campaign to open roads and waterways is a US and ARVN military effort, but its contribution to the civil side merits mention. By 1 January 1966, it was estimated that, as a result of military actions over the preceding six months, 30 percent of the major roads in Vietnam were relatively secure. A new system for classifying relative security was then instituted:

> Red: Closed, either by VC/NVA military control of the area or by extensive physical interdiction. Requires major military operation or engineer effort to open.

Amber: Marginal. Used by RVN, US/FW forces employing thorough security measures. Used by civilians subject to VC taxation. Frequent incidents occur.

Green: Controlled by RVN-US/FW forces. Minimum security measures required. Isolated incidents may occur.

A major effort was launched in 1966 to clear more roads. A series of special operations known as ROAD RUNNER and BUSHMASTER has been targeted on improving and extending road security; COUNTY FAIR-type operations also contribute.

-- In ROAD RUNNER, multiple routes are used simultaneously to make it difficult for the VC to concentrate for an ambush.

-- BUSHMASTER makes use of friendly ambushes to upset VC ambushes along communication routes.

-- COUNTY FAIR is designed to smash the local VC administrative structure and tax collection organizations and the guerrillas that give them muscle. It contributes to overall area control--the best way to make travel along roads and waterways safe.

The following results have been achieved; they show a trend rather than a precise measure of progress:

	GREEN	AMBER	RED
8 February 1966	32 %	41 %	27 %
30 June 1966 (Most recent report)	36	26	38
31 August 1966 (Estimate)	40	60	

Additionally, 34 percent of SVN's 1200 miles of railroad are now open, i.e., in approximately the green condition described for roads.

To secure the waterways, a further series of measures has been taken. For the Saigon ship canal, US amphibious operations such as JACKSTAY and LEXINGTON I and II, naval gunfire and air attacks, as well as numerous RVN operations in the mangrove swamps along the Saigon ship canal, have been undertaken.

Armed helicopters and light observation aircraft are routinely kept airborne over ships as they transit narrows along the Long Tau and Soi Rap Rivers (i.e., the Saigon ship canal).

Twelve US Navy minesweepers have been introduced to supplement the Vietnamese Navy minesweeping operations of the river approaches

to Saigon and the Nha Be POL depot. As a result, the enemy's capacity to seriously disrupt ship traffic into the Saigon port has been significantly reduced.

For other waterways Operation GAME WARDEN, using 71 newly introduced patrol boats, covers the river approaches to Saigon and the Mekong and the Bassac waterways to deny their use by the VC and suppress VC tax collection. Many VC tax collection stations have been destroyed; VC traffic now moves much less freely than it did a year ago.

Naval, police and customs agencies have been organized to deal with river control in a more integrated manner. GVN police now serve aboard US naval ships conducting river patrols.

Road and waterway security can never be absolute so long as even a minor guerrilla threat exists. A single man with a rifle or a command-detonated land or water mine can render a route insecure. A green security condition requires the continuous presence of friendly forces as patrols and in static guard posts at critical points such as bridges. Other military operations must keep large enemy units entirely out of the area.

Effort in the Coming Year: It is hoped that by the end of 1966 roads in the green security category can be increased to around 50 percent. Waterways, especially the Saigon ship canal, will be made safer for friendly traffic and VC/NVA use of the critical Mekong River and Bassac River complex will be denied to a large extent.

Operation GAME WARDEN will be stepped up by increasing the number of US ships involved to 120 from 71.

By the end of 1967 it is tentatively estimated that many additional roads can be largely secured (i.e., in green or amber condition), such as Route 1 from Saigon north to the Demilitarized Zone, Route 15 from Saigon east to Vung Tau, Route 4 from Saigon south to Ca Mau, Route 19 from Qui Nhon west to Pleiku, and Route 11 from Da Lat to the seacoast.

RESTORING LAW AND ORDER

In normal circumstances the principal function of civil police is to maintain law and order, protect lives and property, detect and suppress illegal activities, and perform various regulatory functions ranging from traffic control to border patrol. On top of all these functions, the National Police of Vietnam support the national effort to overcome the Viet Cong. While the armed forces seek out and destroy the enemy military forces, the police gather intelligence on VC clandestine operations and movements, maintain public order in urban and rural areas freed of overt VC influence by military forces, and seek to prevent the movement of men and material into VC hands.

Beginning in 1964, revitalization of the police has received high priority, with support from AID. By 1966 the police were carrying an important share of the counter-insurgency effort. Significant improvements have been made in the police organization within the last year. More and more the police are spreading out from the cities and are combatting the VC in the rural areas.

Police activities consist of various major programs: including Regular police help to provide security and order in hamlets, villages and cities and participate in the Resources Control Program in order to regulate illegal movement of people and supplies; Police Field Forces are targeted against marauding bands of VC propagandists, tax collectors, kidnapers and killers; and Police Special Branch carries out an intelligence and operational role against the VC apparatus.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- Total police strength has grown from 42,000 a year ago to 56,000. Over 2900 policemen and policewomen are presently receiving training. Until recently draft age men were ineligible for the police; opening of the 21-29 year age bracket will increase the flow of recruits.

-- The tactical Police Field Force, consisting of small, highly mobile, lightly armed units capable of controlling low levels of armed banditry, now numbers 3000 trained and equipped men. Twenty-three companies have been organized, fifteen are operational and the remainder are undergoing training. Captured documents and prisoner interrogation reveal that the VC in the provinces close to Saigon consider the Police Field Forces a grave threat and have made them a priority target.

-- A countrywide police communications net of 3400 radios now links regional directorates to province and district police offices. During the last year 347 radios were added to the resources control net, and 304 issued to the police field forces. The regular police sponsored village/hamlet network now has 10,000 two-way radios.

-- Police mobile patrols in Saigon increased 30 percent in FY 1966. Boat patrols of waterways in and around Saigon were inaugurated.

-- Police Special Branch has been strengthened. Prisoner Interrogation Centers now exist in 31 provinces; hamlet informant nets have been greatly expanded. Good intelligence pays off. One hamlet informant provided information leading to the arrest of 27 Viet Cong agents.

-- Police actions against the VC infrastructure were more effective than in any previous period in recent years. During the first half of 1966, police arrested 6960 known or suspected VC, killed 288, and wounded 52.

-- Since 1964, police have carried on an increasingly intense program of resource control using checkpoints, identity cards and family census measures to prevent movement of men and materials to the VC. The system now consists of 6800 trained personnel operating 813 checkpoints. This program is as yet far from being fully effective, but the frequency of VC attacks against checkpoints and personnel tends to confirm intelligence reports that it is hurting the VC.

-- Approximately 3000 police man static, mobile and marine checkpoints in the Saigon area and the seven surrounding provinces. 1966 has seen an extension of the resources control system to the Delta; police are operating 311 checkpoints in the upper and lower Mekong area and aboard patrol boats in the network of Delta rivers and canals.

-- A major development during 1966 has been increasing cooperation between the military and police in resources control. National Police are assigned to each of the 71 US Navy vessels involved in Operation GAME WARDEN patrols of the major Delta waterways.

-- Resource control achievements for the first five months of 1966 include: Persons apprehended - 7035 known or suspected VC; 27,398 draft evaders; 4146 military deserters; 28,290 illegal residents. Commodities seized include 2.7 million kilograms of food, and substantial volumes of medicine, firearms and ammunition, and other equipment.

-- 7,500,000 persons have been registered and issued ID cards since the program began in 1958. Identification cards are an integral part of the population control program designed to reduce the support the VC/NVA can obtain from the local populace. The present ID card method for identifying such elements as Viet Cong, military deserters, draft evaders, criminal fugitives, and illegal residents was introduced in 1960.

-- ID card checks during 1 June 1965 - 30 June 1966 contributed to the detecting of 13,456 known or suspected VC, arrest of 5771 deserters, apprehension of 50,309 draft evaders, and identification of 58,988 illegal residents. Even without an adequate central records facility for cross-checking personal data with intelligence, police and military agencies, some 87 VC and 676 military deserters have been detected using only ID card information.

-- 120 American public safety advisors are now advising the Vietnamese Police in various fields. Commodity assistance has been furnished the police by the US and other Free World countries in the form of communications equipment, vehicles, boats, laboratory and training equipment, and weapons and ammunition.

-- The National Police Academy at Thu Duc, with American help, is almost completed. A Field Forces Training Center at Trai Mat is under construction and already being partly used. 700 police have received training abroad in the US and other countries.

Effort in the Coming Year: The police, a growing force that only within the last two years has received priority attention, have many deficiencies. Management needs strengthening; leadership is thin, and frequent shifts further weaken efficiency. The police must compete with the armed forces for qualified personnel. Training facilities limit the rate at which the police can expand. Police field forces represent a new concept which all province chiefs do not fully understand. But the GVN, with US help, is seeking to improve police capabilities. 1967 plans include:

-- Expanding police strength at least to the 72,000 which was originally the 1966 goal. Expanding PFF toward a goal of 8500 by January 1, 1967.

-- Putting 60 PFF companies into the field, at least one company in every province by mid-1967.

-- Adding 2500 radios to the existing 10,000 unit village/hamlet network.

-- Increasing the police training capacity.

-- Stepping up Police Special Branch activities against VC infrastructure.

-- Registering and issuing new ID cards to 2.5 million people. Applicants will be fingerprinted and photographed, and will include 15-to-18-year-olds to hamper VC use of youth for liaison agents and couriers.

-- Building and training staff for the National Record Identity Center to classify, cross-reference, and search 10,000 sets of fingerprints each day.

GIVING GUERRILLAS A SECOND CHANCE: THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

Since 1963 the GVN has offered the Viet Cong guerrillas a general amnesty program known as Chieu Hoi (Open Arms). In no area of the government's efforts have the results been so impressive in demonstrating the increasing disillusionment and disaffection in the Viet Cong ranks.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- From the program's beginning in early 1963 to the end of August 1966, over 40,000 Viet Cong have voluntarily left the jungles and swamps, surrendered, and undergone the process of reintegration into Vietnamese society--which is the heart of the program.

-- In the last 12 months, steady, and in some respects spectacular, improvement in the program's effectiveness has been achieved. From

1 August 1965 to 1 August 1966 some 17,445 Viet Cong returned to the government, compared with 21,315 during the preceding thirty months of the program.

-- In a special campaign conducted over the Vietnamese New Year 3462 returnees came in, carrying 709 weapons plus miscellaneous material and documents.

-- The total for 1966 alone is 12,106 as of August 26 -- more than the 11,124 that returned to the government during all of 1965. The rate of guerrillas seeking amnesty is now 50 a day.

-- Of the 1966 total, about 8000 were members of the military arm of the VC and over 3800 were civilians attached to the VC.

-- The GVN, with US aid, has built Chieu Hoi reception centers in every province and is now in the process of improving or expanding the older ones. During the period immediately following their arrival at the centers, the former Viet Cong are given courses which include political indoctrination and practical skills and are assisted in beginning a new life, sometimes in the hamlets and sometimes as laborers and semi-skilled workers.

-- Special field personnel have been sent to the provinces to seek out the Viet Cong through every channel of communication available and to convince them that if they remain in the jungles and swamps they have no future, but if they return to the government they can help build a new and free Vietnam.

-- JUSPAO has helped the GVN mount a major informational support program, utilizing printed materials (leaflets, posters, banners and pamphlets), airborne and ground loudspeaker broadcasts, and special radio and TV programs. In the last week of August, more than 45 million leaflets were dropped over VC and North Vietnam areas.

-- The Viet Cong have shown intense sensitivity to these efforts urging the Viet Cong and NVA infiltrators to rally to the government. Current Viet Cong instructions to their troops are to drown out loudspeakers by beating on pots and pans and to collect and burn leaflets before reading.

Effort in the Coming Year: The importance of the Chieu Hoi program cannot be overestimated. Hence it is planned to:

-- Increase substantially the amount of funds available.

-- Provide maximum needed material assistance, particularly in the supply of roofing, cement, and other material for new housing for the returnees, in transportation and distribution of PL 480 rice to returnees in the centers, in expanded vocational training, and in the resettlement of returnee families.

-- Double the capacity of the national reception center to 1000 and complete the construction of 14 more provincial and district centers.

-- Expand the program of special armed propaganda teams of former Viet Cong, used to recruit additional VC returnees.

-- Continue the campaign of leaflets, millions a week.

The 1967 aim is to double once again the number of VC returning to the GVN.

CARING FOR WAR VICTIMS AND REFUGEES

One result of the increased tempo of military operations since 1964 has been a massive movement of peasant families seeking refuge in more secure territory under GVN control. More than a million have migrated since the fall of 1964. This steady influx swamped existing facilities for emergency care and faced the GVN with a task of vast dimensions.

To meet these crying human needs, the GVN launched a major emergency program. AID, the US military, US voluntary agencies, and other Free World countries have joined in assisting the GVN to cope with this humanitarian task. Its components include temporary housing, supplies of clothing and household goods for those forced to abandon their belongings, a temporary subsistence allowance for emergency feeding, medical and health care, primary schooling for children, vocational training in new skills, resettlement, and reintegration into the Vietnamese economy.

In the past six months the GVN response has been increasingly effective--particularly since the appointment in February 1966 of a Special Commissioner for Refugees, Dr. Nguyen Phuc Que. His Special Commissariat provides a focal point for refugee programs which were previously diffused among the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Rural Construction, and other agencies.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- In the last 12 months, temporary shelter has been provided to over 460,000 refugees.

-- In the same period almost 280,000 refugees have been resettled, either in new locations or by return to their native villages. Incoming refugees exceeded those resettled, so the total in temporary encampments rose during the year from 320,000 to over 500,000.

-- For calendar 1966 the GVN has budgeted over 1.1 billion piasters (approximately $10 million) for refugee relief payments, housing, resettlement grants, schools, and vocational training, and other program costs.

-- In FY 1966 the US programmed $22.5 million for Vietnam refugee relief, including $10.4 million in AID funds, $7.9 million in Food for Peace commodities, and $4.1 million from other related programs (health, agriculture, education, logistics, etc.).

-- The Special Commissioner for Refugees has asked Province Chiefs to review their needs for the construction of temporary refugee housing and has established minimum standards for refugee camps (one dispensary, two wells, and twenty latrines for every 100 refugee families and one classroom for every 100 refugee children). The GVN has increased refugee relief payments from 7 to 10 piasters per person per day, or 5 piasters and 400 grams of rice per person per day.

-- In Quang Tri, one temporary refugee center is 80 percent completed and two others are programmed. In Quang Ngai, 500 housing units are planned, and materials have been delivered for 300 of these. In Tay Ninh Province, 150 units have been completed in addition to 13 other units under self-help projects, and an additional 100 units are under construction. In three districts in Binh Dinh Province, a total of 200 housing units are under construction; 300 have been completed.

-- 104 temporary classrooms for refugee children had been completed as of 30 June 1966, and 60 more were under construction, out of 269 planned for 1966. In many provinces permanent structures are being built or expanded under the new hamlet school program to serve both refugee and non-refugee children.

-- Short-term vocational training programs for refugees have been started at five polytechnic schools operated by the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Labor has undertaken short courses in masonry and construction trades.

-- Several pilot inter-provincial resettlement projects are under way. In mid-May, nearly 1000 refugees were resettled from Phu Yen Province to the Cam Ranh Bay area. Food and temporary housing were furnished. Work is available in the area, and refugees will build their own permanent housing with materials furnished by the US and GVN. Each family will be provided with 600 square meters of land for house and garden. Another resettlement project in Dong Lac on Cam Ranh Bay will accommodate an initial group of 300 refugee families. This project is co-sponsored by the GVN, the US, the Vietnamese Confederation of Trade Unions, and the US International Union of Electrical Workers. The Assistant to the President of the IUE participated in groundbreaking ceremonies for this project, and presented the CVT with the initial $15,000 of the IUE contribution.

Effort in the Coming Year: The goal for 1967 is to expand refugee relief and raise the standards of care and rehabilitation to the target levels established in 1966.

-- Because so many refugee facilities have been hastily erected to meet sudden inflows, additional construction will be undertaken to provide health and educational facilities and improve housing standards.

-- Additional refugee staff will be recruited and trained, and the rate of resettlement accelerated.

-- The US and GVN plan 50 vocational training/community centers near refugee camps with large populations. Vocational training will be given in simple skills, home improvement and child care, agricultural practices, blacksmithing. The centers will also offer sewing, health, sanitation, and literacy classes for the rank and file of the refugee camp population.

-- New ground must be broken in finding employment opportunities for refugees. While many may return to agriculture, continuation of the war will make this impossible for the time being for others. Further vocational training will help. Handicraft and cottage industry cooperatives will be organized.

-- Free World contributions to refugee relief will increase. The Federal Republic of Germany's new refugee aid programs, totalling approximately 25 million Deutschmarks, will include assignment of 25 experts to assist in the construction of refugee centers, erection of a refugee village near Saigon to accommodate about 300 families, and establishment of a social welfare training center. The Federal Republic has also entered into an agreement with the Knights of Malta, under which the latter will provide a multi-purpose team or teams for refugee camps.

-- New Zealand plans to increase--from 8 men to 14--the strength of the surgical team which has been serving refugees in the Qui Nhon area, provide two or three mobile teams to work in refugee camps in the area, and furnish four or five vocational training instructors.

-- US voluntary agencies will assume an even large humanitarian role (see next section).

THE PUBLIC JOINS IN--THROUGH US VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

In Vietnam today, the American people are once again expressing their concern for the suffering of their fellow man. They have responded to the plight of the Vietnamese people by contributing to and through US voluntary agencies food, shelter, clothing, medical assistance--and hope--for millions of men, women and children in South Vietnam. These voluntary agencies serve as essential and valued partners to the GVN.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- At present 29 US voluntary agencies, with over 400 American staff members, are directly engaged in relief and rehabilitation programs in Vietnam. Of these 29 agencies, 18 are directly involved in refugee relief activities.

-- More than $6 million in funds has been donated by the American people (plus an additional $13 million worth of clothing, medical supplies, school equipment and other material) to the voluntary agencies for emergency relief.

-- In the past year, US voluntary agencies have distributed over 83 million pounds of Food for Peace commodities to feed one and one-half million needy Vietnamese. Essential to their activities is a partnership with the US Government, which defrays the cost of the ocean transportation of the supplies distributed by the voluntary agencies.

-- In refugee relief programs, the number of voluntary agencies has increased from seven to eighteen in the past year and their staffs have increased from 50 to more than 150. Vietnam Christian Service (a joint program of Church World Service, the Mennonite Central Committee and Lutheran World Relief), for example, is quadrupling its staff of doctors, nurses, social and community workers in Vietnam this year.

-- A seven-man team of experts, jointly supported by the American Red Cross and AID, has arrived to operate model refugee camps for the training of Vietnamese Red Cross personnel. This program will be supported in large measure by contributions by the American people to the Red Cross.

-- Countless other Americans have sent donations through APO shipments to individual servicemen and units stationed in Vietnam, and through the Navy's "Operation Handclasp".

Effort in the Coming Year:

-- Continue and increase support to the relief activities of the voluntary agencies, particularly for the half-million refugees in camps.

-- Expand the Food for Peace program to assist three million people-- the food and the funds from the sale of food to assist in relocation, self-help and civic action, refugee relief, school lunch, and maternal and child feedings.

III. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT: Functional Programs and Institution-Building

Aside from those programs already discussed are the ongoing efforts to strengthen key elements of the Vietnamese economic and social fabric--agriculture, education, public health and medicine, government infrastructure. These programs have a major impact on the countryside. They are an integral part of Revolutionary Development.

IMPROVING THE LOT OF THE FARMERS

Vietnam's predominantly rural population--85 percent of the total--has borne the brunt of the war. Farmers have had to leave their ancestral lands to escape Viet Cong terror and fighting. The Viet Cong have seized crops for their own use or for tax levies. VC interference and declining production have drastically reduced shipments to the cities and towns. But the GVN, with US help, has mounted a growing effort to help revive Vietnam's agriculture; despite wartime disruption, progress is being achieved. Major credit is due to the 1000-man staff of the GVN Agricultural Extension Service and to the US agricultural advisors who work with them and Vietnamese farmers in all 43 of Vietnam's provinces.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- With US help, the Ministry of Agriculture has conducted an extensive educational program, including distribution in 1965 of 3.1 million educational leaflets. It is planned to distribute some 4.7 million more this year.

-- During 1965, 375 three-day agricultural training courses were held for 5,000 farmers and local officials. Over 5,000 half-day and one-day training meetings were held for about 150,000 farmers.

-- Young farmers' "4-T Clubs", patterned after the American 4-H Clubs, have risen from 1,200 in 1965 to 2,200 this year, and have over 80,000 members. Membership should surpass 100,000 during the coming year.

-- Fertilizer use is being expanded. In 1962 only 100,000 metric tons of chemical fertilizer were used. By 1965 some 700,000 farmers used approximately 276,000 metric tons of fertilizer on 1,976,000 acres, and received about 1.5 billion piasters in additional income. Major efforts are being made to improve fertilizer distribution. Over 10,000 demonstrations of how to use fertilizer are planned for 1967, twice as many as in 1965.

-- Fifty-nine District Farmers' Associations with 244,000 members, and 250 farmers and fishermen cooperatives have been organized. In 1965 approximately 66,000 metric tons of fertilizer and 50,000 metric tons of corn were sold to 155,000 farmers through cooperatives and farmers' associations.

-- Vietnamese research stations have tested and distributed new varieties of seed. 300 tons of improved corn seed, 40 tons of soybean seed, 150 tons of peanut seed, 250 million sweet potato cuttings, and eight million seed pieces of superior sugar cane were distributed to farmers in 1965.

-- Farmers have become enthusiastic about new crops and techniques. The success of soybean plantings has prompted Mekong Delta farmers to request help in planting 50,000 acres in the next growing season.

-- Vietnamese and American specialists have trained and worked closely with farmers to prevent losses from insects, disease, and rats. 1,400,000 acres were treated for insects and disease in FY 1966, and 20 tons of poison were used to kill about 10 million rats. Losses from these causes, estimated at 30 percent in 1961, have fallen to 16 percent this year.

-- Construction and repair of irrigation canals has continued despite the war. In 1965 some 24 miles of new irrigation canals were completed, 15 miles rehabilitated, and 42 dams built or restored. 70,000 acres were irrigated in 1965 and 78,000 additional acres are expected to be irrigated in 1966.

-- Success in improving hog quality and output is especially notable. Hog production grew from 1.7 million in 1963 to 3 million in 1965, and the average weight from 130 to 220 lbs. Part of this is due to a "Hog-Corn" program whereby a farmer is given three small pigs, eight bags of cement for building a pig sty, and a supply of US-grown surplus corn. One pig is marketed after it is grown and the money returned to cover the cost; the other two pigs are kept for breeding. Over 18,000 fine quality Yorkshire and Berkshire pigs were distributed in 1965, and 26,000 will be distributed in 1966.

-- Fishing--a major source of cash and protein--has greatly expanded. The Vietnamese Inland Fisheries Service teaches farmers how to build and use fish ponds, which with fertilization and supplemental feeding using low quality grain can produce ten times the amount of fish of a natural pond. 27 million fingerlings have been distributed for stocking. Present hatchery capacity is over three million fingerlings.

-- Offshore fish catch has expanded from 165,000 metric tons in FY 1959 to around 400,000 metric tons in FY 1966. This growth has been due to better techniques, new wharfs, nylon nets and motors--some 12,000 of 57,000 fishing boats are now motorized, largely through AID programs.

-- Much has been done to improve the lives of people in rural communities. In 1965 Vietnamese and US home economists conducted home improvement programs with 23,600 families, distributing 1,000 sewing machines. Home Improvement Clubs, for Vietnamese rural women, increased from 1,000 in 1965 to 1,200 in 1966, and membership rose from 25,000 to 30,000.

-- A rural electrification program through three selected cooperatives will begin this fall to bring electricity to 144,000 people in the countryside.

-- Rural water supply has been greatly improved. AID, supplying rigs and technicians, has worked closely with the GVN Directorate of Water Supply. 80 wells and 60 potable water distribution systems were installed in rural villages and district towns in FY 1966. An estimated 3.3 million people have benefited since the program began.

-- On land reform, the GVN is proceeding with distribution of 1.2 million acres of expropriated and government-owned land, much to be given to refugees. A pilot program involving 14,000 acres is being planned in An Giang Province using aerial photography for a thorough cadastral survey to permit the issuance of titles. The land will be divided into individual farm units, but developed as a controlled irrigation area with continuous cropping.

Effort in the Coming Year: The US aid budget for assisting agriculture in Vietnam will probably be doubled. Plans for assistance include:

-- Doubling the seed multiplication program.

-- Provision of 2,000 marine engines.

-- Construction of five cold storage plants for deep sea fishing.

-- Training more agricultural and fisheries cooperative leaders.

-- Training 1,218 extension workers.

-- Distributing 4.7 million educational leaflets.

-- Increasing the number of American advisors in the provinces.

-- Distributing 40,000 purebred chicks and 15,000 purebred hogs.

-- Carrying out a joint GVN/US program for providing agricultural credit funds.

-- Reorganization of the National Agricultural Credit Office.

-- Technical advice to the GVN on problems of the pricing and transport of rice and on plans for comprehensive land reform.

-- Providing an additional 500,000 to 600,000 people with clean water in FY 1967 by drilling wells in the areas northwest of Saigon and in the Delta, where salt water pollutes hand-dug wells.

CREATING A DEMOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Education is one of Vietnam's most vital needs. Traditionally there have been few schools in the Vietnamese countryside, and schools in the cities have been filled to more than capacity. The young seek better educational opportunities; vocational and technical skills are in urgent demand. New educational methods and far more in materials, facilities, and numbers of teachers are needed. The Honolulu Conference and Secretary Gardner's subsequent mission to Vietnam in March declared that priority should be given to elementary education in the country hamlets, to vocational and technical education, and to secondary education.

Accomplishments to date:

-- 6400 hamlet school classrooms have been built so far. This program has been enthusiastically supported by the Vietnamese people, and accordingly has been one of the targets of VC destruction and killings. 1364 classrooms were built in 1965. In 1966 some 1600 have been completed in the first six months, out of 2300 planned. These were largely self-help projects, in which the GVN and the US contributed cement and lumber, and rural families provided the labor. These hamlet schools will provide 540,000 children with an elementary education; about one third of all elementary pupils enrolled in Vietnam.

-- The number of hamlet school teachers has reached 7200, with 3400 trained so far this year.

-- Teacher training programs are being rapidly expanded. The Ministry of Education has selected ten schools for pilot programs and opened a new demonstration secondary school with 280 students at the Faculty of Pedagogy of the University of Saigon. 1095 elementary school and 461 secondary school teachers have been graduated this year. Ohio University and Southern Illinois University advisors are working with Vietnamese educational officials to improve teacher training.

-- English language teaching has been greatly increased. International Voluntary Service courses have 12,600 full-time and 1400 part-time students enrolled. The number studying English at Binational Centers expanded fourfold last year. Civic action teams of US forces have taught English to 30,000 Vietnamese.

-- The US has launched a large-scale textbook program. Thus far in 1966 some 2.2 million textbooks have been distributed to elementary school children, bringing the total so far distributed to seven million. Also distributed last year were 2300 elementary teacher kits, making a

total of 5250 out of 10,000 programmed. Training in the use of the new textbooks was given to 18,750 teachers.

-- Vocational training is expanding. Enrollment in polytechnic schools in 1965 reached 2384, a 16 percent increase over 1964. There were 403 graduates, 60 percent more than the year before. Twenty rural training schools are being built; seven were completed this year, and six others are more than half built. Each will have a capacity of 500 students. With double shifts and full staff, 20-25,000 students can be enrolled. Additionally, many Vietnamese are learning new on-the-job skills with civilian firms or in the army.

-- Agricultural training is being improved. The College of Agriculture graduated 265 in 1965 and 320 in FY 1966, and secondary agricultural schools 290 in FY 1966 against 220 the year before. Enrollment in secondary agricultural schools rose from 920 in FY 1965 to 1280 in FY 1966. 300 agricultural cadre are being given special training under the Revolutionary Development program.

-- A special team of US advisors is being assembled to assist education at the University level. University enrollment increased 12.6 percent in 1966 over 1965. The new University of Can Tho will open on October 15 with four faculties: Science, Law, Letters and Pedagogy, and an Advanced School of Agriculture.

Effort in the Coming Year:

-- 3000 more classrooms will be built and 4000 additional teachers trained under the hamlet school program for a total of 11,400 by the end of 1967. The total of hamlet school classrooms and "self help" classrooms should reach 9000 by the end of 1966, and well over 12,000 by the end of 1967.

-- Enrollment in polytechnic schools will increase to 3000 in 1967 and 4000 in 1968. Additional training will be provided for a thousand refugees and a thousand veterans.

-- Teacher education enrollment will be increased 15 percent at elementary and secondary school levels, 50 percent in normal schools, and 10 percent at university level during FY 1967.

-- Construction of the remaining 13 rural trade schools will be completed. Vocational agricultural instruction will be intensified in An Giang and six other provinces. Rural trade schools will be serving 10,000 sixth and seventh grade students by the end of 1968.

-- Seven million more elementary textbooks will be distributed, bringing the total to 14 million. Work will begin on producing eight million secondary level texts. Every secondary school student will have his own set of English language texts in 1967.

-- The number of Fulbright-Hays lecturers and teachers will be increased from six to twenty this academic year.

-- Six more mobile science educational units and two new in-service teacher educational centers are programmed.

-- US advisors will work with the Ministry of Education on improving program content and in helping to provide an educational plant adequate for a developing state. A special effort to expand secondary school facilities will be made to the maximum extent security permits.

-- For Montagnard areas, where children have lacked access to education, specialists are being recruited to develop means to write Montagnard dialects. A first run of 50,000 textbooks for the Montagnards will be produced during the coming year. Training in agricultural techniques will be emphasized.

-- A five-year program to provide utility vehicles to transport school personnel and educational materials will be begun.

MEDICAL CARE IN THE MIDST OF THE WAR: A SUCCESS STORY

Acute problems of disease, sickness, and sanitation generally overburden the feeble resources of newly developing societies. In Vietnam these have been harshly accentuated by war. 700 of the 1000 civilian doctors have been drafted. The Viet Cong have destroyed many village health centers. The movement of a million refugees since 1964 has increased the danger of communicable disease. But the US and other free world countries have moved rapidly to meet the urgent need. More Vietnamese now have better access to medical care than ever before in their lives. The record of achievement is perhaps the most impressive of all civil aid programs in Vietnam, and the program calls for further rapid expansion.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- 42 Free World medical teams of 5-21 members are now working in Vietnam, including 21 teams of American military medical personnel working at civilian hospitals.

-- Joining the Americans have been volunteer Cuban refugee doctors and medical personnel from Australia, China, Iran, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland.

-- 153 American doctors from 38 states under "Project Vietnam" have already voluntarily served two-month tours at Vietnamese provincial hospitals.

-- By the end of June our medical teams were treating an average of 39,700 patients a month. At the present rate, US and other free world doctors will treat more than two million needy Vietnamese patients in FY 1967, and will be equipped to treat far more if necessary.

-- Under military civic action programs, medical personnel of our regular military units administered some 2.2 million treatments of various nature to the civil populace in the first half of this year.

-- Malaria eradication was an early success. Between 1958 and 1961, the incidence of malaria infection was reduced from 7.2 percent to 1.5 percent. Some 85 percent of Vietnamese subject to malaria are protected and in this last year 405,000 houses were sprayed under the anti-malaria program. The goal is total eradication when security conditions permit restoration of a nationwide campaign.

-- To prevent the spread of communicable diseases, special attention is given to refugees as they come to the refugee centers. Some 50,000 immunizations against cholera and 70,000 against plague were given refugees and others in areas where outbreaks of disease threatened in the first half of 1966, adding to a total of some 12 million immunizations so far given with AID-donated medicine.

-- A special program for 90,000 Saigon elementary school children was completed in February.

-- Using vaccine donated by Canada, another special program will shortly begin for the immunization of school children against polio.

-- The assistance of the National Tuberculosis Association is being sought in a program against TB.

-- In the increasingly crowded cities we are assisting the Vietnamese Government to improve sanitary conditions, and providing garbage trucks in the collection of refuse.

-- After visiting Vietnam in March, Secretary Gardner suggested emphasis on improving the transport and distribution of medical supplies. Construction has since begun on four regional medical depots and the expansion of the Saigon central depot. With US military help, the logistics system for the movement of medical supplies to Vietnam has been improved.

-- Major emphasis has been placed on medical education. The American Medical Association, drawing on US medical school faculties under AID contract, is working with the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Saigon to revise curricula and educational techniques.

-- The Vietnamese and US Governments jointly financed the construction of a basic sciences complex at the University which was completed in March 1966.

-- In this last year 32 Vietnamese trained in medicine in the United States, and 2,100 students (not including nurses) attended medical facilities in Vietnam supported by the US.

-- Since there are now only about 2,500 nurses and 3,000 practical nurses and midwives in Vietnam, the US has supported the construction and staffing of six new nursing schools, four of which are now open. When all are completed, Vietnam will have eight such schools, the number of student nurses will be doubled, and over 800 will be graduated annually.

-- The US has assisted in the renovation and construction of ten key provincial hospitals. Construction has been troubled by rising costs and competing demands for materials, but two of the hospitals are now near completion. Further expansion of existing hospitals is to start shortly.

-- The US has donated 28 surgical suites to hospitals throughout the country. Prefab techniques are being investigated for the improvement of 14 more provincial hospitals.

-- Our military units through their civic action programs renovated or constructed 29 local dispensaries in the first half of 1966 besides treating hundreds of thousands of patients.

-- The German hospital ship "Helgoland" has arrived, and equipment for ten 200-bed portable emergency hospitals has been donated by Canada.

Effort in the Coming Year:

-- The AID budget for medical help to Vietnamese civilians rose from about $5 million in FY 1965 to $25 million in FY 1966; it will rise to more than $50 million in FY 1967.

-- Emphasis will continue on improving basic medical education and facilities to prepare for Vietnam's future peacetime needs. The US plans to work with the GVN on improving regional public health laboratories, rehabilitation facilities (including those for the blind) and the operations of the Ministry of Health.

-- By 1970 Vietnam will be capable of producing annually 200 fully-trained physicians and 50 dentists a year.

-- A survey will be conducted on where new medical facilities should be built, using permanent type hospital construction on a standard architectural plan.

-- Fifty inter-village maternity/dispensaries are planned by the end of 1967.

-- US civil and military agencies are cooperating on methods to improve the flow of medical supplies both to and within Vietnam, and to help the GVN maintain the proper balance of medical resources between civilian and military needs.

STRENGTHENING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

For ten years the VC has marked the structure of government in Vietnam as its special target; systematically murdered, maimed, or kidnapped government officials; and made public service vulnerable and hazardous. Their aim has been to destroy government at the lower levels, or leave behind a wasted structure of intimidated and ineffective officials, especially in rural areas. Cities have been besieged by refugees, and beset by problems of rapid urbanization, political instability and growing insecurity. 1964-1965 saw rapid deterioration. These trends have not yet been finally reversed, but much progress has been made, especially in the last six months.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- A major effort has begun to restore some authority and autonomy to the vital and traditional village/hamlet level of government. Salaries for village and hamlet officials are being increased and a coordinated program to rebuild this weakest link between the people and the government is under way.

-- The RD Cadre performs an essential role in helping local officials to rebuild village and hamlet administration.

-- The National Institute of Administration, Vietnam's only school for administrators, is being reorganized. New programs are designed to train more young officials for work outside of Saigon. Each year there are graduating classes totalling 170, who are assigned to rural districts as Deputy District Chiefs for administration or jobs of equal responsibility. In addition NIA graduates 70 senior clerks yearly for positions in the GVN.

-- Training centers for local officials have been built and staffed in most of the 43 provinces. Last year 14,000 local government employees participated in training programs.

-- Technical services are being decentralized to the provinces and districts and provide services more readily to the rural population.

-- The May 30, 1965 local elections were a significant, if generally unpublicized, step towards developing a responsible and creative relationship between central, provincial, and village government.

-- A major administrative conference was held in Saigon in October 1965, with province chiefs, mayors, and councilmen attending, representing all provinces.

-- Viet Cong terrorism against local officials is being slowly reduced. 991 local officials were killed or kidnapped in the first half of 1965; 512 in the second half of 1965; and 420 in the first half of 1966.

-- Finally, the September 11 elections for a Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution will reinforce the democratic process and provide new foundations for the reconstruction of government at all levels.

Effort in the Coming Year: The GVN, with US help, plans to give special emphasis to strengthening government institutions and improving public services, particularly at the provincial, village and hamlet levels, which are critical to revolutionary development.

-- Training of government administrators will be expanded; 5,000 more local officials are to be trained during the remainder of 1966.

-- Student capacity of the National Institute of Administration is being increased by 39 percent with part time courses for 700 trainees, and the addition of business administration courses with AID help.

-- We will continue to urge steps to improve the legal system, with emphasis on social justice.

HELPING VIETNAMESE YOUTH

Youth in Vietnam represent the key to truly "revolutionary" development. The young have been suspicious of government--a government which has relied traditionally on the wisdom of the elders. They have tended to stand aside. Meanwhile, the VC labor to capture the spirit and energy of youth for purposes of insurgency. So new horizons of hope and opportunity must be opened to the youth of Vietnam. They need to be educated so that they can successfully reach for these new horizons. They must be motivated to serve their country in war, just as they must be prepared to serve it in peace.

Accomplishments to Date:

-- The GVN has improved its aid to and contact with youth groups, and is encouraging the participation of young people in local government. Democratic student government athletic programs, and civic action programs are being sponsored by the "New School Movement" in the secondary schools. Thirty out of 187 secondary schools have adopted this program, and the GVN is encouraging its expansion.

-- Young civilians and soldiers joined in a highly successful project of self-government and self-improvement in one of Saigon's worst slums, District 8. Premier Ky has directed expansion of this experiment to other Saigon slum areas.

-- Youth are aiding their countrymen through civic action programs. Some 12,000 secondary school students under the direction of young teachers and youth leaders worked this summer in Saigon and 33 provinces on reconstruction and repair projects in hamlets and urban slums. Other youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, Buddhist and Catholic student groups, the National Voluntary Service, and the Voluntary Youth Association are working on a variety of socio-economic development projects.

-- Under the Ministry of Youth, the Province Youth and Sports Service is developing civic responsibility through voluntary civic action and social welfare projects--aiding competitive sports programs and assisting the police through the 41,000 man Combat Youth Force. There are 7,500 youth cadre at the province, district, village and hamlet levels.

-- Greater emphasis is being placed on recruiting capable young people as RD Cadre. Young men and women are ideally suited to the rigorous life of revolutionary development cadre. They have the ability to motivate others.

-- Thirty-one provinces have 4-T Club programs similar to our 4-H Clubs. Membership of young people from farm families has risen from 46,000 in 1965 to 81,000 this year.

-- Vocational training for students is expanding. Many others are learning on-the-job skills working on construction projects.

Effort in the Coming Year: Programs are under way to:

-- Increase broad programs of educational assistance to youth.

-- Strengthen the Ministry of Youth and increase aid to the Province Youth and Sports Service.

-- Encourage youth to participate in government. Many will be given important responsibilities in guiding the people and improving conditions in Saigon slum areas.

-- Increase vocational training opportunities.

-- Send more young people to rural areas during school vacations.

-- Sponsor and help more competitive sports events. Our military units will increasingly help.

-- Improve the effectiveness and morale of the Combat Youth Force.

-- Work with the religious youth organizations to improve their leadership and resources for greater work in social welfare.

IV. THE FREE WORLD JOINS IN--
32 Nations Help the Vietnamese

Many other Free World countries have come to the aid of Vietnam. There were nine helping this embattled nation in 1963. As of today, 32 nations have participated. They have sent more than 700 teachers, technicians and medical personnel. In the first six months of 1966, their grant assistance for civil programs amounted to more than $15 million. Over 600 Vietnamese are studying abroad at the invitation of foreign governments.

Nations which have given non-military aid to Vietnam include:

Argentina	France	Israel	New Zealand
Australia	Germany	Italy	Norway
Belgium	Great Britain	Japan	Pakistan
Brazil	Greece	Korea	Philippines
Canada	Guatemala	Laos	Spain
China	Iran	Luxembourg	Switzerland
Denmark	Ireland	Malaysia	Thailand
Ecuador		Netherlands	Turkey
			Venezuela

Their large and varied assistance, either contributed directly or in some cases through the Red Cross, includes: surgical teams, civil engineers, dairy experts, textbooks, hand tools, blankets from Australia; agricultural and electric power advisors, mathematics textbooks and electrical power substations from the Republic of China; $55 million of reparations plus radios, ambulances, and medicine from Japan; police training in Malaysia; medicine from Greece, Turkey, Israel, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Ecuador, Brazil; relief goods from India and Pakistan; petroleum and medical specialists from Iran; a wide range of teachers, experts and other assistance from France, Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom; and much else.

In the last few months, major new contributions have included the donation by the Federal Republic of Germany of $4.4 million for refugee relief, social centers and buses for the city of Saigon. Germany has also supplied the fully equipped hospital ship "Helgoland" which arrived in Saigon in August. This ship carries eight doctors, 30 other medical personnel, 145 beds, medical supplies and an ambulance. Canada is giving polio vaccine and equipment for ten emergency portable hospitals and Japan a ward and surgery section to the Cho Ray Hospital in Cholon.

New medical teams are being sent by Japan, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom. Venezuela is giving 500 tons of rice.

Military units from the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines are participating actively in civic action programs in the communities near which they are stationed.

The United Nations and its specialized agencies are also making significant contributions to the social and economic development of Vietnam. Under the UN Development Program 23 technical assistance programs are under way in such varied fields as tuberculosis control, postal services, soil survey, and physical therapy. UNICEF and WHO have large programs in the field of health. IAEA, ILO and UNESCO are also conducting programs in Vietnam. ECAFE is also pressing ahead with projects of benefit to all the nations in the Mekong Basin, and has undertaken surveys for irrigation, hydroelectric facilities, and bridge construction projects in Vietnam.

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POSTSCRIPT

To end at the beginning, I would repeat that this progress report focusses mainly on accomplishments to date. Its purpose is to show what the GVN, with US help, is doing in key non-military fields--under quite difficult wartime circumstances. It is written in full recognition that few of the problems the GVN and US confront have yet been solved, that all too many shortcomings still exist, and that much more remains to be done. Nonetheless what <u>has</u> been achieved to date is more than impressive enough to demonstrate both real progress and growing momentum in the joint Vietnamese/US effort to move Vietnam forward, even in the midst of war. That is the message of this report.

ANNEX

HONOLULU--SEVEN MONTHS OF PROGRESS

Another way to show the accelerating tempo of our "other war" might be to relate its progress to date to those joint pledges made during your meeting with the top Vietnamese leaders at Honolulu 6-8 February 1966. Only seven months have passed since this meeting, perhaps too short a time to show real progress. But these months have not been wasted. The impetus already given to Revolutionary Development, the electoral process, economic stability, and a better life for the Vietnamese people might best be demonstrated by reviewing the status of 10 major pledges made in the Joint Communique and Declaration of Honolulu of 8 February 1966. To this end, the following Annex recapitulates highlights in my main report.

GOAL. The GVN "pledged again:

-- To formulate a democratic constitution for discussion and modification.

-- To seek its ratification by secret ballot.

-- To create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government."

STATUS. The first step in this direction preceded Honolulu--the elections for provincial and city councils of 30 May 1965.

-- The second step takes place 11 September, when the Vietnamese people will elect 117 men and women to draft a constitution for Vietnam.

-- The GVN has already announced a third step--elections next year for whatever governmental institutions are called for in the new constitution.

GOAL. "The President and the Chief of State and the Prime Minister have agreed that their two Governments will take further concrete steps to combat inflation in Vietnam."

STATUS. Measures taken during 1966:

-- The Vietnamese piaster was devalued by 50 percent.

-- Port congestion was reduced and the volume of imports doubled.

-- Import procedures were reformed to increase competition and restrain prices.

-- Customs duties and domestic taxes were increased.

-- By late summer the cost of living index ceased to rise, money in circulation declined slightly, confidence in the piaster--and thus in the country's future--strengthened, and black market exchange rates fell sharply.

GOAL. "Continued emphasis by both Vietnamese and Allied Forces on the effort to build democracy in the rural areas--an effort as important as the military battle itself."

STATUS. This effort, called Revolutionary Development, continues at an accelerating pace:

-- During the first six months of 1966, 531 hamlets containing around 580,000 people, were brought into the program. 195 of these hamlets, with 408,000 people, had previously been under VC control.

-- The largest direct budget for these efforts in Vietnam's history has been committed: 1.7 billion piasters so far in calendar year 1966. Other ministerial programs in direct support also reached record levels.

-- RD Cadre teams, 24,766 men and women, are now operating in all provinces, with a separate Montagnard Program of 3773 cadre in the Highlands.

-- 9338 cadre have received RD training at Vung Tau.

-- Training facilities and staffs have been expanded to train and graduate 5000 to 6000 new cadre every 15 weeks.

GOAL. The GVN invited those fighting with the Viet Cong to leave their jungle hideouts, and "come safely to join us through the Open Arms program."

STATUS. Since that call around 11,000 VC have returned to the government, accepted its protection and sought its benefits, under the Open Arms program.

GOAL. "Continued emphasis on the design of rural construction work to meet the people's needs for larger output, more efficient production, improved credit, handicrafts and light industry, and rural electrification."

STATUS. Major steps are being taken in rural areas:

-- Under the provincial electric program, power has been furnished to 135 localities as of 1 July 1966.

-- Rural Electric Cooperatives will bring electricity to 144,000 people in three selected locations, with service to begin in the first area in September. 30 additional rural areas will be served with electricity in 1966 under the RD electricity program.

-- 80 additional wells and 60 potable water systems have been provided in this last year in villages and district towns.

-- Much of the $398 million obligated for US aid imports in FY 1966 was for fertilizer, machinery, iron and steel, and petroleum products to strengthen agriculture and industry in the provinces.

-- The GVN, with US help, is improving the mechanisms for providing credit, both to the farmer and the small businessman.

-- Special attention is being given to help refugees learn the production of handicrafts and other skills of use to Vietnamese society.

GOAL. "In agriculture, it was agreed that special effort would be made to move agricultural know-how--particularly new species of highly productive rice and corn and vegetable seed--from the experiment station to the farmer in the fields."

STATUS. Agricultural programs are being greatly strengthened:

-- About 1200 tons of improved rice, corn, soybean, vegetable and other seeds, plus tens of thousands of improved coconut and sugarcane cuttings have been distributed to farmers in the first half of 1966.

-- Over 40 varieties of new seeds are being released through agricultural research stations for seed multiplication.

-- The major part of 4.4 million educational leaflets scheduled this year have been distributed to farmers.

-- Most of 26,000 pigs to be given to the farmers in 1966 have been distributed. There are now three million of improved varieties of Yorkshire and Berkshire pigs; average weight has grown from 130 to 220 pounds.

GOALS. "Steps for more rapid land reform were carefully reviewed."

STATUS. A pilot program for distributing 14,000 acres in An Giang is proceeding, with 80 percent of aerial mapping for the cadastral survey now completed.

-- GVN is proceeding with distribution of 1.2 million acres of expropriated and government-owned land to new owners, including refugees.

GOAL. "Both Governments agreed to make increased efforts in the training of health personnel, in providing teams for medical care, and creating a stronger medical logistics system."

STATUS. American and other Free World medical teams in Vietnam increased to a total of 42 teams with 5 to 21 members per team. They were treating an average of 39,700 patients a month at the end of June. They included 21 teams of American military medical personnel working at civilian hospitals throughout Vietnam.

-- Altogether 495 American medical and paramedical personnel are serving the needy civilian populace in Vietnam compared to 193 at the beginning of the year.

-- Four of six new nursing schools have been opened, two during the last year. When all are completed the number of student nurses will be doubled and over 800 graduated annually.

-- The medical faculty of the University of Saigon was strengthened by a contract with the American Medical Association and the completion of a new basic sciences complex.

-- AID and the Department of Defense worked out a common medical supply system.

-- Expansion of the Saigon medical depot and construction of eight regional medical depots has begun.

GOAL. Both Governments "agreed to strengthen their cooperation in building elementary schools, in training teachers, in reinforcing vocational and technical education, and in supplying textbooks."

STATUS. Construction was completed on 2309 elementary classrooms in the hamlet schools program in FY 1966, making a total of 6377.

-- 3200 teachers have been specially trained for elementary schools in the hamlets this year, and an additional 1095 elementary school teachers were graduated from normal schools.

-- 461 secondary school teachers completed training at the Faculty of Pedagogy at Saigon.

-- 20 rural vocational training schools are being built; seven have been completed so far this year and six others are more than half built. Each school will have a capacity of about 500 students. With double shifts and full staff, 20-25,000 can be enrolled.

-- 300 agricultural cadre are being given special training under the RD program.

-- 30 percent increase in polytechnic education is planned for this coming school year.

-- 2.2 million textbooks have been distributed to elementary school children, bringing the total almost to the half-way point in the distribution of 14 million textbooks under the scheduled program.

GOAL. "It was agreed that the refugees who have of their own free will come over from the enemy side must be adequately cared for and prepared to resume a useful role in society . . . It was agreed that a special effort will be made to provide good schools for refugee children."

STATUS. GVN has established a Special Commissariat for Refugees, funded with more than one billion piasters for 1966.

-- USAID/Saigon now has 49 staff positions (35 in the field) and a budget of over $20 million for refugee-related programs, including Food for Peace commodities.

-- 18 voluntary agencies (with staff of over 150) are currently engaged in refugee relief.

-- 306 temporary centers to receive refugees have been established, with in-country material and logistic support to respond to sudden influxes.

-- The GVN has provided 104 classrooms for refugee children, with 60 more under construction and funds allocated for an additional 137.

-- By mid-1966, over one million refugees had been given temporary assistance, of whom 360,000 had been resettled and over 140,000 returned to their native villages.

-- A program of vocational training and cottage industry is under way for these people.

-- The most pressing problem in refugee work now is integrating them into their new communities.

Col. Buckington

CHINA POLICY AIRED BY U.S.

Full Exposition Given To Japanese By Humphrey

By PHILIP POTTER
[Washington Bureau of The Sun]

Washington, Nov. 9 — Asahi, Japan's leading newspaper with a circulation of more than 5,000,000, last week carried perhaps the fullest exposition of United States policy toward Red China ever given by a top American official.

It came in the course of an hour-and-a-half interview Vice President Hubert Humphrey gave to Shoryu Hata, the newspaper's foreign editor. Both the Japanese and English language editions of Asahi devoted a full page of type to it.

The comprehensiveness of the interview, also touching on American hopes of drawing Japan into discussions of America's nuclear strategy and policy, points up the significant fact that to the many duties given Mr. Humphrey in the domestic field Mr. Johnson has added a role in foreign policy, if not in the making of it, at least in expounding and explaining it.

The interview given Hata is one example. Another came last weekend when the Vice President took Sweden's Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, to the Greenbrier resort and spent hours explaining United States foreign policy matters in which the Swedes have an interest.

In the Erlander case, the Vice President was filling in for the President, who is in Texas convalescing from his gall bladder operation, but long before that the Chief Executive was exposing his Vice President to foreign dignitaries.

Mr. Humphrey was host at a Capitol breakfast for Aldo Moro, Italian Premier. He has said official farewells on the President's behalf to half a dozen other visiting foreign dignitaries.

Sits In On Meetings

During the President's recuperation from surgery, Mr. Humphrey received and had long talks with Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos and Brig. Gen. Abdel Razak, the Prime Minister of Iraq, here on unofficial visits.

Like other vice presidents before him he sits in on meetings of the National Security Council, but has not participated in the weekly luncheons of the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and McGeorge Bundy, special presidential assistant for national security affairs, where many of the hard foreign policy decisions are talked out.

Getting the same daily intelligence briefings as those given the President and exposed to most of the documents and important cables dealing with defense and foreign policy, Mr. Humphrey frequently talks with the President about such subjects. If he has contrary views, he prefers to present them privately, rather than air them at group meetings.

Correspondents and columnists here have made much of the fact that Mr. Humphrey has not been sent abroad on trips such as those Mr. Johnson, as Vice President, made for the late President Kennedy and Richard Nixon made on President Eisenhower's behalf.

Initiatory Programs

But this Administration, shaping and putting through Congress initiatory programs of the Great Society, to date has eschewed foreign travel as a means of promoting foreign relations. Mr. Johnson has yet to make any extensive trips abroad. Mr. Humphrey's turn no doubt will come.

In the meantime, he has had a hand in the selection of and the briefing of those going from the Senate for official trips overseas.

In short, while attending to manifold duties as one of Mr. Johnson's principal lieutenants in seeing legislation through Congress, as head of the Space Advisory Council, the Peace Corps Advisory Committee and the President's Council on Youth Fitness; in maintaining liaison with the nation's mayors and in advising on agricultural policy, Mr. Humphrey has devoted a good deal of time and attention to foreign affairs and is thoroughly versed in the aims and purposes of our overseas undertakings.

Policy Discussed

The interview given Hata focussed on our policy toward Red China, which is always under attack by Japanese leftists and has been a subject of criticism by others, particularly those in the business community, who see a big market in mainland China.

Hata asked the Vice President to evaluate problems posed for the world by the Communist Chinese and how we intended to deal with them.

Mr. Humphrey saw the problem largely in terms of Peking's seeming determination, once it has achieved the necessary military, nuclear, economic and diplomatic power, to get control of, or at least dominate again, all the areas China "thinks it historically possessed," ranging from substantial chunks of the Soviet Union to much of Southeast Asia.

Combat This Drive

To attain its goals, Mr. Humphrey said, Peking wants to drive Western power out of the Indian Ocean and out of the Pacific Ocean or "at least back a long ways." Once it has dominated Asia, he said, it plans to employ racism, communism, diplomacy and propaganda to obtain friendly

regimes in African and Latin America.

The United States, he told Hata, seeks to combat this drive by strengthening economically the threatened countries and "I think this is most important—making it perfectly clear to Communist China that her external adventures, her desire to test her strength militarily will not pay off; that she will get her nose a terrile price for this. . . .

"I would say what we are compelled to do is to resist all forms of Communist Chinese aggression . . . .propaganda, subversion, terror, diplomatic pressure, economic pressure. . . .

"And this is one of the reasons that we seek to do what we can to prevent China from gaining respectability and acceptance. I mean if the Chinese can frighten everybody, they will accept them—not because they want to but because they think the have to. But if other nations feel that they don't have to accept them because there are other powers that will protect them, then China does not gain acceptance."

Reasons Stated

We oppose Peking's admission to the United Nations, Humphrey said, "because Communist China openly repudiates the charter; she does not believe in peaceful coexistence; she believes in violence (and) aggression; she says so . . . and until she changes her mind we are going to have to resist."

If the United States were to give recognition to Red China now, he said it would cause all Southeast Asia to lean toward Peking and tend to make fifth columnists of the overseas Chinese living by the millions in Southeast Asia.

We are resisting Red China's aims in South Vietnam, the Vice President said, "because we think that if South Vietnam is made the victim of aggression . . . everyone else will tend to feel that they have to make their accommodations to the new power of China."

In his own frank opinion, Mr. Humphrey said, China's power "is overrated. She has great numbers of people, but she doesn't have an industrial base yet."

He said he did not underestimate the innate brilliance and ability of the Chinese and regretted that the Peking leaders were destroying links of affection that once existed between their people and ours.

Would Seek Peace

But the present Communist leaders, Mr. Humphrey said, "do not have immortality . . . and come in . . . when the men of the long march have put in their time on this earth and they are gone and a new generation comes forward and that new generation has found out that the price of aggression is too high, conditions can improve.

"It will take patience and forbearance," he said, and American initiative.

He said he believed "there are certain cultural exchanges that could be made, noting that the United States already has authorized its newsmen to go to Red China if they can get in.

"As soon as we get any indication that the Chinese Communist leaders would prefer to live in a world of peace, we are prepared to walk the extra mile to seek that peace," he said, adding that he personally believed "we must be on the alert at all times for any indication of a peaceful outlook."

In the meantime, Mr. Humphrey said, close working relationship between Japan and the United States are "absolutely fundamental and basic to any successful policy for Japan or the United States in Asia.

"I believe that we need a working partnership like we have with some of our European friends—every bit as good," he said. "I believe that we ought to be as considerate of Japan as we are of Japan as we are of Germany . . . as we are of Great Britain, because Japan represents the strongest productive power today in Asia and because it is Asian and we are not . . . and we need Asian partners."

Time Is Arriving

In this connection, Mr. Humphrey said, "I believe the time is arriving when the United States ought to include friendly countries in our nuclear strategy and nuclear policy. That doesn't mean you turn weapons over to them. It doesn't mean that you share the weapons.

"It simply means that nuclear policy is so important today that friendly nations ought to be included within the general discussion and strategy as to the use of nuclear weapons or the potential use or the agreement not to use them. I mean the whole nuclear question ought to be more closely related to our general international commitments and international security policy.

"We are trying to work something out in Europe on this. I think that ought to be extended, I say, to Japan—the same kind of consideration and consultation. Japan is a major power. We look upon her as one."

Train Scatters Hindu Pilgrims

Calcutta, Nov. 9 (AP) — A train's approach scattered hundreds of Hindu pilgrims on a railroad bridge spanning the Bagmati River in Bihar state today and ten were trampled to death in the rush to get out of the way. About 40 were injured.

Survivors attacked the engineer and conductor when they halted the train down the line and reports from the scene said both were hospitalized in critical condition.

The pilgrims had assembled to bathe in the Bagmati's waters in the rites of the Partik Purnima, the November full moon. The train was not scheduled to stop there and the crowd panicked when it failed to brake.

Italy's Population

Rome, Nov. 9 (AP)—Italy's population reached 52,787,000 at the end of August, the Government announced.

week strike by independent steel haulers, announces end and Ja

Humphrey Attacks Viet War Dissenters

Oct. 1967

By Ward Just
Washington Post Staff Writer

[Note: Speech was delivered Oct. 23, 1967]

Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey delivered a sarcastic, emotional attack on dissenters in America yesterday. "I have not forgotten the lessons of the thirties," he said, "when men cried 'peace,' and failed a generation."

He assailed the militant marchers who assaulted the Pentagon on the weekend as "incredibly ridiculous," and gained the most generous applause of the afternoon when he told of his anger at watching morning television reports of American troops cleaning up the "mess" in front of the Pentagon. "Never have our soldiers had to suffer such indignities at home," he said.

"Those who made it should have cleaned it up," he said.

The Vice President was addressing a meeting of the National Defense Executive Reserve, a businessman's group which resembles a kind of executives' national guard. He spoke for an hour, departing repeatedly from a prepared text.

President Defended

Humphrey was defending the President as much as his policies. Mr. Johnson was described as "pained, unhappy, burdened"—but brave in execution of his responsibilities in Vietnam and elsewhere. The Vice President compared the President to Abraham Lincoln and Harry S. Truman, and Vietnam to Korea, World War II, and the War for American Independence.

Humphrey followed closely a theme recently expounded by the President himself. It is the image of an Administration beleaguered from within and without, but resolute in the tradition of Lincoln, FDR, and—twice cited yesterday—John F. Kennedy.

The war in Vietnam, which underlay all the assumptions in yesterday's address to the executives, was defended in all its contexts: it was said to be beneficial for the Vietnamese themselves, crucial to Asian security, and fundamental to the existence of the United States. It was a direct parallel, the Vice President said, with the American commitment in Europe in 1941.

"Neurotic . . . Mainland China"

But beyond Vietnam, as Humphrey made clear, was a "neurotic, soon-to-be-nuclear-armed mainland China, which "still lives by irrational revolutionary creed." Despite this, however, he said "we do not seek to make mainland China our enemy. We do not seek to encircle and crush her."

To the dissenters at home, there were warnings:

"I think it is true that all Americans realized that we are in the midst of a protracted, costly struggle . . . which . . . will probably not end until Hanoi comes to believe that we have the will . . . to see it through."

The militant demonstrators, he made clear, reinforced Hanoi's resolution.

But the theme was the unpopularity of the war and the hard decisions a President is forced to make. Humphrey spoke of the "terrible divisions" which fractured the country in the Civil War, the "fierce dissension" during World War I, and the opposition to American involvement in Europe in the late nineteen thirties.

The Vice President reached back to the Continental Congress, General George Washington at Valley Forge and Lincoln in 1864 to find comparisons to Lyndon Johnson in 1967.

The implications for American policy were obvious:

"I, for one, would not want to be responsible for a policy which deferred today's management troubles until they became unmanageable . . . a policy of Armageddon on the installment plan," the Vice President said.

"(a) The title and description of the job objectives for which individuals are to be trained;

"(b) The length of the training period;

"(c) A schedule listing various operations for major kinds of work or tasks to be learned and showing, for each, job operations or work, tasks to be performed, and the approximate length of time to be spent on each operation or task;

"(d) The wage or salary to be paid at the beginning of the course or training, at each successive step in the course and at the completion of training:

"(e) The entrance wage or salary paid to employees already trained in the kind of work for which the individuals are to be trained;

"(f) The number of hours of supplemental related instruction required; and

"(g) Information respecting the cost of usual training and other usual services provided employees other than those described in section 206 of this title, in order to make them fully productive.

"SEC. 215. For purposes of applying chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, any grant received by an employer under this part—

"(a) shall not be included in the gross income of such employer, and

"(b) shall not be treated as reimbursement for expenses incurred by such employer in his trade or business.

"PART C—AUTHORIZATIONS, DURATION OF PROGRAM

"SEC. 221. The Secretary shall carry out the programs provided for in this title during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and the succeeding fiscal year.

"SEC. 222. (a) For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title, except the provisions of section 205, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of $875,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968.

"(b) Of the funds authorized under subsection (a) of this section, not less than 10 per centum nor more than 20 per centum shall be used by the Secretary for the purpose of carrying out training programs under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 for persons eligible under section 206 of this title.

"(c) Of the funds appropriated under subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall reserve not less than 12.5 per centum nor more than 37.5 per centum for the purpose of carrying out part B of this title.

"(d) For the purpose of making loans under section 205, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968.

"(e) Appropriations authorized by this section shall remain available until expended."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROUTY. I yield.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, after consultation with the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], as well as with the proponent of the pending amendment, the manager of the bill, and others, I send to the desk a unanimous-consent request and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous-consent request will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Ordered, That on Wednesday, October 4, after the approval of the Journal there be a quorum call to ascertain the presence of a quorum, immediately after which further debate on the motion by the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Prouty) (amendment No. 371) to the motion of the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Byrd) to recommit with instructions S. 2388, a bill to provide an improved Economic Opportunity Act, to authorize funds for the continued operation of economic opportunity programs, to authorize an Emergency Employment Act, and for other purposes, be limited to 20 minutes to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Prouty) and the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Byrd).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, just to make it clear, Senators have unlimited time today and tonight, as long as they wish to remain in session, to debate this amendment?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes; the limitation does not begin until tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I ask the majority leader at what time he intends to have the Senate convene tomorrow?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Ten o'clock. We already have an order.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I should like to inquire whether amendments to the Prouty amendment would be in order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Not if the unanimous-consent request is agreed to.

Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished minority leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

VIETNAM

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on yesterday we had very considerable discussion of the situation in Vietnam, and I think it ranged into the question of the conduct of that struggle.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I suggest that the Chamber be cleared and that there be order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chamber will be cleared, and we will have order. All attachés whose presence is not needed in the Chamber will remove themselves from the Chamber.

The Sergeant at Arms is directed to see that these instructions to clear the Chamber are carried out.

The Senator from Illinois may proceed.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, from time to time inquiry has been made of me about what seems like dissident views that have been expressed on this question of Vietnam, and particularly as it relates to the minority side of the aisle.

I have stated over and over again that the Republican Party umbrella is ample for all purposes and for all shades of opinion. I have only two concerns. The first is, of course, that we do not try to invade the constitutional prerogative of the President of the United States.

The first article of the Constitution does give to the Congress the power of the purse. And, in exercise of that power, we can discipline virtually everything in Government.

The Congress also is the exclusive lawmaking body in our form of government, and we can abolish every bureau. We can abolish nearly every agency. We cannot abolish the Presidency or the Supreme Court because they are constitutional offices. However, with those exceptions, we can go pretty far in exercising our exclusive function as the one and only lawmaking body. The fact that a whole body of administrative law has developed in this country was only possible under a delegation of power by Congress.

So, we have the power of the purse, and when the Constitution made the President the Commander in Chief, it tendered to him the sword of the country. And that includes not only the conduct of our foreign relations, but also the conduct of any struggle or hostility in which we might be engaged.

The only other concern I have is about my own conduct in this matter. I want to be sure it is in conformity with my conscience and my conviction. Beyond that, it does not make any difference, because my responsibility is to explore for the facts, to ascertain as much as I can on a given subject, and then to exercise an independent judgment.

Mr. President, I hope I have not failed to do that, for Edmond Burke once remarked in Parliament that he felt he would betray his constituency if he did not do that. I grant the same privilege, the same prerogative, and the same latitude of every Member of the Senate.

What is more, I have no hostility toward criticism. I think it was in World War I that Woodrow Wilson said that in time of war we need more criticism, not less. But always it has to be within the framework of our constitutional power, and we must not arrogate to ourselves the conduct of an external struggle.

I think we have had some lessons in that field. Mr. President, the very Capitol, where we sit in the Senate wing, was destroyed in the War of 1812 because there was too much civil interference with the conduct of that war.

Lincoln did not brook any interference from a committee that was set up on the conduct of the war. I think it was General Grant who said that the greatest aid for him was from none other than Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederacy, because he was interferring with Robert E. Lee and his tactics and his strategy.

Who shall say what the outcome of that war would have been if that great general from the South had been let alone? Nobody knows, but that interference was helpful, and Grant recognized it and paid testimony to it.

So, I grant that right, but I hope always it will be within due bounds. However, criticism, I always recognize.

On Sunday I had an experience and at first, I did not know how it came about. The operator of a very splendid motel in Galesburg, Ill., called me on the telephone. I scarcely know him. He said that he and the city—having a population of about 40,000—were going to be hosts to about 130 or 140 Vietnam veterans, all wounded, who were in the hospital at Great Lakes, Ill.

The whole community was energized to turn out for these youngsters. They lodged them. They fed them. They entertained them. They brought them from Great Lakes to Galesburg, a distance of 150 miles, and they took them back.

I was asked to get on the telephone at 5 o'clock on Sunday and to make them a telephone speech, which I did.

When the speech was over, a sergeant by the name of Wright was designated to respond to the speech, and he did.

He said:

Senator, we want to thank you. You are in our corner, and you have stood up for us, and you stood up for the cause. And we, the wounded from Vietnam, want you to know it from us. And we say it as sincerely, as simply, as emphatically as we know how. We simply thank you.

What I did first on Sunday was to salute them as a measure of deference, because a salute is given to a superior, and I recognize the superiority of their sacrifice. They come back without legs and without arms. And if anybody wants to see what Vietnam has done, he needs only to go out to Walter Reed, which is an evacuation hospital, to see the results.

When flowers came into my room at the hospital from time to time, I got a cart and went down to the Vietnam wards with those bouquets. They were better for them than for me. However, I have seen what has happened, and I yield to nobody in my hope, in my desire, and in my prayers that somehow this insane and grim and grisly business can honorably come to an end.

I think you have to say that for the President of the United States. I cannot in my position, and I cannot under any circumstances, denigrate him or demean him in the eyes of the world in connection with this controversy by anything that I might say. And so, granting all this latitude to anybody in the legislative branch of the Government, I feel that the time has come to say a little more than I have said on the subject of Vietnam.

I recognize my kinship with those who were out in Galesburg, Ill., by virtue of a common uniform which I wore 50 years ago as a private first class, as a sergeant, and as a second lieutenant in France on the western front. That is a kinship that you cannot forget.

And I want to be sure that almost a half million American boys who are out there in the cause of our country will not be the forgotten men under any circumstances, because they are too precious as Americans who have responded and are willing to do their duty even if the last and supreme sacrifice is required for their services.

I will never forget as I think of the thousands who have now died, in addition to the thousands who have been wounded, the lines of Colonel McCrae, that Canadian doctor who had a field dressing station on the banks of the Ypres River in France, and saw the bodies roll down into the door of his dressing room tent out there on the front, and who finally committed his soul to paper and in that tender and gentle poem said:

We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.

Well, some boys are lying out there. I do not know what I would say to the shades of those who made that sacrifice. I want to be sure, if I can, that it is not a vanity and that I fully recognize my responsibility in an anxious hour like this.

It was said the other day:

First. That our programs and our policies were suspect by friend and foe alike. Where, I would like to know? Who besides bonnie Charles de Gaulle has been so bold as to affront us in this field? Thirty countries are helping us now. Have you heard it from Australia? Have you heard it from New Zealand? Have you heard it from Korea? Indeed, not. The nations have been there in our corner. They did not always send troops, but there were other kinds of assistance that they sent.

So, is that a good sentiment to utter, that we are suspect by friend and foe alike? I do not know where it is, and I want to see the proof. And I do not like to see it go on the dispatch wires into every corner of the earth, to make a headline.

I remember once doing some work on immigration, trying to help India; and when I got to Bombay and Calcutta, the headlines were that high—"India's Friend Is Here."

Nothing is provincial here, or parochial; nothing is limited. What we say here goes on the wire. And if you want a lesson, send somewhere—I could tell you where—to get the international shortwave monitor, and see what is said on the Senate floor, which goes out of the shortwave stations from Peking and from Hanoi and elsewhere.

How good is it for the morale of the troops? You ought to be out there on the front on a lonely night, when the bombs are dropping or the mortar shells are coming over, and see whether it makes a difference. Oh, yes, they begin to wonder whether they are the forgotten men, and are forgotten back home. It is a ghastly feeling, I can tell you; and sometimes I had it on the western front a long, long time ago. That is one thing about which I want to be extremely careful.

It has been said that the President was brainwashed by a military-industrial complex. I would hate to have heard that said about General Eisenhower, the grand captain of the second great crusade mission in world affairs. I do not believe anybody ever said it about him, great tactician that he was, great strategist that he was. They combed the Army to find him. And General Marshall was deeply attached to him. And so he became the grand captain.

Well, I can imagine how he feels about a statement like that. It does not sound good and it does not look good, because he was a Republican President who served us with honor and distinction. And it would not sound good about any President.

Have you heard the British demean their King and Queen? If you have, show me the day and the time. Why, we were so circumspect about it that when the King and Queen were our guests, we set up a scaffolding in that rotunda so that the cameras would not catch the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga and the surrender of Lord Cornwallis. That is how circumspect we were. And I was there, roving around in the place, to find out what it was all about.

No, you do not demean the ruler. The President is not our ruler, but you do not demean him in the eyes of people abroad; for when you do, you demean the prestige of this Republic. And I do not mean to do it, as the one remaining great, free republic on the face of the earth.

Yesterday, this whole question about security came up. Where was our security? I heard the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee ask these questions. I am no tactician, goodness knows. I have been to the command staff school as a lieutenant, but I am no tactician, I am no strategist. But I do know this, Mr. President, from those with whom I have associated in government: that our outer defense perimeter started in Korea and went to South Vietnam. Now, you see, Saigon, in South Vietnam, is at the lower end. That is our left flank. Suppose the left flank of your line is turned and you lose Vietnam? Then what?

The distinguished Senator from Hawaii can certainly tell us about how close it is from the Philippines to Malaysia and to Indonesia. And you cite to me a holding station where you can hold if we lose Vietnam. There is no place short of Singapore. Anybody who has some perspective knowledge of tactics can tell you that. And when you are in Singapore, you are at one of the clogged water courses that I am confident, as surely as I am standing here, the Soviets are going to try to control. Control Panama, control Singapore, the two ends of the Gulf of Aden and Suez, and you have just about command of the world. That is all you need.

So you have to see this in perspective. There is no holding line between Saigon and Singapore. So when they speak about the fall of Southeast Asia, they are not kidding. And I am not disposed to quarrel with men who have gone through our military schools, who have worked with worldwide maps, and who are expected to plot this thing in the large. That is what you need for the security of the country.

There may be Members in this body this afternoon who may remember, as I remember, when during the war we went down to the Munitions Building for briefings by George Marshall, the Chief of Staff.

I almost fell out of my seat one morning. These were members of the Appropriations Committee. I almost fell out of my seat when suddenly, out of a clear sky, he said:

Gentlemen, I may have bad news for you.

We waited with bated breath. He said:

Our best intelligence tells us that the Japanese are going to invade Alaska, and for the moment we can't stop them. We can't redeploy our troops from the Pacific. We think the strategy we follow is correct; and

if they invade Alaska, we'll have to let them do it.

What do you think the wave would have been in this country if the Japanese Army had suddenly invaded Alaska? I ask you.

Why, it would have been a wave of such intensity that I expect people would want to come and cut the throats of leaders down here for letting our domain be invaded. But General Marshall was a soldier and a great one. He knew what he had to do, no matter how much he might be scolded and he kept the ship's nose in the wind. Everybody knows how we came out. He was right and I do not try to argue with them about it.

That is our outside security line. Suppose it fails. I think the Senator from Missouri could tell us the answer. It will run from Alaska to Hawaii, and you tell me how far you are from San Francisco and Los Angeles, as to whether or not our security is involved out there in Asia. If I did not think it was, I guess I would take another good long look at this whole business before we get through.

It has been said we have not emphasized the political needs and aspects of this controversy in the face of the fact that maybe we cannot get a military solution. Have we defaulted in that field? I thought they had an election out there to pick a constituent assembly. I thought they had an election out there. Senator MURPHY and Senator HICKENLOOPER went there as observers from this side. They came back and said that in their judgment it was a fair and honest election. They brought back ballots with them and indicated exactly how the people went to the polls. Is it not strange that in this second election in September a half million more people voted than had voted in the earlier election? Does that mean anything? It means we have done something to dispel fears in Vietnam and in shoving back the Vietcong so that life can pursue its normal course. Has that been neglecting the political fabric? Those figures simply do not prove it.

I reemphasize these two facts largely because the point is made that our security is not involved. This is a pretty small consideration when one thinks of these high-speed bombers. The designers are not at all satisfied with the speeds we get today, and I presume that would be particularly true with respect to military aircraft. They have just tied this great ball into short reaches, and you can go from here to there in very short order. When you do so on a pair of wings, you can have in the fuselage the lethal and deadly weapons that will impair our security. Let no one say our security is not involved, and with it, of course, the peace of the world is involved.

Who can forget how fast these things move. Here was a student. I suppose almost everybody has forgotten his name. His name was Princip and he was standing in a doorway in the little town of Sarajevo. When the Austrian Archduke and his Duchess, who were the heirs to the throne, came by, out comes the pistol and he shoots and both die before they get to the hospital. The legends are set in motion. The boots on the cobblestones begin to sound all over Europe, and before we knew it we were caught up in a frightful conflagration.

What about this area in Southeast Asia? Are we there to stop aggression? I think we are. Are we there in the interest of peace so that the thing will not spread? I think we are. Are we there in the interest of self-determination, a phrase Woodrow Wilson used so often? I think we are. Can we not do that without undertaking to police the entire world? I think we can. I am not insensible to the fact that there is a limitation to our capacity in manpower, in finances, and in any other field you want to mention. No one can be insensible to it today when you stop to figure the fever, turbulence, and problems you have everywhere in the world. But these are ideals and these are objectives that I think we can probably serve and I think we are serving them now. I think it is an undertaking to which we were committed.

I hear it said that we ought to stop bombing immediately, project a day, sharpen up your forces, then say to all the world, "On this day we stop; on this day a ceasefire will stop everything. Now, if you, the enemy fail to desist in your hostility, then we shall feel free to use everything at our command in order to bring you to heel."

Well, have we not said some of that already? Oh, I rather think so. We have used a good many countries, like Britain, we used the Hanoi embassy in Moscow, people in Warsaw, and elsewhere, but strangely enough these things have not produced anything yet. The tragedy of it is that I think we have gone pretty far but, Mr. President, we could get no reciprocal assurances, and that is the stinger.

I am sure we were willing and I am sure that sentiment was conveyed. If only those three crack divisions they had at the demilitarized zone would stay in their place, but Ho Chi Minh and his associates would give no such assurance. What would you deduce from it? If you would stop the only leverage we have now, those troops would have moved. And what about the Marines on the outside and north of the demilitarized zone? What about those who could become the forgotten men? I am not going to forget them. I am not going to see that kind of punishment visited upon them because suddenly we felt we had to stop this bombing business as a kind of last, desperate resort. It may be the war is a one-way street. Everybody discovered that from the day they invented warfare. There is a great troop risk involved when they counsel that kind of action.

But there is something else that ought to engage our recollection and that is what happened in Korea in 1951. We had a brilliant offensive mounted there and we were doing exceedingly well. Then, suddenly, a kind of inertia came into it. In some areas they reported that President Truman had issued a standstill order. He had not. You will not find it in history books or papers. That is not what happened. But the word went out that we were going to settle for the 38th parallel and that deenergized the drive, and as a result it cost us 90,000 casualties.

Do you want to go down that anxious road again? Not me, not me. One lesson in history is enough and with 450,000 men, and perhaps more over there now, no sir, I am not going to expose them to that sort of thing and rue the day that I do it. That will be a hardened memory with which to keep a rendezvous from that day on.

I, for one, do not propose to do it.

In a recent speech, it was stated that we should end our search-and-destroy operations. The Senator has seen the Montagnards when he was in Vietnam last week. We could not bring them in before. Finally we had to go out and find them by searching the hills and the valleys. That was the only real technique we had which was effective for a time. But, it is said, we should stop it. We should end this business of search and destroy.

What kind of posture does it put us in? A defensive posture.

The moment we are on the defensive, we can no longer employ a technique of this kind. Is that what we want to do? Is that what we want to say to General Westmoreland and our troops out there? I do not.

Sooner or later the truth has got to come to the American people.

A great point was made about taking all this to the Security Council. That matter was argued in this Chamber for hours on yesterday, as if it had not been up there. They made a real endeavor. We have to get nine votes. Yes, there is no veto power where a procedural matter is involved, and this would be procedural. But, we could not get them. We could not energize the members of the Council to take a real interest in it.

Suppose, however, we did get nine votes. What would be the next step? Not procedural. It would have to be substantive.

How do we get a substantive matter out of the Council, with the Soviet Union sitting there with a veto?

I do not think we have looked all the way down that road. Inquiry leads me to believe that our Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, has not been wanting in trying to get some kind of action in the Security Council. He has not been successful.

Thus, Mr. President, in all the discussion had on yesterday, I do not think it came to anything because I doubt very much whether it was pursued to a real conclusion.

I fairly shuddered when the two newspaper editors, Ashmore and Baggs, finally got visas from the State Department and went out to Hanoi.

If I had been the State Department, they would not have gotten any visas, because they are both associated, as I understand it, with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, in Santa Barbara. That is where Robert Hutchins, former president of the University of Chicago, is. Senators should read some of the stuff that comes out of that center. I sent for and got lots of it. I delivered quite a lecture on one. The subject was "Justice for All, Freedom for None."

I wish I had my notebook with me so that I could read a few of the notes—they would knock your hats off as to what they had in mind as to the ultimate in a free society. Their idea was that our free society would have to be restructured, that there could be no freedom any more. Justice, yes.

But, I say, what will happen when freedom goes?

What is that old ditty——

No man escapes when freedom fails.
The best men rot in filthy jails.
And those who cry "appease, appease."
Are hanged by those they sought to please.

Mr. President, that is one reason why our boys are in Vietnam. Let freedom slip, and it begins to slip everywhere.

We remember that Churchill said he was not made the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.

Let me say that I was not made a Senator to preside over the liquidation of the holy fabric of freedom. May I be the last ever to approach that kind of task.

Well, Mr. President, Ashmore and Baggs go out there. I followed that pretty closely. I thought perhaps they were really going to "pin one on." But read between the lines. What and how much did they get out of Hanoi, if we stopped bombing? It could have eventuated into something. Not that it would. It just could. They came back emptyhanded. But they had enough for a few headlines.

I consigned Ashmore and Baggs to the wastebasket. I received a letter from them excoriating me for identifying them with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

Well, Mr. President, they have not heard the last of it, I say to my friends of California. They will hear a lot more on that subject before I get through, because if this is going to be the new politics in our country, predicated on the theory that freedom must be liquidated, then the time to start fighting is now.

Thus, I just "kiss off" Ashmore and Baggs after their escapades on the front pages. I doubt very much whether they will make any significant history from now on.

Now I get back to one more point, and then I think I have said enough.

In 1952 we actually went abroad to bring the grand captain back, made him the head of our party and elected him to the Presidency of the United States. We reelected him in 1956. If there had been no constitutional prohibition on a third term, I make so bold as to say that Dwight D. Eisenhower had sufficient of the trust, esteem, and confidence of the American people to be elected for a third time.

Thus, it would occur to me that we who have been associated with him in a common party, we who have gone to see him so often at the Tuesday morning sessions at the White House, could very well, when we are baffled and troubled by problems of this kind, when we are disconcerted of spirit in what appears on the outside to be a kind of party dissidence, we could take a little more counsel from him because he is a great tactician and a great strategist. He is now at that age where he can speak with a wealth of wisdom and experience.

I can only hope that we do not wander too far afield so that, somehow, we go across that yet undefined line under which we might arrogate to ourselves the conduct of the war.

It is a rather interesting thing—I have run down many legal cases before the Supreme Court—that I have found as yet no delimitation on the powers of the Commander in Chief under the Constitution. Thus, I want to abide by that Constitution. I do not want him to invade our responsibility and I do not want to invade his. When he wants counsel, he can call—and he does; how many times we have been to the White House with the maps and the charts looking over them to see where we are and getting some better ideas about direction. Then we knew, I think, a little better, for our own comfort and the stability of our soul, what we should do.

So, Mr. President, that is the whole story. I am not disposed to argue it, as I said at the outset. I want to be sure only that I comport myself according to my own convictions and my own conscience, because I have a responsibility to myself, to my country, and to those boys who are out there in Vietnam now.

May we pray for them always. May we make no mistakes that will add an undue burden on, and an undue jeopardy to, a task which in itself is amply hazardous without our adding to it.

I do not want our boys in Vietnam to become the forgotten men.

Thus, in every step we take, in every word we utter, let us be sure that we have in mind those men who, at this very moment, are 12,000 miles from this gracious country, who are ready for any sacrifice, who are ready for any vigil, who are ready for any task in order to requite their obligations and responsibilities as soldiers of the United States of America.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, what the distinguished minority leader said needed saying. It was said eloquently. He spoke as an American. I think the American people approve of what he had to say.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, it was indeed said eloquently, and, of course, as an American, and I suggest there has not been a word uttered in this Chamber over the last many months that has been uttered by other than an American. I think this is very clear. I do not think any of us who have spoken has had any lack of responsibility or any reason to feel that he was not discharging his obligation to his country or to this body, or to those who are serving on active duty anywhere in the world.

Just as it was proper for the Senator from Illinois to call to the attention of all of us our responsibility not to weaken the cause of our Nation, the cause of freedom in the world, so I think it is equally important for all of us to meet our responsibility, when we disagree with the conduct of affairs by our Government, to state that disagreement as clearly and distinctly as possible, whether in time of peace or in time of war.

The strength of our democracy depends upon this being done, because people in high office can make errors as can people of humble station.

The only way to guard against error in what is at best an imperfect world, in the conduct of affairs by men who are at best less than omniscient, as they should be less than omnipotent, is to encourage, certainly not to condemn or seek to stifle, criticism of a responsible nature by all citizens, including Members of the Senate of the United States.

(At this point Mr. SPONG assumed the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I have listened to the distinguished minority leader with a great deal of interest. All of us have very deep respect and affection for the Senator from Illinois, and certainly I have always counted myself as one of those who admire him very much. He has great talents and I particularly enjoy his company. It pains me very much to have a different view on such an important matter of policy.

I have not the slightest doubt that he has the deepest conviction when he says he is not a Senator to liquidate the holy fabric of freedom. I am sure he feels that way. I feel just as strongly that the pursuit of this war under the conditions that exist is more likely designed to liquidate the holy fabric of freedom because of what could well be a war of indefinite tenure, indefinite existence, and possibly involve China.

So what we are arguing about is not the objective. I think the objective of the Senator from Illinois and that of myself and those of us who disagree with the current policy in Vietnam are identical. We do have this difference of judgment, and it is a judgment based upon similar facts, as to the best way to go about preserving our freedom.

The Senator expressed his very deep feeling for the men in Vietnam. All of us share that. There are men from every State represented by everyone in this body, and we are all getting, almost daily, notices of their death or injury. The difference is, I think, that those of us who would like to liquidate this war believe that we are acting in the interest of those men in Vietnam. We do not wish them to stay there. Also, we believe it is not in the national interest to do so.

So it seems to me the question is narrowed a bit if we get down to some of the issues that are related to this question. What is the objective of this Vietnam policy? Is it in the interest of this country and the preservation of our strength?

The Senator intimates, in one section of his speech, that our security is involved. Yesterday I said I thought our security was best protected by maintaining a strong country, and not wasting or spending our resources, manpower, and money, in South Vietnam. This is not a part of the world which it seems to me has ever been regarded heretofore as strategic and as of vital importance to the United States.

The Senator from Illinois mentioned President Eisenhower, a great general. When President Eisenhower was in office, this matter was presented to him in 1954. He very carefully selected his Chiefs of

Staff, General Ridgway and General Gavin. They undertook a study of the landing problems in support of the French in Vietnam. Very wisely, after a thorough examination, General Ridgway recommended against it, although there were powerful people in that administration, including the Secretary of State, and Admiral Radford, who were for it. But President Eisenhower, exercising his responsibility as President, decided against it. I think history will prove him right.

General MacArthur had made a statement, not under these same circumstances, but after what had been his experience in the same area to the effect that it would be very foolish to engage in a land war on the continent of Asia.

I believe there are other leading military men who have taken that view. There has been a difference of opinion among the highest branches of the military establishment on this particular problem. But General Eisenhower at least made a decision not to go into that precise area, Vietnam. I believe at that time there was the question of landing in North Vietnam, but, anyway, it was in the general area of Vietnam, and he decided not to go to the aid of the French.

We were at that time in a false position in supporting a colonial power, which is contrary to the tradition of this country. I think this whole operation from the beginning has been afflicted with this weakness. The idea that Vietnam would threaten the security of this country by bombs or other means is not realistic.

I assume that what the Senator is saying is that Russia and/or China will use it as a base to attack us. I do not know what other reason would lead us to say that what happens in South Vietnam is a real and direct threat to the security of the United States.

If it Russia that is the threat, I do not see how Russia needs Vietnam to be a threat to the United States. At any rate, Russia, not so long ago, had missiles in Cuba and withdrew them. If she is determined on such an attack, I do not know why she withdrew those missiles in Cuba.

This gets us into a very involved matter as to motives. With due respect, I do not see how what the Senator thinks will happen in South Vietnam is a threat to us. I agree with what the Senator said about the recent election and that the votes were cast, but most people agree that the conditions for the voting were determined by us and our proteges. It seems to me this would be quite similar to having a rule in Arkansas that only Democrats could be elected. I would feel that I would come out pretty well under those conditions and we could count the votes as they were cast.

But coming back to the matter of security, which I commented on yesterday—and I assume perhaps the Senator from Illinois had that in mind, because I said I thought that we are playing the Communist game—if that is what is involved, and I think it certainly is involved in the long term, I think that we are weakening this country. I think there is evidence that this country, not just in the Senate, but in the polls, and the speeches, the statements of recognized and respectable people—they are not all peculiar people who are evidencing dissent in this matter—there is great confusion and much difference of opinion. But judging from recent speeches by responsible Members of this body, I particularly think it significant that some of the Republican Members are reflecting their own maturity of judgment, and also, presumably, that of their constituents. I think that is a very healthy thing. I think this is the proper role of the minority party in any government, to take that position, to refine the issues, and to contribute to a refinement of policy which I hope will be wiser than the one we are following.

I do not think even the Senator from Illinois is pleased with our present situation. It is a very disagreeable thing, even though he supports the present policy.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Before the Senator gets too far away from Ridgway and Gavin——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will yield for a question, but I do not wish to lose the floor.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I think we have got to keep our history straight here. The Senator drew upon history. Let me state my version.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All right.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is based upon having been in North Vietnam in 1953. I was at Hanoi. I saw our Navy planes, that we had given to the French, take off in the hope that they could save Dienbienphu, the last French stronghold, as the Senator knows.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. They did not save it. The French got licked.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Notwithstanding the fact that we poured 700 million American dollars into their effort.

Now, why were they there? They had been there; Indochina, as it was then known, was under French tutelage for more than 90 years.

They did not even train people to run the government. They were willing to train doctors only because of tropical diseases. They were there to conquer, not to preserve the freedom of a humble people. They were really there to subdue them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That may have been their motive.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Well, it was the case.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But I daresay they did not cause nearly the destruction, in the 90 years they were there, that we have caused in 2 years. I am sure they did not kill anything like as many people, nor disrupt the economy and the life of the people in Vietnam as much.

I do not mean that we have done this because of bad motives; we have done it through lack of wisdom, I will say.

But if I may come back to it, the question which I think is central, and which we are really interested in, is what policy really serves the interests of this country. Surely just what kind of government they may have in South Vietnam is not of such importance to us as to justify our risking 500,000 men. We have already suffered 15,000 deaths, and nearly 85,000 casualties. To compare that loss to our interest in the kind of government in a little country that has never before had a representative government, and say that we must give them precisely what we think they ought to have, does not make any sense to me.

It is the question of our security, I think, that is of central importance. Surely we could agree that all that we are doing is not worthwhile, simply to give this little country representative government, or a democratic government, if you like, in which they elect people in the same fashion we do in Chicago, or in Harlem, or in Arkansas. Whether it is necessary to the security of this country, seems to me to be the crucial point.

I cannot see that it is crucial to our security. On the contrary, when you consider the cost that we are now undergoing, and what we have already suffered—the Senator knows how much we are spending; it is now estimated at the rate of $30 billion a year. The casualty rate is twice as high this year as it was last year. We have already suffered, this year, more casualties than in all of last year. The rate is going up, and will continue to go up if the war is intensified, one would suppose.

Is it worth the cost? It seems to me that it could be only if this is a very strategic area, from the point of the security of this country. I cannot see that the proponents of the war have made a case, their argument does not appeal to me. I would be most interested, if anyone can make that point.

On the contrary, as I said yesterday, the Chinese first stated this thought, and I think it has some validity: If we were not there, they could not challenge the United States; they have no air force worthy of the name—the Chinese, I am speaking of now, not South Vietnam—that neither South Vietnam nor North Vietnam have anything that they could attack us with is self-evident. The Chinese have no air force, they have no navy worthy of the name; they have, we presume, a very primitive nuclear weapon, but no delivery system, as of now.

In addition to that, while we have apparently built up great fear and apprehension about it, there is nothing, really, in the record, in our hearings, or anywhere else that I have heard of, indicating any fervent desire on the part of the Chinese to attack us in the foreseeable future. That will depend, of course, a great deal upon the way we conduct ourselves, in regard to China.

But what we are doing is sending our men over there and having them slaughtered. We are spending our money, we are disrupting our economy, we are threatened with inflation, we are confronted with an enormous deficit; I do not know what is going to be done about the tax bill, but the news in the papers every day says it will have very hard sledding. If that does not come through, there will be a deficit of some $28 or $30 billion. That will cause further disruption here.

Then there is the division within our country, the lack of unity and cooperation among our citizens, in carrying out our policies domestic as well as foreign, which is a very serious thing for a great and powerful country of this kind. The alienation of the young people—you can laugh all you like at hippies, but it is not just hippies. I have been to a number of universities where there are no hippies, or at least there are very few. The most responsible and intelligent young people of this country do not support this war, by and large. They have given every evidence of it in practically every university in the country.

Not that that in itself is decisive, but it is indicative of a lack of justification for this war. It has not been made a self-evident fact of life that it is in our interest to pursue this war.

There was no question of this sort in the Second World War. There was very little question in Korea. There was certainly none in the First World War. Why is it that there is such a great question now? Could it not be possible that the feeling of those who oppose this war could have some validity? Might that not be indicated by the fact that it is shared by so many people in this country?

All of us are elected here. I do not think that my fellow Senators who have expressed their opposition to the continuation of this particular war—and I say "this particular war" because it is not like any of the other wars which have been mentioned—completely ignore the views of their constituents.

To make it out that Ho Chi Minh is like Hitler is nonsense. He has none of of the characteristics. His country has none of the power, or characteristics of power, that Germany had, and so on. That kind of an analogy makes no sense whatever to me. We have to judge it on the facts of this case; and it seems very strange to me that so many people in this country, of all types and characters, dissent from the pursuit of this particular war and the fashion in which we are pursuing it. I think it is something to give the Senate pause, and I believe that we should all participate, as are the Senator from Illinois, and his colleagues on his side of the aisle, and those of us on this side of the aisle, in discussing this problem.

I think the Senator has rendered a great service in opening up the subject. he always attracts attention to these problems, much more than any other Senator can, because of his own very special talents, which we all appreciate. But I think it is a very fine thing to discuss it, if we can arrive—and I hope we can—at an agreement about where the real interests, the vital security interests of this country lie, and what pursuits, what policies, would best promote them. If we could arrive at such an agreement, it would be the greatest favor we could render, not only to the President, but to this country.

The suggestions about using the United Nations, it seems to me, are entirely appropriate. We helped to create that body. We have been its principal sponsor. I do not think the suggestions that have been made should be dismissed because, in the past, the United Nations has not been able to solve all these problems. I think it should be given a real try. And I do not think we have yet given it a real try, partly because of the feeling that it is futile. Under the serious conditions that now exist, I do not believe that we should refrain from doing anything possible, and I do not think we have, to obtain the agreement of the Security Council to put this matter on the agenda and have it discussed, and hopefully to have some resolution of it, with the assistance of the members of the Security Council.

I can only say that I hope all Senators will do as have the Senator from Illinois, the Senator from California, and others, in talking about this matter and seeking to resolve it.

All the other matters that we have before us seem to be connected with Vietnam—the foreign aid program has been affected by it, and almost all the other matters that have come before my committee. This morning we had a meeting on the Asian Development Bank. All of the consideration comes around to the question of what is going to happen to Vietnam. Unless we can resolve this, it is like a cancer eating into all our other policies. I think everybody knows that it is affecting our budget. It affects the tax bill. All of these matters relate to Vietnam.

If the Members of the Senate cannot discuss it and hopefully come to some agreement upon it by a clear majority, the country is going to be more and more divided. We are going to get in deeper and deeper trouble.

I do not know what the answer is. We have to make some agreement on it, it seems to me. It is an intolerable situation for the most powerful country in the world with all its vast resources at its disposal to be in this position, apparently not able to make up its mind. Its mind is not made up. Even though the President has control, he cannot carry on indefinitely without the real support of the country. I think we can agree to that.

Difficulties will arise in other fields. Difficulties have already arisen in other fields. They are not directly affected, but are indirectly affected by Vietnam.

So, I could not overexaggerate the importance of the Senate continuing the discussion and coming to some resolution. I do not quite see how we can come to a resolution, but we ought to be able to come to a resolution and a high degree of agreement as to where our interests are.

Is it in the interest of this country to pursue the war indefinitely with the escalating cost of money and lives? Is it in the interest of this country to bring the war to a close by some kind of compromise?

I do not think that approach has been explored as it should be, certainly through the U.N.

I commend the Senator for at least bringing up the question for proper discussion.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, certain it is that any war develops stresses, spiritual, moral, and emotional, that very often impel many people to take a given course of action. Even in the War Between the States it was so.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was the trouble.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The party of Lincoln, when it came time to hold a convention, decided that there would be a rump convention and that they would not nominate the Commander in Chief.

The person who then corresponded to the Republican national chairman today besought Lincoln with every talent he had to try to do something to get the soldiers back before the November election and to get this thing over and to receive some negotiators from the South.

I think history will bear this out, that Lincoln met aboard ship two of them that had been brought through the lines.

Lincoln listened very carefully and then he took a piece of paper. At the top he wrote:

No. 1. The Union must be preserved.
No. 2. Slavery must be abolished.

He then said:

Gentlemen, you fill in the rest of it, the disposition of the horses, the military material, the feed stocks, all of that. You write that in there, but just leave No. 1 and No. 2 at the top, and I will sign it.

You see, we are up against a decision of some kind. No. 1. Do we quit? Do we retreat? Do we go ahead to a victory? Do we deescalate? And if we do, I think that we throw away whatever leverage we have?

What is the answer? I am content to go along in the interest of our troops with that position that does not forfeit our leverage in the hope that there can be negotiation and put it on thicker and thicker if necessary.

I learned long ago that it is the hit dog that yelps. They are being hit. They are being hurt, and they are beginning to yelp.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What does the Senator have in mind as the final outcome in this area? What does he want to achieve in Vietnam? Does he want a colony?

I wonder what the Senator has in mind that we wish to have there in the foreseeable future.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Do we have any commitment under the Southeast Asian Treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not to do what we are doing.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think so.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What are the commitments? It is a protocol state.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They are to cooperate with the other members of the Southeast Asian Treaty as to what course we should take. There was no guarantee that we were to come to their aid in South Vietnam.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No commitment as to self-determination?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I think you had better reexamine that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have reexamined it. That is the opinion of a number of experts who appeared before our com-

mittee. I may say that the Secretary of State never used that as an excuse until about a year and a half ago. They gave other reasons.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Maybe there was not an occasion for it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was only involved in a minor way until we began to escalate the number of troops.

I wonder what the Senator has in mind. Does he think the United States security requires us to have a permanent presence in Southeast Asia or South Vietnam?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I said nothing about a permanent presence. I mentioned, and I presume the Senator was present, that I probably have a different military concept in that we have an outside perimeter than runs from Korea to Vietnam. If that is there, what about the rest of Southeast Asia? And we will have to include Australia, New Zealand, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They are all part of it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I then understand that the Senator believes a permanent base there is necessary for our security?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No. I think that after stability is restored at long last, they can set up their own military requirements in order to meet this threat.

Perhaps the Senator does not share my conviction that this is a Red threat. This is a Communist threat that proposes to liquidate freedom in South Vietnam.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish the Senator would explore that a little further.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Does it need any explanation?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it does. By way of background, a moment ago it was stated that this area of Indochina was a colony of France. France took it about 1870 or thereabouts, and they held it until they were forced out in 1954. And the leader then was Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the nationalist forces which really defeated the French.

Mr. DIRKSEN. You stated why the French troops were there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was a colony of France. That is why they were there. It was a colony, and they were trying to maintain it as a possession which they exploited for its national wealth.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It was colonialism at its very worst.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know that it was different from all the other French possessions. They exploited it as they always have and as most colonial powers do.

What I am coming to is what do we have in mind? The Senator says that we do not have in mind maintaining a permanent presence there, and that it will not be a colony.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I do not think there is any doubt. This is a Communist threat. I do not want to see that line broken so that all of the rest of Southeast Asia is exposed, because if it is, then the whole Pacific coastline of this country will be exposed.

If that does not involve security, then I have no understanding of the word.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is making a real contribution. At least, we understand each other. If I understand the Senator, he thinks we should have a permanent presence there.

This, of course, leads to different conclusions. I do not wish to misspeak myself or misinterpret the Senator's words. If that is true—and I gather from what the Senator said that it is—then certainly my theory is quite wrong. I mean, I do not agree with that view at all. I do not believe that would promote the security of this country. I believe that the security of this country would be better promoted, rather than establishing a colony there in place of the French, to have Vietnam a strong, independent country. I think we made a great mistake in intervening there.

I believe the analogy of Yugoslavia is a very sound one. Vietnam would have been a Communist country, but an independent country; because they have had a thousand years of history, fighting the Chinese, to avoid becoming a satellite; and they succeeded in that up until the French took them.

This is an important difference. The President has never said that. I do not know whether the Senator means to say that or not, but I gather that he did say that. Am I correct?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I said it; yes, I did.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. You did?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes. And yesterday you said our security is not involved at all. It depends on whether or not you take a global view of security. If you do not, the chances are that you are right. I take a different view, because we have conquered time, space, and distance to the point where this is a pretty small world.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with that, and that is the reason why I think what I consider an obsolete concept of colonial bases is no longer adequate for security in this kind of world. I think we have to find new ways, particularly ways of working with countries such as Russia, rather than competing with them for bases in outposts such as South Vietnam. I think this is bound to bring a clash, bound to bring a nuclear exchange, which will not be in the interest of this country or any other country.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Of course, that is a speculation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What is a speculation?

Mr. DIRKSEN. What you just said. It is a speculation into the future, as to whether there will be a nuclear clash.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. You mean if we do not find a way to get along with Russia, it is speculation that there will be a clash?

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is still a speculation in proportion, as I have seen these figures put on a blackboard in a good many places, as to how many people will be killed if they unleash nuclear exchanges, and whose people will be killed in greater numbers, and they run up into the millions. I cannot believe that mankind has so sloughed off its compassion and its commonsense as to get into that kind of a hole—yet.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think they do it deliberately.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Oh, no.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have rarely got into wars deliberately. You blunder into these wars. And what we are doing in assuming the mantle of the British Empire, and in beginning to accumulate bases such as Vietnam, is to expose us to the same kind of troubles the British had, to a gradual erosion of our power and of our influence. We have already, I think, lost the sympathy of Western Europe in this policy—not because they do not have great respect for this country as such, as a great country, but they question our judgment in pursuing this war, which they believe is undermining the strength of this country.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I cannot believe that mankind will blunder into this sort of thing. We did not blunder into it in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. That was done after the most prayerful deliberation. And when it was done, they picked up the pieces, assessed the damage, saw how many people were killed, and how by nuclear weapons you can convert a cool, placid river into a boiling stream. That is not lost on the leaders anywhere in the world, and I cannot imagine that they are going to blunder into that sort of thing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, of course, I wish I had the same faith the Senator has, even though we continue the policies we have now that apparently inspire his allegiance to this policy in Southeast Asia, which is to fight off this Red menace, that he at the same time thinks they are going to be so reasonable that they will never engage in a nuclear war. I think you are trying to have it both ways. If they are as dangerous a menace as you would lead us to believe because of Vietnam, then, surely, we could have no assurance that they would not use nuclear weapons.

Mr. DIRKSEN. They know that nobody ever won an earthquake, and they are not going to blunder into this.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not see why the Senator thinks that they are behind Vietnam and that this is a step intended to attack us.

Mr. DIRKSEN. They are certainly behind North Vietnam. Have you any doubt about Soviet weapons over there?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh, no. But they are helping an ally, in the same way we have helped allies. That does not mean the Soviets are intending to use South Vietnam or North Vietnam as a stepping-stone to attack us.

Mr. DIRKSEN. We are not over there to conquer anybody.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why not? You just said we are going to have a base there.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not say we are going to have a base there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was trying to develop what the Senator did say.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I certainly did not. We are over there to help South Vietnam preserve their Republic, their freedom, their self-determination, and, over and above everything else, freedom from aggression.

Now, why is the Soviet Union helping North Vietnam? For freedom's reasons? No. To conquer South Vietnam. That is

the difference. It is certainly a sharp difference in principle.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, of course, I need not tell you about this idea of aggression—the other side believes we are the aggressor. We have intervened in a civil war, a war between Vietnamese. The Senator does not deny that. These are all basically Vietnamese.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Basically, yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. And we do not live there, and it is a foreign country, and we intervened.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What would have been the situation if the Chinese had sent a hundred thousand men over here during our Civil War?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I am glad I do not have to speculate on that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a civil war; and the assumption that everybody believes that this is an outright aggression by one national state or another is open to question; is it not?

Mr. DIRKSEN. It seems to me that from the very days of Ngo Dinh Diem—and I had many meetings with him when I was there—they were just trying to set up a republic to suit themselves. They were content to leave their neighbors to the north alone. That did not satisfy Ho Chi Minh—not on your life. He was going to bring all of what was ancient Indochina into the fold, no matter what it cost. That was the conflict.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All we tried to do in the South, since the Senator referred to the Lincoln principle, was to set up our own government, if the North would leave us alone, but the North would not do that.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The North did not try to conquer the South. We had a Constitution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But we did set up a Confederacy, yet the North insisted on conquering us anyhow.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, we did not; we took exception to Calhoun's Doctrine of Nullification and said that the South just could not walk out.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what Ho Chi Minh said to Diem.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Ho Chi Minh had nothing to say.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. He thought he should have.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That is a different thing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Just as Lincoln thought he should have.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, Lincoln did not. Lincoln was guided by the Constitution that applied to the Senator's State as well as it applied to his own State. The South walked out on it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Before I sit down, I should like to have a clarification. I understood the Senator to say that we needed a base; that we intended South Vietnam to be a permanent base for the United States.

Mr. DIRKSEN. If I said that, I would have opened up the whole subject of colonialism, which is as alien as anything I know of to our concept of government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not want to prolong the discussion, but I should like to clarify the question. What does the Senator say is the objective of our war in Vietnam? What is it that we wish to achieve that is worthy of what we are doing?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I mentioned security. Obviously, it would take a long military lecture of global dimensions to persuade my friend from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; I mean what concrete effect would result in Vietnam?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Did I not recite the right of those people to decide their destiny for themselves, particularly their political destiny?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Are we going to leave Vietnam?

Mr. DIRKSEN. We undertook to fulfill a commitment under the SEATO Treaty, while we did not ask for much in Geneva in 1954, I think we came away from there somewhat with the idea that if they had to have help and asked us for it, we would help. What happened?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did not Diem ask us for help? We put him in office; he was "our boy."

Mr. DIRKSEN. We did not put him in; the people of South Vietnam put him there. Diem went around the countryside, talking to South Vietnamese farmers, rice farmers, and everyone else. He was a very popular person. I listened to him when he was on the platform at the time. We did not put him in; he put himself in.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator mean to say that Diem was elected in a free election?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No; I mean that he undertook, by going around the country, to get the trust and confidence of the people there. Then, too, of course, there had to be a leader to take over somewhere along the line. Who was a more natural leader than Ngo Dinh Diem? But we did not put him in.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The fact is that he created such a dictatorship that we had to come to his aid and support him all the time.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I am sorry to say that that case has been badly exaggerated.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is a very grave difference of opinion as to the historical fact.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But it is clear that the Senator does not wish us to incorporate this as a colony or a military base. He said that. And he does not wish us to be there permanently.

Mr. DIRKSEN. How often must I say that we do not go in for colonialization at all? As for setting up a base there, if I know the meaning of the word——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There are people who say we have set up bases there.

Mr. DIRKSEN. You say there are people. I have not heard them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has not heard them?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, sir.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it is very important to clarify what our purposes are in Vietnam. I would put it this way to see if it comes closer to the Senator's thought. The Senator says that we guarantee the right of self-determination, that they had an election, and that it was a good election. Why if that is so do we not leave or turn it over to them?

Mr. DIRKSEN. You have an enemy up there and you have to make sure——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That means we stay.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What does the Senator want to do? You have not heard me quarreling with what we have done. You have been quarreling for the last year about the conduct of the war.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What does the Senator want to do?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have said it.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Tell the Senate. Does the Senator want to quit now and pull out?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What I would like to see happen—whether it will happen this way I do not know—is a reconvening of the Geneva conference, and our agreeing to abide by the result. We did not agree the last time at the last minute. We refused to agree.

Mr. DIRKSEN. We were not even a signatory.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Nobody was. There was agreement to it, and we refused to agree. We can neither claim rights under it nor claim other people's rights under it. The Senator is correct. We were not a signatory.

I would like to see a return to the principles of the Geneva conference. The President himself, at about the time of his speech at Johns Hopkins, said that was a proper basis. The North Vietnamese, have said that was a proper basis. I would like to see that, and a negotiation under the cochairmanship of Great Britain and Russia; and that they come to an agreement as to a way to have elections, full and free elections, throughout South Vietnam to create their government; and we would come home.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Has the Senator heard Ho Chi Minh ask for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; but I have not heard us either. This is what I would like to see happen.

Mr. DIRKSEN. He is the guy taking the pasting. He is the guy being pushed around.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; and so are we.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Why not ask, and see what the reaction is?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The reason is that he feels he has been unjustly attacked. I regret very much that he has not responded to these offers we have made. I think he is wrong for his benefit and for our benefit. Do not misunderstand me. What does Ho Chi Minh have at stake? A little God-forsaken country of 15 million or 16 million people.

We are threatening the security of the strongest country in the world, on which other countries depend economically, politically, and morally. This is a great undertaking and a great risk.

The Senator's expression of a moment ago reassured me when he said he was not a Senator to liquidate the holy fabric of freedom. Neither am I, but I think the course we are following will do it in the bitter end. We are expending this for what? Suppose we take all of Vietnam. Is it worth it? The price we are paying for this is all out of proportion to anything we can gain. We cannot do all of this. At least 15 or 30 million peo-

ple have an election. That is not the kind of objective to justify this.

There is surely something more that the Senator has in mind. I was trying to develop it. Is it to have a permanent base? The Senator said "No."

Mr. DIRKSEN. No.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has not mentioned anything yet to make me believe that this is worth what we are doing. That is about the sum and substance of it.

Therefore, I think we should return to the Geneva Conference and liquidate this war on the same basis the parties really involved, which were the French and the Vietnamese, agreed to in 1954, which we had a major part in disrupting and preventing from being carried out.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I see no reason for continuing this. I tried to emphasize my concept of our security line from Saigon and Vietnam to Korea. I still believe in the general field of global strategy that is our defense line, and if we lose it by having the flank turned, that means the line is shortened and the Pacific will no longer be a real defense to our country. As for freedom, it is an indivisible as well as a holy fabric. When it is impaired in one place, that impairment continues.

What about the people in our country like those associated with the Center for Democratic Institutions, who, for instance, belabor the line "Justice for all, freedom for none." They would liquidate freedom.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator mentions freedom. What does the Senator say about Greece? Here is one of our old allies, and suddenly freedom is snuffed out, like that.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No; it is not.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, it is. I read just recently in the newspaper that a former minister there made a statement critical of the government and the next day they arrested him. One woman refused to print a newspaper under censorship and they threatened her with arrest. There are 50 members of the Parliament who are still in jail.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is only within the last 2 weeks that the newly elected Supreme, they call him, of the American Hellenic Organization, which is referred to as AHEPA, Mr. Andrew Fasseas of Chicago, who is president of the national association, has returned from Greece. He has been in my office. If ever there was a devotee of freedom he is. I have not heard him say yet they have been deluded of their freedom.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator think there is a free government in Greece?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes, I do. Just because they have a military junta for a specific purpose for a little while to shove back the Communist influence——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Communist influence?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Surely, and it has been trying to move into Greece.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is the Senator saying that the previous government was a Communist government?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not say anything about the previous government. You can have a new government move in without there being a Communist government. We have Communists in this country, do we not?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a minor affair.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It may not be as minor as the Senator thinks. I am having trouble trying to take the bill off the Calendar to reenergize the Subversive Activities Control Board, only to be met with resistance in this Chamber, and probably more when the authorization for State, Justice, and Commerce comes here, when every veterans organization in the country is for it, so that the Board can go through. Yet, the Assistant Attorney General went before the committee and said there are 100 cases over at the Department of Justice that should be submitted to the Control Board. It is not a government. The influence, however, is here. Perhaps the Senator does not——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a minor one, I think. It is here. If we continue to follow policies as misguided as the present one, it will grow. I have not heard J. Edgar Hoover say recently that he was as much disturbed about it as he was 20 years ago.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Once upon a time it was minor. It was minor in Albania, Rumania, and Poland. But it is not minor any more. It has swallowed up all those countries.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator think the Communists are threatening this country?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I say that communism is threatening the world. If it is not, then why this imbroglio in Vietnam?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is a pertinent question. I was under the impression that since the death of Stalin, the drive of that branch—not the Chinese—was receding. It certainly has become less aggressive.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Did the Senator get that idea from Kosygin's visit?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The strength of these parties, for example, in Western Europe, is not so powerful now as it used to be. In France and Italy it is still a major party. In France and Italy, about 25 percent of the electorate is Communist, although both countries have been making substantial economic and political progress.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What were the gains reported in the press made by the Communists in France?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Where?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I saw a little subhead on it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In what country?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I thought it was in France. I will look it up.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not even know they had an election in France.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It was a local election.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I saw a report on the elections in Bremen, Germany, where the right wing gained a little there. I saw that in this morning's paper. But I did not realize that communism is on the march, so to speak, nearly so much now as it was under Stalin.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It has never been off the march.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As a relative matter, it is not so aggressive as it used to be. We have made considerable progress in various ways in adjusting to the Russians. The Senator himself, I believe, finally relented and supported the Consular Treaty this year. To me, that is just an indication. Not that the treaty is significant in itself, but it is an indication.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Would the Senator like to tell the rest of the story about the Consular Treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was mentioning only that it was approved by the Senate. The press said—and I do not want to misquote without checking—that the Senator from Illinois did not positively oppose it. I think the Senator was right. Do not misunderstand me, I thought this was a sign of a degree of relaxation of the kind of fear and apprehension that afflicted us at the height of the Stalin era. I think we were quite justified in being apprehensive because Stalin was a very determined and resourceful man. But I think, since then, there has been a lessening of pressure, a relaxation of that conflict, that they are moving themselves internally more toward a different and more relaxed system.

Mr. DIRKSEN. All that has exactly nothing to do with it. I am sure that we can imagine the man who sat in my office——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. And brought us all that information which I could not even discuss.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is quite correct. I did not mean to criticize him. I merely meant to say I thought this was a sign that he accepted a change or an evolution taking place in the Communist world. I think in the Kremlin and in Eastern Europe there are signs of it. China is in a class by itself.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It was not a sign at all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was not?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Just coming to grips with naked reality.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the following bills of the Senate:

S. 117. An act for the relief of Martha Blakenship; and

S. 534. An act for the relief of Setsuko Wilson (nee Hiranaka).

The message also announced that the House insisted upon its amendments to the bill (S. 1160) to amend the Communications Act of 1934 by extending and improving the provisions thereof relating to grants for construction of educational television broadcasting facilities, by authorizing assistance in the construction of noncommercial educational radio broadcasting facilities, by establishing a nonprofit corporation to assist in establishing innovative educational programs, to facilitate educational program availability, and to aid the operation of educational broadcasting facilities; and to authorize a comprehensive study of instructional television and radio; and for other purposes, disagreed to by the Senate; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. MACDONALD of

Massachusetts, Mr. KORNEGAY, Mr. SPRINGER, and Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had passed the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 853) making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1968, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

S. 1564. An act to amend the marketing quota provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended; and

S. 2162. An act to amend the Act of January 17, 1936 (49 Stat. 1094), reserving certain public domain lands in Nevada and Oregon as a grazing reserve for Indians of Fort McDermitt, Nev.

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 853) making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1968, and for other purposes was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

AMERICAN LEGION RESOLUTION ON THE PANAMA CANAL

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the American Legion has long had a history of careful and knowledgeable interest in the foreign relations of the United States. The Legion has never hesitated to come out foursquare on issues in which they believe. But at the same time, they have not done so without the most careful study and analysis of the situation.

The 49th annual convention of the American Legion has passed a series of important resolutions on foreign policy. I have the honor of being foreign relations chairman of the American Legion of South Carolina. It will be my pleasure, therefore, from time to time, to call attention of the Senate to some of these carefully prepared resolutions.

For example, Resolution No. 356 concerns the Panama Canal, a subject which is under active discussion in this Congress. I would like to point out that the Legion once more reiterates its previous positions. It reaffirms support of the existing treaties and opposes any dilution of U.S. rights in the Canal Zone.

I ask unanimous consent that the resolution of the 49th national convention of the American Legion on the Panama Canal be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. 356

Whereas, The American Legion has repeatedly insisted that the Government of the United States must retain sole and complete authority over the administration, operation, maintenance, and protection of the Panama Canal as provided for in the 1903 Treaty; and

Whereas, the course of U.S.-Panamanian relations has demonstrated that any concessions made on our part in regard to our rights in the Canal Zone have only led to increased demands by the Panamanians; and

Whereas, the most recent series of negotiations concerning the existing canal and a possible new canal has resulted in three proposed treaties which reportedly, if ratified, would—

(a) abrogate the 1903 Treaty,

(b) substitute a weak and perhaps inefficient form of administration over the present canal,

(c) compromise and probably render impossible our ability to defend the canal in times of crisis (or even to guarantee its security in normal periods),

(d) abandon both our capital investment and its earnings,

(e) give the canal to the Republic of Panama, completely, and unequivocally, on or before the last day of 1999 (just 32 years from now),

(f) provide that the United States—under very limited circumstances but at great cost to this country—might construct a second canal across the Isthmus of Panama, the ownership of which would revert to Panama—at no cost to that country—60 years after its opening, or the year 2067, whichever is earlier; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, by the American Legion in National Convention assembled in Boston, Massachusetts, August 29, 30, 31, 1967, That The American Legion:

(1) reaffirms its support of the basic and still existing provisions of the 1903 Canal Treaty, and of the continued indispensable sovereign control by the United States over the Canal Zone;

(2) opposes ratification of the proposed treaties in their present form;

(3) opposes any change in U.S. rights in the Canal Zone; and

(4) reiterates its stand taken at previous National Conventions concerning these matters.

(By unanimous consent the following routine business was transacted:)

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Jones, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session,

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The PRESIDING OFFICER announced that on today, October 3, 1967, the Vice President signed the following enrolled bill and joint resolution, which had previously been signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives:

S. 602. An act to revise and extend the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, and to amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965; and

S.J. Res. 109. Joint resolution to authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation commemorating the 50 years of service to the Nation by the Langley Research Center.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

AMENDMENT OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

A letter from the Under Secretary of the Air Force, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend title 10, United States Code, to increase the number of congressional alternates authorized to be nominated for each vacancy at the Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Armed Services.

AMENDMENT OF MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1966

A letter from the Director, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966, as amended, to extend the period of time within which the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources is to submit its final report and to provide for a fixed expiration date for the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Commerce.

ROZA DIVISION, YAKIMA PROJECT, WASHINGTON

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting pursuant to law, a draft of contract relating to proposed drainage and minor construction work which, together with previously executed contract, will exceed a total cost of $200,000 on the Roza Division of the Yakima project, Washington; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

ADMISSION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN DEFECTOR ALIENS

A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of orders entered granting admission into the United States of certain defector aliens (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

Two letters from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of orders suspending deportation of certain aliens, together with a statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law pertaining to each alien, and the reasons for ordering such suspension (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

THIRD-PREFERENCE AND SIXTH-PREFERENCE CLASSIFICATION FOR CERTAIN ALIENS

A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, reports on third-preference and sixth-preference classification for certain aliens (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDING OFFICER:

A resolution adopted by the Board of Supervisors of the County of San Diego, California, favoring the enactment of some form of a Federal tax-sharing program; to the Committee on Finance.

in Helena that the Anaconda people will be represented by a similar group.

MEETING WITH SENATORS MANSFIELD AND METCALF AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA OF DEFENSE, SECRETARY WIRTZ OF LABOR AND WALTER A. HAMILTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, OCTOBER 9, 1967

We met with Secretaries McNamara of Defense, Wirtz of Labor, and Mr. Walter A. Hamilton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce, representing Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge.

As we are all aware, the Federal Mediation Conciliation Service has been enmeshed in the copper strike since its beginning and is doing the best it can to bring the parties together. I think we can state that the Secretaries have been most interested in this situation since its inception but that they feel that there is nothing that the government can do at this time; that this is a matter which should be settled through the process of free collective bargaining between the union and management; and they are hopeful that this will be done. They were not at all interested about invoking Taft-Hartley or releasing copper from the stockpile. It is indeterminate at this time how much copper is on hand in the normal reserve but there are no indications of a shortage in supply at the moment even though the situation may be becoming somewhat crimped. We feel that the unofficial board of Secretaries with which we met would like to be helpful but they feel as we do, that the government cannot step in unless it is mandatory for the national security which, they indicated, is not the case at this time and they are adverse to recommending Taft-Hartley because it would make a bad situation that much worse and possibly bring about a resumption of the strike into the middle of winter.

The meeting with the three Secretaries was the result of a letter that we sent to the President on Tuesday, October 3. His answer was to set up this meeting and it is our intention to keep in touch with the Secretaries on this matter as well as with the unions and also with some of the Anaconda people in the not too distant future. The three Secretaries will continue to function as group in this matter.

MEETING WITH CHARLES BRINCKERHOFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE ANACONDA CO., OCTOBER 11, 1967

We have just concluded three meetings: First, with Messrs. Joseph Molony and Al Skinner at their request on Friday, October 6; second, with Secretaries McNamara, Wirtz and Walter A. Hamilton, representing Secretary Trowbridge of Commerce, at the President's suggestion, on Monday, October 9; and, third, with Mr. Charles Brinckerhoff, Chairman of the Board of the Anaconda Company on Wednesday, October 11. Mr. Brinckerhoff was in Washington to attend another meeting.

All parties indicated a real interest in trying to get down to negotiations to the end that the copper strike could be brought to a conclusion.

Speaking for myself, I was pleased that Governor Babcock called a meeting of the unions and the Anaconda officials in Butte on October 10, and I am happy to note that the unions and the Anaconda officials will meet in Butte on Tuesday, October 17. It would be my hope that this meeting would be my hope that this meeting would be the kickoff to serious negotiations between Anaconda and the unions and that it would not be just for the purpose of getting together and just indicating that both sides were willing to sit down. If it could be arranged that after this first meeting, further meetings could be held, not in a week or so, but on a day-to-day basis between the two parties with the Mediation and Conciliation Service representative acting as a go-between between the two, it might be possible then to get down to hard bargaining.

It is my belief that three months have been wasted up to this time and that has meant a tremendous decline in income for the people out of work as well as for the State of Montana. It is my further belief that the government does not intend to invoke Taft-Hartley. As the Secretaries indicated to me, there was no national security involved nor does it intend to release any copper from the stockpiles. Therefore, the responsibility rests on the shoulders of the unions and the Company to get together and the only way that could be done, in my opinion, in a continual meeting on a give and take basis on the part of all concerned, and it would be my further hope that if this were done, the present impasse might be broken and perhaps grounds for agreement could be arrived at.

The government will not, in my opinion, intervene in any way at this time. Therefore, with winter coming on, with incomes declining considerably, with needs becoming more apparent, it is necessary that in good faith, all parties concerned get to the table, stay there, and continue neogtiations to the end that an agreement can be arrived at.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an observation, with the consent of the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I wish to commend the distinguished majority leader for the very forceful manner in which he presented this very vexatious problem.

My State of Nevada likewise is involved with two of the major copper companies. The hardships that are already apparent to the workers who are out of work and have been out of work for some 2 or 3 months are becoming increasingly critical. In the eastern part of my State, where one of the copper companies is located, many of the workers have left to seek employment elsewhere because of the lack of employment.

I commend the majority leader for his forthright statement. It seems to me that until the day comes when both labor and management sit around the conference table day after day and around the clock, as the majority leader suggested, we are not going to break the impasse.

With winter just around the corner in both the great State of Montana and my State, and particularly in areas where copper companies operate, it is high time that management and labor and their spokesmen worked extra long hours in free collective bargaining to resolve this problem. We cannot permit this impasse to continue.

I congratulate the majority leader for his statement earlier in the session, shortly after the strike began. The Senator from Utah [Mr. MOSS], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTOYA], and I joined in a letter to the President, just as the Senator from Montana did at a later date, asking that a factfinding group be appointed to inquire into the issues involved.

I think that the majority leader has performed a great service in this respect in at least a promise that starting tomorrow morning they will get together to discuss this matter. I commend the Senator for his statement.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Nevada for his kind remarks.

As the Senator knows, on Friday or Saturday last, an agreement was reached between the steelworkers and the Pima Copper Mining Co., in Arizona. While that company employs only about 650 people, it was, nevertheless, a settlement. The amount arrived at, I think, was 75 cents, which covers hourly increases, fringe benefits, increased pensions, and the like.

I would think there is a meeting ground somewhere between the 50-odd cents which Kennecott in Utah said it was prepared to offer, and the less than $1 the union said it is prepared to negotiate on. To me there seems to be a degree of flexibility on each side; the parties are not so far apart as to preclude a settlement at an early date. With the proper effort by all of us, this strike can be settled. More than 3 months is too long a time. The strike has already had too harsh an effect on the economy of the people of our States and the States themselves.

I thank the Senator from Minnesota for yielding.

(At this point, Mr. INOUYE assumed the chair.)

STATEMENTS OF DEAN RUSK ON VIETNAM ANALYZED

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, on Monday, October 12 the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, opened his press conference with a statement which has been marked by editors and commentators as significant. They are not altogether in agreement as to what constitutes the significance, but generally it has been labeled as bold and clarifying. I do not see it as being any more bold than previous statements made by the Secretary nor any clearer since the style and language are those of the Secretary, unless the clarification is in the more simplified and restricted statement of our purpose and objectives in Vietnam. The Secretary did not speak of bringing the good life or the great society to Southeast Asia as a purpose of the war or of honoring the pledges of four Presidents, nor did he suggest that we cannot improve life in our own cities unless we make improvements in Vietnam. He said that we are in Vietnam in our own national interest and to honor of commitment.

Our commitment is clear and our national interest is real—

He said. I do not intend to reopen the question as to whether or not our commitment is clear since this point has been subject to serious debate and challenge for nearly a year and a half.

The Tonkin Gulf resolution in 1964 gave the President no power which he did not already have nor was it in any way an open-ended license for expansion and intensification of the war free from congressional restraint or criticism.

The President, in a recent press conference, indicated the purpose of that resolution. He said the purpose was to

keep Congress in place and hold us committed in case there was a change in policy in Southeast Asia.

Our commitment under the SEATO Treaty signed in 1954 was a limited one, imposing a limited obligation upon us, an obligation which was contingent at least in part on the concurrent response of the other major nations in the treaty organizations. There is little to be gained from arguing these quasi-legal points. Any worthwhile debate must deal with the realities of Southeast Asia. The debate on Vietnam is not a matter of variations on a theme although the Secretary evidently wants to have it considered within those limits. It is a debate upon the theme itself and beyond that on the nature of the music which the State Department is playing.

Let me consider first the positive statements made by the Secretary. He said there is "no significant body of American opinion which would have us withdraw from Vietnam" and "no serious opinion among us which wishes to transform this struggle into a general war." I do not know whether this is an accurate statement or not, but in any case it is irrelevant since the debate on our policy in Vietnam falls betwen these two extremes.

Early in his remarks the Secretary speaks of the fate which Asian communism has planned for Southeast Asia. Asian communism, for that matter world communism, undoubtedly has a fate fate planned for Southeast Asia and for all the world, but the fact that it has such plans does not necessarily mean that they are possible of realization or that we have to respond to every action as though the total plan were in operation and likely to be realized.

On the record, the Secretary has not shown himself to be the most accurate judge of Chinese intentions or potential or of the other forces running within the world. I quote from his May 18, 1951, speech before the China Institute in New York: he describes "greedy hands" of Russia stretching out to dismember China.

He said:

> China is being sacrificed to the ambitions of the communist conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign masters into an adventure of foreign aggression . . . (Korea); the Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

He said of the Nationalist Chinese government:

> We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historical demand for independence from foreign control.

The debate on Vietnam is not, as the Secretary states, essentially over procedures for carrying out policies on which the Nation is united. This is a debate on matters of great substance over which the Nation is indeed deeply divided and concerned. The Secretary may speak as solemnly as he can—and he can speak solemnly—but the Members of Congress and the people of the country must continue to ask and seek answers to the question, "What is America's proper role in the world and what is the bearing of the policy in Vietnam on the fulfillment of that role?" We cannot permit the Secretary to dismiss, even solemnly, the United Nations and the recommendations of Members of the Senate including the majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, with the easy remark:

> There are some problems about going through an exercise of futility . . . to satisfy some critics among our own people.

Members of the Senate have a clear constitutional responsibility, which becomes personal because of their position, to be concerned over foreign policy, a responsibility which in the case of the Secretary of State exists only by delegation or proxy. As a matter of fact much of what has been done or what is being done in Vietnam may be a costly exercise in futility—that the bombing of North Vietnam for example, if we are to accept the recent testimony of the Secretary of Defense regarding the failure of that bombing to reduce significantly the supply of arms and men to the South, may be such an exercise; that the much publicized program of pacification, more recently labeled "revolutionary development," which is essentially an attempt to graft onto Asian society Western values and institutions and practices, may also be an exercise in futility.

The one rather clear conclusion from his remarks is that in his mind, the United States must establish and maintain an anti-Communist bastion in South Vietnam and that this is essential as a part of the overall strategy of containing China through encirclement and that all of this bears quite directly on our national interest, if not our survival. This is a continuing application of the strategic theory of John Foster Dulles and reflects in action the ancient fear of the yellow peril presented to us now in a new image of the Secretary of State in his words:

> Within the next decade or two there will be a billion Chinese on the Mainland, armed with nuclear weapons, with no certainty about what their attitude toward the rest of Asia will be.

If this is the specter that is haunting Asia, it is difficult to see how we will rid Asia of it even though we achieve an unpredictable and total victory in South Vietnam.

I fail to see the relationship between the 1 billion and nuclear weapons. We have in this country 200 million people, very nearly, but only one of them has control over nuclear weapons.

The Secretary seems to accept the Chinese Communists belief that their doctrine of world revolution is applicable to the entire underdeveloped world. It must be encouraging to the Chinese propagandists to see this basic tenet of their political philosophy accepted and endorsed by the American Secretary of State.

I think, Mr. President, that we must ask ourselves: What is the real measure of the Chinese threat? What does it show on the record? There may be every reason to believe that the leaders in Peking are firmly convinced that their revolution will serve as a model for the developing world and for the eventual defeat of the industrial "cities" by the countryside of the "people," in reality, the Chinese experience has, with one significant exception, almost no relevance outside China. In no other country or part of the world do precisely the same conditions exist under which the Chinese Communists achieved power. Mao was able to gain control of China because he gained leadership of the Chinese nationalist movement, consolidating, and leading it against a foreign invader in World War II. Only in Vietnam has this feat been duplicated. Ho Chi Minh is the only Communist leader in the underdeveloped world who was able to gain control of his country's nationalist movement at the time of resistance to a foreign invasion.

Throughout the underdeveloped world, Chinese attempts to promote their style of revolution have met with failure, largely because of internal forces, of which nationalism itself is the most important.

The failure of the Communist attempt to gain control of Indonesia in late 1965 was a disaster of major proportions. China's attack on India in 1962 and her support of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue have dealt a severe blow to whatever hopes Indian Communists might have had for capitalizing on India's internal problems and divisions.

In Japan the Communist Party has followed the Peking line at great cost, alienating the trade unions and the powerful Japanese Socialist Party. Even North Korea has proclaimed its "neutrality" in the Sino-Soviet Communist struggle. China's lack of success in Africa has also been noteworthy. The Government of Malawi had to get rid of some cabinet ministers for allegedly conspiring with the Chinese; Kenya expelled the New China News Agency correspondent "in the interests of national security"; Burundi, once regarded as safely in the Chinese camp, expelled Peking's diplomatic mission. In Latin America, the Chinese have had even less success. Even Fidel Castro, whose rise to power had been hailed in Peking as a demonstration of the validity of the Chinese analysis of the Latin American revolutionary situation, has also denounced China.

China continues to talk a world power game, but even with nuclear weapons, the evidence of internal economic difficulties, particularly the food-population problem, and the political struggle, which may be only a dress rehearsal for what will come after Mao passes from the scene, suggest that China's principal concern and effort will remain domestic and internal for a long time to come.

China's foreign policy objectives are of concern to us, but there is significant disagreement—which we must also acknowledge—about her ability to pursue these objectives successfully. She seeks recognition as a great power whose voice is heard in the world's councils. China, understandably, seeks to overcome the bitter legacy of a hundred years of humiliation by the West. Recognition as a

great power is essentially a nationalist, rather than a ideological objective. All Chinese, Communist and non-Communist, agree on its importance.

China also seeks recovery of the "lost territories," Hong Kong, Macao, parts of Soviet Asia, Taiwan and the offshore islands, and land along the Sino-Indian frontier. This is also an essentially nationalist objective, shared by all Chinese. In Chinese eyes, it is not an expansionist position, for they consider that these territories were taken forcibly from China by the unequal treaties imposed on her during the 19th century, or in the case of Taiwan, were denied to her by the military power of the U.S. 7th Fleet.

China seeks to reestablish what she considers her traditional sphere of influence in Southeast Asia and to eradicate U.S. military power from the Asian mainland. Chinese political domination in that area has not been clear or consistent, at least not since the 10th century when Vietnam achieved "independence" from China. At times the relationship appears to have meant little more than tacit agreement not to aid China's enemies.

China's desire to eliminate U.S. power and influence from the Asian mainland, where it conforms to Communist ideological opposition to democratic philosophy, is basically nationalistic and there is little reason to believe that a non-Communist Chinese government would welcome a U.S. presence on the Asian mainland any more than the present government in Peking actually does.

Our policy in the Far East is based largely on unsubstantiated assumptions. First, we assume that revolutions throughout the less-developed world are a Chinese-inspired wave of the future and that Vietnam is a test case for guerrilla war and for wars of national liberation. There is no good reason for accepting this characterization of the war in Vietnam. The techniques of the Chinese revolution have not yet proved fully successful in China; they are a long way from inspiring revolution in other parts of the world. Second, we assert that the Southeast Asia situation is analagous to previous situations and experiences in Asia and in Europe. Military containment worked in Europe and in Korea, according to the theory; thus it is the method to be applied in Southeast Asia or in any other test area. But the conditions under which containment was effective in Europe and in Korea do not exist in Southeast Asia, which is marked by deep ethnic and social divisions; by instability, political and social; by deep antagonism to Western colonialism; and by a desire for change rather than for a return to the past.

Many of our problems today are the result of our unwillingness or inability in the past to anticipate what might be the shape of the world 20 years in the future. Few Americans expected in 1945 that 20 years later we would still have 225,000 troops in Europe. We have 55,000 troops in South Korea 14 years after the end of the fighting yet at, the height of the Korean conflict, we never had as many troops committed as we have today in Vietnam. We must ask whether we are prepared to maintain from 100,000 to 200,000 troops in South Vietnam as well, for 15 or 20 years after the fighting stops. If we are not prepared to do so, the process must be reversed before temporary commitment assumes the character of a permanent establishment and an irritation in the changed context of another generation. We must begin now the adjustments of attitude which will be necessary if we are to reduce or liquidate our commitments in Asia.

The long-range question is whether the United States and China are on a collision course. The likelihood of confrontation, of ultimate showdown, is not immediate, and certainly is not inevitable.

With regret I must conclude that the Secretary, in his remarks, has added nothing constructive to the debate of American involvement in Southeast Asia by way of new facts, new policies, strategy or understanding, but rather because of the posture, almost of defiance, careless of intentional abuse of the language, can serve only to raise the emotional level of the debate, obscure the issues upon which judgment should be made and cause further frustration and division within the country, I believe, as well as between the Congress and the executive branch of the Government.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I wish to commend the Senator from Minnesota on the excellent statement which he made involving present discussions concerning Vietnam, and I share with him concern about peace for the future. He is one of the most perceptive of U.S. Senators, and certainly one of the most eloquent, and we are always glad to see him display this kind of interest on this subject.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator very much.

THEODORE C. SORENSEN TO BREAK 4 YEARS OF SILENCE ON VIETNAM

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I think it is an important matter also, with respect to Vietnam, that there will come on the newsstands tomorrow morning an article which breaks a 4-year record of silence by a man who served in the White House under two Presidents. This is the first statement to date on this subject by one of America's most recognized authorities. Certainly, after 4 years of silence, it would be important for us to read the article in the Saturday Review which will appear on the newsstands tomorrow, under date of October 21, by Theodore Sorensen.

The substance of Mr. Sorensen's approach is that he sees Vietnam leading the United States to its own self-destruction. I think he makes an earnest plea, without criticism, of approaches for America and its leadership to find a way out. He makes the statement without regard necessarily to who should be the the leading party to call the meeting which would necessarily result in talks, but he does point out that talks of this kind are not necessarily doomed to end in disagreement and disappointment.

He points out four basic approaches which, if both sides used them, could work. I thoroughly endorse this approach as not necessarily the only one, but a workable one.

The first is to return to the Geneva Agreement of 1954.

The second is for an end to hostilities and a withdrawal of all foreign troops and bases.

The third is for a neutral, peaceful, independent South Vietnam, free to determine by election its own new political and social system and its relationship with and its reunification with the north.

And fourth, for a government, if necessary—though neither Saigon nor the NLF has squarely faced this—a coalition government, composed of all parties, as in the Laotian settlement of 1962, acting on behalf of all Vietnamese citizens in accordance with the principles of universal suffrage, free speech, free worship, and meaningful land redistribution.

I think all people will look on this statement as one which not only deserves our attention, but, considering the record of 4 years of silence by this authority, deserves the attention and concern of all of us.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT OF THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL ACT OF 1950

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2171) to amend the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, so as to accord with certain decisions of the courts.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Internal Security Act of 1950, which S. 2171 seeks to amend, was enacted over the veto of President Harry S. Truman. I believe it would be most worthwhile for the Senate to review the legislative and judicial history of that act. In his veto message of September 22, 1950, President Truman displayed characteristic courage, and remarkable foresight when he wrote:

> The idea of requiring Communist organizations to divulge information about themselves is a simple and attractive one. But it is about as practical as requiring thieves to register with the sheriff. Obviously, no such organization as the Communist Party is likely to register voluntarily.

President Truman, after reviewing the evidentiary problems which would confront the Attorney General in a registration proceeding, continued:

If, evenutally, the Attorney General should overcome these difficulties and get a favorable decision from the Board, the Board's decision could be appealed to the courts. The courts would review any questions of law involved, and whether the Board's findings of facts were supported by the preponderance of the evidence.

Then with amazing prophetic perception, President Truman wrote:

All these proceedings would require great effort and much time. It is almost certain that from 2 to 4 years would elapse between the Attorney General's decision to go before the Board with a case, and the final disposition of the matter by the courts.

And when all this time and effort had been spent, it is still most likely that no organization would actually register.

Mr. President, let me reread for emphasis that last statement of President Truman's when he vetoed the Internal Security Act of 1950:

And when all this time and effort had been spent, it is still most likely that no organization would actually register.

Let us look at the record. Since 1950, the Justice Department has brought actions under the Internal Security Act against the Communist Party itself, 22 alleged front organizations, and 44 individuals. How many have registered? Harry Truman was absolutely right. Not a single individual or organization has registered.

President Truman was deeply concerned not only about the futility and expense of the Internal Security Act, but also about the profound threat to traditional American liberties posed by this act.

He stated it this way:

Unfortunately, these provisions are not merely ineffective and unworkable. They represent a clear and present danger to our institutions . . . the application of the registration requirements to so-called Communist-front organizations can be the greatest danger to freedom of speech, since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798. This danger arises out of the criteria or standards to be applied in determining whether an organization is a Communist-front organization.

These would be no serious problem if the bill required proof that an organization was controlled and financed by the Communist Party before it could be lassified as a Communist-front organization. However, recognizing the difficulty of proving these matters, the bill would permit such a determination to be based solely upon the extent to which the positions taken or advanced by it from time to time on matters of policy do not deviate from those of the Communist movement.

With keenness, President Truman realized that—

This provision could easily be used to classify as a Communist-front organization any organization which is advocating a single policy or objective which is also being urged by the Communist Party or by a Communist foreign government.

President Truman summarized his objections to these sections of the bill when he wrote:

The basic error of these sections is that they move in the direction of suppressing opinion and belief. This would be a very dangerous course to take, not because we have any sympathy for Communist opinions, but because any governmental stifling of the free expression of opinion is a long step toward totalitarianism.

Harry Truman spoke for America, our values, and our principles when he added:

There is no more fundamental axiom of American freedom than the familiar statement: "In a free country, we punish men for the acts they commit, but never for the opinions they have." And the reason this is so fundamental to freedom is not, as many suppose, that it protects the few unorthodox from suppression by the majority. To permit freedom of expression is primarily for the benefit of the majority because it protects criticism, and criticism leads to progress.

In continuing his veto message, President Truman simply and straight-forwardly captured the central truth about freedom of speech in our society:

We can and we will prevent espionage, sabotage, or other actions endangering our national security. But we would betray our finest traditions if we attempted, as this bill would attempt, to curb the simple expression of opinion. This we should never do, no matter how distasteful the opinion may be to the vast majority of our people. The course proposed by this bill would delight the Communists, for it would make a mockery of the Bill of Rights and of our claim to stand for freedom in the world.

And what kind of effect would these provisions have on the normal expression of political views? Obviously, if this law were on the statute books, the part of prudence would be to avoid saying anything that might be construed by someone as not deviating sufficiently from the current Communist propaganda line. And since no one could be sure in advance what views were safe to express, the inevitable tendency would be to express no views on controversial subjects.

The result—

As clearly seen by President Truman—could only be to reduce the vigor and strength of our political life—an outcome that the Communists would happily welcome, but that free men should abhor.

President Truman reminded us eloquently:

We need not fear the expression of ideas—we do need to fear their suppression.

Mr. President, anyone who lived through the dark days which followed or can read about them knows how very right Harry Truman was proved. We know all too well the orthodoxy which so widely revered. We know of the blacklist and the willingness, even the zeal, of some to equate dissent with disloyalty and to punish error as though it were treason.

This was a national malady, not the exclusive practice of one party or one group. But our national dialog was diminished and our national life was impoverished as a result. We spent inordinate time and tremendous energy—proving our total anticommunism and corresponding pro-Americanism.

I believe the Nation has matured since that experience. I believe that we profited from that tragic lesson.

But I wonder, Mr. President, when I hear the level to which our debate in this very Chamber has slipped in the past week.

On last Wednesday on this floor the sponsor of S. 2171, the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], in support of his motion to suspend the rules, quoted the testimony of Herbert A. Philbrick, the former informant for the FBI, before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee this year.

The senior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] quoted Mr. Philbrick as follows:

There is no question but that the law the Communists fear the most, the law that they fought the longest and the hardest was the Internal Security Act of 1950. The Communists fought that measure tooth and nail, in court and out, week in and week out, for 15 solid years.

Mr. President, I know that the Communists opposed the Internal Security Act when it was before the Congress. But I do not take lightly any implication that the Communists and their sympathizers or unwitting accomplices were the only people who opposed this act.

A great President and a great American, Harry S. Truman, opposed the Internal Security Act.

The Department of Justice, ably headed by then Attorney General and later Supreme Court Justice, Tom Clark, opposed the Internal Security Act.

The Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency opposed the Internal Security Act.

The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Boston Herald, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch opposed the Internal Security Act.

Senator Paul H. Douglas, a truly great American, opposed the Internal Security Act.

Clarence Mitchell, an outstanding American, testified against the Internal Security Act in behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

William Green of the American Federation of Labor, James Patton of the National Farmers Union, Charles M. LaFollette of the Americans for Democratic Action, Dr. Ralph E. Himstead of the American Association of University Professors, Benjamin Epstein of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, John W. Edelman of the Textile Workers Union, and Bishop John Wesley Lord of the Methodist Church also opposed the Internal Security Act.

I want to make it crystal clear, Mr. President, that respected, responsible, and renowned Americans whose devotion to country is far, far beyond question opposed this act before it was enacted and continued their opposition.

I do not pretend to know the motives of the Communist Party officials and members who opposed this act for 15 years. But I reject absolutely any suggestion no matter how subtle that Communists alone, have constituted or been the moving force behind the opposition to this act.

President Truman concluded his veto message of the Internal Security Act in this way:

I do not undertake lightly the responsibility of differing with the majority in both Houses of Congress who have voted for this bill. We are all Americans; we all wish to

Secretary Rusk on Asia

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1967

Secretary Rusk's impassioned defense of Vietnam policy has demonstrated that his faith in the ultimate success of Administration strategy remains total. Yet the unpleasant fact is that the American policy of military escalation, after nearly three years, has not succeeded. That failure is the essence of the problem in Vietnam.

Mr. Rusk is right that few Americans favor either simple withdrawal or all-out war. But that is far from warranting a statement that the debate in Congress and the country is "essentially a debate about detail." Half a million American troops, two million South Vietnamese refugees, a tonnage of bombs exceeding that dropped on Europe in World War II—the conflict over these aspects of American policy can hardly be dismissed as "detail."

Escalation—an untried nuclear war theory applied to a guerrilla conflict—has neither intimidated the enemy nor reduced his forces. On the contrary, these have tripled in the period of escalation. More Americans are being killed each week now than were lost in the three years of aid and advice that preceded the bombing of North Vietnam and the stepped-up ground warfare in the South that followed.

* * *

The change of policy from Kennedy's "their" war to Johnson's "our" war—again no matter of detail—lies at the heart of the issue between the Administration and its critics. Mr. Rusk asserts that Washington still is pursuing "limited objectives by limited means." But his entire case rests on the much more sweeping doctrine that "vital national interests" of the United States are at stake in Vietnam, a doctrine challenged by Senator Fulbright and many others.

"Those who would place in question the credibility of the pledged word of the United States under our mutual security treaties would subject this nation to mortal danger," Secretary Rusk avers. But he himself acknowledges that few Americans propose to "abandon" this country's commitment to South Vietnam, whether they attribute that commitment to the SEATO Treaty, as Mr. Rusk does, or to the compulsions the United States has created by the scale of its intervention.

The real issues are whether to stop bombing in the interest of getting talks started, recognize the Vietcong as a legal party and negotiate a compromise peace. There is overwhelming support for such moves among America's allies in Europe and the main Asian nations, such as Japan, Indonesia and India. They believe the continuation of the war—and the danger that it might spread on a global scale—would undermine their security far more than a negotiated settlement.

This factor seriously weakens Mr. Rusk's argument that American intervention in Vietnam defends the world against being "cut in two by Asian Communism, reaching out through southeast Asia and Indonesia." The Indonesians, who defended themselves from Communism, have just urged cessation of the bombing as essential to a negotiated peace. Most other Asians outside of the American client states urge the same course.

* * *

Mr. Rusk denies he has in mind a containment policy for Communist China identical to the one the United States used to apply to the Soviet Union. But he argues that American security is at stake in Vietnam because the United States for the next decade or two must promote "cooperation among the free nations of Asia" as a means of protecting them against Chinese pressure until a less militant generation of Chinese leaders takes charge in Peking. All this implies a long-term need for American bases in Vietnam, yet Mr. Rusk upholds the Manila commitment to withdraw within six months of a peace settlement.

What the whole approach ignores is the special nature of Communism in Vietnam, the native origins of the Vietcong, the historic Vietnamese antagonism toward China, the divisions in Asian and world Communism, the Sino-Soviet conflict and the cautiousness of Chinese foreign policy even during the madness of the cultural revolution. It vastly exaggerates the importance of Vietnam, geographically a dead-end street, in the defense of Asia and the Western Pacific—let alone the United States.

It is not the realities of the Chinese menace that have led the Administration into a vast escalation of the Vietnam war. Rather, it is the escalation of America's involvement that now induces the Administration to evoke objectives that will appear large enough to justify a half-million American troops, great armadas of ships and planes and the expenditure of more than $2 billion a month.

The new pattern in which the Secretary of State has arranged the Administration's old arguments for its Vietnam policy is thus not persuasive, not reassuring, but alarming. It suggests that de-escalation of American war aims will have to precede de-escalation of the war.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1967

Washington: Dean Rusk and 'The Yellow Peril'

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, Oct. 14—In his carefully prepared and impassioned defense of the Administration's Vietnam policy, Secretary of State Rusk has revived the old emotional dread of "The Yellow Peril."

This has an interesting history. Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany raised it for the first time in the 1890's. It was a scare that the yellow races would increase in population to such an extent that they would challenge the security of the white peoples. William Randolph Hearst exploited it into the cult of "yellow journalism." Even President de Gaulle of France, in his visions of the future, sees racial rather than ideological conflict as the central issue. And now, for whatever reason, we have the Secretary of State of the United States, who is certainly no racist, raising these same old fears about the masses of China.

The Dominion of Fear

It is an interesting and tragic story. The most powerful force in world politics today is fear. The nations are now spending more money on wars and preparations for wars than the sum total of all the national incomes of all the underdeveloped countries on earth. All the thoughtful political leaders know this is mad, but fear drives them on and fear differs from one country to another.

Sometimes it is genuine fear of military destruction. Often it is merely fear on the part of the men in power that they may be overthrown by bullets or ballots. But in any event, the dominion of fear prevails, partly because it is justified, and partly because all politicians have learned that it is easier to frighten their people than to persuade them.

The Vicious Circle

The world waits, therefore, for one of the great nations to break into this vicious circle of fear, to give a lead back to sanity, to take not a critical but only a marginal risk for common sense and the human family. Johnson in Washington, Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin in Moscow, and Mao Tse-tung in Peking are all confronted by this problem of the easy or the hard way.

All of them know it is easier in their political situation at home to point to the foreign devil, to increase the military budget, to appeal to national pride and prejudice, than to break away into new patterns of thought and policy and move toward a better life for their own peoples and the whole world.

Despite all their differences, Washington, Moscow and Peking have all recognized the necessity of restraint. The political parties, the universities, the press, and even the churches in America are all divided about Vietnam policy, but, with few exceptions, they agree on limiting our power for limited objectives. The same is true elsewhere.

Moscow is determined that Washington will not win a military victory in Vietnam, but it does not provide the long-range rockets or bombers or torpedoes that could attack our airfields at Saigon or Danang, or hit our aircraft carriers in the South China Sea.

It is not that the Soviets don't have these weapons. They could neutralize the airports at Saigon and Danang and the American aircraft carriers that hit Hanoi and Haiphong, but this would mean war to the death. They know it, and avoid it, just as we avoid destroying Hanoi and knocking out the harbor of Haiphong, which we obviously have the power to do.

Even the Chinese Communists are restrained in action if not in word. Their propaganda against the United States and even the Soviet Union is vicious—the worst since Goebbels—but their military actions are cautious. Washington talks peace but makes war on the Chinese border. The Chinese Communists talk war and even the conquest of the world, but, while their words are extreme, their military aid is limited and defensive.

Secretary of State Rusk has been appealing to fear in dealing with the critics of the Johnson Administration's Vietnam policy. Having failed to persuade the Administration critics, he is now trying to scare them. Having failed to convince them, Mr. Rusk has now revived echoes of the old American fear of "The Yellow Peril."

Asked by John Finney of The New York Times why he thought the security of the United States was "at stake in Vietnam," Mr. Rusk replied: "Within the next decade or two, there will be a billion Chinese on the mainland, armed with nuclear weapons, with no certainty about what their attitude toward the rest of Asia will be."

Rusk's View

Mr. Rusk did not accept the consequences of his apocalyptic vision. He did not follow the view of the China experts that Peking was not really a military menace, that Peking was not trying to send its military forces into Southeast Asia. He rejected the suggestion that our policy was to "contain" the expansion of Peking's power and ideology. He said that we were not trying to be the policeman of Asia. And he insisted that, while Communist China was a menace to both the security of Asia and the United States, that we would get out of Vietnam six months after there was a peace settlement in that country.

In short, what he really did was merely to increase the element of fear. Politically it is a more effective argument in the coming Presidential election campaign, but is it effective for peace? The general feeling here seems to be that it is not; that it is good politics but bad policy, and that it only raises the elements of emotion and fear that perpetuate dissension in the world, and skepticism and mistrust at home.

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