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Senator Hubert H. Humphrey's Address to the

TOWN HALL

Following is a text of Senate Majority Whip Hubert H. Humphrey's prepared speech before the TOWN HALL

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During the past two weeks the United States has once again been challenged to match deeds with words in opposing aggression and defending freedom around the world. While protecting the security of an embattled ally in Southeast Asia, American ships were the object of an unprovoked attack by North Vietnamese P-T boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Johnson's prompt and decisive response to this naked aggression demonstrates to our friends that our power remains pre-eminent and our devotion to freedom firm, and to our foes that the United States is no "paper tiger". The measured response to this attack proves that we are prepared to meet aggression in whatever form, that we shall not be forced to choose between humiliation and holocaust, that the firmness of our response in no way diminishes our devotion to peace. The joint resolution passed by both Houses of Congress by an overwhelming majority indicates broad support for the President's action.

Our action in the Gulf of Tonkin is a part of the continuing struggle which the American people must be prepared to wage if we are to preserve free civilization as we know it and resist the expansion of Communist power. It is a further indication that the break-up of the bipolar world which has characterized the international relations of the past two decades and the easing of tensions between East and West following the nuclear test-ban may have changed the pattern of U.S. involvement in world affairs, but it has not diminished it. We retain the role of leader of the free world that we inherited at the end of World War II, and in that role our responsibilities remain world-wide. In that role our responsibility extends to distant Asia as well as to countries on our doorstep. The President's action demonstrated that our guard is up -- and we are prepared to meet those responsibilities.

In the light of recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin, I would like to review the background and the nature of our commitment in Southeast Asia. Through this examination I would hope to indicate why we are willing to devote our manpower and our treasure to the defense of that area.

What are the basic questions in the crisis in Viet-Nam which has brought tragedy to hundreds of thousands of Asians and today holds daily danger for thousands of Americans who are serving their country on a distant frontier? I believe the basic questions are four: 1) Why are we there? 2) How did we get there? 3) What should our policy be in this area? 4) How do we carry out this policy?

Once these questions are answered, we can understand why President Johnson acted resolutely to repel aggression in Southeast Asia. We will then be better prepared to preserve and strengthen the broad bipartisan consensus that has existed over the past decade on this issue, and make certain that our nation's objectives and intentions are clearly understood by friend and foe alike.

I. Why are we in Southeast Asia? In simplest terms we are there to prevent the Communists from imposing their power on the people of South Viet-Nam and its neighbors on the Indo-China peninsula. We are in South Viet-Nam to assist the South Vietnamese people to prevent local Communist forces, directed and controlled from North Viet-Nam, backed by the support of Communist China, from taking over the country. The present crisis would not confront us today if the Hanoi and Peiping regimes had abided by the letter and spirit of the Geneva agreements of 1954 on Indo-China and of 1962 on Laos and this crisis could be solved tomorrow if Hanoi and Peiping decide to respect those agreements, to honor both the spirit and the letter of those agreements.

The 1954 agreements established a truce line dividing North and South Viet-Nam at the 17th parallel. The Communists were to withdraw to the North, and the non-Communists to the South. Neither country was to be used as a military base for the resumption of fighting or to carry out an aggressive policy. The language of the agreements was clearly intended to guarantee the independence of each zone from intrusion or interference by the other. Each part of the divided country would be left alone to solve its own domestic problems in peace.

From the start the Communists failed to live up to the letter or spirit of the agreements. They placed thousands of hidden caches of weapons and ammunition scattered through the South. Large numbers of Communist Viet Cong military personnel were instructed to remain in the South, to go underground until orders were given to resume military activity. Initially the Hanoi regime looked on these precautions as a form of insurance in case the South did not quickly collapse and come under Hanoi's domination.

Though not a party to the Geneva agreements of 1954, the Administration of President Eisenhower declared that the United States would respect them and would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the Accords "with grave concern and as a serious threat to peace". This declaration was followed by a pledge of support from the United States government to the fledgling South Vietnamese government, committing us to assist the new government at Saigon in resisting subversion or aggression.

From 1954 to 1959, the two Viet-Nams developed along separate paths. The Communists' anticipated decline of South Viet-Nam as a functioning independent nation did not occur. By 1959 it was clearly apparent to the North Viet-Nam government, which had failed to solve the problem of feeding its own people, that South Viet-Nam was not about to fall like a ripe apple into the Communist orbit.

To all but North Viet-Nam, Communist China, and the Soviet Union, the developments in South Viet-Nam appeared encouraging. The country was not a threat to anyone; as of 1959, no foreign nation, including the United States, had bases or fighting forces in South Viet-Nam. The country was not a member of any alliance system. It constituted no "threat" to the North -- except in the sense that its economy far outshone that in North Viet-Nam.

Disturbed by the progress of its neighbor to the South, Hanoi began in 1957 to reactivate the subversive network it had left south of the Seventeenth Parallel after Geneva. It began the attempt to bring about the collapse of the South through selective, low-level terrorism and sabotage.

In 1959 North Viet-Nam through the Viet Cong embarked on a large-scale program of terrorism and subversion aimed at overthrowing the government of South Viet-Nam by undermining the morale and loyalty of the civilian population. Besides activating the cadres that had been left behind, Hanoi began to infiltrate trained men and supplies in a concerted effort to conquer South Viet-Nam.

The extent of this effort could hardly be concealed, though Hanoi pursued its propaganda theme of "national liberation". It was by then evident that this was no war of "liberation" but a war of subjugation. By 1962 the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam had found the Hanoi Government guilty of violating the 1954 agreements. Today it is well established that the Viet Cong and their political arm, the "National Liberation Front," are directed and aided from Hanoi.

Why are we in Viet-Nam today? The answer to the question is evident: We are there to help guarantee the survival of a free nation increasingly menaced by an enemy -- Communist subversion and terrorism. We are there because we were invited by the Government of Viet-Nam. We are there because of our commitment to the freedom and security of Asia.

Some might ask: Why is it so important to preserve the freedom and independence of Viet-Nam? I would answer that the position of the United States in Asia and throughout the world will be greatly affected by the nature of our response to the crisis in Viet-Nam. Our word is either good or it is not. Our commitment is either kept or it is not. If we demonstrate our determination to stick by one friendly government, another such government may never be assaulted. If, on the other hand, we pull out of South Viet-Nam, we can expect more of the same somewhere else. Ultimately it is our own security that is weakened.

II. How did we get there? This leads to the second basic question which I listed at the outset: How did we get where we are today in Southeast Asia?

In regard to Viet-Nam the record is clear. We are defending freedom in Viet-Nam today because three American administrations, Republican and Democratic, committed us to do so. Our commitment today reflects a line of policy we have followed consistently and firmly for ten years.

Our present policy toward Viet-Nam was initiated by President Eisenhower in 1954 in a letter which he wrote to the President of Viet-Nam in October of that year: "We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be

more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam . . .

"The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

Early in 1959, President Eisenhower reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Viet-Nam:

"Strategically, South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement . . . The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom."

In 1959, 1960 and 1961, Communist subversion and terror steadily increased in Viet-Nam, and the need for American assistance increased. In 1961, President Kennedy sent both Vice President Johnson and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Taylor, to examine the situation. On their return a new and stronger program of assistance was organized. Here is what President Kennedy said about it at that time:

"As you know, during the last two years that war has increased. The Vice President visited there last spring. The war became more intense every month -- in fact every week. The attack on the Government by the Communist forces with assistance from the north became of greater and greater concern to the Government of Viet-Nam and the Government of the United States . . .

". . . As the war has increased in scope our assistance has increased as a result of the requests of the Government."

President Kennedy continued, "We have had a very strong bipartisan consensus up till now and I'm hopeful it will continue in regard to the actions that we're taking."

The policy which President Eisenhower began and President Kennedy continued has been carried forward by President Johnson. It should be clear then that we are in Viet-Nam today because three Administrations have considered the defense of this area to be essential to American vital interests. It is not a matter of partisan difference. This was demonstrated once again this last week when the overwhelming majority of both parties in the Congress backed the joint resolution in support of the President's action.

III. What Should Our Policy Be? I now turn to the most fundamental question: What should our policy be?

P18 President

* By now there should be no doubt that we will

~~First of all we must~~ stay in Viet-Nam -- until the security of the South Vietnamese people has been established. We will not be driven out. We have pledged our support to the people of Viet-Nam -- and President Johnson has shown that we intend to keep it. ~~He has~~ Let there let the world know -- friend and foe alike -- that we ~~did~~ not abandon our allies, that we have the will and determination to persevere in the struggle to defend a brave people desiring to preserve their freedom and independence. The Congress of the United States has recently shown that it supports the President.

Second, although our contribution may be substantial, the primary responsibility for preserving independence and achieving peace in Viet-Nam remains with the Vietnamese people and their government. We should not attempt to "take over" the war from the Vietnamese. Our aid, our guidance and our friendship are essential. But the basic decisions must remain Vietnamese. May I remind those latter-day prophets of "total victory" that this is a war for independence -- and no lasting independence can be imposed by foreign armies. *

Third, the struggle in Viet-Nam is as much a political and social struggle as a military one. What has been needed in Viet-Nam is a cause for which to fight, a program for which the people of Viet-Nam will sacrifice and die. What has been needed in Viet-Nam is a government that can inspire hope, embodying the aspirations of both the educated elite in the cities and the peasant masses in the countryside. What has been needed is a government in which the people of Viet-Nam have a stake. For the peasant who has known only the sacrifices and ravages of war for nearly 20 years and never the benefits of modern civilization, government

is no longer a burden to be patiently borne, but an oppressor to be cast off. What has been needed is not just guns and tanks, but schools and hospitals, pig production, clean water, land reform and administrative reform. What has been needed is a government that is deeply concerned about the welfare of the peasants and that holds a high regard for their lives and fortunes.

The task of Government leaders in helping the people is enormous. Victory will not come only from trained armies or increasing economic production and improving the material lot of the masses. What is equally important is the problem of inspiring hope, of commanding the intellectual and emotional allegiance of those who will shape the society -- which includes both the elite groups and the peasant leaders.

The struggle in Viet-Nam therefore must be fought as much with land reform as with knives and rifles, with rural development programs as well as with helicopters. Where effective rural development programs are being carried out -- as they are in a number of cases with the aid of United States rural development advisors -- the peasants do respond. If these programs are pushed and the allegiance of the peasants won, the Viet Cong guerrilla can no longer rely on an anti-government populace for support and protection. As Ambassador Lodge has said, "If the people were to deny the Viet Cong, they would thus have no base; they would be through."

The struggle for the allegiance of the peasant will not be won in Saigon, but in the countryside. Nor will it be won by centralized government action alone -- however necessary that might be. The participation of the people in the struggle to preserve their freedom from Communist domination must begin on the lowest level of society -- in the village. A prime objective must be the development of self-governing local organizations, associations and cooperatives. The Government of South Viet-Nam should declare its intention of fostering free elections at an early date with the widest possible participation of the people. Wartime conditions may temporarily require extraordinary measures, but in the long run only a government with a popular mandate can survive.

If I have emphasized here the importance of economic and social programs in winning the struggle in Viet-Nam, it is not because I judge military programs to be unimportant.

They are highly important and essential to the success of the other programs I have described. If physical security without human welfare is no better than a prison, social welfare programs without physical security is no more than an illusion. It is impossible to bring the fruits of tangible economic progress to a village when the Viet Cong can assassinate the skilled, highly motivated local administrator responsible for the program, undoing the patient work of months in a single act of random terror. Safety and security in the countryside are an obvious pre-requisite for any program of social, economic, and political reform.

As I noted earlier in these remarks, the Viet Cong attack began when it became clear that South Viet-Nam was making real progress in the years after the Geneva Accords. Not only had the new Republic not collapsed -- contrary to the Communists' fond expectations -- it had achieved striking advances in such fields as land reform, education, health, agriculture and industry.

Faced with this dismaying fact, and shaken by failure to make similar progress in the territory under their control, the Communists launched their campaign of insurgency against South Viet-Nam.

Much more effective than propaganda was their program of systematic terror aimed at destroying key links inthe chain of social and economic progress: teachers, medical workers, local administrators, agricultural experts, and other skilled personnel. The Viet Cong weapon was murder. Thousands of individuals like these were killed. Their schools,offices, and tools were bombed or burned. It was a campaign deliberately calculated to damage South Viet-Nam in the area where its success contrasted most vividly with the situation in North Viet-Nam, the task of providing a good life for its people. And the sad fact is that to a great extent, in many areas it worked. Security in the countryside was undermined, and without safety and protection from reprisals further development was impossible.

The situation today remains very similar. The Viet Cong continue to concentrate their attack on the civilian population, especially on key individuals who represent the effort of the central government to bring a better life to the countryside. The military effort of the government forces is aimed primarily at establishing security, so that development programs can go forward in peace -- the condition of life without which neither development nor economic reform is possible. To achieve the security needed the Government of Viet-Nam will require outside help in strengthening its administrative arm. Technical assistance should be provided by the United States and its SEATO allies to assist the Government in strengthening the administration at all levels. Only such action can repair the damage which the Viet Cong has inflicted on the Vietnamese administration.

The events of the past two weeks do not alter the basic fact that the war will be won or lost in South Viet-Nam. This remains the principal battlefield and this will be the scene of victory or defeat. This does not mean -- as our action in the Gulf of Tonkin indicated -- that North Viet-Nam will remain a privileged sanctuary regardless of provocation. Further attacks will be met with equal firmness. We dare not ignore such aggression. President Johnson has reminded us "aggression unchecked is aggression unleashed." But the President also warned us in his speech before the American Bar Association about the dangers posed by those impulsive spokesmen who are "eager to enlarge the conflict in Southeast Asia".

> "They call upon us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions, engulf much of Asia, and threaten the peace of the world.
>
> ". . .Such action would offer no solution at all to the real problem of Viet-Nam."

President Johnson concluded:

> "It has never been the policy of an American President to systematically place in hazard the life of this nation by threatening nuclear war.
>
> "No American President has ever pursued so irresponsible a course. Our firmness at moments of crisis, has always been matched by restraint; our determination by care."

The independence and security of South Viet-Nam therefore will be achieved only in a hard, costly, complex struggle -- which will be waged chiefly in South Viet-Nam. One would hope that discussions here at home during an electoral campaign would not lead to misunderstandings abroad. It would be a tragedy if rash words here at home were to inspire rash actions in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese people -- who have tirelessly and courageously borne the "long twilight struggle" for so long -- know full well that there is no quick or easy victory to be won.

IV. How Do We Implement Our Policy? We implement our policy by standing firmly behind our friends, by being prepared to meet any contingency. As the President has stated, "We seek no wider war". We are therefore prepared to consider negotiations or an enlarged role for the United Nations where this would be effective.

Throughout the present crisis in Southeast Asia the United States has adhered firmly to its view that the peace of the region can be assured through a return to the international agreements that underlie the independence of South Viet-Nam. We have never ruled out the possibility of negotiations at some stage. And we should never rule it out in the future.

But as President Johnson said on April 21, "No negotiated settlement in Viet-Nam is possible as long as the Communists hope to achieve victory by force". But, "Once war seems hopeless, then peace may be possible. The door is always open to any settlement which assures the independence of South Viet-Nam, and its freedom to seek help for its protection."

Our task in Viet-Nam is clearly to make aggression seem hopeless. Out of that new realization can come new grounds for a negotiated settlement that safeguards South Viet-Nam's independence. Negotiations must take place at the proper time however. Premature negotiations can do little more than to ratify the

present achievements of the aggressors and this we will not do.

As for the possible role of the United Nations in bringing about a Southeast Asian settlement, UN Secretary General while in Washington last week, voiced his belief that the UN could not effectively contribute to an immediate solution in Southeast Asia. And yet the United States immediately presented its case before the United Nations General Assembly following the recent attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin. I am hopeful that some day a strong UN peacekeeping force backed by the major powers will exist to step into situations like this one. At the present time, however, the UN is not equipped to deal with the war in South Viet-Nam. As the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated last month, it is not a question of ruling out UN action, but of deciding on the appropriate timing for UN involvement. Once aggression has been stopped, once a political settlement has been achieved, a UN presence might be helpful in guaranteeing and monitoring the agreement.

There is a possibility for a UN role in the border area between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam which need not interfere with the continuing American presence in Viet-Nam.

As one who has long been a strong supporter of the UN, who has long regarded the UN as "the eyes and ears of peace", I welcome any enlargement of its role in Southeast Asia where this would effectively advance the goals of preserving the freedom and independence, as well as the peace of Viet-Nam.

On the basis of the policy for Southeast Asia described here, our objectives can be achieved. To be sure, it will take a great deal of time and effort and patience and determination -- and the cost will be heavy in money, in lives, and, for some, in heartbreak. But in Asia as elsewhere for the leader of the free world, there is no comfort or security in evasion, no solution in abdication, no relief in irresponsibility.

Our stakes in Southeast Asia are too high for the recklessness either of withdrawal or of general conflagration. We need not choose between inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation. The stakes can be secured through a wise multiple strategy if we but sustain our national determination to see the job through to success. Our Vietnamese friends look forward to the day when national independence and security will be achieved, permitting the withdrawal of foreign forces. We share that hope and that expectation.

The outcome of the conflict in Southeast Asia will have repercussions for our interests in other areas of the world. Our actions Southeast Asia are being watched closely by the Communist governments in Moscow and Peking. The world has evolved to a point where aggressive nations hesitate to use nuclear war or large-scale conventional war as normal instruments of policy. But the technique of war by externally supported insurgency remains a favored instrument in the Communist arsenal. If we prove that aggression through externally supported insurgency can be defeated, we will be contributing to the achievement of peace not only in Asia but throughout the world.

I deeply believe that the American people do indeed have the maturity, the sense of perspective, and the determination to see the present crisis through to an outcome that will strengthen the cause of peace everywhere. And our objective in Asia and throughout the world is progress toward that peaceful -- if distant day -- when no man rattles a saber and no one drags a chain.

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REMARKS OF VICE PRESIDENT

Hubert H. Humphrey

before the

PACEM IN TERRIS Conference

New York City

February 17, 1965

Peace on Earth

The Scripture tells us to "Pursue peace" - and mankind has since the beginning of time condemned the horrors of war. If discord and strife, wars and the threat of wars have persisted throughout history, it is perhaps as St. Augustine says: that men make war not because they love peace the less, but rather because they love their own kind of peace the more. Yet men of peace of every kind and every land remember well the year 1963. For in that fateful year a venerable apostle of peace left our world, leaving behind a legacy which will endure for years to come. Generations of men -- young and old alike -- will remember the final testament of that gentle peasant Pope, Pope John XXIII, the encyclical Pacem in Terris, in which he left to men of all faiths, to men holding many concepts of peace, an outline for peace in our world which can be accepted by all men of good will.

And if our generation can heed the parting plea of the man whose work we honor at this Conference, generations yet to come may hope to live in a world where in the words of the late President Kennedy "the strong are just, the weak secure and the peace preserved."

It is a privilege and an honor to participate in this Conference dedicated to exploring the meaning and the message of Pacem in Terris. It is particularly fitting that this convocation meet at the beginning of International Cooperation Year. I am confident that your deliberations here will advance our world along the road to "peace on earth" as described by Pope John.

The encyclical John XXIII presented to the world was a public philosophy for a nuclear era. Comprehensive in scope, his message expounded a political philosophy governing relations between the individual and the state, relations between states, and relations between an individual state and the world organizations.

Pacem in Terris continues and completes the social philosophy which the Pope had begun a year earlier in his encyclical Mater et Magistra, in which he elaborated the principles of social justice which should guide the social order. In Pacem in Terris he extended this philosophy to the world, concentrating now on relations between states and the role of the world community.

This encyclical represents not a utopian blueprint for world peace, presupposing a sudden change in the nature of men. Rather, it represents a call to action to leaders of nations, presupposing only a gradual change in human institutions. It is not confined to elaborating the abstract virtues of peace but looks to the building of a world community governed by institutions capable of preserving peace.

The Pope outlined principles which can guide the actions of men -- all men regardless of color, creed or political affiliation -- but it is up to statesmen to decide how these principles are to be applied. The challenge to this Conference is to provide statesmen with further guidelines for applying the philosophy of Pacem in Terris to the problems confronting our world in 1965.

I would like to direct my remarks principally to the questions of relations between states and to that of a world community. Pope John's preoccupation -- and our preoccupation today -- is with an amelioration of international relations in the light of the dangers to mankind posed by the existence of modern nuclear weapons. The leaders of the world must understand -- as he understood -- that since that day at Alamogordo when man acquired the power to obliterate himself from the face of the earth, war has worn a new face. And the vision of it has sobered all men and demanded of them a keener perception of mutual interests and a higher order of responsibility. Under these conditions mankind must concentrate on the problems that unite us rather than on those which divide us.

Pope John proclaimed that the issues of war and peace are the concern of all. Statesmen -- who bear a heavier responsibility than others -- cannot ignore the implications for the survival of mankind of new discoveries in technology, biology, nuclear physics and space. In this nuclear age the deliberate initiation of full-scale war as an instrument of national policy has become folly.

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Originally a means to protect national interests, war today can assure the death of a nation, the decimation of a continent.

Nuclear power has placed into the hands of men the power to destroy all that man has created. Only responsible statesmen -- who perceive that perseverence in the pursuit of peace is not cowardice, but courage, that restraint in the use of forces is not weakness, but wisdom -- can prevent present international rivalries from leading to an incinerated world.

The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over Cuba in the autumn of 1962 undoubtedly weighed heavily in the Pope's thinking and lent urgency to his concern to halt the nuclear arms race. Addressing the leaders of the world, he stated:

> "Justice, right, reason, and humanity urgently demand that the arms race should cease; that the stockpiles which exist in various countries should be reduced equally and simultaneously by the parties concerned; that nuclear weapons should be banned; and that a general agreement should eventually be reached about progressive disarmament and an effective method of control."

This plea had special pertinence for the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, the principal nuclear powers.

A few months later, President Kennedy demonstrated the US commitment to the goal of peace. In a speech at American University in June of 1963, he called for renewed efforts toward a "more practical, more attainable peace -- based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions -- on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned."

The leaders of the Soviet Union responded favorably. In October 1963, the U.S. and Soviet governments signed a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This treaty won respect throughout the world for the United States and the Soviet Union -- indeed for all nations who signed it. It has inspired hope for the future of mankind on this planet. And members of this audience will recall that the man who first proposed a test ban treaty way back in 1956 -- and who shares in the credit for its accomplishment -- is the United States Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson.

The nuclear test ban was the first step in the path toward a more enduring peace. "The longest journey begins with a single step,"

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President Johnson has said -- and that single step has been taken.

Other steps have followed.

We have resolved not to station weapons of mass destruction in space. A United Nations resolution, jointly sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, called on all countries to refrain from such action. It was adopted by acclamation -- without a single dissenting vote.

This was a vital step toward preventing the extension of the arms race into outer space.

This year the United States is cutting back on the production of fissionable materials. Great Britain and the Soviet Union have announced cutbacks in their planned production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. As President Johnson has stated, the race for large nuclear stockpiles can be provocative as well as wasteful.

The need for instant communication between the United States and the Soviet Union -- to avoid the miscalculation which might lead to nuclear war -- was proven during the Cuban missile crisis. Since that time, we have established a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow to avoid such miscalculation.

The agenda for the future remains long. Among the measures needed to limit the dangers of the nuclear age are measures designed to prevent war by miscalculation or accident.

We must seek agreements to obtain safeguards against surprise attacks, including a network of selected observation points. We must seek to restrict the nuclear arms race by preventing the transfer of nuclear weapons to the control of non-nuclear nations; transferring fissionable materials from military to peaceful purposes, and by outlawing underground tests, with adequate inspection and enforcement. The United States has offered a freeze on the production of aircraft and missiles used for delivering nuclear weapons. Such a freeze might open the door to reductions in nuclear strategic delivery vehicles.

It is the intention of the United States Government to pursue every reasonable avenut toward agreement with the Soviet Union in limiting the nuclear arms race. And the President has made it clear that he will leave no thing undone, no mile untraveled to further the pursuit of peace.

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Today in the year 1965 we must recognize that the next major step in controlling the nuclear arms race may require us to look beyond the narrow U.S. - Soviet competition to the past. For the explosion of a nuclear device by Communist China in 1964 has impressed upon us once again that the world of today is no longer the bi-polar world of an earlier decade. Nuclear competition is no longer limited to two super-powers.

The efforts of the United States and Europe to enable the nations of Europe to have a greater share in nuclear defense policy -- without encouraging the development of independent national nuclear deterrents -- constitute a recognition of this.

In addition to Europe, we now have the problem of finding ways of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

With the explosion of the Chinese nuclear device several months ago -- and the prospect of others to follow -- it may be that the most immediate "next step" in controlling the nuclear arms race is the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia.

In view of the evident determination of the present Communist government of Mainland China to use its limited nuclear capability it hopes to develop for maximum political and propaganda benefit, it is not surprising that other modern Asian nations are tempted to build their own nuclear deterrent.

But the nations on the perimeter of Communist China are not alone. As President Johnson has stated, "The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it."

If the need for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is more immediate in Asia today, it is no less important in Latin America, Africa and the Near East. All of these areas are ripe for regional arms pacts which would prevent these countries from developing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons would serve no useful purpose in preserving their security. The introduction of these weapons would provoke a rivalry that would imperil the peace of Latin America and Africa and intensify the present rivalries in the Near East. It would endanger the precarious economies of countries which already possess military forces too large for their

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security needs and too expensive to be maintained without outside assistance.

Such nuclear arms control agreements should naturally be initiated by the nations of the area. In Latin America, such an agreement has already been proposed. Should the nations of Latin America, of Africa and the Near East through their own institutions or through the United Nations, take the initiative in establishing nuclear free zones, they will earn the appreciation of all nations of the world. Containment in these areas would represent a major step toward world peace.

If nuclear rivalry is an obstacle to peace today, it is not the only one.

In Pacem in Terris John XXIII returned to a theme he had discussed in Mater et Magistra when he stated: "Given the growing interdependence among peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic inequality among them persists." If control of nuclear weapons is a central issue in improving relations between East and West, accelerating the economic development of new nations is essential to harmony between North and South.

In Latin America, in Asia and Africa, another threat to peace lies in the shocking inequality between privileged and impoverished, between glittering capitals and festering slums, between booming industrial regions and primitive rural areas. A real threat to peace in these areas is the revolutionary challenge of an unjust social order in which true peace -- peace based on justice -- is impossible.

Those who have been "more blessed with this world's goods" must heed the Pope's plea to assist "those political communities whose citizens suffer from poverty, misery and hunger and who lack even the elementary rights of the human person."

We must do this out of compassion -- for we are our brother's keeper. And we also do it out of self-interest as well -- for our lot is their lot, our future their future, our peace their peace. This planet is simply too small for the insulation of the rich against turbulence bred of injustice in any part of the world.

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The flow of foreign aid -- both capital and technical assistance - is indispensable to the narrowin g of the gap between rich nations and poor. Much has been done by individual nations and by international organization. But more must be done -- both through foreign aid and by enlarging their opportunities for trade -- to assist those developing nations which are striving to bring to their people the economic and social benefits of modern civilization. The exact dimensions of the task and the most effective way of fulfilling it are questions which deserve further attention by the United Nations.

If the arms race is a strain on the economy of rich nations, it is an intolerable burden on that of poor nations. For developing nations with a rapidly expanding population, primitive economic institutions, and little capital development, participation in a nuclear arms race is inde - fensible.

A pioneer statesman of the nuclear era, the late Senator Brien McMahon, proposed almost two decades age that resources diverted from the arms race could be set aside to meet the unmet social and economic needs of mankind. His counsel remains valid today .

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The man whom we honor today -- like his predecessors -- recognized that a secure peace depends on a stable world community. And a stable world community requires a viable international organization .

The strengthening of the existing w orld organization -- the United Nations -- is one of our most urgent tasks.

Today we hear voices advocating abandonment of the United Nations, withdrawal from the United Nations, They are misguided. They would abandon an imperfect instrument for preserving world peace because they dislike our imperfect world. To abandon the U. N. -- or to immobilize it through crippling restrictions or failure to support it -- would only prove that our generation had forgotten the lessons of half a century of nationalism and isolationism. Let those who would destroy the United Nations recall the international anarchy that followed the demise of the League of Nations. In a nuclear era when anarchy can lead to annihilation, the United Nations deserves the support of all nations -- large and small, rich and poor. The heroes of the world community are not those who withdraw when difficulties ensue -- not those who can envision neither the prospect of success nor the consequence of failure -- but those who stand the heat of the battle -- the fight for world peace through the United Nations.

As everyone knows, the General Assembly has felt obliged to go into recess while negotiations proceed in search of a solution to the present constitutional impasse.

This is not a happy situation and it raises some political and legal problems for the UN's largest contributor as I am sure it does for other members. There are several things to be noted about this crisis.

First, the United Nations will continue even though the General Assembly has been deadlocked by a refusal of certain members to meet their obligations. The Security Council is not affected -- nor are the operations of that diversified family of affiliated agencies in the UN system.

Second, the membership includes nations with radically different ideas about the proper role of international organizations in world affairs; yet none denies they have a role. The argument is not whether the General Assembly should continue to function but under what ground rules it should carry on.

Third, the United Nations has expanded rapidly and almost continuously for two decades now -- and in the course of it the membership has more than doubled. In the meantime, the world environment in which it operates has undergone pervasive change. Under the circumstances, it would be surprising if the Organization did not face some awkward adjustments to new realities.

It may take time and patience and a high capacity to absorb frustration before the General Assembly gets back on the track or selects a somewhat different road ahead. But I am confident we meet in the hall of an institution which is in the throes of growing pains -- not in the grip of a fatal disease.

Another aspect of the world organization that requires immediate strengthening is the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations. Given the scope and the scale of major power interests and commitments around the world -- we are required to assume that any armed conflict may bear within it the seeds of a nuclear disaster.

So a workable peace system must be able to resolve by non-violent means the kinds of disputes which in the past have led to wars -- and to keep disruptive change in non-violent channels.

Here we can begin to see just how operational a peace system must be -- to visualize peacekeeping machinery in being and in action.

In its most operational and visible form, peacekeeping in action is an armed patrol of soldiers of peace in blue berets -- standing between warring ethnic groups in Cyprus...men who patrol the Gaza Strip twenty-four hours a day for the eighth year running...those who jump in to repair breaches of the peace along the other frontiers of Israel ... others who still stand watch along the fifteen-year-old truce line in Kashmir... and still others who keep tabs on the armistice line along the 38th Parallel in Korea.

These units of operational peacekeeping machinery were in place and in action when we arose this morning and they will be there when we go to bed tonight because there was an international organization to deal with threats to the peace; because there were established rules and procedures for conducting the business of peacekeeping; because there was a way to finance peacekeeping missions; and because members made available personnel and equipment and transport and other goods and services.

But the machinery of peace is much more than keeping an uneasy truce: it is the Security Council and the General Assembly and the Secretariat; it is conference machinery and voting procedures and Resolutions and assessments; it is a mission of inquiry or observation -- and a single civilian moving anonymously from private meeting to private meeting on a conciliation assignment.

Peacekeeping machinery is organization -- plus people and resources -- designed and operated to sustain a secure world order.

What we have so far is rudimentary -- even primitive -- machinery. It is not as extensive as it should be. It is not as versatile as it should be. It is not as reliable as it should be.

But it <u>is</u> machinery. It has proved to be workable in practice when enough members in practice wanted it to work.

Clearly one of the requirements of a workable peace system is to supplement and complement and improve the operational peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations.

Eventually we would hope that this machinery would be in a position to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes and incipient conflicts -- ideally by quiet conciliation -- if need be by verbal confrontation before the bar of world opinion -- and in extremis by placing whatever kind of peacekeeping force is needed in a position between antagonists -- so that no sovereignty is without potential international protection and no nation need call upon other nations to help protect them from predatory neighbors. Today we recognize that this is not possible.

In 1954 the Geneva accords were ratified guaranteeing the independent status of South Vietnam. Today in Vietnam that freedom is endangered by the systematic attempt of foreign backed subversives to win control of the country. Today peace in Southeast Asia can be obtained if the violators will cease their aggression.

Our policy is clear. We will continue to seek a return to the essentials of the Geneva accords of 1954. We will resist aggression. We will be faithful to a friend. We seek no wider war. We seek no dominion. Our goal in Southeast Asia is today what it was in 1954 -- what it was in 1962. Our goal is peace and freedom for the people of Vietnam.

An essential step for the strengthening of peacekeeping is the establishment of a flexible troop call-up system for future emergencies. The U.N. cannot do its peacekeeping job if there are long delays in getting its forces to world trouble spots.

(MORE)

The Secretary General's request that members maintain special U.N. peacekeeping contingents deserves the support of all, and I rejoice that some members have already responded -- Canada, the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and Iran.

The U.S. will assist in this strengthening of the peacekeeping capacity by helping to train and equip contingents of other nations earmarked for U. N. use -- by transporting these units when necessary -- and by paying their fair share of the cost of peacekeeping operations. We hope others will do the same.

It is, of course, the smaller countries which stand in the greatest need of international protection. But the great powers have an equal interest in effective peacekeeping machinery.

For a nation like the United States, the investment in U.N. peacekeeping is one of the best we can make. We do not aspire to any Pax Americana. We have no desire to play the role of global gendarme. Although we shall honor our commitments to assist friendly nations in preserving their freedom, we have no desire to interject American troops into explosive local disputes.

But disputes do occur; and if hostilities are to be ended and the peace preserved, there must be some outside force available to intervene. In many cases -- though not in all -- a stable professional U.N. force can play that role.

Therefore both the large powers and the small powers have a common interest -- if for different reasons -- in effective international peacekeeping machinery.

This is why the current impasse in the General Assembly -- and the consequent paralysis in its ability to rise to an emergency if need be -- is to be so deeply regretted.

IV

I have dwelt briefly this evening on but three of the foremost problems of peace -- nuclear competition, the gap between rich nations and poor, and the need for building a world community through the United Nations. In this Conference you will explore others.

A year ago in addressing the United Nations, President Johnson stated: "All that we have built in the wealth of nations, and all that we plan to do toward a better life for all, will be in vain if our feet should slip, or our vision falter, and our hopes ended in another world-wide war. If there is one commitment more than any other that I would like to leave with you today, it is my unswerving commitment to the keeping and to the strengthening of the peace."

Our commitment to strengthening the peace has not weakened. We seek a peace that is more than a pause between wars. But our knowledge of ourselves tells us that we can expect no sudden epidemic of peace, that we have far to go before as President Johnson says the "greatness of our institutions" matches the "grandeur of our intentions". The pursuit of peace is a gradual process.

Peace is too important to be the exclusive concern of the great powers. It requires the attention of all -- small nations and large, old nations and new.

The pursuit of peace resembles the building of a great cathedral. It is the work of generations. In concept it requires a master architect; in execution, the labors of many.

The pursuit of peace requires time -- but we must use time as a tool and not as a couch. We must be prepared to profit from the vision of peace left by great men who came our way.

(MORE)

We honor Pope John XXIII on this occasion not because he demonstrated that perfect peace can be achieved in a short time. We honor him because he raised our hopes and exalted our vision.

He realized that the hopes and expectations aroused could not all be satisfied in the immediate future. What can be accomplished in a limited time will always fall short of expectations.

This should not discourage us. What is important is that we be prepared to give some evidence that progress toward peace is being made, that some of the unsolved problems of peace can be met in the future.

This is the vision which Pope John left us in his encyclical Pacem in Terris.

"Without vision the people perish," says the Scripture.

It is the duty of our generation to convert this vision of peace into reality.

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REMARKS OF VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY AT THE
EDWARD R. MURROW CENTER OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY,
MEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS, DECEMBER 6, 1965

When President Johnson awarded Ed Murrow the Medal of Freedom -- the highest civilian decoration this nation has to bestow -- the President's words summed up his career:

"A pioneer in education through mass communications, he has brought to all his endeavors the conviction that truth and personal integrity are the ultimate persuaders of men and nations."

Truth . . . and personal integrity.

That was the legacy of Edward R. Murrow.

The man whom we honor today would approve of the educational innovation we inaugurate here: The Center of Public Diplomacy.

He would approve of the concept of the Center: to bring together professors, foreign correspondents, government officials, and graduate students for a probing exchange of views on the uses of public diplomacy.

He would approve of the Center being located amidst the great universities of the Boston area.

He would approve of the Center being here at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy -- the first graduate school of international relations established in the United States.

His only objection would be to the fact that the Center has been named after himself.

For Ed Murrow was one of the most selfless celebrities of our generation. In both broadcasting and government -- two public professions in which there is no surplus of modesty -- he remained to the end a totally unpretentious person, modest, and even shy.

He was idolized by his fellow broadcasters and at one point something close to a Murrow cult began to emerge. When a network official felt it was going a bit too far, and announced that he was forming a "Murrow Isn't God Club," Ed promptly wrote to him, and applied for a charter membership.

Edward R. Murrow was a man, too, of courage and principle.

On one occasion, when a fellow broadcaster was attacked by a group of super-patriots, the man suddenly found himself on one of TV's infamous blacklists. Murrow promptly gave the man 7,500 dollars to hire attorney Louis Nizer and initiate the libel suit that eventually cleared his name. "I'm not making a personal loan to you," said Murrow. "I am investing this money in America."

But if there is any special way that Ed Murrow would want to be remembered it would be expressed by the simple word; reporter.

Though he never would have admitted it, he virtually created radio and television reporting as we know it today.

Who can forget the drama of that solemn dateline: "This . . . is London"?

For when he said: "This . . . is London" -- it suddenly <u>was</u> London.

It was the real London -- and he had suddenly taken us there . . . out into the noisy terror of the streets, and down into the quite fear of the bomb shelters.

We no longer simply <u>heard</u> about the war from our radios. We were made spectators at the scene. When he stood on a London rooftop during a Nazi raid, and said "The English die with great dignity," it became more than merely news. We stood there on that rooftop with him, and we sensed that dignity.

Ed Murrow's war-time broadcasts were a whole new dimension in news reporting.

It was a dimension he was to broaden all during the rest of his life.

He often said in later years that broadcasting -- both in radio and television -- was essentially a transportation medium. It was not meant merely to inform. It was meant to carry the audience to the scene itself.

That is why Ed Murrow risked his life in 25 bombing missions over Germany. That is why he sailed up the English Channel in a minesweeper. That is why he stood in the horror of Buchenwald on the very day it was liberated.

For to Ed Murrow, to report . . . meant to be there.

To us -- now in 1965 -- all this may seem routine and obvious.

But Edward R. Murrow, as much as any single man in his time, made it all possible. As a mourning colleague put it at the time of his death, "He was an original and we shall not see his like again."

President Kennedy's appointment of Ed Murrow as director of the United States Information Agency was widely applauded.

A few people were surprised that Edward R. Murrow should turn his back on all the gold and glamour of Madison Avenue and take on the headaches of a much maligned and misunderstood government agency. But they did not know Ed Murrow.

He had been asked by the President to serve -- and believing that the public interest must come first, he was ready to serve. "Besides," as he told a friend later, "I had been criticizing bureaucrats all my adult life and it was my turn to try."

The fact is that he had been in public life ever since he was graduated from college, as a pioneer in that new and powerful establishment that has been aptly called "the fourth branch of government" -- the American press.

The appointment was a brilliant one. Ed Murrow understood, as well as any man in our century, the responsibility -- and the power for good -- of modern mass communications. He understood the relationship of that power to our open society.

He knew that the United States, as any open society, is a house with transparent walls. He knew that people who live in an open society should tell the truth about themselves.

In an open society as ours, the first principle of our public morality is that truth should be told.

As Lincoln once said:

"... falsehood, especially if you have got a poor memory, is the worst enemy a fellow can have."

Propaganda, to be effective, must be believed. To be believed, it must be credible. To be credible, it must be true. If it is not, in the end it will not stand up.

The evil genius Joseph Goebbels taught us unfounded propaganda can be effective only if the big lie is so bold and monstrous as to appear uninventable. In an open society, people are incapable of believing that anyone could be capable of such perversity. A propagandist such as Goebbels can enjoy temporary triumphs -- in a totalitarian society. In a free society, the shallowness of his creed will be exposed.

Today, the whole world can see what is going on in this global goldfish bowl that is the United States. We have a candid free press. And American magazines, films, and television shows, for better or worse, go virtually everywhere overseas.

In this kind of open society, it is futile for a government to put out false propaganda. There are too many non-governmental sources of information available to refute it.

The public official's words, as well as his actions, are inescapably subject to the

searing scrutiny of the reporter, the pundit and the scholar.

This includes the scrutiny of hundreds of foreign correspondents who are reporting back to their own nations every day. It includes the scrutiny of 80,000 foreign students, all of whom are writing home and most of whom will eventually be going home, to tell family and friends what America is really like.

Three and a half million American tourists go abroad every year. A million American military personnel and their dependents are stationed around the world. Over 30,000 American missionaries are scattered around the globe.

Each of these Americans becomes a kind of individual USIA to every person he meets overseas.

There is, then, not just one official Voice of America coming out of Washington. There is a whole, gigantic Chorus of Voices of America -- a chorus of literally millions -- who carry the story of the United States abroad. But this chorus is not under the baton of any minister of propaganda. Each American tells his own story -- refelcting his own understanding of America.

The diversity of American life is represented in the picture presented to the world.

But in an era where diplomacy is practiced by private individuals as well as government officials, new responsibilities arise for all.

For the businessman who conducts negotiations abroad with foreign governments; for the scholar or writer lecturing in foreign lands; for the artist or scientist attending international festivals or conferences, there is an obligation to know one's country, to give an objective analysis, to be an effective advocate. (And, might I add, to do this, we must know major languages of the world, which our educational system must be equipped to teach).

Ed Murrow excelled as a reporter because he knew the world which he was reporting. If the citizen diplomat is to excel he must know his country and the world he is addressing.

As one who understood the effect of the communications revolution on diplomacy in our time, Edward R. Murrow would rejoice that "public diplomacy" will now be the object of continuing study and reflection by serious students and scholars.

If four decades of public diplomacy have disappointed those who saw in Woodrow Wilson's "open diplomacy" the solution to all international disputes, it remains today -- far more so than in Wilson's time -- an important part of international relations.

In the United States two decades of world leadership have enhanced its importance. The exposure of Americans to foreign affairs has multiplied dramatically. Our military and political commitments around the world, our participation in hundreds of international organizations, the expansion of the Foreign Service, the development of the foreign aid agency and the Peace Corps have placed more Americans in a diplomatic role than was conceivable twenty years ago.

The enlargement of our foreign affairs machinery has been accompanied by a vastly enlarged public market for information on foreign affairs.

The result is that scholars and businessmen, labor leaders and foundation executives -- and the average American citizen, too -- are more deeply concerned and more vocal on international affairs than ever before.

As recent events have shown, American citizens today do not restrict their foreign affairs concerns to detached criticism of governmental action. They initiate public programs and public protests favoring one course of action or deriding another. They advocate freely and they dissent freely.

For those of us in government, John Stuart Mill's advice is as valid today as when uttered a century ago:

"We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still."

And, thus, we must prize both advocacy and dissent.

Without the right of dissent, the free debate essential to an enlightened consensus is impossible.

Oftentimes the views of the American people will be expressed through the Congress, which can excercise great influence on the conduct of foreign relations -- through resolutions and speeches as well as through the power of confirmation and of controlling expenditures. In conducting affairs of state at an important international conference, and American Secretary of State may find that a Congressional resolution or a Senate committee investigation may determine the setting for action far more than any decision taken by the President of the United States. Congressional participation in diplomacy is now well-accepted. But what precise role it is best suited to play remains a disputed issue -- one which will merit the attention of scholars of this center of public diplomacy.

For my part, I do not fear the encroachments of Congress on the conduct of diplomacy. It is possible that during the first half of the century there did occur in Western societies a "functional derangement between the governed and the governors," an assumption by popular legislatures of powers they were ill-equipped to exercise in the field of international affairs.

Today under our Presidential system an American President has the authority and the power he needs to determine the course of foreign policy.

Modern communications technology has aided what the Constitution intended -- that the President take the lead in formulating and executing foreign policy. Strong Presidential leadership -- combined with independent Congressional initiatives -- is what is needed in the age of public diplomacy.

When this is present -- as it is today -- there need be little fear of excessive Congressional intervention.

And public diplomacy, however important it is destined to become, is not likely to supercede private diplomacy.

But the importance of public diplomacy has been enhanced by the communications revolution of our time. This has provided us with an electronic means of multiplying the human mind. We can today literally reach out and communicate -- simultaneously -- with millions of other minds.

One simple invention -- the transistor radio -- may have had more psychological impact on the world than any other single invention in the past century.

For the transistor radio -- which in this country we still regard as a kind of toy -- has suddenly become an immensely significant political instrument.

People everywhere today -- on the plains and paddies of Asia; on the rolling grasslands of Africa; on the high slopes of the Andes -- everywhere in our shrunken world, people are now within earshot of a transistor radio.

What is more, most of these people today in the nearly 50 new nations that have erupted into the political scene since the end of World War II, have the franchise. Their village views are backed up by their village votes.

These people in the remote villages of the world may not be literate in the traditional sense.

But they are politically conscious. They are in touch. They know what is going on. And they will help shape the future of mankind.

Through their village radios, they can now pick and choose from the world's political opinions.

What is true of the village transistor radio of today will be true of the village television set of tomorrow. Television is already in more than 90 countries of the world. It is now the fastest growing medium of communication on earth.

What does all this really mean?

It means that the communications explosion has vastly enlarged the role of public diplomacy. This is the instrument the Edward R. Murrow Center is going to study.

May it always be an instrument, in our country, for truth. May it always be an instrument used for man's betterment and emancipation.

In the word of Ed Murrow:

"If truth must be our guide then dreams must be our goal. To the hunger of those masses yearning to be free and to learn, to this sleeping giant now stirring, that is so much of the world, we shall say: We share your dreams."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECEMBER 9, 1966 FOR THE PRESS NO. 289

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACH
ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS'
71ST ANNUAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
WALDORF-ASTORIA HOTEL, NEW YORK CITY
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1966, AT 8:45 P.M., E.S.T.

Mr. President, and fellow students of the antitrust laws:

I want you to know how much I appreciate the warmth of your welcome to one who is, after all, best known to you as a former enforcer of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.

Let me say at the outset that in the two months I have been in the State Department I have revised some of my thinking. Being Under Secretary of State is a great deal different than being Attorney General, and I assure you that I do not propose to bring a suit charging a combination in restraint of trade ... against the Common Market. Nor will we dispatch U.S. Marshals to break up rioting ... by the Red Guards in Peking.

On the other hand, there is one element of change for which I had hoped but which has not materialized. There are just as many pickets.

Indeed, where the mid-1950s are remembered as the era of the Fifth Amendment, I would suggest that the mid-1960s will be known as the era of the First Amendment. We live in a banner period for free speech.

We have been virtually engulfed in a tide of demonstrations, rallies, boycotts, pickets, and bumper strips, covering a range of issues and a range of urgency.

We have seen memorable, powerful expressions like the March on Washington. There have been teach-ins on Viet-Nam. In Berkeley, there was even a vivid demonstration on behalf of existentialism -- by the student who paraded all day with a picket sign that was blank.

The latest manifestation is lapel buttons. I saw one today proclaiming, "Mary Poppins is a Junkie."

There is the button reading "Support Your Local Police" and its opposite number, which reads "Your Local Police are Armed and Dangerous."

And there is another set which perhaps carries diversity of opinion to a peak of classic simplicity. One says "Button", the other, "Anti-Button."

I.

Today, I would like to spend a few minutes discussing with you the issues of East-West Trade and I would like to begin by recalling still another protest cause -- that of the citizens who have ranged themselves into "Committees to Warn of the Arrival of Communist Merchandise on the Local Scene."

Some have gone into groceries to paste labels on Polish hams. A man in Shreveport, Louisiana appeals for funds in the belief that if we continue to import Yugoslav tobacco for American cigarette blends, "all the Christians will be persecuted and the women raped and the little children sent to slave camps." A lady in New Jersey is waging a campaign against the import of carrots from Canada on the ground that some of the carrots are Communist carrots.

Let me make it plain that I have no quarrel with the right of such individuals to protest or demonstrate lawfully. Nor is it for me to object to their ardor on behalf of a cause. But I would suggest that their patriotism exceeds their understanding, for in such blanket protest against communism, they are reacting to the facts of the last decade rather than this one.

Communism surely remains a resolute opponent of free societies. And surely there is little need, at a time when we are fighting in Viet-Nam, to repeat our nation's determination to resist Communist aggression.

But how vastly different is the face of communism in the World today than it was a decade ago. How much meaning can even the phrase "world communism" have when Red Guards riot at the Soviet Embassy in

Peking

Peking and the Chinese Communists charge the Soviet Union with conspiring with the United States to betray North Viet-Nam?

Communism is no longer the monolith of Stalin's time. Increasingly, we see deep, even bitter divisions between Communist nations. Increasingly, we see Eastern European countries pursuing individual national interest and identity. Increasingly, these countries reflect grave understanding of the impartial dangers of destruction.

For both sides, these changes create a channel for contact, for understanding, and for peace. And this is a channel we have already begun to travel. Three years ago, we were able to agree on a Test Ban Treaty. Recently, we extended our cultural exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union and we have signed an air travel agreement. Only yesterday, came word of the agreement barring nuclear weapons in space.

Two months ago, President Johnson told a New York audience that:

> "Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the East -- a shift from the narrow concept of co-existence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement.
>
> "Under the last four Presidents, our policy toward the Soviet Union has been the same. Where necessary, we shall defend freedom; where possible, we shall work with the East to build a lasting peace.
>
> "We do not intend to let our differences on Viet-Nam or elsewhere ever prevent us from exploring all opportunities. We want the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and our allies shall go step by step with them just as far as they are willing to advance."

In short, the winds of change in Eastern Europe are freeing the ice floes of the Cold War. They can be warm winds. They can also be trade winds.

II. Trade

II.

Trade with Eastern Europe is a subject in which the NAM has exhibited sustained and responsible interest, as exemplified by the extensive study by Dr. Mose Harvey, which you commissioned. As I think Dr. Harvey would agree, this is a time when increasing trade with Eastern Europe, under careful and selective direction, can be both good business and good policy.

But the Government does not now have the authority to free that trade or to apply selective direction. It is not now possible for the United States to take full advantage of the opportunities presented by trade.

The core of the problem is that only Yugoslavia and Poland now receive the same tariff treatment we give to the other countries of the world. The President may not extend it to the other countries of Eastern Europe.

This is the "Most-Favored-Nation" treatment, which for 40 years has been central to our foreign commercial policy. (I might add, however, that I have never understood the reason for the phrase. All that "most favored" means is non-discriminatory treatment).

We gave Most-Favored-Nation treatment to Eastern Europe for many years. In 1951, however, at the height of the cold war, we withdrew it, imposing on the products of these countries the very high rates of the old Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.

This was a rational distinction to make in 1951. But is it rational today? Should not the President have authority to negotiate with any of these countries for the advantages we can gain by offering them the same tariff rates we apply to the rest of the world?

The President's

The President's inability to negotiate in this manner now sharply limits our capacity to use our great economic power of trade as an instrument of foreign policy. And more obviously, it sharply limits trade. This is a self-imposed restriction--and we are the only major free world nation to so tie our hands.

Recognizing the potential of a freer hand, the President sought to explore both the policy and trade benefits. In early 1965, he appointed a study committee of distinguished business, labor, and academic leaders, including members of this Association and chaired by J. Irwin Miller, Chairman of the Cummins Engine Company.

The Miller Committee conducted an exhaustive study--which was based on full access to our defense and intelligence information. In its superb report, it concluded that the United States, having built the most powerful defense system the world has ever seen, could and should seek practical means of reducing areas of conflict.

Peaceful, non-strategic trade, the Committee said, "can be an important instrument of national policy in our country's relations with individual Communist countries of Europe" and we should use trade negotiations with those countries more actively, aggressively, and confidently, "in the pursuit of our national welfare and world peace."

And the single most important step, the committee concluded, is to give the President discretionary authority to grant--or withdraw--non-discriminatory tariff treatment to individual countries of Eastern Europe.

The proposed East-West Trade Relations Act, based on the Miller Committee recommendations, would do exactly that. Congress did not act on this measure last year, but as the President said in October, we intend to press for it in the coming Congress.

III. I have

III.

I have so far only suggested the Administration's reasoning in supporting this measure. Let me now analyze it in somewhat greater detail on the framework of three basic questions.

The first is, why should we send goods to Communist countries--opponents of our system--and thus either directly or indirectly strengthen their military capacity?

Unlike the blanket condemnation of protesters who paste labels on hams in markets, this is not only a sensible question, but a basic question. There are three answers to it.

1. At present, the export of strategic goods--goods closely or directly related to military use--are strictly controlled. In seeking this Act, we would not abandon such independent controls.

2. The Soviet Union's military capability is not based on imports. On the contrary, as the world knows, it has developed advanced weapons and space technology from its own resources.

3. It is not likely that trade with the United States would release Soviet resources for additional military spending. The Soviet Union already gives highest priority to military spending. Larger imports from the United States would almost certainly expand the consumer sector of the Soviet economy, not the military. As the Miller Committee noted, any change in Soviet resource availability would "affect its civilian economy, not its military budget."

The basic point, after all, is that we are talking about trade, not aid. The Soviet Union and the other East European countries would have to pay for increased imports either with gold or by increased exports--and those would require diversion of resources to produce.

The effect

The effect of all three of these points was summarized by the Miller Committee: "Total Western nonstrategic trade, let alone U.S. trade, could not be expected to alter the fundamental relationship between East-West military capabilities."

Accepting that conclusion, it is still fair to ask the second question: Would expanded East-West trade really amount to very much economically; is it really good business?

The total amount of trade potential in the East European countries should not be exaggerated. They are not among the great trading nations, nor are they soon likely to become so.

Nevertheless, their trade could be meaningful. The rocketing success of the free economies in the West is exerting a major influence on the economic planners of the east.

In the past 15 years, East European trade has increased five-fold. Last year, the free world sold more than six billion dollars in goods to Eastern Europe and bought almost the same amount.

The United States has not shared in this growth. West Germany, for example, exports more than half a billion dollars worth of goods each year--five times our present total. Earlier this year, the Fiat company of Italy entered into an agreement to build an 800 million dollar compact car plant in the Soviet Union.

In other words, East European trade with the West is going to expand, with us or without us. If we do not participate, however, we will lose more than business opportunities. We will have forfeited a major opportunity to achieve policy gains, and this raises the third question: Would expanded East-West trade really amount to very much diplomatically; is it really good policy?

This, in the

This, in the Administrations' view, is by far the most important aspect of East-West trade. Where reasons of economic gain might justify it, reasons of policy require it.

As Secretary Rusk observed last week:

> "It is too late in history to maintain intractable hostility across the entire range of relationships ... Even at a time where there are difficult and painful and even dangerous issues between us, it is necessary in the interest of homo sapiens for the leaders on both sides to explore the possibilities of points of agreement."

Enlarged trade can be a significant framework for such exploration -- if the countries of Eastern Europe want trade, as surely they do. Life magazine this week describes a trade fair in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The American pavilion was small compared with the Soviet and German displays, but it was stocked with such items as a crop-dusting plane, data processing machines, a tire-recapping machine, and an electronic "car doctor".

The magazine quotes one American official as saying, "They try to do everything here with one pair of pliers. When we showed them 20 different kinds of pliers, not to mention all those screwdrivers -- well, my God."

In less than two weeks, the pavilion had attracted 650,000 people, three times the population of the city.

At the most specific level, the enlarged trade would give us the influence to secure satisfactory economic concessions, such as patent protections, or trade and tourist promotion offices, or assurances concerning arbitration of commercial disputes.

A larger benefit relates to the continuing movement of these countries away from the rigidities of the past. Politically, they are

reasserting

reasserting their national identities. Economically, they are turning increasingly away from centralized direction and increasingly toward greater use of the profit incentive.

Yugoslavia is the model example. After breaking away from the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslavia began economic decentralization, giving considerable autonomy to individual enterprises. This has continued to the point that Yugoslavia is now a member of the great international economic institutions like the World Bank, GATT, and the International Monetary Fund.

This change is not isolated. Almost all the countries of Eastern Europe are working to overcome the clumsiness and inefficiencies of over-centralized economic direction.

Next January 1, Czechoslovakia embarks on a major economic reform program placing new responsibilities on the plant managers and placing new stress on the market and the price system in determining the success or failure of individual enterprises.

A year later Hungary is scheduled to put even more radical changes into effect. New experiments are underway in Bulgaria and Poland. And you are familiar with the experiments in using the profit motive underway in the Soviet Union.

In most of these countries efficiency is replacing ideology as the guide in economic matters, and the demands of the ordinary consumer for more goods and a better standard of living are being listened to with new respect.

What is most striking in this process of change is that in no two Eastern European countries are the changes identical. Each is going its own way, reflecting growing feelings of national identity and independence which are coming to the surface throughout the area.

But by acting

But by acting on these changes, we can advance our own interests and advance the prospects of peace. Through trade, we can encourage them to rebuild their historical friendly ties to the West. Through trade, we can increase their contacts with American businessmen -- and tourists. Through trade, we can encourage their participation in international institutions -- and international responsibilities. Through trade, we can increase their stake in peaceful relations with the West.

And finally, basic to all of these benefits is our demonstration of faith in the strength of the free society. We do not fear the tests to which the future will put such a society. We have not sought to seal it behind an Iron Curtain or a Berlin Wall -- nor should we seal it behind a rigid tariff blockade.

That blockade should be removed. On behalf of good business, good policy, and good sense I invite and welcome your support.

* * * * * * * * * * *

Katzenbach
E-W trade

p.3. Communism no longer a monolith. E. Europe pursuing indiv national interest

3 - 4 Bq quota - policy of peaceful engagement

4 - increased trade with E. Europe is good business - and good policy

4 - Gatt must be used / reductions to permit business to expand E-W trade.
MFN - withdrawn in 1951 - now should be restored.

5. Presidents inability to negotiate should be remedied

6 Quote Miller report
Proposed E-W trade Relations Act - based on Miller committee would do ~~But~~ what is needed - give the President ability to negotiate.

6. Will and non-strategic goods
no ~~doubt~~ assurance to Sov military capacity as it is not tested on inputs
Would not release Sov resources for additional defense spending

Trade would be limited in volume - but critical effects would be good. East European trade is going to expand - with or without US. Will have policy gains if we exclude it.

Is it really good policy
Encourages enlargement of area, agreement, softening the regulations / the regime. Pursuing individual interests / profit motive looms larger - econ decentralization increased. (eg. Yugoslavia before — now Czechoslovakia).

Efficiency replacing ideology as economic motive.

We can encourage historical friendly ties with West - and encourage participation in int. institutions

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE FOY D. KOHLER
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
MID-WINTER CONFERENCE, AMERICAN LEGION'S FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
ROBERT MEYER MOTOR INN, ORLANDO, FLORIDA
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1966, AT 12:00 NOON, E.S.T.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your friendly welcome.

Ladies and Gentlemen: I am glad to be with you today. It seems very appropriate to me that my first appearance outside of Washington since my return from the Soviet Union should be in Florida, for it is the state my wife and I are in the process of adopting, having originated, respectively, in North Carolina and Ohio. This background, I take it, will make us feel very much at home among our fellow Floridians.

Just a few weeks ago, we returned from Moscow after living there for nearly four and one-half years. Maybe as a result of that experience and of previous assignments in Eastern Europe, I can cast some light for you on the problems of East-West relations, a subject which is vital--I was about to say a matter of life and death--to all of us.

A century ago a voyage to Russia consumed months. When we came back by combination of plane and ship it took us seven days. When direct air communications are established next year, a flight from Moscow to New York will take about eight hours. But even today a missile can make it in thirty minutes.

For a good many years American Presidents have been concerned that the traffic between these two particular points on the globe should go by sea and land and in the atmosphere, rather than on a ballistic trajectory through space. I have had the privilege of working with several Administrations--with President Eisenhower, with President Kennedy, with President Johnson--on this question. I found that each of these Presidents, looking at the problem from the point of view of the national interest, of the well-being and security of all Americans, came to hold essentially the same views and reached essentially the same conclusions. The policies which have issued from their profound consideration of how to insure a peaceful world have been set forth by all of them--most recently, of course, by President Johnson.

Speaking last August at the National Reactor Testing Site for the Atomic Energy Commission at Idaho Falls, the President, after hailing the peaceful potential of atomic power said:

> "But there is another -- and a darker -- side of the nuclear age that we should never forget. That is the danger of destruction by nuclear weapons....
> uneasy is the peace that wears a nuclear crown. And we cannot be satisfied with a situation in which the world is capable of extinction in a moment of error, or madness, or anger.
>
> "Since

"Since 1945, we have opposed Communist efforts to bring about a Communist-dominated world. We did so because our conviction and our interests demanded it; and we shall continue to do so.

"But we have never sought war or the destruction of the Soviet Union; indeed, we have sought instead to increase our knowledge and our understanding of the Russian people with whom we share a common feeling for life, a love of song and story, and a sense of the land's vast promises."

After talking of our differences with the Soviet Union, the President posed the question as to what practical step could be taken forward toward peace. He answered himself: "I think it is to recognize that while differing principles and differing values may always divide us, they should not, and they must not, deter us from rational acts of common endeavor....This does not mean that we have to become bedfellows. It does not mean that we have to cease competition. But it does mean that we must both want -- and work for and long for -- that day when 'nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more'."

In October, just before he left for his trip to the Far East, President Johnson spelled all this out a bit further in a speech in New York, reviewing U.S. policy toward Europe as a whole. "The Atlantic Allies", he said, "have always tried to maintain /a healthy balance/ between strength and conciliation, between firmness and flexibility, between resolution and hope....The world is changing. Our policy must reflect the reality of today, not yesterday....A just peace remains our goal....

"Our purpose is not to overturn other governments but to help the people of Europe to achieve:

"A continent in which the people of Eastern and Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder together for the common good.

"A continent in which alliances do not confront each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a framework in which West and East can act together in order to assure security of all."

The President then listed some new measures he intends to take to strengthen the prospects for improved relations with the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe in trade and other fields and he welcomed comparable measures on the part of our Atlantic allies.

Why have a succession of Presidents of different political persuasion reached essentially the same conclusions? Why did President Johnson state our policy in the terms I have quoted? These are questions I should like to explore with you this morning.

I think we can start by agreeing that the Free World continues to be challenged by a hostile political system whose leaders claim that only that system, materialistic in concept, authoritatian in character, is capable of solving the problems besetting mankind. They proclaim as a matter of historical inevitability that their system is destined to rule the world. It is a fact that Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe pursue an ideology fundamentally opposed to our own.

Since

Since 1945, the conflict between the two systems has sometimes taken the form of trials of strength and periods of military conflict; more often, it has been conducted by less violent methods. That confrontation, in broader terms, has its "defensive" and "offensive" aspects, if I may use these military terms. I propose to speak to you today about both aspects.

In the course of the last twenty years the United States has had to confront Communist violence in many parts of the world. This we have done, and this we will do, if necessary, again. We firmly believe that in the nuclear age no power has the right to impose its ideas or its system on others through the use of arms. This is a fundamental lesson which all nations must learn and abide by. We have striven to drive that lesson home.

Accordingly, when Greece was threatend by Communist subversion in the immediate post-war years, the United States did not hesitate to come to the aid of Greece. At that time, there were many who argued that we should not. They said that Greece was under a conservative, indeed even a reactionary system, not worthy of our assistance. Today, twenty years later, Greece is a thriving democracy, and even the severest critics of President Truman's policy now agree that our efforts in Greece contributed to peace and stability in the Balkans.

I need not speak to you at length about the Korean War. Many of you assembled here today took part in that conflict, and you know well what was at stake. The United States did not hesitate to send its young men and to commits its resources in order to insure that peace and stability prevail in the Northern Pacific. Because we did not hesitate, Communist China as well as Stalin's Russian learned, painfully and at some cost to them, that the United States is unflinching when faced with the threat of force.

In Europe, we have made it clear to our friends and foes that we stand by our commitments. They have been tested twice in Berlin. The United States is still in West Berlin and no citizen of West Berlin need fear about his future.

There was a time during the post-war confrontation when the Soviet leadership, because of misguided assumptions, concluded that the balance of power could be turned in its favor and that the United States could be stared down in a nuclear confrontation. Soviet missiles were implanted not far from here -- in Cuba. But precisely because we stood firm and fast, wisdom prevailed and the Soviet missiles are there no longer.

Thus painfully and gradually, a measure of restraint has come into American-Soviet relations. This has come about because the Soviets have no illusions about our determination to meet force with force.

We are in the process of establishing the same principle in Viet-Nam. The issue there is not a local one. It pertains to the peace of Asia and, more fundamentally, to the kind of strategy international communism will follow in this decade. Having learned that overt force does not pay, some Communists concluded that covert force may open the gates. We are keeping them shut. It is no secret that we believe that in keeping them shut we are aiding not only the cause of peace but also the arguments of those Communists who have already learned that violence is not the way

to

to global supremacy. Had we been weak in Viet-Nam, we would have helped the arguments of the more radical Communists who contend that covert violence is something to which the United States cannot effectively respond. If we had not responded, we would have proven the radical Communists right.

These periods of violence have thus demonstrated -- and are demonstrating in Viet-Nam -- that Communist attempts to expand their systems by force an and will be contained by the determination of the Free World. But, as I have suggested, these responses have been essentially "defensive". And these contests have also demonstrated that force is not a solution to the basic conflict between political systems.

In many respects the more important and long-lasting aspect of the struggle is the one I would describe as "offensive" despite its less spectacular nature. I have in mind active promotion of a process of gradual change designed to shape the kind of world we would all like to live in. -- A world of cooperative communities, in which ideological divisions no longer create fundamental gulfs between men and societies, -- a world in which violence gives way to the rule of law, -- a world in which poverty and suffering are overcome by world-wide efforts to improve the well-being of man.

Indeed, this quieter and more subtle process has already brought about some fundamental evolutionary developments in the Communist world. And the action of such natural forces as nationalism have been encouraged by positive programs of developing constructive relationships with the countries of Eastern Europe, carried on by the United States and other Western countries for the past decade.

The Communist world is no longer monolithic. We can no longer talk of a Sino-Soviet bloc. The first crack appeared in 1948, with the Soviet-Yugoslav split. One of the great decisions in American foreign policy was President Truman's prompt and immediate support of the Yugoslav declaration of national independence by the provision of large-scale military and economic aid to support this Yugoslav position. Since then Yugoslavia has gone its own independent way, and is experimenting with changes in its economic and political system that are of importance for the Communist world as a whole. As you probably know, Yugoslavia has gone a long way towards a market economy, and today the Yugoslav leaders are debating what role the Communist party should be playing in this society, how much dissent ought to be permitted, what forms of human liberty should be introduced into a system that once was a totalitarian one. Just four days ago, for the first time in Communist history the government of one of the Yugoslav provinces, Slovenia, was forced to resign in the face of opposition in its own parliament.

Ten years ago, both Poland and Hungary challenged Soviet supremacy. Although the Hungarian Revolution was brutally crushed, Poland did gain a measure of autonomy. Its government has not broken with the Soviet Union, and we should have no illusions about that. Nonetheless, significant aspects of Polish life are free of Communist control. More than eighty percent of Polish farm land is privately owned and cultivated. Collectivization has been abandoned altogether. A measure of freedom of expression is tolerated. Extensive contacts with the West have been developed. Hundreds of young Poles are studying in Western institutions, many of them in the United States.

More

More generally, the process of fragmentation in the Communist world has been accentuated by the Sino-Soviet dispute. That dispute has dissipated the illusion of unity which has been one of the sources of strength of Communist ideology. It has proven not only to the world at large but to the Communists themselves that their ideology does not ensure global unity; it has proven that national aspirations and feelings are more powerful than doctrinal formulas.

Today, the Soviet people can take little comfort in having a Communist neighbor to the East of them. That Communist neighbor, with nearly four times the population of the Soviet Union, makes no secret of its hostility and contempt for the Soviet Union. I often wonder how we would feel if one of our neighbors had close to seven-hundred million people, was developing nuclear weapons and rockets, was condemning our social system, and laying claims to major portions of our territory? I need not recall how concerned we were of the Soviet missiles on the small island of Cuba. Magnify that threat many times and you may get a sense of how an average Russian feels.

That Sino-Soviet dispute has served to increase the margin of autonomy for the East Europeans. While generally siding with the Soviet Union, with the notable exception of Albania, the East Europeans have also taken advantage of the dispute to assert greater autonomy for themselves. This is a normal and understandable effect, typical of the international game: whenever a major partner is preoccupied elsewhere, the minor partners become more effective in asserting their interests. In that respect the East Europeans are no different from anyone else.

If I may generalize broadly, today, the East Europeans are increasingly desirous of developing relations with the West. They realize that the crisis they face in their economies, the need they have for more advanced forms of science and technology, their quest for cultural self-expression can only be satisfied through closer relations with the West.

This, to a large extent, is also true of the Soviet Union. I have in mind here the Soviet people rather than the Soviet leadership. The leadership itself is still governed by ideological considerations, which color its approach to the West. It is still more interested in pursuing the goal of fragmenting Western unity than of seeking a general accommodation with the West. But we should keep in mind that Communist rule in these countries, by their own definition, represents a monopoly of political power in the hands of a single party which includes only a small minority of the population. And Russian society at large, as I can testify through countless contacts, desires to participate in the Western civilization, it wishes to develop closer contacts with the United States, it does not desire to be cut off from the world by an ideological curtain.

I would be misleading you if I created the impression that everything is rosy in the Communist world -- and I do not mean to make a bad pun by that remark. There are many things taking place there which we can justly classify as retrogressive. We are unhappy over the fact that, in the context of our efforts to improve relations with the East, the Czechoslovak Government has seen fit to kidnap a U.S. citizen who was not even in Czechoslovakia voluntarily but was brought in by a Soviet aircraft not even scheduled to stop there.

We are

We are also dismayed, as are all free men, by the sight of distinguished Soviet writers being tried and sent to prison because they dared to publish in the West the products of their creative talent. We are indignant when American tourists in the Soviet Union are subjected to harsh and arbitrary procedures for trivial offenses. We are concerned by the conflict with the Catholic church and by other forms of intellectural intolerance recently manifested in Poland.

All of these manifestations, however, have to be seen in their broad perspective. And the trend, to me, seems clear: it involves a decline in the ideological passions which have dominated mankind in the last one-hundred years.

Without going into tedious historical analysis, I think it is fair to say that the age of ideologies has been a peculiar phenomenon in history. It was the product of a very special phase of European development. Other nations, going through similar social and industrial revolutionary changes, became infected by ideological attitudes.

Those of you who travel to Europe must be struck how much less ideological the Europeans have become. The same is true, I can tell you on the basis of my personal experience, of the East Europeans and the Russians. Indeed, precisely because they were exposed to a pernicious and dogmatic ideology, in some respects they are even less ideological than their West European brothers. I remember talking not long ago to an East European Communist professor, whom I asked, "Why did your ideology die so quickly?" To which he responded, and I repeat -- he is a Communist, "Die so quickly? I think it took too long to die!" His attitude is symtomatic of many others who, disillusioned by Stalinism, embittered by persistent economic and social failures of the system are turning to more pragmatic solutions.

I think it is our role in the world today to take advantage of the trends of thought and of the developments which I discussed to shape a larger and more stable relationship with some of the Communist states and to encourage constructive change within. We should not lower our guard, but we should take advantage of every opportunity to develop closer contacts and wider relations with them, in order to shape a stable world.

Our efforts to that end have not been without their rewards. We helped save Yugoslav independence during its hour of danger and anyone familiar with East Europe knows that in the years that followed Yugoslavia has had a major liberalizing impact on the rest of the Soviet world. Under President Eisenhower we extended economic assistance to the Poles, and we made it easier for them to preserve their free enterprise agricultural system. Taking advantage of the opportunities which are now opening, we wish to expand our relations with the Communist states. Some of the restrictions on East-West trade adopted during the earlier, more intense phase of the cold war have now outlived their usefulness. In proposing to Congress the East-West Trade Relations Act, the President has taken an action designed to give greater flexibility to the United States in dealing with the Communist countries. The export of military or militarily useful items to Communist countries is effectively prohibited by Allied agreement. Further restrictions on our trade with these states do not in the long run deny the Communists anything; they can obtain most of the goods concerned in West Europe or elsewhere. Added restrictions do make it more difficult for us to develop relations designed to shape patterns of development that we consider favorable in the Eastern states. At the same time they punish our own farmers and manufacturers unnecessarily.

I do not

I do not think I need to tell you that our purpose is not a series of give-aways; rather, our intent is to create such commercial relations that the Communist states develop closer ties with the West, such relations that they will increasingly be encouraged to evolve domestically along the lines we desired. I can assure you that the people in these countries know how we and the Western Europeans live. They know it is much better than the way they live. They want to live as we do, to have cars, adequate housing and better clothing. It is clear to me that it is in our interest to take actions which help bring about a diversion of their resources from military and space programs to consumer goods. Trade is not just commercial, but also political. It is a two-way street and one of the channels of communications with these countries. Let me put it to you this way. Who here would not sooner have people in Yugoslavia growing tobacco rather than producing munitions? Who among us would not rather have Soviet workers making passenger cars instead of missiles. Isn't it better for us all for Poland to devote increased resources to production of high-quality pork and ham? Who does not think it useful that Romanian resources be devoted to an automobile tire industry rather than to production of jet fuel?

In sum, we must be able to use our vast power and our resources to shape the kind of world we would want to see our children live in. In his recent major speech on East-West relations, the President called for "a broader vision of peaceful engagement". This was not a call for an immediate accommodation with the Soviet Union nor was it an effort to attain a settlement in Europe on the basis of the status quo. It is rather a commitment on the part of the United States to continue seeking a new Europe, in which a more durable settlement can eventually be attained.

As the President said, the present division of Europe and of Germany will be ended through a long process of change, which requires the emergence of new conditions and attitudes both in the East and in the West. There are no rapid breakthroughs waiting in the wings.

As we look to the future, we believe that progress towards European unity and Atlantic cooperation provides a foundation stone for a stable East-West reconciliation. We'll continue to build such a Europe and we'll continue to seek such a reconciliation.

Eventually, we hope to see emerge an Eastern Europe of more independent states, with governments more responsive to domestic needs and pressures, participating more fully in a larger structure of bilateral and multilateral East-West cooperation in Europe -- a cooperation that includes also the United States and the Soviet Union. In seeking such East-West reconciliation, in the words of Secretary of State Rusk, "ours is not an effort to subvert the East European governments nor to make those states hostile to the Soviet Union or to each other. No one would benefit from an Eastern Europe that is again 'Balkanized.'"

We approach this task in a spirit of self-reliance and optimism. We know that we have the means to repel aggression wherever it occurs. We know that we have the will do do so. Of this, let no one have any doubt. But it is not enough simply to react to Communist challenges. If we are to win this contest, we must remain on the "offensive"; we must take positive and constructive initiatives. We know that our citizens, intelligently perceiving the realities of this age, will support an East-West policy that uses to the fullest the wealth and diversity of this nation to shape an enduring peace.

* * *

F. Kohler

p. 4 — description of autonomy in Eastern European countries

5 rationalism as ideology
effect of Sino-Soviet split

5- ↓ Europeans increasingly (decrease)
of contacts with West

6- trade - E-W. Trade Act

This certainly was one possibility. But it was not the only one. And it has taken a good many cold showers to clear our heads. No one likes cold showers, and these have been especially unpleasant because they were accompanied by a great, roaring wind which drove the drops of cold water very forcefully against our sensitive skins.

But now, thanks to this cold water therapy, we can see that we, as much as anyone else, were mesmerized by the ancient, glorious, but now obsolete concept of the nationalistic nation-state. Even in our rebellion against it, the only alternative we could picture was a supra-nationalistic nation-state.

Now we see that the alternatives are far more numerous and more varied. And we see that, paradoxically, we were false to the peculiar genius of the Anglo-Saxon peoples (les Anglo-Saxons) in insisting that the logic of the situation led, clearly and inexorably, to the one, correct, cartesian solution -- applied yesterday to our territories, tomorrow to Western Europe, the day after to Africa, or Latin America, or even to the ancient cultures of Asia.

Now we see that there is not just one form, there are many forms in which the nations of Western Europe, of all Europe, of the Atlantic Community, of the entire world can associate for one or another purpose. And we see that the choice among these forms is not a matter of dogma or doctrine or ideology, but a matter of weighing pragmatically the advantages and disadvantages of each concrete possibility.

The result will not for many years, perhaps even many generations, be the sort of neat and tidy structure that delighted my old professors of political science. It may never stand still long enough for them

to describe it and frame examination questions about it. It may even make professors of political science ~~so~~ as obsolete as the old-fashioned, ~~totally soverign nation-state.~~

But it will work. Science and technology are tying us together too tightly, constantly creating new and larger interdependencies; and they will not permit the structure not to work. Where one form of association fails to do its job, our computers will quickly locate the trouble and either "de-bug" the system or design a better one. All that is required of us is to approach these questions with open minds.

In addition to this central defect in our vision -- our obsession with a United States of Europe -- there have been shortcomings in our execution of certain of our policies.

We have sometimes been ourselves guilty, particularly in economic matters, of just the sort of narrow nationalism that we were denouncing.

(Continue here with page 12.) Then,

Add between pp 12 and 13:

We have not applied imagination and statesmanship in a timely and farsighted manner to the problems which science is pressing upon us:

We have not developed policies to safeguard for the general welfare the riches of the ocean depths, riches which are clearly the property of no man and of no nation, but of all mankind.

We have found only half answers or no answers at all to the problems of regulating and promoting communications among nations, directly or through the wonderful new technology of the satellites.

It is now clear that

Those who believe that the only alternative is a renewal of nationalism are mistaken. Those who believe that European peace and stability problems of this decade will be solved by the super-powers of the last decade are also mistaken. The peace and stability of Europe will not be built on decisions in which Europeans do not participate and on conclusions which they do not share. Similarly the decisions which can insure peace and stability of Europe must include those across the Atlantic and beyond the Urals. This is the only solution to the problems of Europe which embodies realism. The incontrovertible evidence of the past two decades, in every part of the world, is that no superiority in nuclear weapons is sufficient to impose political solutions upon unwilling populations.

Our purpose is not to impose on Europe any particular ~~&~~ constitutional pattern. Rather it is to assist Europeans in making Europe whole again. We seek what Europeans seek: a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe cooperate together. We said, as President Johnson has said, "a continent in which alliances do not confront each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a framework in which East and West can act together in order to assure the security of all."

To achieve these aims

We must continue ~~to~~ to strengthen the security of the Atlantic Alliance through ~~(a)~~ modernizing its institutions. We must encourage the perfection and expansion of the Western European Community. We must pursue both of these while getting on with the task of improving East-West relations.

~~If~~ The iron curtain is to be lifted from the center of Europe - this latter objective must be given our urgent attention.

P. 6 I do not say that there are no ~~larger~~ longer threats to freedom, among them certain aspects and varieties of that Communism which only 21 years ago seemed such an unchanging and unchangeable monolith. And I would assert -- ~~with~~ and, I am sure, ~~the earnest support of~~ that Mr. Brezhnev would concur -- that our ideological differences remain substantial.

We have failed to address the problems posed by the great international corporations, operating sometimes outside the effective control of any government.

We have found no effective means for avoiding the constant enrichment of the technologically wealthy nations, first of all ourselves, and the impoverishment of the technologically poor.

And most damning of all, we have not begun to find a substitute for the condition which the man we honor today so aptly called "the balance of terror".

But these are things we <u>can</u> do.

Page 4, et seq. Remove references to "Western European Unity".

p. 14. Third sentence; reword to read: "The cornerstone of that effort must be the development of an ever denser web of associations binding together the peoples of Europe and consolidating the partnership between Europe and the United States."

Second para: replace "unity" by "partnership".

Last para: drop last phrase.

p. 16. Reword second para to read: "As an integral part of reducing the barriers within Europe and the obstacles to a European settlement, we wish to work...

p. 17. Drop first two para.

p. 19. Drop "Western" in 2nd and 9th lines of third para.

But leave "Western" on p. 20.

It is not a task

that will be completed in

my time or yours, in that

of my children or your

children. But if that

world we seek is to

come to pass — a world in

which order has replaced

anarchy, peace ~~has~~ has

~~triumphed over~~ succeeded war,

compassion has displaced

contention, justice has

trampled over injustice — we

must ~~begin~~ not delay any

longer.

(1) Re acquaintance of Europe with other members of family

Fading of European identity / is new fact of int. life. Relationship of US to that family is the new problem.

New relationship - of Europe
- East to Moscow
West to U.S.

---

interdependence

Churchill world
World of uncontested power
— isolationism. Stalinism
attempted to isolate
Eastern Europe

(2) Emaye — father —
Strong. adult relationships

Does it mean that
some of hope is losing
in Marijon

Send letter from H.H.

Thanks for
Read
pass. Hope you
feel free
write

to JFK

Send letter
draft

By Cleveland

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

9th — Security ends it.

Brzezinski

Berger

Gard

Security — noon

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE JANUARY 10, 1967

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
ON THE STATE OF THE UNION

(AT 9:33 P.M. EST)

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Vice President, Distinguished Members of the Congress:

I share with all of you the grief that you feel at the death today of one of the most beloved, respected and effective Members of this body, the distinguished Representative from Rhode Island, Mr. Fogarty.

I have come here tonight to report to you that this is a time of testing for our Nation.

At home, the question is whether we will continue working for better opportunities for all Americans, when most Americans are already living better than any people in history.

Abroad, the question is whether we have the staying power to fight a very costly war, when the objective is limited and the danger to us is seemingly remote.

So our test is not whether we shrink from our country's cause when the dangers to us are obvious and close at hand, but, rather, whether we carry on when they seem obscure and distant -- and some think it is safe to lay down our burdens.

I have come tonight to ask this Congress and this Nation to resolve that issue: to meet our commitments at home and abroad -- to continue to build a better America -- and to reaffirm this Nation's allegiance to freedom.

As President Abraham Lincoln said, "We must ask where we are, and whither we are tending."

The last three years bear witness to our determination to make this a better country.

We have struck down legal barriers to equality.

We have improved the education of 7 million deprived children and this year alone we have enabled almost one million students to go to college.

We have brought medical care to older people who were unable to afford it. 3-1/2 million Americans have already received treatment under Medicare since July.

We have built a strong economy that has put almost 3 million more Americans on the payrolls in the last year alone.

MORE (OVER)

We have included more than 9 million new workers under a higher minimum wage.

We have launched new training programs to provide job skills for almost one million Americans.

We have helped more than a thousand local communities to attack poverty in the neighborhoods of the poor.

We have set out to rebuild our cities on a scale that has never been attempted before.

We have begun to rescue our waters from the menace of pollution and to restore the beauty of our land, our countryside, our cities and our towns.

We have given one million young Americans a chance to earn through the Neighborhood Youth Corps -- or through Head Start, a chance to learn.

Together, we have tried to meet the needs of our people. And, we have succeeded in creating a better life for the many as well as the few. Now we must answer whether our gains shall be the foundations of further progress, or whether they shall be only monuments to what might have been -- abandoned now by a people who lacked the will to see their great work through.

I believe our people do not want to quit -- though the task is great, the work hard, often frustrating, and success is a matter not of days or months, but of years -- and sometimes it may be even decades.

I have come here tonight to discuss with you five ways of carrying forward the progress of these last three years. These five ways concern programs, partnerships, priorities, prosperity and peace.

First, programs. We must see to it, I think, that these new programs that we have passed work effectively and are administered in the best possible way.

Three years ago we set out to create these new instruments of social progress. This required trial and error -- and it has produced both. But as we learn, through success and failure, we are changing our strategy and we are trying to improve our tactics. In the long run, these starts -- some rewarding, others inadequate and disappointing -- are crucial to success.

One example is the struggle to make life better for the less fortunate among us.

On a similar occasion, at this rostrum in 1949, I heard a great American President, Harry S. Truman, declare this: "The American people have decided that poverty is just as wasteful and just as unnecessary as preventable disease."

Many listened to President Truman that day here in this chamber, but few understood what was required and did anything about it. The Executive Branch and the Congress

waited 15 long years before ever taking any action on that challenge, as it did on many other challenges that great President presented. When, three years ago, you here in the Congress joined with me in a declaration of war on poverty, then I warned, "It will not be a short or easy struggle -- no single weapon will suffice -- but we shall not rest until that war is won."

I have come here to renew that pledge tonight.

I recommend that we intensify our effort to give the poor a chance to enjoy and to join in this Nation's progress.

I shall propose certain administrative changes suggested by the Congress -- as well as some that we have learned from our own trial and errors.

I shall urge special methods and special funds to reach the hundreds of thousands of Americans that are now trapped in the ghettos of our big cities -- and, through Head Start, to try to reach out to our very young children. The chance to learn is their brightest hope and must command our full determination. For learing brings skills; and skills bring jobs; and jobs bring responsibility and dignity, as well as taxes.

This war -- like the war in Vietnam -- is not a simple one. There is not single battle line which you can plot each day on a chart. The enemy is not easy to perceive, to isolate, to destroy. There are mistakes and there are setbacks. But we are moving, and our direction is forward.

This is true with other programs that are making and breaking new ground. Some do not yet have the capacity to absorb well or wisely all the money that could be put into them. Administrative skills and trained manpower are just as vital to their success as dollars. I believe those skills will come. But it will take time and patience and hard work. Success cannot be forced at a single stroke. We must continue to strengthen the administration of every program if that success is to come -- as we know it must.

We have done much in the space of two short years, working together.

I have recommended, and you, the Congress, have approved, 10 different reorganization plans, combining and consolidating many bureaus of this Government, and creating two entirely new Cabinet departments.

I have come tonight to propose that we establish a new department -- a Department of Business and Labor.

By combining the Department of Commerce with the Department of Labor and other related agencies, I think we can create a more economical, efficient and streamlined instrument that will better serve a growing nation.

This is our goal throughout the entire Federal Government. Every program will be thoroughly evaluated. Grant-in-aid programs will be improved and simplified as desired by many of our local administrators and Governors.

Where there have been mistakes, we will try very hard to correct them.

Where there has been progress, we will try to build upon it.

Our second objective is partnership -- to create an effective partnership at all levels of government. I should treasure nothing more than to have that partnership begin between the Executive and the Congress.

The 88th and the 89th Congresses passed more social and economic legislation than any two Congresses in American history. Most of you who were Members of those Congresses voted to pass most of those measures. But your efforts will come to nothing unless it reaches the people.

Federal energy is essential. But it is not enough. Only a total working partnership among Federal, State and local governments can succeed. The test of that partnership will be the concern of each public organization, each private institution, and each responsible citizen.

Each State, county, and city needs to examine its capacity for government in today's world, as we are examining ours in the Executive department, and as I see you are examining yours. Some will need to reorganize and reshape their methods of administration -- as we are doing. Others will need to revise their constitutions and their laws to bring them up to date -- as we are doing. Above all, I think we must work together and find ways in which the multitudes of small jurisdictions can be brought together more efficiently.

During the past three years we have returned to State and local governments about $40 billion in grants-in-aid. This year alone, 70 percent of our Federal expenditures for domestic programs will be distributed through the State and local governments. With Federal assistance, State and local governments by 1970 will be spending close to $110 billion annually. These enormous sums must be used wisely, honestly, and effectively.

We intend to work closely with the States and localities to do exactly that.

Our third objective is priorities, to move ahead on the priorities that we have established within the resources that are available.

I wish, of course, that we could do all that should be done -- and that we could do it now. But the Nation has many commitments and responsibilities which make heavy demands upon our total resources. No administration would more eagerly utilize for these programs all the resources they require than the administration that started them.

Let us resolve, now, to do all that we can, with what we have -- knowing that it is far, far more than we have ever done before, and far, far less than our problems will ultimately require.

Let us create new opportunities for our children and our young Americans who need special help.

We should strengthen the Head Start Program, begin it for children three years old, and maintain its educational momentum by following through in the early years.

We should try new methods of child development and care from the earliest years, before it is too late to correct.

I will propose these measures to the 90th Congress.

Let us insure that older Americans, and neglected Americans, share in their Nation's progress.

We should raise social security payments by an overall average of 20 percent. That will add $4 billion 100 million to social security payments in the first year. I will recommend that each of the 23 million Americans now receiving payments get an increase of at least 15 percent.

I will ask that you raise the minimum payments by 59 percent -- from $44 to $70 a month, and to guarantee a minimum benefit of $100 a month for those with a total of 25 years of coverage. We must raise the limits that retired workers can earn without losing social security income.

We must eliminate by law unjust discrimination in employment because of age.

We should embark upon a major effort to provide self-help assistance to the forgotten in our midst -- the American Indians and the migratory farm workers. And we should reach with the hand of understanding to help those who live in rural poverty.

I will propose these measures to the 90th Congress.

Let us keep on improving the quality of life and enlarging the meaning of justice for all of our fellow Americans.

We should transform our decaying slums into places of decency through the landmark Model Cities Program. I intend to seek for this effort, this year, the full amount that you in Congress authorized last year.

We should call upon the genius of private industry and the most advanced technology to help rebuild our great cities.

We should vastly expand the fight for clean air with a total attack on pollution at its source, and -- because air, like water, does not respect manmade boundaries -- we should set up "Regional Airsheds" throughout this great land.

We should continue to carry to every corner of the Nation our campaign for a beautiful America -- to clean up our towns, to make them more beautiful, our cities, our countryside, by creating more parks, more seashores, and more open spaces for our children to play in, and for the generations that come after us to enjoy.

We should continue to seek equality and justice for each citizen -- before a jury, in seeking a job, in exercising his civil rights. We should find a solution to fair housing, so every American, regardless of color, has a decent home of his choice.

We should modernize our Selective Service System. The National Commission on Selective Service will shortly submit its report. I will send you new recommendations to meet our military manpower needs. But let us resolve that this is to be the Congress that made our draft laws as fair and as effective as possible.

We should protect what Justice Brandeis called the "right most valued by civilized men" -- the right to privacy. We should outlaw all wiretapping -- public and private -- wherever and whenever it occurs, except when the security of this Nation itself is at stake -- and only then with the strictest governmental safeguards. We should exercise the full reach of our constitutional powers to outlaw electronic "bugging" and "snooping".

I hope this Congress will try to help me do more for the consumer. We should demand that the cost of credit be clearly and honestly expressed where average citizens can understand it. We should immediately take steps to prevent massive power failures, to safeguard the home against hazardous household products, and to assure safety in the pipelines that carry natural gas across our Nation.

We should extend Medicare benefits that are now denied to 1,300,000 permanently and totally disabled Americans under 65 years of age.

We should improve the process of democracy by passing our election reform and financing proposals, by tightening our laws regulating lobbying, and by restoring a reasonable franchise to Americans who move their residences.

We should develop educational television into a vital public resource to enrich our homes, educate our families and to provide assistance in our classrooms. We should insist that the public interest be fully served through the public's airwaves.

I will propose these measures to the 90th Congress.

Now we come to a question that weighs very heavily on all our minds -- on yours and mine. This Nation must make an all-out effort to combat crime.

The 89th Congress gave us a new start in the attack on crime by passing the Law Enforcement Assistance Act that I recommended. We appointed the National Crime Commission to study crime in America and to recommend the best ways to carry that attack forward.

While we do not have all the answers, on the basis of its preliminary recommendations we are ready to move.

This is not a war that Washington alone can win. The idea of a National Police Force is repugnant to the

American people. Crime must be rooted out in local communities by local authorities. Our policemen must be better trained, must be better paid, must be better supported by the local citizens that they try to serve and protect.

The national government can and expects to help.

I will recommend to the 90th Congress the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1967. It will enable us to assist those States and cities that try to make their streets and homes safer, their police forces better, their corrections systems more effective, and their courts more efficient.

When the Congress approves, the Federal Government will be able to provide a substantial percentage of the cost:

-- 90 percent of the cost of developing the State and local plans, master plans, to combat crime in their area;

-- 60 percent of the cost of training new tactical units, developing instant communications and special alarm systems, and introducing the latest equipment and techniques so that they can become weapons in the war on crime;

-- 50 percent of the cost of building crime laboratories and police academy-type centers so that our citizens can be protected by the best trained and served by the best equipped police to be found anywhere.

We will also recommend new methods to prevent juvenile delinquents from becoming adult delinquents. We will seek new partnerships with States and cities in order to deal with the hideous narcotics program. We will recommend strict controls on the sale of firearms.

At the heart of this attack on crime must be the conviction that a free America -- as Abraham Lincoln once said -- must "let reverence for the laws. . .become the political religion of the Nation."

Our country's laws must be respected. Order must be maintained. I will support -- with all the constitutional powers the President possesses -- our Nation's law enforcement officials in their attempt to control the crime and violence that tear the fabric of our communities.

Many of these priority proposals will be built on foundations that have already been laid. Some will necessarily be small at first, but "every beginning is a consequence." If we postpone this urgent work now, it will simply have to be done later, and later we will pay a much higher price.

Our fourth objective is prosperity, to keep our economy moving ahead, moving ahead steadily and safely.

We have now enjoyed six years of unprecedented and rewarding prosperity.

Last year, in 1966:

-- Wages were the highest in history -- and the unemployment rate, announced yesterday, reached the lowest point in 13 years;

-- Total after-tax income of American families rose nearly 5 percent;

-- Corporate profits after taxes rose a little more than 5 percent;

-- Our gross national product advanced 5.5 percent, to about $740 billion;

-- Income per farm went up 6 percent.

We have been greatly concerned because consumer prices rose 4.5 percent over the 18 months since we decided to send troops to Vietnam. This was more than we had expected -- and the Government tried to do everything that we knew how to do to hold it down. Yet we were not as successful as we wished to be. In the 18 months after we entered World War II, prices rose not 4.5 percent, but 13.5 percent. In the first 18 months after Korea, after the conflict broke out there, prices rose not 4.5 percent, but 11 percent. During those two periods we had OPA price control that the Congress gave us and War Labor Board wage controls.

Since Vietnam we have not asked for those controls and we have tried to avoid imposing them. We believe we have done better, but we make no pretense of having been successful or doing as well as we wished.

Our greatest disappointment in the economy during 1966 was the excessive rise in interest rates and a tightening of credit. They imposed very severe and very unfair burdens on our home buyers and on our home builders, and all those associated with the home industry.

Last January, and again last September, I recommended fiscal and moderate tax measures to try to restrain the unbalanced pace of economic expansion. Legislatively and administratively we took several billions out of the economy. With these measures, in both instances, the Congress approved most of the recommendations rather promptly.

As 1966 ended, price stability was seemingly being restored. Wholesale prices are lower tonight than they were in August. So are retail food prices. Monetary conditions are also easing. Most interest rates have retreated from their earlier peaks. More money now seems to be available.

Given the cooperation of the Federal Reserve System, which I so earnestly seek, I am confident that this movement can continue. I pledge the American people that I will do everything in a President's power to lower interest rates and ease money in this country. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board tomorrow morning will announce that it will make immediately available to savings and loan associations an additional $1 billion, and will lower from 6 percent to 5-3/4 percent the interest rate charged on those loans.

We shall continue on a sensible course of fiscal and budgetary policy that we believe will keep our economy growing without new inflationary spirals; that will finance responsibly the needs of our men in Vietnam and the progress of our people at home; that will support a significant improvement in our export surplus, and will press forward toward easier credit and toward lower interest rates.

I recommend to the Congress a surcharge of 6 percent on both corporate and individual income taxes -- to last for two years or for so long as the unusual expenditures associated with our efforts in Vietnam continue. I will promptly recommend an earlier termination date if a reduction in these expenditures permits it. This surcharge will raise revenues by some $4.5 billion in the first year. For example, a person whose tax payments, the tax he owes, is $1,000, will pay, under this proposal, an extra $60 over the 12-month period, or $5 a month. The overwhelming majority of Americans who pay taxes today are below that figure and they will pay substantially less than $5 a month. Married couples with two children, with incomes up to $5,000 per year, will be exempt from this tax -- as will single people with an income up to $1,900 a year.

If Amercans today still paid the income and excise tax rates in effect when I came into the Presidency, in the year 1964, their annual taxes would have been over $20 billion more than at present tax rates. This proposal is that while we have this problem and this emergency in Vietnam, while we are trying to meet the needs of our people at home, your Government asks for slightly more than one-fourth of that tax cut each year in order to try to hold our budget deficit in fiscal 1968 within prudent limits and to give our country and our fighting men the help they need in this hour of trial.

For fiscal 1967, we estimate the budget expenditures to be $126.7 billion and revenues of $117 billion. That will leave us a deficit this year of $9.7 billion.

For fiscal 1968, we estimate budget expenditures of $135 billion. With the tax measures recommended, and a continuing strong economy, we estimate revenues will be $126.9 billion. The deficit then will be $8.1 billion.

I will very soon forward all of my recommendations to the Congress. Yours is the responsibility to discuss and to debate them -- to approve or modify, or reject them.

I welcome your views, as I have welcomed working with you for 30 years as a colleague and as Vice President and President.

I should like to say to the Members of the opposition -- whose numbers, if I am not mistaken, seem to have increased somewhat -- that the genius of the American political system has always been best expressed through creative debate that offers choices and reasonable alternatives. Throughout our history, great Republicans and Democrats have seemed to understand this. So let there be light and reason in our relations. That is the way to a responsible session and a responsive government.

Let us be remembered as a President and a Congress who tried to improve the quality of life for every American -- not just the rich, not just the poor, but every man, woman and child in this great Nation of ours.

We all go to school -- to good schools or bad schools. We all take air into our lungs -- clean air or polluted air. We all drink water -- pure water or polluted water. We all face sickness some day, and some more often than we wish, and old age as well. We all have a stake in this Great Society -- in its economic growth, in reduction of civil strife, and a great stake in good government.

We must must not arrest the pace of progress we have established in this country in these years. Our children's children will pay the price if we are not wise enough, courageous enough, and determined enough to stand up and meet the Nation's needs as well as we can in the time alloted us.

Abroad, as at home, there is also risk in change. But abroad, as at home, there is greater risk in standing still. No part of our foreign policy is so sacred that it ever remains beyond review. We shall be flexible where conditions in the world change -- and where man's efforts can change them for the better.

MORE

We are in the midst of a great transition -- a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet.

In Latin America, the American chiefs of state will be meeting very shortly to give our Hemispheric policies new direction.

We have come a long way in this Hemisphere since the Inter-American effort in economic and social development was launched at Bogota in 1960 under the leadership of President Eisenhower. The Alliance for Progress moved dramatically forward under President Kennedy. There is new confidence that the voice of the people is being heard, that the dignity of the individual is stronger than ever in this Hemisphere, and we are facing up to and meeting many of the Hemisphere problems together. In this Hemisphere that reform under democracy can be made to happen -- because it has happened. Together, I think, we must now move to strike down the barriers to full cooperation among the American nations, and to free the energies and resources of two great continents on behalf of all of our citizens.

Africa stands at an earlier stage of development than Latin America. It has yet to develop the transportation, communications, agriculture, and, above all, the trained men and women without which growth is impossible. There, too, the job will best be done if the nations and peoples of Africa cooperate on a regional basis. More and more our programs for Africa are going to be directed towards self-help.

The future of Africa is shadowed by unsolved racial conflicts. Our policy will continue to reflect our basic commitments as a people to support those who are prepared to work towards cooperation and harmony between races, and to help those who demand change but reject fool's gold of violence.

In the Middle East, the spirit of good will toward all unfortunately has not yet taken hold. An already tortured peace seems to be constantly threatened. We shall try to use our influence to increase the possibilies of improved relations among the nations of that region. We are working hard at that task.

In the great subcontinent of South Asia live more than a sixth of the earth's population. Over the years we -- and others -- have invested very heavily in capital and food for the economic development of India and Pakistan.

We are not prepared to see our assistance wasted, however, in conflict. It must strengthen their capacity to help themselves. It must help these two nations -- both our friends -- to overcome poverty, to emerge as self-reliant leaders, and find terms for reconciliation and cooperation.

In Western Europe we shall maintain in NATO an integrated common defense. But we also look forward to the

time when greater security can be achieved through measures of arms control and disarmament, and through other forms of practical agreement.

We are shaping a new future of enlarged partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic and technical cooperation, in trade negotiations, in political consultation, and in working together with the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The emerging spirit of confidence is precisely what we hoped to achieve when we went to work a generation ago to put our shoulder to the wheel and try to help rebuild Europe. We faced new challenges and opportunities there -- and we faced also some dangers. But I believe that the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as both sides of this chamber, wanted to face them together.

Our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are also in transition. We have avoided both the acts and the rhetoric of the cold war. When we have differed with the Soviet Union, or other nations, for that matter, I have tried to differ quietly and with courtesy, and without venom.

Our objective is not to continue the cold war, but to end it.

We have:

-- ~~signed~~ reached an agreement at the United Nations on the peaceful uses of outer space;

-- agreed to open direct air flights with the Soviet Union;

-- removed more than 400 non-strategic items from export control;

-- determined that the Export-Import Bank can allow commercial credits to Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, as well as Rumania and Yugoslavia;

-- entered into a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union for another two years;

-- agreed with Bulgaria and Hungary to upgrade our legations to embassies; and

-- started discussions with international agencies on ways of increasing contacts with Eastern European countries.

This Administration has taken these steps even as duty compelled us to fulfill and execute alliances and treaty obligations throughout the world that were entered into before I became President.

Tonight I now ask and urge this Congress to help our foreign and commercial trade policies by passing an East-West trade bill and by approving our consular convention with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has in the past year increased its long-range missile capabilities. It has begun to place near Moscow a limited anti-missile defense. My first responsibility to our people is to assure that no nation can ever find it rational to launch a nuclear attack or to use its nuclear power as a credible threat against us or against our allies.

I would emphasize that that is why an important link between Russia and the United States is in our common interest, in arms control and in disarmament. We have the solemn duty to slow down the arms race between us, if that is at all possible, in both conventional and nuclear weapons and defenses. I thought we were making some progress in that direction the first few months I was in office. I realize that any additional race would impose on our peoples, and on all mankind, for that matter, an additional waste of resources with no gain in security to either side.

I expect in the days ahead to closely consult and seek the advice of the Congress about the possibilities of international agreements bearing directly upon this problem.

Next to the pursuit of peace, the really greatest challenge to the human family is the race between food supply and population increase. That race tonight is being lost.

The time for rhetoric has clearly passed. The time for concerted action is here and we must get on with the job.

We believe three principals must prevail if our policy is to succeed:

First, the developing nations must give highest priority to food production, including the use of technology and the capital of private enterprise.

Second, nations with food deficits must put more of their resources into voluntary family planning programs.

Third, the developed nations must all assist other nations to avoid starvation in the short run and to move rapidly towards the ability to feed themselves.

Every member of the world community now bears a direct responsibility to help bring our most basic human account into balance.

I come now finally to Southeast Asia -- and to Vietnam in particular. Soon I will submit to the Congress a detailed report on that situation. Tonight I want to just review the essential points as briefly as I can.

We are in Vietnam because the United States of America and our allies are committed by the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet the common danger" of aggression in Southeast Asia.

We are in Vietnam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Vietnam and others

in 1962 is being systematically violated by the Communists. That violation threatens the independence of all the small nations in Southeast Asia, and threatens the peace of the entire region and perhaps the world.

We are there because the people of South Vietnam have as much right to remain non-Communist -- if that is what they choose -- as North Vietnam has to remain Communist.

We are there because the Congress has pledged by solemn vote to take all necessary measures to prevent further aggression.

No better words could describe our present course than those once spoken by the great Thomas Jefferson:

> "It is the melancholy law of human societies to be compelled sometimes to choose a great evil in order to ward off a greater".

We have chosen to fight a limited war in Vietnam in an attempt to prevent a larger war -- a war almost certain to follow, if the Communists succeed in overruning and taking over South Vietnam by aggression and by force. I believe, and I am supported by some authority, that if they are not checked now the world can expect to pay a greater price to check them later.

That is what our statesmen said when they debated this treaty, and that is why it was ratified 82 to 1 by the Senate many years ago.

You will remember that we stood in Western Europe 20 years ago. Is there anyone in this chamber tonight who doubts that the course of freedom was not changed for the better because of the courage of that stand?

Sixteen years ago we and others stopped another kind of aggression -- this time it was in Korea. Imagine how different Asia might be today if we had failed to act when the Communist army of North Korea marched south. The Asia of tomorrow will be far different because we have said in Vietnam, as we said 16 years ago in Korea: "This far and no further."

I think I reveal no secret when I tell you we are dealing with a stubborn adversary who is committed to the use of force and terror to settle political questions.

I wish I could report to you that the conflict is almost over. This I cannot do. We face more cost, more loss, and more agony. For the end is not yet. I cannot promise that it will come this year -- or come next year. Our adversary still believes, I think, tonight, that he can go on fighting longer than we can, and longer than we and our allies will be prepared to stand up and resist.

Our men in that area -- there are nearly 500,000 now -- have borne well "the burden and the heat of the day." Their efforts have deprived the Communist enemy of the victory that he sought and that he expected a year ago. We have

steadily frustrated his main forces. General Westmoreland reports that the enemy can no longer succeed on the battlefield.

I must say to you that our pressure must be sustained -- and will be sustained -- until he realizes that the war he started is costing him more than he can ever gain.

I know of no strategy more likely to attain that end than the strategy of "accumulating slowly, but inexorably, every kind of material resource"-- of "laboriously teaching troops the very elements of their trade." That, and patience -- and I mean a great deal of patience.

Our South Vietnamese allies are also being tested tonight. They must provide real security to the people living in the countryside. This means reducing the terrorism and armed attacks which kidnapped and killed 26,900 civilians in the last 32 months, to the levels where they can be successfully controlled by the regular South Vietnamese security forces. It means bringing to the villagers an effective civilian government that they can respect and rely upon, that they can participate in, and that they can have a personal stake in. We hope that government is now beginning to emerge.

While I cannot report the desired progress in the pacification effort, the very distinguished and able Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge: ,reports that South Vietnam is turning to this task with a new sense of urgency. We can help, but only they can win this part of the war. Their task is to build and protect a new life in each rural province.

One result of our stand in Vietnam is clear.

It is this: the peoples of Asia now know that the door to independence is not going to be slammed shut. They know that it is possible for them to choose their own national destinies -- without coercion.

The performance of our men in Vietnam -- backed by the American people -- has created a feeling of confidence and unity among the independent nations of Asia and the Pacific. I saw it in their faces in the 19 days that I spent in their homes and in their countries. Fear of external Communist conquest in many Asian nations is already subsiding -- and with this, the spirit of hope is rising. For the first time in history, a common outlook and common institutions are already emerging.

This forward movement is rooted in the ambitions and interests the Asian nations themselves. It was precisely this movement that we hoped to accelerate when I spoke at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore in April 1965, and I pledged "a much more massive effort to improve the life of man" in that part of the world, in the hope that we could take some of the funds that we were spending on bullets and bombs and spend it on schools and production.

Twenty months later our efforts have produced a new reality: The doors of the billion dollar Asian Development

that I recommended to the Congress, and which you endorsed almost unanimously, I am proud to tell you are open. Asians are engaged tonight in regional efforts in a dozen new directions. Their hopes are high. Their faith is strong. Their confidence is deep.

Even as the war continues, we shall play our part in carrying forward this constructive historic development. As recommended by the Eugene Black mission, and if other nations will join us, I will seek a special authorization from the Congress of $200 million for East Asian regional programs.

We are eager to turn our resources to peace. Our efforts in behalf of humanity I think need not be restricted by any parallel or any boundary line. The moment peace comes, as I pledged in Baltimore, I will ask the Congress for funds to join in an international program of reconstruction and development for all the people of Vietnam -- and their deserving neighbors who wish our help.

MORE

We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation between the people of Mainland China and the world community -- including working together in all the tasks of arms control, security, and progress on which the fate of the Chinese people, like their fellowmen elsewhere, depends.

We would be the first to welcome a China which decided to respect her neighbors' rights. We would be the first to applaud her were she to apply her great energies and intelligence to improving the welfare of her people. And we have no intention of trying to deny her legitimate needs for security and friendly relations with her neighboring countries.

Our hope that all of this will some day happen rests on the conviction that we, the American people and our allies, will see and are going to see Vietnam through to an honorable peace.

We will support all appropriate initiatives by the United Nations, and others, which can bring the several parties together for unconditional discussions of peace -- anywhere, any time. And we will continue to take every possible initiative ourselves to constantly probe for peace.

Until such efforts succeed, or until the infiltration ceases and until the conflict subsides, I think the course of wisdom for this country is that we must firmly pursue our present course. We will stand firm in Vietnam.

I think you know that our fighting men there tonight bear the heaviest burden of all. With their lives they serve their Nation. We must give them nothing less than our full support -- and we have given them that -- nothing less than the determination that Americans have always given their fighting men. Whatever our sacrifice here, even if it is more than $5 a month, it is small compared to their own.

How long it will take I cannot prophesy. I only know that the will of the American people, I think, is tonight being tested.

Whether we can fight a war of limited objectives over a period of time, and keep alive the hope of independence and stability for people other than ourselves; whether wd can continue to act with restraint when the temptation to "get it over with" is inviting but dangerous; whether we can accept the necessity of choosing "a great evil in order to ward off a greater"; and whether we can do these without arousing the hatreds and passions that are ordinarily loosed in time of war -- on all these questions so much turns.

The answers will determine not only where we are, but "whither we are tending."

A time of testing -- yes. And a time of transition. The transition is sometimes slow; sometimes unpopular; almost always very painful; and often quite dangerous.

But we have lived with danger for a long time, and we shall live with it for a long time yet to come. We know that "Man is born unto trouble." We also know that this Nation was not forged, did not survive and grow and prosper without a great deal of sacrifice from a great many men.

For all the disorders we must deal with, and all the frustrations that concern us, all the anxieties that we are called upon to resolve, for all the issues that we must face with the agony that attends them, let us remember that "Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigues of supporting it."

But let us also count not only our burdens but our blessings -- for they are many.

Let us give thanks to the one who governs us all.

Let us draw encouragement from the signs of hope -- for they, too, are many.

Let us remember that we have been tested before and America has never been found wanting.

With your understanding, I would hope your confidence, and your support, we are going to persist -- and we are going to succeed.

END (AT 10:44 P.M. EST)

Comments on Shriver draft / T. Hughes

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1/28/67

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES
AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON 20500

East-West Speech

January 6, 1967

To: John Rielly

From: Glenn Schweitzer GES

Subj: Vice President's Speech on East-West Relations

I regret that the enclosed thoughts for possible inclusion in the Vice President's speech are late. The President will probably announce our food from the sea initiative in February. Therefore, the comments related to this subject depend on the timing of the Vice President's speech.

The suggested language has been checked with Ed. Wenk.

Last year Congress established the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development -- a cabinet level Council which determines policies affecting our activities on the seas and coordinates our broad range of marine activities. Congress singled out international cooperation in marine activities for special emphasis, and promoting the peaceful uses of the seas has become an integral part of our national policy. The oceans know no boundaries, and I am particularly eager that we work with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe in exploring, understanding, and using the seas and their resources for the benefit of mankind.

Since the International Geophysical Year American scientists have cooperated with their colleagues from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in expanding man's understanding of the oceans. Last spring more than 200 Americans attended the Second International Oceanographic Congress in Moscow. The warm hospitality extended to them by many Soviet oceanographers attested to the close cooperation that has developed in recent

years between our scientists.

Now, in addition to exploring the seas, our scientists are devoting new energies to mitigating the harmful effect of man's activities on our marine resources. We are familiar with the impact of pollution on the Chesapeake Bay and Lake Erie and along our coasts. Similarly, the sturgeon of the Volga -- the source of caviar -- are becoming victims of industrial wastes, and Lake Baikal and the Sea of Azov are threatened by the by-products of industrial progress. Is this not still another area for sharing our experiences to preserve the perishable resources of our populations?

Our scientists were also delighted to meet many other Eastern European colleagues during the Moscow Congress. We continue to support research activities at fisheries laboratories in Poland which will benefit the Polish people. Also, more and more American tourists are venturing to the Black Sea where they see for themselves the efforts of Rumania and Bulgaria to preserve and develop their coastal resources.

We and the Soviet Union are participants in international arrangements governing fishing in large areas of the North Atlantic, king crab fishing off Alaska, and the exploitation of fur seal resources. As Soviet fishing activities continue to expand into waters of interest to our fishermen, we must strengthen still further the tradition of cooperation to ensure that limited fishing stocks are not depleted and that our communities which have been dependent on the seas for generations continue to thrive.

We have the technological resources to use the protein of the sea as one weapon in combatting the most pressing problem among more than one-half of the world's population -- hunger. The President has announced our accelerated endeavor to assist the protein deficient countries of the world to develop their capabilities to use fish resources, and we are vigorously pushing forward with the technologies such as fish protein concentrate needed to fulfill this pledge.

However, the imbalance between protein supply and demand is so serious that the efforts of all nations are required to save lives and

to
enable many countries of the world/enjoy the accomplishments of the twentieth century. We invite the Soviet Union and the other nations of the world to join with us, through the agencies of the United Nations and through bilateral efforts, in a humanitarian endeavor of unprecedented scope which will also strengthen the bonds of peace throughout the world. Recent international cooperation in exploring the fishery resources of the Indian Ocean and the Tropical Atlantic were first steps; now is the time to expand such activities and to turn the insights of science into benefits for starving populations.

The recent agreement on outerspace testifies to the interest of the world community in promoting peaceful scientific endeavors to explore the unknown. Opportunities for joining forces in not only exploring but in using the marine environment are before us. As we worked with the Soviet Union to develop acceptable arrangements for our activities in space, we shall endeavor to work with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the

world to promote scientific exploration of the seas and rational uses of its resources.

E-H speech

January 11, 1967

Dear Glenn:

Many thanks for the draft section on food from the sea. We hope to be doing an East-West speech soon and we hope to be able to use this. I shall be in touch with you at that time.

Many thanks for your help.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

John E. Rielly
Assistant to the Vice President

Mr. Glenn Schweitzer
National Council on Marine Resources
& Engineering Development
Room 405
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

JER/bje FOR-REL:VP's mtg with Marshall Shulman & E-W speech 1/11/67

January 11, 1967

E-W speech

MEMORANDUM

TO : The Vice President

FROM : John Rielly

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Marshall Shulman

In talking to Marshall Shulman today, if appropriate you might mention that you are committed to give a lecture at Webster College in Missouri in March on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech. The speech is always a foriegn policy speech and in my judgment should be addressed to the East-West problem. It would be most helpful if you could engage Marshall's assistance in preparing a speech for this occasion. Whether he will actually be on board as a consultant to the Marine Sciences Council, I don't know. But if he can help us on this one, we should have him start thinking about it as soon as possible.

Release time 5:30 p.m. GMT, 12:30 p.m. EST, 23 February 1967

Sir Montague Burton Lecture
by W. W. Rostow
The University of Leeds, Leeds, England
23 February 1967

The Great Transition: Tasks of the First and Second Postwar Generations

I.

In his State of the Union address on January 10 of this year, President Johnson said: "We are in the midst of a great transition: from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the Cold War to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet."

It is this theme that I should like to elaborate today, by looking backward over the two postwar decades and looking forward to the agenda which is emerging for the next generation.

History is rarely clean-cut in its lines of demarcation. Wars, revolutions, and other traumatic events do leave their mark on the calendar; but their clarity is sometimes illusory, distorting the timing of more profound changes they reflect. Nevertheless, I believe we are now -- potentially -- in a true watershed period. We can make some shape out of the major experiences through which we all have passed since 1945. We can define some of the dangers, challenges, and possibilities which are beginning to grip the world community and which will increasingly engage it in the years ahead.

To elaborate this theme, I have chosen to review the evolution of international affairs under four major headings -- each of which represents a dimension of our common, central task -- the building of a viable world order.

First, aggression: that is, deterring or dealing with efforts to alter the territorial or political status quo by one form or another of violence applied across international frontiers.

Second, economic and social progress in the world community as a whole and in the developing regions, in particular.

Third, international organization which has assumed not merely global forms, through the United Nations and related institutions, but also (as Churchill foresaw) developed increasing vitality in the various regions.

Fourth, reconciliation -- the search for and the discovery of areas of agreement across ancient and recent barriers so as to reduce the dangers of conflict, to give to the world community a growing framework of unity and order, and to fulfill the injunctions of Article I of the United Nations Charter.

I shall try briefly to examine how each of these four continuing strands of policy and experience have evolved in the past twenty years, and suggest the tasks which will confront us in the days ahead.

more

II.

The Problem of Aggression

The postwar world was shaped by two quite arbitrary processes. First, there emerged de facto or de jure lines of demarcation between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. These lines resulted principally from the disposition of military forces at the end of the Second World War; although they were also affected by events in the early postwar years -- notably, Stalin's consolidation of his position in Eastern Europe and the Chinese Communist victory on the mainland.

Second, a series of new states emerged from the process of decolonization. Most of these were the product of colonial history; but in the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, the birth of new nations produced new lines on the map.

A great deal of the first postwar generation's history consists of efforts to frustrate those who sought to alter these international boundaries by force: Communists because they felt that they had the historical right and duty to move their power forward beyond them; certain new nations because they felt a sense of grievance over the lines which had emerged. And at certain points the two efforts interwove, as Communists acted to exploit post-colonial ambitions, frictions, and discontents.

III.

Three Phases of Communist Aggression

The postwar Communist offensive had a certain shape and rhythm. There was Stalin's thrust of 1946-51, in association with Mao, from 1949; Khrushchev's of 1958-62; finally, the offensive conducted over the past four years by Mao and those who accepted his activist doctrines and policies with respect to so-called "wars of national liberation."

Starting in early 1946, Stalin consolidated into Communist states the countries of Eastern Europe where Soviet troop positions provided leverage, while pressing hard against Iran, Greece, Turkey; then via the Communist parties in Italy and France. His effort reached its climax in the Berlin blockade of 1948-49.

The West responded with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of NATO. A stalemate developed after the success of the Berlin airlift in 1949.

As this duel in the West proceeded, Stalin, working through the Cominform, launched an offensive in the East, which can roughly be dated from Zhdanov's speech of September 1947. It involved guerrilla warfare in Indochina, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. And after the Chinese Communists came to power in November 1949, the offensive in Asia reached its climax in the invasion of South Korea. It ended in May 1951 with the successful United Nations defense at the 38th parallel against a massive assault by the Chinese Communists; although costly fighting continued for two further painful years.

From the opening of truce talks in the summer of 1951 to the launching of the first Soviet Sputnik in October 1957, there emerged what passes in postwar history as a relatively quiet interval. It was, of course, interrupted by the Suez and Hungarian crises in 1956; but these resulted less from the tensions of the Cold War than from the dynamics of change within the non-Communist world and within the Communist bloc, respectively. During this

time, the Soviet Union was mainly engaged in its post-Stalin redispositions: political, economic, and military.

Meanwhile, Communist China turned primarily to tasks of domestic development. Only in Indochina did local conditions favor major Communist momentum; but the North Vietnamese settled in 1954 for half the victory they had sought.

Khrushchev's domestic changes represented a significant softening of Stalin's harsh regime -- and for Soviet citizens, historic gains. His foreign policy style, too, was different and, in its way, more flexible. Nevertheless, considerable ambitions remained embedded in Moscow's foreign policy.

And with the launching of Sputnik, a new phase of attempted Communist expansion got under way.

Khrushchev had consolidated by that time unambiguous control over the machinery of the Soviet government as well as over the Communist Party. He looked to the exploitation of two new facts on the world scene: first, the emerging Soviet capacity to deliver thermonuclear weapons over long distances as a means of forcing the West to make limited diplomatic concessions; second, the marked acceleration of nationalism and modernization in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, yielding an environment of endemic turbulence on those continents.

It was in this post-Sputnik period that Moscow laid down its ultimatum on Berlin; the Communist Party in Hanoi announced it would undertake to revive guerrilla warfare in South Viet Nam; Castro took over in Cuba; and Soviet military and economic aid arrangements were extended to increase their leverage not only in the Middle East, where the process had begun earlier, but also in Indonesia and elsewhere. It was then that Mao announced: "The East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind," and, in that spirit, initiated in 1958 the crisis in the Taiwan Straits.

There was a good deal of opportunistic enterprise in all this rather than a majestic grand design; but it was clearly a phase of Communist confidence and attempted forward movement.

In 1961-62, Khrushchev's offensive was met by the West as a whole at Berlin; and a further dramatic test of nuclear blackmail was faced down in the Cuba missile crisis by President Kennedy. For the time being, at least, that latter crisis answered a question which had greatly engaged Khrushchev: whether the Free World would surrender vital interests through diplomacy under the threat of nuclear war.

The answer to the second question -- concerning the ability of the West to avoid successful Communist exploitation of the inherent vulnerability of the developing area -- had to be given at many points by many devices:

-- in Laos, by an evident determination to frustrate a Communist takeover, yielding the Geneva Accords of 1962;

-- in Viet Nam, by President Kennedy's decision in December 1961 to enlarge our support for the South Vietnamese;

-- in Africa, by the whole cast of European and American approaches to the new African nations; and, in particular, support for the United Nations effort in the Congo;

-- in Latin America, by the isolation of Castro's Cuba.

By the end of the Cuba missile crisis in the autumn of 1962, the momentum had largely drained out of Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive; but Moscow's move towards moderation, symbolized by the negotiation of the atmospheric test ban treaty in 1963, had no echo in Peiping.

The Sino-Soviet split was gravely aggravated after the Cuba missile crisis and became increasingly overt as recriminations were exchanged and inter-party documents revealed.

The Chinese Communists sought to seize the leadership of the Communist movement, notably in the developing areas, and to unite it with the radical nationalists of Asia and Africa. They thrust hard against Soviet influence within Communist parties on every continent, fragmenting some of them; sought to bring Castro aboard; moved boldly, overplaying their hand in Africa; probably played some role in triggering the attempted Communist takeover in Indonesia; and postured aggressively during the Indo/Pak war of 1965. As a result of the problems they created, the Afro-Asian conference at Algiers in 1965 never materialized.

At one point after another this Chinese Communist offensive in the developing world fell apart, leaving the war in Viet Nam perhaps the last major stand of Mao's doctrine of guerrilla warfare.

There is a certain historical legitimacy in this outcome.

For the better part of a decade, an important aspect of the struggle within the Communist movement between the Soviet Union and Communist China had focused on the appropriate method for Communist parties to seize power. The Soviet Union had argued that the transit of frontiers with arms and men should be kept to a minimum and the effort to seize power should be primarily internal. They argued that it was the essence of "wars of national liberation" to expand Communist power without causing major confrontation with the United States and other major powers. The Chinese Communists defended a higher risk policy; but they were militarily cautious themselves. Nevertheless, they urged others to accept the risks of confrontation with United States and Western strength against which the Soviet Union warned.

Although Hanoi's effort to take over Laos and South Viet Nam proceeded from impulses which were substantially independent of Communist China, its technique constituted an important test of whether Mao's method would work even under the optimum circumstances provided by the history of the area. As General Giap has made clear, Hanoi is conscious of this link:[1] "South Viet Nam is the model of the national liberation movement in our time . . . if the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Viet Nam is overcome, this means that it can be defeated everywhere in the world."

IV.

These Communist efforts to extend their power and influence beyond the truce lines of the Cold War interwove, as I suggested earlier, with a second set of problems: the dissatisfaction of various ex-colonial nations with the frontiers -- and other arrangements -- which had emerged from the passing of colonialism. The list is long of conflicts based on real or believed grievances of this kind: the Arab/Israeli dispute; Suez; Somali/Ethiopia; Algeria/Morocco; Kashmir; West Irian; the Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia; Cyprus, etc. In addition, older quarrels were exacerbated by

[1] Quoted from Studies on Viet Nam, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, Australia, August 1965, p. 23. Minister of Defense Giap made the statement on the tenth anniversary of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 (July 19, Nhan Dan).

the mood of rising nationalism which swept the developing world; for example, Peru/Ecuador, Thailand/Cambodia. The Communist powers sought to exploit a number of these conflicts in order to expand their leverage in the developing world via diplomacy, subversion, arms and economic aid agreements. But their roots mainly lay in an extension of anti-colonial attitudes and doctrines from the days of struggle to the early years of independence: in a continuity of policy from rebellion to governmental policy. It seemed easier for some leaders of the new nations to create a sense of nationhood by continuing to evoke the rhetoric and methods of anti-colonialism -- and xenophobic nationalism -- than to turn immediately to the more mundane concepts and tasks demanded for the successful building of a viable nation.

Looking back over this whole sequence, certain general observations are possible.

First, the postwar international boundaries and truce lines have proved remarkably resistant to efforts to alter them by force. In this first postwar generation the non-Communist powers did not achieve a peaceful world community under law. But we did maintain the minimum condition for building such a community; namely, that aggression not be successful. And through persistent effort in the United Nations we have de-fused many small crises and choked off many episodes of violence which could have provoked major conflict.

Second, as the two postwar decades ended, some of the aggressive, romantic revolutionaries -- Communist and non-Communist -- were passing from the scene, or entering a phase of protracted frustration -- for the time being, at least. We have been dealing with leaders obsessed by ambitious maps of their region (or of the world) which they tried to bring to reality: from Mao's map of the area where China has, in the remote or recent past, wielded power or influence, to Nkrumah's vision of a united black Africa led from Accra; from Castro's vision of the Andes as the Sierra Maestra of South America to Ho's image of the former French colonial empire in Asia run from Hanoi. Each has confronted both other people's nationalism -- at the expense of which these maps would be fulfilled -- as well as a more general resistance to changes in the territorial or political status quo by external violence. Resistance to the achievement of these visions, combined with the growing demand of people throughout the world for economic and social progress, has eroded both ideological and nationalist aggressive romanticism.

One sees this in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe; it is a central issue in the struggle within mainland China. This is the essence of the pragmatic tide rising through the developing nations, supplanting the slogans derived from Lenin's Imperialism and the struggle against colonialism, with the more austere rhetoric of economic and social development. A new generation is emerging, sceptical of the expansionist and geo-political concepts and visions that engaged their elders.

In an interesting leader of January 14, 1967 -- The Last Revolution -- The Economist recently advanced the proposition that the end of Mao would be the end of a line of romantic revolutionaries reaching back to 1789. I would put the proposition this way.[2]

There have been three major types of war in modern history: colonial wars; wars of regional aggression; and massive wars to alter the Eurasian balance of power -- the latter attempted by industrially mature powers.

[2] For an elaboration of this theme, see The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 1960, pp. 107 ff.

In the first postwar generation we have had to deal with the threat of the latter, as undertaken by Stalin and Khrushchev, under inhibitions set by the nuclear age. But we have also seen a good many acts of regional aggression arising "from the dilemmas and the exuberance of newly formed national states, as they looked backward to past humiliation and forward to new opportunity, while confronting the choices open to them in the early stages of modernization." Despite their global pretensions, I would place Mao's efforts in the latter category.

Given the rhythm of modernization, with vast continents entering the early stages of modernization after the Second World War, it is natural that we should have seen a phase of regional aggression. From the record of history we should be in reasonably good heart about this phase. For these early, limited external adventures, associated with late pre-conditions or early take-off periods, appear generally to have given way to a phase of absorption in the adventure of modernizing the economy and the society as a whole. But, as I shall later emphasize, this underlying hopeful trend is potential, not inevitable; and it could be transitory.

If these aggressive impulses have diminished in the technologically mature Soviet Union, and in most of the less developed nations, we should be able to go forward in the generation ahead from the frustration of aggression and the absence of major hostilities toward settlement, reconciliation, and cooperation. This, surely, should be the object of policy in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; and, as it is already the object of policy in the West with respect to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and mainland China.

VI.

We have had to allocate in the first postwar generation an enormous amount of our energy, talents, and resources to the frustration of aggression and the avoidance of major war. Despite this environment of tension and, to some extent, because of it, the world community has also launched programs of economic and social development on an international basis which are truly revolutionary when compared to what was done during the inter-war years or deeper in the past.

We began, of course, with the Marshall Plan and Western Europe. So quickly did Western Europe respond that -- although the job was by no means completed -- minds were beginning to turn to more systematic efforts in the developing areas in the winter of 1948-49; for example, at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in Paris. President Truman's Point Four proposal in January 1949 was an important benchmark in this transition. In the United States a Presidential commission was working to systematize and enlarge this turn in policy, when the attack was made in June 1950 on South Korea. The Korean War both postponed a focusing of public attention and resources on the problems of development and, through a sharp rise in raw material prices, appeared to postpone somewhat its urgency.

It was in the post-Korea phase that thought and policy began to crystallize around the problem of accelerating economic growth in developing nations. In the early 1950's the best work on development by the United States was done in places in which we had major security commitments; for example, Turkey, Taiwan, and Korea. The substantial and sustained assistance provided for security purposes was gradually put to good advantage in terms of development. But towards the end of the 1950's, doctrines took hold and institutions emerged aimed at development itself -- outside a narrow security context; notably, the Development Loan Fund, the Inter-American Bank, the Wise Men's study of India and Pakistan for the World Bank, and the creation of the World Bank's soft loan window, the International Development Association.

Evidently, the United States was not alone in this transition. As colonies moved towards independence, the metropolitan powers began to provide systematic aid to the new nations for which they formerly had borne a direct responsibility. The Colombo Plan organization was set up, for example, as early as 1950.

But only in the first half of the 1960's did the world community begin to bring development policy towards the center of the stage: with the consortia arrangements of the World Bank for India and Pakistan; the Alliance for Progress; and a variety of other international consultative institutions. In the United States this transition assumed -- putting aside Viet Nam -- the form of a shift from military to economic support, and from generalized supporting assistance to purposeful development aid. Economic assistance of nations other than the U. S. rose by 18% from 1960 to 1965. *

This barely noticed expansion in the multilateral machinery and resources available for support of developing nations was accompanied by a learning process within those nations which has been quite dramatic. One after another success story in development emerged in the sense that nations learned the trick of generating sustained and reasonably balanced growth at rates which substantially outstripped population increase. The list is now quite long: Greece, Turkey, Israel, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and nations in Latin America containing perhaps three-quarters of the population of that continent.

The problems of development are, of course, by no means solved. Large parts of Africa, for example, have not yet developed the human and physical infrastructure and sufficient political unity required for a sustained take-off. And in each of the other developing regions some countries have not yet established the necessary and sufficient conditions -- economic and political -- for take-off.

Finally, India, with 500 million human beings, is not yet stably on the road to sustained growth. But many of the prerequisites exist and, beneath the surface of the present political and agricultural situation, important new elements of agricultural and industrial vitality give solid grounds for hope.

In general, we have made great but uneven progress thus far in the 1960's. Many of the old contentious debates have subsided as men perceived their irrelevance; for example, arguments concerning private versus public enterprise, industry versus agriculture. They have given way to a pragmatic synthesis. New concepts, working methods, and institutions have emerged which should permit vigorous growth in the developing nations in the generation ahead.

But a lion stands in the path: the food-population problem. The solution to this problem will certainly be central to the agenda of the coming generation.

The elementary facts are these. If present trends continue, the world's population will grow from some 3.4 billion today to about 4.5 billion by 1980. Nearly three-fourths of this tremendous expansion will be in the population of the developing world. Population control measures instituted over this period could damp this increase somewhat; but they could have a profound effect by the year 2000. To feed this increased population at existing levels of consumption -- and allowing for the impact of urbanization and income increases on effective food demand -- will require an annual rate of increase of at least 4% of food production in the developing world. (3) The overwhelming portion of this increase will have to be met from increased production in the developing world. The average rate of increase in food production over the

* As measured by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.

(3) This includes an income effect on food demand accompanying a 4% increase in GNP.

past five years has been only slightly over 2%. To avoid mass starvation -- in President Johnson's phrase -- "to help bring our most basic human account into balance" -- the whole world community will have to apply to its solution every device at its command. Moreover, sometime during the coming generation, mainland China will have to acknowledge more fully and act on the proposition that agriculture and population control is its fundamental problem; and it may need the help of the world community to avoid mass starvation.

As work on development moved forward, a parallel and related evolution occurred in cooperation among the industrialized nations. The OEEC, which managed European revival, was converted to the OECD in 1961, embracing Japan in 1964. It gradually became a forum for examining the economic relations among the more advanced states, generating a spirit of acknowledged interdependence among the industrialized nations which has also suffused monetary and trade policy in such world organizations as the IMF and GATT.

Much in postwar security policy was rooted in a consciousness of our tragic common failure to stop aggression in time during the 1930's. Similarly, postwar economic policy reflected the memory of the nationalistic policies which converted the recession after 1929 into a convulsive global catastrophe.

We have clearly done better in international economic policy during the first postwar generation than we did during the inter-war years, although at least four major matters remain on the agenda for the years ahead:

-- an international aid policy, geared to self-help measures, but sufficiently expanded in scale to permit high and steady rates of growth in those developing nations prepared to take the necessary parallel domestic action.

-- a satisfactory international monetary system which recognizes and relates problems of liquidity to problems of international capital sources and movements and the realities of the balance of payments adjustment process.

-- a reconciliation of agricultural policies in the light of the overwhelming fact of the food-population problem, and the adoption and support for voluntary programs of population control in the developing world.

-- a satisfactory trade policy embracing the legitimate interests of developed and developing nations.

VII.

International Organization: The Movement Towards Regionalism

The tasks of economic cooperation have combined with a movement towards organized interdependence in the world community -- especially in regional groups -- whose roots go deeper than economics. The nations of the Western Hemisphere had successfully pressed for a formal recognition of its regional grouping at the United Nations Charter Conference in San Francisco in 1945; but the postwar movement towards regionalism began, of course, in Western Europe. (4)

Essentially, the movement towards Western European unity recognized three facts:

-- As many Western European leaders looked ahead, starting from the devastation of the Second World War and the acute dependence on the United States of the postwar days, they reached out for a method of organization which would give them a larger voice in their own destiny.

(4) Although regionalism as an active political and economic force outside Western Europe has gathered momentum only in the 1960's, it was foreshadowed by the creation of the regional economic commissions of the United Nations: the Economic Commission for Europe (1947; Asia and the Far East (1947); for Latin America (1948); Africa (1953).

-- They perceived, however, that in military, economic, and other matters, a measure of interdependence with the United States would be required for the indefinite future; and

-- They accepted the fact that the nation-state -- even nation-states of 50 million commanding the best in modern science and technology -- could not deal effectively either with the United States as a partner or with the scale of the problems which were emerging on the world scene, whether East-West or North-South.

Western European regionalism was conceived by Europeans as a method for solving this three-sided dilemma. And it had the steady support of the United States which in 1947 made -- and has sustained -- a conscious decision that a strong, unified Western Europe was more in its long-run interest than fragmented but less capable European partners.

In the first postwar generation, Western European unity moved forward substantially, goaded by the Soviet threat but inhibited by an understandable reluctance to surrender deeply rooted national concepts. Today -- despite evident and grave problems -- that movement is still alive and active despite the rising sense of security since the Berlin and Cuba missile crises of 1961 and 1962. And, as one contemplates the agenda for the coming generation, as nearly as it can now be defined, the case remains valid, strengthened by evidence that it is difficult to absorb and apply certain types of new technology without investments in research and development and markets beyond the reach of nations of 50 million. Western Europe is unlikely to make the maximum contribution that it could make to the tasks of security, human welfare, reconciliation, and institution-building in the world community unless it continues to move towards unity.

Meanwhile, in the course of the 1960's, forces similar to those which have initiated economic regionalism in Western Europe began to take hold in other parts of the world, notably in Latin America and, most recently, in Asia.

Latin American unity is an old dream -- dating from the days of Bolivar. It has taken on a new vitality as Latin Americans have moved from the first stage of their industrialization, focused on the production of consumers' goods in substitution for imports, to growth centered on medium and heavy industry. In terms of stages of growth, the more advanced countries of Latin America -- Mexico, the southern regions of Brazil, and Argentina, for example -- are emerging from take-off and moving toward technological maturity. In Mexico, at least, that transition has been successfully made; although throughout Latin America, industrialization is hobbled by an overly protective system which has diminished competition, efficiency, and full utilization of capacity. Powerful vested interests are embedded in those national protective systems.

But as the Latin Americans move into industries of higher and more sophisticated technology, they are beginning to try to overcome this heritage of take-off. They feel acutely the constriction of national markets and the irrationality of building steel, automobile, chemical, and other industries on a national basis. They are also being pushed towards economic integration by an awareness that their traditional exports are unlikely to earn the foreign exchange needed for their further development; that they must cultivate industrial exports; but at the present time they must go through a transitional stage of regional protectionism before they can emerge with competitive efficiency on the world scene.

Meanwhile, the Central American Common Market has demonstrated that countries at a much earlier stage of development can profit greatly from a common market arrangement -- a lesson worth the serious attention of Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

more

Finally, the Latin Americans are beginning to look inward from the coastal cities, which have historically been the basis for their modernization. They are beginning to recognize expanding needs and possibilities for international collaboration in developing the inner frontiers of South America.

These convergent and palpable economic forces making for economic cooperation and integration are supported by a sense -- not unlike that which continues to motivate the European unity movement -- that in the world of the present and the future, the voice of Latin America will be strengthened to the extent that Latin Americans can find common ground and common policies.

It is natural, therefore, that the currently discussed meeting of the Presidents of the American Republics should focus primary attention on economic integration and multi-national projects.

In Western Europe and Latin America those pressing towards unified action could build on a substantially common tradition. But in Asia, history offered a less promising initial base. Nevertheless, we have seen in the past two years a quite remarkable surge of regional enterprise in Asia.

From South Korea to Australia, from Japan to Singapore, there are solid and particular national reasons why the nations of Asia and the Pacific should begin to group together in mutual support. These underlying considerations were strengthened by the American commitment of major forces in Viet Nam in 1965 which has given to the region confidence that it has a future to design.

As in Europe and Latin America, the initial expression of this movement has been in the form of economic institutions: the rapid negotiation of the Asian Development Bank; the new vitality of the Mekong Committee; gatherings to survey the possibilities of regional action in education, agriculture, etc. It remains to be seen how the encouraging political impulses which underlay the Asian and Pacific Council in Seoul and the Association of Southeast Asia will evolve.

In Africa, too, where regional cooperation has existed in some regions, such as East Africa, one can detect other beginnings, at least, of the same mixture of economic and political impulses that have led to regionalism elsewhere. The Organization of African Unity has existed since May 1963. Despite political schisms -- regional and ideological -- it undertook to deal with two substantial African disputes -- Somalia/Ethiopia and Morocco/Algeria--thus avoiding the intervention of extra-African powers. On the economic side, the African Development Bank has been launched and sub-regional economic communities are being formed in Eastern and West Africa as a result of planning by the ECA. Most of Africa, as noted earlier, is in a pre-industrial stage, building slowly the pre-conditions for take-off. It makes good sense to try to create the essential physical and institutional infrastructure, in this pliant early phase of development, on a regional and sub-regional basis. This was a major consideration that led to the reshaping of the American aid program to Africa over the past year to give greater emphasis to multinational cooperation.

As the evolution of the movement towards Western European unity indicates, the building of regionalism is a long, slow process. At every stage the case for moving forward must overcome the inherent attraction and inertia of staying with familiar national modes of operation. Moreover, regionalism is no substitute for building solid national structure. Nevertheless, the next generation is likely to see real, if irregular, progress towards regional cooperation, because the political and economic impulses which underlie it are compelling. Regional cooperation -- within a framework of global collective security and common efforts in development -- is likely to grow,

as it must, if the desires of men and governments to take a larger hand in their own destiny are to be reconciled with the inadequacies of the nation-state on the one hand, and the imperatives of interdependence on the other.

For the United States, this move towards regionalism has a particular meaning. We were drawn into world responsibility after the Second World War by the need to fill certain vacuums of power. The cost of not helping in Greece, Turkey, Western Europe, Korea, and elsewhere, was self-evident; and it was judged, case by case, to outweigh the burden of engagement. But postwar America was not interested in building a network of satellites. It looked forward eagerly to the earliest time when other nations could stand on their own feet and deal with us as partners in as safe and orderly and progressive a world community as we all could achieve.

Regionalism -- in Western Europe and elsewhere -- has thus commended itself to the United States as a way of permitting us to shift away from the disproportionate bilateral relations inherent in a large power working with smaller powers.

We see in regionalism a way not of returning to isolation, but of leaving the nations of the various regions to do as much for themselves as they can -- and more with the passage of time -- while preserving the ties of inter-dependence where they are judged on both sides to be in the common interest.

VIII.

Reconciliation

The central lesson we have drawn from our experience -- and from the whole sweep of events since 1914 -- is that our main task is the organization of a durable peace. We tend, looking back, to share Churchill's judgment of the Second World War as "unnecessary." We are conscious that, in a nuclear age, the human race cannot afford another world war. Therefore, whatever the frustrations and difficulties, we are committed to look beyond the non-Communist islands of security, progress, and order, to a settlement of the Cold War itself and the shaping of something like a true global community.

The first condition for such a community is, I would say again, that alterations of the international status quo by force not be permitted to succeed. The status quo is, of course, not sacrosanct. It is always changing. And in the past two decades it has altered in major ways through changes within nations and by international agreement. We now have, for example, a fairly promising prospect before us in relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the West on the other. But we shall forget at our peril that this prospect was created mainly by the strength and unity of the West when confronted by the challenges of Stalin and Khrushchev.

Looking ahead, we can define one aspect of the challenge of the next generation as this: whether we can, in this time span, solve the three problems which, from the early postwar years onward, have virtually defined the Cold War:

-- ending the division of Germany and Europe;

-- preventing further nuclear proliferation and damping the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons systems between the United States and the Soviet Union;

-- bringing mainland China into a normal relation to the world community.

In different ways, each of these issues is now active.

There is a growing consensus in the West that our task with respect to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is to make the most of the forces of moderation which have emerged since 1953 -- and, especially, since the Cuba missile crisis -- and gradually to create an environment in which the East/West confrontation is so reduced that the problem of Germany can be peacefully resolved.

No one can now perceive the time or the shape of such a resolution. But there is a common will to create an environment in which the major unresolved questions of the Cold War in Europe can be settled. Underlying this process is a dilution, at least, of the Communist commitment that they must help impose their doctrines on others; the rising tide of national and regional assertiveness in both Eastern and Western Europe; and the washing away, under the tests of performance, of the Communist conviction that their systems for organizing society are inherently superior to those of the West.

The process will not move forward automatically. It could easily be disrupted if the West fragmented and presented opportunities for renewed pressure from the East; but right now it is in at least slow motion with virtually universal support in the West.

Whereas the moment of truth in East/West relations, centering on a resolution of the German problem, may not come upon us for some time, we face in the months ahead an urgent and critical question with respect to the nuclear arms race.

We are all actively trying to find the terms for a non-proliferation agreement; and the emergence of an anti-ballistic missile defense for Moscow has posed for the United States and the Soviet Union the question of whether the nuclear arms race shall be brought under control or go into a vast and expensive round of escalation on both sides with respect to both offensive and defensive weapons.

The two issues are partially linked. It may well be argued that it will be more difficult for the non-nuclear powers to accept a non-proliferation agreement if its context is believed to be a heightening of the bilateral arms race in strategic systems between the United States and the Soviet Union. And there will be other searching questions raised by the non-nuclear-weapons states in the current meeting of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva and beyond which require response.

But if we fail to create a world of non-proliferation, the result would not merely be more national nuclear systems and the instabilities that might accompany such a situation, but also a fragmenting of political relations within the non-Communist world. But if we should succeed -- as we must try very hard to do -- the world community will be drawn closer together.

What is at stake, therefore, in the discussions and negotiations that are upon us in these days, are issues which will set much of the framework for the organization of the world community over the next generation.

In Communist China, we are seeing one of the great dramas of modern history. The Long March veterans -- who worked for more than thirty years in what appeared to be remarkable unity -- have now split and are engaged in an open struggle for power. Beneath the surface of the struggle for power is a debate on policy between revolutionary romantics and pragmatists. The resolution of this debate will shape mainland policy and Communist China's relations for many years ahead.

This judgment reaches back to the nature and roots of the Chinese crisis. It is clear that after their remarkable victory in 1949, Chinese Communist leaders made two grandiose errors.

First, they set in motion a pattern of economic development focused on heavy industry and the modernization of their armed forces which was historically inappropriate. They behaved as if they were at a stage similar to Stalin's Soviet Union of 1930; in fact, they were closer to that of Japan near the turn of the century. Like Japan at that time, they needed to develop in modern China -- as a foundation for industrialization -- an agricultural system based on strong peasant incentives, combined with the massive application of chemical fertilizers. They chose collectivization and inadequate investment in agriculture. Despite some shift in recent years toward a higher priority for agriculture, the result is a food-population position which is incompatible with rapid economic development.

Second, they chose to move out onto the Asian and world scene with objectives that disregarded the realities of power in the world arena. They sought an expansion of control and influence beyond their capacity; and they failed.

In the face of these failures, the future of Chinese domestic and foreign policy are evidently now at stake as well as the future of the leaders engaged.

No one can confidently predict the timing and the sequence of the outcome. There is a decent hope, however, that soon or late, a mainland China will emerge which will accept as its primary task the modernization of the life of the nation and accept also the proposition that the international frontiers of the region shall not be changed by the use of force.

So far as the United States is concerned, President Johnson has made clear on a number of occasions that we look forward to that day and to welcoming that kind of mainland China into the community of nations.

IX.

What I have asserted thus far is that the tasks of the second postwar generation may consist in:

First, moving from the mere frustration of aggression to a phase of settlement, reconciliation, and cooperation with respect to endemic disputes arising either with Communist regimes or between non-Communist states;

Second, moving forward in the tasks of growth in the developing regions, and especially coming to grips -- as a world community -- with the food-population problem;

Third, carrying forward, refining, and consolidating the movements towards regionalism -- in Western Europe and elsewhere, as well as in global cooperative enterprises in the fields of aid, trade, money, and in various technical fields which lend themselves best to universal effort;

Fourth, moving towards a liquidation of key issues of the Cold War in Europe, and towards arms control, while working to bring a more moderate Communist China into a normal relationship to Asia and the world.

Taken together they offer expanding scope for the United Nations in the years ahead. In the past two decades, the U. N. has contributed to each major dimension of international policy; but the inherent schisms and conflicts of those years often by-passed the U. N. or permitted it only a secondary or marginal role. If we can move forward on the agenda I have outlined, the U. N. may begin more nearly to fulfill the functions envisaged for it in 1945.

Having held up this challenging but essentially hopeful vision of what may lie ahead, I would now wish to underline a general proposition:[5]

"On occasion it may be proper to regard the course of history as inevitable, ex post; but not ex ante."

There was nothing inevitable about what we achieved in the first postwar generation: the revival of Western Europe; the preservation of freedom in Turkey, Greece, and West Berlin; the saving of South Korea and Malaya; the Alliance for Progress; the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba; and all the rest. These enterprises took brave -- and often visionary -- men and women of many nations. They did not rely on inevitable historical trends: they shaped historical possibilities by their commitment.

Nor were our failures over these years inevitable -- explicable, as always, but not inevitable.

And there is no inevitability built into the projection I have outlined for the second postwar generation -- only possibilities. And these constructive possibilities will not be made good unless we work as hard at them as we have worked in the past twenty years on a somewhat different agenda.

It would, in fact, not be difficult: surveying the forces at work within Western Europe; in East-West relations; in the dynamics of the developing regions; in the forces at play within Communist China -- to project a quite different prospect: a prospect not of progressive movement towards order and reconciliation and progress, but towards disruption, fragmentation, mass hunger, and renewed danger.

For example, the great hopes for progress in East-West relations depend on the maintenance of an adequate, flexible, and integrated defense system in the West, as well as on an imaginative and creative approach to the East. There is no reason to believe that a failure of the West to stay together might not tempt Moscow again towards adventure.

Similarly, a failure of the Vietnamese and their allies to see through the engagement to an honorable peace could destroy the emerging foundation for confidence and regional cooperation in Asia, with further adverse consequences on every continent.

X.

I have said little thus far about the American position on Viet Nam because I wished to expose one American's view of the broad tasks of foreign policy that lie before us all. President Johnson is conducting a policy which, in fact, is already at grips with many of what I have called second-generation tasks. I come from a government which, contrary to a widespread view, is not overwhelmed and obsessed by the problem of Viet Nam.

On the other hand, we are confident that what we are seeking to accomplish in Viet Nam is right and essential if we are to move successfully through the great transition.

We are honoring a treaty which committed us to "act to meet the common danger" in the face of "aggression by means of armed attack" in the treaty area. And this commitment is also being honored by Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand -- as well as by the remarkable action of South Korea, which was not bound by treaty in this matter.

[5] British Economy of the Nineteenth Century, Oxford, 1948, p. 143.

We are also dealing with the gross and systematic violation of an agreement, signed in 1962, which committed all parties, including Hanoi, to withdraw their military forces from Laos; to refrain from reintroducing such forces; and to refrain from using the territory of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

We are also encouraged by the efforts of the people of South Viet Nam to make a transition to orderly constitutional government of the kind which the people of South Korea have accomplished with such notable success since 1961.

And we are answering, as we have had to answer on other occasions, the question: Are the word and commitment of the United States reliable? For the United States cannot be faithful to its alliances in the Atlantic and unfaithful to its alliances in the Pacific.

I know that some of the younger generation in the United States -- and, I daresay, in Great Britain -- believe that we in the American Government are old-fashioned in our approach to Viet Nam. It is true that we recall often the lessons of the 1930's; we recall experiences in Greece and Berlin and Korea which are not part of the living memory of those now in universities. That is, I think, because our experience has forced us to contemplate the chaos since 1914 and the reality of the task of building a durable peace. A new generation will, of course, decide what in its experience is to be remembered and set its own goals and priorities.

But in the perspective I have presented tonight, what is old-fashioned about Viet Nam is the effort by the leaders in Hanoi to make their lifelong dream of achieving control over Southeast Asia come to reality by the use of force.

It is their concept of "wars of national liberation" that is old-fashioned. It is being overtaken not merely by the resistance of the seven nations fighting there, but also by history and by increasingly pervasive attitudes of pragmatism and moderation.

History, I deeply believe, will show in Southeast Asia, as it has displayed in many other parts of the world, that the international status quo cannot be altered by use of external force. That demonstration is costing the lives of many South Vietnamese, Americans, Koreans, Australians, and others who understand the danger to them of permitting a change in the territorial or political status quo by external violence -- who cherish the right of self-determination for themselves and for others.

If the argument I have laid before you is correct -- and if we have the common will to hold together and get on with the job -- the struggle in Viet Nam might be the last great confrontation of the postwar era.

If the Cuba missile crisis was the Gettysburg of the Cold War, Viet Nam could be the Wilderness; for, indeed, the Cold War has been a kind of global civil conflict. Viet Nam could be made the closing of one chapter in modern history and the opening of another.

XI.

As befits a world in transition, then, we in the American government, under President Johnson's leadership, are dealing with elements from the old agenda while doing what we can to define, grip, and move forward the new agenda.

President Johnson is honoring a Treaty placed before the Senate by President Eisenhower in 1954 and overwhelmingly approved. He is insisting on compliance with an international agreement made in Geneva in 1962, by the Administration of President Kennedy. But his thrust is forward. He has placed before the Congress a Space Treaty; proposals to expand East-West trade; to create the Asian Development Bank; a Consular Convention with the Soviet Union; a request for a resolution to multilateralize the American contribution to a sustained effort to win the race between food supplies and population increase.

It is clearly his hope to be able to present to the Senate a non-proliferation agreement; and we are prepared to put our best and most constructive minds to work in negotiations to head off, if possible, another major round in the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons.

In all this we are conscious that there is little we can accomplish by ourselves. The nation-state -- whatever its size and resources -- cannot solve the vast problems now before us or foreseeable. Nor is this any longer a bi-polar world, despite the continued disproportionate concentration of nuclear power in the United States and the Soviet Union. The dynamics of the lively first postwar generation has yielded a world arena of diverse nations determined to take a hand in their own destiny.

We shall achieve arrangements of authentic partnership -- based on mutual respect and acknowledgement of interdependence -- or we shall not deal successfully with the new agenda.

America is now -- and, I believe -- will continue to be, ready to play its proper role in such partnerships.

I concluded my last survey of American foreign policy from a British University platform twenty years ago with this injunction from one of our poets.(6)

> "One thought ever at the fore --
> That in the Divine Ship, the World, breasting Time and Space,
> All peoples of the globe together sail, sail the same voyage,
> Are bound to the same destination."

That, I believe, will remain the spirit of America's foreign policy in the generation ahead.

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(6) The American Diplomatic Revolution, Oxford, 1943, p. 24

2/28/67

HH-

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

Can't work things
out w/ Russia
alone Consequences
of bi polar World.

working understanding
w/ the European govts

in a world made one by
science and threatened with
universal destruction

if we lose our vision of
humanity in the narrow pursuit
of national interest.

Division

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2/27

To John R.

From Ted

Pls see Marshall's draft, as edited and boiled down. It is still ponderous and needs some work. Henry Owen and Bob Bowie have copies and will have their comments to me early today. Suggest we jointly work over further, and then, once VP has approved, we can pass thru Rostow without getting involved in "clearance." If anything, this text is too safe now.

for, than to define our purpose in terms of what we are against.

Another lesson of our experience is that the effort of the Western alliance to construct some forms of association which transcend the narrow nationalism which has bred so much violence and misery in this world is a cause worthy of continued and renewed energy. That cause, which has had so promising a beginning in fruition in the movement toward European unity and Atlantic partnership, is now threatened by a rebirth of nationalism. We have not been blameless for this trend, nor are we ourselves free from the narrow perception of our interests in nationalist terms, but the time has long since past when we can allow this virulent and obsolescent force to govern the destinies of mankind.

The world has become too small for chauvinism. It will soon be possible to traverse the Atlantic ocean in two hours; missiles can now do so in less than half an hour; words, pictures, ideas and emotions cross national boundaries, continents and oceans as swiftly as they go from this platform to where you are sitting. The onrush of technological change is breath-taking in its opportunities, but it will also be remorseless in its destructive power if nationalist rivalries are allowed to be revived against two decades of progress.

During most of those two decades, and until about four years ago, a constructive force has been at work in Europe, submerging old hostilities, releasing the constraining bonds of old habits and closed institutions to the fresh stimulation of competition and cooperation across national boundaries, building a new Europe upon the foundations of the old. At the heart of this progress was the recognition that modern technology creates new and larger

[Insert p. 4]

It would be well for all to remember the havoc and heartache which nationalism has brought to the people of Europe in the past half-century. The erosion of the cement of fear that bound Western Europe together in alliance with the US and Eastern Europe in alliance with the Soviet Union

is the coherence engendered by fear declines in the Western and Eastern Europe, ~~all to the~~ ~~declines~~, ~~to the temptation~~ ~~to resist~~ and one sides should & resurface that nationalism is corroding the regional

Insert p 4

bonds that developed under the pressure of external threat. For ~~if~~ in the long run ~~Such nationalism~~ a new "balkanization" - East or West - would be no less threatening to the peace and stability of Europe than the old.

interdependencies, and that the community of interest of the peoples of Western Europe in freedom, prosperity and security must find its expression in larger forms of economic and political association than the nation-state. At the same time, a sense of common interest has connected Western Europe with America by a thousand threads, woven by daily habit into a pattern of practical partnership. In the last few years, however, the question has arisen whether this forward movement, so full of promise and hope, shall be arrested and reversed.

There are those who counsel us that the renewal of nationalism must be accepted as an inevitable and immutable fact, and that we can only resign ourselves to the abandonment of the structure we have begun, and to the acceptance of a return of power politics among nations. We are told also, in the name of "realism," that the next step must be a settlement of European problems by hegemonial agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. I do not believe that this is realism. I do not believe that peace and stability can be built upon hegemonial domination, whether American or Soviet or the two together. The incontrovertible evidence of the past two decades, in every part of the world, is that no superiority in nuclear weapons is sufficient to impose political solutions upon unwilling populations. Moreover, although I believe deeply that the Soviet Union and the United States share a common interest in preventing another terrible war, and must do everything within their power to cooperate to that end, I do not think we have yet reached the point at which we can say that the political aims of the Soviet Union are consonant with our own, although we hope that this may someday become true.

I do not minimize the profound causes which have given rise to this

Insert ~~P.5~~ P.5j

Those who believe that the only alternative is a renewal of nationalism are mistaken.

Those who believe that European problems of this decade will be solved by the super-powers of the last decade are also mistaken.

The Peace and stability of Europe will not be built on decisions on which Europeans do not participate and ~~on~~ conclusions which they do not share. Similarly decisions on which can ensure the peace and stability of

p 5 - insert (2)

Europe must include those
~~Eu~~ across the Atlantic
and beyond the Urals.
This is the only solution
to the problems Europe which
embodies
"realism".

In the center of the Berlin (endure)
there stands a stark mute —
the skeleton of a church, preserved
to symbolize eternally the depravity
of war. Before long the iron
curtain will similarly lie in
ruins. Its remnants will
stand as a symbol of the
ideological age. Let rigid
dogmas never again divide
mankind. Let human ideals
never again become the sovereign
ideological bigotry. The iron
curtain is coming down — a
great act in the human
drama is at hand! Through mediation
in Europe we can and
must shape a commonwealth
of progress dedicated to

- peace not to war
to construction and development
not doctrinal conflict.
The US is ready to
play its role.

atavistic spirit among the nations of Europe and here at home, but I do not believe we are helpless to prevent the drift of events in this direction. It is not beyond the wit or will of man to shape events in a more constructive direction, and in particular I believe there is a great deal that we can do to help bring this about.

There are many factors involved in this turn of events: the easement of tension, the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence," the fragmentation of the Communist world, the economic recovery of Europe, the latent power of nationalist sentiments and institutions. But I think we can profit most from an honest recognition of the extent to which our own shortcomings have contributed to this development. We have not always acted with sensitivity for the interests and feelings of our partners. We have not sufficiently appreciated how ~~much~~ American military, industrial and technological power appears to our European allies as a suffocation ~~to~~ of their own development and identity, and we have not yet learned to exercise our leadership with resiliency and accommodation for the interests of those who are associated with us. In part I think this is because we have been so much preoccupied with and anxious about vexatious events elsewhere, which we feel are of common concern, although this feeling is not widely shared in Europe. Let us admit that we have not always shown that breadth of vision in defining and describing our purposes which would serve to inspire confidence and intimacy. But this is what we can do, and are determined to do, in order to give renewed encouragement to the sense of community in Europe, and between Europe and America, which must be the very foundation of our policy.

Why must this be the foundation of our policy? Not because Europe is

the center of the universe, but because the association of Europe and America is vitally necessary to the accomplishment of those positive aims which are necessary to the survival of the cherished values we hold in common. I want to make it especially clear that it is also not because we want to rekindle the Cold War, or to stimulate cohesion by an artificial regeneration of tensions. We regard the easement of tensions with the Soviet Union, and between East and West Europe, as a favorable development, necessary for reducing the danger of war and encouraging to the evolution of political relationships in a desirable direction.

I want to underline this point. The events of the past twenty years have laid the foundation for a new phase of effort. The cornerstone of that effort must be the resumption of progress toward Western European unity and toward a sense of partnership between Western Europe and the United States. The reason why this must be so is that this unity is absolutely essential to the realization of the positive purposes toward which our efforts must be directed during the new period of history which now has opened up before us.

What are those positive purposes?

First, we must work toward a settlement of those European problems which have been left unresolved in the aftermath of the war. A constructive settlement of Europe's problems can only be achieved with the full and voluntary participation of the people concerned, backed by a confident and unified Western Europe. It is only in the framework of such a European settlement that we can hope to achieve, step by step over the coming years, the reunification of Germany, which is essential to European stability and peace. We have been fortunate that the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany have shown a readiness to join this larger structure, and to encourage the growth

of democratic political institutions at home, with moderation and restraint, in the confidence that only this course could lead to the peaceful unification of their country under conditions which would contribute to, rather than jeopardize, the general security. If the revival of nationalism elsewhere on the continent is allowed to frustrate this development, it can only serve to stimulate the revival of that nationalism in Germany which its responsible leaders and the rest of the world alike deplore. A fragmented Europe of competing nation-states cannot advance its own prosperity, guarantee its own security, nor settle the problems of a divided continent.

Second, we wish to work together with our Western European partners in encouraging a further development of trade, technological and cultural contacts with Eastern Europe. We can foresee the possibility, during the period ahead, of evolutionary progress toward a freer flow of persons and trade across the continent of Europe -- toward, in short, the final dissolution of the iron curtain.

Third, it is our purpose to encourage the continued evolution of Soviet policy beyond the ambiguities of what it now calls "peaceful coexistence" toward more substantial forms of cooperation. For both this objective and for the one I have just mentioned, Western European unity is an essential prerequisite, for divisive political tendencies within the West invite Soviet exploitation rather than genuine cooperation. With opportunities for pressure and manipulation foreclosed by Western unity, we can with confidence anticipate that self-interest will lead the Soviet Union to accept the advantages of cooperative relations. In support of this purpose, we shall continue our utmost effort to reduce the danger of another war by seeking practical restraints upon armaments, and cooperative efforts through the United Nations wherever possible to settle local conflict situations without violence.

Fourth, neither Europe nor America can hope to be islands of security in a turbulent world. It must therefore be our common purpose to consider how the resources of the industrialized parts of the world can usefully assist the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America so that progress and stability and hope may overcome despair and violence. It does not require much foresight to realize that the widening gap between growing populations and diminishing food supplies is approaching a time of explosion. Shall we sit in complacency, lulled by creature comforts, until we are engulfed in chaos, or will we act, now and together? It is Europe's problem as much as it is ours, and we must consult together, and plan together, and combine our wisdom and our resources to help work toward security and peaceful development in these formerly remote parts of the world. We have no monopoly on wisdom, and we need and will welcome the partnership of Europe in helping the world to navigate through what will surely be a decade or more of danger for the developing nations.

This brings me to the fifth and most important positive purpose to guide our efforts in the period ahead. We have certain values in common with the people of Western Europe. It may be hard to define these values without using high-flown phrases that have become worn and depreciated. But the heart of the matter, it seems to me, is that what we are trying to do, however imperfectly, is to build societies in which man can realize his potentialities, in all his creative diversity. This can only succeed in a world environment that makes this kind of life possible, and that is why I firmly believe the people of Western Europe and of the United States must work together toward some kind of international system and order in the world. We have made a beginning. The creation of the United Nations is an achievement, but we must build upon this beginning. We must use it and strengthen it. We must consider at every point whether our actions strengthen or weaken the movement toward

order and restraint. Those of us who believe in progressive democracy must provide the dynamism for establishing the conditions of progress and order in the world. The heart-beat of this effort must come in the first instance from the people of Western Europe and America, who have so much to give, and also so much to lose if the future is surrendered to international anarchy and violence.

We have successfully weathered the difficult trials of the post-war period. No we go forward into a new period of history, and we must do so with vision and purpose.

###

Our guide could be no better than that set forth 21 years ago by Churchill:

"If we adhere faithfully to the Charter of the

Thx - Bryan's K.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2/27/67

1) Be kind

2) passage - which LBJ would be outraged. Sounds like Bobby Baby —

3) add some USIA

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1) What kind of Europe
are we shooting
for

2) - How to put it into effect

3) Community of developed
nations? E.W. —
Working together
then go on to
work with

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

4) End of age of ideological conflict
When Ronald Reagan took office, it was the last gasp of ideological politics. Today, Lithuania remains a Berlin Wall last.
ITE

5) E-West European reconciliation

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

6) Road - Highway. —
Lisbon & Vladivostok
could be done by
Europeans

7) End of ideal-seeking
militant movement.

Address of Vice President
Hubert H. Humphrey
Westminster College
Fulton, Missouri
March 6, 1967

I am honored to
appear on this platform
which has been graced
by many whose eloquence
and profundity I cannot
hope to equal. Some of you
will recall
hear today
the eloquence and wit, ~~the appearance the~~
~~the grace on this same platform~~
the courage and defiance
of a man who appeared
on this platform

(2)

twenty one years ago, to ~~Some of~~
~~you will remember that~~
~~address in which Sir~~
~~Winston Churchill was to~~
sear the consciousness of the
world with that dread
phrase "the iron curtain".
With that address Sir
Winston Churchill alerted the
world that a new phase
in history had begun — the
prolonged post-war conflict
that came to be called "the
Cold War".

It is that accasion
and that phrase — the
Iron Curtain — that will form
the starting point for my

(3)

Remarks today.

It is my belief that we may be approaching another new period in history. Today I wish to describe for you some characteristics of this new period, and some of the ~~opportu~~ requirements and opportunities which it places before us.

P 1- Shulman draft - as marked.

REMARKS
VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY
21st ANNIVERSARY OF CHURCHILL ADDRESS
WESTMINSTER COLLEGE
FULTON, MISSOURI
MARCH 5, 1967

Draft: Fulton, Mo., March 5, 1967

VISION AND PURPOSE

President Davidson, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am mindful of the honor of speaking from this platform, which has been graced by so many distinguished speakers over the past thirty years. As I began to prepare my thoughts for this occasion, my mind dwelt particularly upon that time, just twenty-one years ago to the day, when Winston Churchill delivered from this platform that historic address which was to sear the consciousness of the world with that dread phrase, "the iron curtain."

I have taken that occasion, and that phrase, as the starting point for my remarks today.

Historians have long since recognized Churchill's Fulton, Missouri, speech as a major marker along the road of our awakening recognition that a new phase in history had begun -- that post-war conflict, which was to become known as the "Cold War." It is my belief that we stand today upon the threshold of another new period in history, and although I have no such lapidary phrase to put before you and cannot pretend to equal the unparalleled eloquence of that magnificent statesman, I wish to describe for you some characteristics of this new period as I see them, and some of the requirements and the opportunities which it places before us.

On that day in March of 1946, when Sir Winston uttered his memorable sentence: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adratic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent," there were many in this country -- and elsewhere, who were most reluctant to accept the truth of his stark characterization of the state of affairs. For quite a long while, the notion was unacceptable to many because it conflicted with our hopes and dreams that the

terrible catastrophe of war might be succeeded by a new period of harmony and cooperation among nations. But this was not to be. I have no wish now to add to the recriminations of those times, and I shall leave to historians the task of tracing the events by which the Cold War came into being, but what I wish to underline today is that, although it seemed discouraging and even impossible to many at that moment, this nation and the democracies of Western Europe did successfully mount the laborious effort that was required to bulwark peace and defend their free institutions from the dangers which then threatened them. The record of these twenty-one years has been a remarkable one -- not perfect by any means, but extraordinary in the degree to which this country, unseasoned in the affairs of the world, rose with unprecedented generosity and responsibility to meet the requirements of those times.

The world has changed greatly in twenty-one years. Many of these changes, I believe, may be regarded as the desired consequence of the Western alliance which was then forged in the mingled fires of our hopes and fears. The nations of Western Europe stand today independent and prosperous, reasserting Europe's historic role in the world, and of this fact we may be proud. The nations of Eastern Europe are beginning once again to enter into fruitful relations with their neighbors to the West, and we welcome this hopeful beginning. The Soviet Union, recovering by heroic effort from the frightful loss of human life and resources which it suffered in the war, has grown greatly in the power to grant its people the satisfaction of their material needs, and no-one who cares about the human condition can fail to rejoice at this fact. We cannot yet say that the iron curtain has disappeared, but it has surely become less impermeable, for people, commerce and ideas have begun to criss-cross the European continent to a degree which might have seemed

Insert - p 3.

Europe - East and West - is changing - in relation to to the U.S, to the Soviet Union - and to each other.

inconceivable only a few years ago, and this fact too we warmly welcome.

Indeed, all these changes I have described are among the symptoms of a new flux in the political life of Europe which, as I say, we helped to bring about, but whose significance we have not yet fully grasped.

We have come, I believe, half-way in the effort which we began twenty years ago. As we have seen, many of the changes which we dared to hope for have begun to manifest themselves. This fact should give us confidence and encouragement, but it also places before us new conditions and new requirements. The time has come for the Western alliance to shift gears. The question we face is whether we will shift into high gear, or into reverse.

Forward or backward? This is the issue as I see it in the debates which have arisen concerning our relations with Europe and the Soviet Union. The difficult judgment we are called upon to make is to distinguish which elements of our conduct should be changed or discarded, and where we must persevere. I would like to suggest to you some answers to this question.

One clear lesson I think we have learned from our experience is the sterility of anti-communism as the rallying-cry for free nations. We have for too long been hypnotized by this negative ideology, which has bred meanness and suspicion among us, cramping us in its fears, corroding the confidence and the freedom over which it pretended to be guardian. I do not say that communism is no longer a problem, and I think we would be making a mistake if we assumed that the changes which have been taking place have already brought about the total disappearance of those ideological differences which still unfortunately separate Soviet purposes from our own. But this is no longer our central problem, nor is it a sufficient expression of our purposes. It is more important to be able to say what America stands

2nd draft

ADDRESS OF VICE PRESIDENT
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
WESTMINSTER COLLEGE
FULTON, MISSOURI
MARCH 6, 1967

I am honored to appear on this platform which has been graced by many whose eloquence and profundity I cannot hope to equal. Some of you here today will recall the eloquence and wit, the courage and defiance of a man who appeared on this platform twenty-one years ago to sear the consciousness of the world with that dread phrase "the iron curtain". ~~With that address Sir Winston Chruchill alerted the world that a new phase in history had begun -- the prolonged post-war conflict that come to be called "the cold war".~~ [Insert] (1)

It is that occasion and that phrase -- the Iron Curtain -- that will form the starting point for my remarks today.

It is ~~my belief~~ that we may be approaching another new period in his tory. Today I wish to describe for you some characteristics of this new period, and some of the requirements and opportunities which it places before us.

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Visit p. 1

across the fragile political ~~landscape~~ crossings

(1) Corpus Christi.

On that day
~~Twenty one years ago~~, Winston
Churchill announced that
a "iron curtain" had descended
on the center of Europe and
divided Europe in two. Far
most ~~two decades~~ an generation
iron curtain has separated
~~divided~~ Berlin
a ~~Iron~~ Europe stays +
determined ~~to~~ allies in
~~the victors to~~ a the great war had
who soon saw victory on
faced each other.
~~divided~~ ~~Europe~~ ~~confrontation~~ the
front for to est-arrangement
mentality to
"cold war"

"From Stetten in the Baltic
to Trieste in the Adriatic, an
Iron Curtain has descended
upon the Continent", he said.

affairs of the world.

The world has changed greatly in twenty-one years. Many of these changes, the great in our world in the past two decades may be regarded as the desired consequence of the Western alliance which was then forged in the mingled fires of our hopes and fears. The nations of Western Europe stand today independent and prosperous, capable of achieving a fresh role for Europe in the reasserting Europe's historic role in the world -- and of this fact we may be proud. The nations of Eastern Europe are beginning once again to enter into fruitful relations with their neighbors to the West -- and we welcome this hopeful beginning. The Soviet Union, recovering by heroic effort from the frightful loss of human life and resources which it suffered in the war, has grown greatly in the power to grant its people the satisfaction of their material needs -- and no one who cares about the human condition can fail to rejoice at this fact.

We cannot yet say that the Iron Curtain has disappeared, but it has surely become less impermeable. People, commerce and ideas have begun to criss-cross the European continent to a degree which might have seemed inconceivable only a few years ago -- and this we warmly welcome.

Insert - p. 4

All of these changes are among the symptons of a new flux in the political life of Europe which we helped to bring about, but whose significance has not yet been fully grasped.

Insert - bottom 1 page 3

We have come half-way in the effort which we began twenty-one years ago. Many of the changes which we dared to hope for have begun to take place. This should give us confidence and encouragement, but it also places before us new conditions and new requirements. Europe--East and West--is changing in relation to the United States, to the Soviet Union -- and to each other.

The difficult judgment we are called upon to make is to distinguish which elements of our conduct (policy) should be changed or discarded, and which should be retained. It is to this I would like to suggest to you some answers to this question. subject that I would like to address my remarks today.

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Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent." There were many in this country -- and elsewhere -- who were reluctant to accept the truth of his stark characterization of the state of affairs. For a long while this notion was unacceptable to many because it conflicted with our hopes and dreams that the terrible catastrophe of war might be succeeded by a new period of harmony and cooperation among nations. But this was not to be. I have no wish to add to the recriminations of those times, and I shall leave to historians the task of tracing the events by which the Cold War came into being. What I wish to underline today is that, although it seemed discouraging and even impossible to many at that moment, this nation and the democracies of Western Europe did successfully mount the laborious effort that was required to bulwark peace and defend their free institutions from the dangers which then threatened them. The record of these twenty-one years has been a remarkable one -- not perfect by any means, but extraordinary in the degree to which this country, unseasoned in the affairs of the world, rose with unprecedented generosity and responsibility to meet the requirements of those times.

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Insert - bottom of page 3

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Nationalism FER

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2nd insert p. 5

As Students of history you will know that we cannot praise nationalism along the Volga and the Danube and at the same time expect that it to be spurned along the Seine and the Rhine.

1st insert p. 5

Just as the tribe
has proven over
centuries to ~~small~~
~~nstructed~~ an
authority to
meet the needs
and channel the
energies of man,
so the nation
is ~~too small~~ too
small in a world
made one by
science and technology
and threatened
with universal
destruction.

Another lesson of our experience is that the efforts of Europe to construct forms of association which transcend narrow nationalism -- narrow nationalism which has bred so much violence and misery in this world -- are worthy of continued and renewed energy.

It would be well for all to remember the horror and heartache which nationalism has brought to the people of Europe in the past half-century.

As the cohesiveness engendered by fear declines in both Western and Eastern Europe, no one should rejoice that nationalism is corroding the regional bonds that developed under the pressure of external threat. For in the long run, a new "balkanization" of Europe -- East or West -- would be no less threatening to the peace and stability of Europe than the old.

In Western Europe that cause, which had so promising a beginning in the movement toward European unity and Atlantic partnership, is now threatened by a rebirth of nationalism.

The world has become too small for chauvinism. It will soon be possible to cross the Atlantic in two hours. Missiles can now do so in less than half an hour. Words, pictures, ideas and

emotions cross national boundaries, continents and oceans as swiftly as they go from this platform to where you are sitting. The onrush of technological change is breathtaking in its opportunities, but it will also be remorseless in its destructive power if nationalist rivalries are allowed to be revived against two decades of progress.

During most of the past two decades a constructive force has been at work in Europe, submerging old hostilities, releasing the constraining bonds of old habits and closed institutions to the fresh stimulation of competition and cooperation across national boundaries, building a new Europe upon the foundations of the old. At the heart of this progress was the recognition that modern technology creates new and larger interdependencies, and that the community of interest of the peoples of Europe in freedom, prosperity and security must find its expression in larger forms of economic and political association than the nation-state. At the same time, a sense of common interest has connected Western Europe with America by a thousand threads, woven by daily habit into a pattern of practical partnership. In the last few years, however, the question has arisen whether this forward movement, so full of promise and hope, shall be arrested and reversed.

p. 6.7

p. 7. Top two lines: replace "the effort of the Western Alliance" by "the world-wide movement".

p. 7. Replace second para by:

But surely the cause of European unity, whose achievements are already impressive in absolute terms, and are particularly impressive when viewed against the dark background of historic hatreds and suspicion -- that cause which has already brought irreversible positive changes to the political and economic map of Europe and has enormously strengthened the partnership of the Atlantic nations -- that cause now seems to some in danger of being submerged in a wave of the same obsolete, narrow nationalism which has given the Western World -- along with its great heroes -- its even greater disasters.

I am not so pessimistic. I do not foresee any reversal in the tides of history. Rather I see in the conflicting currents which beset us a healthy reminder that the world is not so simple as it seemed to many of us, even as recently as a decade ago.

The political and economic history of Western Europe, of the Atlantic community, of our times does not resolve itself into a clear, straightforward struggle between the forces of unity -- wearing the white hats -- and the forces of nationalism -- in the big, black sombreros.

For this simplistic outlook we in this country are, partly to blame. We have had a very clear -- entirely too clear -- vision of where Europe was headed. It seemed to us, and to many Europeans, to be obvious beyond all argument that to be strong and prosperous like us, Europe should be unified like us -- exactly like us.

At times our vision of a united Europe appeared to many Europeans bearing the unmistakable stamp: "Made in the USA".)

(2) The task of the present generation is to begin and for your generation to complete is the lifting of that iron curtain so that Europe will once again become whole, so that Europe will no longer be a stage for ~~antagonists~~ confrontation but for the reconciliation of all those whose roots have sprung from the European family.

(3)

So that

~~Each~~ men of the ~~Many~~

European family no longer

war against each other

as hostile neighbors,

no longer coexist in

frigid isolation separated

by an iron curtain; rather

(4)

as a great man Adlai Stevenson once said,
~~When~~ when men have learned to
live as members of the same
human family," to respect
each others differences, to
heal each others wounds,
to promote each others progress,
and to benefit from each
others knowledge."

That moral commitment and
concern flows across the worlds
frontiers.

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