

~~Well~~ Well, now I'm glad you just asked me that because ~~now~~ just I'm/going to let you have it good.

Let's talk about barbarians for a ~~moment~~ little while. This nation has contributed \$2 billion in economic aid since 1954 to the Vietnamese -- to ~~the~~ South Vietnam. This nation didn't have 600 troops in Vietnam before 1961. No other country <sup>has</sup> ~~has~~/helped like this. This nation was not a signatory to the team but <sup>it</sup> ~~yet~~ abided by the so-called protocol ~~of~~ Geneva. The people of South Vietnam had never been a really what you call country, in the terms of one independent nation state it had been dominated by a thousand for a thousand years by the Chinese, 200 years by the French. When after the French colonialism was destroyed and rightly so the country was divided at the 17th parallel as a means of convenience, a temporary demarcation line. But there were commitments made that there would be no intrusion into the other area; that there would be no violation of this border and many other commitments.

By 1959 it is a matter of confirmed historic/record that the Vietnamese of the North -- the Viet <sup>Minh</sup> ~~Minh~~ decided that they could not take over South Viet Nam through the election process or through normal political ~~processes~~ processes; that the South Vietnamese economy was better than 3 to 1 in terms of gross national product; that it was progressing much better; that ~~it~~ even though it had to accept ~~200,000~~ 9 hundred-thousand refugees it was able to absorb them even with all its political problems and they determined on that ~~day~~ day in 1959 to start an open program of infiltration, ~~and~~ subversion and terrorism. Part of this was directed ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> Laos and the very man <sup>Phouma</sup> ~~Phouma~~, Phouma, who is the Prime Minister of Laos today, was then being used for a period of time and ~~was~~ buffeted around by the Communist <sup>that</sup> ~~forces~~ forces -- primarily because may I say/we were backing some of the wrong forces. And then Mr. <sup>Souvanna</sup> ~~Souvanna~~ Phouma becomes Prime Minister and today the Pathet Lao <sup>to</sup> which used ~~the~~/harrass the old rightist regime in Laos harrasses and tries to destroy the <sup>Souvanna</sup> ~~Souvanna~~ Phouma regime in Laos with the backing of whom -- China and North Vietnam. Today ~~the~~ <sup>Souvanna</sup> ~~Souvanna~~ Phouma, the neutralist, and <sup>Kong Le</sup> ~~Kong Le~~ the man

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who for a long period of time led the neutralist forces against the right wing forces in Laos is helping the United States of America ~~xx~~ trying to defend its borders being ~~xxxx~~ South ~~xxxxxx~~ and ~~xxxxxx~~/of some help to/Vietnam .

~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>think</sup> have in Now the Vietnam ~~xxxx~~ ~~xxxx~~/engaged/the most unbelievable <sup>as the</sup> Viet Cong series of ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ terroristic acts that modern history has recorded. There isn't any doubt but ~~xxx~~ what in South Vietnam there are Communists that are part of the Viet Cong, <sup>T</sup> there isn't any other doubt but what 35 to 40 thousand Vietnamese from the North, trained ~~xxxxxx~~ saboteurs, confirmed Communists, have been infiltrated into the South. There isn't any responsible official in any free government anywhere in the world ~~x~~ that denies that.

What's been going on? ~~Systematic~~ Systematic burning of villages, systematic slaughter of the mayors of villages, systematic destruction of hamlets, systematic destruction of ~~xxxx~~ hospitals. As they said, I believe it was ~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~xxxxxx~~, HE SAID they ~~x~~ had to destroy the theaters of the government of South Vietnam and what were the theatres? The hamlets, the cooperatives, the schools, the ~~xxxxxx~~ mayors, the hospitals, the doctors and the elite, ~~xxxx~~ the professionally trained ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ have been ~~xxxxxx~~ people/~~xxxx~~ ~~systematic~~ systematically slaughtered. And what bothers me, my fellow Americans, is I have yet to hear very many college students or others rise up and say, "What is this kind of barbarism where over 400 of the mayors of the provinces <sup>have been</sup> ~~xxxx~~ around Saigon have been decapitated and their heads/put on a pike and they walked them through the streets and intimidate the people and slaughter them destroying whole villages?" <sup>A</sup> and I hear about the terrorism of the United States.

I want to say -- let me just go a little bit further. This government didn't use any military power until this winter and our barracks were bombed, ~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>(military)</sup> we have ~~xxxxxx~~ advisers attached to the South Vietnamese force but not combat and you know it . And it doesn't do any good to have Americans distort the facts of their own country, <sup>B</sup> but by Feb. of this year some of our forces were compelled to defend themselves. At Xmas time some of our men were killed, barracks were destroyed, an airport destroyed, hotels blown up, our embassy blown up, innocent people

killed. Finally we decided that we would retaliate and we started to pick out systematically in North Vietnam strategic ~~the~~ targets. What kind of targets? Not a single city. We stalked ~~the~~ harbors, or ~~at~~ <sup>the</sup> gun boats that attacked our destroyers in international waters, and let me tell this audience right now, that when the United States of America gets to a point where the high seas are not to be considered international waters and where the ships of this nation cannot sail the high seas regardless of what they may be doing ~~xx~~ on those high seas, as long as they are not attacking, then this is an unhappy day for America. We don't bomb Russian submarines that are four miles off our coast and they're there. We don't shoot up Russian trawlers that are in our fishing waters and they're ~~there~~ there. If we did, there would be a parade around the White House I suppose 24 hours a day.

But I have sat in the Security Council when your President had ~~selected~~ them select the ~~the~~ targets that we would bomb. What targets? Radar, ammunition depots, ships that are coming down the coastal waters carrying tons of weapons. What are they carrying them for -- a 4th of July celebration? Where are they coming from? <sup>from</sup> China? I just want to say this--that war is an ugly business no matter ~~xx~~ what -- of course, it's ugly. Your government doesn't enjoy having American lives lost or having to commit American power as we are ~~in the North Vietnam~~ against North Vietnam. Your government has no desire to accelerate this war. Your government stands ~~xx~~

ready today if anybody can bring us somebody from Hanoi with the power to negotiate, somebody from Peking ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~, with the power to negotiate, <sup>1</sup> so help me God, we'll sit down and spend the ~~xxx~~ rest of our time negotiating <sup>with them</sup>

But we don't intend to call ~~xx~~ a negotiation sitting down with the bandits and we don't intend to say let's negotiate, we'll take South Vietnam. Not on your life. And who do you think wants that? No one, except China and North Vietnam. Do you think the Russians really want China to be dominant in Asia? Do you think that Mr. Khrushchev and the present regime in the Soviet Union who still embrace what we call peaceful co-existence want to have China prove that peaceful co-existence is impossible and to prove their doctrine that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence? There has never been a more aggressive force than the ~~political~~



of  
 leaders ~~in~~/China. They haven't learned international responsibility. They're feeding  
 Minh  
 Ho Chi ~~minh~~/and North Vietnam into this gristmill too. They say, sic 'em. ~~Yam~~  
 Do you think India wants the United States out of Vietnam? I know it doesn't.  
 Because when the United States leaves ~~Viet~~ Vietnam and Vietnam is taken over by  
 North Viet<sup>Minh</sup> and the Chinese have that whole area as their so-called sphere of  
~~x~~ interest, India hasn't a restful night. Did India attack China a year ago? When  
 did China get to be such a ~~peaceful~~ <sup>sweet</sup> peace loving little country and we such barbarians?  
 Your government hasn't attacked anybody. This government has been accused of every-  
~~thing~~ thing by some people that ought to know ~~me~~ better. And I think the people  
 that are privileged to have a college education ~~ought~~ ought to be the first to ~~talk~~  
 tell the American people some of the facts of life and the facts of life are that  
 your government has offered economic aid to North and South Vietnam. Your government  
 has offered a billion ~~x~~ dollars to help develop the Mekong Delta. Your government has  
 offered peace to North Vietnam on the basis of non-interference with their country  
 and economic aid to their country and non-interference in South Vietnam and the  
 withdrawal of American forces from ~~Viet~~ South Vietnam if there will just be ~~the~~ peace  
 and <sup>if</sup> they'll leave those people alone. But let me tell you, so help me God, as long as  
 I have any voice in this government, even as an adviser, I agree with our President  
 and I'll help ~~to~~ sustain this position. We will not withdraw. We will not give up.  
 We will not be defeated. We are <sup>the</sup> powerful nation. We'll use our power with restraint.  
 We'll use it for the rights and the freedoms of others. And let's make it clear to  
 the whole world ~~that~~ we're not afraid. We're not going to weaken if it takes ten years.  
 We've got what it takes to win this fight if we'll win it. And if we don't confuse  
 your  
 ourselves, keep ~~our~~/mind on the enemy -- the enemy is not in Washington, not at all.

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## The Dilemmas of Decision in Vietnam

Those who speak as though there were some simple solution in Vietnam speak irresponsibly. There is no simple solution. There are only terrible dilemmas and difficult choices.

Some say that sustained large-scale attacks upon Communist staging areas and supply lines in North Vietnam will win the war. I say that that is nonsense. The support provided to the war in South Vietnam by North Vietnam is an important factor in the war in the South. But that support is not of such a character that it can be significantly and directly slowed by attacking lines of communication and supporting bases.

Let us be clear that we are talking of small groups of infiltrators winding their way through the jungles and mountains on foot trails. We are talking of arms infiltrated at night over the same trails or of arms delivered by small boats moving in and out of a long coastline. We are talking of small wooden barracks set in the midst of the jungle.

We ☐ have had to attack targets of this kind and we may have to attack them again in order to retaliate for actions by North Vietnam in the South, in order to demonstrate our determination and in order to make clear to

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the rulers of North Vietnam that they are embarked upon a dangerous course which can have increasingly serious consequences for their country. We can expect our attacks to have some limited military effect, but we would deceive <sup>if</sup> ourselves/we were to believe with some of the critics that such action by itself can win the war. You cannot kill many infiltrators walking at night through the jungles with bombs dropped from airplanes. You cannot destroy many supplies by air attack when they are carried in small boats or on the backs of men. You cannot stop a war by hitting some barracks.

There are other critics who say that our involvement in South Vietnam is all a colossal error and that the sooner we correct that error by getting out the better off we shall be. These critics fail to recognize that we are deeply committed to the people of Vietnam as a result to the actions of three Presidents and that we cannot so readily turn back. They fail to recognize that we are seeking to establish an important international principle - that aggression by proxy can no more succeed than direct aggression. They do not understand that we are seeking to ensure compliance with solemn international undertakings which are daily being violated.

violated.

The critics on both sides oversimplify. They do not recognize the problems involved in the courses of action that they advocate. They do not recognize that we are caught up in some very real and excruciating dilemmas. Faced by such dilemmas the President has continued the policies of his predecessors and has sought a middle ground. Unfortunately, as a result of the actions of the Communist side, however, the middle ground is shifting. We have been compelled to take action against North Vietnam and we may be forced to take further such action. The President's actions have made clear that we will not shrink from doing what must be done. At the same time we recognize that in a most basic sense the struggle is in the South and that that is where it must be fought. We strive constantly to improve our own effort and the effort of the government of South Vietnam. Despite the political turmoil our joint efforts have not been without success.

So long as the Vietnamese of the South fight on, withdrawal is out of the question. At the same time we do not preclude negotiations. Negotiations are not an end; they are a means. And if it became evident that negotiations could



could indeed produce a return to the essentials of the Geneva Accords of 1954, we should not fear to negotiate.

I repeat, the President walks on a middle ground. He seeks no wider war and he will not abandon South Vietnam. He is prepared for the worst but is hopeful still that the worst can be avoided. The President, unlike his critics, sees no magic solution. His actions reflect the conviction that the solution must be found in some mixture of force and restraint; military action and diplomacy. We would do well to support him in this middle course.

## South Vietnam's Politics and South Vietnam's War

It is easy - indeed it has become fashionable - to criticize the people of South Vietnam who, in the midst of a desperate war, seem to be engaged in "politics as usual".

But before we throw up our hands and argue that the political situation relieves us of our responsibilities, <sup>let us</sup> consider the deeper causes of the political turmoil and how that turmoil is related to the war.

Let us begin by recognizing that there is nothing "usual" about the existence of open political conflict in Vietnam and that therefore "politics as usual" would be a misnomer for what is occurring. There was no open politics under French colonial rule. The French developed the civil and military bureaucracies, though not on a particularly democratic model. The political party organizations were suppressed and were consequently clandestine and conspiratorial in character. In this environment it was relatively easy for the best organized and most conspiratorial of the parties - the Communist party - to capture the nationalist banner. So it was Ho Chi Minh who led a coalition of Communists and nationalists to victory over the French.

In the period after the defeat of the French, the North was governed by the Communist Party while the South was

was governed by the only effective leadership the French had left behind - the civil and military bureaucracy. The first leader of the nation - Ngo Dinh Diem - came from the civil bureaucracy. He was in many ways a remarkable man who made a remarkable record. Just to cite two facts in support of that statement let me remind you that the government of South Vietnam under Diem successfully settled one million refugees from the North in the South. It increased school enrollment from 500,000 to 1.5 million in the first seven years of its rule.

But Diem was, unfortunately, a man with serious limitations. He was a mandarin administrator who became increasingly out of touch with his people. He tapped no well-springs of emotion and he failed to capture the imagination of the nation and to create a strong sense of nationhood. Though effective in dealing with conspiratorial organizations, he was unable to cope with rising new political forces in South Vietnam. Ultimately this failure led to his downfall.

The elimination of the authoritarian Diem regime has, with some ups and downs, produced a much freer, more open political system than Vietnam has ever before enjoyed. While successor administrations have been under the control of the military they have been forced to seek accommodation

with



with the new political forces. It is generally speaking, this process of accommodation which we observe when we observe the political turmoil that seems presently to grip South Vietnam.

What are these new political forces? While it is difficult to generalize, they are basically forces of a new nationalism. It is nationalism which motivates the students, the young military officers and the elements travelling under the Buddhist banner. These forces are often irresponsible, sometimes anti-foreign. They are not accustomed to the disciplines of democratic politics and they have not yet developed a political system within which peaceful change can readily take place. But basically, they are very healthy forces for they represent something vital in Vietnamese society which has heretofore not found adequate expression.

At the same time, the problem posed by this development is obvious enough. The search for political consensus among contending political forces in a new nation creates difficult problems at best. Such a process carried out in the middle of a civil war could have disastrous results. Yet if this process does not go forward in some form it is doubtful whether an effective government can be established in South Vietnam.

Vietnam.

We must demonstrate - as the President had demonstrated - steadiness and forbearance. We must recognize that a long experience of conspiratorial politics creates deep distrust and makes consensus difficult. We must respect the efforts of the leaders of Vietnam to bridge the gaps between themselves and to work out viable political arrangements. Most important, we must persevere with our own efforts to help the government of Vietnam preserve its independence and must not abandon that effort on the excuse that political turmoil relieves us of our responsibilities to the people of Vietnam.

At the same time we ask something of the people of Vietnam. We ask that they show reasonable restraint in their actions. We ask that the leaders not exploit the present situation for their own short-run political gain. We ask that they maintain and increase the momentum of their efforts to deal with the problems of insurgency within Vietnam.

The experience of the past year and a half has demonstrated that there is a good deal of resiliency within South Vietnam. The war has been prosecuted despite the political difficulties. Improvements in the Vietnamese effort have been made. The struggle will be long and great

U.S.

U.S. and Vietnamese perseverance will be needed, but with such perseverance we can hope to succeed in our joint efforts.



## VIET CONG AGGRESSION

A cardinal principle of international law is that nations do not interfere in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations. They do not export men and munitions to practice violence and villainy against the governments and peoples of their neighbors. Those that do so are aggressors and are "outlaws" among the family of nations. North Vietnam has consistently violated this principle through its continued covert aggression against its neighbors and therefore warrants the retaliation due any aggressor.

The time has come for the United States to spell out clearly and precisely -- for ourselves, for our friends, for the whole world -- what our policy is towards this latest Communist challenge of covert aggression. The recent attacks on American personnel and bases in South Vietnam were a challenge not only to our support of a friendly country attempting to resist external aggression, but also a challenge to America's determination.

The responsibility of defending the free world has largely fallen on us because we are the strongest Western power. With this in mind, we must exercise our tremendous might with a sober realization of our duty and principles. Our response to the recent attacks was both just and fitting.

The United States has no ambitions but to seek a peaceful environment for orderly world progress. However, orderly world progress requires in the first instance at least a rudimentary world order based on respect for international law and obligations.

Interference in the internal affairs of other nations through covert aggression is a violation of international law and inhibits development of peaceful progress.

Those who continue aggression against their neighbors, must be prepared for our retaliation. We may seek no wider war, but we will not compromise the freedom and liberty of our friends, and eventually ourselves, by allowing aggression to go unchecked. We should let it be known that while we are not afraid of negotiations, we are not prepared to let Geneva become our Munich.

Communist North Vietnam is clearly the source and sponsor of the Viet Cong insurgency. Their claims of innocence are such fabrications that the only ones deceived are those who close their eyes to the facts.

The history of the North Vietnamese aggression goes back to 1954. After the Geneva settlement the Communists stored arms and ammunition in South Vietnam for future use. They left behind some of their guerrilla fighters to await the Party's call in case plans for a peaceful take-over of the country failed. And they did fail.

The prosperity of South Vietnam was in marked contrast to the stagnation in North Vietnam. This contrast, of course, was intolerable to the North Vietnamese leaders who preached the superiority of Communism. So, they carefully launched their present program to subvert the government of South Vietnam. In 1956, they started to rebuild and organize their machinery in the South and by 1958 they were ready to start using calculated terror tactics. From 1959 to 1961, the pace

of Viet Cong aggression accelerated steadily. At this point the situation was sufficiently grave so that the government of South Vietnam asked the United States for increased military assistance to counter this aggression. With U. S. assistance the tide at first began to turn; but the North Vietnamese then stepped up their efforts and increased the numbers of men and munitions infiltrated into South Vietnam.

The objective of North Vietnam's aggression is quite simple. Certainly, it is not to bring the "blessings" of Communism to other lands. The comparative stagnation in North Viet-Nam and Communist China show how little communism has really accomplished. They want control over all of the land and people of Vietnam; and history has shown that Communists will pursue any tactics in order to aggrandize their control.

Their present strategy is no longer overt aggression as in Korea because they have learned that the free world will not let them transgress openly. Instead they pursue a policy of covert aggression which they hope will lead to the down-fall of their neighbors. Their method of doing this is to use their own country as a source and sanctuary for activities elsewhere.

This form of aggression has thus far cost North Vietnam very little and must have seemed very profitable. For every guerrilla they have supplied the South Vietnamese must provide 15 to 20 defenders. Hanoi provided the direction for this insurgency but until recently was considered immune from attack. They have trained both their own

people and recruits from South Vietnam and then sent these guerrillas to South Vietnam to form the cadre of the insurgency movement. Material support in the form of munitions, money, supplies and additional personnel have been provided in ever increasing amounts. More advanced weapons, including crew-served types are now being encountered.

For example, an article in the February 21 Washington Post cites the capture by the South Vietnamese of approximately 160,000 lbs of infiltrated military equipment. Included in this cache were 1,000 Soviet carbines, several hundred Soviet submachine guns, light machine guns and Chinese burp guns.

The authorities in Communist North Vietnam have gone to elaborate lengths to conceal their direct support. This is to preserve the fiction that the armed uprising in the South is an internal matter. However, no effort at concealment carried out on such a huge scale can ever be completely successful. However much the Viet Cong may use captured armaments, one fact is incontrovertable: Soviet carbines, submachine guns and Chinese burp guns certainly do not originate in South Vietnam.

The United States is not the only one to notice such blatant disregard for the Geneva Accords. A special report by the International Control Commission in June 1962 said that there was, and I quote, "sufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt" that North Vietnam had sent arms and men into South Vietnam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal government there. The ICC found the authorities in Hanoi in specific violation of four provisions of the Geneva Accords in 1954.

The flow of military personnel -- officers, enlisted men and specialists -- from the North to the South has been steadily increasing. Recent estimates are as much as 1,000 men a month. While much of the Viet Cong personnel needs is recruited locally -- quite often through direct coercion, the infiltration routes supply hard core units and most of the Viet Cong's leaders. They come from North Vietnam through Laos, and sometimes Cambodia, into the border provinces of South Vietnam. When they arrive, they are assigned to various Viet Cong units as replacements or, occasionally, to form the nucleus of a new unit. Thus despite the heavy casualties of three years of fighting, the hard-core Viet Cong force is larger now than it was at the end of 1961. And, as they are running out of South Vietnamese to "repatriate," an ever increasing percentage of the Viet Cong forces is made up of North Vietnamese.

Not only does Hanoi provide the tools and the support for this aggression but it also controls and directs the activities of the Viet Cong. The strategy, the tactics, and the tempo of the insurgency are carefully plotted and directed by officials of the North Vietnamese government. They control not just the overall direction of the war but often the day-to-day activities of the insurgents. This is not a loosely connected series of isolated incidents by individual guerrilla bands but a carefully conducted tactical campaign mapped in advance under expert direction from North Vietnam.

When charged with the responsibility for guiding and supporting the armed rebellion in the South, Hanoi calls the allegation slanderous,

unfounded and even provocative. However, at other times they are more candid in discussing their real position. In his address to the third party Congress Ho Chi Minh spoke of the necessity, quote "to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South." General Giap writing in the Communist journal Hoc Tap described the North as "the revolutionary base for the whole country." In the same journal another high North Vietnamese official had the audacity to write that North Vietnam "is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong base for the struggle for national reunification." Apparently, when Hanoi says the armed uprising in the South is an internal matter, what they mean is that it is an internal North Vietnamese matter.

It is clear that the Viet Cong operation in South Vietnam was organized and has been regularly controlled and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi. The Lao Dong Party (i.e., the Communist Party) in the North provides the political direction. Planning and operations are carried out by the Central Research Agency, the huge intelligence organization in Hanoi. The Army of North Vietnam supplies the Viet Cong with plans and with a steady supply of officers and enlisted men, as well as equipment. Radio Hanoi is the real voice of the Viet Cong; and the clandestine radio of the so-called Front for Liberation in the South faithfully follows its lead. Sometimes it is a day or two late, but it echoes the master's voice.

On January 19, 1964, Radio Hanoi quoted a Liberation Front broadcast of the previous day promising a ceasefire by the Viet Cong on the



lunar New Year (TET). If there was such a broadcast by the Front, no one in South Vietnam heard it. The item in question was broadcast by the Viet Cong Radio the day after Hanoi. And of course, when the New Year arrived, the Viet Cong did cease hostilities, just as Radio Hanoi had said they would.

Another example of Hanoi's excellent control over the movements of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam is the sudden cessation of attacks against American bases since our retaliatory strikes of February. When Hanoi lost its privileged sanctuary, it found it necessary to regroup and reconsider before continuing its attacks. Accordingly, they were able to shut off these attacks almost instantly. In short, the Liberation Front is just that and no more -- a front for North Vietnam.

If it were true, as the aggressors claim, that they had popular support; they would have won their war of liberation long ago. Nor, would their cause need to have external origins of foreign direction. If this were truly a people's war, unrest would not have to be incited from abroad, and true local leaders would have arisen spontaneously. At this moment, there are still no George Washingtons, no Garabaldis and no Sun Yat-Sens among the insurgents. There are instead only the Quislings and trained operators of Ho Chi Minh.

The attempt to subvert and overthrow the Republic of South Vietnam, however camouflaged and disguised is aggression. This is the "new" form of Communist aggression.

We have seen all too often how the Communists have violated the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others, in Eastern Europe, East Berlin, and in the Far East. Thousands of Americans died in Korea in order to prevent that nation from succumbing to aggression from the North. The primary reason that the countries of Indochina are in peril today is that the Communists have not adhered to their pledges made at the Geneva Conference in 1954 to respect the integrity of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The International Control Commission which was set up to be the guardian of these rights has been ineffective because the Communists have sabotaged the working of that commission. No effective action can be taken by the ICC without participation by all its members; and the Communists have used their membership to delay, block, and frustrate action.

What is at stake in South Vietnam is the freedom and independent national existence of some 14 million people. Moreover, if the Viet Cong win in South Vietnam, the Chinese Communists can boast that only their form of revolution is successful and that they should lead the world Communist movement. If that happens, we will experience a new series of wars of liberation all around the globe.

The United States should view this new form of aggression with mounting concern, for this new challenge is a fundamental threat to our national aims and goals. These are to foster free and independent but cooperating states so that they and their citizens may develop economically, socially and politically into responsible members of the world community.

This is as fundamental to our foreign policy now as it was some 50 years ago when Woodrow Wilson declared our belief in the self-determination of nations, or some 140 years ago when James Monroe stated that we could not allow foreign powers to interfere in the affairs of countries in the Western Hemisphere. In the world today we should insist that the peoples of the threatened countries be allowed to have their own choice as to their destinies, and we should not permit this choice to be taken away by this new form of aggression.

The current objective of the U. S. should simply be to make the outlaws cease and desist their aggression. Only at that point should we end our retaliation. Covert aggression like any other kind of aggression justifies retaliation. If the aggression does not cease, then the U. S. should take whatever steps are necessary to force compliance. We strive for peace but if the Communists persist in aggression we have little choice but to retaliate. This country has learned, and it has been an expensive lesson, that our first line of defense is the freedom of other lands.

We and other free world countries -- in both Asia -- and Europe have been helping the South Vietnamese to man this first line of defense. For the most part, the allied contributions have been relatively small; but the presence of these other flags -- and hopefully, there will be more -- shows that the world is not deluded by false claims that the struggle in Vietnam is an internal insurgency. Factional strife there may be. But the evidence I have cited shows that the basic challenge remains that of Communist aggression, directed and supported from the North. The entire non-communist community has a vital stake in having this aggression recognized for what it is... and having it defeated.

## WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?

The last few weeks have brought a dramatic upsurge in concern and confusion among the American people on why we are in Vietnam. Demonstrations against American policy in Vietnam have been held in a dozen different countries. Many of these, of course, are communist inspired; but there is also some confusion among allies, neutrals and even communist states abroad, just as there is here at home among pickets, hunger strikers--and even apparently, some members of U. S. Senate.

We Americans have an unfortunate tendency to look at world problems only in the present tense, and to ignore both the historic trends and future interests, which shape today's world. We are impatient of difficult and complex entanglements; we seek oversimplified, black and white answers. We look for fish or cut-bait alternatives.

This, we treat Vietnam as though the problem had only arisen with our air attacks of recent weeks or the Tonkin Gulf crisis of last summer. At most, we trace the history of our involvement in Indo China to the French defeat in 1954. It is well to remember that almost every American President in this century, starting with McKinley and the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, has found it

necessary to involve U. S. power and prestige in defense of American interests in the Pacific.

As one contribution to the current great debate on Vietnam, I should like to review some key historical factors and basic interests affecting our involvement.

Vietnamese history is in part a struggle to resist domination from the north and maintain independence from China. After 400 years of at least partial success, the Vietnamese were conquered by France a century ago and remained part of the French empire until the Japanese took over in World War II. The post war struggle was again one of national independence, although communist cadres came to play an increasingly dominant role in the resistance movement. In fact, what had started out as an internal struggle for independence now became an effort to substitute Chinese control for French. The Chinese role in this part of the struggle was as pronounced as it is today.

In 1954, Dien Bien Phu confirmed the handwriting on the wall for the French, leading to the Geneva agreement which divided the country into communist North Vietnam and a non-communist state in the South.

It is now clear that the communists regarded the Geneva Agreements--to which, incidentally, the U. S. was not a party--as merely a way station en route to a unified and communist controlled Vietnam. Their original hope was that all of Vietnam would fall into their hands through the elections called for under the Agreements. As in any totalitarian country, the outcome could be controlled in the North;

and they could rely upon the chaos in the South to work in their favor. But it soon became clear that the Communists had no intention of allowing any free expression of choice, or effective international supervision of elections in their part of the country. Since the International Control Commission was unable to enforce the Geneva Accords against the North, South Vietnam refused to fall into the trap of one-sided elections. But the Communists also had another string to their bow. They left behind hundreds of caches of arms and ammunition, and thousands of disciplined cadres who were to remain underground until the time came for organized insurgency. In the meantime, Ho Chi Minh concentrated on solidifying his control in <sup>the</sup> North while waiting for South Vietnam to collapse of its own weight. The mass migration of refugees, the end of formal French colonial rule and the economic and political aftermath of nearly a decade of warfare made the communists highly confident of the ultimate outcome.

But to their surprise and dismay, the fragile Republic of South Vietnam managed to survive. And thanks to the greatly expanded American economic assistance initiated under President Eisenhower, South Vietnam not only survived but prospered--at least relative to communist North Vietnam, whose economy declined in almost the same degree as that in the South expanded.

In a sense, it was the success of those five years from 1954 to 1959, which began the present phase of the struggle. North Vietnam apparently decided that time was not on the communist side, and that the deliberate program of aggression must be accelerated. Indeed, the Lao Dong party set itself the task of "liberating the South from the



atrocious rule of the U. S. imperialists." During the next two years over 5,000 South Vietnamese civilian leaders were murdered in cold blood or kidnapped. Now the hidden sympathizers and arms in the South were brought out. Other Communists who had gone to the North at the time of the separation had been given intensive indoctrination and training; and they were infiltrated back into South Vietnam to organize the expanded guerrilla effort. This, apparently was the Communist interpretation of the "peaceful" unification objective they professed.

President Kennedy accepted the challenge to our national commitment, undertaken at the time of partition, that we would regard violation of the Geneva accord as a threat to international security. Although President Kennedy ordered a significant increase in the American military assistance and advisors to South Vietnam, he also evidenced America's desire for a peaceful and stable Indo China which could develop free of the cold war conflict. Unfortunately, the communist violations of the 1962 accords on Laos, made pursuant to this hope, have been matched only by their systematic and larger scale violations in South Vietnam. Indeed, there is a relationship between them, for Laos is the corridor through which Hanoi's octopus reaches its tentacles southward. It also establishes clearly the difficulty of attempting to negotiate lasting settlements with Hanoi and Peking.

In the last year or so, during President Johnson's Administration, Viet Cong escalation of the guerrilla struggle has been paralleled by

an unfortunate breakdown in the thin fabric of democratic government in South Vietnam. In retrospect, it may be that we expected too much of a tired people in a war-torn country whose period of legal independence was spent entirely in conditions of virtual seige. Nevertheless, our pundits have too often made their judgments on the basis of Saigon alone--which some say is as far removed from the real Vietnam as is the Paris from which the capital has taken much of its culture. Those who best know the Vietnamese people--the farmers, villagers, and artisans of the countryside--have the greatest faith in their ability to eventually achieve a viable and reasonably democratic government suited to their own traditions and needs. But it is clear that they can never have this chance as long as they are subjected to a reign of terror instigated, directed and supported from the North.

Thus, we come to the present stage of Vietnam's long struggle which is marked by Mao Tse Tung's classic transition from isolated guerrilla actions to organized military operations by sizeable units, and in which the Viet Cong are taking every advantage of the country's international political difficulties. Their concern at the growing U. S. effort to help the South Vietnamese government first took the form of outright PT boat attacks on our destroyers last August. Since then, the Communists have stepped up their attacks directed at Americans. They hope the U. S. will grow increasingly dismayed at its losses and attempt to disengage. They are enraged by our determination.

I have summarized the "how" of our involvement in Vietnam, and the nature of our commitment there. But it is also important to examine the nature of the U. S. interest--the "why" as it applies to the future.

On August 7, following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, Congress passed a joint resolution which said in part, "The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia." What is at stake here is not only Vietnam, important as the struggle there is to its people and to the international credibility of our undertakings. What is at stake is the 200 million people living in the area to the east of India and south of China with its vital geographic location and valuable natural resources. Communist control of this area would threaten our forward defense position in all of Asia.

I am not sure that the familiar analogy of the "falling dominoes" is the most apt; for given the nature of the area and its people, the extension of Communist control is more likely to resemble the spread of an ink spot on a blotter. If former French Indo China cannot be protected, Thailand, Burma and Malaysia will be untenable. Then all of the area between the Indian sub-continent and the Pacific archipelagoes of Indonesia and the Philippines would be subject to the whims of an expansionist power which has made no secret of its aggressive philosophy. Indeed, it has castigated its elder partner, the Soviet Union, for excessive caution! The U. S. found it necessary in its own interests to fight to prevent the control of this vast area by the Japanese Empire in World War II. Even where the immediate geographic objective was far smaller, in South Korea, the U. S. felt that it must respond to aggression. If one then counts up the stakes in Asia as a whole, adds the importance of meeting the new Communist technique of wars of deliberation, and recognizes the fact of our commitment in Vietnam, the nature of our

interest becomes clear.

Our policy in Southeast Asia has been one of helping the freedom loving peoples of the area fight effectively for their independence. An important part of this effort is a complex but critical intangible, the state of mind of those resisting Communist expansion. Communist China has been making strenuous efforts to condition those it intends to dominate by portraying its brand of communism as the "wave of the future." At the same time, it attempts to depict the United States as a "paper tiger," incapable of stemming the red tide. In this way, it hopes to destroy the will to resist in those who continue to oppose Communism. Any visible evidence of weakening U. S. determination, any sign, however small, of a growing weariness on our part, any indication that we will take an easy way out if it is offered, is certain to have a disastrous impact on the will to resist of all the remaining free peoples of Asia. Conversely, by demonstrating our firm intent to continue our support of those who are fighting to stay free we can insure the maintenance of the will to resist among all free men in the area.

No one wants to die or have their sons die in Vietnam. Yet, without the brave men making sacrifices there now, it seems certain that we would face even larger casualties elsewhere at a later time. How many millions of World War II dead would be alive today if the democracies had been militarily prepared and willing to make some sacrifices in the late nineteen thirties?

We must recognize the fact that any further successes by the Peiping regime will enable them to consolidate their hold on the Chinese people. With her gradual emergence as a nuclear power, China, under this leadership, will become increasingly hostile to the United States, and will some day pose a serious military threat. We must insure that Peiping's brand of militant communism is stigmatized with defeat and not glorified by success.

We should keep this in mind in evaluating the counsels of those who say we have stumbled blindly into a civil war in the jungle which is of no concern to us.

We have undertaken commitments to Vietnam under our last three Presidents, commitments which are in keeping with the actions of a half of dozen others in this century. President Johnson put the matter as simply as possible last summer when he explained our policy guidelines in Southeast Asia. "First," he said, "America keeps her word."

History in other parts of the world have shown all too clearly what happens when the strong do not keep their word to defend the weak. One by one they fall victim to an aggressor, or, in the hope of saving something, come to terms only to be swallowed "peacefully." In Vietnam, we have given our word to help that country defend itself against a communist "war of liberation"--a twentieth century euphemism for aggression. How well we keep that word may govern the future of all of Southeast Asia and ultimately, our own.

I have little patience with those who pose the alternative in the stark terms of defeat or major escalation. The problem, to be sure, is difficult and frustrating; and it calls for sacrifice and the running

of risks. But that is what leadership means for the United States today. We have thus far exhibited great patience in carefully limiting our responses against North Vietnam. The future course of events will depend in large measure on whether the communists correctly evaluate the strength of our determination and commitment. I believe that the Congress and the American people should make clear to all the answer to the question of why we are in Vietnam. The answer is that our vital interests require it. Our purpose is equally clear. We are there to fulfill a commitment and we mean to see it through--whatever it may take. Backed by this resolve, we can safely let the President and his advisors develop the political and military tactics for doing so. We must avoid all temptation to take the "easy way" out for as the history of the struggle against communism has shown, such a course leads inevitably to more difficult and dangerous dilemmas. Free men everywhere are anxiously watching our will and determination. We cannot fail them in this critical hour.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 24, 1965

Dave:

These are the speeches that I talked  
to you and the Vice President about.

Mike Manatos

Rielly says he sure to  
give one to Muskie.  
Dave

See Ross

## OUR OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

For a few minutes today I would like to focus with you on one of the major trouble spots of the world, and perhaps the major trouble spot for the United States - Southeast Asia and, in particular, Vietnam. I will address myself principally to the nature of our objectives as I see them in this area; but in so doing I will touch on some general aspects of what might be called rules of the game in connection with wars of national liberation; and I will discuss briefly why the US is in South Vietnam and the character of our participation there.

In the past 18 years, the United States has experienced a series of major confrontations with the Communists. One of those confrontations was an extended but limited war in which members of the free world joined in Korea to hold off the onslaught of the Communist forces. As we have countered these threats, we have at the same time built our own strength to a point where we have a truly credible deterrent in all levels of warfare---except the one we face now in Southeast Asia.

These confrontations with the Communist Bloc, and the development of tremendous military power by the United States and its Allies, have led Communist leadership to the conclusion that world wars and local wars are too dangerous because they involve direct conflict and may well escalate up to the nuclear level. They have concluded that, while they may eliminate world wars and local wars as means of advancing their doctrine, national liberation wars will continue to provide an

effective means of Communist advancement. They say that such wars are not only admissable, they are inevitable; and they view these as the means by which Communism can spread to the point where it covers the decisive part of the globe.

The war of national liberation is not new. We have seen it in several instances since World War II, and its nature and the nature of the Free World's response have led to a tacit set of rules that seem to govern this level of conflict. I would like to look for a moment at these rules and at some of our experiences with the liberation war.

Mr. Khrushchev has stated that national liberation wars can flare up at any time in the future where conditions can be created to cause a people to lose their patience and rise in arms. Mao Tse Tung, who has been perhaps the most influential individual on the theory and conduct of the "war of liberation," and in his primer on guerrilla warfare has provided his comrades with the rationale for the conduct of this kind of war.

Vo Nguyen Giap, who followed the classic pattern against the French, claims that the aim of the Viet Minh was to win back the independence and unity of the country and to bring land to the peasants. As he said: "Our strategy was to wage a long-lasting battle. A war of this type entailed several phases. In principle, starting from a stage of contention, the war goes through a period of equilibrium before arriving at a general counter offensive.... Only a long-term war could enable us to utilize to the maximum our political top cards,

to overcome our materiel handicap, and to transform our weakness into strength."

As an aside, I might note that Che Guevara has expressed the same principles in the Latin American context, following his Cuban experience.

We have experienced over the past 18 years a series of these insurrections, some of which have been successful and some unsuccessful. Greece, the Philippines and Malaya are examples where the Communists failed. Indochina and Cuba are examples of Communist success. None of these third-class wars, regardless of the degree of success, has been a spontaneous and internally supported insurrection. All have been fomented and supported in varying degrees by the Communists from outside.

The Free World response to these wars has been characteristic of our objective to bring peace to and ensure freedom in the country under attack. We have never sought to widen the area of conflict, nor have we sought to raise the level of violence. There has, therefore, emerged a tacit rule that ~~says to some people~~ one cannot counter a war of insurrection beyond the borders of the country under attack.

Where the West has been successful in countering the war of liberation there has always been a combination of factors leading to a favorable conclusion. Not least among these has been the fact that outside assistance was either stopped or was ineffectual for various reasons. In Greece, for example, between 1946 and 1949 we were successful because of Communist dissension and blunders, improved capabilities of the Greek army and the development of better leadership. But perhaps

more importantly, the Yugoslavs in 1949, following Tito's break with Stalin, closed off supply routes in northern Greece and the insurrection withered.

In the Philippines between 1947 and 1953, Communist Hukbalahaps carried on a guerrilla war in much the same fashion as we have seen in other areas. The tide was stemmed under the great leadership of Magsaysay, who established a solid political base and undercut support to the Huks. External support for the insurgents was difficult in this case, and this very fact eased Magsaysay's task.

The Malayan case, which is the longest one in the record, began in 1947 and took more than 10 years to defeat. A high degree of experienced British leadership and careful direction of the counter-insurgency effort were important factors. The prospect of independence was a great motivating factor to the Malayan people. British tactics and techniques were in the long run successful. But here again external support to the insurgents was limited and difficult.

On the other side of the ledger, Indochina involved a combination of a united anti-colonial people, indoctrination with Communist slogans; and a collapse of the French effort. Both the Soviet and Chinese Communists aided Ho Chi Minh and Giap in developing the strategy and building forces. Aside from Mao's victory in China, this was the first major success for the Communists in a war of liberation. And, here, for the first time, insurgent victory was ensured by outside support.

I would emphasize again that the unstated rules of the game appear to restrict the response by the Free World to operations within the country under insurgent attack. Our respect for these rules stems from abhorrence of a larger war, respect for the integrity of nations regardless of their form of government and a profound desire to support the United Nations as the keeper of world peace.

In Southeast Asia, on which all American eyes--and indeed those of the whole world--are currently fastened, we appear to be approaching a decisive point. Many citizens seem still to ask why we are in South Vietnam, and, why we are engaged in Laos and Thailand. We need not reach very far back in recent history to determine the answer. The Geneva Accords of 1954 provided that Vietnam would be partitioned along the 17th parallel and that regulations would be imposed on foreign military bases, personnel and armaments. Country-wide elections leading to the reunification of North and South Vietnam would be held by July 20, 1956. An International Control Commission was established to supervise the implementation of the agreements.

Neither the US nor Vietnam signed the '54 protocols. The US, however, stated that it would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the Geneva agreements. Furthermore, we would view any renewal of the aggression with grave concern and as a threat to international peace and security. We went on to say that we would continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the UN.

In 1962, Canadian and Indian members of the ICC found North Vietnam guilty of subversion and covert aggression against South Vietnam.



Laos had also become a part of the equation in Southeast Asia and the three Laotian political factions agreed to the establishment of a neutralist regime. The declaration and protocol on the neutrality of Laos was signed in 1962 by a fourteen nation conference at Geneva.

The Communists have consistently violated the intent and thrust of the protocols, the United States, in turn, has been forced into larger and larger commitments in an attempt to insure the continued freedom of Southeast Asia outside the Bamboo Curtain. President Johnson has most recently, in the State of the Union Message, stated why we are in Vietnam. He has said that we are there, first, because a friendly nation asked us for help against aggression; and, secondly, because our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. Twice in the recent past we have been forced to fight aggression in the Far East; to ignore aggression now would only increase the danger of a larger war.

Let me turn for a moment to the nature of US participation in the defense of Southeast Asia, for it is a reflection of the character of our objectives there.

The Communist Vietminh regime formally took control of Hanoi and North Vietnam in October, 1954. President Eisenhower shortly thereafter pledged American assistance directly to South Vietnam. In succeeding years, we promised to render direct support to Vietnamese armed forces and to expand economic cooperation and assistance. In 1955, armed revolt was precipitated in Saigon and the South Vietnamese Government appealed to the United Nations against the North Vietnamese

Communists, who, in violation of the Geneva agreements, were preventing Northerners from migrating into South Vietnam. Later in 1955 the Communists initiated their first overt propaganda move in South Vietnam. From 1957 on, the tempo of Communist attack increased not only in South Vietnam but in Laos as well.

Despite these increases in subversion and insurgent attacks, the US commitment to Vietnam remained relatively small. We had only 327 officers and men in the US Military Assistance and Advisory Group in 1960 but by the end of the year had agreed to increase the number to nearly 700. This support, though increasing in quantity in almost direct ratio to the increase in Communist pressures and attacks, has always been limited to two general areas. We have provided advice and assistance to the armed forces and we have provided economic assistance and advice to the governments as well as to the villages and hamlets in the countryside.

Despite our efforts, and they have grown greatly in the past year and a half, the Communists have been more and more flagrant in their violations of peace and human decency. Assassinations and other terrorist acts have not only been perpetrated on the South Vietnamese, but they have increasingly been directed at United States citizens. We have finally been forced to retaliate.

It seems to me that the United States has remained extraordinarily patient in the face of such obvious aggression, and the character of our reaction has continued to be a measure of our objectives. Until forced in recent times to act in a very limited military fashion against

North Vietnam, the United States has confined its effort to the countries under attack. Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia and we operate solely in the cause of freedom. As President Johnson has said several times, we seek no wider war. The charge of imperialism levelled against us is as false as the doctrine of the Communists whom we oppose.

We have no economic interests in South Vietnam save that of the opportunity for those people to develop a good life and to participate freely in the world economic community. We have no territorial designs on Southeast Asia. We have no interest in acquiring military bases in this area. Our present system of bases is adequate to support our fleets and air forces in countering the threat of major war from Communist powers. We, therefore, seek no broadened US military involvement through the establishment of a complex of bases in Southeast Asia.

Our prime goal is to insure that South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and the neighboring countries may develop as they choose and that they remain outside the sphere of Communist tyranny.

Our objectives in this area should and will, I am certain, continue to be limited. We have no design against Hanoi or Peiping. We seek peace in the countryside of South Vietnam and Laos. We seek a peace achieved there by the efforts of the people of these two countries. They are the ones who must win the struggle. It appears to me that this can only happen if Hanoi ceases its war-like support of the Viet Cong and seek a peaceful settlement. Let it be clear, however, that

we would not negotiate in order to withdraw from the field only to see those who seek the kind of freedom we espouse overwhelmed by a rising Communist tide.

It seems to me that we would seek negotiation with honor and with the guarantee of peace and freedom for those peoples involved. We should never negotiate a withdrawal as a means of escaping our responsibilities and our pledges to the free peoples of Asia. As President Johnson has said, "What is at stake is the cause of freedom." Freedom, in our book, is not negotiable.

I should like to make one last point. I share with you and, I am sure with all Americans, the increased concern over terrorism and brazen acts of aggression against United States citizens and against the representatives of the armed forces of our country. Any of these acts has been sufficient cause for the United States to respond in a much stronger fashion than it has. It has continued to be patient and has, in fact, ignored several major incidents by not responding. The responses that have been made to North Vietnamese aggression have been more than justified but have continued to be in keeping with the limited objectives that are characteristic of our policy in this area.

I repeat again that our people seek only the peaceful solution. But it does seem to me that the rules of the game must change. We have accepted for too long the dictates of practice in which we restrict our efforts to the country under subversive Communist attack. We must continue to advise and assist in South Vietnam. But our response

to the terrorism and overt attacks on our own Americans in Vietnam must be met by something more than tit-for-tat. A single response to a single act does not in my view provide the answer. Hanoi must be made to understand that she cannot continue to support the insurgent movement in South Vietnam and Laos.

We are not interested in overthrow of the Governments of Hanoi or Peiping. We are only interested in achieving compliance with the Geneva Accords. Our military actions must be limited and Hanoi must understand that the objectives of these actions are limited. But Hanoi must be persuaded that our commitment to the limited objective of causing her to cease support of the aggression in South Vietnam and Laos is a total commitment. And she must be convinced that we will see through the course that we undertake. We must move away from the eye-for-an-eye and tooth-for-a-tooth approach and commence to apply limited but graduated military actions, reinforced by political and economic pressures, against Hanoi. Our objective will be not to destroy Hanoi's ability to provide support to the rebels but simply to insure that Hanoi understands that she must eliminate support and direction of the insurgents to her south and west.

I cannot help but believe that a vital interest of the United States and the Free World is at stake in these two small countries in Southeast Asia. We cannot withdraw from our responsibilities to pursue the limited objectives that I have outlined earlier. I believe that our people and our political leaders support these objectives; and I am certain that they will continue the struggle no matter how protracted

it may be. They seek not a war with Hanoi nor do they seek hostilities with Communist China. They seek only the opportunity for free Asian people to continue to develop in freedom and peace.



March 4, 1965

Memo to Donald Nicoll, Administrative Assistant  
to Senator Muskie

From John Rielly, Office of the Vice President

I am sending over a draft speech which the Vice President was planning to give to Senator Muskie. Because the Senator has been out of town, he has not had a chance to do so personally.

If you have any questions on this speech, please do not hesitate to give us a call.

cc: Ron Stinett



Copy - original  
to Mark Kip

THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

These are trying times for the United States, its soldiers, its diplomats, and its civilians in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong is engaged in an all-out effort to conquer the country, and for the moment at least is meeting with some success. Meanwhile, the government of South Vietnam continues to be unstable, its leaders jockeying for power, its control of the countryside deteriorating. Calls are heard from both home and abroad that the U. S. should get out of South Vietnam, that the country should be "neutralized," and that the situation will become much worse because of both the size and the ineptness of our involvement. But the people who say these things are weary and impatient. They lack a true understanding of the nature of the struggle in Vietnam, and they lack devotion to the very serious causes that we are pursuing in that country. The fact is that South Vietnam would have long ago fallen to the Communists had we not vigorously supported them. Certainly our support has frustrated and upset the timetable of the leaders in Peiping and Hanoi who thought an innocent country was ripe for picking some years ago. We are not winning yet; they have not won yet, and U. S. patience, perservance, and superior strength can still turn the tide. More important, we can and must show the Communists that they cannot succeed in their tactics of indirect aggression, lest they be tempted to employ them elsewhere.

This is not a civil war, nor a people's revolution in South Vietnam. It is a vast aggression, covert to be sure, but skillfully directed from

the North. It is a calculated aggression directed against people whose primary interest is to be left alone to till their fields and raise their families in peace and tranquility. This is not a just or popular cause the communists pursue. This is a naked power grab, a grab for territory, a grab for resources, a grab for the minds of people. It is estimated that as many as 34,000 agents of the North Vietnamese have spilled across the indefensible borders over the last five or six years. There they have recruited by false promises, threats, blackmail, and force, large numbers of peasants who are pushed forward to be shot by their countrymen who are defending their homes and villages. Meanwhile, the hard core does its political dirty work among the remaining terrorized peasants.

A successful defense in South Vietnam requires that Ho Chi Minh and his henchmen in Hanoi cease their campaign of externally directed aggression. Our recent reprisal attacks have served to demonstrate our determination and to identify the true source of the insurgency in South Vietnam. More can and will be done, hopefully while avoiding a wider war in Southeast Asia. We do not intend to expose needlessly other peoples to the sufferings of war, but we are determined that South Vietnam shall remain free of communist domination. The Hanoi regime must be made to see that they cannot wage a war on a neighbor's soil while enjoying sanctuary on their own. The war in the South must be won by the Vietnamese themselves, and our assistance must insure that interference by the North does not make victory impossible.

The U. S. presence in South Vietnam is not a colonial one. We seek no commercial advantages, no bases, no special right or privileges. Our sole interest is to preserve freedom and to check communist expansion. Our efforts provide encouragement to the Thais, to the Laotians, to the Koreans, and to the Chinese on Taiwan, who are all facing the same threat. It would be splendid if we did not have to assume the burdens imposed by this effort; but without our assistance the area would quickly fall victim to the growing power of the aggressors from the North.

U. S. assistance is vast and multifarious. Since 1954, we have committed nearly \$3 billion to the defense of South Vietnam. At present, 24,000 American soldiers and civilians are present in the country. The economic assistance mission is the largest by far that we have in any country.

Our military effort is substantial. We provide the regular army, the popular or regional forces, the civil guard, and the police with their equipment and supplies. We also provide them services in maintaining and operating equipment which requires skills and knowledge that the Vietnamese themselves have not yet learned. One important area of U. S. assistance is in the air effort where U. S. pilots instruct and train the South Vietnamese in actual combat operations. U. S. piloted helicopters have also provided a large measure of support. This air effort has kept the Viet Cong off balance. Lastly, we provide advisors at all echelons down to the battalion level, and to all parts of the

country including district and villages. There are some 12,000 U. S. advisors employed in this effort and they have established mutually beneficial relationships with their Vietnamese counterparts. The Vietnamese know their troops, and the countryside; the Americans know the equipment, and provide advice drawn from the common body of doctrine on counterinsurgency warfare. They help expedite the delivery of resources to the pressing combat areas. Contrary to popular impression, our advisors do not include large numbers of Special Forces. These skilled soldiers take on the difficult task of working with the mountain tribes such as the "Montagnards," and of maintaining a presence in the isolated areas of the country. Their primary function is to train their counterparts in specialized counterinsurgency techniques.

We also give a great deal of assistance to the central government in Saigon, advising them on external affairs, as well as on the conduct of their own domestic programs. Our relationship to the South Vietnamese naturally extends beyond the normal diplomatic ties of allies and our administrative specialists work throughout the Vietnamese bureaucracy.

The objective of these U. S. efforts is to insure the development of an orderly and prosperous economy in a basically rich country. Our programs of development provide for industry, for urban housing and employment, and for rural development. The rural programs are especially extensive, and provide agricultural credit, land reform, fertilizer, pigs, wells, education, and a host of other things to an alert and receptive peasantry.

There are some who ask, is this vast effort a waste of U. S. resources? They pose an affirmative answer by pointing to governmental instability, alleged corruption and ineptitude in administration, an ineffective military with a high desertion rate, and a populace which largely does not know its leaders and fails to follow them. In examining these distorted assertions, several facts should be observed. First, this is a nation struggling against one of the most effectively organized efforts at terror and insurgency that the world has ever seen. Few governments have been faced with such a burden, especially in their infancy as an independent nation. The Viet Cong seek to sabotage all assistance that the U. S. gives. They have become quite skilled at this since they have had their political cadres in the countryside since 1954. In 1959, they began the current campaign of terror and covert invasion. The U. S. did not increase its scale of effort to the current high levels until 1961, when the full impact of the Hanoi effort began to be felt. The point is that our resource and advisory assistance has been extensive only for about three years, and that the government of Vietnam has made remarkable strides in the face of growing aggression since then. We have helped to remake a heterogeneous and static army of 150,000 into a modern, mobile force of 250,000, with additional paramilitary forces of 200,000. We have changed central government administration from its former archaic ways to more modern and efficient methods, thus radically increasing the flow of resources within the country. A whole new generation of Vietnamese leaders has had to be trained in military and administrative skills, as well as the wider responsibilities of

governing a nation. We must remember that few of these leaders are much over forty years of age. We have been making steady progress, and this is recognized by the Viet Cong, who are increasing the savagery of their attacks in an effort to nullify these gains. We cannot cease our efforts because of adversity. We cannot stop just as we are about to reap substantial dividends.

What are the problems which tend to negate our efforts? The first is governmental instability. It is often said that if the Diem government had not been overthrown, we would not have the succession of short-lived governments that have followed. This statement overlooks the fact that many facets of the present instability can be traced to the faults of the Diem regime. Diem overextended limited government resources in the Strategic Hamlet program and frustrated military and administrative leadership in the field and in Saigon by keeping most decisions to himself. He failed singularly in creating a popular government and a viable political base. More than that, he was beginning to withdraw from contact with his own subordinates and from his American advisors, and his outlook became increasingly unreal. Mounting pressures led to the Buddhist uprisings and the growing dissatisfaction of the military commanders who finally overthrew him. Since then, we have been engaged in the difficult task of building a sound political structure and creating a broad political base. Basically able, young men have had leadership thrust upon them suddenly, and they need more time to develop the experience needed to govern effectively.



Perhaps the most pernicious fallacy is that the South Vietnamese military is not doing well in fighting the Viet Cong. In fact, the "ARVN" is developing into a hard-hitting force, developing skill in tactics and the handling of modern equipment. They do not have the numerical advantage that experience has indicated to be desirable in handling insurgencies in the past. The ARVN and the paramilitary forces with a total of 450,000 men have only a 3.5 to 1 advantage over the Viet Cong with their 134,000 men including hard core. A more favorable ratio would be 10 to 1. The paramilitary forces are admittedly weak. It is from their ranks that practically all desertions are experienced. It is only recently that we have been able to give them the proper training, leadership, direction, and pay to create an effective fighting force. Their members do not necessarily desert to the Viet Cong; they go back to their villages, and many eventually return to the ranks.

Nevertheless, despite these disadvantages, the ARVN has been taking the war to the Viet Cong, inflicting great casualties on them, and preventing them from massing for any larger attacks. As a result of this growing professional capability, we can look forward to even better results. The ARVN has suffered large casualties, but it is becoming combat seasoned. The U. S. need not take over direction of these forces. Patience and growing mutual respect have begun to show results. While ambushes continue to be publicized beyond their true effectiveness the many successful South Vietnamese attacks which have hurt and contained the Viet Cong military effort go virtually unnoticed. This tends to give a distorted picture of the military situation within the country.



Unfortunately, this successful military effort by the regular forces is not followed up by progress in the stationing of local security forces and the development of effective political and administrative elements left behind. It has been much easier to train an army than to control the countryside. For this we need time, concentration of effort, and patience. We will inevitably suffer many frustrations. But, unfortunately, there is no quick and cheap way to win this war. American patience is needed as much as American technology. It is largely a process of education and training. While it takes only five years to build a sophisticated modern bomber or missile, it still takes at least three times as long to develop leadership in an officer corps.

Finally, there is the problem of insuring the people's loyalty. We hear that the Viet Cong control most of the country, that the people are apathetic and hostile to the government, and that the government does not enjoy the support of the people in the cities. It is true that this is a complex and difficult matter. The people have as yet seen little to offer encouragement for the future. But this is largely because of the crushing burden of the war itself. There is no reason to believe, however, that the Viet Cong have won the hearts of the people. They interfere with the flow of the economy, sabotage the railroad, interfere with rice shipments, tax the peasants heavily and terrorize the people who resist them. The people desperately want security, protection from Viet Cong raids and violence. We believe they despise the Communist infiltrators sent out from the North, but they fear

reprisals if they oppose them. When the government offers any hope of security, they respond eagerly. Our programs of economic and educational assistance are the prime targets for the Viet Cong. It is no coincidence that school teachers are constantly being attacked. The people have not been given a chance to develop and express their loyalty. This will come with increased central government protection. It is said that the Buddhists and the students in the cities are Communist-inspired in their unrest, and that they will not be loyal to any government. Again, these people want to live in peace. They want their democratic aspirations satisfied. They fear the war, even though they are relatively safe in the cities. It is important that the Vietnamese government work with them, accommodate their legitimate demands, and enlist them in the larger tasks of building a free nation. The failure of communication between the government and the Buddhists and between the government and students as well, has been the prime cause of unrest, and governmental instability. The problem is now identified, however, and Vietnamese leaders, military and civilian, are now working hard on this problem.

This has been a long and desperate war and victory continues to elude us. It is hard to escape the impression that we are losing ground. We must now <sup>+</sup>become impatient, however. The U. S. has not been assisting the Vietnamese at the present scale long enough to have turned the tide. For the past 3 years, we have been building a relationship with the Vietnamese people, government, and military that is unique in history. This relationship has sorely tried our patience and taxed our resourcefulness. It would be easy to shrug our shoulders and say, "we cannot help

those who will not help themselves." This would be the easy but cowardly way out. We have sought the full and continued confidence and cooperation of the Vietnamese, and in turn, we have respected their independence and desire to build a nation. Such measures must in the long run bring decisive results. Our advisors will continue to work side by side with their Vietnamese counterparts at all levels throughout the country, sharing the horrors and weariness of an insidious and persistent aggression. In the end, the growing military capabilities, developing leadership, and returning hope of the people will turn the tide. The continued patience, understanding, and full commitment of the U. S. to a beleaguered people will someday serve to defeat the Communists, and the repercussions of that defeat will inspire free people the world 'round.

Most Americans certainly unite in the fervent hope that the present U.S. policy of air escalation of the war with North Vietnam will not cause retaliation and further escalation by North Vietnam, China or the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the hazards are great. Local commanders and guerrillas can take independent action which can deeply involve the major powers even against their will in a classic escalation situation. U.S. assessments of the restraint which will be exercised by North Vietnam or Chinese leaders may be wrong. Events in Indonesia or elsewhere may complicate the situation further.

The possibility cannot be dismissed, and may in fact be a probability, that North Vietnam and Chinese troops may sweep across South Vietnam, thus facing the United States with the excruciatingly painful decision of whether to use nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons should be used for a second time by the United States on Asians, it would be difficult to envisage what military gains might outweigh the world wide political defeat which would result.

Because of the enormous risks now being undertaken, two unusual approaches are here suggested which might help to limit the war and advance the negotiations which the Administration is said to be ready to begin when it considers the time propitious.

1. A policy of true intentions. President Johnson has said time and again that the United States seeks no wider war and has limited objectives in Vietnam. To emphasize this it is suggested that the United States begin immediately and continue during the coming months a series of moves which communicate this fact to the Chinese and the Russians. Such actual deeds would add weight to the words addressed by U.S. leaders to Soviet leaders. The aim here would be to help create an atmosphere in which the conflict can be localized to Southeast Asia and negotiations undertaken along the lines suggested in point #2.

[more]

The range of steps as regards China is more limited than with the Soviet Union, but might include action to publicly lift restrictions on travel to the Mainland.

Action concerning the Soviet Union might include indication to the Kremlin that the United States still looks upon a Johnson-Kosygin exchange with interest. Travel of Soviet tourists to the United States could be permitted to continue (one recent group was turned down; another group is planning a late April visit.) An impressive indication of U.S. continued interest in maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union would be Senate approval of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. consular convention. While the Republican leadership has taken the initial view that this should not be done, the President would certainly seem able to marshal Senate assent if he indicated this was important in the Vietnam context.

2. Establish a wider negotiating framework. The United States views its negotiating position with North Vietnam as weak and is seeking to strengthen it by the admittedly hazardous policy of bombing by U.S. planes north of the 17th Parallel.

Is it possible to view the issue in a broader context? There are many issues where the United States is in a strong negotiating position. If the framework for negotiations were broadened the United States might achieve the necessary negotiating strength which it is now attempting to achieve through the current highly dangerous military action.

Regarding North Vietnam, The New York Times of March 1 lists the kind of issues that might be discussed with North Vietnam - "trade with the West, increased diplomatic recognition, possible food-for-peace aid and international development assistance."

Regarding Communist China, indications could be given, probably through Warsaw or appropriate neutrals, that the United States understands and accepts the fact of China's role in Asia. Approaches could be made on the subjects of U.S. recognition, trade, and UN seating.

[more]

Regarding the Soviet Union, indications could be given that the United States is prepared to negotiate meaningfully and intensively, in the appropriate forum, on such issues as trade, Central Europe and disarmament, especially a non-proliferation pact.

As part of any overall negotiations, the United States might try to reach a clear understanding with the Communist world on "wars of liberation" in the underdeveloped countries and the ground rules for peaceful change there. In this process a major role might be worked out for the United Nations.

The aim would be to indicate to both the Soviet Union and China that the United States is prepared to begin to move toward a change in policy toward Communist China and in Central Europe. Within this broader context Vietnam's situation could likely be defused as a part of a broad scale effort of the Johnson Administration to move toward stable world conditions which would enable it to get on with building the Great Society.

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
[1965]



# Why Vietnam

THE ROOTS OF COMMITMENT  
TOWARD PEACE WITH HONOR  
THE TASKS OF DIPLOMACY  
THE TASKS OF DEFENSE  
THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN NEED





# Why Vietnam

THE ROOTS OF COMMITMENT  
TOWARD PEACE WITH HONOR  
THE TASKS OF DIPLOMACY  
THE TASKS OF DEFENSE  
THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN NEED

## Foreword

My fellow Americans:

Once again in man's age-old struggle for a better life and a world of peace, the wisdom, courage, and compassion of the American people are being put to the test. This is the meaning of the tragic conflict in Vietnam.


In meeting the present challenge, it is essential that our people seek understanding, and that our leaders speak with candor.

I have therefore directed that this report to the American people be compiled and widely distributed. In its pages you will find statements on Vietnam by three leaders of your Government—by your President, your Secretary of State, and your Secretary of Defense.

These statements were prepared for different audiences, and they reflect the differing responsibilities of each speaker. The congressional testimony has been edited to avoid undue repetition and to incorporate the sense of the discussions that ensued.

Together, they construct a clear definition of America's role in the Vietnam conflict:

- the dangers and hopes that Vietnam holds for all free men
- the fullness and limits of our national objectives in a war we did not seek
- the constant effort on our part to bring this war we do not desire to a quick and honorable end.



AUGUST 20, 1965.



## Why Vietnam

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## The Roots of Commitment

*In the historic documents that follow, two American Presidents define and affirm the commitment of the United States to the people of South Vietnam.*

*In letters to Prime Minister Churchill in 1954 and to President Diem in 1954 and 1960, President Eisenhower describes the issues at stake and pledges United States assistance in South Vietnam's resistance to subversion and aggression.*

*And in December 1961 President Kennedy reaffirms that pledge.*

Extracts From Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill,  
April 4, 1954

(From Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 1953-1956, New York, 1963)

*Dear Winston:*

I am sure . . . you are following with the deepest interest and anxiety the daily reports of the gallant fight being put up by the French at Dien Bien Phu. Today, the situation there does not seem hopeless.

But regardless of the outcome of this particular battle, I fear that the French cannot alone see the thing through, this despite the very substantial assistance in money and matériel that we are giving them. It is no solution simply to urge the French to intensify their efforts. And if they do not see it through and Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists the ultimate effect on our and your global strategic position with the consequent shift in the power ratios throughout Asia and the Pacific could be disastrous and, I know, unacceptable to you and me. . . . This has led us to the hard conclusion that the situation in Southeast Asia requires us urgently to take serious and far-reaching decisions.

Geneva is less than four weeks away. There the possibility of the Communists driving a wedge between us will, given the state of mind in France, be infinitely greater than at Berlin. I can understand the very natural desire of the French to seek an end to this war which has been bleeding them for eight years. But our painstaking search for a way out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us to the conclusion that there is no negotiated solution of the Indochina problem which in its essence would not be either a face-saving device to cover a French surrender or a face-saving device to cover a Communist retirement. The first alternative is too serious

in its broad strategic implications for us and for you to be acceptable. . . .

Somehow we must contrive to bring about the second alternative. The preliminary lines of our thinking were sketched out by Foster [Dulles] in his speech last Monday night when he said that under the conditions of today the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community, and that in our view this possibility should now be met by united action and not passively accepted. . . .

I believe that the best way to put teeth in this concept and to bring greater moral and material resources to the support of the French effort is through the establishment of a new, ad hoc grouping or coalition composed of nations which have a vital concern in the checking of Communist expansion in the area. I have in mind, in addition to our two countries, France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. The United States government would expect to play its full part in such a coalition. . . .

The important thing is that the coalition must be strong and it must be willing to join the fight if necessary. I do not envisage the need of any appreciable ground forces on your or our part. . . .

If I may refer again to history; we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson? . . .

*With warm regard,*

IKE.



## Letter From President Eisenhower to President Diem, October 1, 1954

*Dear Mr. President:*

I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Vietnam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a *de facto* rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Vietnam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelli-

gent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

## Letter From President Eisenhower to President Diem, October 26, 1960

*Dear Mr. President:*

My countrymen and I are proud to convey our good wishes to you and to the citizens of Vietnam on the fifth anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Vietnam.

We have watched the courage and daring with which you and the Vietnamese people attained independence in a situation so perilous that many thought it hopeless. We have admired the rapidity with which chaos yielded to order and progress replaced despair.

During the years of your independence it has been refreshing for us to observe how clearly the Government and the citizens of Vietnam have faced the fact that the greatest danger to their independence

was Communism. You and your countrymen have used your strength well in accepting the double challenge of building your country and resisting Communist imperialism. In five short years since the founding of the Republic, the Vietnamese people have developed their country in almost every sector. I was particularly impressed by one example. I am informed that last year over 1,200,000 Vietnamese children were able to go to elementary school; three times as many as were enrolled five years earlier. This is certainly a heartening development for Vietnam's future. At the same time Vietnam's ability to defend itself from the Communists has grown immeasurably since its successful struggle to become an independent Republic.

Vietnam's very success as well as its potential wealth and its strategic location have led the Communists of Hanoi, goaded by the bitterness of their failure to enslave all Vietnam, to use increasing violence in their attempts to destroy your country's freedom.

This grave threat, added to the strains and fatigues of the long struggle to achieve and strengthen independence, must be a burden that would cause moments of tension and concern in almost any human heart. Yet from long observation I sense how deeply the Vietnamese value their country's independence and strength and I know how well you used your boldness when you led your countrymen in winning it. I also know that your determination has been a vital factor in guarding that independ-

ence while steadily advancing the economic development of your country. I am confident that these same qualities of determination and boldness will meet the renewed threat as well as the needs and desires of your countrymen for further progress on all fronts.

Although the main responsibility for guarding that independence will always, as it has in the past, belong to the Vietnamese people and their government, I want to assure you that for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

## Letter From President Kennedy to President Diem, December 14, 1961

*Dear Mr. President:*

I have received your recent letter in which you described so cogently the dangerous condition caused by North Vietnam's efforts to take over your country. The situation in your embattled country is well known to me and to the American people. We have been deeply disturbed by the assault on your country. Our indignation has mounted as the deliberate savagery of the Communist program of assassination, kidnapping and wanton violence became clear.

Your letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown—that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva Accords designed to ensure peace in Vietnam and to which they bound themselves in 1954.

At that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared that it "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously

threatening international peace and security." We continue to maintain that view.

In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction of the floods which you describe. I have already given the orders to get these programs underway.

The United States, like the Republic of Vietnam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek to persuade the Communists to give up their attempts of force and subversion. In any case, we are confident that the Vietnamese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have sought so hard and so long.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.



# Toward Peace With Honor

*Press Conference Statement by the President, The White House, July 28, 1965*

Not long ago I received a letter from a woman in the Midwest. She wrote:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my humble way I am writing to you about the crisis in Vietnam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam. My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just something that I don't understand. Why?

I have tried to answer that question a dozen times and more in practically every State in this Union. I discussed it fully in Baltimore in April; in Washington in May; in San Francisco in June. Let me again, now, discuss it here in the East Room of the White House.

Why must young Americans—born into a land exultant with hope and golden with promise—toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one. But it echoes clearly from the painful lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime, in two world wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.

## THE NATURE OF THE WAR

It is this lesson that has brought us to Vietnam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government. But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam and spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism.

## THE STAKES IN VIETNAM

And there are great stakes in the balance.

Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and grasping ambition of Asian communism. Our power, therefore, is a vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise, or in American protection. In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened. And an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace. We learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict.

Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years, have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.

Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Vietnam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We cannot now dishonor our word or abandon our commitment or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.

This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Vietnam.



## INCREASED EFFORT TO HALT AGGRESSION

What are our goals in that war-stained land?

First: We intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces, their attacks, and the number of incidents. I have asked the commanding general, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.

I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time, to 35,000 per month, and stepping up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.

After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful consideration. And I will give the country adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations.

We have also discussed with the Government of South Vietnam lately the steps that they will take to substantially increase their own effort—both on the battlefield and toward reform and progress in the villages. Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new program to be tested upon his return to that area.

I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to be available immediately to the Congress to review with the appropriate congressional committees our plan in these areas. I have asked them to be available to answer the questions of any Member of Congress.

Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited amount to present legislation to help meet part of this new cost until a supplemental measure is ready and hearings can be held when the Congress assembles in January.

In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the present Defense appropriations bill now to transfer funds, in addition to the additional money that we will request.

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement. We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can foresee. Nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power.

But we will not surrender. And we will not retreat.

For behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources of all of the American Nation.

## TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable. We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly, and many times, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time. Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions, with the help of 40 nations throughout the world. But there has been no answer.

But we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost.

I have spoken many times of our objectives in Vietnam. So has the Government of South Vietnam. Hanoi has set forth its own proposal. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose people may be affected. For we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield.

## THE UNITED NATIONS

In this pursuit we welcome, and we ask for, the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials—or any one of its 114 members—can, by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us

nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and the gratitude of the United States of America.

I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Secretary-General U Thant a letter from me requesting that all of the resources, energy, and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam. I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago.

## FREE CHOICE FOR VIETNAM

We do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory. But we insist, and we will always insist, that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South, or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision. And they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

This was the purpose of the 1954 agreements which the Communists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those agreements was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action.

As battle rages, we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich the condition of their life—to feed the hungry, to tend the sick—teach the young, shelter the homeless, and help the farmer to increase his crops, and the worker to find a job.

## PROGRESS IN HUMAN WELFARE

It is an ancient, but still terrible, irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man are united in the simple elusive desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding toil.

As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we can help all the people of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black has made great progress since my appearance in Baltimore in that direction, not as the price of peace—for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost—but

rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man.

## THE DIFFICULTY OF DECISION

Let me also add a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, in a hundred towns, in every State in this Union—working and laughing, building, and filled with hope and life. I think that I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President.

## A NATION WHICH BUILDS

There is something else, too. When I was young, poverty was so common that we didn't know it had a name. Education was something you had to fight for. And water was life itself. I have now been in public life 35 years, more than three decades, and in each of those 35 years I have seen good men, and wise leaders, struggle to bring the blessings of this land to all of our people. Now I am the President. It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every American citizen have an equal opportunity, to help every family get a decent home and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old.

As I have said before, that is what I have lived for. That is what I have wanted all my life. And I do not want to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many people for so many years now drowned in the wasteful ravages of war. I am going to do all I can to see that that never happens.

But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy we must have the courage to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom—all swept away on the flood of conquest.

So this too shall not happen; we will stand in Vietnam.



## The Tasks of Diplomacy

*Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,  
August 3, 1965*

As the President has said, "there are great stakes in the balance" in Vietnam today.

Let us be clear about those stakes. With its archipelagos, Southeast Asia contains rich natural resources and some 200 million people. Geographically, it has great strategic importance—it dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side, and Australia and New Zealand on the other. The loss of Southeast Asia to the Communists would constitute a serious shift in the balance of power against the interests of the free world. And the loss of South Vietnam would make the defense of the rest of Southeast Asia much more costly and difficult. That is why the SEATO Council has said that the defeat of the aggression against South Vietnam is "essential" to the security of Southeast Asia.

But much more is at stake than preserving the independence of the peoples of Southeast Asia and preventing the vast resources of that area from being swallowed by those hostile to freedom.

### THE TEST

The war in Vietnam is a test of a technique of aggression: what the Communists, in their upside-down language, call "wars of national liberation." They use the term to describe any effort by Communists, short of large-scale war, to destroy by force any non-Communist government. Thus the leaders of the Communist terrorists in such an independent democracy as Venezuela are described as leaders of a fight for "national liberation." And a recent editorial in *Pravda* said that "the upsurge of the national liberation movement in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of the activities of Communist parties."

Communist leaders know, as the rest of the world knows, that thermonuclear war would be ruinous.

They know that large-scale invasions, such as that launched in Korea 15 years ago, would bring great risks and heavy penalties. So, they have resorted to semi-concealed aggression through the infiltration of arms and trained military personnel across national frontiers. And the Asian Communists themselves regard the war in Vietnam as a critical test of that technique. Recently General Giap, leader of North Vietnam's army, said:

If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world.

In Southeast Asia, the Communists already have publicly designated Thailand as the next target. And if the aggression against South Vietnam were permitted to succeed, the forces of militant communism everywhere would be vastly heartened and we could expect to see a series of so-called "wars of liberation" in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

International law does not restrict internal revolution. But it does restrict what third powers may lawfully do in sending arms and men to bring about insurrection. What North Vietnam is doing in South Vietnam flouts not only the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 but general international law.

The assault on the Republic of Vietnam is, beyond question, an aggression. It was organized and has been directed by North Vietnam, with the backing of Communist China. The cadres of guerrilla fighters, saboteurs, and assassins who form the backbone of the Viet Cong were specially trained in the North. Initially, many of them were men of South Vietnamese birth who had fought with the Viet Minh against the French and gone North in their military units after Vietnam was divided in 1954. But that reservoir was gradually exhausted. During 1964 and since, most of the military men infiltrated from the North have been



natives of North Vietnam. And near the end of last year they began to include complete units of the regular North Vietnamese army. In addition to trained men and political and military direction, the North has supplied arms and ammunition in increasing quantities—in considerable part of Chinese manufacture.

Between 1959 and the end of 1964, 40,000 trained military personnel came down from the North into South Vietnam, by conservative estimate. More have come this year. Had all these crossed the line at once—as the North Koreans did in invading South Korea 15 years ago—nobody in the free world could have doubted that the assault on Vietnam was an aggression. That the dividing line between North and South Vietnam was intended to be temporary does not make the attack any less of an aggression. The dividing line in Korea also was intended to be temporary.

If there is ever to be peace in this world, aggression must cease. We as a nation are committed to peace and the rule of law. We recognize also the harsh reality that our security is involved.

We are committed to oppose aggression not only through the United Nations Charter but through many defensive alliances. We have 42 allies, not counting the Republic of Vietnam. And many other nations know that their security depends upon us. Our power and our readiness to use it to assist others to resist aggression, the integrity of our commitment, these are the bulwarks of peace in the world.

If we were to fail in Vietnam, serious consequences would ensue. Our adversaries would be encouraged to take greater risks elsewhere. At the same time, the confidence which our allies and other free nations now have in our commitments would be seriously impaired.

## THE COMMITMENT

Let us be clear about our commitment in Vietnam.

It began with the Southeast Asia Treaty, which was negotiated and signed after the Geneva agreements and the cease-fire in Indo-China in 1954 and was approved by the United States Senate by a vote of 82 to 1 in February 1955. That Treaty protects against Communist aggression not only its members but any of the three non-Communist states growing

out of former French Indo-China which asks for protection.

Late in 1954 President Eisenhower, with bipartisan support, decided to extend aid to South Vietnam, both economic aid and aid in training its armed forces. His purpose, as he said, was to "assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

Vietnam became a Republic in 1955, was recognized as an independent nation by 36 nations initially and is so recognized by more than 50 today.

Beginning in 1955, the Congress has each year approved overall economic and military assistance programs in which the continuation of major aid to South Vietnam has been specifically considered.

During the next five years, South Vietnam made remarkable economic and social progress—what some observers described as a "miracle."

Nearly a million refugees from the North were settled. These were the stout-hearted people of whom the late Dr. Tom Dooley wrote so eloquently in his first book, *Deliver Us From Evil*, and who led him to devote the rest of his all too brief life to helping the people of Vietnam and Laos.

A land reform program was launched. A comprehensive system of agricultural credit was set up. Thousands of new schools and more than 3,500 village health stations were built. Rail transportation was restored and roads were repaired and improved. South Vietnam not only fed itself but resumed rice exports. Production of rubber and sugar rose sharply. New industries were started. Per capita income rose by twenty percent.

By contrast, North Vietnam suffered a drop of ten percent in food production and disappointments in industrial production.

In 1954, Hanoi almost certainly had expected to take over South Vietnam within a few years. But by 1959 its hopes had withered and the South was far outstripping the heralded "Communist paradise." These almost certainly were the factors which led Hanoi to organize and launch the assault on the South.

I beg leave to quote from a statement I made at a press conference on May 4, 1961:

Since late in 1959 organized Communist activity in the form of guerrilla raids against army and security units

of the Government of Vietnam, terrorist acts against local officials and civilians, and other subversive activities in the Republic of Vietnam have increased to levels unprecedented since the Geneva Agreements of 1954. During this period the organized armed strength of the Viet Cong, the Communist apparatus operating in the Republic of Vietnam, has grown from about 3,000 to over 12,000 personnel. This armed strength has been supplemented by an increase in the numbers of political and propaganda agents in the area.

During 1960 alone, Communist armed units and terrorists assassinated or kidnapped over 3,000 local officials, military personnel, and civilians. Their activities took the form of armed attacks against isolated garrisons, attacks on newly established townships, ambushes on roads and canals, destruction of bridges, and well-planned sabotage against public works and communication lines. Because of Communist guerrilla activity 200 elementary schools had to be closed at various times, affecting over 25,000 students and 800 teachers.

This upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity apparently stemmed from a decision made in May 1959 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of North Vietnam which called for the reunification of Vietnam by all "appropriate means." In July of the same year the Central Committee was reorganized and charged with intelligence duties and the "liberation" of South Vietnam. In retrospect this decision to step up guerrilla activity was made to reverse the remarkable success which the Government of the Republic of Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh Diem had achieved in consolidating its political position and in attaining significant economic recovery in the five years between 1954 and 1959.

Remarkably coincidental with the renewed Communist activity in Laos, the Communist Party of North Vietnam at its Third Congress on September 10, 1960, adopted a resolution which declared that the Vietnamese revolution has as a major strategic task the liberation of the South from the "rule of U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." This resolution called for the direct overthrow of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Next door to South Vietnam, Laos was threatened by a similar Communist assault. The active agent of attack on both was Communist North Vietnam, with the backing of Peiping and Moscow. In the case of Laos, we were able to negotiate an agreement in 1962 that it should be neutral and that all foreign military personnel should be withdrawn. We complied with that agreement. But North Vietnam never did. In gross violation of its pledge, it left armed units in Laos and continued to use Laos as a corridor to infiltrate arms and trained men into South Vietnam.

There was no new agreement, even on paper, on Vietnam. Late in 1961, President Kennedy there-

fore increased our assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. During that year, the infiltration of arms and military personnel from the North continued to increase. To cope with that escalation, President Kennedy decided to send more American military personnel—to assist with logistics and transportation and communications as well as with training and as advisers to South Vietnamese forces in the field. Likewise we expanded our economic assistance and technical advice, particularly with a view to improving living conditions in the villages.

During 1962 and 1963 Hanoi continued to increase its assistance to the Viet Cong. In response, President Kennedy and later President Johnson increased our aid.

Hanoi kept on escalating the war throughout 1964. And the Viet Cong intensified its drafting and training of men in the areas it controls.

Last August, you will recall, North Vietnamese forces attacked American destroyers in international waters. That attack was met by appropriate air response against North Vietnamese naval installations. And Congress, by a combined vote of 504 to 2, passed a resolution expressing its support for actions by the Executive "including the use of armed force" to meet aggression in Southeast Asia, including specifically aggression against South Vietnam. The resolution and the Congressional debate specifically envisaged that, subject to continuing Congressional consultation, the armed forces of the United States might be committed in the defense of South Vietnam in any way that seemed necessary, including employment in combat.

In summary, our commitment in Vietnam has been set forth in:

- The Southeast Asia Treaty, which was almost unanimously approved by the United States Senate;
- The pledges made with bipartisan support by three successive Presidents of the United States;
- The assistance programs approved annually, beginning in 1955, by bipartisan majorities in both Houses of Congress;
- The declarations which we joined our SEATO and ANZUS allies in making at their Ministerial Council Meetings in 1964 and 1965;



— The joint Congressional resolution of August 1964, which was approved by a combined vote of 504 to 2.

Our commitment is to assist the government and people of South Vietnam to repel this aggression, thus preserving their freedom. This commitment is to the South Vietnamese as a nation and people. It has continued through various changes of government, just as our commitments to our NATO allies and, in various forms, to many other nations remain unaltered by changes in government.

Continued escalation of the aggression by the other side has required continued strengthening of the military defenses of South Vietnam. Whether still more American military personnel will be needed will depend on events, especially on whether the other side continues to escalate the aggression. As the President has made plain, we will provide the South Vietnamese with whatever assistance may be necessary to ensure that the aggression against them is effectively repelled—that is, to make good on our commitment.

### THE PURSUIT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

As President Johnson and his predecessors have repeatedly emphasized, our objective in Southeast Asia is peace—a peace in which the various peoples of the area can manage their own affairs in their own ways and address themselves to economic and social progress.

We seek no bases or special position for the United States. We do not seek to destroy or overturn the Communist regimes in Hanoi and Peiping. We ask only that they cease their aggressions, that they leave their neighbors alone.

Repeatedly, we and others have sought to achieve a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam.

We have had many talks with the Soviet authorities over a period of more than four years. But their influence in Hanoi appears to be limited. Recently, when approached, their response has been, in substance: You have come to the wrong address—nobody has authorized us to negotiate. Talk to Hanoi.

We have had a long series of talks with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw. Although Peiping is more cautious in action than in word, it is un-

bending in its hostility to us and plainly opposed to any negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

There have been repeated contacts with Hanoi. Many channels are open. And many have volunteered to use them. But so far there has been no indication that Hanoi is seriously interested in peace on any terms except those which would assure a Communist take-over of South Vietnam.

We and others have sought to open the way for conferences on the neighboring states of Laos and Cambodia, where progress toward peace might be reflected in Vietnam. These approaches have been blocked by Hanoi and Peiping.

The United Kingdom, as Co-chairman of the Geneva conferences, has repeatedly sought a path to a settlement—first by working toward a new Geneva conference, then by a visit by a senior British statesman. Both efforts were blocked by the Communists—and neither Hanoi nor Peiping would even receive the senior British statesman.

In April, President Johnson offered unconditional discussions with the governments concerned. Hanoi and Peiping called this offer a “hoax.”

Seventeen nonaligned nations appealed for a peaceful solution, by negotiations without preconditions. We accepted the proposal. Hanoi and Red China rejected it with scorn, calling some of its authors “monsters and freaks.”

The President of India made a constructive proposal for an end to hostilities and an Afro-Asian patrol force. We welcomed this proposal with interest and hope. Hanoi and Peiping rejected it as a betrayal.

In May, the United States and South Vietnam suspended air attacks on North Vietnam. This action was made known to the other side to see if there would be a response in kind. But Hanoi denounced the pause as “a worn-out trick” and Peiping denounced it as a “swindle.” Some say the pause was not long enough. But we knew the negative reaction from the other side before we resumed. And we had paused previously for more than four years while thousands of armed men invaded the South and killed thousands of South Vietnamese, including women and children, and deliberately destroyed school houses and playgrounds and hospitals and health centers and other facilities that the South Vietnamese had built to

improve their lives and give their children a chance for a better education and better health.

In late June, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers established a mission of four of their members to explore with all parties concerned the possibilities for a conference leading to a just and lasting peace. Hanoi and Peiping made it plain that they would not receive the mission.

Mr. Harold Davies, a member of the British Parliament, went to Hanoi with the approval of Prime Minister Wilson. But the high officials there would not even talk with him. And the lower-ranking officials who did talk with him made it clear that Hanoi was not yet interested in negotiations, that it was intent on a total victory in South Vietnam. As Prime Minister Wilson reported to the House of Commons, Mr. Davies met with a conviction among the North Vietnamese that their prospects of victory were too imminent for them to forsake the battlefield for the conference table.

We and others have made repeated efforts at discussions through the United Nations. In the Security Council, after the August attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, we supported a Soviet proposal that the Government of North Vietnam be invited to come to the Security Council. But Hanoi refused.

In April, Secretary General U Thant considered visits to Hanoi and Peiping to explore the possibilities of peace. But both those Communist regimes made it plain that they did not regard the United Nations as competent to deal with that matter.

The President's San Francisco speech in June requested help from the United Nations' membership at large in getting peace talks started.

In late July the President sent our new Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, to New York with a letter to Secretary General U Thant requesting that all the resources, energy and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam. The Secretary General has already accepted this assignment.

We sent a letter to the Security Council calling attention to the special responsibility in this regard of the Security Council and of the nations which happen to be members of the Council. We have

considered from time to time placing the matter formally before the Security Council. But we have been advised by many nations—and by many individuals—who are trying to help to achieve a peaceful settlement that to force debate and a vote in the Security Council might tend to harden positions and make useful explorations and discussions even more difficult.

President Johnson has publicly invited any and all members of the United Nations to do all they can to bring about a peaceful settlement.

By these moves the United States has intended to engage the serious attention and efforts of the United Nations as an institution, and its members as signatories of its Charter, in getting the Communists to talk rather than fight—while continuing with determination an increasing effort to demonstrate that Hanoi and the Viet Cong cannot settle the issue on the battlefield.

We have not only placed the Vietnam issue before the United Nations, but believe that we have done so in the most constructive ways.

### THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE

What are the essential conditions for peace in South Vietnam?

In late June, the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam set forth the fundamental principles of a “just and enduring peace.” In summary, those principles are:

- An end to aggression and subversion.
- Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny “in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources.”
- As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the Government of South Vietnam and the nations that have come to its aid to defend South Vietnam; and the removal of foreign military forces from South Vietnam.
- And effective guarantees for the freedom of the people of South Vietnam.

We endorse those principles. In essence, they would constitute a return to the basic purpose of the Geneva Accords of 1954. Whether they require reaffirmation of those Accords or new agreements em-



bodying these essential points, but with provision in either case for more effective international machinery and guarantees, could be determined in discussions and negotiations.

Once the basic points set forth by South Vietnam's Foreign Minister were achieved, future relations between North Vietnam and South Vietnam could be worked out by peaceful means. And this would include the question of a free decision by the people of North and South Vietnam on the matter of reunification.

When the aggression has ceased and the freedom of South Vietnam is assured by other means, we will withdraw our forces. Three Presidents of the United States have said many times that we want no permanent bases and no special position there. Our military forces are there because of the North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam and for no other reason. When the men and arms infiltrated by the North are withdrawn and Hanoi ceases its support and guidance of the war in the South, whatever remains in the form of indigenous dissent is a matter for the South Vietnamese themselves. As for South Vietnamese fighting in the Viet Cong or under its control or influence, they must in time be integrated into their national society. But that is a process which must be brought about by the people of South Vietnam, not by foreign diplomats.

Apart from the search for a solution in Vietnam itself, the United States Government has hoped that discussions could be held on the problems concerning Cambodia and Laos. We supported the proposal of Prince Sihanouk for a conference on Cambodia, to be attended by the governments that participated in the 1954 conference, and noted the joint statement of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in April, to the effect that both favored the convening of conferences on Cambodia and Laos. Subsequently, however, Hanoi appeared to draw back and to impose conditions at variance with the Cambodian proposal.

We look beyond a just and enduring peace for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, to the day when Peiping will be ready to join in a general settlement in the Far East—a general settlement that would remove the threat of aggression and make it possible for all the peoples of the area to devote themselves to economic and social progress.

Several of the nations of Asia are densely populated. And high rates of population growth make it difficult for them to increase per capita incomes. The solution to these problems cannot be found through external aggression. They must be achieved internally within each nation.

As President Johnson has said, the United States stands ready to assist and support cooperative programs for economic development in Asia. Already we are making available additional funds for the development of the Mekong Valley. And we are taking the lead in organizing an Asian Development Bank, which we hope will be supported by all the major industrialized nations, including the Soviet Union. We would welcome membership by North Vietnam, when it has ceased its aggression.

Those are our objectives—peace and a better life for all who are willing to live at peace with their neighbors.

#### THE PRESENT PATH

I turn now to the specific actions we are taking to convince Hanoi that it will not succeed and that it must move toward a peaceful solution.

Secretary McNamara is appearing before the appropriate committees of the Congress to discuss the military situation within South Vietnam in detail. In essence, our present view is that it is crucial to turn the tide in the South, and that for this purpose it is necessary to send substantial numbers of additional American forces.

The primary responsibility for defeating the Viet Cong will remain, however, with the South Vietnamese. They have some 545,000 men in military and paramilitary forces. Despite losses, every branch of the armed forces of South Vietnam has more men under arms than it had six months ago. And they are making systematic efforts to increase their forces still further. The primary missions of American ground forces are to secure the air bases used by the South Vietnamese and ourselves and to provide a strategic reserve, thus releasing South Vietnamese troops for offensive actions against the Viet Cong. In securing the air bases and related military installations, American forces are pushing out into the countryside to prevent build-ups for surprise attacks. And they may be used in emergencies to help the South Vietnamese in combat. But the main task of rooting out the Viet Cong will

continue to be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese. And we have seen no sign that they are about to try to shift that responsibility to us. On the contrary, the presence of increasing numbers of American combat troops seems to have stimulated greater efforts on the part of the fighting men of South Vietnam.

At the same time, on the military side, we shall maintain, with the South Vietnamese, our program of limited air attacks on military targets in North Vietnam. This program is a part of the total strategy. We had never expected that air attacks on North Vietnam alone would bring Hanoi to a quick decision to cease its aggression. Hanoi has been committed to its aggression too long and too deeply to turn around overnight. It must be convinced that it faces not only continuing, and perhaps increased, pressure on the North itself, but also that it simply cannot win in the South.

The air attacks on the North have also had specific military effects in reducing the scale of increased infiltration from the North. Finally, they are important as a warning to all concerned that there are no longer sanctuaries for aggression.

It has been suggested in some quarters that Hanoi would be more disposed to move to negotiations and to cease its aggression if we stopped bombing the North. We do not rule out the possibility of another and longer pause in bombing, but the question remains—and we have repeatedly asked it: What would happen from the North in response? Would Hanoi withdraw the 325th Division of the regular army, which is now deployed in South Vietnam and across the line in Laos? Would it take home the other men it has infiltrated into the South? Would it stop sending arms and ammunition into South Vietnam? Would the campaign of assassination and sabotage in the South cease? We have been trying to find out what would happen if we were to suspend our bombing of the North. We have not been able to get an answer or even a hint.

Those who complain about air attacks on military targets in North Vietnam would carry more weight if they had manifested, or would manifest now, appropriate concern about the infiltrations from the North, the high rate of military activity in the South and the ruthless campaign of terror and assassination which is being conducted in the

South under the direction of Hanoi and with its active support.

#### THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Let me now underline just a few points about the political and economic situation in South Vietnam. For we know well that, while security is fundamental to turning the tide, it remains vital to do all we can on the political and economic fronts.

All of us have been concerned, of course, by the difficulties of the South Vietnamese in developing an effective and stable government. But this failure should not astonish us. South Vietnam is a highly plural society striving to find its political feet under very adverse conditions. Other nations—new and old—with fewer difficulties and unmolested by determined aggressors have done no better. South Vietnam emerged from the French Indo-China war with many political factions, most of which were firmly anti-Communist. Despite several significant initial successes in establishing a degree of political harmony, the Government of President Diem could not maintain a lasting unity among the many factions. The recent shifting and reshuffling of Vietnamese governments is largely the continuing search for political unity and a viable regime which can overcome these long-evident political divisions.

And we should not forget that the destruction of the fabric of government at all levels has been a primary objective of the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong has assassinated thousands of local officials—and health workers and school teachers and others who were helping to improve the life of the people of the countryside. In the last year and a half, it has killed, wounded, or kidnapped 2,291 village officials and 22,146 other civilians—these on top of its thousands of earlier victims.

Despite the risks to themselves and their families, Vietnamese have continued to come forward to fill these posts. And in the last six years, no political dissenter of any consequence has gone over to the Viet Cong. The Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects, the Cambodians (of whom there are about a million in South Vietnam), the Montagnards—all the principal elements in South Vietnamese political life except the Viet Cong itself, which is a very small



minority—remain overwhelmingly anti-Communist.

The suggestion that Ho Chi Minh probably could win a free election in South Vietnam is directly contrary to all the evidence we have. And we have a great deal of evidence, for we have Americans—in twos and threes and fours and sixes—in the countryside in all parts of Vietnam. In years past Ho Chi Minh was a hero throughout Vietnam. For he had led the fight against the Japanese and then against the French. But his glamor began to fade when he set up a Communist police state in the North—and the South, by contrast, made great progress under a non-Communist nationalist government. Today the North Vietnamese regime is badly discredited. We find the South Vietnamese in the countryside ready to cooperate with their own government when they can do so with reasonable hope of not being assassinated by the Viet Cong the next night.

At the present time, somewhat more than 50 percent of the people of Vietnam live in areas under control of their government. Another 25 percent live in areas of shifting control. And about 25 percent live in areas under varying degree of Viet Cong control. But even where it succeeds in imposing taxes, drafting recruits and commandeering labor, the Viet Cong has not usually been able to organize the area. We have a good deal of evidence that Viet Cong tax exactions and terrorism have increasingly alienated the villagers. And one of the problems with which the South Vietnamese government and we have to deal is the large scale exodus from the Central Highlands to the coastal areas of refugees from the Viet Cong.

It is of the greatest significance that, despite many years of harsh war, despite the political instability of the central government, and despite division of their country since 1954, the people of South Vietnam fight on with uncommon determination. There is no evidence among politicians, the bureaucracy, the military, the major religious groups, the youth, or even the peasantry of a desire for peace at any price. They all oppose surrender or accommodation on a basis which would lead to a Communist take-over. The will to resist the aggression from the North has survived through periods of great stress and remains strong.

The central objective of our foreign policy is a peaceful community of nations, each free to choose its own institutions but cooperating with one another to promote their mutual welfare. It is the kind of world order envisaged in the opening sections of the United Nations Charter. But there have been and still are important forces in the world which seek a different goal—which deny the right of free choice, which seek to expand their influence and empires by every means, including force.

#### THE BULWARK OF PEACE

In defense of peace and freedom and the right of free choice:

- We and others insisted that the Soviets withdraw their forces from Iran.
- We went to the aid of Turkey and Greece.
- We joined in organizing the European Recovery Program and in forming the North Atlantic Alliance.
- We and our allies have defended the freedom of West Berlin.
- We and 15 other nations joined in repelling the aggression in Korea.
- We have joined defensive alliances with many other nations and have helped them to strengthen their defensive military forces.
- We supported the United Nations in its efforts to preserve the independence of the Congo.
- We insisted that the Soviet Union withdraw strategic weapons from Cuba.

Had we not done these things—and others—the enemies of freedom would now control much of the world and be in a position to destroy us or at least to sap our strength by economic strangulation.

For the same basic reasons that we took all those other measures to deter or to repel aggression, we are determined to assist the people of South Vietnam to defeat this aggression.

In his last public utterance, recorded only half an hour before his death, a great and beloved American, Adlai Stevenson, said:

There has been a great deal of pressure on me in the United States from many sources to take a position—a public position—inconsistent with that of my Government. Actually, I don't agree with those protestants. My hope in

Vietnam is that resistance there may establish the fact that changes in Asia are not to be precipitated by outside forces.

I believe, with the President, that “once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable.”

The great bulwark of peace for all free men—and therefore of peace for the millions ruled by the adversaries of freedom—has been, and is today, the power of the United States and our readiness to

use that power, in cooperation with other free nations, to deter or to defeat aggression, and to help other free nations to go forward economically, socially, and politically.

We have had to cope with a long series of dangerous crises caused by the aggressive appetites of others. But we are a great nation and people. I am confident that we will meet this test, as we have met others.

## The Tasks of Defense

*Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, August 4, 1965*

The issue in Vietnam is essentially the same as it was in 1954 when President Eisenhower said:

I think it is no longer necessary to enter into a long argument or exposition to show the importance to the United States of Indochina and of the struggle going on there. No matter how the struggle may have started, it has long since become one of the testing places between a free form of government and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to have the greatest significance for us, and possibly for a long time into the future.

We have here a sort of cork in the bottle, the bottle being the great area that includes Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, all of the surrounding areas of Asia with its hundreds of millions of people. . . .

### THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

What is at stake in Vietnam today is the ability of the free world to block Communist armed aggression and prevent the loss of all of Southeast Asia, a loss which in its ultimate consequences could drastically alter the strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific to the grave detriment of our own security and that of our Allies. While fifteen years ago, in Korea, Communist aggression took the form of an overt armed attack, today in South Vietnam, it has taken the form of a large scale intensive guerrilla operation.

The covert nature of this aggression, which characterized the earlier years of the struggle in South Vietnam, has now all but been stripped away. The control of the Viet Cong effort by the regime in Hanoi, supported and incited by Communist China, has become increasingly apparent.

The struggle there has enormous implications for the security of the United States and the free world, and for that matter, the Soviet Union as well. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists have chosen to make South Vietnam the test case for their particular version of the so-

called "wars of national liberation." The extent to which violence should be used in overthrowing non-Communist governments has been one of the most bitterly contested issues between the Chinese and the Soviet Communists.

Although the former Chairman, Mr. Khrushchev, fully endorsed wars of national liberation as the preferred means of extending the sway of communism, he cautioned that "this does not necessarily mean that the transition to Socialism will everywhere and in all cases be linked with armed uprising and civil war. . . . Revolution by peaceful means accords with the interests of the working class and the masses."

The Chinese Communists, however, insist that:

Peaceful co-existence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought about through proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country. . . . The vanguard of the proletariat will remain unconquerable in all circumstances only if it masters all forms of struggle—peaceful and armed, open and secret, legal and illegal, parliamentary struggle and mass struggle, and so forth. (Letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963.)

Their preference for violence was even more emphatically expressed in an article in the *Peiping People's Daily* of March 31, 1964:

It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition, but it would be inappropriate to emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition. . . . the proletarian party must never substitute parliamentary struggle for proletarian revolution or entertain the illusion that the transition to socialism can be achieved through the parliamentary road. Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to socialism, the proletariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old state machine and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . .



"Political power," the article quotes Mao Tse-tung as saying, "grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Throughout the world we see the fruits of these policies and in Vietnam, particularly, we see the effects of the Chinese Communists' more militant stance and their hatred of the free world. They make no secret of the fact that Vietnam is the test case, and neither does the regime in Hanoi. General Giap, head of the North Vietnamese Army, recently said that "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. . . . If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world." And, Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, pointed out that "The experience of our compatriots in South Vietnam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of South America."

It is clear that a Communist success in South Vietnam would be taken as proof that the Chinese Communists' position is correct and they will have made a giant step forward in their efforts to seize control of the world Communist movement.

Furthermore, such a success would greatly increase the prestige of Communist China among the non-aligned nations and strengthen the position of their followers everywhere. In that event we would then have to be prepared to cope with the same kind of aggression in other parts of the world wherever the existing governments are weak and the social structures fragmented. If Communist armed aggression is not stopped in Vietnam, as it was in Korea, the confidence of small nations in America's pledge of support will be weakened and many of them, in widely separated areas of the world, will feel unsafe.

Thus, the stakes in South Vietnam are far greater than the loss of one small country to communism. Its loss would be a most serious setback to the cause of freedom and would greatly complicate the task of preventing the further spread of militant Asian communism. And, if that spread is not halted, our strategic position in the world will be weakened and our national security directly endangered.

#### CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Essential to a proper understanding of the present situation in South Vietnam is a recognition of the

fact that the so-called insurgency there is planned, directed, controlled and supported from Hanoi.

True, there is a small dissident minority in South Vietnam, but the Government could cope with it if it were not directed and supplied from the outside. As early as 1960, at the Third Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, both Ho Chi Minh and General Giap spoke of the need to "step up" the "revolution in the South." In March 1963 the party organ *Hoc Tap* stated that the authorities in South Vietnam "are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution."

Through most of the past decade the North Vietnamese Government denied and went to great efforts to conceal the scale of its personnel and materiel support, in addition to direction and encouragement, to the Viet Cong.

It had strong reasons to do so. The North Vietnamese regime had no wish to force upon the attention of the world its massive and persistent violations of its Geneva pledges of 1954 and 1962 regarding non-interference in South Vietnam and Laos.

However, in building up the Viet Cong forces for a decisive challenge, the authorities in North Vietnam have increasingly dropped the disguises that gave their earlier support a clandestine character.

Through 1963, the bulk of the arms infiltrated from the North were old French and American models acquired prior to 1954 in Indochina and Korea.

Now, the flow of weapons from North Vietnam consists almost entirely of the latest arms acquired from Communist China; and the flow is large enough to have entirely reequipped the Main Force units, despite the capture this year by government forces of thousands of these weapons and millions of rounds of the new ammunition.

Likewise, through 1963, nearly all the personnel infiltrating through Laos, trained and equipped in the North and ordered South, were former Southerners.

But in the last eighteen months, the great majority of the infiltrators—more than 10,000 of

them—have been ethnic Northerners, mostly draftees ordered into the People's Army of Vietnam for duty in the South. And it now appears that, starting their journey through Laos last December, from one to three regiments of a North Vietnamese regular division, the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army, have deployed into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam for combat alongside the Viet Cong.

Thus, despite all its reasons for secrecy, Hanoi's desire for decisive results this summer has forced it to reveal its hand even more openly.

The United States during the last four years has steadily increased its help to the people of South Vietnam in an effort to counter this ever-increasing scale of Communist aggression. These efforts achieved some measure of success during 1962. The South Vietnamese forces in that year made good progress in suppressing the Viet Cong insurrection.

Although combat deaths suffered by these forces in 1962 rose by 11 percent over the 1961 level (from about 4,000 to 4,450), Viet Cong combat deaths increased by 72 percent (from about 12,000 to 21,000). Weapons lost by the South Vietnamese fell from 5,900 in 1961 to 5,200 in 1962, while the number lost by the Viet Cong rose from 2,750 to 4,050. The Government's new strategic hamlet program was just getting underway and was showing promise. The economy was growing and the Government seemed firmly in control. Therefore, in early 1963, I was able to say:

... victory over the Viet Cong will most likely take many years. But now, as a result of the operations of the last year, there is a new feeling of confidence, not only on the part of the Government of South Vietnam but also among the populace, that victory is possible.

But at the same time I also cautioned:

We are not unmindful of the fact that the pressures on South Vietnam may well continue through infiltration via the Laos corridor. Nor are we unmindful of the possibility that the Communists, sensing defeat in their covert efforts, might resort to overt aggression from North Vietnam. Obviously, this latter contingency could require a greater direct participation by the United States. The survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of all of Southeast Asia and to the free world that we must be prepared to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory.

Unfortunately, the caution voiced in early 1963 proved to be well founded. Late in 1963, the Communists stepped up their efforts, and the military situation began to deteriorate. The Diem Government came under increasing internal pressure, and in November it was overthrown. As I reported in February 1964:

The Viet Cong was quick to take advantage of the growing opposition to the Diem Government and the period of uncertainty following its overthrow. Viet Cong activities were already increasing in September and continued to increase at an accelerated rate in October and November, particularly in the Delta area. And I must report that they have made considerable progress since the coup.

Following the coup, the lack of stability in the central Government and the rapid turnover of key personnel, particularly senior military commanders, began to be reflected in combat operations and throughout the entire fabric of the political and economic structure. And, in 1964, the Communists greatly increased the scope and tempo of their subversive efforts. Larger scale attacks became more frequent and the flow of men and supplies from the North expanded. The incidence of terrorism and sabotage rose rapidly and the pressure on the civilian population was intensified.

The deteriorating military situation was clearly reflected in the statistics. South Vietnamese combat deaths rose from 5,650 in 1963 to 7,450 in 1964 and the number of weapons lost from 8,250 to 14,100. In contrast, Viet Cong combat deaths dropped from 20,600 to 16,800 and, considering the stepped-up tempo of activity, they experienced only a very modest rise in the rate of weapons lost (from 5,400 to 5,900).

At various times in recent months, I have called attention to the continued buildup of Communist forces in South Vietnam. I pointed out that although these forces had not been committed to combat in any significant degree, they probably would be after the start of the monsoon season. It is now clear that these forces are being committed in increasing numbers and that the Communists have decided to make an all-out attempt to bring down the Government of South Vietnam.

The entire economic and social structure is under attack. Bridges, railroads and highways are being destroyed and interdicted. Agricultural products are being barred from the cities. Electric power



plants and communication lines are being sabotaged. Whole villages are being burned and their population driven away, increasing the refugee burden on the South Vietnamese Government.

In addition to the continued infiltration of increasing numbers of individuals and the acceleration of the flow of modern equipment and supplies, organized units of the North Vietnamese Army have been identified in South Vietnam. We now estimate the hard core Viet Cong strength at some 70,000 men, including a recently reported increase in the number of combat battalions. In addition, they have some 90,000 to 100,000 irregulars and some 30,000 in their political cadres, i.e., tax collectors, propagandists, etc. We have also identified at least three battalions of the regular North Vietnamese Army, and there are probably considerably more.

At the same time the Government of South Vietnam has found it increasingly difficult to make a commensurate increase in the size of its own forces, which now stand at about 545,000 men, including the regional and local defense forces but excluding the national police.

Combat deaths on both sides have been mounting—for the South Vietnamese from an average of 143 men a week in 1964 to about 270 a week for the four-week period ending July 24 this year. Viet Cong losses have gone from 322 a week last year to about 680 a week for the four-week period ending July 24.

Most important, the ratio of South Vietnamese to Viet Cong strength has seriously declined in the last six or seven months from about five to one to about three or three-and-a-half to one; the ratio of combat battalions is substantially less. This is far too low a ratio for a guerrilla war even though the greater mobility and firepower provided to the South Vietnamese forces by the United States help to offset that disadvantage.

The South Vietnamese forces have to defend hundreds of cities, towns and hamlets while the Viet Cong are free to choose the time and place of their attack. As a result, the South Vietnamese are stretched thin in defensive positions, leaving only a small central reserve for offensive action against the Viet Cong, while the latter are left free to concentrate their forces and throw them against select-

ed targets. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Viet Cong retains most of the initiative.

Even so, we may not as yet have seen the full weight of the Communist attack. Presently, the situation is particularly acute in the northern part of the country where the Communists have mobilized large military forces which pose a threat to the entire region and its major cities and towns. Our air attack may have helped to keep these forces off balance but the threat remains and it is very real.

Clearly, the time has come when the people of South Vietnam need more help from us and other nations if they are to retain their freedom and independence.

We have already responded to that need with some 75,000 U.S. military personnel, including some combat units. This number will be raised to 125,000 almost immediately with the deployment of the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces. But, more help will be needed in the months ahead and additional U.S. combat forces will be required to back up the hard-pressed Army of South Vietnam. Two other nations have provided combat forces—Australia and New Zealand. We hope that by the end of this year others will join them. In this regard, the Koreans have just recently approved a combat division for deployment to Vietnam, which is scheduled to arrive this fall.

#### ROLE OF U.S. COMBAT FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

As I noted earlier, the central reserve of the South Vietnamese Army has been seriously depleted in recent months. The principal role of U.S. ground combat forces will be to supplement this reserve in support of the front line forces of the South Vietnamese Army. The indigenous paramilitary forces will deal with the pacification of areas cleared of organized Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units, a role more appropriate for them than for our forces.

The Government of South Vietnam's strategy, with which we concur, is to achieve the initiative, to expand gradually its area of control by breaking up major concentrations of enemy forces, using to the maximum our preponderance of air power, both land and sea-based. The number of "fixed-

wing" attack sorties by U.S. aircraft in South Vietnam will increase many fold by the end of the year.

Armed helicopter sorties will also increase dramatically over the same period, and extensive use will be made of heavy artillery, both land-based and sea-based. At the same time our Air and Naval forces will continue to interdict the Viet Cong supply lines from North Vietnam, both land and sea.

Although our tactics have changed, our objective remains the same.

We have no desire to widen the war. We have no desire to overthrow the North Vietnamese regime, seize its territory or achieve the unification of North and South Vietnam by force of arms. We have no need for permanent military bases in South Vietnam or for special privileges of any kind.

What we are seeking through the planned military buildup is to block the Viet Cong offensive, to give the people of South Vietnam and their armed forces some relief from the unrelenting Communist pressures—to give them time to strengthen their government, to re-establish law and order, and to revive their economic life which has been seriously disrupted by Viet Cong harassment and attack in recent months. We have no illusions that success will be achieved quickly, but we are confident that it will be achieved much more surely by the plan I have outlined.

#### INCREASES IN U.S. MILITARY FORCES

Fortunately, we have greatly increased the strength and readiness of our military establishment since 1961, particularly in the kinds of forces which we now require in Southeast Asia. The active Army has been expanded from 11 to 16 combat-ready divisions. Twenty thousand men have been added to the Marine Corps to allow them to fill out their combat structure and at the same time facilitate the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve. The tactical fighter squadrons of the Air Force have been increased by 51 percent. Our airlift capability has more than doubled. Special Forces trained to deal with insurgency threats have been multiplied eleven-fold. General ship construction and conversion has been doubled.

During this same period, procurement for the expanded force has been increased greatly: Air Force tactical aircraft—from \$360 million in 1961

to about \$1.1 billion in the original fiscal year 1966 budget; Navy aircraft—from \$1.8 billion to \$2.2 billion; Army helicopters—from 286 aircraft to over 1,000. Procurement of ordnance, vehicles and related equipment was increased about 150 percent in the fiscal years 1962–1964 period, compared with the preceding three years. The tonnage of modern non-nuclear air-to-ground ordnance in stock tripled between fiscal year 1961 and fiscal year 1965. In brief, the military establishment of the United States, today, is in far better shape than it ever has been in peacetime to face whatever tasks may lie ahead.

Nevertheless, some further increases in forces, military personnel, production and construction will be required if we are to deploy additional forces to Southeast Asia and provide for combat consumption while, at the same time, maintaining our capabilities to deal with crises elsewhere in the world.

To offset the deployments now planned to Southeast Asia, and provide some additional forces for possible new deployments, we propose to increase the presently authorized force levels. These increases will be of three types: (1) Additional units for the active forces, over and above those reflected in the January budget; (2) military personnel augmentations for presently authorized units in the active forces to man new bases, to handle the larger logistics workload, etc.; and (3) additional personnel and extra training for selected reserve component units to increase their readiness for quick deployment. We believe we can achieve this buildup without calling up the reserves or ordering the involuntary extension of tours, except as already authorized by law for the Department of the Navy. Even here the extension of officer tours will be on a selective basis and extensions for enlisted men will be limited, in general, to not more than four months.

The program I have outlined here today and the \$1.7 billion amendment to the fiscal year 1966 Defense Appropriation Bill now before the Committee will, in the collective judgment of my principal military and civilian advisers and myself, provide the men, materiel and facilities required to fulfill the President's pledge to meet the mounting aggression in South Vietnam, while at the same time maintaining the forces required to meet commitments elsewhere in the world.



# The Challenge of Human Need

*Address by the President to the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists, The White House,  
May 13, 1965*

## THE THIRD FACE OF THE WAR

The war in Vietnam has many faces.

There is the face of armed conflict—of terror and gunfire—of bomb-heavy planes and campaign-weary soldiers. . . .

The second face of war in Vietnam is the quest for a political solution—the face of diplomacy and politics—of the ambitions and the interests of other nations. . . .

The third face of war in Vietnam is, at once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It is the face of human need. It is the untended sick, the hungry family, and the illiterate child. It is men and women, many without shelter, with rags for clothing, struggling for survival in a very rich and a very fertile land.

It is the most important battle of all in which we are engaged.

For a nation cannot be built by armed power or by political agreement. It will rest on the expectation by individual men and women that their future will be better than their past.

It is not enough to just fight against something. People must fight *for* something, and the people of South Vietnam must know that after the long, brutal journey through the dark tunnel of conflict there breaks the light of a happier day. And only if this is so can they be expected to sustain the enduring will for continued strife. Only in this way can long-run stability and peace come to their land.

And there is another, more profound reason. In Vietnam communism seeks to really impose its will by force of arms. But we would be deeply mistaken to think that this was the only weapon. Here, as other places in the world, they speak to restless people—people rising to shatter the old ways which have imprisoned hope—people fiercely and justly reaching for the material fruits from the tree of modern knowledge.

It is this desire, and not simply lust for conquest, which moves many of the individual fighting men that we must now, sadly, call the enemy.

It is, therefore, our task to show that freedom from the control of other nations offers the surest road to progress, that history and experience testify to this truth. But it is not enough to call upon reason or point to examples. We must show it through action and we must show it through accomplishment, and even were there no war—either hot or cold—we would always be active in humanity's search for progress.

This task is commanded to us by the moral values of our civilization, and it rests on the inescapable nature of the world that we have now entered. For in that world, as long as we can foresee, every threat to man's welfare will be a threat to the welfare of our own people. Those who live in the emerging community of nations will ignore the perils of their neighbors at the risk of their own prospects.

## COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

This is true not only for Vietnam but for every part of the developing world. This is why, on your behalf, I recently proposed a massive, cooperative development effort for all of Southeast Asia. I named the respected leader, Eugene Black, as my personal representative to inaugurate our participation in these programs.

Since that time rapid progress has been made, I am glad to report. Mr. Black has met with the top officials of the United Nations on several occasions. He has talked to other interested parties. He has found increasing enthusiasm. The United Nations is already setting up new mechanisms to help carry forward the work of development.

In addition, the United States is now prepared to participate in, and to support, an Asian Develop-



ment Bank, to carry out and help finance the economic progress in that area of the world and the development that we desire to see in that area of the world.

So this morning I call on every other industrialized nation, including the Soviet Union, to help create a better life for all of the people of Southeast Asia.

Surely, surely, the works of peace can bring men together in a common effort to abandon forever the works of war.

But, as South Vietnam is the central place of conflict, it is also a principal focus of our work to increase the well-being of people.

It is that effort in South Vietnam, of which I think we are too little informed, which I want to relate to you this morning.

#### STRENGTHENING VIETNAM'S ECONOMY

We began in 1954, when Vietnam became independent, before the war between the North and the South. Since that time we have spent more than \$2 billion in economic help for the 16 million people of South Vietnam. And despite the ravages of war, we have made steady, continuing gains. We have concentrated on food, and health, and education, and housing, and industry.

Like most developing countries, South Vietnam's economy rests on agriculture. Unlike many, it has large uncrowded areas of very rich and very fertile land. Because of this, it is one of the great rice bowls of the entire world. With our help, since 1954, South Vietnam has already doubled its rice production, providing food for the people as well as providing a vital export for that nation.

We have put our American farm know-how to work on other crops. This year, for instance, several hundred million cuttings of a new variety of sweet potato, that promises a sixfold increase in yield, will be distributed to these Vietnamese farmers. Corn output should rise from 25,000 tons in 1962 to 100,000 tons by 1966. Pig production has more than doubled since 1955. Many animal diseases have been eliminated entirely.

Disease and epidemic brood over every Vietnamese village. In a country of more than 16 mil-

lion people with a life expectancy of only 35 years, there are only 200 civilian doctors. If the Vietnamese had doctors in the same ratio as the United States has doctors, they would have not the 200 that they do have but they would have more than 5,000 doctors.

We have helped vaccinate, already, over 7 million people against cholera, and millions more against other diseases. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese can now receive treatment in the more than 12,000 hamlet health stations that America has built and has stocked. New clinics and surgical suites are scattered throughout that entire country; and the medical school that we are now helping to build will graduate as many doctors in a single year as now serve the entire civilian population of South Vietnam.

Education is the keystone of future development in Vietnam. It takes trained people to man the factories, to conduct the administration, and to form the human foundation for an advancing nation. More than a quarter million young Vietnamese can now learn in more than 4,000 classrooms that America has helped to build in the last 2 years; and 2,000 more schools are going to be built by us in the next 12 months. The number of students in vocational schools has gone up four times. Enrollment was 300,000 in 1955, when we first entered there and started helping with our program. Today it is more than 1,500,000. The 8 million textbooks that we have supplied to Vietnamese children will rise to more than 15 million by 1967.

Agriculture is the foundation. Health, education, and housing are the urgent human needs. But industrial development is the great pathway to their future.

When Vietnam was divided, most of the industry was in the North. The South was barren of manufacturing and the foundations for industry. Today more than 700 new or rehabilitated factories—textiles mills and cement plants, electronics and plastics—are changing the entire face of that nation. New roads and communications, railroad equipment, and electric generators are a spreading base on which this new industry can, and is, growing.

#### PROGRESS IN THE MIDST OF WAR

All this progress goes on, and it is going to continue to go on, under circumstances of staggering adversity.

Communist terrorists have made aid programs that we administer a very special target of their attack. They fear them, because agricultural stations are being destroyed and medical centers are being burned. More than 100 Vietnamese malaria fighters are dead. Our own AID officials have been wounded and kidnapped. These are not just the accidents of war. They are a part of a deliberate campaign, in the words of the Communists, "to cut the fingers off the hands of the government."

We intend to continue, and we intend to increase our help to Vietnam.

Nor can anyone doubt the determination of the South Vietnamese themselves. They have lost more than 12,000 of their men since I became your President a little over a year ago.

But progress does not come from investment alone, or plans on a desk, or even the directives and the orders that we approve here in Washington. It takes men. Men must take the seed to the farmer. Men must teach the use of fertilizer. Men must help in harvest. Men must build the schools, and men must instruct the students. Men must carry medicine into the jungle, and treat the sick, and shelter the homeless. And men—brave, tireless, filled with love for their fellows—are doing this today. They are doing it through the long, hot, danger-filled Vietnamese days and the sultry nights.

The fullest glory must go, also, to those South Vietnamese that are laboring and dying for their own people and their own nation. In hospitals and schools, along the rice fields and the roads, they continue to labor, never knowing when death or terror may strike.

How incredible it is that there are a few who still say that the South Vietnamese do not want to continue the struggle. They are sacrificing and they are dying by the thousands. Their patient valor in the heavy presence of personal physical danger should be a helpful lesson to those of us who, here in America, only have to read about it, or hear about it on the television or radio.

We have our own heroes who labor at the works of peace in the midst of war. They toil unarmed and out of uniform. They know the humanity of their concern does not exempt them from the horrors of conflict, yet they go on from day to day. They bring food to the hungry over there. They supply the sick with necessary medicine. They help the farmer with his crops, families to find clean water, villages to receive the healing miracles of electricity. These are Americans who have joined our AID program, and we welcome others to their ranks.

#### A CALL FOR AID

For most Americans this is an easy war. Men fight and men suffer and men die, as they always do in war. But the lives of most of us, at least those of us in this room and those listening to me this morning, are untroubled. Prosperity rises, abundance increases, the nation flourishes.

I will report to the Cabinet when I leave this room that we are in the 51st month of continued prosperity, the longest peacetime prosperity for America since our country was founded. Yet our entire future is at stake.

What a difference it would make if we could only call upon a small fraction of our unmatched private resources—businesses and unions, agricultural groups and builders—if we could call them to the task of peaceful progress in Vietnam. With such a spirit of patriotic sacrifice we might well strike an irresistible blow for freedom there and for freedom throughout the world.

I therefore hope that every person within the sound of my voice in this country this morning will look for ways—and those citizens of other nations who believe in humanity as we do, I hope that they will find ways to help progress in South Vietnam.

This, then, is the third face of our struggle in Vietnam. It was there—the illiterate, the hungry, the sick—before this war began. It will be there when peace comes to us—and so will we—not with soldiers and planes, not with bombs and bullets, but with all the wondrous weapons of peace in the 20th century.

And then, perhaps, together, all of the people of the world can share that gracious task with all the people of Vietnam, North and South alike.



File: Pittsburgh Special

5/14

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Bill Connell called Mager  
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Bill Mager  
has the transcript.



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