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### United States Senate

#### **MEMORANDUM**

November 14, 1964

Memo to Senator Humphrey

From John Rielly

Attached are two excellent

articles from recent issues of

Foreign Affairs devoted to the problem

of nuclear sharing and the MLF.

They are worth reading.

Rowards Walnish

# ERHAR **VOTES FOR DELAY** ON ATOMIC FLEET

Bonn Said to Seek Time to Work Out a Plan More Acceptable to de Gaulle

By PHILIP SHABECOFF
Special to The New York Times Special to The New York Times BONN, Nov. 11—A caucus of the ruling Christian Democratic party voted tonight for a delay in West German participation German participation the proposed nuclear-armed

allied fleet. The vote came after Dr. d Adenauer had report rad Adenauer had reported to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard on the talks he had in Paris Monday with President de Gaulle, who is strongly opposed to the Kon creation of the United States

sponsored nuclear force. [The United States' insiston establishing the ence fleet despite France's opposition is troubling Western military authorities, including many high-ranking Americans, survey of and United of opinion at NATO States bases has

found.]

Bonn Avoids Timetable urging a delay, In the Chris tian Democratic caucus point edly refrained from setting any kind of timetable. Thus point-West German commitment firm join n the nuclear force next appeared to have been the vear shelved time being for the

New British interest in fleet expressions n a modified nuclear the apparent willingand the of United States to delay make it easier accept a for Bonn to adopt its new attitude, here observers said. the chief motive of the policy shift, they added, is a desire to reach some accommodation with the shift. rance

While definitely not abandon-ing the fleet concept, the West German Government was said to be seeking time in which to work out plans for a nuclear with "a more nore European thus more ac-ident de Gaulle. fleet character, ceptable to President

#### Commitment Is Stressed

A spokesman for the Christian Democrats emphasized after the caucus that West Germany was still committed to the fleet con-

He added, however, that the Government "saw no special need" to speed up the development of the proposed fleet special ment ment of the proposed fleet, which would have mixed crews to be drawn from the participating nations. He noted that a treaty covering the pri would not be completed project year in any event because of the slow-moving negotiations with Britain and bers of the No other mem-North Atlantic Treaty Organization

At a news conference this aft a Government spokes ernoon, man declared it was "too early" to say whether the Paris talks between former Chancel-

Continued on Page 12, Column 1

12

## ERHARD'S PARTY FOR FLEET DELAY

Continued From Page 1, Col.

lor Adenauer and President de Gaulle would produce any sub-stantial change in the recently strained relations between France and Germany.

France and Germany.

These strains stemmed from French demands that West Germany back down on plans to join the United States in creating the nuclear fleet and that it lower its state-supported wheat prices to the \$106.25 a ton agreed to by all other members of the European Economic Community. Besides France, the other members are Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and the other members are a Belgium, the Netherlands

It now appears that the Bonn Government is yielding on both these issues to some degree, informed sources were saying tonight.

These sources said that the were

These sources said that the Christian Democratic statement about holding the line on grain prices was just "window dressing" to placate the West German farmers.

They noted that Chancellor Erhard would speak to leaders of the farm lobby in the next few days and that he would probably break the bad news then about lower prices on grain. the

steen about lower prices on grain.

There had been some speculation here that the West German Government would yield on the nuclear-fleet issue in return for the easing of French pressure on grain prices. This line of thought has been discredited by today's developments, observers declared.

A Government spokesman rejected rumors that President de Gaulle had urged Dr. Adenauer to seek the removal of West Germany's Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schröder. The Foreign Minister, whose policies have been pro-United States and cool toward France, has come under heavy fire in recent weeks from Dr. Adenauer and other members of the Christian Democratic party.

There were reports today that Chancellor Erhard was planning to appoint his predecessor as a special adviser on French - German and European questions. In this capacity Dr. Adenauer would be a kind of permanent liaison between President de Gaulle and the West German Government.

Ball and Erhard to Meet

Ball and Erhard to Meet
BONN, Nov. 11 (AP) —
Under Secretary of State
George Ball will meet with
Chancellor Erhard Monday to
discuss the Atlantic alliance
and international problems, the
Government said today.

U.S. Sees Bonn in Agreement

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 11

United States officials interpreted the West German statement today as indicating no more than agreement with Washington's view that completion of the nuclear-fleet treaty could be delayed until the early weeks of 1965.

They said there did not appear to be any major change in West Germany's enthusiastic support for the project.

A delay until early next year has been accepted here to await consideration of proposals from the new British Labor Government.

It was believed here that the west German statements It was believed here that the West German statement did not mean abandonment of the Erhard Government's aim to have the treaty ratified by the Bundestag before next autumn's election

New Missiles For Germany
WASHINGTON, Nov. 11
(UPI)—The chiefs of the West
German and United States
armed forces reached today
what was described as "large
areas of agreement" on NATO
defense strategy.
A Pentagon statement said
the discussions between the military leaders centered on "the
contribution of new weapons,
including the Pershing missile
system."
The Pershing is a two-stage,
nuclear-tipped missile, capable
of striking targets at distances
up to 400 miles. It is replacing
the older Redstone missile in
West Germany.
The United States Army sent
one of its five Pershing missile
battalions to West Germany
earlier this year. The battalion
has four Pershing launchers,
manned by 635 men. New Missiles For Germany

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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#### COALITION DIPLOMACY IN A NUCLEAR AGE

By Henry A. Kissinger

Alliance. They have focused on such issues as nuclear strategy and control, the organization of Europe and the nature of an Atlantic Community. However, the most fundamental issue in Atlantic relationships is raised by two questions not unlike those which each Western society has had to deal with in its domestic affairs: How much unity do we want? How much pluralism can we stand? Too formalistic a conception of unity risks destroying the political will of the members of the Community. Too absolute an insistence on national particularity must lead to a fragmentation of the common effort.

One does not have to agree with the methods or policies of President de Gaulle to recognize that he has posed an important question which the West has yet to answer. There is merit in his contention that before a political unit can mean something to others, it must first mean something to itself. Though de Gaulle has often acted as if he achieved identity by opposing our purposes, our definition of unity has occasionally carried overtones

of tutelage.

There is no question that the abrupt tactics of the French President have severely strained the pattern of allied relationships which emerged after the war. But no one man could have disrupted the Alliance by himself. Fundamental changes have been taking place in the nature of alliances, in the character of strategy and in the relative weights of Europe and the United States. A new conception of allied relationships would have been necessary no matter who governed in Paris or in Washington.

COALITION DIPLOMACY

The impact of particular statesmen aside, a farsighted policy will gear itself to dealing with these underlying forces. It will inquire into the degree to which objectives are common and where they diverge. It will face frankly the fact that different national perspectives—and not necessarily ignorance—can produce differing strategic views. It will examine the scope and limits of consultation. If this is done in a new spirit on both sides of the Atlantic, a more vital relationship can take the place of the previous U. S. hegemony.

#### II. THE CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF ALLIANCES

Since the end of World War II an important change has taken place in the nature of alliances. In the past, alliances have been created for three basic reasons: (1) To provide an accretion of power. According to the doctrine of collective security, the wider the alliance, the greater its power to resist aggression. (2) To leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. It has often been argued that had Germany known at the beginning of both World Wars that the United States—or even England—would join the Allies, war would have been averted. (3) To provide an incentive for mutual assistance beyond that already supplied by an estimate of the national interest.

To be sure, even before the advent of nuclear weapons, there was some inconsistency among these requirements. The attempt to combine the maximum number of states for joint action occasionally conflicted with the desire to leave no doubt about the collective motivation. The wider the system of collective security, the more various were the motives animating it and the more difficult the task of obtaining common action proved to be. The more embracing the alliance, the more intense and direct must be the threat which would produce joint action.

This traditional difficulty has been compounded in the nuclear age. The requirements for tight command and control of nuclear weapons are to some degree inconsistent with a coalition of sovereign states. The enormous risks of nuclear warfare affect the credibility of traditional pledges of mutual assistance.

As a result, most of the theories of nuclear control now current within the Western Alliance have a tendency either to turn NATO into a unilateral U. S. guarantee or to call into question the utility of the Alliance altogether. American strategic thought

verges on the first extreme; some French theorists have hinted at the second.

As for the United States, official spokesmen have consistently emphasized that the European contribution to the over-all nuclear strength of the Alliance is negligible. European nuclear forces have been described as "provocative," "prone to obsolescence" and "weak." For a considerable period after the advent of the Kennedy Administration, some high officials held the view that on nuclear matters the President might serve as the Executive Agent of the Alliance. Since then the United States has made various proposals for nuclear sharing, the common feature of which has been the retention of our veto over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance.

However sensible such schemes may appear from the point of view of the division of labor, they all would perpetuate our hegemony in nuclear matters within the Alliance. Allies are considered necessary not so much to add to over-all strength as to provide the possibility for applying power discriminately. In these terms, it is not surprising that some allies have considered their conventional contribution as actually weakening the overall strength by raising doubts about the nuclear commitment of the United States.

According to the contrary view, alliances have lost their significance altogether. The French theorist, General Gallois, has argued, for example, that nuclear weapons have made alliances obsolete. Faced with the risk of total destruction, no nation will jeopardize its survival for another. Hence, he maintains, each country must have its own nuclear arsenal to defend itself against direct attack, while leaving all other countries to their fate.

This formula would mark the end of collective security and would be likely to lead to international chaos. Under conditions of growing nuclear power on both sides, it would be idle to deny that the threat of nuclear retaliation has lost some of its credibility. The Gallois theory would, however, transform a degree of uncertainty into a guarantee that the United States would not come to the assistance of its allies, thus greatly simplifying the aggressor's calculation. Moreover, in order to protect itself in this new situation, each country would need to develop not only a nuclear arsenal of its own but also foolproof procedures for assuring the Soviets that a given nuclear blow did not originate from its territory. If Gallois is right, and each country is unwill-

528

territory a more attractive strategy and the threat of nuclear retaliation a more effective deterrent. The interests of the Alliance may be indivisible in an ultimate sense. But this does not guarantee the absence of sharp conflicts on methods to reach these objectives.

COALITION DIPLOMACY

In short, the destructiveness and range of modern weapons have a tendency to produce both extreme nationalism and neutralism. A wise alliance policy must take care that in dealing with one of these dangers it does not produce the other.

The nature of alliances has changed in yet another way. In the past, one of the reasons for joining an alliance was to impose an additional obligation for assistance in time of need. Were each country's national interests completely unambiguous, it would know precisely on whom it could count; a formal commitment would be unnecessary. Both the aggressor and the defender would understand what they would confront and could act accordingly. Wars could not be caused by a misunderstanding of intentions. They would occur only if the protagonists calculated the state of the stat

lated the existing power relationships differently.

Traditionally, however, the national interest has not been unambiguous. Often the aggressor did not know which countries would ultimately be lined up against it; Germany in 1914 was genuinely surprised by the British reaction to the invasion of Belgium. Occasionally the defenders could not be certain of the extent of their potential support—as was the case with the Allies in both wars regarding U. S. participation. Historically, the existence of an understanding on this point, tacit or explicit, has often been the determining factor in the decision to go to war. In the decade prior to World War I, the staff talks between Britain and France, which led to the transfer of the French fleet to the Mediterranean, were one of the key factors in Britain's decision to go to war in August 1914. (Thus the talks achieved one objective of traditional alliances: to commit Britain to the defense of France. They failed in another: to make the opposing alignment clear to the potential aggressor.)

One of the distinguishing features of the nuclear period is that the national interest of the major powers has become less ambiguous. In a bipolar world, a relative gain for one side represents an absolute weakening of the other. Neither of the major nuclear countries can permit a major advance by its opponent regardless of whether the area in which it occurs is formally protected by

ing to risk nuclear devastation for an ally, it will also want to prevent itself from being triggered into nuclear war by a neighbor. Thus each country will have a high incentive to devise methods to protect itself from a counterattack based on a misapprehension. The Gallois theory would lead to a multiplication of national nuclear forces side-by-side with the development of methods of surrender or guarantees of non-involvement.

When views such as these carry influence on both sides of the Atlantic, it is no accident that much of the debate on nuclear matters within NATO turns on the question of confidence. We tend to ask those of our allies possessing nuclear arsenals of their own: If you trust us, why do you require nuclear weapons? Our nuclear allies reply: If you trust us, why are you concerned about our possession of nuclear weapons? Since the answer must inevitably emphasize contingencies where either the goals or the strategy would be incompatible, the debate on nuclear control within NATO has been inherently divisive.

The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of one country poses one set of problems; the range of modern weapons raises another. In the past, a threatened country had the choice either of resisting or surrendering. If it resisted, it had to be prepared to accept the consequences in terms of physical damage or loss of life. A distant ally could be effective only if it was able to bring

its strength to bear in the area of conflict.

Modern weapons have changed this. What each member country wants from the Alliance is the assurance that an attack on it will be considered a casus belli. It strives for deterrence by adding the strength of a distant ally to its own power. But, equally, each state has an incentive to reduce damage to itself to a minimum should deterrence fail. The range of modern weapons provides an opportunity in this respect for the first time. In 1914 Belgium could not base its defense on a strategy which transferred to Britain the primary risks of devastation. In the age of intercontinental rockets this technical possibility exists.

Part of the strategic dispute within the Alliance, therefore, involves jockeying to determine which geographic area will be the theater of war if deterrence fails (though this obviously cannot be made explicit). A conventional war confined to Europe may appear relatively tolerable to us. To Europeans, with their memory of conventional wars, this prospect is not particularly inviting. They may find a nuclear exchange which spares their

an alliance or not. Neutral India was no less assured of American assistance when the Chinese attacked than allied Pakistan would have been in similar circumstances. In these conditions, the distinction between allies and neutrals is likely to diminish. A country gains little from being allied and risks little by being neutral.

This inevitably results in the weakening of allied cohesion, producing what some have described as polycentrism. But polycentrism does not reflect so much the emergence of new centers of actual power as the attempt by allies to establish new centers of decision. Polycentrism is virulent not because the world has ceased to be bipolar, but because it essentially remains so. Far from doubting America's military commitment to Europe, President de Gaulle is so certain of it that he does not consider political independence a risk. He thus adds American power to his own in pursuit of his policies.

No matter how troublesome a major ally may be, it cannot be allowed to suffer defeat. France's policy is made possible by our nuclear umbrella—a fact which adds to the irony of the situation and the annoyance of some of our policy-makers. Our frequent insistence that in the nuclear age an isolated strategy is no longer possible misses the central point: for this precise reason allies have unprecedented scope for the pursuit of their own objectives. And the more the détente—real or imaginary—proceeds, the more momentum these tendencies will gather. We live in a curious world where neutrals enjoy most of the protection of allies and allies aspire to have the same freedom of action as do neutrals.

These conditions turn coalition diplomacy into an extraordinarily delicate undertaking. Appeals which were effective in the past either work no longer or turn counterproductive. Thus the warning that certain European actions might lead the United States to withdraw is bound to have consequences contrary to those intended. If believed at all, it demonstrates that there are at least some contingencies in which the United States might abandon its allies, thus magnifying pressures for European autonomy.

The scope for real Third Force policies is vastly overestimated. Realism forces close association between Europe and the United States whatever the vagaries of individual statesmen. But it has happened often enough in Western history that an underlying community of interests was submerged by subsidiary rivalries. Ancient Greece foundered on this discord. Western Europe nearly tore itself apart before it submerged its rivalries. And now the Atlantic area faces the challenge of how to combine common action with a respect for diverse approaches to the central problem.

#### III. THE ABSTRACTNESS AND NOVELTY OF MODERN POWER

The destructiveness of modern weapons gives the strategic debate unprecedented urgency. The speed with which they can be delivered complicates the problem of command and control in a way unimaginable even a decade and a half ago. Doctrinal and technical disputes occur within each government. It is not surprising, then, that they should rend the Alliance as well.

The novelty of modern weapons systems gives the disputes a metaphysical, almost theological, cast. Never before in history has so much depended on weapons so new, so untested, so "abstract." No nuclear weapons have been exploded in wartime except on Japan, which did not possess means of retaliation. No one knows how governments or people will react to a nuclear explosion under conditions where both sides possess vast arsenals.

Moreover, modern weapons systems are relatively untested. During the debate in this country over the nuclear test-ban treaty, a great deal of attention was focused on the adequacy of our warheads. In fact, the other components of our weapons systems contain many more factors of uncertainty. The estimated "hardness" of Minuteman silos depends entirely on theoretical studies. Of the thousands of missiles in our arsenal, relatively few of each category have been thoroughly tested. There is little experience with salvo firing. Air-defense systems are designed without any definite knowledge of the nature of the offense. A high proportion of the phenomena discovered in nuclear testing have been "unexpected."

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the purpose of modern weapons is deterrence: to prevent—by a particular threat—a certain course of action. But deterrence is primarily a psychological problem. It depends on the aggressor's assessment of risks, not the defender's. A threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a "genuine" threat interpreted as a bluff. Moreover, if deterrence is successful, aggression does not take place. But it is

impossible to demonstrate why something has not occurred. It can never be proved whether peace has been maintained because NATO pursues an optimum strategy or a marginally effective one. Finally, the longer deterrence lasts the more color will be lent to the argument that perhaps the Communists never intended to attack in the first place. An effective NATO deterrent strategy may thus have the paradoxical consequence of strengthening the argument of the paradoxical consequence of strengthening the paradoxical consequence of strengthening

ening the arguments of the quasi-neutralists.

Even if there is agreement about the correct weapons system, there may be disagreement about how it can best be coupled with diplomacy to produce deterrence. How does one threaten with solid-fuel missiles? As these are always in an extreme state of readiness, how then does one demonstrate an increase in preparedness such as historically served as a warning? From a technical point of view it is highly probable that missiles can perform most of the functions heretofore assigned to airplanes. The shift to missiles and the elimination of airplanes envisaged by the former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric' makes a great deal of sense technically. But has adequate attention been given to the kind of diplomacy which results-particularly in crisis situations—when the retaliatory threat depends on solid-fuel missiles in underground silos? During the Cuban missile crisis, dispersing SAC planes to civilian airports proved an effective warning. What will be an equivalent move when our strategic forces are composed entirely of missiles?

These questions do not permit clear-cut answers. Yet they are at the heart of many of the disputes within NATO. The United States has held the view that deterrence was best achieved by posing a credible threat. And it has related credibility to whether the risks, if deterrence failed, were tolerable. The Europeans for a variety of reasons have generally been of a different opinion. They have maintained that deterrence depended on posing the most extreme risks. They have been prepared to sacrifice a measure of credibility in favor of enhancing the magnitude of the threat. This debate has been inconclusive because it ultimately depends on a psychological, not a technical,

judgment.

The controversy originated in an attempt by the United States in 1961 to change the relative weight to be given to conventional and nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine. The method of effecting

this change was not new—though it was urged with new insistence. NATO had been presented many times before with American blueprints and had seen its consultative role limited to discussing the technical implementation of an American conception. What gave the dispute its particular urgency was that the advent of a new, highly analytical American Administration coincided with the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe and the deliberate policy of President de Gaulle to assert a more independent role.

In the process, many of the issues that had been obscured in the previous decade by the curious, somewhat one-sided nature of the transatlantic dialogue came for the first time into sharper focus. This highlighted a difference in perspective between the American and the European conception of NATO which had

existed since its beginning.

When the Korean War raised the spectre of Soviet military aggression, both sides of the Atlantic made a serious effort to turn NATO into a more effective military instrument. However, given the enormous disparity in military and economic strength between the United States and Europe, the primary concern of the European countries was to commit the United States to their defense. They saw in NATO above all a means to obtain American protection, by which was meant American nuclear protection.

However, the Europeans had too much experience with the tenuousness of formal commitments not to strive for more tangible guarantees. This led to pressures for the stationing of American troops in Europe. European reasoning was similar to that ascribed to a French marshal in 1912 when he was asked how many British troops he wanted for the outbreak of a European war. He is reported to have replied: "We need only one, who we will make sure is killed on the first day of the war." In the nuclear age, the price of a guarantee has risen to something like five divisions.

With so many American troops permanently stationed in Europe, it was only sensible to try to give them some meaningful military mission. Even during the period of the doctrine of massive retaliation, NATO forces were larger than the prevailing strategic concept seemed to demand. Indeed, the number was somewhat inconsistent with it. Despite our commitment to a retaliatory strategy, we constantly pressed for a European con-

<sup>1&</sup>quot;Our Defense Needs: The Long View," Foreign Affairs, April 1964.

tribution of ground forces. The Europeans, though they agreed to a succession of NATO force goals, never really believed in the doctrines used to rationalize them. Rather they saw in their military contribution a form of fee paid for United States nuclear protection. The Europeans agreed to our requests. But they tried to see to it that their actual contributions would be large enough to induce us to keep a substantial military establishment in Europe, yet not so high as to provide a real alternative to nuclear retaliation. They were opposed to giving the conventional forces a central military mission; but they also resisted any hint of American withdrawal.

This ambivalence was brought into the open by the shift in United States strategic doctrine in 1961. The American attempt to strengthen the forces for local defense had the paradoxical consequence of bringing to the fore the issue of nuclear control which for many Europeans had always been the crux of the matter. For the first time, U. S. strategic views were publicly challenged, at first hesitantly, then ever more explicitly. Europe had now gained sufficient strength and confidence so that the mere enunciation of an American policy no longer guaranteed its acceptance. The peremptory way in which the United States proceeded only sharpened the controversy. And France added fuel to the flames by giving European misgivings their most extreme formulation.

But if French policy has deliberately sharpened conflicts, the United States tendency to turn an essentially psychological issue into a technical one has unintentionally exacerbated disagreements beyond their intrinsic significance. Our spokesmen often leave the impression that disagreement is due to the ignorance of our allies, and that it is destined to yield ultimately before extensive briefings and insistent reiteration. Faced with opposition, we are less given to asking whether there may be some merit in the arguments of our allies than to overwhelming them with floods of emissaries preaching the latest version of our doctrine.

But the real problem is not that the Europeans fail to understand our quest for multiple options. They simply reject it for themselves. When the issue is Asia or Latin America, Europeans favor an even more flexible response than we do; with respect to the defense of Europe, their attitude is more rigid. As long as the United States retains ultimate control over nuclear weapons, the European incentive is bound to be exactly the opposite of

ours. Rather than permit a "pause" for "appreciating the wider risks involved," Europeans prefer to force us to make our response as automatic as possible.

This problem has little to do with whether the United States could afford to give up Europe. It is rooted in the nature of sovereignty and made more acute by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Robert Bowie, one of the most eloquent spokesmen of the dominant school of U. S. thought, criticized British nuclear policy before the Assembly of the Western European Union as follows: "Britain has retained its national command structure and the right to withdraw them at its option. This means that they certainly could not be counted on by any of the others to be available in case of need." [Italics supplied.] If this concern is real regarding British nuclear forces, which are, after all, assigned to NATO, it must be even stronger regarding U. S. strategic forces which remain under exclusive American control.

The problem can then be summed up as follows: Exclusive U. S. control of nuclear strategy is politically and psychologically incompatible with a strategy of multiple choices or flexible response. The European refusal to assign a meaningful military mission to conventional forces in Europe is incompatible with the indefinite retention of large U. S. forces there. If the United States prizes a conventional response sufficiently, it will have to concede Europe autonomy in nuclear control. If the Europeans want to insist on an automatic nuclear response, a reconsideration of our conventional deployment on the Continent will become inevitable. Refusal to face these facts will guarantee a perpetuation of present disputes and increasing disarray within NATO.

The United States-European dialogue on strategy is confused further by the nature of the intra-European debate. Many of those who applaud our views do so for reasons which may not prove very comforting in the long run. We must be careful not to take every agreement with us at face value. Acquiescence in our opinion can have two meanings: It can represent either a sincere commitment to Atlantic partnership or disguise a neutralist wish to abdicate responsibility. For the American nuclear umbrella, now sometimes exploited by President de Gaulle for his own purposes, can also be used—and more dangerously for the West

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Proceedings of Western European Union Assembly, Ninth Ordinary Session, December 3, 1963.

—to support policies amounting to neutralism. In many countries it is the leaders and groups traditionally most committed to national defense who have developed views on strategy which challenge American concepts; while some of those most ready to accept U. S. strategic hegemony have in the past been the least interested in making a serious defense effort. We may therefore have to choose between our theories of nuclear control and Atlantic cohesion, between the technical and the political sides of Atlantic policy.

#### IV. DIFFERENCES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Some of the strains in Atlantic relationships have resulted from factors outside anybody's control. Many reflect the growth in Europe of the very strength and self-confidence which American policy has striven to promote since the end of World War II. Others have been caused by the tactics of President de Gaulle, whose style of diplomacy is not really compatible with the requirements of coalition. We share the responsibility through too much insistence on technical solutions and too little allowance for the intangibles of political judgment and will.

But perhaps the deepest cause of transatlantic misunderstandings is a difference in historical perspective. Americans live in an environment uniquely suited to an engineering approach to policy-making. As a result, our society has been characterized by a conviction that any problem will yield if subjected to a sufficient dose of expertise. With such an approach, problems tend to appear as discrete issues without any inner relationship. It is thought that they can be solved "on their merits" as they arise. It is rarely understood that a "solution" to a problem may mortgage the future—especially as there is sufficient optimism to assume that even should this prove to be the case, it will still be possible to deal with the new problem when it materializes.

But Europeans live on a continent covered with ruins testifying to the fallibility of human foresight. In European history, the recognition of a problem has often defined a dilemma rather than pointed to an answer. The margin of survival of European countries has been more precarious than ours. European reasoning is likely to be more complicated and less confident than ours. This explains some of the strains in Atlantic relationships. Americans tend to be impatient with what seems to them Europe's almost morbid obsession with the past, while Europeans sometimes

complain about a lack of sensitivity and compassion on the part of Americans.

In the fall of 1963, our newspapers were filled with derisory comments about French manœuvres then taking place. The scenario of these manœuvres supposed that an aggressor force was attacking France through Germany. France's allies had surrendered. As the aggressor's armies were approaching her borders, France resorted to her nuclear weapons. It is, of course, easy to ridicule this scenario by contrasting the small size of the French bomber force with the magnitude of the disaster envisaged. But the crucial issue is not technical. It arises from the fact that France has undergone shattering historical experiences with which Americans find it difficult to identify. The scenario of the French manœuvres recalled importantly-perhaps too rigidly-France's traumatic experience of 1940, when foreign armies attacked all along the Western front and France's allies collapsed. The British Fighter Command remained in England; the fact that this critical decision was wise does not affect the basic psychological point. Moreover, the French disaster came at the end of two decades in which France almost single-handedly shouldered the responsibility for the defense of Europe while her erstwhile allies withdrew into isolation or offered strictures about France's obsession with security. The nightmare that some day France might again stand alone goes far deeper than the obstinate illwill of a single individual.

A comparable problem exists in Germany. Washington has at times shown signs of impatience toward the German leaders and their constant need for reassurance. Secretary Rusk has been reported more than once to be restless with what he has called the "pledging sessions" which the Germans seem so often to demand. However, insecurity is endemic in the German situation. A divided country with frontiers that correspond to no historical experience, a society which has lived through two disastrous defeats and four domestic upheavals in 40 years, cannot know inward stability. The need to belong to something, to rescue some predictability out of chaos, is overwhelming. The memories of our allies should be factors as real in the discussions of our policy-makers as the analysis of weapons systems.

The importance of this difference in historical perspective is compounded by the continuing disparity in strength between the two sides of the Atlantic. While it has become fashionable to speak of Europe's new-found equality, it is important not to take it too literally. Europe has gained in strength over the past decade and a half. It can and should play an increasingly responsible role. But for the foreseeable future we are likely to be

by far the stronger partner. It is important to be clear about this because it requires us to show unusual tact and steadiness. Many of our allies have been guilty of unilateral actions far more flagrant than ours. But when we act unilaterally, disarray in the Alliance is almost inevitable. Drastic changes in U.S. strategic doctrine or action without adequate consultation-such as the removal of I.R.B.M.s from Îtaly and Turkey or the withdrawal of troops from Germanycreate either a sense of European impotence or increase the pressure for more autonomy. Bilateral dealings with the Soviets, from which our allies are excluded, or about which they are informed only at the last moment, are bound to magnify Third Force tendencies. When our allies resist such U. S. policies and practices, it is not necessarily because they disagree with our view but because they are afraid of creating a precedent for unilateral changes in other policies. (Even statements of substantive disagreement may be a smoke-screen for deeper concerns.) Moreover, many allied leaders who have staked their prestige on certain U. S. policies can suffer serious domestic consequences if we change them drastically.

Thus the voice of Europe reaches us in extremely distorted form. President de Gaulle sharpens all disputes and even creates them in pursuit of his policy of independence. But some other leaders do not give full expression to their disquiet because they do not want to undermine further the solidarity on which their security is thought to depend. Whereas France exaggerates her disagreements, some other countries obscure theirs. Thus the dialogue with Europe is often conducted on false issues, while real issues—like the future of Germany, or arms control, or the role of tactical nuclear weapons—are swept under the rug in order not to magnify the existing discord.

We, in turn, are faced with the problem that technology and political conditions are changing so rapidly that no policy can be maintained over an indefinite period of time. How to shape policies that are responsive to change while maintaining the confidence of our allies? The future vitality of the Western Alliance depends on understanding the possibilities and limits of the consultative process.

V. THE LIMITS AND PURPOSES OF CONSULTATION

The always difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified by three factors:

(1) The fact that the two superpowers are committed to the existing balance provides their European allies with wide scope

for purely national actions.

(2) The internal workings of modern government are so complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterwards in international forums. The tendency of the United States to confine consultation to elaborating its own blueprint reflects less a quest for hegemony—as some of our European critics occasionally assert—than a desire to avoid complicating still further its own decision-making process.

(3) As governments have found in their domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity of understanding. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, and with widely varying histories, differences are almost inevitable. And they are likely to be made all the more intractable by a technology of unprecedented destructiveness

and novelty.

Thus consultation is far from being a magic cure-all. It will not necessarily remove real differences of geography, perspective or interest. Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the chief concerns of the Alliance.

The dominant American view has been that consultation would be most effective if there were a division of labor within the Alliance according to which the United States retained control over nuclear weapons while Europe specialized in conventional forces. Similarly, it has been suggested in Great Britain that the independent British nuclear deterrent could be given up in return for a greater voice in American policy. The proposed NATO Multilateral Force on which the United States increasingly stakes its prestige is basically a device to make its nuclear hegemony acceptable.

In other words, the thrust of our policy is to create a structure

<sup>4</sup> For the author's view on the NATO Multilateral Force see, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," The Reporter, March 28, 1963.

See "The Labor Party's Defense and Foreign Policy," by Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Affairs, April 1964, p. 391-398.
 For the author's view on the NATO Multilateral Force see, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma,"

which makes it physically impossible for any of the allies (except the United States) to act autonomously. This raises the following problems: (a) How effective will consultation based on such premises be? (b) Is such a system as useful for the long-term political vitality of the Alliance as it is for the conduct of a general nuclear war?

With regard to the first of these, any process of consultation must be responsive to the following three questions: Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has enough competence?

These three levels are not necessarily identical. Many agencies in our own government have a right to express their views, but not all carry the same weight. When some of Britain's Labor leaders suggest that they want a greater voice in our decisions in return for giving up British nuclear weapons, the answer has to be: Like whose voice? Like that of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce Department? In our interdepartmental disputes, clearly, the outcome often depends on the constituency which the agency or department represents. The weight given to advice is inevitably related to the competence that it reflects.

If the United States retains indefinitely an effective monopoly of nuclear power, we would probably find in time that Europe simply does not have sufficient technical competence for its views to carry weight. And this in turn is likely to breed irresponsibility on both sides of the Atlantic. A right of consultation without the ability to make a serious judgment may, in fact, be the worst possible system. Over a period of time it is bound to reduce Europe's voice in Washington; while in Europe it must produce a sense of impotence or extreme nationalism. Indeed, it may enable neutralists to focus all Europe's anti-nuclear sentiment against the United States. Some European autonomy on nuclear matters—preferably growing out of existing programs—seems therefore desirable.

The emphasis placed on a unitary strategic system for the Alliance has reversed the proper priorities. The real challenge to the consultative process is less in the field of strategy than in diplomacy. The ability to fight a centrally controlled general war is useful; but the ability to devise common policies in the

face of a whole spectrum of eventualities is much more impor-

If the Alliance cannot develop procedures for a common diplomacy—or at least an agreed range of divergence—it seems contradictory to insist on a system of unitary strategic control. When NATO has proved unable to develop even a common trade policy toward the Communist world, it is not surprising that countries are reluctant to entrust their survival to a NATO ally, however close. Policies on a whole range of issues such as Suez, the Congo, negotiating tactics over Berlin or the defense of Southern Arabia have been unilateral or divergent. The United States is now in the curious situation of staking a great deal of its prestige on establishing the NATO Multilateral Force and a system of unitary strategic control while East-West negotiations or the war in Southeast Asia or arms control are dealt with more or less unilaterally.

In re-assessing these priorities, it may be important to ask how unitary a system of control for strategy and diplomacy is in fact desirable. What kind of structure is more vital in the long run: An Atlantic system that automatically involves all partners? Or one that permits some autonomy? On many issues—particularly East-West relations—united action is essential. With respect to others, some degree of flexibility may be desirable. Over the next decades the United States is likely to find itself increasingly engaged in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European allies will probably not consider their vital interests at stake in these areas. President de Gaulle's views on this subject are far from unique in Europe, even if his methods are.

If the Atlantic system is absolutely centralized, policy may be reduced to the lowest common denominator. The Soviets may use our involvements elsewhere to blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point. On the other hand, if Europe is accorded some capacity for autonomous action—military and political—its concern would be no greater, but the temptation for Soviet adventures might be reduced. Put positively, a structure which permits a variety of coördinated approaches toward the new nations could enhance the vigor of our policies, the self-confidence of our allies and the long-term vitality of the Alliance. Paradoxically, the unity of the

Atlantic area may well be furthered by a structure which grants the possibility of autonomous action while reducing the desire for it.

#### VI. WHAT STRUCTURE FOR THE ATLANTIC AREA?

The most delicate problem faced by the United States in its Atlantic policy, then, is to promote cohesion without undermining the self-confidence and the political will of its allies. Formal structures can help in this effort. But when they become ends in themselves they may cause us to beg the key question by the very terms in which we state it.

Some of the current theories of Atlantic partnership run precisely this risk. According to the dominant U.S. view, shared by such wise Europeans as Jean Monnet, there is only one reliable concept of Atlantic partnership—that described by the image of "twin pillars" or a "dumbbell," composed of the United States and a united Europe organized on federal lines with supranational institutions. This is, of course, one form of Atlantic partnership. But is it wise to stake everything on a single approach? History is rarely such a linear and simple process.

Every European state is the product of some process of integration at some time over the past four centuries; and Germany and Italy achieved unity less than one hundred years ago. European history suggests that there is more than one way to achieve integration. In Italy, it came by way of plebiscite and annexation abolishing the individual states. In Germany, unification occurred under the aegis of one state but as the act of sovereign governments which remained in existence after unity was achieved. The resulting structure clearly did not lack cohesiveness.

Moreover, how valid is a concept of European integration which is rejected by both France and Great Britain? In the outrage over Britain's exclusion from the Common Market, it has not always been noted that Britain's view (shared by both major parties) of the organization of Europe is almost identical with that of France. Both countries would find it difficult, if not impossible, to commit themselves now to a federal structure and a common parliament. It only adds to the irony of the situation that many of the most ardent advocates of Britain's entry into the Common Market both here and in Europe are also dedicated

proponents of a federal Europe. How do they propose to reconcile these two objectives?

There may be various roads to European coöperation. The one traced by the Fouchet Plan—calling for institutionalized meetings of foreign ministers and sub-cabinet officials—is not the least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with British participation. It has the advantage of producing some immediate progress without foreclosing the future. It would also permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than

the "twin pillar" concept now in vogue.

While the United States should welcome any European structure that reflects the desires of the Europeans, it would be unwise to stake everything on one particular formula. A very rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the Atlantic context. Is it really possible or useful to lump the countries of Europe together on all issues? Are they always inherently closer to one another than any of them is to the United States? Do the Dutch inevitably feel a greater sense of identification with the French, or the British with the Germans, than either does with the United States? If we separate the question into political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to retain some flexibility? There is a grave risk that too doctrinaire an approach will produce either a collapse of political will, or more likely, a new and virulent form of nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of the patries. A Europe largely constructed on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity will be what distinguishes it from America. Our bent for structural remedies sometimes blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own momentum and that this cannot be foreseen from the proclamations of their founders.

In assessing our own Atlantic policy, we must cut through slogans to such questions as: Is it wise to insist that the only road to European unity is by institutions unacceptable to both France and Britain? Is the best way to solve the strategic problem by staking our prestige on a device—the Multilateral Force—which compels us to oppose the existing nuclear programs in Europe while bringing a host of presently non-nuclear countries (among them Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey) into the

COALITION DIPLOMACY

nuclear business, occasionally with only their reluctant assent? Can it be in the interest of NATO, of the Federal Republic, or of the United States, to make Germany the senior European nuclear partner in the Multilateral Force and to create an institution which can rally all anti-U.S., anti-German and anti-nuclear sentiments against us?

European history teaches that stability is unattainable except through the coöperation of Britain, France and Germany. Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries in the name of Atlanticism. The United States should not choose a special partner among its European allies. The attempt to woo one, or to force European countries to choose between us and France—a tendency which despite all disavowals is real—must magnify the European nationalism which French policy has already done so much to foster.

Our concern thus returns to the somewhat out-of-scale figure of President de Gaulle. A sense of frustration resulting from his policies, and even more from his style, has caused many to see him as individually responsible for the failure to realize many deeply felt objectives. This is not the place to attempt an assessment of his character. Conceivably he is as petty, as animated by remembered slights, as some of our commentators suggest. It is also possible that a man so conscious of his historic role has larger purposes. At any rate, we will not know until we have had a real dialogue with him. In a period of détente with Soviet Russia, is it impossible to conduct a serious conversation with a traditional ally? President de Gaulle has repeatedly expressed his willingness to coördinate strategy rather than to integrate it. We should make new efforts to explore what he means. His 1958 proposal of a Directory is not acceptable when confined to Britain, France and the United States. Do we know his attitude toward a wider forum?

Irritation with de Gaulle's tactics does not change the fact that in his proposals of 1958 for a Directory he put his finger on perhaps the key problem of NATO. In the absence of a common foreign policy—or at least an agreed range of divergence—the attempt to devise a common strategy is likely to prove futile. Lord Avon and Dean Acheson have come to the same conclusion. The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level—composed perhaps of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic and Italy—for concerting the

policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic. Such a body should discuss how to implement common Atlantic purposes and define the scope of autonomous action where interests diverge. It should also be charged with developing a common strategic doctrine.

Conceivably this could end the sterile scholastic debate over the relative benefits of integration as against coördination. It might heal a rift which if continued is bound to hazard everything that has been painfully built up over 15 years. Both the United States and France are able to thwart each other's purposes. Neither can create an alternative structure—France even less than we. As in a Greek tragedy, each chief actor, following a course that seems quite reasonable, is producing consequences quite different from what he intends.

This should not happen. The problems will become insuperable only if technique is exalted above purpose and if interest is too narrowly conceived. The West does itself an injustice by comparing its disagreements to the rifts in the Communist bloc. In the Communist world, schisms are inevitable and unbridgeable. Western societies have been more fortunate. Their evolution has been richer; they have forged unity by drawing strength from diversity. Free from the shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the nations of the West can render a great service by demonstrating that if history has a meaning it is up to us today to give it that meaning.

#### THE FRENCH PEOPLE AND DE GAULLE

By Michel Gordey

HAT is the reaction of the French people to the politique de grandeur—the policy which, in the name of France, General de Gaulle is projecting on a world scale? Before this question can be answered we must first ask: How is French policy shaped and decided? Next, how is it made known to parliament and public opinion? Third, do the broad masses of the people have access to adequate and objective information on which to base their judgment of this policy? Only then can we

turn to the question: What is their judgment?

A statesman who has been familiar with General de Gaulle's working methods for over 20 years offered this confidential description of how French foreign policy is made today: "When he deals with foreign policy, the General goes into seclusion and plunges into prolonged meditation. He seldom consults experts or advisers, even those very close to him. For a long time he mulls over the questions that need to be resolved. Then, suddenly, often without even informing his ministers, he announces his decision. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, and certainly the Council of Ministers, are called upon only to execute and apply the decision which the General made entirely by himself. There is usually no real debate on diplomatic issues within the Government." The men of Quai d'Orsay by and large confirm, albeit reluctantly, this description of the method which reduces them to the role of mere executants of orders from on high.

Once a decision has been made in the Elysée, there follows a fairly short period of briefing the leading French diplomats, a process which takes place in absolute secrecy. A very few men are acquainted with the General's over-all strategy: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a handful of high officials whose rockbound Gaullism is a pledge of their discretion, the Minister of Information and sometimes the French Ambassador to the country to which the decision applies. That is all. There are generally no leaks. When there are, they are deliberate, never fortuitous. In Paris, leaks are practically never indiscretions or trial balloons, as they are in other countries (the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, for example). They are already part of the second stage—

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## MOSCOW AND THE M.L.F.: HOSTILITY AND AMBIVALENCE

By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

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#### OCTOBER 1964

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Moscow and the M.L.F.: Hostility and Ambivalence Zbigniew Brzezinski
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#### MOSCOW AND THE M.L.F.: HOSTILITY AND AMBIVALENCE

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

In the Soviet opposition to the American-sponsored scheme for a Multilateral Force—the NATO nuclear-missile fleet—two themes have been paramount: the M.L.F. is the opening wedge for the German acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the M.L.F. will set in motion the process of nuclear proliferation. According to Soviet spokesmen, the consequences are bound to be dangerous for the peace of the world, and, as if to give credence to these warnings, they have ominously hinted that the "most serious" consequences will follow implementation of this scheme.

Although the issue of German access to nuclear weapons and the matter of proliferation are obviously inter-related problems, the Soviet and East European spokesmen have tended to place more stress on the German danger, both in their public statements and in the attacks on the M.L.F. by their press and radio. This is presumably because of the greater emotional response that can be generated by the very thought of Germans wielding nuclear weapons. The German theme naturally has been stressed particularly heavily by the Czechs and the Poles; their public comments and their official notes to the United States have concentrated heavily on the remilitarization of West Germany, on the building of the national German Army, its growing offensive capacity, and so on. It is noteworthy that the Rumanians, Bulgarians and Hungarians, all historically somewhat more indifferent to the subject of Germany than the Czechs and the Poles, have been markedly less interested in the M.L.F. The more serious Soviet treatments of the problem, as, for instance, in the monthly journal International Affairs, as well as informal comments by Soviet spokesmen, have laid equal stress on the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, hinting at the complications that could ensue for both sides, especially with regard to the American-Soviet disarmament negotiations.

In recent months, the Soviet attacks have become more shrill, frequent and even somewhat more threatening in tone. The current Soviet offensive against the M.L.F. raises the question, what is the *real* Soviet purpose? Is it the same as that proclaimed, namely, to deny West Germany any access to nuclear weapons

127

128

systems and to stop the process of proliferation, thereby serving the cause of peace? Or is there some hidden and different motive?

It is legitimate to ask this, even though the Soviets might charge that in doing so one is questioning their good faith. Yet if their good faith is not involved, then perhaps their good judgment might be. The Soviet leaders must realize-since it is a matter of public knowledge-that today the European situation is far more complex for the United States than was the case even a decade ago, and that the French decision to pursue its own national nuclear force (following the English precedent) creates a real political alternative for West Germany. The Soviet leaders must also know that within West Germany there is already a powerful political faction, centered in Bavaria, pressing for a Gaullist policy, and that its influence and potential nationalist appeal are not to be dismissed lightly. The Soviet leaders should, therefore, at least consider the possibility that a defeat of the M.L.F. will not mean the maintenance of the status quo, but an irresistible German drive for its own nuclear force or, alternatively, a Franco-German nuclear enterprise, linking together for the first time in a joint military venture the two European nations with the most distinguished history of martial achievements.

The Soviets must know that at the present time NATO's tactical missiles and strike aircraft are under the so-called "two-key system" and, given the existing political pressures in Western Europe, it might be expanded to include Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (M.R.B.M.s) unless the development of the M.L.F. preëmpts that probability. Under the "two-key system," allied countries own and man the missiles, while the warheads are controlled jointly by the United States and the country where the missiles are placed. This arrangement comes much closer to the national deterrent idea than does the M.L.F.

One possible answer to the question concerning Soviet motives in opposing the M.L.F. can be called the extreme Machiavellian interpretation. According to it, the Soviets do realize the consequences of the failure of the M.L.F. and they welcome them. That is why they also frequently tell the West Europeans that the M.L.F. is an American scheme for the perpetuation of U.S. monopoly, thereby cynically playing on European nationalist feelings. In their view, a resurgent, militarist Germany will, first

of all, do more than all of Khrushchev's present and past efforts to resolidify the Soviet bloc, now torn asunder by nationalist conflicts. The Poles, the Czechs and the others, threatened by a militant and nuclear-armed Germany or Franco-Germany, will have no choice but to flock to Moscow for their protection. The Soviet people will also rally more closely around their leaders.

Secondly, a resurgent nuclear-armed Germany will inevitably disunite the West. It will drive England and Italy into neutralism, and might even give Paris some second thoughts. One consequence might be to push the United States into a posture of direct conflict with Bonn, thereby putting America and the Soviet Union on the same side against the continental West Europeans. Alternatively, it might drive the United States out of Europe. Clearly all of this would be most desirable from the Soviet point of view. Such an extreme Machiavellian interpretation can even draw on historical analogy: the Soviet attitude toward the rise of Hitler was very much of that sort. Acting on the theory of "the worse, the better," Moscow opposed Hitler's rise only verbally, while instructing the German Communist Party not to support

the Social Democrats in their efforts to stop the Nazis.

The extreme Machiavellian interpretation presupposes a high degree of recklessness and cynicism in the Soviet approach to the M.L.F. and discounts any sincerity in the proclaimed Soviet fears of Germany. If that is correct, there is nothing to be done but to go ahead with the M.L.F., ignoring altogether the Soviet concerns. Yet this interpretation is not entirely satisfactory. For one thing, it simply ignores the recent historical experience of Russia and Eastern Europe, particularly during World War II; it is most unlikely that this ordeal did not leave its mark on Khrushchev's and Gomulka's patterns of thought. Furthermore, if it were correct to suppose that the Soviet leaders cynically and recklessly see political advantage in a nuclear-armed West Germany, then a purely national German nuclear force would serve these Machiavellian Soviet objectives even better. But both the Soviets and the East Europeans have made it amply clear that they would regard that as nothing short of a calamity.

The fact is that fear of Germany in the East is a reality in the same way that the preoccupation of many Americans with Cuba is a reality-except that the Russians, having only recently lost 25 million people in a war with Germany, have somewhat more cause to be concerned about the 70 million technologically ad-

There is some evidence to suggest that recent Soviet efforts to establish a bilateral American-Soviet relationship are closely related to the increased Soviet fear of a German-French alliance, inevitably directed at the present status quo in Europe. To counter that, the Soviet leaders would like to achieve an American-Soviet co-sponsorship of the present division of Europe, thereby gaining time for the reconsolidation of the East while setting in motion new dissensions in the West. The quest for a bilateral relationship with the United States has made the Soviet leaders rethink their long-standing objective of driving the United States out of Europe; they can no longer be sure that success in this would actually benefit them, and the hesitant and fumbling Soviet approach to West European problems during the last several years reflects continued indecision on this score.

Notwithstanding this ambivalent attitude toward the United States, a standing component of Soviet policy is its opposition to any American sharing of nuclear weapons with the continental Europeans and its determination to obstruct any Western measures which aim toward greater unity. When in late 1959 it was proposed under the Norstad Plan that NATO become the fourth nuclear power (and some suggested variants even provided for coördinated national nuclear forces), the Soviet response was very negative. A. Arzumanyan, the Director of the influential Institute of World Economy and International Relations, described the Norstad Plan as "a compact between the most aggressive and reactionary American top brass and West German militarism." Some Soviet commentators implied that in the Norstad Plan they saw a double threat—the actual and direct spread of nuclear weapons, including to Germany, and the potential resolution of internal Western conflicts. Initial Soviet comments on the M.L.F. were somewhat milder; it was seen primarily as an effort to reduce Western political bickering and more specifically to forestall Paris' wooing of Bonn. In retrospect, it seems clear that at least in part the Soviet willingness to change its previous

attitude and to sign the test-ban agreement was connected with the calculation that it would force the abandonment of the M.L.F. (as well as perhaps promote some new Western dissensions). Only as the M.L.F. moved closer to fruition was the Soviet campaign against it stepped up. It reached a new peak in the middle of this year with the bitter attacks on Erhard and the Soviet note to the United States of July 11, 1964, threatening "severe and perhaps irreparable consequences."

130

There appears to be some tension between the Soviet desire not to drive America altogether out of Europe, thereby leaving a vacuum which Moscow thinks inescapably will be filled by de Gaulle and Strauss, and the obvious Soviet advantage in keeping the West in a state of fragmentation. As the M.L.F. could become an instrument for coördinating the Western military effort in the decisive branch of nuclear weaponry and for forging even closer political ties between Europe and America along the lines of the Atlantic Community concept (albeit for the time without France), the Soviet leaders see an immediate stake in strongly opposing it. The emotional implications of even indirect German access to the nuclear club then become useful in stimulating opposition in Western Europe, within the Labor Party, or among

the potential neutralists in Scandinavia and Italy.

For the time being, it is this short-range and mischievous interest in Western disunity that appears to be the chief Soviet stake in preventing the M.L.F., and it over-rides the long-range genuine fear of Germany. A prolonged period of internal Western bickering is certainly the optimum condition from the standpoint of the Kremlin. The Soviet leaders may presumably calculate that there is no immediate danger of a sudden German veering toward Paris and of a defiant German pursuit of an independent national nuclear deterrent. Therefore, they can afford to oppose the M.L.F. and even put their opposition to good use in terms of inter-Communist politics. In this respect, the mixedmotive and the Machiavellian interpretation overlap. The German threat is always helpful in gaining greater adhesion from the Poles and the Czechs, and the opposition to proliferation justifies the Soviet nuclear monopoly in the Communist world. Multilateral nuclear arrangements in the West would eventually embarrass the Soviet monopolists, but it is doubtful that the Soviets would wish to share their know-how and devices with the Poles. the Hungarians, etc., not to speak of the Chinese.

On balance, it would seem that the Soviet attitude toward the M.L.F. is thus not so much a matter of total recklessness and cynicism as of shortsightedness and a combination of ambivalence about the United States position in Europe, of a basic hostility to Western unity, and of real concern about Germany. The ambivalence makes it more than likely that the present détente will not be affected by the M.L.F.; the Soviet stake in not having America back the West Germans and the French in a more vigorously anti-Soviet policy is too great to be affected by the M.L.F. In fact, one is reminded here of the various Soviet threats after the collapse of the E.D.C. of what would follow West German rearmament. Just as the Soviets have warned recently of "most serious consequences" that would follow the implementation of the M.L.F., in December 1954, a special communiqué issued by the Soviet Union and the East European states warned that the rearmament of West Germany "would be an act aimed against the preservation of peace and making for another war in Europe." Yet because of the broader Soviet interest at the time in developing the so-called "spirit of Geneva," the rearmament of Germany was followed by . . . the Austrian Peace Treaty. The reopening of the Berlin crisis or any other overt Soviet action ending the present détente will be based on broader calculations than just a reaction to the M.L.F. Similarly, Soviet hostility to Western unity has to be taken for granted. There is no reason to expect the Soviet Union not to oppose the M.L.F. or any other multilateral Western arrangement.

However, because in the past the Soviet record in analyzing developments in Western Europe has not been notable for its perception, there is merit in further discussions with the Soviets and the East Europeans about the M.L.F. in the hope of assuaging at least those aspects of their hostility that stem from genuine fears and from a misreading of developments. In talking to them, it would be especially desirable to draw on arguments derived from actual Soviet experience; mere American assertions that the M.L.F. is designed to prevent nuclear proliferation, particularly to Germany, can be dismissed by Moscow -from its very different perspective-as inherently dishonest or simply naïve. Yet Russian fears, if genuine, exist already in respect to the two-key system. The point which Moscow ought

to be made to understand better is that the M.L.F. provides less national access than the two-key system, and as long as Western Europe is exposed to Soviet M.R.B.M.s there will be demands for a comparable West European deterrent. The only question is under what and whose control.

Recent Soviet experience offers two mutually reinforcing avenues of argumentation that may strike closer to home. First of all, Moscow makes much of German rearmament, and the West German Army is cited daily as a threat to peace. Because of their emphasis on this, the Soviet leaders should be reminded of their earlier opposition to the E.D.C. There are strong parallels between that opposition and the present attacks on the M.L.F. It is doubtful that at the time the Soviet motives were of the "extreme Machiavellian" variety; rather, then as now, they were probably mixed: desire for less Western unity, fear that the E.D.C. would prompt German rearmament, hope that its failure would perpetuate divisions in the West and avoid the creation of a German Army. The Russians now know how wrong they were. The collapse of the E.D.C. led straight to the formation of a German Army. If their concern over German rearmament is real, perhaps they occasionally entertain some second thoughts about their opposition to the E.D.C. And if that is the case, then

perhaps they might give the M.L.F. a second look.

Even more effectively, because it is still a live issue, the Soviets might be asked to reflect on their recent and unsuccessful attempts at alliance management, particularly with respect to China. This should not be approached as a matter for Western glee, but as providing an analogy for the purpose of drawing a lesson useful to both sides. The Soviet experience shows that defying the desire of one's allies for a larger share of the decisionmaking and of military power can be very unrewarding. Today the Chinese are openly striving to achieve a national nuclear force, and the Soviet Union cannot stop them. If the Soviet leaders are seriously concerned about proliferation, and especially about the eventual German acquisition of nuclear weapons, they should ponder their failure to cope with the Chinese. The Germans are certainly better prepared technologically for acquiring such weapons, they have potential political and military backing in France, and there is already a "Chinese faction" within the ruling Christian Democratic party in the persons of Strauss et al. Moscow should realize that its disregard of these pressures simply

reinforces the suspicion that its policies toward the M.L.F. are in fact governed by purely Machiavellian calculations, and that in reality it does not mind Germany taking a "Chinese" path. A temperate evocation of the Soviets' own experience with Peking may drive home the lesson—which Marx also taught—that frustrated nationalism becomes simply more nationalistic; that nationalism satisfied and controlled by multilateral arrangements

becomes internationalism.

The M.L.F., far from weakening the Soviet opposition to the Chinese, even buttresses the present Soviet stand and in the very unlikely event of a reconciliation could even provide the basis for continued Soviet opposition to a Chinese national nuclear deterrent. By attacking the M.L.F. as nothing but a device for spreading nuclear weapons to our allies, the Soviets strengthen the Chinese claim for Communist national deterrent forces and in effect embarrass themselves. By seeing the M.L.F. for what in fact it is—a multilateral arrangement—the Soviets further justify their earlier refusal to aid the Chinese.

It would also be important to talk with the East Europeans, particularly the Czechs and the Poles, who have shown most concern with the implications of the M.L.F. for West Germany, and who have increasing, if still limited, leverage on the Soviet Union. Their stake in the situation is far simpler and less ambitious than the Soviets'; it is to assure their own security. Hence it would be useful to impress them with the fact that they should not accept uncritically the Soviet interpretation of the M.L.F., nor Soviet policies toward Germany as a whole. They should be asked whether they would prefer West Germany to own M.R.B.M.s under the "two-key system," rather than the M.L.F. Without entering into the complex and necessarily speculative issue of the nature of Soviet motives, one could recall to the Czechs and the Poles that if the E.D.C. had come into being there would be today no national German Army. The M.L.F. is simply an atomic equivalent of the E.D.C.

Furthermore, the Poles and the Czechs might be reminded that the primary consequence of the two postwar Soviet offensives in Germany—namely, the two Berlin crises in the late forties and the late fifties—has been to strengthen West Germany's military position. Increased Soviet pressure on the West simply led in each case to a new push in West German rearmament. This may or may not have been intended by the Soviets, but it is doubtful that the outcome has been beneficial for East European security.

That the East Europeans may in fact have a more realistic understanding of the situation is suggested by Gomulka's proposal of December 1963 for the denuclearization of Central Europe, which did not make the abandonment of the M.L.F. a precondition (although the Poles held that German ports would have to be closed to M.L.F. ships); parallel East German statements, echoing the Soviet line, were far more rigid, and warned that the M.L.F. would further reduce the chances of German reunification. Presumably, the Poles realized that the M.L.F. does in fact reduce somewhat the chances of Germany acquiring an independent national nuclear force, and for the East Euro-

peans this is most important.

134

Yet when all that has been said, it is still necessary to come back to the elusive historical-psychological dimension of the problem. Europeans find it hard to understand why Americans are so concerned about Cuba-and we often feel that the Europeans are letting us down by not sharing our view of Castro. We feel strongly that missiles in Castro's hands would be a threat to us and to peace; the argument is doubtless valid, even though Cuba is small and has never waged war on the United States. That cannot be said about Germany in relation to Russia and Eastern Europe. It is therefore essential to dispel legitimate fears. The United States stands to lose very little by making a public pledge that it would oppose any attempt by West Germany to transform its participation in the M.L.F. into an independent nuclear force; this would merely reinforce the point made by President Kennedy in his Izvestia interview of November 1961. Some M.L.F. participants which do not now have national nuclear forces—as for instance, Germany—might wish to file a formal declaration with the United Nations, stating that under no circumstances would they seek an independent nuclear deterrent, outside of multilateral control and manning. Neither step is likely to reassure fully the Soviets and the East Europeans, who know that in political affairs words have a short life span. but it would show that we recognize and respect the Soviet fear that the M.L.F. might evolve into national nuclear forces. Public and solemn pledges would become an additional obstacle to national proliferation and would underline the twin purpose of the M.L.F.: to provide a collective nuclear defense of the West without promoting the spread of national nuclear forces.

HHH/ADA/JPR

We are gathered here tonight — eld friends and new — to celebrate the nineteenth birthday of Americans for Democratic Action. As I thought over the events of this period, it first seemed to me that nineteen years had rushed by quite painlessly: leoking around this room I see a number of old celleagues who haven't aged at all. And I trust they will return the compliment, even though in realistic terms it may be that we have spent too much time in the same elevator to have much perspective on each other.

Yet, on second thought, when we inject some perspective into our journey together, we must realize that the last nineteen years have been a period of incredible change. The American people have faced great challenges and, despite temporary set-backs, have responded in a fashion which validates our basic faith in the democratic precess.

The fact that this has occurred should not, however, erase from our memory the possibility that there were other roads which could have been taken. There is no mystery about the last nineteen years because we in 1966 have read the last chapters of the story. But there is no greater error one can make than to assume that what has happened had to happen.

Let me recall to you the state of mind which in January, 1947, led to the formation of Americans for Democratic Action. There was then little optimism among liberals. Indeed, we had ominous forebodings about the future direction of American society. And with good reason.

Did the Republican landslide in the elections of 1946 presage a revival of the eld order? a repudiation of the New Deal? Was the United States going to repeat the pattern of 1920 and junk all the great accomplishments of the New Deal as it had those of Woodrow Wilson? Were all the basic social and economic questions we thought to be closed open for reargument? Was the hard-wpn legitimacy of the trade union movement to be repudiated?

In another sector, was the United States going to move decisively against its ancient curse of racism? Or was the Negro going to be left in the limbo

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designed for him at the end of Reconstruction? Would "separate but equal" — really "separate and unequal" — remain the constitutional definition of equality? In short, would the issue of racial equality continue to be barred from national politics (as had been the case since 1877)?

Or, in the area of international relations, would the United States learn the somber lesson of the 1930's and accept its responsibilities in the world as the guardian of at best freedom, at least diversity, against the surging force of communist totalitarianism? Or, as seemed highly probable to many of us at that time, would the "Fortress America" mentality lead to a new isolationism, a selfish doctrine of "affluence in one country"?

As I said, we know the answers to these questions in 1966. And we have every right to be proud of the extent to which our labors have contributed to the outcome.

But in 1947 the future was up for grabs. These who founded ADA had no illusion that they could simply ride the locomotive of history to a preordained liberal destination.

The omens then were bad. The Republicans running riot in Congress, denouncing even school lunch programs as "socialism". A Democratic party which had still not recovered from the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Economic and political chaes in Europe. And the leng shadow of Stalinist totalitarianism falling over the disunited and dispirited free world.

The liberals who founded ADA had no failure of nerve. They had the nerve of failure: the courage to go out and fight for seemingly lest causes. They were fighters with no time or patience for self-pity or alienation. When they were licked, they came home only long enough to dress their wounds, and then went back to fight again.

I am not here tonight to display my battle-stars, but I can not refrain from noting that the current generation of so-called "radicals -- who have wen the battles they never fought -- might learn a little humility from a few years

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experience in ADA, in the operational context of liberalism where the problem is implementing ideals in political action, not achieving theological purity.

The difficulty in the United States -- or in any other democratic society -is that the implementation of liberal public policy is not accomplished by convincing the readers of liberal journals. ADA has always recognized that its major task is the persuasion of the electorate - a fact which involves it necessarily in accommodation and compromise.

To put it another way, ADA is a political group, not a utopian sect.

This commitment to the democratic political process has given ADA its distinctive character over the years. It has made possible a common leyalty to the erganization among men and women of strong convictions and opinions, who have The state of the s often differed vigorously among themselves.

Several thousand times over the last mineteen years a newspaperman, er critic, has come up to me with a triumphant look in his eye and said "How do you explain ADA's position on Madegascar? or Guam? of the Straits of Magellan?"

(I sometimes wonder : Is there anything we haven't taken a position en at least ence?)

Now as you well know, ADA's views are rarely unanimous - I recall a Foreign Policy Commission at one Convention submitting four minority reports, and no majority report -- and each of us has a little list of policy questions where he has been on the lesing end of a vote.

If every time anyone lost a vote, he walked out -- ADA would have collapsed in 1948. No political organization can survive, let alone be effective, if everything becomes a matter of principle.

Similarly, if ADA had any pretensions to monolithicism - if it tried to enforce some party line on members and officers -- ideological crises would quickly shatter the group.

Se, as I patiently explain to my interregators, it is quite possible for one to disagree totally with some ADA policy but remain loyal to the organiza-

tion. What we have had in ADA — and it is a precious item — is an atmosphere of mutual trust which transcends whatever immediate differences we may have over policy questions.

As a political group, we are interested in communication — net excommunication. We are not a forum for public displays of ideological purity, but a body of men and women dedicated to working out our ideals in a complex, contingent universe. Although we may differ strongly with each other, we do not convert these honest disagreements into accusations of immorality.

When we fight ever issues, we fight hard -- and sometimes in the heat of battle a little rough rhetoric may creep into the discussion -- but fundamentally we respect the integrity of our opponents. This sense of community, I repeat, is ADA's most precious possession.

It is in that spirit -- of communication, not excommunication -- that we liberals must explore the issues in Viet-Nam. We begin with a common set of premises: no same human being wants a war -- in Viet-Nam or anywhere else; no rational American wants, in particular, a war with China; most of us wish that we could turn back the historical clock in Viet-Nam ten years and take the options not taken in the 1950's.

But denouncing history is a particularly futile form of argument. We can't turn the clock back and start over again. We can't erase the mistakes of the past. No amount of denunciation of past ineptitudes will alter in the slightest the alternatives that we confront in 1966.

Who said what to whom in 1954 has as much relevance to our dilemmas in 1966 as the "evils of Versailles" had in Germany in 1932. The issue then was not "What created Hitler?" but "How can he be Stopped?". What went wrong in Germany, or Indochina, is a problem for the historian. What can we do about the realities history has produced? The question for political men.

and arguing about history is generally a way of avoiding unpleasant confrontations with the presents it is an posture we regulationally or tentral liberals can form for posture with the presents of the posture of the

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But while we can not rewrite history, we can learn from it. It seems to me, for example, hardly necessary to explain to an ADA audience how the communists operate, how the demand for "coalitions" is a staging point in the application of what Rakesi cynically called "salami tactics" -- slicing up the non-communists.

No one here needs to be informed about "transmission belts" or fronts, the standard -- I almost said patented; it is that public -- communist techniques of infiltration.

I found it curious that anyone who refers to the National Liberation Front as a front is assailed as a "hawk" or a "war-monger"; it reminds me of the old days in the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party when anyone who called Joe Stalin a communist was denounced as a "red-baiter".

The operation in Viet-Nam is in fact a classic demonstration of communist technique. And just as in the 1930's you could find candid, blunt explanations of communist tactics in magazines written for the cadres, today you can learn from authoritative sources in Hanoi what the strategic goals of Vietnamese communism.

Let me make it clear that in my judgment our enemy in Viet-Nam is Vietnamese communism — a particularly militant variety of national communism which has its own program of expansion. While Peking undoubtedly has a strong strategic interest and great influence in Hanoi, kherexis it would be a vast oversimplification of a complex relationship to consider North Viet-Nam as a satellite of Red China.

Vietnamese communism needs no spurring. The men who lead the Lao

Dong -- the Communist Party -- have developed their objectives over more than
a quarter of a century. There is nothing secret about it -- just read the reports
of party congresses. Their goal is simple: the "liberation" and "unification"
of all of former French Indochina with Thailand and Malaya thrown in for what
might be called geopolitical reasons.

In this "War of National Liberation", the base in North Viet-Nam serves

as the training ground and sanctuary for allegedly autonomous national liberation fronts, the "parallel apparats" of classical communist method.

At the moment, in addition to the National Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam, there are others essentially in a state of incubation waiting for the appropriate moment in Thailand and Malaya. And there is, of course, the Pathet Lao on Laos. Little has been heard recently of the Khymer Resistance Force, but one may suspect that if Cambodian policy became critical of Hanoi, this body would emerge from mothballs.

All these "liberation fronts" are branches of the Lae Dong.

In 1954, for example, at the Geneva Conference there were no representatives of the Pathet Lae or the Khymer Resistance Forces, but no one urged that communist negotiations be held up until these/guaerrilla forces were "recognized". On the contrary, when the question arease: Who will sign the military agreements for these alleged bands of native patriots? Ta-Quang-Buu stepped up and took the pen.

Who was Ta-Quang-Buu? Vice Minister of National Defense in Hanoi.

Why did he sign? Because Hanoi felt the Geneva agreements were in its interest and abandoned the fiction that the Pathet Lao and Khymer Resistance Forces were simply Laotian and Cambodian \*\*Excess\*\* nationalists.

I submit to you that the National Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam

today must be understood as a creature of the Lao Dong, and xinxevidence Taxhukkress

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it has "only the appearance of an independent existence."

This last phrase, let me hastem to add before someone spots a "hawk", is not my formulation. It is drawn from a secret Lao Dong circular, dated Dec. 7, 1961, which went on to point out that the communists in Viet-Nam were "unified from North to South under the Central Executive Committee of the Party, the chief of which is President Ho."

New we come to the crucial question of "recognition" of the National Liberation Front.

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On one hand, recognition -- in traditional terms -- means merely accepting the existence of some de facto entity. On the other hand, recognition is also employed to connete an acceptance of the legitimacy.

\*\*Modes position on Red China, for example -- which anticipated current "new thinking" on the subject by sixteen years -- was set forth before the Korean War as follows: "We believe that the principal objective of American policy in China must be the maintenance of communication and traditional friendly contact with the Chinese people. We believe that sooner or later we will be compelled to establish diplomatic relations with the Mao-Tse-Tung regime as the effective government of China, however much we detest its devotion to totalitarianism."

Now if demands for "recognition of the Vietcong" mean merely that the United States recognizes its existence, everybody's time is being wasted in this dispute. The President has repeatedly stated that the Vietcong can participate in negotiations.

But the Hanoi regime is unwilling to accept this type of recognition.

Instead, they have demanded recognition of the NLF as a legitimate, autonomous, sovereign body. In their words, as the "sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people".

We will not accord this kind of recognition, which in effect flemands of the United States and the South Vietnamese a confession of illegitimacy as a precondition for discussing peace.

For the fundamental consideration is that -- in my judgment -- our cause in Viet-Nam is legitimate, is just. While I fully recognize the integrity and sincerity of many dedicated liberals who do not share my views, I simply can not

reconcile my liberal ideals with any policy of unilateral disengagement which would leave fifteen million South Vietnamese at the mercy of Hanoi's terror regime.

The options are fight -- or get out. They are not subject to modification by wishful thinking :"stay -- but don't fight" is not a position, but an escape from taking a stand.

If we reject withdrawal, the question is how -- by what mixture of military and non-military measures -- can we effectuate a policy which will convince Hanoi that its timetable of expansion needs revision.

First, we must build up the military shield in South Viet-Nam, and for this purpose there is no substitute for conventional force commitment combined with effective use of air power. It has recently been suggested by a distinguished commentator that we should contain communism in Asia by a nuclear tripwire -- as we did in Europe -- but the problem of containing communism in Asia is tactically quite different from the European model.

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The European nations on the perimenter of communist expansion were highly developed and capable -- given protection and generous economic aid -- of remarkable feats of reorganization. They were quite \*\*Expansion\*\* accomplished state=builders, fully supplied with trained personnel and institutional habits. In the late 1940's, when over a quarter of the electorate in France and Italy was voting communist, there were no internal security problems these societies could not master, and without violating the groundrules of democratic justice.

In South Viet-Nam, by by contrast, we must nurture the basic institutional development of a modern state. In the midst of a war, against an adversary who has turned terror into a science by the systematic murder of trained Vietnamese personnel, we are typing to accomplish social, political, and economic objectives which would be difficult even under the most peaceful conditions.

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that there has been a certain amount of turmeil within the South Vietnamese government. Critics of

our involvement have fastened upon the recent demonstrations as proof of our failure, as evidence that we should abandon the enterprise.

This is curious logic. Admittedly the internal disputes in South

Viet-Nam create great difficulties, but in a more basic sense can we not take

some pride in the success of our pluralistic principles? Surely no one can

accuse the United States of creating a "reactionary dictatorship" when students

South

in Saigon parade with anti-American banners? The/Vietnamese, bled white by the

their

calculated assassination of thousands of its ablest leaders, are fumbling towards

a democratic order -- their experiments may be a bit unnerving in the conditions

of wartime, but -- from our vantagepoint as liberals, in particular -- are is the

tumult not preferable to the monolithic silence in Hanoi?

Indeed, on the fundamental level of commitment, we are fighting in South Viet-Nam to make it possible for the South Vietnamese to quarrel amongst themselves, to prevent the icy hand of communist totalitarianism from destroying the wonderful, vehement diversity of this vital people.

We are fighting, in short, to guarantee to the South Vietnamese the power to make their own decisions about their future. Decisions which should be made not under the gun of the terrorist, but in free and open elections, supervised (as we noted in 1954) by the United Nations.

As the President and the Secretary of State have pointed out time and again, the United States will abide by the decision of the Vietnamese in such a free election.

But we will not permit the communists -- who are understandably leary
of free elections: Did you notice that the other day in Peking they had a
marvelously free election for local people's congresses? Over two million people
freely cast their ballets for 2400 unopposed candidates!

We will not permit the communists to substitute bullets for ballots, to substitute their definition of free elections for ours, to strangle the emergent democratic consciousness of South Viet-Nam under the guise of "liberation". In the same fashion that American power in Europe was employed -- in President Kennedy's fine phrase -- to "make the world safe for diversity", we will stand by our friends in Asia. And the course of events in Europe over the past twenty years is adequate proof of our me commitment to freedom and pluralism, is ample refutation of the charge that we are building an imperialist empire.

To conclude, let me just add this personal note. In my trip through Asia I was immensely heartened by the growth of democratic traditions. Many of us, I fear, look at the world through European lenses and I suspect that underlying much of the criticism of our action in Viet-Nam is the unarticulated proposition that Asia is hopeless — that whatever the ideological merits of our involvement may be, we are historical losers.

I regret to say that I have even sensed a certain feeling that democracy is something that only white men can effectively utilize -- there is a whole body of rather patronizing scholarly literature on the natural attraction of Asians and Africans towards dictatorship.

Well, I am here to tell you that there is a democratic future in Asia, that in India, for example, freedom is cherished \*\*gainstxf\*\*axf\*\*\* as it is in the United States and is being implemented under conditions that we have never in our history encountered. The Japanese, the Philipinos, the Malayans have created free societies.

Asian communism, whether centered on Peking or Hanoi, has the destruction of these embyronic democracies on its agenda. (Malaya and the Philippines have already been through the wringer of guerrilla warfare) Viet-Nam is now the testing ground and -- whether one plays dominos or not -- the outcome in Viet-Nam is crucial to the cause of freedom in Asia.

I trust that we liberals will be as forthright and unreserved in our response to the needs of our imperiled Asian allies as we were to those of our European friends. Freedom, after all, is not a commodity and the most-favored-nation list.

# ADDRESS OF VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY TENTH ANNIVERSARY DINNER THE CATHOLIC ADULT EDUCATION CENTER CHICAGO, ILLIBOIS JANUARY 31, 1966

It is a privilege and a pleasure to participate in the tenth
anniversary celebration of the Catholic Adult Education Center of
Chicago, and to join you in honoring Adlai Stevenson through the
establishment of the Adlai Stevenson Award.

A decade ago Adlai Stevenson was a prophet without honor in his own country. Today his prophecy is honored in every country where free men live. To receive an award honoring him is a high honor for any public man.

Adlai Stevenson would cherish this award. For him, spirited discussion of public issues was indispensable to the functioning of democratic government, to the health of a free society. For him

free discussion included public airing of issues whose time had not arrived. "Our country, "Stevenson stated in October 1952, "was built on unpopular ideas, on unorthodox opinions. My definition of a free society is a society where it is safe to be unpopular."

As a man who spent much of his professional life in this community, Adlai Stevenson knew and valued the contribution of this Center in probing the controversial issues of the present and the future. During the past ten years, under the distinguished leadership of Monsignor Daniel Cantwell, Dr. Russell Barta, and Mr. Vaile Scott, you have practiced that "free speech in the Church" which the German theologian Karl Rahner has described as essential to the formation of the Christian conscience. You have raised within the community those hard issues which Adlai Stevenson aired for over a decade before the American people -- the issues of nuclear war and peace, of social

inequality and injustice at home and abroad, of urban blight and rural decay brought by technological revolution, of freedom and dissent at home while challenged by tyranny abroad.

For many Americans, his views once sounded faintly heretical.

In politics, the difference between a heretic and a prophet is often one of sequence. Often prophecy is heresy -- properly aged. An essential quality of a statesman is a willingness to risk being prematurely wise -- and an unwillingness to hide one's wisdom. The man whom you honor epitomized this concept of statesmanship.

Adlai Stevenson sought to maximize the element of rationality in politics. As an experienced political leader he knew that one of the difficulties of being reasonable in an irrational world is that you have a small clientele. No public man in our time did more to enlarge the clientele of reason in politics.

A free society such as ours cannot flourish without the enlightenment which private groups like the Adult Education Center and its companion organizations bring to public life. "The essence of republican government," Adlai Stevenson once said, " is not command. It is consent." The enlightened consensus required for republican government to function is created when public spirited individuals working through groups like this provide the leadership and the platform for searching scrutiny of the burning issues of our time. In this May you have ten years of distinguished accomplishment.

Adiai Stevenson understood a decade before most of his colleagues the interdependence of mankind in a technological era- and the consequences that followed for international affairs. His speeches and his writings reflectate theme eloquently expounded in the recent encyclicals of Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI -- the solidarity which binds all men in an interdependent world, and the obligation

of statesmen and rulers to bear this in mind in governing the peoples of the world.

In his eloquent plea for peace, Pacem in Terris, Pope John

admonished world leaders that men cannot survive in an interdependent

world if the nuclear arms race continues unabated. He stated:

"Justice, right, reason, and humanity urgently demand that the

arms race should cease; that the stockpiles which exist in various

countries should be reduced equally and simultaneously by the parties

concerned; that nuclear weapons should be banned; and that a general

a agreement should eventually be reached about progressive dis
armament and an effective method of control."

Adlai Stevenson was deeply moved by the Pope's encyclical. Speaking here in Chicago less than a month after the issuance of the encyclical, he said of the Pope: "It is clear that for him the human race is not a cold abatraction, but a single precious family whose life, interest, responsibilities, and well-being are a constant and loving preoccupation."

And he went on to say:

"The human race is a family, Men are brothers. All wars are civil wars. All killing is fratricidal ... Peace is, moreover, the one condition of survival in the atomic age. So our human family must be organized for peace, and this entails the building, at world level, of the civil authority, the peacekeeping functions, ... the effective social institutions ... "minreedomnanticissant at homeswhileschallengedsbystyrenn

shared Stevenson's view that the peace of the world cannot be assured so long as tribalism persists in the form of anarchich nation-states.

World order and stability requires international institutions. It was this firm conviction that international institutions - above all the United Nations - must be strengthened that brought Pope Paul to the United Nations headquarters in New York where Adlai Stevenson served for five years.

Speaking of the United Nations organization Pope Paul stated:

"The edifice which you have constructed must neverfall; it must be perfected, andmade equal to the needs which world history will present.

"You make a stage in the development of mankind from which retreat must never be admitted but from which it is necessary that advance be made....

"You give sanction to the great principle that the relations between peoples should be regulated by reason, by justice, by law, by negotiation; not by force, nor by violence, not by war, not by fear or by deceit."

What a tragedy that Adlai Stevenson did not live to witness

Pope Paul's appeal to the leaders of the world to expand the area

where the writ of the United Nations may run. It remains for us

to strengthen the General Assembly, to build the peace-keeping

machinery, to perfect the UN technical agencies. This can eventually

bring greater order and stability intotthe anarchy of international life.

Adlai Stevenson knew that peace would not come, that stability

and order would remain threatened so long as the gap between rich nations and poor continued to widen.

In our interdependent world the obligation of those nations that are rich and advanced toward those that are post and undeveloped was spelled out in bold language by Pope John in his encyclical Mater et Magistra. He stated:

"The solidarity which binds all men and makes them members of the same family requires pplitical communities enjoying an abundance of material goods not to remain indifferent to those political communities whose citizens suffer from poverty, misery, and hunger, and who lack even the elementary rights of the human person.

#### He concluded:

"We are all equally responsible for the undernourished peoples.

Therefore, it is necessary to educate one's conscience to the sense of responsibility which weighs upon each and everyone, especially upon those who are more blessed with this world's goods."

Every day we see peoples caught between soaring hopes and immovable traditions. Each day we learn anew that the disorder which persists cannot be ended by political maneuver or military power alone.

We learn anew of outbreaks of violence and turbulence, or peaceful revolutions turned into violent ones. We learn anew of disorder which invites Communism -- which so often comes as the scavenger of ruined revolutions.

We now know that peace can be threatened by other forces than armies crossing borders and bombs and missiles falling from the sky.

Peace can be threatened by social and economic deprivation, by destitution and hunger. If we are concerned about "Peace-keeping"

in all its aspects, then we dare not ignore this explosive threat which can erupt at any time.

less fortunateits to be fulfilled, we must learn to apply the principles of social and economic solidarity which have for several decades been applied to the domestic economy to the international economy.

Just as progressive taxation has been an effective instrument for promoting economic and social justice within nations - so progressive sharing of the burdens of an interdependent world must be accomplished.

It is through the leadership of groups like this -- who did so much to win the fight for justice at home that the battle for justice abroad will be won. Pope John testified to this exhorting citizens to participate actively in public life and to contribute "towards the attainment of the common good of the entire human family, as well as that of their own country."

When we approach the staggering problems of our world with
the vision of Pope John and Adlai Stevenson, we can come to understand
that the growing interdependence of mankind caused by the technological
in
revolution can lead to a world civilization which both persons and nations
find their individuality enhanced, find their mutual dependence and
mutual fate a condition to be welcomed rather than a threat to be feared.

We know that the goals of Pope John, Pope Paul and Adlai Stevenson, the hopes and expectations they aroused cannot all be satisfied in the immediate future. What can be accomplished in a limited period of time will always fall short of expectations.

But because of the man we honor here tonight we can be confident that some progress will be made. For in our own country it was Adlai Stevenson more than anyone else who brought back to American life the spirit described by John Adams as one of "public happiness".

This spirit is reflected in "delight in participation in public discussion

and public action, a joy in citizenship, in self government, in self control, in self discipline and in dedication." In this spirit Stevenson attracted to public life in its broadest sense the many talented men and women who today serve their country and the world community.

Many of these are in this room tonight.

Inspired by his words and his work, I hope you will realize those goals which he defined and served so well.



# L.B.J.'s Foreign Policy Consumble

## Successes

The Johnson administration has been looking for fresh ideas and initiatives in foreign policy. Examples are the President's espousal of a "summit meeting" of Latin American leaders and of regional development programs in Africa. Others probably lie ahead. Some White House advisers exude a new mood of resolute optimism. Johnson's critics dismiss all this as an "exercise in rhetorical rejuvenation" or attribute it to the White House fears of the coming congressional elections based on Johnson's own bad showing in recent polls. Yet a glance at the major sectors of U.S. foreign policy will show that a measure of optimism is not out of place.

Let us start with Europe. On the anniversary of D-day last fortnight, peace in Europe had lasted one day longer than it did between World Wars I and II. As it passed this milestone Europe had less reason to expect another war than at any time since the Cold War began. This despite De Gaulle's efforts to dismantle NATO. Even De Gaulle counts on the natural coherence of the Atlantic world, and its U.S. nuclear umbrella, for ultimate security. Meanwhile the changes in NATO are echoed by fissures in the Warsaw Pact, and the so-called "satellites" of Eastern Europe show increasing independence of Moscow.

n Asia there is a grisly war, but it is not a very dangerous one either to the U.S. or to world peace. Moreover, the news from Vietnam is so much better than a year ago that Johnson and McNamara ought to be taking bows instead of brickbats. The fierce battle in the central highlands-a "spoiling attack" on General Giap's North Vietnamese troop concentrations—is another sign that the initiative has moved to U.S. and Vietnamese forces. The casualty ratio; the enemy desertion rate; the increased mobility, firepower and morale of Westmoreland's troops, all justify his confidence that he can handle the "monsoon offensive" which Giap may be preparing. Even the Saigon political situation looks more stable on the first anniversary of the Ky directory.

Red China is going through a purge, the first major split in its leadership since the Mao regime took power. It may signal the

end of that regime and its successor may be less bellicose and more concerned with China's enormous internal problems. Maoism has lost all influence in Indonesia, whose new leaders have just terminated Sukarno's insane war on Malaysia and seem to be steering their unfortunate country back to ways of order and sense.

Indeed a new Asia is beginning to take shape. Perhaps its birthplace will be recorded as Seoul, the capital of an even bloodier war than Vietnam's only 15 years ago. In Seoul last week the foreign ministers of nine free Asian and Pacific countries-Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealandmet to discuss their mutual desire to cooperate on trade, development and other common problems. For the first time the new men of Asia (as Thai Foreign Affairs Minister Thanat Khoman put it) "are getting together without being influenced by any of the former colonial powers." The initiative came from the proud leaders of the Republic of Korea, a successful new nation (economic growth rate almost eight percent a year) anxious to assert its Asian identity.

This new free-Asian regionalism is indigenous, not made in America, and it is welcomed by U.S. policy makers. The U.S. role is mainly to give it financial and technical aid, as through the Mekong Basin project and the Asian Development Bank.

In Latin America our main regional agencies are the Alliance for Progress and the Organization of American States. In what was widely criticized as his major blunder, President Johnson broke the letter of the nonintervention treaty on which the O.A.S. was founded when he unilaterally sent over 22,000 U.S. troops to quell the Dominican rebellion of April '65. That "blunder" does not look so bad today.

Johnson intervened, so he said at the time, solely to save lives and to assure a free election. He has succeeded in both. His intervention enabled the O.A.S. to take control of the troops of six nations (mostly U.S.) that have kept substantial peace for a year in the Dominican Republic. O.A.S. picked the provisional president, Garcia-Godoy, whose disinterested integrity made the recent election possible. O.A.S. oversaw the voting and can now withdraw its remaining 8,000 soldiers as soon as the new president-elect, Joaquin Balaguer, agrees.

Balaguer campaigned on a promise of

civil peace, and the Dominicans, especially the rural women, supported him with a landslide. One can even hope that the Dominicans, despite their long history of violence and tyranny, are now on the road to successful self-government. Hats should be off to Garcia-Godoy, to the U.S. representative to the O.A.S., Ellsworth Bunker, and to all others who made possible this success story (knock wood) of inter-American diplomacy.

And not just diplomacy. Democracy also had a victory. The right of a people to choose their own government is the essential principle at issue in our struggle with Communism. Whenever a people freely exerts that right, our side scores a political victory of a kind that our adversaries can't answer.

An even more crucial election is scheduled in Vietnam in September. Some U.S. policy makers are gloomy about it, since the Vietcong will try to sabotage it and the Buddhists threaten not to participate. Yet the very prospect of an election, and Marshal Ky's evidently serious preparations for it, have already strengthened the directory. The U.S. has every reason to cheer the plans for this election. It could well result in the first broad popular base for a government in Saigon, and so make the political side of the war as hopeful as the military.

Johnsonian foreign policy has not been uniformly successful, nor should it get credit for all its own recent good news. But neither has it been the series of disasters some of Johnson's critics love to wallow in. We must be doing something right, for aggression is being contained, regional institutions of order are developing, some new countries are thriving, and there is even a little permeation of the Iron Curtain (as in Willy Brandt's East-West German conversations). If Johnson is serious in his talk of new initiatives in foreign policy, the time is opportune. He should ignore the polls when he knows that a policy is the right one, such as his attempt at bridge-building in Eastern Europe. The little outcroppings of sense, decency and hope now visible around the world prove that good policies sometimes have their reward. And there are ample opportunities ahead for U.S. policy to continue trying to make the world at least somewhat safer both for democracy and for diversity.

August 8, 1966 Jilm VP. Spuh,

Memo for Ted
cc: John R.
From The Vice President

by kep people in government and outsiders on matters of foreign policy. We ought to catalog those speeches and be able to use some of the themes within them. Take, for example, the attached speech by Javits. It's surely within my philosophy. It's the sort of speech that I ought to be making, and I would respectfully suggest that we work it over with our own input and have such a speech ready for some occasion. I like the Javits approach.

Once again, I ask that our speech research files be kept in better order, not only what we say but what others say. We are not picking the brains of our neighbors and, if we are, we are lacking in a proper system of cataloging that which we have discovered. Please note page 2 of Javits's speech, his four points. They are very good, and I am asking John Rielly now to rework this speech for a Humphrey presentation.

SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS (R-N.Y.)

FOR RELEASE 6 P.M. MONDAY, APRIL 25, 1966

## ACCEPTANCE OF POWER, NOT "ARROGANCE OF POWER": THE GUIDELINES FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Since the Second World War, the United States has labored long and hard and patiently to promote the principles of peace in freedom, political stability and economic and social progress. These labors are finally showing signs of success.

This is attributable to these factors: Discernible signs of success in the bipartisan foreign policy founded on international and regional organization; economic and technical assistance for newly-developing countries; and our willingness to use force if need be to turn back wars of aggression masquerading as wars of national liberation.

Last week, a leading critic of U.S. policy described our efforts as stemming from an "arrogance of power," which he said had served us brly and can only lead to deepening crises in the future. Such pessimism assumes that our policy is generally wrong and that the U.S. is to blame for the unsolved problems of diplomacy today.

Such criticism may be useful as a warning of over-confidence and over-commitment, but it should not be accepted as a valid finding that our policy has failed. Our policy since the Truman Administration has been basically progressive, basically sound and, on balance, it is succeeding.

Our policy since World War II has been based on an acceptance of power, not an "arrogance of power."

And because it is beginning to show signs of success, this is the time to accelerate it and put more resources behind it to bring about a decisive breakthrough. I believe such a breakthrough is fully within our capability now, provided we are not dismayed, frustrated or deterred by counsels of pessimism or by immobilizing self criticism.

Let us remember that it certainly was not arrogance of power that fathered the Marshall Plan; or led to U.S. encouragement of the regional organizations such as the European Common Market; or that developed our whole foreign aid program and such concepts as the Alliance for Progress; or that moved us to put our security on the lime in defense of the free world with organizations such as NATO.

Rather, it was U.S. willingness to accept our responsibilities as a world power, and our determination to make effective use of that power.

The world in which we found ourselves in 1945 looked very bleak.

e Soviet Union, instead of remaining an ally, chose to become a foe.

Western Europe was in a condition of economic ruin and political instability. The European colonies around the world, used to waiting and delay, were impatient for independence. At that time and in the ensuing years, it seemed as if there would be no end to the need for United States involvement and commitment of vast amounts of resources. It was all an uphill fight — a fight filled with sporadic signs of frustration. Our efforts seemed to be making little progress, and our good motives were often misunderstood.

Now, at last we see some light. We can face crises and problems with real confidence. Some practical and psychological corners in international politics have been turned.

There is a new awareness in underdeveloped nations that communism promises much but delivers little.

There is a growing recognition that the United States is prepared to combine its desire for peace and conciliation with the will to use force to oppose aggression.

There is a fuller appreciation of the necessity for and the benefits of regional cooperation.

There is greater acceptance of the democratic philosophy and more understanding of the strong points of the system of private enterprise.

There is no denying present difficulties and trouble spots. The conflict in Vietnam shows few signs of abating. Communist China persists in its vow to instigate more so-called "wars of national liberation." NATO is being buffeted by the challenges of President de Gaulle. But there is no reason to focus solely on these events, as if they were the only events of importance. Another side of the story remains to be told.

## DEVELOPING NATIONS: A NEW AWARENESS

After World War II, the United States fostered and welcomed the independence of the former colonial territories. National self-determination has always been a cardinal principal of our approach to foreign affairs.

Having gained their independence, these new nations developed a kind of nationalism that was more concerned with condemning their former rulers than it was with progress in their own countries. In time, this nationalism turned against the United States as well. Despite our efforts in their behalf, we became the symbol of prosperity and strength in their eyes -- a symbol which they both admired and attacked.

These new nations professed a policy of neutralism or non-alignment as between the United States and the Soviet Union. In practice, however, they tended to side almost automatically with the Soviet Union. This situation is now changing. It is changing because of the growing awareness that there was great danger and little return in this relationship. The people of these new nations began to recognize that the real threat to their security and independence came not from the West, but from the Communist world. A number of attempted communist coup d'etats furnished the proof.

The result has been the emergence of a genuine policy of "neutralism" -- a real desire to be masters in their own houses, to be beholden to no one. Accordingly, many of these nations have encouraged the United States in its efforts in Vietnam. They recognize that our action there could be a deterrent to communist power plays in their own countries.

There have also been a number of internal changes in these new nations that give cause for hope. Many of them have been plagued by one-man, doctrinaire, leftists dictatorships which neither gave hope for future free elections nor evinced any signs of fiscal responsibility. Little economic growth and runaway inflation have been characteristic of these dictatorships.

Recent events in Africa where the overthrow of certain governments which had become economically bankrupt and too much under Chinese communist influence were greeted by immense African approval. Ghana is an example of this. Indonesia, where the overwhelming number of Indonesians have risen up in support of the Army's efforts to prevent a communist takeover, has been another example.

## UNITED STATES WILL AND PURPOSE

Ever since 1945, states who oppose the principles and interests of the United States have been continually testing our will -probing to find our weak spots, trying to discover some United States commitment that might not be kept. No sooner did the war end, then we were forced to talk tough to prevent the takeover of Iran by the Soviet Union. This was followed by a long line of confrontations that have become indelible in our minds: the Communist War in Greece, the Berlin Blockade, Korea, Lebanon, and Cuba, to name the major ones.

United States foreign policy has never been opposed to change per se. We see nothing sacred in the status quo for its own sake. In fact, our country has been and still is a central force for reform and we do have our own revolutionary tradition. But, the United States is against attempts to change the status quo by force -- by aggression whether direct or indirect. When a government facing such aggression has requested our help -- and help could practically be given -- we are generally responded.

It is my belief that our participation in the Vietnam struggle will go a long way toward convincing aggressors that the United States from our own shores and a small country, yet, we have sent large numbers on the calculations of the aggressors.

Moreover, the Communists are beginning to have serious problems of their own. The Sino-Soviet split is not simply over ideological dogma; it is a struggle to see who will dominate the Communist world. There should be enough mutual recrimination in this split to keep the Communists busy tending to their own problems and creating fewer difficulties elsewhere.

## THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

One of the most hopeful signs of progress, to me, is the growing appreciation of the necessity for and the benefits of regional cooperation. The idea and the practice of regionalism has interprosed itself between the realities of nationalism and the hopes of interationalism. Regionalism represents the new realism in the solutions to current international problems.

Regional economic, technical, and defense groups, I believe, are in line with the major fact of the post World War II world -- interdependence. Indeed, regionalism is an acknowledgement of the fact that nation-states are interdependent and of their need to pursue common objectives jointly with the minimal surrender of sovereignty. It is now a truism that certain problems can be tackled more productively by several nations than by going it alone.

Under the aegis of Articles 51 and 53 of the United Nations Charter, regional organizations have been springing up on all continents. The U.N., in fact, has set up councils to correspond to and promote these regional groups. In our own hemisphere, there are three major regional organizations: The Rio Pact, the Latin American Common Market, and the Central American Common Market. The latter, in particular, is making great strides. In addition, the very successful the LS. and Japan to Latin America on a regional basis, gives me special satisfaction because of my role in initiating it. Asia, with toward regional approaches. Also very encouraging is the progress being made in Africa under the Organization for Africa Unity.

Standing at the head of all regional efforts are the European Common Market and NATO. The success of these is a continuing tribute to the foresight of the Western Nations. NATO and EEC have become so engrained, so solid, as ways of life for their members, that not even the challenges of President de Gaulle have been able to tear them apart.

### VICTORY IN THE BATTLE OF PHILOSOPHIES

Underpinning the whole Cold War is the confrontation of the democratic and totalitarian philosophies, the struggle for the minds of men. It seemed to some pessimists that Communism was the wave of the future, that it had all the answers, and that the people of the world really preferred it to democracy. These pessimists are being proved wrong.

In the beginning, we could not expect the peoples of the world to know what Communism was. They had to learn about it for themselves. Communist Parties were proposing a whole kit of necessary reforms, and these parties seemed to be the only way to bring about change, the only alternative to despotic feudal oligarchies.

In time, the people learned that the Communists rarely delivered e reforms, and the few reforms they did make, cost the people themselves dearly. Communism forced a complete break with local traditions, with private ownership patterns, and allowed no opposition and no free speech or religion. One form of dictatorship had been traded for another.

There is even a growing realization that the free enterprise system can meet a lot of their problems. The market economy, supply and demand, is now being seen as a better and more efficient indicator of private wishes and public needs. Even the Soviet Union and other Communist countries have instituted "capitalist" reforms along these lines.

Given knowledge and a real choice, people will always prefer freedom to slavery. We are beginning to win the battle of philosophies; it will be the biggest victory of all.

# # # #

MEMORANDUM

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

September 9, 1966

Fregre aid Spack antons

Memo for John R.
cc: Ted
From The Vice President

Here is a mighty good outline of the importance of foreign aid. As I have told you, I want a top-grade speech on the whole subject of the War on Poverty on the world scene.

John Reilly The Attached is from John Nuveen & Chic It CametoMy about Jehn Mar 1965.

#### A POSITIVE FOREIGN POLICY

"Every dollar spent for defense \* \* \* is wholly negative, \* \* \* simply a means of buying time \* \* \* to hold off potential enemies while peaceful ideas take hold and people come to friendship and understanding. \* \* \*"

People to People Program

- I. The principal positive foreign policy program of the United States has been the foreign aid program expenditures for economic development.
  - A. The Marshall Plan, which absorbed the Aid to Greece and Turkey program, was our first undertaking and it was extremely successful.
  - B. Since 1953 foreign aid has been identified almost exclusively with the underdeveloped countries and has not been successful.
- II. The foreign aid to the underdeveloped countries has not been successful for the following reasons:
  - A. There has been no careful re-thinking of the philosophy of aid to underdeveloped countries such as was presented by General Marshall in his Harvard commencement address for the developed European countries.
  - B. The program of economic aid that was successful in Europe has, since 1953, been diluted so that, on a per capita basis, it has provided aid to the underdeveloped nations at less than 1/18th of the amount given to Europeans.

Note: The figure of \$100 billion total of foreign aid has very little relevance to a discussion of our aid to underdeveloped countries. This figure, taken from the reports of the Office of Business Economics on Foreign Grants and Credits, includes the following items having no relationship to underdeveloped countries:

\$16 billion - Post-war relief
23 billion - Lend-lease carry-over, International Monetary Fund, etc.

12 billion - European Recovery Program

\$51 billion

Whereas the \$12 billion expended for European recovery was almost entirely spent for economic aid, of the

\$49 billion of foreign aid appropriated
since 1953,
34 billion was for military assistance,
defense support, and
3 billion for administrative expenses and
international agencies, or
\$37 billion for non-economic aid, leaving
\$12 billion for economic and development aid

assistance from 1953 to 1965 (12 yrs.)

Considering that Europe has only 1/6th of the population of the underdeveloped countries (250 million vs. 1,500 million)

and that the European aid was spent in one-third of the period during which we have given aid to the underdeveloped countries (4 years vs. 12 years), the per capita impact of our aid to underdeveloped countries has been only 1/18th of that to Europe.

- C. The underdeveloped countries have not had prosperous economies that could be revived or free governments that could be restored as was true in Europe. Therefore, these things must be created, and economic aid alone is not sufficient to create them.
- III. The beliefs that our foreign economic aid to underdeveloped countries is bankrupting us, building formidable economic competition abroad, or helping to close the economic gap between the have and have-not nations are all equally unreal.
  - A. Since investment is the key factor in a capitalistic economy, it is interesting to see a comparison of the figures of the U.S. domestic investment, taken from the United States Statistical Abstract, and the appropriations for economic aid in the foreign aid budgets for the last four year period for which statistics are available.

Year	U.S. Gross Private Domestic Investment	U.S. Appropriations for Foreign Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries
1959 1960 1961 1962	\$73 billion 72 billion 69 billion 77 billion \$291 billion	\$ .750 billion .976 billion .962 billion 1.582 billion \$4.270 billion

From this it is obvious that we have appropriated less than 1/70th of the investment we have made to maintain and slightly increase our own standard of living to help raise the standard of living of the underdeveloped countries, but since we only have approximately 1/8th of the population that they have, it is obvious that we have only spent on them, on a per capita basis, 1/560th (1/70th x 1/8th) or less than 1/5th of 1% of what we have spent on ourselves. In other words, for every \$100 that we invest for each citizen of the United States, we toss a couple of thin dimes to the have-not citizen of an underdeveloped country.

- B. In view of the great disparity between private investment at home and public investment abroad, it is obvious that it is unrealistic to think that our government could supply enough capital to the underdeveloped countries to significantly affect their economic development. Most of the capital that they need must be generated through the accumulation and investment of savings within their own economy and by private investment from foreign countries. A necessary prerequisite to self-development in most instances is not only technical assistance but a revision of their political systems to encourage private enterprise and a change in their social institutions affecting education, caste, etc. to stimulate private initiative.
- IV. The greatest underdeveloped resources in the underdeveloped nations are the people. Therefore, the aid which they most need is social and political aid. The carrying out of social and political aid programs will require a radical change in the organization of the administration of our foreign policy.

- A. The science of social change involves anthropology, sociology, history, and other disciplines with which the ordinary businessman, engineer, or technician is unfamiliar. Therefore, the responsibility for social aid should not be turned over to an agency set up primarily to administer economic programs.
- B. Likewise, political evolution and development is a job for political scientists and men experienced in the art of politics. The ambassadors and the political officers on their staffs in our embassies are presumed to have competence in this area and they should have the full operating responsibility for our aid programs in those underdeveloped countries that need social and political aid.
- C. Social and political change can only be brought about by the local leaders in the underdeveloped countries and our principal method of aid must be through intelligent advice and suggestion, which requires deep knowledge of the history as well as the social, religious, and cultural life as well as the personalities of the leaders, such knowledge as can only be gained by long contact with a particular society. The policy of rotating our foreign service personnel every two or three years prevents them from being able to give sound advice or to gain the confidence and respect of the local leaders, which is necessary to giving effective aid.
- D. It is obvious that one policy planning division in Washington is totally inadequate to undertake intelligent policy planning for eighty or ninety countries around the world and the only way that we can have adequate planning is to have a policy planning group for every country, preferably resident in that country.
- E. All of this suggests a much greater delegation of authority not only for planning but for implementation of our policies to the local ambassador, thereby effectively fixing responsibility and encouraging initiative. The caliber of man that we need for our ambassadorial posts can only be maintained if they are given the opportunity to exercise such initiative and responsibility.
- V. The reorganization of the State Department to effect these changes is a full time job. We cannot expect the men responsible for the daily administration of our foreign affairs to take on this additional task. Such reorganization must have the full support of the White House. Therefore, the most effective way in which to bring it about is through a special commission reporting directly to the President.
- VI. The urgent need for reorganization is underlined by the amazing increase in the budget for international affairs in the past 25 years.

Fiscal Year	Federal Budget	National Security	Int'l Affairs
Average 1936-40 1963-64	\$ 8 billion 99 billion	\$ 1 billion 60 billion	\$.025 billion 2.7 billion
Increase	12 times	60 times	100 times

Even more important is the fact that since World War II, our position has changed from that of an observer in international affairs to that of a leader with responsibility not only of formulating policy but carrying it out.

No department of our government has faced as complete a change in its operations, both as to character and size, and therefore requires careful administrative study and revision.

JER/bje FOR-REL:Re VP speech to 25th Biennial Congress of Cooperative League

September 23, 1966

## MEMORANDUM

TO : Marty McNamara

FROM: John Rielly

Is the Vice President scheduled to speak before the 25th
Biennial Congress of the Cooperative League sometime in
October? I received a draft speech from Clyde Ellis on
this so I assume we must have made some commitment
somewhere.

speech

# JER/bje FOR-REL:Re VP speech to 25th Biennial Congress of the Cooperative League

September 23, 1966

MEMORANDUM

TO : Ted Van Dyk

FROM: John Rielly

I gather that the Vice President is committed to making a speech before the 25th Biennial Congress of the Cooperative League of the U.S.A. I received a draft from Clyde Ellis on this. I do want to do some editing on the final draft of the speech, but am not eager to do the first draft as my knowledge of the Cooperative movement is not up to date in detail. My guess is that Dave Gardner would have great interest in taking the initiative on this one. Is this one definitely on your calendar?

spech

# OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

September 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM

: The Vice President

FROM : John Rielly

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Speeches

In response to your memo on foreign policy speeches, I thoroughly concur that it would be advisable for you to try to find an occasion to make a major arms control and disarmament speech this fall. I shall prepare one and have it for use any time after October 1st. At the present time, I don't see an appropriate platform, but I think a possibility would be United Nations Day, October 24th. I will check with Marty to see where you are scheduled to be on that day. Such a speech should not only cover the subject of arms control and nuclear proliferation in Latin America, but should address itself to the main issue of the moment--that of a general non-proliferation treaty. You will have a little more freedom and flexibility after Erhard's visit at the end of September. Even then, however, you would have to take some risks if you are willing to say anything important. You should weigh the risks and advantages of getting out ahead of the White House a little on this.

In regard to Latin America, I have been holding a speech on the Alliance for Progress for over a month. It was prepared for the anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, but not given because the President decided to do so himself. It can be used at any appropriate occasion. One occasion that is coming up is the opening of the new Inter-American Center in New York (the group headed by David Rockefeller and Bill Rogers), but this will not be until towards the end of the year. You may want to do it sooner. It is ready any time you want to schedule it.

In regard to Africa, I advise against giving a speech on Africa unless you have something particular to say on this subject. The principal issues of interest are Rhodesia, South Africa and Nigeria. What exactly someone in your position could say on them I am not sure. However, I will have a draft prepared any way (I have a couple African specialists on tap at State and in New York who would be glad to do this) just in case an appropriate occasion comes up.

# OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

September 19, 1966

pli spusher

MEMO To John R. From John R.

Remember to call Tom Melady, and John Schot and ask them to draft a paper on U.S. policy in Africa.

Also remember to call George Bunn and ask them to do a speech on arms control and disarmament.

bont

Remember to call Dick Gardner and ask him to do a draft on the United Nations.

## JER/bje FOR-REL:draft speeches for VP

October 20, 1966

MEMORANDUM

TO : The Vice President

FROM: John Rielly

In regard to your memo of October 18th on the speech of the decade of development, we are holding a draft speech on this subject for any suitable occasion. Ted tells me that we are not likely to have an occasion before the end of the campaign, but it is ready to go whenever you need it.

I am also holding a speech on nuclear proliferation and another on the Alliance for Progress. They can be used whenever a suitable platform is available. Spell

# THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

October 18, 1966

Memo for John Rielly From The Vice President

cc: Ted Van Dyk

Please note the attached editorial from the Minneapolis

Tribune. I would like to get a good speech, not too long, on the decade of development. We can use some of the material we used in the OECD speech.

## Self-Help for the World's Poor Nations

THE PLIGHT of the world's developing countries, and their macility to make more than painfully slow progress in this "Decade of Development," has created a sense of frustration within the nations themselves and in the international organizations trying to help them.

Male 24 (3/

If the present trend of a slowdown in growth and an increase in population continues, inhabitants of these countries can look forward only to fewer jobs, less food and a lower standard of living. These are the ingredients of political revolt.

Considerable attention was focused on this problem last week, in the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as in an analysis published by the Committee for Economic Development (CED).

Examining the records of the few countries that have broken through barriers to rapid economic growth and higher personal incomes, the CED report found that the governments and people of these nations had the ability and the will to give realistic priorities to the measures required to lift them from the swamps of poverty. Too many low income countries, it was found, have not faced up to doing what development requires, even when they have abundant resources.

The poor countries need economic and technical help from the industrial giants, but even more, they need self help. High on their list of priorities should be training and more efficient use of their manpower, as well as an accelerated program to limit population growth. Increase in agricultural

productivity needs to be a major objective, while industrial projects should be limited to those that can turn out products competitive in foreign and domestic markets.

Many of the developing countries have tried to make the hurdle from a primitive society to an industrial one, with no stops along the way. They have looked to the outside for help, rather than drawing on their own resources. The result has been too many failures.

#### OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

#### WASHINGTON

November 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM

The Vice President

John Rielly

SUBJECT: Speech on World Poverty and Development

I had hoped that you might be able to do a speech on world poverty, the decade of development and the theme of international social justice before the meeting of the National Council of Churches. However, my discussions with Bill Welsh on this subject indicate that for a number of reasons it is more appropriate to use that platform for a domestic-oriented speech. Therefore, we shall have to find another platform for this type of speech.

I have a draft here which was done outside and has a few good ideas in it. But my basic problem with a speech like that is: how does one say anything significant about the problem of world poverty and development without discussing the failure of the industralized countries (and particularly of the United States, whose gross national product equals half of total world production) to respond to the increasing need of the developing world for assistance, and to the increasing capacity of the developing world to absorb higher levels of external assistance? Everyone knows that this is the case. It has been documented by the World Bank, the United Nations, the Pope, the World Council of Churches, numerous scholars, and every organization that made a study of the problem. Yet the response of the United States Government during the last three years has been to reduce the level of capital assistance, to impose higher and higher interest rates, and to impose further restrictions.

For the most part the White House has done nothing to resist this trend.

I would like to have some idea of how we handle this issue before going ahead and writing a speech on this subject. Do you have any ideas?

- Pushing tur edes.

## JER/bje FOR-REL: possible Dec platform ak for arms control speech

#### November 21, 1966

#### MEMORANDUM

TO : Marty McNamara

cc: The Vice President

FROM : John Rielly

SUBJECT: Speech Platforms for December

I'm still looking for a suitable platform for the Vice President to deliver a speech on arms control and nuclear proliferation. I have been holding a speech draft since early September on this. You will recall that we tried to find some suitable platform during the campaign, but without avail.

I know there is little time between now and January ist to schedule any new appearances, but I would be interested in knowing if any of the appearances already committed might be suitable for an address on this subject. I believe the Vice President is scheduled to dedicate a university and also address one or two Jewish groups some time in December? Could you send me a note informing me which appearances are booked and whether they might be suitable?

This subject is not and we really should not permit it to wait until January.

#### December 27, 1966



MEMORANDUM

TO : Ed Wenk

FROM: John Rielly

The Vice President is going to try to give a speech on East-West relations some time in January or February. We want to include in it some discussion of the Space Treaty and of the possibilities for cooperation in the oceanography field. Could you have Glenn Schweitzer draft a couple of pages on this subject. We shall entertain anything you think should go into a speech of this type. If I could have it by January 5th that would be fine.

Antifersity of Notre Dame
Notre D

Thank you for your letter of November 29th. We would be honored to have the Vice President at the University of Notre Dame on January 16, 1967 and will arrange for a public lecture, an informal gathering with faculty and students, or even a tour of the campus and classes - whatever the Vice President prefers. If you wish to include community and democratic party leaders in these activities, I would be pleased to make such arrangements.

I have asked Mr. James Wiser of the Academic Commission at the University to contact you for further clarification of plans. I know all of the University is looking forward to Vice President Humphrey's visit; thank you again for accepting our invitation.

James A. Bogle,
Assistant Professor,
Faculty Advisor to the
Academic Commission

JB/1b

( W)

#### OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

January 13, 1967

Speech speedures

Memo to The Vice President

From Bill Welsh

Re attachments from Ted Van Dyk and John Rielly

Your idea of clearance on sensitive Foreign Policy Speeches seemed ideal to me. Drafts cleared by you would be delivered to the Secretary State's office on any major speech with a notation that "The Vice President has reviewed this text and would like for you to have a copy before its delivery." Then any questions can be raised directly with you.

On general speeches, there would be no agency "clearance." Staff would continue to consult for policy quidelines on phrasing, but always on an informal basis.

Doesn't this seem to be the spirit of your approach?

MEMORANDUM

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

January 9, 1967

To Bill week

TO:

The Vice President

FROM:

Ted

RE:

Speech Clearance Procedures

I have read through the attached memo.

As John points out, it is seldom that we undertake a text of such sensitivity that there is any reason for concern re department and agency reactions.

Where a speech <u>is</u> sensitive, or where any policy question arises, I have always made it a practice -- both with foreign and domestic texts -- to check informally with the department or agency involved and to so draft the language that:

- 1) You say what you want to say, yet
- 2) Any fracases within government are avoided.

#### National Security and foreign policy texts

Since the President made his "no clearance" instruction many months ago, I have sent to Mac Bundy, and now Walt Rostow, your important foreign policy texts whenever I thought there might be a question (and to cover you). They have always received these in the spirit that it was unnecessary for you to submit them, but that they would be happy to add a suggestion or two. They have made suggestions from time to time -- always useful, but nothing major or at variance with original draft.

John R. did, as he indicates, run some of your texts through the State bureaucracy in the process of preparation -- with the result he outlines here.

#### My reaction

You work for the President, and it seems to me that your texts -- when submitted for comment and review -- should be to NSC and Walt Rostow, who are the President's men.

There are people in State and Defense whose judgment we respect and who, from time to time, may actually undertake the first draft of a text for you. Whenever we have had one of these done, the text has been sent directly over here from the author (whether he be Assistant Secretary, bureau chief, or just plain desk officer). We have then checked back with the right people at State or NSC re facts, policy, etc., but without ever getting the text involved in "clearance" by a whole line of Department bureaucrats. This inevitably takes all the heart and content out of the text, and also ties up hours and days while small minds nitpick among each other.

#### Proposal

I suggest we continue as we have, without getting your texts tied up in bureaucracy any more than absolutely necessary.

In no case do I believe an early working draft should be allowed to get into a "clearance" situation.

If you will leave this to me, I will see that your texts are exposed to appropriate people for review -- working with our staff people in such a fashion that you will be protected and still impart the message you want imparted.

The only problem really does seem to lie with State, and I suggest that in those occasional instances where the Secretary might have a real objection, we set it up so that you handle it with him directly, informally and without fuss. There are ways to do this.

> See me Amend as follows:

#### OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

November 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM

TO

The Vice President

FROM

: John Rielly

clines nume SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Speeches: Clearance Guidelines

The State Department's reaction to two of your recent speech drafts (one in preliminary, one in final form) suggest the need to review with you exactly what guidelines you want followed in preparing your foreign policy speeches.

All last year your major foreign policy speeches were cleared by both the State Department and the White House. This year, following the President's indication to you at the end of last year that you need not formally clear your speeches, we have followed a more informal practice of circulating a draft to Walt Rostow or to a knowledgeable policy-level official in the State Department. In most cases they have not been formally submitted for clearance as was the case last year. There have only been about four speeches (West Point speech on China, National Press Club speech on Vietnam, Oregon speech on Vietnam, and your speech last week at the Pan American Union on Latin America) requiring this sort of clearance.

The Oregon speech is a good illustration of the problem. Knowing that this speech would have more significance than usual because of the importance of the Vietnam issue in the Duncan-Hatfield race, I had personally drafted the speech drawing on many of the proposals under consideration by the Harriman group. I circulated an early draft to Chet Cooper of Harriman's staff; Leonard Unger, Chairman of the Vietnam Task Force and Deputy to Bill Bundy; and to Tom Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Between the time it was originally drafted and the time it was delivered, Ambassador Goldberg gave his speech at the United Nations which effectively scooped the draft I had prepared. The final draft of the speech that was telexed out to you for your approval differed with the Goldberg draft only in the phrasing of one sentence: it stated the issue of Viet Cong representation in negotiations in a form of a straight declarative sentence rather than in a circumlocution.

Rusk was most unhappy with your Oregon speech. I later learned that there had been a terrific battle between Rusk and Goldberg over Goldberg's speech. In the end, Goldberg got final clearance from the White House for his speech. Rusk was not keen in some things Goldberg said and was all the more unhappy when they were repeated by you. He seemed to be under the impression that in delivering the speech you had gone beyond the prepared text. He was further exercised by the Andy Glass interview on the Manila Conference which was reported the same day.

Rusk specifically asked Ben Read to find out whether this speech had been formally cleared by the Department and whether you stuck to the text. I explained to Ben that it had not been formally cleared but had been seen by three ranking people in the Department. On the Secretary's instructions, Ben Read asked that in the future an information copy of any speech of yours could be sent to the Department in advance, despite the President's statement last year that you did not have to formally clear your speeches. I agreed to do this, but pointed out that the President's instruction had absolved you of the necessity of any formal clearance.

In view of the Secretary's request and his considerable unhappiness with the Oregon speech, I sent a copy of an early draft of your Latin American speech to Ben Read and another to Walt Rostow. Several days later I received Rostow's comments as well as those of Lincoln Gordon. The latter's were sent over in writing. Gordon elaborated his views at considerably greater length in a half hour telephone conversation. On the key section of the arms race in Latin America, I deleted my entire section and substituted the new language submitted by Gordon. I incorporated all the other deletions that he specifically requested.

In the section on political development, I revised it along the lines of his suggestions, though I did not eliminate it. I also qualified the comment encouraging greater European representation in Latin America. Gordon objected to my mentioning of the names of a group of Presidents so I deleted this and substituted countries. He said this was a great improvement though he would prefer not mentioning any countries at all. He did not press the latter point however. None of this section raised any problems for Rostow.

Following our conversation the morning before the speech was to be delivered, Lincoln Gordon left Washington for Cambridge, Massachusetts. In the afternoon his Deputy, Bob Sayre, called to indicate that he would like to have the preference to Europe eliminated and also wanted to delete or revise further several paragraphs on political development that Linc Gordon and I had discussed. Although Linc Gordon had raised some questions about this section, he had not asked that it be deleted. I therefore was uncertain as to the extent Sayre was actually speaking for Gordon or to what extent he was speaking for Sayre. I know Bob Sayre well. He is an able man but is probably the most conservative Deputy Assistant Secretary in the entire State Department. He was the principal protege of Tom Mann and prides himself on his hard-line approach to Latin American problems. As is usually the case, he is "more Catholic than the Pope" and makes Tom Mann look like a liberal.

At his request I sent Bob the revised section in dispute which he took to the Secretary. He succeeded in getting the Secretary very excited about this, and it was at that point that the Secretary called you in Minnesota, and myself in Washington. Following these talks we eliminated the section in dispute. That result all around was to eliminate important sections of the speech and weaken others leaving it a pretty bland product in the end.

The latter case is different from the Oregon case in this respect: due to the election you did <u>not</u> have a chance to review the final text <u>before</u> it was given final clearance. This was a serious, if unavoidable, disadvantage, as one could only have a general idea of your views on the thrust of the speech but not a precise knowledge of your response to particular sections.

The question for the future is: do you want all speeches to be <u>formally</u> cleared by both the State Department and the White House? If they are cleared by the White House you will have considerably more flexibility than you will in State, for both bureaucratic and policy reasons. In the more recent case, a section of the speech was vetoed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

You are aware of course that clearance by Walt Rostow and his staff will not necessarily satisfy Secretary Rusk and you run a grave risk of antagonizing, if not alienating, him if you do not clear everything with him. His well-established policy views on anumber of important subjects are considerably more restrictive than those of the White House. The Secretary would never have cleared a speech on US-Soviet relations like the one the President gave on October 7th (which was drafted chiefly by Zbignew Brezinski and Francis Bator) nor would he have cleared the speech given by Ambassador Goldberg.

There can be absolutely no question that you must avoid any divergence from the President's policy in public statements. However, if you consider it important to try to re-identify yourself with some of the issues which you were associated with in the past, and to end the estrangement from the liberal-academic community, it will be difficult to do this if it is necessary to adjust every speech to fit the prejudices of every timid State Department bureaucrat that may get involved. I refer specifically to such issues as arms control and disarmament, US-Soviet relations, East-West trade, Latin American policy and the United States. On Vietnam, I would counsel 100 per cent orthodoxy as defined by State in all public statements and no effort to stretch the limits of US policy. On certain less delicate issues, you may have a little more flexibility. Do you think you do--and if so on what issues? I have been inclined to fight hard in the negotiations over some of these speeches--but will not do so if our policy is to be 100 per cent safe on every issue.

If the President takes the election results seriously, he may be prepared to recognize that his own succession depends on identifying his Administration with some foreign policy issues that have appeal to the liberal and intellectual communities which he has alienated in the past two years. It is possible that in some cases he may not object to your attempting to break new ground. This proved to be the case on the China issue this past year.

If the President does in fact believe that the standard of orthodoxy which the Vice President must adhere to in every case is that defined by Secretary Rusk, then you will of course have no choice but to do so. This may be the price you have to pay for smooth relations with the White House. But I would want to be sure before finally concluding this, because you can be sure the price you will have to pay in the country is a high one.

One alternative is to abandon any hope of making creative or imaginative foreign policy speeches and use the forum of television to break new ground. Statements on television are more tentative—and can be more easily knocked down if the reaction is negative. If it is favorable, one can then elaborate the theme later in a formal speech. This may be the pattern which necessity dictates in your present circumstances.

We have the speech before the Institute for International Education coming up December 6th, and I am holding a draft on arms control. Could I have your guidance before you go on vacation so I can proceed with these two?

# OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON 1/19/67

JUNE:

Note the VP's note to occasionally send these panel members speeches. At some point could you pull together a list of the members of these various advisory panels which we can have on hand. When an important speech comes up, we can then give it or part of it to the public relations department here and they canmail these speeches out. We will not have to be responsible for the actual mailing out if we have the list ready.

#### STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISORY PANEL MEMBERS

#### TO BE SENT VARIOUS VP"S SPEECHES

#### EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS ADVISORY PANEL

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# Spechis

## THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

February 13, 1967

Memo for John Rielly From The Vice President

Here is a mighty good pamphlet on international economic cooperation. There is some material in here for speeches on this line. I have marked up some of it. Look it over and make sure that we make use of it somewhere along the line.

Speech on Intern And



TWENTY YEARS AFTER: AN APPEAL
FOR THE RENEWAL OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
ON A GRAND SCALE

Saf 3

#### A REPORT

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE AND PAYMENTS

OF THE

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES



SEPTEMBER 1966

Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1966

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Sueed or Irlum YEARS AFTER: AN APPEAL

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(Created pursuant to sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304, 79th Cong.)

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11

#### LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

SEPTEMBER 16, 1966.

To the Members of the Joint Economic Committee:

Transmitted herewith for the use of the members of the Joint Economic Committee and other Members of Congress is a report of the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments entitled "Twenty Years After: An Appeal for the Renewal of International Economic Cooperation on a Grand Scale."

The views expressed in this subcommittee report do not necessarily represent the views of other members of the committee who have not participated in hearings of the subcommittee and the drafting of its report.

Sincerely,

WRIGHT PATMAN, Chairman, Joint Economic Committee.

SEPTEMBER 15, 1966.

Hon. WRIGHT PATMAN, Chairman, Joint Economic Committee. U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is the unanimous report of the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments entitled "Twenty Years After: An Appeal for the Renewal of International Economic Cooperation on a Grand Scale."

The subcommittee wishes to express its gratitude and appreciation for the guidance it has received from the experts who appeared before it as witnesses.

Sincerely.

HENRY S. REUSS, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments.

LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

Support 16, 1966.

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CONTENTS

	Pag
Letters of transmittal	11
I. International cooperation or chaos: 1947 and 1967	
III. Dramatic action is called for: An invitation to others to take the initiative	

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The world is in trouble deep trouble in al least his still error arms of economic negotiation and policy, tents and to have developed countries; each make, a believe independent payments; international machine referen

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# TWENTY YEARS AFTER: AN APPEAL FOR THE RENEWAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION ON A GRAND SCALE

#### I. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OR CHAOS: 1947 AND 1967

The Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee has reached the conclusion that a dramatic new approach is necessary in order to infuse new life into negotiations to dispose of the unresolved issues on the international economic agenda. There is no reason to think that agreement and closer cooperation are impossible, but the technicians and experts are still on dead center. There is only one way to get things moving again: this

is to call together a high-level conference of governments.

Twenty years ago this coming June 5, 1967, the prospects for rapid European recovery and for multilateral economic cooperation were hanging in doubt. Twenty years ago this coming June 5, the century's most ambitious experiment in multilateral economic cooperation was launched when Secretary of State Marshall made a brief suggestion in a commencement address at Harvard University. He invited the European nations to take the initiative in coming together to estimate their needs and to plan for coordinated reconstruction efforts. That initiative was taken; the United States responded; and the European recovery program—a noble and successful experiment—was the result.

But the spirit of 1947 and the determination to solve vital problems are missing today. We believe that the time has come to renew our cooperative efforts on the grand scale of 1947. We believe that the experience of the Marshall Plan points the way—that an initiative from others promises more success than an initiative from the United

States.

By issuing a report at this time, we hope not only to provoke discussion of our views. We hope also to assure the representatives of the OECD countries or of a broader group of nations that an initiative coming from them to call a high-level governmental conference is feasible and would be welcomed by us. Finally, we hope to assure the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, that if they saw fit to respond favorably to such an initiative, they would have full and enthusiastic backing.

### II. OUR WORLD IS ON DEAD CENTER IN TRADE, AID, PAYMENTS, INTERNATIONAL MONEY, AND DOMESTIC STABILITY

The world is in trouble—deep trouble—in at least five different areas of economic negotiation and policy: trade; aid to less developed countries; maintaining a balance in international payments; international monetary reform; and maintenance of stable price levels in economies marked by full employment and rapid economic growth.

(1) On trade.—The latest round of trade negotiations initiated under President Kennedy moves ponderously toward its June 1967 deadline with little prospect for achieving very much of what had been hoped from it at its initiation 5 years ago. Furthermore, whatever happens, the United States, like other countries, will need a new trade policy after next June when the present round terminates for good or ill.

(2) On international aid programs.—The will of the industrial countries to help the less developed seems to be fading even though material advance in our own domestic economies is creating an increasing capacity to give such help. In the United States, the architects and champions of foreign aid in Congress, as elsewhere, are withdrawing their advocacy of long commitments, if not indeed of any commitments at all. Our European partners seem to deny the obligation to participate in such efforts except on a strictly commercial basis. The proposal to increase the flow of aid through the International Development Association and thereby to internationalize it has been shrugged off. The prosperous Common Market turns increasingly inward, and the other industrialized nations therefore begin to look to their separate interests. As the needs grow, therefore, and more people face severe shortages of food, to say nothing of amenities, programs become progressively inadequate.

(3) On international payments.—The cooperation on international adjustment and facilitation of payments settlement which marked the early postwar years has congealed into rigid exchange rates and recriminations as to who is to make adjustments to keep the system in balance. Restrictions ease the situation or postpone the day of settlement, but only at the cost of liberal trade policy and future prosperity. The U.S. unilateral efforts to put its own payments in order without damage to the international economy have shown little real progress. As a result, there has been a continuing increase in the supply of dollars in foreign hands accompanied by a persistent conversion of such dollars into gold by at least one of the powers; namely, France. The process continues at such a rate that many are begin-

ning to fear a future run on the dollar.

(4) On international monetary reform.—Heads of national treasuries and central banks have been talking international monetary reform for over 5 years. But today we live on hope rather than accomplished agreement. We have reached agreement on brilliant exegeses on the alternatives but no agreement at all on which one we will take as a basis for policy. Our best hope is that if all goes well, everyone but France will be in agreement a year from now as to what we might start to do if the world ever ran into serious financial trouble. This is small consolation, for real trouble will not necessarily give us notice of a year or two in order to enable us to put the new machinery in place. The world faces a very real risk that if a financial crisis comes, it will be with so little warning that we had better have the machinery in existence and functioning, not merely agreed upon in vague principle. And that kind of agreement is far from an immediate prospect.

(5) On full employment without inflation.—Almost every one of our countries is producing more with each passing year. Each in its own way has found a road to rising productivity, full employment, and

rising standards of living. But no nation has managed to obtain a full employment economy with rapid growth while still retaining reasonably stable prices. And every one knows full well the end of the road if the nations do not solve this dilemma.

If the world's malaise were only economic, matters would be bad enough. But it is also political. The disintegration that has set in in recent years has gone across the full scope of diplomatic and military issues, as well as economic. Policies of the various countries have become increasingly preoccupied with shortrun nationalistic advantage rather than long-term international cooperation.

Lipservice to interdependence is common, but actual international cooperation fades hourly into the background. Whether we are negotiating about military affairs, for example NATO, or international monetary reform seems to make little difference. The discussions that do take place are at a very low level—technical discussions by finance, trade, or aid officials, or brief bilateral affairs of limited agenda. The smaller countries are in no position to take the initiative. The larger countries pledge international cooperation but practice national parochialism. Heads of State visit each other for a weekend but the pronouncements that follow contain little of substance. The powers are divided about gold only a little less than about the solution to the problems of Vietnam and southeast Asia. In a word, the nations of the world are slipping back into postures of adamant nationalistic selfishness. Psychologically the world is on a dangerous skid toward international chaos.

### III. DRAMATIC ACTION IS CALLED FOR: AN INVITATION TO OTHERS TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE

History gives little ground for expecting the economies of the world to move smoothly forever if we do not mend fences in time through international cooperation. Now is the time, therefore, to act before a crisis finds a spark to set it off. We have a fitting occasion which provides both a convenient date and a symbol for such cooperation. June 5, 1967, will be the 20th anniversary of Secretary of State George C. Marshall's famous speech at Harvard in which he launched his call for international cooperation which led to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of postwar Europe.

The key to the Marshall Plan was: (1) International cooperation in planning and execution of programs to solve one common problem while the nations remained at odds on other issues set aside for the moment; and (2) a U.S. pledge of good will, cooperation, and the goods and capital necessary to make the plan work. It was so successful that it inspired a whole decade of varied international cooperative efforts, many of which still survive to the benefit of

Europe and the world.

The problems now are different. Success depends not on the United States providing the capital and other resources the world needs. Success depends upon joint cooperation and contributions of all the industrialized countries. The leading nations might make such a contribution by convening a high-level governmental conference which would design and launch a new plan of international coopera-

tion, comparable in scope and appeal to the original Marshall Plan, to become operational on that plan's anniversary, June 5, 1967.

Therefore, this subcommittee calls upon the United States and the other industrial countries (Europe plus Canada and Japan) to work toward an immediate convening of such a conference with two objectives: (1) To develop mechanisms of cooperation where necessary to achieve full employment, rapid growth, and stable prices in each of our countries; and (2) to develop techniques for international cooperation in trade, aid, and monetary reform that will make it possible for the developing countries to feed their teeming millions and develop their economies until they become true trading partners on equal status.

The plan developed out of the conference, for activation next June 5, should contain provisions at least for the following:

(i) A trade policy to succeed the present round of negotiations

under GATT;

(ii) An aid policy that would see to a real transfer of goods and services from the advanced to the developing countries, on a scale more nearly related to the urgent needs of the latter:

(iii) A program of international monetary reform, through the IMF, that would adequately reconcile the interests of reservecurrency countries and other countries holding these currencies as reserves: and

(iv) Establishment of machinery to assist in maintaining continuing cooperation for achieving full employment and price stability throughout the cooperating community of nations.

Such a high-level governmental conference would serve several other purposes. It would bring together under one roof technicians and experts in a number of fields who have been working for too long in separate compartments. It would force them to take a global view of the problems on which they have been working and to see anew the interconnections among them. It would move problems that are too important to be settled on a bilateral basis or within restricted groups to an appropriate multilateral forum. Above all, it would provide the political impetus necessary to mobilize efforts to solve these problems, and it would demonstrate in a dramatic way the commitment of these countries to building a harmonious and generous international economy.

In placing this appeal before the nations—our own as much as the others of the free world—the subcommittee is not unmindful of the difficulties. But it is more mindful of the penalties of failure. We must find a way to break out of the small battlegrounds of the technicians and forge a new spirit and practice of international cooperation. If we do not, then economic and political pressures, created by nationalistic parochialisms, will force us eventually to face these same decisions under far less favorable circumstances.

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Therefore, this subsequenties calls upon the United States and the other industrial countries therape play canada anti-topical to work toward as impositely convening of such a conference with two abjectives: (1) To developmentary to achieve full employment, rapid growth, and stately prices in each of approximities; and (2) to develop techniques for international compensation in units, and, and monetary return that will make if possible for the developing countries to feed their techniques millions and developing countries to feed their techniques true trading partners as equal states.

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#### March 16, 1967.

TO:

John Reilly

FROM:

Julie

RE:

FOR YOUR BACKGROUND REFERENCE AND USE: SOME RECENT REPRINTS OF MAGAZINE ARTICLES

AND SPEECHES BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

For your glancing and, possibly, as enclosures for outgoing correspondence, attached are a few recent reprints.

For supply, please call Fay or Janice -- 103-3203.

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# RECENT BY-LINE MAGAZINE ARTICLES AND REPRINTS OF SPEECHES BY THE VICE PRESIDENT AS OF MARCH 17, 1967

(NOTE: "R" signifies a bulk supply of reprints is available)

SUBJECT	MAGAZINE OR ORGANIZATION	I TITLE OF ARTICLE OR SPEECH	DATE
AGRI - CUL TURE	Soil Conservation (R)	"Regional Cooperation in Conservation"	DATE 1/67
BUSINESS	American Business Press Convention (Leaflet)	Tribute to American Advertising (Excerpt of speech)	2/2/67
(	American Business Press Convention (Leaflet) (BR	Spaceh Ar	2/2/67
CIVIL RIGHTS	American Conversations (Pamphlet) - Interview by American Jewish Com.	"Race in a Changing World"	2/12/67
	Negro Digest (R)	"Closing America's History Gap"	2/67
	Tuesday (R)	"For Our Youth: Expand Opportunities"	3/67
CULTURE	Musical America	Tribute to Pablo Casals	4/67
CULTURE	Musical America  Reader's Digest (R) (Reprint of Article from Atlantic Monthly)	Tribute to Pablo Casals  "The Legacy My Father Left Me"	4/67
FAMILY  FOREIGN POLICY- LATIN	Reader's Digest (R) (Reprint of Article from Atlantic Monthly)  ADA World (Reprint of Speech in Newspaper)	"The Legacy My Father	
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FAMILY  FOREIGN POLICY- LATIN	Reader's Digest (R) (Reprint of Article from Atlantic Monthly)  ADA World (Reprint of Speech in Newspaper)  Institute for International Education Dinner (R) (Reprint of speech	"The Legacy My Father Left Me"  "Humphrey Urges Positive Latin Program"  "World Leadership and	1/67
FAMILY  FOREIGN POLICY- LATIN AMERICA  OCEANO-	Reader's Digest (R) (Reprint of Article from Atlantic Monthly)  ADA World (Reprint of Speech in Newspaper)  Institute for International Education Dinner (R) (Reprint of speech in pamphlet)  Undersea Technology (R)	"The Legacy My Father Left Me"  "Humphrey Urges Positive Latin Program"  "World Leadership and International Education"	1/67 2/67 12/6/66 1/67
FAMILY  FOREIGN POLICY- LATIN AMERICA  OCEANO- GRAPHY	Reader's Digest (R) (Reprint of Article from Atlantic Monthly)  ADA World (Reprint of Speech in Newspaper)  Institute for International Education Dinner (R) (Reprint of speech in pamphlet)  Undersea Technology (R)  Rehabilitation Record (R)	"The Legacy My Father Left Me"  "Humphrey Urges Positive Latin Program"  "World Leadership and International Education"  "Opportunity to Move Ahead"  "Society's Benefits Are for	1/67 2/67 12/6/66

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# World Leadership And International Education

An Address by Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice President of the United States

Institute of International Education December 6, 1966 New York Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y.

On the evening of Dec. 6, 1966 the Institute of International Education was privileged to present the Vice President of the United States, the Honorable Hubert Humphrey, as the main speaker at a dinner attended by 600 leaders of the academic, business and civic community. The Vice President was introduced by Lawrence A. Wien, an IIE trustee and dinner chairman. Welcoming remarks were made by Kenneth Holland, IIE president.

One of the things I've become accustomed to reading lately is that scholars and politicians should get together more—some-thing on the order of Aristotle and young Alexander the order of Aristotle Great meeting for tutorial.

I think it is a good idea for those of my political colleagues who feel they need the help. And it isn't even a bad idea for some of my former academic colleagues who might profit by knowing Alexander's problems. Being a Renaissance man myself-an ex-professor and a present politician-I tend to favor an evening with Aristotle.

The Institute of International Education is a place where intellect and power have been brought together—and long before Franklin Roosevelt's "brains trust" or the era of the Washington in-and-outer.

The Institute of International Education has been in existence now almost half a century. From its initiatives have flowed the Fulbright Act, the Smith-Mundt Act, the International Cultural Exchange Act, the International Education Act, and the range of highly important programs which form the base of our efforts in international education today. And these programs came none too soon. But without the work of the Institute of International Education, they might not have come at all.

In the past two decades, we have seen science and technology shrink our neighborhood so that today the moral unity and interdependence of man (which for centuries has been the basis of Western civilization)—has now become a physical fact of our lives. Isolationism has been replaced by a global consciousness. Yet we are today only at the primitive

with Aristotle.

The communications satellites bear with them the implications of a one-world classroom. The sky is no longer the limit.

stages of the scientific and technological development which will shrink our human neighborhood still further.

The prospect of a supersonic transport plane—a few years ago a matter of "if"—is today only a matter of "who first?" I doubt that we have full grasp of what the SST will mean in terms of increased exchange of people and goods. And the communications satellites—Buck Rogers items through most of our lifetimes—will soon be bringing mass communication, in the real sense, to our planet. They bear with them, too, the implications of the creation of a one-world classroom.

The sky is no longer the limit!

In such an age, our position of world leadership demands that we go far beyond our present efforts in international education. The International Education Act will make a real difference in helping improve the faculties, facilities, and libraries of our colleges and universities. Its impact will be felt at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. The new Center for Educational Cooperation will serve as a government manpower resources headquarters in the entire field. These things give us a framework upon which we can build.

Next year, the President will convene a White House Conference on International Education. Its purpose will be to look beyond the programs now under way, or even contemplated—in fact, to take international education into Century 21. Planning meetings for the conference will begin in the next few weeks, under the chairmanship of Secretary Gardner and Dr. James Perkins of Cornell. But we all should remember that the determination of the government to do its part to strengthen international education in no way dimin-

ishes the need for continued leadership in this field by private institutions of all kinds—foundations, universities, colleges, churches, and others.

The role of the government in this field must always be to supplement, never to supplant, the efforts of private groups and individuals. The bold experiments, the expanded programs that should come from private institutions like the Institute of International Education, can be carried out only with the continued support of American private benefactors. So take the initiative. Do your job. Lead.

Indeed, one of the urgent tasks of our American democracy is to find new ways and means to mobilize and allocate both public and private resources to the priorities of our time without either destroying private initiative or unduly enhancing public power.

Tonight I would like to address myself to the next decade to the world of the 1970's. I would like to take advantage of the presence of so many illustrious figures from the world of education and finance, foundations and business, the communications media and the arts—to raise certain questions which you and your children must answer. And it is appropriate that these questions be put to you.

Governments—and government officials—must deal with immediate problems. This often clouds their perception of the future. But you are less inhibited by these restraints and better situated to anticipate what is coming as well as to respond to what is here.

In speculating on the world of the 1970's (and what I suggest here tonight can only be considered as speculation by an

An urgent task of American democracy is to find new ways to mobilize and allocate public and private resources to the priorities of our time.

amateur), I would like to raise several questions about the consequences of what has been called "the second Industrial Revolution."

The first Industrial Revolution was characterized by the invention of powerful machines which multiply man's capacity for physical work. The second Industrial Revolution which is coming upon us long before the problems of the first have been solved-is characterized by the invention of new electronic machines which are destined to multiply the capacity of the human mind.

One important consequence of the second Industrial Revolution involves the technological gap which today separates the world's most developed country, the United States, from the other developed areas of the world-yes, even Europe. This unique gap exists in large part because the second Industrial Revolution has developed in the United States far more than in any other area. It results, in part, from the differing levels of technological progress and organizational efficiency, which are also affected by the factor of optimum size. These can lead to the creation of differences between two developed areas—developed in the sense of the first Industrial Revolution—just as there are differences which now exist between the so-called developed areas of the Northern Hemisphere and the developing or underdeveloped nations of the South.

Scientific and technical progress is continuing at an accelerated rate—with no prospect of reaching a saturation point. Discoveries are based on previous knowledge and, in turn, generate progress in other fields. Progress becomes selfpropelling.

Only four areas of the world—the United States, Western Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union-have the educational and research resources and other elements of a technological base to deal with the current pace of scientific discoveries. But none of the four has the resources today to deal effectively with the entire spectrum of these discoveries, although the United States comes closest to it.

The extent to which this scientific and technological progress takes place depends greatly on the rate of investment in research and development. Recent Common Market estimates show the total of scientists and research workers in the United States to be four times greater than in all the countries of the EEC, and three-and-a-half times greater than in the Soviet Union. According to the same estimates, research expenditures in the United States are seven times greater than in the Common Market and three-and-a-half times those of the Soviet Union. And U.S. per capita investment is six times as much as in the Common Market and four times that of the Soviet Union.

Beyond the statistics, however, we are told by European entrepeneurs that this disparity in scientific research capacity is widened by the difference in organizational capacity between the United States and Europe. Aurelio Peccei of Organization is the decisive Olivetti, for one, believes that only the United States possesses the highly developed modern organization required to profit appreciably from the technological discoveries of today.

This is especially important in the new and complex field of electronic data processing, where organization is the decisive factor in exploiting the potential capacity of highly refined factor in exploiting the potential capacity of highly refined machines.

by the invention of new electronic machines destined to multiply the capacity of the human mind.

Revolution is characterized

The second Industrial

machines. To translate the amazing potential of computers into concrete benefits for society requires an accumulation of skills which few nations have. It requires, as Mr. Peccei points out, "evolved user techniques, knowledge of machine languages, advanced methodology, rich program libraries, access to the cross-fertilizing experiences of a vast network of users, plus a competent array of mathematicians, analysts, and programmers."

What is relevant here is that the material advantages which exist in an advanced society such as the United States or Western Europe are multiplied by the organizational structure and capacity of the country or region.

Western European countries today have neither the size required for such efficient organization nor adequate basic infrastructure, such as fully sufficient communication linkage essential to transmission of electronic data. The end of the present fragmentation of Europe is considered a necessity.

But fortunately, on both sides of the Atlantic we are beginning to face up to this problem. We have already taken steps to remove barriers to the flow of scientific and technical information and instruments to and from our country.

As a United States Senator, I proposed that NATO, in meeting the new challenges facing the Alliance, should take concrete steps toward narrowing the technological gap. Proposals for such cooperative actions are now formally before the NATO ministers. The OECD ministers have recently authorized an analytical study of the gap.

One promising proposal has been Prime Minister Wilson's for a European Technological Community. If Europe—



technology, I have no doubt that the technological gap would, in the next decade, begin to close.

If Europe were to pool her

Ambassador Eugenie Anderson, U.S. Representative on the UN Trusteeship Council; HE President Kenneth Holland, and the Vice President.





Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey greet Rep. John Brademas of Indiana, Congressional sponsor of the International Education Act of 1966. He received IIE's distinguished service award.



Distinguished dais guests.



Adama Balima, IIE-sponsored New York
University student from Upper Volta; Henry Hyatt
(wearing glasses) of the UN Secretariat;
Guillermo Betancour, IIE-sponsored Venezuelan
NYU student; David L. Guyer, IIE Vice
President for Development and Public Affairs
and Vice President Humphrey.



Vice President Humphrey with Lawrence A. Wien, IIE Trustee and chairman of the dinner.



The Vice President and Miss Jane Marsh, IIE-sponsored soprano who won first prize in the 1966 Tchaikovsky International Music Competition in Moscow. She sang at the dinner.



Mrs. Maurice T. Moore, IIE Trustee.



H. E. Sr. Carlos Mackehenie, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Peruvian Mission to the United Nations, with Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey.

which has already seen the benefits of a European Economic Community, a Coal and Steel Community, and an Atomic Energy Community-were to pool her technology in a similar way, I have no doubt that the gap would, in the next dec- We must guide the technoade, begin to close.

The fundamental question which I would like to leave with you is: What are the implications of this second Industrial Revolution for the international relations of the 1970's-especially the late 1970's?

I do not know the answer. But already, serious men are concerned that it could result, not in greater unity, not in the cementing of a long-cherished Atlantic partnership, but in estrangement between Europe and the United States.

Yes, it could release forces which would widen the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at a time when the ideological and military competition between them might be diminishing.

If these are legitimate concerns, should not men of vision and foresight seek to plan for these eventualities, and by decisive action influence their development? We must guide the technological revolution so that it can enhance our unity rather than cause alienation and division. This means that some way must be found to insure a continuous exchange of technological and organizational experience between Europe and the United States-which will achieve an equilibrium that can be maintained and possibly, some day, be expanded to include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

If this seems fanciful, I would repeat that I am discussing the next decade, which ends in 1980, not the present.

logical revolution so that it can enhance our unity.

Some way must be found to ensure a continuous exchange of technological and organizational experience between Europe and the United States.

Reflecting on the problems which this second Industrial Revolution will bring to our own country in the next decade, a young American pioneer in the second Industrial Revolution, Mr. John Diebold, has proposed the creation of "an institute for the continued assessment of the human consequences of technological change."

Perhaps what is needed in the international field is some equivalent forum which would bring together, under nongovernmental auspices, men of wisdom and experience from the universities and foundations, science and industry, politics and the professions-who could systematically assess the implications of this second Industrial Revolution for the world of the 1970's. Their recommendations would invariably become an important guide to governmental decision-making.

Yes, we must have a global policy which fits the new realities of a new era. With such a policy, we shall be better prepared not only to deal with the relations between the technologically advanced areas of the world, the problems of survival and peace which affect all countries, but also with those areas where the first Industrial Revolution is still taking hold. I refer to the problems of hunger and overpopulation, education and historian, the technological social justice, and distribution of wealth. We shall be better prepared to strengthen and enlarge the area of prosperity in the world.

> In the next decade—even more than the present—the relationship between foreign affairs and education will be important. The scholar and the businessman, the foundation and the university will play a significant role in accelerating the technological revolution and assisting mankind to deal with its

consequences. But the closeness of their relationship, in this decade or the next, in no way implies that the university and the scholar and the scientists should cease to pursue their own ends independently. Chief among these is the pursuit and dissemination of truth. Government at home or abroad should not deflect them from pursuing this end.

But in the next decade—as in this one—scientific and technological education will not be enough to sustain the spirit of civilization or the functioning of a democratic society. The vision of the poet and the philosopher, the humanist and the historian are needed to stimulate what Shakespeare called the "better angels of our nature." Without these to guide us, the technological revolution in the next decade can bring the faceless man of an Orwellian world, men whose sole distinction lies in their similarity to one another.

The vision we need as we face the 1970's is that of a great man who died in this city a decade ago-Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. For him, the marvels of modern science and technology provided man with a new opportunity to build a truly human world. Through his vision we can come to understand that the growing interdependence of mankind caused by the technological revolution can lead to a world civilization in which both persons and nations find their individuality enhanced, find their mutual dependence and mutual fate a condition to be welcomed, rather than a threat to be feared.

If the men of talent and vision seize the opportunity to plan now for the world of the 1970's, your children and mine at the turn of the next decade can look forward with hope and confidence to 1984.

The growing interdependence of mankind caused by the technological revolution can lead to a world civilization in which both persons and nations find their individuality enhanced.

Without the vision of the

the humanist and the

poet and the philosopher,

revolution in the next dec-

ade can bring the faceless

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
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Arrangements for the reception and dinner were covered by a special foundation grant.



## Negro Digest SERUARY 1967 GA JOHNSON PUBLICATION 350

## **ANNUAL NEGRO HISTORY ISSUE**


Articles By

JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN • BENJAMIN QUARLES STERLING STUCKEY • JOHN HENRIK CLARKE

and Others

## **CLOSING AMERICA'S HISTORY GAP**

By Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey





FREDERICK DOUGLASS

HARRIET TURMAN

## CLOSING AMERICA'S HISTORY GAP

By Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey

"... The shared pride in Negro history and achievement is a solid foundation upon which to build a new and healthy climate of mutual respect and understanding among all elements of society..."

girl flipped the pages of her new, third grade social studies book. As she came to the last page, she seemed puzzled. She re-read the book's cover, and began a more deliberate inspection of its contents. After scanning the book a second time, the little girl raised her hand, and asked her teacher:



"Where am I in this book?"

Undoubtedly a similar question has run across the minds of millions of Negro youngsters. From whence have I come in America's history and who am I and where do I fit in American society. This is not a new feeling.

Seventy-six years ago, Edward A. Johnson, noted Negro historian and educator wrote of how: "... the little colored child feels when he has completed the assigned course of United States history and in it found not one word of credit, not one word of favorable com-

ment tor even one among the millions of his foreparents who have lived through nearly three centuries of his country's history . . ."

The unfortunate and tragic fact is that generations of Negro children have grown up with a warped attitude toward themselves, their parents and grandparents.

Inside the American classroom, they have not found anything to give them a sense of dignity and self-worth. They have searched vainly through pure white books for some positive recognition of their race's contribution to the civilization of man.

Outside the classroom, these Negro youngsters and their parents have been subjected to the severe hardships, the unending frustrations and humiliations of discrimination and segregation. They have become a people robbed of their rich history and culture by historians, through omissions, neglect, and the perputation of racial stereotypes and myths.

This has been a great American tragedy. We have no way of knowing how many Negro youths have become frustrated, discouraged, and bitter over their feeling of "nobodyness." We have no way of knowing how many potential Negro scientists, scholars, doctors, teachers, and businessmen have been swept into the ditch of oblivion by the psychological backlash from the Negro history gap.

Dr. Charles H. Wesley, educator, author and historian who cur-

rently serves as executive director of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, has written: ". . . History is not the story of men and women of one race or color and the neglect and omission of the men and women of another race and color. It is neither the glorification of white people nor black people, but it is the story of people irrespective of race or color. It should deal with people in all times and places and should present the contribution of all the people to civilization. When a part of the people has been neglected or given subordinate places, history, in order to be truthful, must be reconstructed."

I agree with Dr. Wesley.

Let us reconstruct American history as it really happened. Let the full facts be known, the real story told of the remarkable contributions of Negroes to America's growth and greatness.

Let all our children, Negro and white, learn the complete history of our country.

Let them learn that Negroes were here as far back as the days when Columbus discovered the Western Hemisphere; that Negroes accompanied the Spanish and Portuguese explorers of the New World; 26 Negroes were among the 44 settlers who founded Los Angeles; explorer Jean Baptiste Point Du Sable, a French-educated Negro trader founded our country's second city—Chicago, in 1772; surveyor Benjamin Ban-

neker helped Major Pierre l' Enfant plan and lay out the city of Washington.

Inventor Elijah McCoy devised the self-lubricating machine; Matthew Henson was the first man to set foot on the North Pole—45 minutes ahead of his chief, Admiral Perry.

Let our boys and girls learn about slave-poetess Phillis Wheatley who began the tradition of Negro literature in America; about Frederick Douglass, a great American orator and statesman who played a significant role in the outcome of the Civil War.

Let the education of both youths and adults include proper recognition of the nameless black masses whose toil helped build American cities.

Let all of us understand and appreciate the true role of the Negro in this country's struggle for freedom and justice.

Let every American know that the very first man to lose his life in the cause of American independence was Crispus Attucks, shot down by the British in the Boston Massacre of 1770.

fought in the forces of General George Washington in our War for Independence; 36,000 gave their lives to the North from among 200,000 in the Union Armies and Navy.

... Negro troops charged up San Juan Hill with Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders. They fought and died for their country in World Wars I and II.

Throughout the truth of Negro history runs a nobility in the face of adversity, an epic faith over pain and travail, a courage which exalts character.

The Negro's past is America's past, as is his present and future. He is an integral part of the warp and woof of the varied American fabric.

America has made a start in closing its history gap. But much work remains to be done.

In recent years, boards of education have written and published their own supplementary texts on Negro history. Some textbook publishers have revised and updated their materials on the Negro in American history. Professional organizations in recent months have sponsored national conferences on the treatment of minorities in textbooks. This is a good beginning.

All segments of our society must work together in bridging our history gap. For the shared pride in Negro history and achievement is a solid foundation upon which to build a new and healthy climate of mutual respect and understanding among all elements of society.


In the words of Frederick Douglass, "(This is a time) when the American people are once more being urged to do from necessity what they should have done from a sense of right, and of sound statesmanship . . ." A Reprint from the OCCUPATIONAL DUTLOOK QUARTERLY

VOL. 10 NO. 4 DECEMBER 1988

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

# Interview with Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey





Vice President Humphrey has been closely associated with civil dent's Task Force on Youth Motilithe Vice President reflects his rights activities for more than 20 vation and an ex-officio member long term concern with the probyears. As Senate floor leader for of the advisory council of Plans lems of the disadvantaged and the civil rights bill in 1964, he for Progress. The Vice Presi- his interest in guidance and counplayed a key role in the passage dent has been an effective spokes- seling of young people. of the historic Civil Rights Act of man for transforming civil rights that year.

He is Chairman of the Presilegislation into reality for the Negro and members of other minority groups.

The Quarterly's interview with

#### O. Mr. Vice President: You have been closely associated with efforts to assure equal employment opportunity to Negroes and other minority groups. How are we doing?

A. Fairly well in terms of correcting many long-time discriminatory conditions. But we still have a long way to go. Millions of our fellow citizens are still waiting for a fair opportunity.

#### O. How would you define economic equality for the Negro or any other minority group?

A. Very simply—it is the condition in which every citizen has an equal chance with other citizens for the same job, at the same pay, with the same opportunity to advance, all other qualifications being the same.



## Q. What are the barriers?

A. All sorts of factors: Prejudice against a human being because of the color of his skin; the applicant's own lack of training; biased testing and recruitment procedures; unfair apprenticeship and promotion patterns; obsolete training methods; any one factor or a combination can close the door as tightly as the old "Whites Only" classified ads.

#### Q. What's to be done?

A. There is an answer-a remedyan affirmative approach against every one of these problems. And, fortunately, in both private industry and Government, we are coming up with

#### O. Fast enough?

A. No. And not with enough resourcefulness either. We must be as ingenious in striving for equalityin opening up jobs-as some people have been in trying to perpetuate discrimination.

## Q. Some critics contend that equal opportunity is lagging because "government isn't pushing hard enough." Is that your

A. No. The leadership of the Executive Branch is firm and clear in striving to expand opportunity for all those who have been denied and deprived for too long. However, many obstacles do block the path to equal opportunity for minority citizens; and these obstacles cannot be eliminated overnight. It takes persuasion, persistence, and patience. You can't overcome all of a sudden the prejudices and handicaps of hundreds of


In addition, it's one thing to prohibit job discrimination by law; it's another thing to train underskilled people, so that they are qualified to fill the jobs that are opened up. Adequate preparation and motivation cannot be legislated or ordered by a court of law. The individual Negro or any other jobseeker must prepare himself as best he can, utilizing every available resource.

#### Q. Progress must come all along the line?

A. Exactly. The Federal Government, States, and cities must continue to implement the relatively new civil rights laws. We must expand effective training, counseling, and placement. But every individual whom we seek to help must try to help himself by education and training, so as to fill a higher position.

#### Q. What is the Federal Government's own experience-as an employer-with equal opportunity?

A. It is very encouraging. President Johnson has made unmistakably clear that he is determined to make the Federal Government a showcase of equal opportunity, a model for other employers to follow.



#### O. Who carries out the President's directive?

A. The U.S. Civil Service Commission handles enforcement. It has the responsibility to review all agencies' policies and practices in hiring, upgrading, and training. It provides regulations and guidelines for agencies to develop their own affirmative programs. Thus, earlier this year, the Commission issued regulations under Executive Order 11246, designed to assure "achievement of a model program for equal employment opportunity in the Federal Service."

This blueprint for action is very comprehensive; it reflects the President's determination to make equal employment opportunity an actuality and not just a promise.

### Q. What is being done to help the young Negro understand that lack of qualifications for higher level jobs is perhaps his most serious job barrier today?

A. Many programs are being sponsored by the government, industry, the schools, and private organizations to get this essential message across to Negro and other minority youth.

For example, business groups are cooperating with schools in sponsoring job fairs and other special programs to acquaint minority youth with a realistic, current view of the job market.

The United States Employment Service is in a particularly good spot to help. Its Youth Opportunity Centers are offering new services for young people. Two hundred centers are operating now, counseling young people who come in, and reaching out to locate others. These YOC's and other local employment service offices are also working with schools to help as best they can to smooth the transition from school to work.


## Q. What should the individual youngster do?

A. Any young person, Negro or white, must first decide what he wants, where he wants to go in life, and how he proposes to get there. Often, it's not easy to decide what type of career to pursue.

To make the right choice, it is very important for young people to know themselves, to identify their job interests and talents.

Then, they should take the initiative to explore the local and national

## UNEMPLOYMENT GAP WIDENS BETWEEN WHITE AND NEGRO TEENAGERS--NARROWS FOR ADULT MEN



job market. They should find out what skills and training are needed to get the job they want. With this knowledge, they should work hard in school to get the training and education needed to qualify for that job.

Q. Secretary Wirtz reported recently that the unemployment gap between adult whites and Negroes narrowed some between 1963 and 1966, but that it widened noticeably insofar as youngsters are concerned. Would you care to comment?

A. Employment statistics do unfortunately confirm: The young Negro is losing ground. But I believe this is only temporary.

## Q. What are the reasons for the lag?

A. There are many reasons; the unemployment problem of Negro youth is complex; it is not apt to respond quickly to any simple solution. We have already touched upon some factors—inadequate educational attainment, lack of job training. Job changes among the young are frequent. Negroes are often last to be hired, first to be fired.

What is most disturbing is that the Negro youngsters' unemployment rate has not improved in the face of an expanding national economy and prosperity. The plain fact is that many youths are qualified only for jobs that are in limited demand, or they live in areas where demand is nonexistent.

Q. You are Chairman of the Special Cabinet Youth Opportunity Task Force which developed a summer program for extra employment of youngsters. What were the results of the program?

A. Quite successful. We helped stimulate over 1 million extra—I emphasize extra—jobs for youth.

Unfortunately, despite our best efforts, nonwhite youngsters did not share proportionately in filling the additional jobs we opened up.

#### Q. Why not?

A. Experts have analyzed the situation and have suggested that nonwhite youths were not as fully prepared or informed or counseled about job opportunities.

Minority youngsters may not have expected job success; they may have lacked confidence in obtaining or keeping jobs; they may have feared discrimination. Experts add that white parents often have contacts to help smooth the way for youngsters' employment.



## Q. What can be done to meet this type of problem?

A. We have to take very concrete steps. We must help minority youngsters to expect success—not failure; we must aid in improving their self-image. We must put opportunities right in front of them and encourage them to take hold of their chance. We must find ways to make job information more accessible. One community project funded by OEO involves making information about aid for the poor available in laundromats, grocery stores, and other public-type places.

## Q. Is there any followup of the Summer Job Program?

A. Yes. Its success prompted the President to suggest the possibility of continuing the program on a year-round basis. I am now working with the Youth Opportunity Advisory Committee to mount such a program in the near future.

It's my hope that in the year-round program, we will be able to reach many more nonwhite teenagers.

### Q. Do you think the opportunity for employment presented by such a year-round program will encourage minority youngsters to drop out of school to go to work?

A. I hope not. The President has asked me once again to undertake a Stay-in-School campaign—to urge the 900,000 potential dropouts to finish high school.

I earnestly hope this campaign will be completely successful. But experience shows that many young people do not heed the advice of their elders. They may ignore all sorts of pleas and drop out of school. So, our first job is to encourage them to stay in school. If this fails, it is imperative that they move from school to work and not from school to the idleness of the streets.


#### Q. Many young Negroes fail to train for higher level jobs in part because they don't really believe they will be hired. What can be done to stimulate their motivation?

A. A great deal. I am presently the Chairman of a Plans for Progress Task Force on Youth Motivation. The other members of this task force—all of whom are Negroes employed by major corporations—visit high schools and colleges with large minority student enrollments to serve

as "living witnesses" to the fact that opportunity is available for those who will train themselves for it. They inform students of the jobs available to them in business and industry and the preparation needed to qualify for these jobs.

#### Q. Is the Task Force really active?

A. Absolutely. During May of this year more than 100 Task Force representatives, at their companies' expense, visited 42 predominantly Negro colleges. They received an overwhelmingly favorable response from students and faculty. Similar visits are planned for high schools in major cities throughout the country this year. It is hoped that in each city an advisory committee will be developed for the purpose of arranging for local Plans for Progress companies to consult with the students periodically and conduct special discussions on topics such as job demands, requirements, preparation of résumés. Many other-both voluntary and government-sponsored-programs are aimed at meeting the need for motivation and information.



#### Q. Are we pushing just for "any old job" to keep a person busy, or for a meaningful lifetime career?

A. The latter, of course. We want everyone—white or nonwhite—to be

able to do more than just earn a livelihood. We want him to have a chance to rise, step-by-step, up the economic ladder as high as he or she can go. But that will require broad improvements in our assistance efforts.

#### Q. You want to foster innovations in meeting the job problem?

A. Exactly. That's one of the reasons I urge our institutions of higher learning to reach out into the community—to experiment, to pioneer. May I recall the theme of my address to Howard University's Centennial Convocation in September 1966:

I ask the universities to enlist, to volunteer in the war-on-poverty—to volunteer in man's eternal battle against prejudice and bigotry. I ask you not only to enlist, I ask you to lead the fight, to be in the forefront, to prod government, to prod business and labor and church.

## Q. Does that include "prodding" education itself?

A. Absolutely. Secondary and higher education should adapt to meet the changing needs of a changing America. Vocational education has to be dynamic in keeping up with the fast-moving job market. Higher liberal arts education must prepare students for broad responsibility in today's and tomorrow's world.

## Q. Can we speed the pace of Negro educational attainment?

A. Yes, in fact, we must. Already, Negro educational achievement is rising faster than white. But it is not fast enough. Recent Federal legislation for education and training should contribute to a further acceleration.

## Q. What laws are you referring to?

A. First, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, strengthening education, especially for disadvantaged youngsters. Second, the Higher Education Act, making it possible for colleges to reach down into the high school and even among high school dropouts to find and encourage young people—Negroes as well as whites—who could benefit from higher education.

## Q. What about students' financial problems?

A. The Higher Education Act makes it possible for a student with no funds to go to college—through various combinations of scholarships, workstudy programs, and loans. Incidentally, the scholarship provisions of the Act do not require high academic performance—only the ability to gain admittance to college and to remain in good standing. Actually, the most difficult task today is not financing, but in reaching and convincing the Negro of limited means that the dream of going to college can become a reality for him.

## Q. You referred to nongovernmental assistance. What can labor unions do to further economic and employment equality?

A. A great deal, as they have already proven. But organized labor can exercise a still more considerable influence on equal opportunities for Negroes. I'm glad to note that union leadership has vigorously supported equal employment opportunity legislation. Leadership has been clear, too, in its support of training programs, widened apprenticeship opportunities, open membership, and equal scniority rights. The internationals, however, are often more liberal than

some of their locals. Overall, labor's record of implementing equal opportunity is getting better.

## Q. Are churches doing anything to open job opportunities?

A. Very definitely. Consider, for example Project Equality—the most comprehensive and far-reaching private program to assure equal opportunity in employment. Project Equality is sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church with the cooperation of Protestant denominations and the Jewish faith. Patterned after the Federal Government's contract compliance program, it uses hiring and purchasing power of these religious groups to promote affirmative action for equal employment opportunity.

The program oversees the employment practices of member organizations, their schools and hospitals, as well as programs of suppliers and contractors.

Let's remember the wonderful role of religious leadership in bringing about the Nation's civil rights laws.

Their broad action—like that of all organizations and individuals with good will—can help right what President Johnson has termed "the one huge wrong of the American Nation"—the second class citizenship so long imposed on nonwhites. Second-class education, second-class jobs—this is all part of the same pattern of long-time injustice which we must remedy.

## Q. What then is our goal?

A. In the words of the White House Conference on Civil Rights—"To Fulfill These Rights." That means to make real the promise of our Declaration of Independence and of the U.S. Constitution—the opportunity for a free, full, and wholesome life for every American.

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April 7, 1967

#### MEMORANDUM

Marty McNamara

FROM: John Rielly

Note the attached letter from Bert Fraleigh inviting the Vice President to appear at the Foreign Service Institute.

This would be worthwhile, but not critical. I assume one of your girls will get in touch with Fraleigh.

Attachments



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON Foreign Service Institute

March 29, 1967

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey Vice President
The United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Since returning from Vietnam last January 15, I have been detailed by AID to the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State to assist in developing a special, elite training course for civilian personnel from four agencies, State, AID, USIA and CIA, going to Vietnam to serve in the new Office of Civil Operations there.

The first class under this new course will commence at the Foreign Service Institute here in Washington on April 17, 1967 with approximately eighty members. They will have six weeks of general area study, Vietnamese language familiarization and orientation for their specific field assignments in Vietnam. Upon completion of this training about sixty of them will leave for eighteen to twenty-four months of service in Vietnam while the remainder will continue in intensive language training here. A second class will commence training about the seventh week with new classes starting each six weeks thereafter.

One of the main purposes of our training is to insure that our new field personnel have a clear understanding of the great issues involved in Vietnam and America's commitment to them and to the Vietnamese and American people as well as our overall objectives in Vietnam. It is my feeling, and that of my colleagues here in FSI as well as my fellow workers in Vietnam, that you

feel and articulate America's Vietnam involvement and responsibilities most clearly and inspiringly.

Accordingly, we would consider it a great honor and service if you could speak to the members of our first class here in the Foreign Service Institute in Rosslyn, Virginia, just prior to their completion of the first six weeks of training, on America's commitment in Vietnam. We would set aside one and one-half hours for this purpose on either Thursday or Friday morning, May 25 or 26, from 9:00 A.M., or on the same afternoons from 2:30 P.M. If none of these times is convenient for your schedule, an earlier date can be arranged.

I shall keep in touch with members of your staff on this request and thank you very much for your consideration of it as well as for the support and leadership you are giving so unstintingly to our civilian efforts for freedom in Vietnam.

Sincerely yours,

Bert Fraleigh

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON, D.C. News ruch Jun 3 - 1966 1) Spuches home been accasimally Strillent and repeatedly plateholder,

MEMORANDUM

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

May 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

TO:

The Vice President

FROM: John Rielly

cc: Ted Van Dyk Bill Welsh

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SUBJECT: Vice President's Speech Texts

I would like an opportunity to discuss with you your memo of May 17, 1967, on the subject of the quality of speech texts which you are receiving. Although I would not want to imply any unwarranted criticism of the public relations section of our staff (which has efficiently turned out an incredible number of speeches under great pressure and tight deadlines), I believe that your critical conclusion is widely shared in the press, in the Congress and among the public.

I have some ideas on this subject.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1967

Memo for Ted Van Dyk
Bill Connell
Eiler Ravnholt
Julie Cahn

Norman Sherman Neal Peterson Herb Beckington John Rielly

George Carroll Ken Gray Max Kampelman

From The Vice President

Please note the following from a memo that I have sent to Bill Welsh:

"We must start to develop a speech-writing team that brings to my attention topics of the tomorrows. Our emphasis must be on the future -- post-Vietnam -- 1976, 1980, etc. This futuristic theme must encompass more than the future of science and technology. It must embrace what kind of a country we will live in -- what will the world be like 10 years from now, 20, 30 -- what will local government be like -- what will be the relationship between Federal and state government, etc.

"I want us to start to reach out for new talent. We are dry -uninteresting, dull, and almost approaching boredom. I am tired
of what I am saying and it isn't because I have said it too often.
It's because it has all too little relevancy to the problems ahead.

"So will you get together with this staff and insist -- and I mean insist -- that we bring in new talent to buttress what we already have."

OFFICE OF INFORMATION

May 16, 1967

ple

Miss Ettinger Office of the Vice President Room 176 Executive Offices Building Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Miss Ettinger:

I am enclosing the rough copy of Barbara Ward's address as you requested.

Please excuse the rough nature of this draft. I do hope that it will satisfy your needs at this time.

As I told you, there will be a necessary revision made shortly and I will forward a copy to you as soon as it is available.

Yours truly,

Francis L. P. Kelly

Director of Public Relations

just extraordinarily and fascinatingly interesting because in point of fact anything that can be done which involves you knxkkk in the processes of human development/xx enables you to take some part, however small, in the development and the survival of this small planet satisfactory is by far the most interesting, the most exciting and the most/faxking way to arexitime live and the people to whom awards should be given, and the people who do so much work with much less fun, people, who for example are out seeing that in the streets in Calcutta/and people who die get a decent death people who go out and work in the karekon t The developing world who are really doing the work. Now if you are a mouthpiece to some extent to those people that is ixxix fine but I am very ix uncertain whether those of us who have all of the excitement and all the stimulus of doing this work MAKER ought to get awards as well. I will give Trinity a long list for the next ones. However I feel that if this award does give me a chance of sharing with you what I feel to be the immense opportunities and excitement of the time then I am grateful for the opportunity, because I don't know what you find about this but I think at the moment there is a great deal for of dispear/there is a great deal and a feeling > of discouragement/and possibly in the very well know, almost clicke words sthat things are in the saddle and are riding mankind and yet my strong impression over the last xxxxxxx years is that in fact , this isn't the case that in field after field we live possibly not in an area era of great opportunity but in one is more near to that kind of era than has ever been true in the history of mankind before. That in point of fact-okay this is a hinge of fate, yes it is possible that we have stolen the Promethean fire, yet yes it is possible the enforcement cop on the other hand the chances of remaking the face of the earth, of

recreating the human experiment have never been greater and it is absolutely

and it is absolutely false realism and false history not to see how elearly it is that manking has a new opportunity that he never had before. Must it be realism always to insist that things are getting worse. Must it always be realism to insist that very little can be done. I doubt it. Nor do I think it is the spirit with that which the human race has come as far as it has, and it is extraordinarily resistant, you must admit to have got from Primeval slime to and yet, you know, it has happened all of us must have taken a bit of doing. and therefore the feeling that maybe this future which to some extent unlimited to some extent the area of freedom to the area which we can Aprint with the image of our ideas, that this kind of a future is something which we must weigh in the balance when we are feeling discouraged about Becouse There is More openess about the world now and more wher se we have got to now. than ever before opportunity and perhaps this is the biggest thing about us and perhaps it is just this extraordinary possiblity that we are on the edge of what I would call the end of the cultural scarcity and the beginnings of the culture of abundance. This is a change so startling for the human race that we still can't chart it and we have every right to look at the future with some hope, with some courage with some beliefor what can be done

After all throughout the millennium of the his history, mankind has lived under the opposite culture - the culture of sheer scarcity, The fact that there isn't enough to goo around, The fact is that the soil, the earth, this little bit, this corner that you got for yourself, is all that stands between you and death for you and death for your group. And when you've reached the limit - because populations do tend to creep up to limits - when you've reached that limit, you've only got the choice of starving at home or taking somebody else's land. I mean the rational of conquest is total in a world of scarcity. You can't get away from it, because, if you are confronted with a choice - I survive or that chap over the river survives - well, we all choose that the other chap shan't. I mean this has gone on for keeps. In fact, when Dr. Leeky dug up the hominis - makex what have they got? / The nasty little creatures had been sharping weapons. So it goes a long way back, And it is the feeling that if it comes to it, me first must in a world of scarcity lead to these confrontations. And the institutions we set up, in a age of scarcity, reflect, up to a point, up to a very considerable point, the fact that there's not enough to go around. Now, when in our wonderful Western way we talk about tribal war in Africa, well, by golly, the tribal ax wars in Western Europe in the first part of the 20th Century beat anything ever done in Africa. By the time the

Gauls and the Teutons, The Germans and the French really got going at each other

three times in one generation, what was stirred up makes absolute pikers of the people in Africa. I mean they never even reached first base on tribal war compared with kkm Europe. But the fact which remains deep down in these earlier forms of society, is a continuous movement of conquest based in the fact that once your run out of your hunting ground you've got to pinch somebody else's - it's as simple as that. It goes on in the great Émpires, it goes on all through human history, just so long as there is an absolute limit-point some of where population and resources meet. In fact xxxxxxx of the great melancholy cycles of history, particularly the invasion of the invasion of the Nomads, Stermes they always occurred when the central steps dried up. The moment the central step dried up, kkey then the Tartars,/the A, and the Huns, and the Mongols, and heaven knows what, all came down from the desgert to the 1 Naturally, couldn't eat at home, come/take somebody else's. And when the Mongols arrived at Bagdad, we've-been-teld we're told they made a pit of half a million skulls. When once you've done that, there's enough to eat, because the half million you've put into the pit aren't eating anymore. So I mean, there's a certain simple logic about the institutions of the age of scarcity in which conquest and empires based upon conquest are built into situtations of shortage. And frankly, inspite of the continuous attempts of sages and prophets to s ay this won't do, it just

went right on. Itx And it is a very interesting sort of shift in the human

psychic, khex human KENNERRENERS consciousness, which apparently occurred as far as we can make out, about the fifth millennium B.C. which stretched out over about two millennium, - that after thousands of years of these cycles of conquests, these cycles of brutality, these cycles of desperate destruction, you did get emerging among the great philosophies of the world, a feeling that this was an absolutely impossible way to conduct human affaits. And all these great religious cultures arised with the great formation of the great empires, about between 5 and 2000 B.C.; you'll find again and again, this note of protest against the cultural consequences of scarcity and its conquences in terms of institutions and above all, the institution of conquest and slavery. The feeling that mankind must learn some other Now some people argue that this was a ? back to the much cosier religion within of the tribal circle. Well, at least if you were/in the tribe you practiced cooperation and benevolence because they (you) were blood brothers. In ofther words, you had, as it were, two forms of behavior which was arbitrarily fixed by the limité of your hunting fields within you cooperated more or less - okay I mean there was ?a neighbor had to be watched, /the was trouble inside too. But normally this was an area of cooperation of working together for the survival of the tribe. therefore, one form of human behaveor based on the principle that if you cooperated you came out better than if you cut each other's throats. But you come to the

river, you come to the mountain, you come to the forest, you go to another part

of the forest, and then of course, the same chap, with the same liver, the same guts, the same head, the same emotions, the same needs - oh no, you've got to kill him. And this sort of Minapp disproportion was in the human experience from the start. Now, What the great world religions may be saying is, they may be for the first time try9ng toxformunkte formulate the inner cooperate aspect of living and propose it to societies/which the exterior and totally brutalized like of conquest was accepted as the norm. And it is fascinating that all the great world philosophers / Aphilosophies - Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucism up to The obilonophies of a point, the Jewish prophets, later on the Greeks, the Greek philosophers they +august that mandered must give up the kept saying, it must be done by giving up these fantastic drives for property, these fantastic lusts fax and angers, these biolences - mank must find a way of seeing his neighbor in himself, in fact recreating that cooperative pattern. And this they all have in common. Some people would say - that great great Dawson Catholic scholar Christopher Dorson, for example, he argues that this was one of the great mutations of consciensness which people have perhaps a little left out in their calculations of thes long long upward path from the slime. That at this point, you did get a turning from external religion of the tribual gods and the imperial gods over to the religion in spirit and in truth which was an attempt, in fact to tell mankind that they must get away from the instituations

and/outlooks rooted in scarcity, and find those rooted in neighborly goodwill.

Now we don't know what the roots are - what we do know is that there was an absolutely overwhelming protest right round the known universe against the institutions which empirial and tribal war had brought about. But the interesting thing is, I think, is that there were two kinds of revoit. One was, and here you must forgive very broad generalizations, but I think it's true to say in those areas of the East, particularly where passibly because population was already against right up to the limit of resources - I mean India was overpopulation three thousand years ago, China went throught cycles of overpopulation three thousand years ago - I-mean that have been through a very different history from the West, One's always got to remember that, \* there you had on balance the emphasis on resignation. In other words, you got this attitude towards your fellfowman by not wanting too much. You Ended - you know Budda who taught sorrow and the end of sorrow, taught that you got xxx rid of this by now wanting too much; you gave up this wanting, aggressive demanding self, and you looked to a sort of wantlessness, a ? of non-demand. And it was in that way that you could find a sort of xxxxxxxx strategy of getting out from under these appalling ? Then you have another technique, In China, well it came a little institutions. later but the Confucians, and that's really rather like the British good form and fair play, a very gentlemanly religion which, on the other hand, everyone stays in the place they're in, so it has an element of resignation, but it everyone

behaves themselves decently and you have a whole series of loyalty down from the Empire right down to part (pale (mommy-in-law too, I might say), and these loyalities hold society together and prevent the constraints being broken and in some sense it's fairly resigned. Then, however, (and this is what is so delicious about the human race) you get a complete break from this in one of the peoples who always makes me wonder whether we are absolubely right about complete racial equality, because that's so much better - and that is, the astonishingly tiny, gifted, outrageously active, fully ingenious group, the Jews, because they came up with a quite different strategy for dealing with this disproportion between man's desire for/cooperative living and all the institutions with which he was(strangling (?) himself, because they came up with the idea that, far from resignation, what you wanted was a lot more anger, what you wanted was a lot more activity; what you wanted & was to remake the face of the earth, that the earth was a splendid place, God looked on creation and it was good. It wasn't an illusion, like the Ida Indians said, it wasn't mide, itxwaxakk nothing like that it was good. You know, mine are the cattle on kkm a thousand hills - the feeling that the whole thing was absolutely magnificent. Incidently, one of the great works of art of our own day which gives you this feeling - and I was lucky enough to see it before it went off to be upstairs in the xxxx k synagogue in Jerusalem where it would be more difficult to see = and that was the Charger (?) windows

of the twelve tribes. And to see theme, as it I did in Paris, bussting with the beauty this sense of the beauty and the absolutely incommunicable power in what poetry of created things //you have a sort of sudden biblisal sense of /the biblical vision has given to man - the sense it's good, but it x can be better. And one of the great tasks of mankind is precisely in cooperation with the Creator who chands the whole thing over offinished - well hardly finished at all, let's face it and then says to mankind, "get on with the job, your great contribution, your great aspect will be not passive, you're going to be creators, you to be the people who help & bring the kingdom and all this astonishing array of which get on with it, / reality/I give you, from pineapple to pigs,/this is going to be your job." And you can see that this is, of course, a concept of life which is incrediably enobling, much more difficutt, highly dynamic, pretty dangerous - but it was launched. And when combined with the Greek sense of g order and of law, which is also part of God's gift, it produced the basis roots of our western society. So we started with a freight of opportunity and also a freight of trouble, because you had underliging this attempt - and we did try awfully hard in the various empires, the Holy Roman Empire, we tried again and again to sort of calm the whole thing down! and get it all nice and static so we don't have to bother, because obviously must rulers don't want trouble, this remains in even any kind of society . but

the feeling that you had that there was something very dangerous at work in

Eurppe, was absolutely unbeatable by the powers that be, because it kept coming up in people like St. Francis, + what did he do, He went off and got so poor that it became a disgrace, you know, I mean people didn't know what to do with it. Thenyou have the ? in England who came up with the slogan, "When Adam delved, and Eve she spanned, who was then the gentle man?" Well, you can think that in 1360 this was rather a way out thought, as we would say now. So you have this drive of which/ultimately/our own day I xuppose, Marx is the wkax last emample example, this drive underneath, not to calm everything down and get gccepted institutions which excepted the facts of scarcity and everyone was in his own place - you know the nobleman in his castle, and the poor man at his gate and everyone saying yes sir, no sir, three bags full sir, and a very good confusion formed - no! you didn't get that in Europe. You got these angry people coming up and saying "tain't right." And you see it to a marvelous extend in the great big does in the medicaval churches which were often painted by obscure craftmen, and if you notice one thing about these domes XI down recommend once you might try a little t our around the partish churches of England where the spirit was obviously quite lively) because there you'll always find that the artisan, the peasant, the shepherd - they're all going to heaven. And who's on the other side? Not only the barron, but the bishop too. This sort drive towards the transformation of institutions even though the institutions throughout

the middle ages were rooted as ever in facts of scarcity, were rooted as ever in
the kind of people you bring up if you're going to have warlike society, I do
recommend khakayanaka when next you read Henry the IV, part I, there's a splendid
description
which Raise Prince Herek describes to before breakfast, and

is saying, "Ah, what a boring life. I've only killed 14 Welshmen. Come, give 1-totopur in a sense me some breakfast." x We Well, Hoebert was xxxt xxx caricature of the people who, right through the middle ages, even though they could go off to the crusades and let off quite a bit of steam there (not too much purpose), nonetheless, spent their entire time fighting each other because that was their metier. And if you have that kind of society that's the kind of person you put up to the top. So, it isn't that Europe had different institutions; it had underlying it this incrediable drive of creativeness and/a sort of perfectionism of the most, often perious, but affective extraordinary/kind which was going back, always going back to these biblical roots. Because after all, however much you may try to make our dear Lady the Queen of a respectful and casis cosy church, the did say/hig has put down the mighty and from their seats and explted them of low degree, "which is not a xemixeme sentiment people always like to hear. So there is theis this element, as it were, of drive, and sometimes you have the feeling of bishops actually sitting on it, saying keep down, you know St. Francis, oh God what are we going to do with him, but get him of the church quick, you know. And this feeling of kow having an energy there

wy which you can hardly control, I think has been one f of the great factors in the sort vibrance of western culture. And one of the by-products, and this is what I think is so interesting, one of the by-products was so fascinating an interest in the material things which God had pronounced good that you were ableto develop in this society which you did not develop anywhere else, and that is a tremeusness drive of scientific and technological interests. Well, I think it was xxxx kind of a unique combination of the Greek's passions for mathematics. you know, when they discovered that the scales were and the figures were the same, you know - not exactly, but that music and mathematics had exactly the same kind of relationships. They went out of their minds with pleasure; this was really one of the big things. Now, if you have that winer sense of law and then, on the other this tremendous Jewish drive that this is good, you're going 11 - There to remake it, you're going to create it it comes together and produced, little by little, but of increasing momentum from the 16th Century onwards, that collossal, Colossal drive towards science and technology. It was combined with one af or two other things that one could mention. For instance, that owing to the christian belief ultimately in metaphysical unity, even quite inferior people like merchants and businessmen got rights quite early - they didn't in any other claimed society. And they rights that the barkons got at the magna charter slipped down to the corporations quickly, and that meant they could legislate for their

own taxes, which meant they kept their www money, whereas in the East, on the whole, you didn't - if you got rich the King took it. Whereas in Western Europe, inspite of what has been said to the contrary since, on the whole people's money was fairly safe. Don't forget that we began a parliment because they wouldn't give up the money without representation. And no taxation without representation has even hexax heard in this country. And this extraordianary ability of the owners of property to get safeguards which they never got in the East is one reason why you had savings at all. Another splendid reason, of course, is those wonderful old Puritans who invented the perfect fix mix for capital accumulation; they didn't know they were doing it. But when you consider that they & considered to acquire money, to do well in trade was a sign of God's mercy, but to go and spend w it withxxxxxx was xxxxx papist idolatry, it's perfect, you kept accumulating ix and if you can't spend it you reinvest it. And that is one of the great roots of capital accumulation. And not for nothing! was it in the Puritan cities, in London, in Amsterdam, and places like that, that you (these) got this beginnings of the whole organized system of savings. But when you put saving and technology together, you begin to get the technological revolution, and with the technological revolution, for the first time, you begin to move aga away from the cultural of scarcity. And you move away from the cultural of scencity because, when you once really get the secret of the mathematical laws

fof the manipulation of nature, and if you are prepared to wait long enough, to get the x savings, to build the machines which will x enable you to manipulate these laws, what you/begin to produce becomes so overwhelming that we still don't know the end of it, and it's getting bigger all the time. It's getting bigger because it's based on scientific research, and scientific research, by proceeding from the unknown to the known, then known to the unknown, the more you know, the quicker you move. And so this incrediable cornucopia, which has opened up once you can take the basic building blocks of reality, the material things, and remake them, then there's almost no tik limit. And we haven't even started yet. We're still treating the sea as though it were hunting ground. We don't farm the sea, we've not looked at the junderneath, we haven't started, always xxx spending money on other planets. In other words, we haven't EXER really/begun yet to measure the scale of this abundante which has broken for the first time in human history, that final iron door between resources and population in which all the institutions of Now you may say, looking at the population scarcity in the past has been based in China and India, that I'm over op timastic. I don't think I am because it seems to me that there's nothing in the Chinese that axxxem a Japanese wouldn't winkx have had under similar circumstances and the Japanese, in fact, have produced a stable population, I think that these countries will produce a stable populations too. I think that they need help, RK etc., etc., I mean, I think they

've got to have a population policy, but it's just not an impossibility! because

it has been done. What we don't know is whether we can get rid of the other institutions of scarcity, and that is Jean we in fact get rid of the instinct for conquest, and the instinct for war, and the instinct for aggression, long absolutely after it has been/proven that that is no way in which to secure human survival. Can we, when the rationar/for conquest is gone, acquire for ourselves institutions which are not rooted in the old rational Because the tribe and the nation, as organized fighting units, are organized in order to secure the survival of the in-group at the expense of the out-group. Now the moment both ingroup and outterritory win group together can survive famously, without pinching each other's predextx, you have a new situation, provided you recognize it in time. And that xxxxxx I think, is this century is such an astonishing century in which the great forces of technological change and of scientific growth are creating a tide of \*\*\* abudance every where thi manim along this tide upstick the old institutions rooted in a no longer existing scarcity but still dominant in human imagination, still dominant in world politics. And the confrontation between the two, between the infinite release of resources and the existance, the survival of old institutions, could mean the most appalling example of new wine in old bottles/you could conce Eve. Because the new wine in old bottles, in quite frankly, is nuclear war. But nuclear war comes from nuclear abundance. And therefore, this is by far

the most dramatic, - I-mean it's more than Prometheus, because we don't really

why

know what Prometheus did with it afterwards, we never heard free having his liver pecked out - it wasn't too so jolly . But you didn't/have the sequel ( to taking the fire. But now we live with the sequel ( - the fire is there, the abundance is there, the means are there. We've reached the incredible position where the great resources of mankind are not locked up in the soil, they're locked up here, they're in people's minds, they're in me= research, they're in applied intelligence. And although mankind wastes about 70% of its brains, and practically 50%, I think, on the distaff side at times, the fact remains that there is enormous amount of brain power all over the world and it is so distributed that I suppose you might conceivably have little xxxx raise for extra brains and still carry on conquest the way you know you got Werner poor Bracon

doed it better, in fact, and probably stabalizer them in the localities. So in other words, it isn't all that scarce. Brain power, thank God, is well distributed, and it is now as of 70% the source of wealth. So as I said, the old rational of conquest is gone, but we are stuck with the old institutions with their roots profoundly in the fact that there's not enough to go around. And the enough drama of the next powers is whether we can change those institutions quickly/for this tide of power, material power, to be used for peace and not for ENNAMERS. For the old conflicts. Because if you look back over the kma human record, you would have every reason to despair, because he every single annality analogy of the human regcord suggests that we should have an atomic war within 20 years. Infact, you could say that every analogy of the human record g suggests that it's an absolute miracle we haven't had one already. So in other words, don't, if you just take the sheer record of history without noticing this profound change insisk from the

cultural of scarcity of to the culture of abundance, then I thinky you wan could despair. But the great hope is that we can, in time, make this transition. And I don't mean by that that we'fll & get utopia at the ending/ I merely mean that we'll have a continuingable human experiment, which I think is worth having. Now have we any hope of doing this? Well, yes, I think we have. Because, going back to what we said earlier on, and that is, how the people behaved inside the tribe, well you know, it's not a totally good record - there were civil wards and there is fratricide, but on balance, if you take how human beings have behaved inside a civil cummunity, inside a domestic community, well, you know, they've not done too badly. They # have evolved institutions which have enabled gorgeous civilizations to florish, which have enabled \*\*\* immense advances to take place in human development, /in human bbbbb brain power, and in education, and they have contrived for long periods not to sock each other, which, after all, is the condition for survival. So one shouldn't really be too discouraged, I feel. If you k look at that part of the human record which is concerned with civil or demestic society, domestication of the planet, it would be one, I think, perfectly valid way of putting it. Now if you accept that our aim, our over-arching aim, must be to get the institutions which have given us a fair degree of stability inside our domestic society and extend them to a world society, which science and technology has made so small you could walk around the chute (?) in two hours f if you accept that as the aim, then I'd like to put wix to you that there are three overriding ones, and let's look at them. One is sometimes called the rule of law, but I think Tone ought to extend it to cover every expedient by which people do not seetle their dispute by violence. \* There will always be disputes, because there'll always be human beings, and in domestic society we have disputes just as between nations - the difference by and large is that if we are not Alcapone we don't think that we shoot it out. Normally you take it to/law courts or to arbitration, or to negotiation, or to your joint wage-bargaining sessions. In other words, we

in fact have an infinite number of stmategies by which we don't/shoot it out. And the rule of law covers this vast range of procedures for the mediation of disputes. So that's one whole xx field we have. Now, secondly, increasingly, and interesting enough, this reflects the growth of the sense of the society of abundance inside domestic society, and that is we have more, and more sense of the general welfare. In other words, you don't in fact leave people so miserable and so despairing that they might just as well shoot the judge anyway because they could be no worse off than they are. That sense of the growth of a stake in your socefty, of sufficient welfare to think it worthwhile settling things by reason, that's another element of peace in our domestic society. And the third, I think, is just a sense of community. Sometimes it's called consensus, though; -sometimes I'm told we should within use that word - but anyway, the think is it's the aread/in which you are prepared to believe that although people are different you can get along with the old so-and I think so because afterall he's a neighbor. This broad consensus, for sense of community, holds very different people together, very different groups together, ind a single society. Now, the Chinese have done it, off and on, for two thougand years in an autocratic andzhemen or bureaucratic society - over one-quarter of the human race. In the American Republic, which is now the oldest, continuous, political institution in the ww world ( I stress continuous) this society has done it over a continent. Now if you te/going/to can do a thing continent-wide, if you can do

a thing for a quarter of the human race, I suspect you could do it for a planet,

Especially when you can whish around the planet at the speed we can, and especially a lot of when, I think, shortly/people will be leaving the planet and coming back \*\* XEXERS XXXX (you know the-erbit-te-Hilten - one of the Hiltons which just goes into orbit - it's the orbital erbit to Hilton, that's it - the really way out, the real jet set will go for their future holidays). But it's a may very small place and as long as people see it may just/a launching pad and as something that you'd better have there to land on when you come back, \* I think the better it will be - anyway, a small place. Can we get some of ness these institutions of law abiding, of wext welfare, the general welfare, /of this community - can we get it planet-wide. Because this is really where we are, and I think everything we do has to be judged in these terms. Because if we can create the institutions throught/the abundance can be mediated, so that the abundance doesn't go into violence, it begins to go into construction, then as I said, we won't have a utopia. for that. I mean, the idea of worrying about people getting a utopia, for heavens I talking about survival, not utopia, I kasema hasten to say. But if we can do that, then I think the changes of spending the next 50 years using these colossal new energies for womething better than \$15000000000000 fone hundred fifty athousand million dollars worth of xxxx armaments a year is perhaps a little brighter. But then well. you say, look where we are now - that's jolly isn't it; are we going to k even begin to kind of a approach this/problem?" Well, let's begin where it's harder, and that's can ke we get

any kind of rule of law.

We have, under the impact of the Founding fathers ( Em mediated through Woodrow Wilson, established the idea that society is nonetheless an open society in and in which the rights of small nations and large should be represented. And we have had a late League of Nations, which that failed, and the United Nations is rocky. But still, first compared with what we had before, these are the/institutions which formalized the fact that there is a world community, whentis should we say. So that's point number Second, the two largest nuclear powers, do seem to me, to have some sense of the nuclear stalemate; this is a great forward. When Rome was facing Carthage it was war to the death, and in fact, it killed Carthage immediately and Rome shortly afterwards. so it in fact is was war to the death for both of them, but it didn't think it at the time. But now, the two greatest powers on earth - Russia and America - eyeing each other in a gingerly way, do realize that each could destroy the other - it's a tremendous step forward, for which, I think we should be profoundly grateful, because otherwise kyxnowyxxxxkinkxwe would probably kexaxxwar by now be at was war. And if they'd invented the atomic bomb in the middle of the war, we'd probably have/a nuclear war before we knew we were getting one. It's probably one of the great mercies of mankind, I think, from, I kerr hope a compassionate deity that the bomb came at the/end of I k shutter to think, well, no, I know where I'd be if Hitler had invented it first - I wouldn't be here, it'd be quite simple. In other words, it was invented just in time for people to realize how horrific it was without it going into general use. And

sort of that is one of those/tiny turning points of history which make you gasp when you the think of it. And it's a nice point that if Hittler hadn't sent out all there Jews he probably would have got it. So we have this sense of the xxx stalemate which is Because Just look what the sense of the stalemate has done to the disputes that have arisen. Out of the stalemate, out of the nuclear stalemate, comes the idea of what I/call the created stalemate and that is that you no longer, under any circumin fact stances, demand an unconditional surrender from anyone. You do not/ever again begin to talk about victory. I know a lot of people do talk about victory, but they really belong to the KMK crusades and look what happened to the KMK KM crusaders. No, the idea that you can still score a victory when at ENENXERNIXEExthe the open end of each side's escalation is nuclear war-that's out. And we recognize it. When If you think of the great disputes that have arisen in the last 20 years, they have all had an out. The Berlin airlift - yes, there were a great many people at the time of the blockade grmored by Stalin of Berlin, who said, send in an amaximix armered division, blast your way through. And therezwezezezezez alas, there were other people who said, let's clear really out, we/wwnshessis can't hold it. And what happened? The intermediate policy. An airlife which went on and on and on for about 10 months. # At the end of it Stalin said oh whatxthe hell with it and gave up. And, therefore, in a sense, nothing was decided. But in another sense, a violent conflict had been wantweed fix defused, as it were, and

it settled down it the status quo. The next of course, was Korea where again it ends up

where it starts - that is, the violence was repelled and no counter violence is practice. And again in the most alarming of the crises, the missle crises in Mr. J Cuba, on the one hand/Khruchev removed the missles, but on the other hand you didn't invade Cuba. So again, stalemate - you're left with exactly with what you a hadbefore - the bearded one is still there, you know, you just stayed put. I suspect that this is what is happening in Viet Nam right now. It's an agnozing period it seems INCIDENTALLY because/to your allies in Europe, most of whom incentently perfectly accept that staff (?) there has to be stamp against violence in Southeast Asia, what else were the down British during for & 12 years in Malaya, what else were they again doing in that rather farceical situation in Indonesia (however, it wasn't so farcecal if you were work actually in ? everything was shut up). In other words, a check to irresponsible violence is felt, I think, by all your allies, or most of your allies, to be right, and a preliminary building against getting any stability into the area. What I think is happening now, is a sort of feeling for the stalemate. Where some of your allies could get worried is when they feel that an esclation on your side der lead beyond stalemate and where they get bewildered is how they can persuade North Viet Nam to give the sign that will bring both signs to the table. And a lot of us think, ix that/above all, a crises on both sides now of non-communication. I don't mean credibility gaps. I=mean honestly, it's the smartest thing to have now, you've got to have a credibility gap or you're not with it. But it's to not here - something else, and that is, both

sides lack an intermediatery to describe to the other what it's intention really are.

although And therefore, allzzhose signals are given, signals don't convey to each side what the other means because the othere side really doesn't know. Hanor Chin Mein sitting in Haoi, having been cut off entirely from the rest of the world since about 1947, and having fought so singlemindedly and continuously for the control of the country against the french and then interchangeable Americans(" all ewhitie Section and thisting C. which you'd have factee looke like you know, it's a feeling of continuity/if you are sitting in HANDI he's Mann Haoi, now/ix asking in a way for a sign - the end of bombing. And he thinks showing that he's that by merely asking, he's/xxxxxx serious . American on the other hand, having on the long, long delays over Korea, is saying, yes, we want a bit more than that chum, even if you say it privately - just say you'll accept the status quo while we negotiate. But neither side is sure the other's not cheating; so you go on bombing, and they go on resisting. And I think, I say to your friends abroad, that the moment it seems that greatest need that both sides have is an intermediatary that can say, "Look, give it a go, give it a khannechance." If the Americans stop bombing Ho Chi Mein, for heaven's sake, just say that you'll stays stabalized for 6 months ! They're not they ' say even asking now for you to say it in public; /just say/it in private." But this crises of confidence, I'm convinced, and E think this would be the view in Britain, that this is KXK crisis at the moment a very delicate/confidence. And that being the case, it's unlikely that the m subterranean issue of negotiating the stalemate which on every precedente from the war is what the country, /what the world needs, can get underway

because you haven't yet got to that quiet situation which, for example, happended in the corridors of the U.N. over Berlin, when the Russians said let's talk. And it was as quiet as that, and nobody knew. We just haven't got there yet. Now I myself you know really the way everyone rushes into strategy these days is a little alarming; I think an awful lot of people in England, including me, would think it would be wise to try out not bombing for a bit -but we don't know, we honestly don't know. Another being been bombed steadily (I've been bombed steadily for years) thing we'd say that have doesn't stop very much - on the contrary it rather stiffens people. So that there's another disadvantage maybe in fact it deesn't produce ixxxxxxxxxx exactly the effect it's supposed to. And there's another difficutly, and that is that if bombing becomes the great symbol of American will to continuinue, suppose you find that it isn't worth it even it and terribably wasteful, then you're stuck withxitx by not being able to stop/when you really want to. In other words, it's a very inflexible instrument at the moment and one which I think your allies wat would like to see Even if you don't stop, de-escalate for a bit, or escalate in another direction. In other words, don't let this become a monolithic and maximum massive decision which then stands in the way ax all these swik subtle exchanges which have to happen when people are genuinely trying to negotiate a stalemate. The position for the stalemate is there. North Vientamese are not going to shove you out of South Viet Nam, the South Vietamese, are in fact, thanks to your intervention, going to have a change of saying what they want for their future.

You are not going to bomb the daylights out of North Viet Nam we hope, and, therefore, in a sense, it can come back to where it was. And all these crises of the f post-war period have come back to where they were - dead. And this is the last point I want to make - veryi interesting things happen, because they then begin to change, not because of violence, not because of interventions - they begin to change because people's minds keginxks turn in other directions. What has happended to the Iron Curtain? It's been rotted by consumer gamax goods, I'm happy to say. If you can buy this time, the forces of change going on in the world are such that what seemed an absolutely insolute problem last week, becomes a lively bidding for a consumer market the week after. And what is happening in Russia and Eastern & Europe now & should, I think, cause all/enter-& prises dance khexixgxdown little jigs down the center of the hall, because what is happening they've discovered the virtuges of the profit motive and the market economy. Well, bully, I mean I'm all for it. But it does obviously make some difference in the extreme, extreme, tenacity of the Marxist tradition, it must. And/uttimately you end up with all these splendid people having little frax fiat and littles renos() and little British warx motor car numbers, and have exactly the same amount of freedom to get into traffic blocks as we have, well I mean, they're home, I would say. In fact, I'm reminded - there's a splendid man called Dr. Minen Milenonchokof??? who is the vicechairman of the Soveet Academy of Sciences, and w he was over for the Raxx Pacem in Terris conference two or three years ago, and he really did his all by telling us the

following story, illustrative of the movement in Russia towards consumer goods.

And the story was that the astranaut , the first Russian astronaut who, of course was a Russian first, who got to the moon, to his astonishment found on the other side an enormous city, with smog, pollution, traffic blocks, every amenity of the modern way of life was there. So, struggling slightly, he went to the mayor and said, you have a very fine city here. What do you make." "Oh," said the mayor, "we make human beings - that's the arms farker factory, that's the legs factory, and the middle is the assembly plant. It's quite a flourishing business - yes we do quite well. How do you make human beings on earth?" Well, the astronaut told him, and the mayor told aaid kim; "For heaven's sake, that's how we make cars." So, you can see, that sometimes what people will laught about is very indicative of their ideological developements, should we say. So as I say, if you can keep stalement mark mates, the forces of erosion are very considerable and it can be that as the ideological feror begins to fade out it is then possible to as it were, stabalize stalemates in a more institution/fashion, by stems strengthening the peace-mk keeping elements of the UN, by putting in, for example take the Mekong River - if you kxxx had something like 50 thousand UN engineers and little blue berries so that every time kkak a would-be Viet Cong got up, he'd trip over an engineer, you could do quite a lot to fill this area with the institutions of what I would call openness and of change. And doing it with vigor and with drive you probably could produce various institutional changes which is as it were both stabalize the stalemate and also find its own momentum of change.

And that obviously brings me to my second point, which is a point of welfare. I don not understand , I simply don't, this is the thing - you know I hope I go to my grave seeing it differentix -but I mean at the moment if it doesn't change I'll go to my grave not understanding it - and that is that the western world which is now growing million by about, I suppose, 70 to 80 thousand/dollars a year, which is what is being added to the national income of the ? world each year - it's on top of a groes national Mobilizable product of well over a trillion dollars and that those resources are mobilizable, because million as I say, we put EXEK 150 thousand dollars worth of them into arms - what is so extraordinary to me is that w quite was sane, ximpix sensable people throughout this area will say but we can't afford economic assistance and it's a waste, and we can't do anything about it. And nearly all our economies are now down to about .5 of 1% of national income for economic assistance and let us be quite clear about this - the whole concept of using western resources for an absolute onslaught on the continuing institutions and conditions of scarcity around the world which would, you would have thought, be the most exciting thing the human race could do (oh, excitement my foot operation rathole), . In other words it doesn't arouse any of those glorious, creative feelings we have when we're told we can bomb the daylights out of our neighbor - that really sends us. And for that we'll KER spend anything. But with when it comes to the possibility that over the next 50 years, we might, by a proper development strategy behind which we have now got a degree of information and a degree of experience which

we simply did not have, even 15 years ago, and that we might launch an effort of modernization so that we balanced the growth of our nearness with the growth of our creativeness, so that in fact, over 50 years we did not end up with ever 1/3 getting richer and richer, and the other 2/3s threatened with starvation - but that in some strange way, doesn't ignite people's imagination. I suppose the Lord knew it was going to happen. He said the poor you will always have with you. I mean, Ixkkink I think He was a little discourgged/at this point. But the fact remains that to create a sort of genuine commitment, a genuine sense that this is one of the proper business of the rich. For the next three generations, let's be frank, it is not there. Now this is extraordinary for a variety of reasons. It's extraordinary first of all, because I don't see how any same people, looking in at a world in which they are getting richer and richer, and more and more comfortable, and in which, as somebody said, obesity is one of the main problems, in that kind of a world how can they hope to cociscle exist in that little two hour circuit the astronauts make, howxxxxxxxxxxx with two thirds of the world's population growing up fast and hungry, despairing, probabably rioutest. After all the war in Viet Nam so how really tough people can xxxxx be, even when they've got very little arms and they've got a jungle to operate in. Suppose that the fakeur future held for two thirds of humanity conditions so bad that it jask might just as well go into the jungle. You might just as well do. / And yet we think that we see can co-exist with that kind of a world . Well you know they told the story of the Duke of

of Wellington. He was marching down St. James Street and a man came up, shook him warmly by the hand and said, "Mr. Smith, I believe." And the Duke said, "If you believe that you can believe anything." And I think that this is where we are with this kind of world-if we believe this, we can believe anything. Well, like Marie Antoinette. We say to the people in developing continent, "eat cake, eat coaco, eat chocholate, "you know, we've got a lot of that, we're not buying the stuff. So that kind of attitude which we don't realize we have is what we've got. So that's the first point that's very puzzling. The second point is that we really do know quite a lot about it. And the idea that we you can't have a working development strategy I now believe to be false. Because of the experiences of people in places like Pakistan, Korea, Isaeral, Greece, Thaiwan, Kenya, parts of Chile - all over the place now, we are getting actual working models! of agricultural and market techniques that work. We've got a pretty shrewd idea of the forms of basic infrastructure that will pave the way. The World Bank has now been in this for 20 years - they haven't got a single default. This is miraculous. After all there was a hardly a railway that was built in America that didn't waxxxx go defautt at some point. And in the 1840's 25 state nine out of the 12 governments in America were in total default to the British. And we used to say things about you then that you say now about the Africans. So the record, in fact, of not going into default in the post war world is little short of miracoulous. The third thing is that often what we take to be incompetence and

inability to earn their way is due to the fact that as the whole kaxa trading system

of the world was inherited from us, and we were the colonial powers and, you know the

guardians, because of this it won't surprise you kkak that it's very much biased in our favor. Becuse, although we did go out to do a certain number of splendid things for our missionaries and our good young civil servants, we also went out there to make what we could out of it, and we made a lot. And the system reflects this fact. The tariffix structure, the stability of raw material prices, the investment patterns, the middleman's earnings, the control of markets, control of insurance, control of mx above shipping, the welfare above everything - believe me, 90% xkexx everything - 80% of the have world's wealth. So I come back to the earlier point - would this society had survived had there been nothing changed since the age of the ??? The answer is no, it wouldn't. neszłyz nearly Jolly weit didn't i make in the 30's anymore than ours didn't either. But what we did since the 19th Century was by a proper use of tax money we raised other people's opportunities by a real reconsideration of the distribution of rewards throught the market by higher wages, fringe benefits, pensions, better management; you got a bigger flow of weatth to the mass market. And finally after the war, a having tried out Keynes's Kensian's theory of public works in a massive way in a war, because the war is the biggest public works public opinion will let you have, we then discovered that if you can have this Keynesian sidea of demand management, of seeing that demand and economy are constantly edging production upwards, not too much, you get inflation, but enough to avoid deflation, then you can get a society which, like ours, is growing by not less

ec. 14

than 4 and 5% a year. Now, all these techniques have changed the despairing proletarians of the Western world into fine upstanding consumers that we see today. Now, it isn't anyone who goes to a society without its problems - I say/gextexany one of our cities can's see that they're stacked with problems. But compared with the 1860's it a miraculous improvement. (1930'5) Compared with the 1830's when I grew up, it's a miraculous improvement. It really is -I lived through this. I can remember being at Oxford when the hungar marches came through - and they were hunger marches. They were people who hadn't had a job or ? for the last 10 years, and their children were three inches shorter and weighted half a stone x less then chiddren now because they were suffering from continuous malnutri-That & England in the 30 s. Well, look at us now, swinging cities, the Beatles, through we've got everything! So, I mean, you can't, you cannot in fact have lived in that period without realizing that the techniques of economic management that has been absolutely incredible improvement. But why not apply it/more generally If it's true for a large domestic society like the United States why isn't is valid for our international thinking? Why don't we have a our economic assistances of world tax, let's say of 1% of national income. Why didn't we look at the trade circuits of the world and see that the distribution of wealth is better through these circuits? Why don't we have for say international equity which is a kind of a maintenance of demand for the world at large? It worked with us. And the only reason why we don't is that we

lodged are still trabalist; we are still 10640 in the institutions of scarcity; we are still lodged Ibged in the idea that if we do not stay behind our own national interest, overwhelming within them, that in some way we're going to be threatened. But on the contrary. We grow now by trade, we grow by gross, we grow by cooperation. But we want haven't yet applied this absolute logic to the society of man. And the reason we haven't is that we don't feel that we are human yet. And we certainly aren't. And so you get to this extraordinary position in which all these resources which are prepared still to pile up behind the ancient institutions of scarcity are unabailable to provide a new environment of abundance. And this, I think, is where we come to thes whole question of a community, Because a community is really where you put it. A community is the people you recognize to be in it. And if there's one thing we need more than anything else, it's a recognition that this human society is a single species, that mankind is the unit, the planet earth is the society. Now it's a very difficult switch to make. There are people in New Guinea, seven thougand language; seven thougand villages, seven thousand head-hunting teams - and ix often, often get quite norman. And if you tell them that the idea of not head-hunting in the village two miles away which speaks a different language they'd think you were nuts - you know - we've always head-hunted in that village. It's in the order of nature to headhunt in that village. Anyway they speak a different language, anyway, we don't like them." But are they much siller than us? Aren't we

all head-hunting? from village to village? It's all a village now. And that kind of transmutation of consciousness that recognizes that we do in fact belong to a human spieces is probably the ultimate key to the establishment of what I would call the culturar of abundance on a sufficiently wide scale for the old, horrific institutions of scarcity not still to blow us up 6 That we are one society I think is proven over and over again, not simply in access, not simply telestar, not simply supersonic planes, not simply astronauts. Has it ever struck you that to an extraordinary degree that ever since about the 1840's mankind as a whole has been in engaged in what you can only call a dialectic dialogue with itself. Because between the Marxist and the Western world there is this continuous, fluctuating, but staying debate about the meaning of human destiny. We set up this ruggard first start of the industrial system. Marx critisizes and says xxxx straight-away it is so rooted in class, so rooted in the institutions of property and privilege, it cannot work, it will never distribute enought to the waxis workers to take off the vast abundance, of this new society. And what is more it is not only technically incompetent it calls out to heaven for vengence. And that's were where Marx/joins his , Jeremiah and Isaiah, and turns up as the last of the great Jewish prophets. Still that same drive underlying our society - you can't get away from it. So what happend? Well, rather inadvertix ently the Western world begins to change. They begin to get paid better wages, they get trade union organizations, they get the vote, the vote leads to Tammany Halla, and by the time you finish Tammany Hall you've got an awful lot of clothes in your cellar. In other

words, things are beginning to go up. So what does Lenin say. You see the debate swings back. And it's on a world-wide scale. Lenin and Marx believed as & much as the founding fathers believed that they're speaking for all mankind. Never forget that from the political roots of your revolution mankind began to be addressed as a single audience. "We hold these truths to be self-evident" for everybody, not tellament just for a kuck bunch of followers in Virginia, absolutely everybody. So this is that point at which the political wingin dialogue began to become world wide - the French Revolution takes this up, "liberay, fraternity and equality" for everyone; Marx takes it up, and then we get to Lenin. Now what did Lenin say? Well N Lenin's explanation in this wonderfully dialectical dialogue is absolutely fascinating, because what Lenin says is "Oh well, the reason why the workers are getting off better in the Western world, and in the Atlantic world, is that they've all been corrupted. There the bourgeois are the bosses. And they're corrupted because they're living off the M work of the developing countries, off the coolie and the , and the Negro, off the slave. And this wealth which they are g dragging out from other poverty-stricken people is corrupting the workers, \$0, although they ought to be getting poorer, they're not, but kk the reason is that the line of exploitation has moved xx significantly to the whole vista of the world. But, says Lenin, it won't last because anytime Western nation comes to industrial xxxxx xxxxxxxxxx supremacy they demand a chuck of colonies and you'll have perpetual imperail war. Well, quite frankly, up to 1939

it didn't look half wrong, because what was true was that the Western world was locked peoples in war and in depression; The developing/were still colonial and still miserable - it didn't look like a bad explanation. And so you get the age of Lenin dast right up into the fifties, then what happens? The Western world gets rid of its colonies it's too bad for the Leninists. And at the same time, far from being involved in an enormous scrap of imperial war to keep chuncks of territory, it finds it infinitely better off when it gets rid of them. / The Dutch fought for about two hundred and fifty years of their entire prosperity depended on the Dutch East Indies, They get rid of it and their standards  $\not\in \phi$  of living goes up by whomk 4% a year. It's the East Indians who are in trouble, not the Datch. Inother words, this whole thing is absolutely cockeyed. And you have a Western world, growing in wealth and shedding its colonial peoples and, in fact, rapidly losing interest in the developing peoples as a result. So what do Mao we get then? We give up Lenin, and we get Maxx and kynn kyn Linginia Piaio (?) And what do they say? They say, "Oh yes, the entire developed world, which includes the Russians now, has become the center of exploititve capitalism, but the great rural MAXXXXXER of the world will, like the Chinese countryside, rise up against that KXXXX citadel and will destroy it, and in its place we'll put, of course, a classless society." Now, the interesting thing is that Lin Piao is still right. He hasn't yet been proved wrong. The Marxist phase is over, the Lenin phase is over, The Piao, the Lin Piao area is still with us. Because it is true that we're getting richer and every year.

It is true that everybody else is getting poorer. It is true that we could ke get a

EXX crystalization of a class wall across the front, but my point is that this is already a worldwide dialogue, a worldwide definition of classes, a world conception (unclear) ..... proletarians were going to attack. It may not come ... the great that dialogue is of the world is now occurring in world terms, and it has been for the last one hundred years. And I maintain that unless we can stretch our own imagination, and our own vigor and our own drive, sufficiently to see it in these terms, we will not in fact, get to the next stage of the dialectical, we will not be able to deal with developing the misieries of the/people and we will not therefore, enter into the next stage with sufficient abundance for our ancient institutions not to defeat its us. And that's where we are now - full of hope, full of despair, full of possibility, full of risks. And I would like to end by suggesting that for Christians in particular, this is the a moment for the utmost action and dedication. Because if there's any group of people, any religion in the world whos taught unity, it's the Christians. They've pushed it far beyond any where else. They've gone beyond family, they talk about the single Mystical Body with the headship of Christ. It's almost as though we were members one of another the same, almost a physical unity of the human race. And you can't push it further than that. It isn't possible. We've inherited the Jewish tradition of compassion; we cannot be content if people are hungry and miserable; we cannot be content, to know that the least of these little ones was not fed and so we spat in the face of God, as the Pope put it very, very effectively. So again, this ix parts of our

tradition. But the last is this - I don't think over the next 50 years, 15 years, whatever way you like to put it, I don't really think that the danger is only going to come from an ideological dialogue. It will be there, I don't doubt it. But it seems to me that there's a much deeper danger which we see already in our w own society and that is that people won't despair, not that they will have/? (word unclear) of the future. In other words, that was what we face now is the possibility that this enormous abundance, landing on us with out purpose, landing on us without direction, will so stifle us, and so bewilder us, and put us in so many traffic cues and under so much pollution and smog that we finally say we can't do it. Mankind, in fact, is not master; there is no future. And nihilism, the kind of nihilism you see now even among some wound; may eastily take its place. So I would say that the Christian who says no, abundance is used for service, these vast resources are part of a God-given plan to see that the universe is edged little by little, a little Closer to the mind of God, and that man is a responsible person in that process - that ix I think, is the way in which despair is defeated. You don't/despair by preaching (though Gid knows I try). You don't do it by that. You stop it by doing. And it is this involvement in the creation of the next phase of humanity, the acceptance of the openness of the the future and a feeling that that is where you still can be creativeor along with the infinite power of God, that you can send forth the spirit and see the world recreated, that ix 's where despair ends and that's where hope begins. And if we are indeed,

as a Christian communion, people of love, people of compassion, people of unity, and people of hope, well now is the time to get up and doing. Thank you.

JER/bje FOA/5

SPEECH REQUEST World Affairs Council of Northern California

June 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Marty McNamara

FROM:

John Rielly

When the scheduling committee takes up the invitation of the World Affairs Council of Northern California, I suggest that we try to accept their invitation unless we have some better alternative. This is an excellent forum, probably the best we can get on the West Coast. If November 2nd or 3rd is convenient, we might try to do this assuming there are no policy problems with that subject at that time. If not, let's try and do an evening dinner sometime in the autumn.

I spoke to Mr. Ivan White of the World Affairs

Council when he was here. I told him we would try to let
them know before September 1st if possible.

WORLD
ADDRESS/NORTHERN AFFAIRS
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA

BARB/marg

20510

June 5, 1967

Inv. Sept-Dec. San Francisco California

Appt. Request June 19-22 REGRET HHH/PENDING HOHN R.

Dear Mr. White:

The Vice President thanks you for your good letter of May 25 and for your cordial invitation.

He will be planning his schedule for September-December in July, and we will be back in touch with you at that time so that you may have a definite answer in connection with your invitation to address a large dinner out in San Francisco.

May I suggest that you contact Dr. John Rielly, the Vice President's Assistant, when you arrive in Washington later this month. He would be most pleased to see you, I am sure, and You may reach him by calling 225-3972.

With every best wish.

Sincerely yours,

Martin J. McNamara Special Counsel to the Vice President

Mr. Ivan B. White World Affairs Council of Northern California 406 Sutter Street San Francisco, California 94108

#### 1c John R WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

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MERRITT K. RUDDOCK DIRECTOR

May 25, 1967

Mr. Martin J. McNamara Special Counsel to the Vice President Office of the Vice President Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. McNamara:

Our President, Mr. Louis H. Heilbron, who is out of the country, has asked me to reply to your kind note of May 16, 1967, concerning the possibility that the Vice President would be able to address the World Affairs Council of Northern California this autumn. It is noted that he will be planning his schedule for the fall months this summer.

The Council would like to raise with you two possibilities. First, we are giving a regional American Assembly in San Francisco on November 2-3, on the subject, "The United States and Eastern Europe". We would, of course, be delighted if he could find it possible to give the keynote address for this important gathering.

In the event the dates of the Assembly or the subject for its deliberations make impracticable the Vice President's appearance at that time, we would very much like to suggest that he address a large dinner to be given in his honor on an international subject of his own choosing, during the late September - early December period. We find that these special civic events go best when programmed on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday evenings.

I plan to be in Washington during the period June 19-22, and would very much like to call on you at a time and date convenient to you to discuss the foregoing in more detail. We would, if possible, like to firm up an engagement before August 1, when our annual program announcement is issued.

comparing the contraction

If convenient, I would also very much like to pay my respects to Vice President Humphrey, for whom I have the greatest admiration. I first met him when serving as United States Consul General in Toronto, and subsequently at the White House Mess and on the occasion of the President's signing ceremony for the Grand Coulee Expansion Act.

For your background information regarding our organization, I enclose a copy of our President's 1966-67 Annual Report.

I would appreciate it very much if you could drop me a line at your early convenience regarding the foregoing.

Sincerely,

Ivan B. White

Director of Programs

Enclosure: Mr. Heilbron's Annual Report (1966-67)

IBW:dj

Submitted to the membership by Louis H. Heilbron, President, on Saturday, May 6, 1967, at the Annual Asilomar Conference.

#### ANNUAL REPORT 1966-1967

This is my second annual report in the year of our Ford Foundation Grant, number two. You will recall that two years ago we received a development grant of \$97,000 covering a three-year period to supplement our own resources.

I believe that we can be proud of what the Board and staff have achieved with these additional moneys. Membership, as of March 1967, has increased by 874 (to a total of 4423); the participation of membership in various programs has increased between two and three fold (to 2000 per month) and the program events have doubled in number. In one extraordinary month we had 33 events.

Along with this expansion in quantity, there has been an improvement in quality. The speakers at noon and evening forums have been of an unusually high caliber; during the past program year we have presented:

- four chiefs of state, 19 foreign ministers, ambassadors and senior officials:
- ten senior State Department officials, including those whom we have designated Visiting Fellows in Residence;
- twelve study and discussion groups involving 440 registrants who have explored specific international problems in depth;
- three separate series of Young Adult programs, which together have involved a monthly average of 500 participants;
- four in-service educational programs to 290 Bay Area teacher registrants in the international field;
- and made available through our speaker service, more than 50 speakers to other organizations.

It is difficult, out of so many events, to select the memorable ones. I dare say that many of us remember with pleasure the dinner for President Marcos of the Philippines - when we listened to the President but kept looking at his beautiful wife.

A notable occasion arose at the time of the Hunter's Point riot. The Negroes of the Hunter's Point Youth Center were invited by Mr. Ruddock to meet the President of Senegal at an official luncheon. For 35 minutes before the commencement of the luncheon they had an opportunity to discuss with the President the role, the responsibilities and the rights of a minority in a democracy. He simply continued a dialogue, on a different level, which he had begun with students at Howard University in Washington, D.C. As a result they felt they were part of a meaningful scene and the experience helped materially in the restoration of order in their troubled area.

Mr. Anatoly Gromyko, son of the Soviet Foreign Minister, exchanged views with a large audience on the meaning of democracy. Dr. Edward Teller and other scientific experts advanced controversial opinions in the American Assembly, on the control of nuclear armaments, sponsored by the World Affairs Council and Columbia University. The State Department Visiting Fellows were extraordinarily frank in their statements and appraisals in meetings held at headquarters and the affiliated Councils. The Treasurer of the International Monetary Fund and other leaders from the international economic field gave our industrial leaders valuable off-the-record analyses and information. The Vietnam situation was explored from varying points of view. Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, was particularly cautious; he addressed us in his native tongue, but he helped his interpreter to translate into English. We engaged in two threeday salutes - actually institutes and panels in depth - on the subjects of the United States relations with Canada and Latin America, especially Mexico. The Council sponsored the premiere of the Mexican Folklorico Ballet at the San Francisco Opera House, a very colorful and well patronized affair which, however, made us more friends than money. The Council sponsored, for its members, a chartered trip to the Middle East and is sponsoring a travel study program to Mexico.

These are a few details, but I would like to stress the following general matters:

1. The development of three young adult groups (a young adult either is or looks under 35) closely associated with the Council, plus an emerging group of former Fulbright, Rhodes and other young scholars who have spent at least a year of post graduate study abroad, constitute the most favorable sign for the future growth of the Council. Young adults are generating their own leadership and enthusiasm. Indeed, so anxious are they to have

a number of pans frying at once that they blew out most of the fuses in preparing a sukiyaki dinner at Council headquarters. Moreover, they tried to obtain a completed membership blank from the speaker of the evening who had wandered in unrecognized. The programs and discussions of these groups are of the highest order.

- 2. The Council has carried out its mandate to present balanced programs on almost every current issue covering the various troubled areas of the world. We have had approximately an equal number of programs on Asia and Europe, and a lesser though representative series with respect to other areas and general international issues.
- 3. The Council has learned that moving picture premieres of appropriate films afford the best media for raising special funds most painlessly. The gift portion of the admission tickets for moving pictures is relatively larger than that incident to other events.
- 4. The programs at headquarters provide an opportunity to engage in greater in-depth discussions and exchanges than programs held on the outside.
- 5. The establishment of a branch of the Council on the Peninsula, with its own Secretary, is part of an effort to bring our major programs directly to each community.
- 6. The World Affairs Council is most successful in the travel field when it offers a program particularly suited to its resources, namely, entree into the official and semi-official life of the countries visited.
- 7. It takes money to run the Council and the Ford Funds are running out.

May I dwell on this last point for a moment. Our budget for fiscal 1967 is about \$196,000 and in order to balance it, our trustees and others have been called upon to contribute about \$10,000 more than originally comtemplated for private gifts. The truth is that it costs annually about \$38 per year to service a member and operate the Council. Corporations, Ford and individual donors have been making up the deficiency. Since Ford moneys are made available on a declining scale each year, the demands to maintain the new level of support which we have attained will have to be met locally. In general terms this means about \$25,000 additional for fiscal 1968, and \$45,000 additional for fiscal 1969.

Those of us who have been working with the Council for many years see in the Council a cultural and educational force as necessary to the Bay Area as the opera, the symphonies and the museums. We reach fewer people directly but our indirect coverage through television, radio and tapes is somewhat comparable. Moreover, the contributions of the Council in many situations are intangible. How do you measure the value of an institution which has caused many of the world's leaders to say that in San Francisco they have found that they can discuss the world's problems freely and frankly and obtain informed replies to serious questions- that they feel rewarded in having met a representative body of United States citizens? The Council has contributed substantially to that spirit of San Francisco which has brought the United Nations back to us for two rededications and which has caused University Assemblies and other important educational institutions to use Northern California meetings as sounding boards for the determination of policy. You will recall also the experience we had when under Mr. Rockwell's Presidency we treated Mr. Khrushchev as hosts should treat an important dignitary of an important foreign state and thereby did a great deal to avoid an unpleasantness (namely, the cancellation of much of his United States trip) which could have had far-reaching and deleterious effects.

Keeping this Council strong will require a greater contribution of money and effort than most of us have heretofore given and I earnestly invite you to upgrade your memberships to match your convictions.

My thanks and appreciation to the Director and his staff, to all the committee chairmen, to my fellow officers and trustees and to the past Presidents, for their unstinting support. I hesitate to single out any individual among the many who have given me so much assistance and who have served so well, but justice requires that I mention our new Director of Programs, Mr. Ivan White, for a creative job well done beyond the call of duty, and Sara Tolles, the staff member assigned to memberships, who is following a long line of romantic precedents and is about to become a June bride.

It has been a great privilege for me to have served you during the past two years and I have faith that this Council will grow from strength to strength.



#### TO : JOHN RIELLY/JANET

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON, D. C.

fild

I thought you would be interested in having a copy; of the enclosed.

Ofield Dukes Assistant to the Vice President

speechs

GUIDE TO 1967 SPEECHES BY THE VICE PRESIDENT (Major Only)

Period Covered: January 1, 1967 to Present Date.

Categories

Speeches indexed:

A) By Date Beginning January 1, 1967
B) According to Principal topic and/or by Audience.

DATE	ORGANIZATION	CITY & STATE
1/6/67	Buffalo Club	Buffalo, New York
1/17/67	Presentation of Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi	Washington, D.C.
1/24/67	Plans for Progress	Washington, D.C.
1/26/67	International Newspaper Advertising Executives	Washington, D. C.
1/31/67	National Conference of Christians & Jews	Washington, D. C.
2/7/67	International Development Conference	Washington, D. C.
2/8/67	West Virginia AFL-CIO Legislative Conference	Charleston, W. Vir.
2/18/67	Cardiology	Washington, D. C.
2/21/67	Civic Dinner	Phoenix, Arizona
2/26/67	Atlantic Undersea Test & Evaluation Center	Miami, Florida
2/28/67	Raleigh (Chapel Hill) Un. of North Carolina	Chapel Hill, N.C.
3/3/67	Congressional Staff Association	Washington, D. C.
		(Con't.)

ORGANIZATION	CITY & STATE
Westminster College	Fulton, Missouri
Science Talent Search Awards	Washington, D. C.
National Book Awards	New York, New York
Farmers Union Convention	Oklahoma City, Okla.
National League of Cities	Washington, D. C.
Goddard Memorial Dinner	Washington, D. C.
Chiefs of Mission	Bonn, Germany
BBC Television Transcript	London, England
	Berlin, Germany
OECD	Paris, France
North Atlantic Council	Paris, France
International Conference on Urban Transportation	Pittsburgh, Pa.
American Society of Newspaper Editors	Washington, D. C.
Texas State Legislature	Austin, Texas
Inter-American Development Bank	Washington, D. C.
7th Pillars of American Freedom	San Diego, Calif.
	Washington, D.C.
, International Agribusiness Conference	Chicago, Illinois
HEW (Education)	Washington, D. C.
New York Stock Exchange	New York, New York
Urban Conference on Social Welfare	Dallas, Texas
State Department - Plans for Progress	Washington, D. C.
	Westminster College Science Talent Search Awards National Book Awards Farmers Union Convention National League of Cities Goddard Memorial Dinner Chiefs of Mission BBC Television Transcript House of Representatives OECD North Atlantic Council International Conference on Urban Transportation American Society of Newspaper Editors Texas State Legislature Inter-American Development Bank 7th Pillars of American Freedom Histadrut Humanitarian Award International Agribusiness Conference HEW (Education) New York Stock Exchange Urban Conference on Social Welfare State Department - Plans for

DATE	ORGANIZATION	CITY & STATE
5/24/67	Advertising Council	Washington, D. C.
5/25/67	Discover America	Washington, D. C.
5/27/67	College of St. Thomas	St. Paul, Minnesota
5/28/67	Boys Town - YOC	Boys Town, Nebraska
6/7/67	Annapolis Naval Academy	Annapolis, Maryland
6/21/67	Communications Workers of America	Kansas City, Missouri
7/7/67	National Education Association	Minneapolis, Minnesota

ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF SPEECHES BY THE VICE PRESIDENT ACCORDING TO TOPIC BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 1967 TO PRESENT DATE.

TOPIC	ORGANIZATION & CITY & STATE	DATE
Agriculture	Farmers Union Convention Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	3/13/67
Agriculture Business	Internation Agribusiness Conference Chicago, Illinois	5/11/67
Americanism	Texas State Legislature Austin, Texas	4/24/67
Arts Books	National Book Awards New York, New York	3/8/67
Business U.S. Economy	New York Stock Exchange New York, New York	5/17/67
Civil Rights	Boys Town Boys Town, Nebraska	5/28/67
Civil Rights Business	Plans for Progress Washington, D. C.	1/24/67
Civil Rights Business	State Department - Plans for Progress Washington, D. C.	5/23/67
Education	HEW (Education) Washington, D. C.	5/16/67
Education ,	National Education Association Minneapolis, Minnesota	7/7/67
Ethnic	National Conference of Christians and Jews Washington, D. C.	1 /21 /67
Foreign Policy	Chiefs of Mission Bonn, Germany	3/30/67
Foreign Policy	House of Representatives Berlin, Germany	4/6/67
Foreign Policy	North Atlantic Council Paris, France	4/7/67

TOPIC	ORGANIZATION & CITY & STATE	DATE
Foreign Policy	OECD Paris, France	4/7/67
Foreign Policy Europe	Westminster College Fulton, Missouri	3/5/67
Foreign Policy Europe	American Society of Newspaper Editors Washington, D. C.	4/21/67
Foreign Policy Latin Am.	Inter-American Development Bank Washington, D. C.	4/28/67
Foreign Policy Vietnam	BBC Television Transcript (Interview) London, England	4/3/67
Freedom Vietnam	7th Pillars of American Freedom San Diego, California	5/2/67
Government	Congressional Staff Association Washington, D. C.	3/3/67
Health	Cardiology Washington, D. C.	2/18/67
Miscellaneous	Presentation of Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Washington, D. C.	1/17/67
Oceanography	Atlantic Undersea Test & Evaluation Center Miami, Florida	2/26/67
Peace Corps	Raleigh (Chapel Hill) Un. of North Carolina Chapel Hill, North Carolina	2/28/67
Poverty	West Virginia AFL-CIO Legislative Conference Charleston, West Virginia	2/8/67
Poverty	Histadrut Humanitarian Award Washington, D. C.	5/8/67
Rights & Responsi- bilities	Annapolis Naval Academy Annapolis, Maryland	6/7/67

TOPIC	ORGANIZATION & CITY & STATE	DATE
Science	Science Talent Search Awards Washington, D. C.	3/6/67
Science Space	Goddard Memorial Dinner Washington, D. C.	3/15/67
Travel	Discover America Washington, D. C.	5/25/67
Urban Problems	International Newspaper Advertising Executives Washington, D. C.	1/26/67
Urban Problems	Communications Workers of America Kansas City, Missouri	6/21/67
Urban Affairs Transpor- tation	International Conference on Urban Transportation Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	4/18/67
World Economic Development	College of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota	5/27/67
World Peace Arms Race	Buffalo Club Buffalo, New York	1/6/67
World Peace Defense	Civic Dinner Phoenix, Arizona	2/21/67
World Peace Vietnam	International Development Conference Washington, D. C.	2/7/67
Youth	National League of Cities Washington, D. C.	3/14/67
Youth	Urban Conference on Social Welfare	
Youth	Dallas, Texas  Advertising Council	5/21/67
	Washington, D. C.	5/24/67

### 60

#### STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE JULY 31, 1967

Mr. President, I rise to speak on one aspect of the mounting problem created by the gradual erosion of the role of the Congress, and particularly of the Senate, in the determination of national security policy. And I intend to suggest to my colleagues a course of action which, although modest in scope, could constitute a first step toward arresting a trend of events injurious to the best interests of our country.

There is no need at this time to rehearse all the evidence in support of the view, held by most if not all members of this body, that the authority of Congress in many respects has been dwindling throughout the years since our entry into the Second World War. The very existence of the Special Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, chaired by the distinguished Senior Senator from North Carolina, currently attests to the concern felt by Senators on this score. In no area is the constitutional imbalance more striking and more alarming than in the field of foreign policy. As a result of the kind invitation of Senator Ervin, on July 19 I gave to his Subcommittee a rather lengthy statement entitled, "Congress and Foreign Policy," which I hope helped define the dimensions of the problem; I shall ask that the statement appear in the Record to follow and give more substance to these remarks.

Because the overall subject of the constitutional role of the Congress in both national and international affairs is now being scrutinized under such distinguished auspices, it would be neither wise nor proper at this time to prejudge the findings and offer recommendations applying to the whole field of inquiry. However, I believe that one facet of the problem in the foreign policy sphere can and should be singled out for prompt attention and action. I refer to the question of what constitutes a "national commitment" and I offer herewith a resolution stating simply that the term "national commitment" is understood to result from nothing less than formal action taken by the legislative and executive branches under established constitutional procedures.

A commitment thus defined engages the honor of the nation in support of a specific undertaking. Obviously, such a process and such a result should neither be invoked frequently nor arrived at lightly. And yet over the years we have found ourselves confronted with multiplying calls for swift and decisive action to be taken on the basis of alleged "national commitments." Admittedly, many of these cries for action have come from non-official sources. But all too often over a long period the executive branch has indeed acted and then sought to justify its intervention by dubious references to equally dubious prior commitments.

Much of the difficulty here, I believe, stems from a lack of precise thought and language rather than from any malign intent or influences. Even so, the possible consequences of involvement in combustible situations abroad in this day and age are too dangerous to permit any use of military power on the casual assumption that the nation is committed to act. Neither should we allow the honor of this country, which is at stake in its commitments, to be cheapened through constant and careless references to its involvement in specific situations.

We in governmental life frequently err by refusing to define our terms and by falling back on cliches which really have not been examined in years. In the field of foreign policy certain phrases reasonably descriptive of the world situation two decades ago are being used almost ritualistically without reappraisal of their relevance to current conditions. Other phrases have been so affected by constant misuse that their original meaning to the American public has been either twisted or entirely lost. The term "national commitment" clearly seems to have fallen into that latter category. In speaking today I am trying to recover and refurbish its original and true meaning from the cloud of confusion which has been created in large measure over the past two or three decades through the increasing conduct of foreign policy by executive agreement.

This resolution in no way tries to interfere with the day-to-day conduct of our foreign affairs. It does not attempt to restrict the constitutional responsibility and power of the President or to revoke any past decisions. It does not respond to any current crisis situation abroad, and it is not a measure directed against any single Administration in this century -- or against anyone at all.

In its essence, this resolution represents a conservative position which seeks to recover in some degree the constitutional role of the Senate in the making of foreign policy -- a role which the Senate itself has permitted to be obscured and diminished over the years. Just as we do not blame external forces for that cumulative loss of our traditional authority, I suggest to my colleagues that we will have only ourselves to blame if we do not reaffirm the power and responsibility given to this body by the framers of our Constitution.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution defining a "national commitment" be inserted in the Record at this point, to be followed by my statement of July 19 entitled "Congress and Foreign Policy," given before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate.

#### PROPOSED RESOLUTION BY MR. FULBRIGHT CONCERNING "NATIONAL COMMITMENT"

JULY 31, 1967

Whereas accurate definition of the term, national commitment, in recent years has become obscured.

Therefore, be it Resolved that it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government through means of a treaty, convention or other legislative instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment.

Luncheon by Foreign Minister Miki

August 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO : BarB

cc: Betty South

FROM: John Rielly

The luncheon which the Vice President will be attending at the Japanese Embassy given by Foreign Minister Taheo Miki will include wives. You may want to note this in his schedule. JER jms FOA/5

VP's regrets that he could not attend reception at Malaysian Embassy.

September 1, 1967

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I want to tell you how sorry I am that I was not able to attend the reception last night at the Embassy celebrating the tenth anniversary of the independence of Malaysia. I had hoped to come but unexpected events required an alteration of my schedule so that I was unable to do so.

I do hope to be able to come on another occasion soon.

I want to take this opportunity to extend my congratulations and best wishes to you and your countrymen on this occasion.

Sincerely yours,

Hubert H. Humphrey

His Excellency Tan Sri Ong Yoke Lin Ambassador of Malaysia 2701 Albermarie Street, N. W. Washington, D. C.

16 Speeches

## dissent ordestruction?

Excerpts from an article in Look Magazine, September 5; reprinted with permission of Look.

BY ERIC SEVAREID

THESE ARE ODD TIMES. Tens of thousands of Americans of every age, color, sex, and economic and intellectual condition are daily and hotly invoking every right and privilege mentioned in the Constitution, the Bible and Bartlett's Familiar Quotations. Others are busy invoking self-serving "higher laws" to supersede the national rulebook. None of them seems familiar with the words "duty" or "obligation."

When we reach the point, which we have, where an organization is formed, called "Proxy Pickets," to rent out picketers for any cause at so much an hour, then we know that the fine, careless rapture of this era of protest is all over and that the corruption of faddism has begun to set in. Every movement becomes an organization sooner or later, then a kind of business, often a racket. This is becoming the age of the cause Cause. Kids will soon be hanging around back lots trading causes the way they used to trade aggies.

One of the oddest things about the period, no doubt, is that anyone like me should feel moved to say these things. I have always believed in the Negro "revolution," if that's the right word.

But it seems clear to me now that a high percentage of today's protests, in these three areas of civil rights, the Vietnam war and college life—all of which commingle at various points—have gone so far as to be senselessly harming the causes themselves, corroding the reputations of the most active leaders and loosening some of the cement that holds this American society together. There never was any real danger that this country would find itself groaning under Fascist oppression, but there is a measure of real danger that freedom can turn into nationwide license until the national spirit is truly darkened and freedom endangered.

The notion is abroad that if dissent is good, as it is, then the more dissent the better, a most dubious proposition. The notion has taken hold of many that the manner and content of their dissent are sacred, whereas it is only the *right* of dissent that is sacred. Reactions of many dissenters reveal a touch of paranoia. When strong exception is taken to what they say by the President or by a General Westmoreland, the dissenters cry out immediately that free speech is about to be suppressed, and a reign of enforced silence is beginning.

What is more disturbing is that a considerable number of liberal Left activists, including educated ones, are exhibiting exactly the spirit of the right-wing McCarthyites 15 years ago, which the liberal Left fought so passionately against in the name of our liberties.

If there were no protests at all about the Vietnamese war, the American society would really be in sad shape. We were in this war very deeply almost before the average busy citizen grasped what had happened, and there was no serious congressional debate on the issue until the winter of 1966. The present national disunion, including the disaffection of so much of the "intellectual community," is just what happened in the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1846-1848, the Spanish-American War and the war in the Philippines that followed. As historian Henry Steele Commager has pointed out, the only wars during which the President had all but universal support were the two world wars, and both were debated and discussed all over the nation

for many long months before we got into action.

So the present protests about Vietnam are entirely within the American tradition. Even so, the law, public necessity and human reason must impose certain limitations.

I happen to feel that the experience of American Negroes these many generations is the one deep stain in the American national soul. I cannot help a greater readiness to condone their excesses than those of prosperous white college students (though the law cannot be morally choosy.). But there are some basic misconceptions about both.

One is that youths of both colors have been driven to action because their conditions of oppression were becoming intolerably miserable. The reverse is the truth. The barriers to Negro equality were beginning to fall before the period of mass physical action set in; this, in fact, is why mass action swept the nation. It is a commonplace now among social historians that change produces revolution before revolutions add to and institutionalize change. Basically, it has not been the street orators and marchers who have been bringing desegregation, for example; the marchers were set in motion by the fundamental changes of principle and law won in the courts by the quiet work of leaders like Roy Wilkins and Thurgood Marshall.

Totally oppressed people, here or in Africa or Asia, do not go into action. It is when the chains have been loosened, when they see some light at the end of the tunnel, that is, when *hope* is aroused, that the people arouse themselves.

In a certain sense, this pattern also applies to white college students protesting their "alienation" and the "establishments" they feel oppress them. Youth in any generation feels alienated because youth is the precarious, emotionally uprooted stage between childhood and maturity. But while individual youths of any generation are self-conscious because of this biochemical transition, today's collective self-consciousness of the young was not generated by them. The great American "youth cult" was generated by older people concerned with youth, from popular psychologists to advertising writers who realized that youth for the first time had sizable spending money, to publishers of girlie magazines who realized old moral barriers were giving way—and not, incidentally, from pressure by the young.

It is easy to sympathize with students in the massive institutions who feel they are treated as index-card numbers, not as individual souls, and various forms of decentralization must come about. But these youths will never persuade the graduating classes of the thirties, who faced the quiet desperations of the jobless Depression and the unmistakable imminence of a vast world war, that their lot is a tragic one. From my own life experience and travels, I would happily hazard the conjecture that to be young and to be a student in the United States of today is to enjoy the most favored condition that exists for any large, identifiable group anywhere in this world.

But experience, as every parent knows, is scarcely transferable. That hilarious slogan—"you can't trust anybody over thirty"— is, indeed, the explicit denial of the validity of experience.

When I listen to the young vigorously suggesting that if they had the governing influence, peace, love, beauty and sweet reason would spread o'er the world, I am tempted to remind them of the barbarities of the Hitler Jugend, the Mussolini Youth, the Chinese Red Guards, the Simbas of the Congo—but perhaps that would be over-egging the pudding, as the English say.

When I hear the passionate arrogances of a Mario Savio (the Berkeley fellow) or read about hundreds of University of Wisconsin students smashing windows and stopping traffic because they're sore about a bus-route schedule (or was it the price of textbooks?), I mutter to myself a private remark of Winston Churchill's: "I admire a manly man and a womanly woman, but I cannot abide a boyly boy."

If youth were complacent, devoid of the spirit of innovation and challenge, we would be in a bad way because some of the source springs of the American genius would dry up. Yet I think the "generational gap" in viewpoint will always be with us, for this reason: Youth can measure society only in one direction—forward, from things as they are, to their ideals. Older people, by the imperatives of experience, must add two other equally valid directions—backward, to things as they used to be, and sideways, to the other societies in the world they know.

Older people know something else: that the Savios, the Adam Clayton Powells and the Stokely Carmichaels are not, despite appearances, genuine leaders. Because they are not the strong men but the weak ones. They have not the moral stamina for the long haul, with its inevitable routines and periods of boredom. Eloquence, brilliance and perhaps even physical bravery are not what count in the end. What counts is the quality the Romans defined and respected above all others—gravitas, meaning patience, solidity, weight of judgment. As Eric Hoffer puts it, "people in a hurry can neither grow nor decay; they are preserved in a state of perpetual puerility."

Furthermore, it is usually true that the habitual protester, the man with a vested emotional interest in protest, unconsciously does not want his goals to be realized. Success would leave him psychically bereft. Many successful revolutionaries in other lands had to be replaced as leaders when the new order of life was installed, partly because of their practical incompetence, partly because they continued in one way or another as protesters, as their nature obliged them to do.

There is a great deal wrong with American society of mid-twentieth century. There are some very ugly areas in our life; but never have they been so thoroughly exposed, researched and organized against. Never in our history have we seen an assault on these evils mounted on the level of Federal action to compare with the legislation

and programs started under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, particularly the latter. Were it not for the creeping calamity of the Vietnam war, Mr. Johnson would, I think, stand revealed to everyone as one of the most vigorously humanitarian Presidents America has had, in spite of those personal crudities that upset the fastidious.

America has never been a frozen, rigid society, caught in conformity. At times we may seem becalmed, but as the Frenchman Jacques Maritain wrote, "Wait a moment, another current will appear and bring the first one to naught. A great country, with as many windshifts as the sea." We are not repeating the experience of Europe, whatever the Marxists and other doctrinists may think. America has eloped with history and run away with it, says Eric Hoffer.

Conformity, mass-mindedness? Go to the totalitarian or to the primitive societies if you wish to see them. Not here. If we live in a web of conforming laws and regulations, it is because we are so individualistic, so infinitely varied in our ideas, desires, ambitions and fears, and so very free to express them and to act upon them. Those who despair of getting public action on, let's say, our fearful urban problems, are wrong in thinking this is because "people don't take enough interest in public affairs." It is for the opposite reason; it is because so many groups, interests, points of view conflict. Ask any mayor. Ask any congressman whose desk is daily heaped with windrows of petitions, complaints, suggestions or denunciations.

It is not our freedom that is in peril, in the first instance. We have never had more freedom to speak out, to organize, to read what we choose, to question authority, whether political or cultural, to write, to film, to stage what would have been impermissible years ago. Never has the police authority been more restricted, never have defendants been so girded with legal protections.

Our freedom will be imperiled only if it turns into license, seriously imperiling order. There can be no freedom in the absence of order. There can be no personal or collective life worth living in the absence of moderation. Repeatedly, since the ancient Greeks, people have hatl to relearn this. Aristotle expressed it no better than Edmund Burke, the Anglo-Irish statesman, who said:

"Men are qualified for civil liberties in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites . . . society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters."

FREEDOM HOUSE NEWSLETTER 20 West 40th Street, New York, N. Y. 10018 SOUTSON SOUTH STATE OF SOUTH S

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