Emily Anne Staples Tuttle papers.

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
Upper Midwest
Women's Leadership Conference
on National Security
EMILY ANNE STAPLES
STEERING COMMITTEE
HOSTESS

Upper Midwest
Women's Leadership Conference
on National Security

PROGRAM

October 28-29, 1983

L'hotel Sofitel
Bloomington, Minnesota

About the conference...

As citizens, women have a vital stake in our national security; however, they are generally silent in the current debate. Knowledge of the issues and alternatives can draw women into active participation in this area of public policy.

The UPPER MIDWEST WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY will provide balanced information and analyses of the political, economic, ethical and military aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations. Issues of U.S.-Soviet competition in the Third World will also be considered. Speakers, panelists and discussion leaders will include nationally recognized experts with varying views.

Women leaders, making use of the resources and expertise available at this conference, can promote reasoned debate within their organizations on the nature of national security and how best to achieve it.

This conference is one of several being held around the country patterned after the national women's leadership conference, sponsored by The Committee for National Security, which was held last June in Washington, D.C.

SPEAKERS

HAROLD DITMANSON

FRANCES FARLEY

MARK GARRISON

AGENDA

Friday, October 28

8:15 a.m. Coffee, Rolls, Registration

9:00 WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS

Barbara Stuhler
Marlene Johnson
Jean Tews
Anne Cahn

9:15 ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Chair: Norma Noonan

Speakers: Elbridge Durbrow, Retired Foreign Service Officer with the rank of Career Minister; former Ambassador to South Vietnam.

Mark Garrison, Brown University; former Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow.

10:45 Break

11:00 Concurrent Workshops: PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF SOVIET SOCIETY

a) William George, Executive Vice President, Honeywell's Control Systems Businesses

Chair: Joann Paden

b) Nicholas P. Hayes, Executive Director, Associated Colleges of the Twin Cities; former visiting professor, Moscow State University.

Chair: Sue Rockne

c) Charles Ritchie, Director of Admissions, Instructor of Russian, Blake School.

Chair: Fran Paulu

SPEAKERS

P. TERRENCE HOPMANN

ROBERT E. HUNTER

NOEL C. KOCH

Friday, October 28

12:30 p.m. Lunch - ECONOMIC FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Chair: Gladys Brooks

Speaker: Ellen Frost, Director of Government Programs, Water Reactor Division, Westinghouse Electric Corporation; former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International, Economic and Technology Affairs, Department of Defense

2:15 THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Chair: Emily Anne Staples

Speakers: Representative Jim Leach, (R) Iowa, Foreign Affairs Committee

Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

3:45 Break

4:00 Concurrent Workshops: THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS

a) Barbara Knudson, Professor, Quigley Center of International Studies, University of Minnesota

Chair: Judy Duffy

b) Emily Rosenberg, Associate Professor, History Department, Macalester College

Chair: Pat Llona

c) C. Patrick Quinlan, Retired Foreign Service Officer; Consultant to State Department on Middle East questions

Chair: Mary Ellen Lundsten

d) Angus McDonald, Senior Consultant for International Education Services, Control Data

Chair: Kathleen Scott

SPEAKERS

BETTY LALL

JOHN LAWYER

CONGRESSMAN JIM LEACH

ADM. HARRY D. TRAIN, II

Friday, October 28

5:45 p.m. Social Hour

6:30 Dinner - POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL

Chair: Barbara Stuhler

Speakers: Frances Farley, Congressional Candidate from Utah, political activist

John Lawyer, Professor of Political Science, Bethel College; International Relations Specialist

Saturday, October 29

9:00 a.m. THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL - LESSONS FROM THE PAST

Chair: Ann Cahn

Speakers: P. Terrence Hopmann, Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota

Betty Goetz Lall, Secretary, Arms Control Association

10:30 Break

10:45 ETHICAL AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARMS RACE

Chair: Lois Rand

Speakers: Ruth Adams, Editor, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Harold Ditmanson, Chairman, Department of Religion, St. Olaf College

Adm. Harry D. Train, II, USN (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, NATO

Saturday, October 29

12:30 p.m. Lunch - NATIONAL SECURITY - 1983 AND BEYOND

Chair: Geri Joseph

Speaker: Robert E. Hunter, Director of European Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University

Wrap-up: Gladys Brooks

Conference Exit Visa:

You will find an evaluation sheet in your conference folder. We would appreciate your evaluation for future planning. Please complete and turn yours in at the registration desk.

Conference Steering Committee

Gladys Brooks*
Chair, Advisory Board,
World Affairs Center
U of M

Geri Joseph
Former Ambassador
to the Netherlands

Lois Rand
Chair, Board of
The Ebenezer Society

Kathleen Scott
Community Volunteer

Emily Anne Staples
Chair, Government
Relations Committee
United Way of
Greater Minneapolis

Barbara Stuhler*
Associate Dean,
Continuing Education
and Extension, U of M

Jean Tews
President, League of
Women Voters of
Minnesota

*Conference Co-Chair

This conference is made possible by contributions to the League of Women Voters Education Fund.

Primary support has been provided by the Honeywell Foundation with additional support from the Patrick and Aimee Butler Family Foundation, the Somerset Foundation, The Committee for National Security and from contributions by individuals.

George Reavon Oct 3.
affected /
As we approach an
election year when
all members of the House
are running + 1/3 of
the Senate.
the healing ap of
rhetoric is very
popular.
Tonight talk is

RESOLUTION

INTERNATIONAL
IT'S TIME
IPKO
HAS COME
PEACE KEEPING ORGANIZATION

BE IT RESOLVED:

That the United States lead a world wide diplomatic effort to establish an international treaty between all nations to abandon war in the setlement of international disputes; that in the implementation of this principle, a world wide convention be held attended by delegates of all nations; that this convention provide a charter for a permanent INTERNATIONAL PEACE KEEPING ORGANIZATION (called IPKO), including an international police force under its sole jurisdiction of sufficient strength to enforce all of its decrees and to furnish all nations of the world with security from foreign military aggression and from international terrorism.

II.

That the international treaty establish the following broad policies deemed essential to IPKO to accomplish its purpose and such other policies and working rules as are necessary.

A. Provide for the elimination of all nations' national military forces on a simultaneous basis, including all of its weapons, with each nation retaining to itself only a National Guard type organization of the strength and with weapons suitable only for its internal security.

B. Provide for the cessation of development, manufacture, importation, and exportation of all military weapons.

C. That IPKO be permitted to establish bases of operation in every nation; to pass through any nation, its air space and coastal waters, to reach any location necessary in the performance of its functions.

D. That no nation have the right to veto the decrees of IPKO.

III.

That IPKO maintain on-site inspection in all nations to determine if its decrees are compiled with; that, in addition, any nation may send its own on-site inspectors to any nation it suspects of violating the decrees of IPKO; such inspections to be entirely at its own expense.

IV.

That IPKO make provisions for the elimination of international terrorism.

V.

That IPKO have no jurisdiction in the internal affairs of any nation; that it have no jurisdiction in settling of disputes betwen nations, except that it prevent military aggression of any nation by crossing the border of another nation with a military force, whether such crossing be with or without the consent of that nation.

VI.

That IPKO have no jurisdiction over the function or operation of any international organization formed for improvement of international justice, human rights, and for the health and welfare of nations or between nations.

A. That any such organization give up the enforcement of any of its decrees through military means and that it permanently disband any military forces it might have.

VII.

That all nations provide for the financial and physical support of IPKO on an equitable quota basis.



Respectfully submitted,

Donald S. Gibson
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November 5, 1981

Washington County Bulletin

Thursday, October 13, 1983
Vol. 25 No. 10

*International Peace Keeping Force, an ideal solution to world arms build-up

By Don Gibson
Cottage Grove

Recent polls indicate that more than half of the people in the U.S. believe that there will be a full scale nuclear war within ten years, and that such a war will destroy civilization throughout the world. They are fearful and logically are trying to reduce the possibility of such a war occurring. Numerous plans have been presented. The freeze and ban the nuclear bomb is presently the most popular. But, although the freeze and ban plan have been around for several years, the plan just doesn't seem to be going anyplace. The reverse seems to be taking place. More and more powerful nuclear bombs are being manufactured and plans for deployment are taking place.

In spite of the demonstrations, marches, arrests, and protest by many people in the U.S. and Europe, the freeze and ban plan is still stalled and ineffective. Why is the arms race going on full speed and the danger of war increasing while time to achieve a real peace is running out?

The freeze and ban plan actually isn't directed toward putting an end to war. It is directed towards eliminating the atomic bomb, but leaves all the others, the conventional weapons, in place and would continue the danger of war. The freeze and ban the bomb plan, if it ever came into being would elevate the status of the conventional weapons when they already are devastating. Even conventional weapons have been improved since the end of World War II. W.W. II was fought with conventional weapons, except at the very end of the war. We all know of the wide spread death and destruction of World War II. A World War III, if fought only with conventional weapons, would also be the end of civilization as we know it.

As long as war is possible, the arms race in conventional weapons can be expected, even if a freeze and ban of nuclear weapons has taken place. How could an onsite inspection to search out violations of a freeze and ban plan be possible when such inspection would disclose what is taking place in conventional arms development? Development of arms is TOP SECRET. No country that was engaged in preparation for W.W. III would consent to an on-site inspection.

Another reason that the freeze and ban plan won't succeed is that it is essentially an arms reduction plan. Efforts at arms reduction have failed in the past largely because the major countries have endeavored to improve their relative position of strength against their opponents through outmaneuvering the others at the bargaining table. They ponder, if a freeze and ban plan goes through, would that leave them in a stronger or weaker relative position in the event of a conventional weapons war, or whether one side gives up more bombs than the other.

The only plan that both the U.S. and Russia (and the rest of the world) can accept is **complete and total disarmament of all national military forces.** This would leave both in the same and equal position. Neither would have the armaments and military forces to wage war on the other. But, both would have a real security and be free of the danger of war and free of the cost of the arms race.

Of course, and this is essential, complete and total disarmament would have to take place in Russia and in the U.S. at the same time and be verified by an on-site inspection. It would have to take place in the rest of the world at the same time.

But, let us suppose that Russia won't agree to a total disarmament. That would not place the U.S. in more danger than it is now in. It would just mean that one more attempt at peace had failed. We would both be in the same position as now. There is no reason, however, to expect Russia not to agree. If a plan is good for the U.S., it is good for Russia also.

Implementation of the plan would only take place after both countries had agreed to the plan. The elimination of the armed forces of each would take place over a period of years with verification of the elimination being made by adequate on-site inspection.

Let us suppose that the U.S., Russia, and the rest of the world have agreed to total and complete disarmament and total disarmament has taken place. Do we trust the Russians, and do the Russians trust the U.S., to live up to, and not cheat on the plan? Do we trust them to not secretly activate their military forces? The world hasn't reached the point where brotherly love and fair play could be counted upon to hold observances of the plan for all time to come. An international police force would be necessary to prevent and stop cheating,if it takes place.

There is a plan for an international police force. It is called INTERNATIONAL PEACE KEEPING ORGANIZATION (IPKO). It would have to be powerful enough to police all nations and to furnish protection and defense to all nations from military aggression from any other nation. Although this is a formidable task, remember that the national forces of all nations would have been eliminated when the IPKO plan went into effect. The police force of the IPKO would be only brought into play if cheating were to take place, or a crossing of a border by a military force were to occur. With adequate on-site inspection, the cheating would be discovered and stopped before it got well underway. Thus the extent of the IPKO force would be much less than the total military forces now in existence in the world, where each nation has to maintain its own defense against all others.

Of course, there would be expense in maintaining the IPKO peace organization and its police force. This expense would be pro-rated among all nations of the world. The share of each nation, however, would be smaller than the amount it now spends for its military force.

Now, look at other benefits of the IPKO plan. In spite of the billions and trillions of dollars now spent on our military machine, the U.S. does not have real security. If it had security, why are we spending billions to further increase our military power? We are afraid that Russia might invent some weapons that would defeat our existing weapons and give them a first strike capability. Russia is fearful of the U.S. for the same reason and thus the arms race goes on. We keep increasing our defense outlay and Rusia does the same. The sophistication and cost of each new generation of arms will go up as long as the arms race continues. Project, if you will, the improvement in the quality of life that can be accomplished if the billions of dollars that will be spent for defense could be used for health, education, environment, roads, elimination of unemployment, improvement of the economy and other useful purposes.

IPKO is the only plan for peace the U.S., Russia, and the world can accept. However, it takes a leader to start the ball rolling. If either the U.S. or Russia accepts the plan, but only agrees to implement the plan upon acceptance of the other, the other will immediately accept. It isn't important which country first accepts.

The IPKO plan, even if accepted by millions of people, will not in itself bring peace. Do not expect the government to initiate the plan. The people will have to be way out in front of the government and force the government to make the necessary laws and treaties to put the plan into effect. The strength of these millions of people has to be directed into political action. It is through the political process that the Congress of the U.S. and the President can be forced to carry out the will of the people. Simply stated, this means that the people only nominate candidates who support the IPKO concept. Then support and vote only for these candidates.

Please note in this talk of the political process that the IPKO plan is non-partisan. If the bombs fall they will kill Democrats, Republicans, rich and poor alike. All people, all nations, have an equal incentive to get out of the arms race and secure a real peace.

Please read the resolution that follows. It has been condensed to the extreme. If you have questions and would like a more complete explanation, write the undersigned and a speaker or information will be provided.

Now the important question—do you believe there is merit in the IPKO plan? Do you see it as the way to get out of the arms race and obtain permanent security for the U.S. and peace in the world? If you do, respond to the plan. Spread the idea among your family, friends, neighbors, and urge them to do the same. its success or failure, the survival of civilization, depends on people like you.

* *Published in the Washington County Bulletin on Oct. 18, 1983*

DONALD S. GIBSON
7007 E. Point Douglas Rd.
Cottage Grove, MN 55016

CNS Reports

August 1983

Second Women's Leadership Conference

THE CONFERENCE

The theme of the Committee's second Women's Leadership Conference in June was US-Soviet Relations. The proceedings were chaired jointly by Mary Grefe, past President of the American Association of University Women, and Yvonne Braithwaite Burke, former Congresswoman from California.

The conference opened with two overviews of US-Soviet relations, by William Hyland, senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Leslie Gelb, national security correspondent for The New York Times. Hyland asserted that we are now going through the most critical period in US-Soviet relations since the death of Stalin. The new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, faces major policy changes on both the domestic and the international scenes -- military stalemate in Afghanistan, a continuing political crisis in Poland, deteriorating relations with the US, and the need for structural changes and reforms at home. Relatively little is known in the US about the power struggle in the Kremlin, but its outcome will have a profound impact on the way these issues are resolved. Gelb identified three forces that will guide relations between the two superpowers: 1) the change in the Soviet leadership; 2) what he described as "real vacuity" in US approaches to the Soviet Union; and 3) continuing pressure on the US from its European allies to take a more cautious and cooperative attitude toward the Soviets.

A panel on US-Soviet economic relations included Paula Stern, senior US International Trade Commissioner; Rep. James Leach, Republican of Iowa; Frank Press, President of the National Academy of Sciences; and Rep. James Weaver, Democrat of Oregon. Stern, speaking on trade, pointed out that bilateral trade between the superpowers makes up a very small volume of the imports or exports of either country. Thus, trade

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OPTIONAL COURSES

Two courses were offered the day before the Women's Leadership Conference began. A speakers' training course was taught by Janet Elsea of Communication Skills, Inc. and Virginia von Fremd, of Professionally Speaking/Vocal Impact Programs, Inc. A course on conflict resolution was taught by Ellen Raider of Ellen Raider International, Inc. and Elizabeth McPherson of the Center for Conflict Resolution, George Mason University.

Speakers' Training

The instructors of the speakers' training course provided so much useful information and generated such enthusiasm on the part of the participants that evaluation sheets completed at the end of the day reflected an overwhelming desire to repeat the program next year.

The course started with lively and rather humorous lectures from both teachers -- advice to the would-be public speaker on everything from posture to voice control, use of hands (strong, not too conspicuous, but very important) to eye contact with the audience (even more important).

The group was then dispatched for half an hour to write a five minute speech on a topic of one's choice. The rest of the day was spent listening to these talks, seeing them replayed on a TV, and hearing the instructors' criticisms and comments on each presentation. The participants were also encouraged to evaluate the talks by their classmates.

Despite the (to some) harrowing experience of seeing oneself on TV (and then hearing one's presentation analyzed and critiqued by all), the workshop was judged by all

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INSIDE

tends to be a weak handmaiden of politics in this context. The record of US attempts to use economic muscle to exert political pressure on the USSR is disappointing, but such efforts continue to be made nevertheless. Press addressed the issue of technology transfer from the US to the USSR. The list of items for which export licenses are proscribed for the USSR is now over 700 pages. Nevertheless, there is some doubt whether it has seriously hampered Soviet industry. Not only is the USSR a powerful scientific achiever in its own right, it has a number of legal and illegal alternatives for obtaining imported technology. Press argued that no harm has come to the US through scientific exchanges with Soviet scientists, since basic research has no immediate military application. On the question of financial credit for East-West trade, Leach pointed out that the US is not the major creditor for the Eastern bloc. By a margin of eight to one, that debt is held by our allies, who have given much of this credit on highly concessional terms. The US has tried to persuade European governments not to subsidize the Eastern bloc to such an extent, but without much success. Weaver described the US as the "OPEC of grain", asserting that we should use this powerful position more consciously for our own political and economic benefit. He said that the current market price for US grain is too low, and amounts to a subsidy to grain-buying countries, including the Soviet Union.

Panel discussions with representatives of citizens' organizations that work on US-Soviet relations acquainted participants with the resources that are available to people who wish to become better informed about the Soviet Union. The groups represented ranged from the United Nations Association to Athletes United for Peace, from the Citizen's Exchange Council to the Public Interest Video Network. A speaker from the Forum Institute presented the results of a survey of 180 citizens' groups actively involved in this field.

The theme of the keynote speech, given by CNS Chairman Paul Warnke, was the futility of trying to use major weapons systems as "bargaining chips" in arms control negotiations. Warnke pointed out that both the US and the USSR will do whatever is necessary to prevent the other from gaining a decisive advantage in armaments. It is futile to imagine that we can win the arms race; our choice is between a perpetual arms race and arms control. The current US administration equates bargaining chips with bargaining advantages, as something to threaten the Russians with, rather than something to exchange for restraint on their part. He suggested that it is very unlikely that the Russians will acquiesce to US demands once we deploy the MX missile and other proposed new weapons systems. Rather, they are likely to react in the same way that we and our allies have responded to the deployment of Soviet SS-20s in Europe -- by planning new systems to match the new threat. There is no way to end this spiral, Warnke said, except serious arms control negotiations.

Discussing issues in US-Soviet security relations, Walter Slocombe, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, focused on the military balance between the US and the USSR. There is no simple answer to the question of who is ahead in the arms race, he said. The US has a larger total number of weapons, and, in general, its weapons are better and more sophisticated than those of the Soviets. By most other, cruder, measures of strength, the Soviets have an edge. It is important to remember, however, that neither side has enough superiority to be able to gain a military advantage by launching a first strike. According to William Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence, the central question in arms control right now is "Can we trust the Russsians?" His answer is that we cannot, but we do not need to. National technical means of verification -- the highly sophisticated intelligence-gathering apparatus now available -- gives us the ability to monitor closely what the Russians are doing without their direct cooperation. Arms control agreements make the process of keeping up with military developments significantly easier, by opening channels through which any ambiguities uncovered by technical means can be discussed.

Thomas Graham, Director of Congressional and Public Affairs at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, discussed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). At the beginning of June, the US position in the INF talks, the "zero option", was that no Pershing II missiles would be deployed in Europe if the Soviets would agree to dismantle all of their SS-20s and their older SS-4s and 5s. The Soviet counter-offer was that they

(continued on page 3)

would reduce their force to the level of the British and French nuclear forces combined. In START, Graham said the US was considering changes in its negotiating position in order to conform to the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission. Both parties to the talks continue to abide by the provisions of the unratified SALT II treaty. Commenting on Graham's remarks, Rep. Beverly Byron, (R-Md), pointed out that the nature of the political process in the US is such that a consensus must be built internally before we can negotiate with our adversaries.

Women's Leadership Conference Co-Chairs Mary Grefe and Yvonne Burke

John P. Hardt, associate director and senior specialist in Soviet economics at the Congressional Research Service, discussed some of the economic constraints on Soviet foreign policy. The continuing need for sophisticated foreign technology, grain imports, hard-currency earnings, and credit does influence Soviet foreign policy, but the influence is not overriding--particularly when there is a conflict with security interests. Hardt confirmed that trade with the Soviet Union does not necessarily confer leverage over foreign policy.

Robin A. Remington, professor of political science at the University of Missouri, pointed out that Eastern European countries play a special role in Soviet foreign policy, as members of a "socialist commonwealth", as sharers of a common political culture, and as members of the Warsaw Pact military alliance. Thus, Eastern European relations are not seen in the USSR as strictly "foreign" policy. Eastern Europe is becoming more heterogeneous, and Soviet authority there has been challenged by six of the seven original Warsaw Pact countries. The most recent challenge, in Poland, is an event of the most profound importance, which will shape Soviet policy in the region for years to come. Internal social problems within the Soviet Union were discussed by Murray Feshbach, demographer and senior research fellow at the Center for Population Research at Georgetown University, who drew a statistical picture of the Soviet population to illustrate his points. The birth rate in European Russia is below replacement level, while that in the Soviet Central Asian republics is two or three times higher. This contrast carries serious implications for productivity, military manpower, and the location of industry. While the birth rate has been dropping, the death rate seems to have been rising. The causes appear to be higher infant mortality rates and excessive male mortality. Alcoholism may be implicated in both these phenomena. The health-care system is plagued with problems of supplies, quality of training, and a high level of infectious disease.

Gary Matthews, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, asserted that the lack of human rights in the USSR is a very basic issue of contention between the US and the Soviets; it is not just a convenient propaganda tool that we use against them. He specifically mentioned Soviet restrictions on emigration, persecution of religious groups, the abuse of psychiatric techniques, and the existence of a large number of political prisoners and labor-camp inmates. Matthews said that the US does not have the kind of leverage on human rights issues with the Soviet Union that it might have with a friend and ally.

Three journalists described the difficulties of reporting from the Soviet Union. Anne Garrels of ABC News was expelled from the Soviet Union without explanation in 1982, after having served there for three years. She outlined the frustrations of operating in Moscow -- the arbitrariness with which rules are made and applied, the irritation of being watched constantly, and the isolation from ordinary Soviet citizens. Patricia Blake, associate editor of Time, was Life Magazine's Moscow correspondent in the late 1950s and early 1960s at the height of the Cold War. She recalled an even stronger atmosphere of mistrust and hostility on the part of official Moscow. Mark Hopkins, from the Voice of America, observed that despite the obstacles to coverage encountered by foreign correspondents, their stories are often the best sources of information that Soviet citizens have about what is going

(continued on page 4)

on in their own country's political establishment. All three emphasized the warmth and the genuinely hospitable nature of the Russian people, contrasting it strongly with the attitude of officials.

Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Prime Minister and present leader of the Oppositon in Norway

Three European politicans articulated views of US-Soviet relations from a region that lies between the superpowers and is a very likely setting for possible confrontation between them. Gro Harlem Brundtland, leader of the opposition Labor Party and former Prime Minister of Norway, reminded the audience that the Atlantic Alliance is a partnership of sovereign states and must be maintained on the basis of common interests. The US is as dependent on Europe as Europe is on the US. The policy of the Alliance is defense and detente, and for the US to appear to abandon detente leads to serious tension between it and its European allies. The Europeans do not believe in perpetual struggle with the Soviets; they do not believe in holding arms control hostage to Soviet good behavior all over the world; they do believe that taking a hard line in foreign policy will drive leftist governments in the Third World into the Soviet camp.

Elizabeth Young, Lady Kennet, an activist in the British Social Democratic Party, pointed out that Britain's situation differs from that of the Nordic countries because Britain is an independent nuclear power. But she too, emphasized the importance of NATO as an alliance. She decried the tendency to speak as if strategic weapons were only those capable of reaching the United States. In European eyes, shorter range weapons targeted at Europe are every bit as strategic as intercontinental ballistic missiles. US foreign policy is too often dominated by its domestic political timetable, to the frustration of the other members of the Alliance.

An Independent member of the Italian parliament, Giancarla Codrignani, said that, although the Mediterranean Sea is a crucial strategic area and a potential scene of conflict, the government of Italy has played a relatively minor role in forming Alliance policy. The Italian sense of direct threat from the East is minimal and the sense of threat from internal Communist subversion is also weak; the Italian Communist party plays a healthy role in the democratic process. Still, the populace is deeply concerned about the threat of nuclear war. In Sicily, more than a million citizens signed a petition to oppose the deployment of Cruise missiles. Codrignani impressed upon the audience the importance of women becoming actively involved in the building of a peaceful society.

The panel on the US, the Soviet Union and the Third World, included Henry Trofimenko, a department head at the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a member of the Moscow Peace Committee and Betty Lall, Professor at Cornell University and a former arms control official. Trofimenko asserted that the Soviet Union has no intent or desire to take over other countries. It has great sympathy for the struggles and aspirations of the Third World countries, and has always supported the process of decolonization. The US, on the other hand, was ambivalent on this issue after World War II, since, while basically sympathetic to decolonization, it was linked in military alliances to the old colonial powers. Trofimenko insisted that the USSR is not pursuing its own self-interest in its policy of support for Third World countries, but said that the US did appear to be engaged in empire-building. He described the Soviet move into Afghanistan as "maybe a desperate action" on the part of the Soviet Union, but one that responded to a real sense of threat. He stated that the Soviets would now like to see a political solution to the conflict, but that the US seems to be quite happy to see it continue as an embarassment to the Soviet Union. Lall suggested three important initiatives for reducing US-USSR bellicosity in the Third World: 1) a joint agreement to reduce arms sales to the third world; 2) a treaty by the superpowers

(continued on page 5)

of military non-intervention in the Third World; and 3) continued observance by the US and USSR of the provisions of the agreements reached in 1972.

A Soviet perspective on US-Soviet relations was presented by Mira Petrovsky, a senior research fellow at the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Petrovsky spoke not only from the point of view of a Soviet citizen, but as a Soviet expert on the American political process. She pointed out that the period of detente had permitted real breakthroughs in arms control, and that detente was never a one-way street in favor of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, most of the American public, according to opinion polls, have consistently favored a reduction of tensions with the Soviet Union. However, a small group in the US has sought to undermine detente out of a deep hatred for Communism, she said. Achieving an atmosphere of mutual respect will not be an easy task, but the superpowers have a responsibility to persevere, not only for the sake of their own people, but for the sake of the entire world.

Tapes of all the plenary sessions of the second Women's Leadership Conference are now available. Each session is on one or two 90-minute cassettes. Proceedings of the Conference will be available in October. The order form is on page 15.

A panel of Americans with extensive experience dealing with the Soviet Union presented three perspectives on what it is like to negotiate with the Russians. Stanley Resor, a former Secretary of the Army and Undersecretary of Defense who was head of the US delegation to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations from 1973 to 1978, said that the Russians place a high value on consistency and continuity in negotiations, and are extremely pragmatic, though also cautious and conservative. It is difficult to arrive at common definitions of parity with them because the configuration of their strategic forces differs so greatly from those of the US. They have a high respect for US technology and, therefore, are particularly willing to negotiate on new weapons systems. But they are very reluctant to remove systems they have already deployed.

James Giffen, vice-president of ARMCO gave a detailed account of that firm's lengthy negotiations with the Soviets over a contract to build a highly sophisticated steel plant in the USSR. The negotiations took years and cost ARMCO millions of dollars; when they were finally concluded, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and, in response, the US imposed sanctions, including denial of some industrial licenses critical to the operation of the ARMCO plant. The entire plan had to be abandoned, and the Soviets soon signed a similar agreement with a European firm.

Henry Trofimenko of the Institute of the USA & Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Judy Mann of The Washington Post

Mark Garrison, director of the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University and former US Deputy Ambassador to the Soviet Union, declared that both the American government and people are guilty of political immaturity in dealing with the Russians. The failure to discern and give priority to our most vital national interests has weakened our effectiveness in achieving our foreign policy goals. We badly need a more sophisticated understanding of how the USSR works; for this, insight into the mentality of a small group of Soviet leaders is essential. Their first priority is to assure that the devastation and near loss of their country in World War II will never be repeated, and they will do whatever is necessary to do so. The US must demonstrate that it accepts the Soviet Union as another superpower, the equal of the US in global terms.

Seweryn Bialer, Ruggles Professor of political science at Columbia University and director of the Research Institute on International Change, closed the Conference saying that fear and lack of communication pervade all levels of US and Soviet society and are entirely mutual. Significant arms

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THE CONFERENCE *(continued)*

control achievements are unlikely in an atmosphere of such poor relations as now exist between the two countries. He predicted that no resolution in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force talks will be achieved in time to prevent the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. Soviet reaction to the deployment is likely to be prompt and extreme, in the form of new missile deployments of its own. Comparing the Andropov and the Reagan administrations, Bialer saw the current Soviet leadership as wishing to be less active in world politics at this point, in order to concentrate more on domestic problems. By contrast, Reagan and those close to him are more ideological and less professional than any US government in the last 30 years. They regard the Soviet system as unnatural, and seem to think that the Soviet government is incapable of responding to positive incentives. Fundamental misperceptions of the USSR prevail in current US foreign policy -- such as a false analogy with Nazi Germany -- and impede the process of managing and defusing the conflict between the superpowers. Finally, Bialer contended that "quick fix" proposals are unrealistic and that, in this age of nuclear arsenals, the United States must include the Soviet Union in its pluralistic approach, despite the oppressiveness of the Soviet regime.

CNS Director Anne Cahn adjourned the Conference with thanks to the speakers and workshop leaders, the staff of the Committee, and the dedicated volunteers who made the Conference possible.

OPTIONAL COURSES *(continued)*

participants to offer a most worthwhile and enlightening day.

Conflict Resolution

For those who participated, this one-day Conflict Resolution Course was an exciting experience that left all hungry for more.

The instructors explained that five basic influencing styles are used, to a greater or lesser extent, by everyone. These styles are defined as "persuading" or "asserting" (called pushing styles), "bridging" or "attracting" (called pulling styles) and "disengaging". How and when each of these styles is used separates successful from less successful negotiators.

Before the course, participants had their business associates, friends, and family, select the influencing styles they felt they used the most and rate their effectiveness. At the same time the participants were asked to select and rate the styles they felt they used with each of these people. This chance to "see yourself as others see you" was, in itself, a most interesting and revealing exercise.

In response to the success of the Conflict Resolution Course offered at the Women's Leadership Conference, CNS is offering another course. This two-day program will take place October 5-6, 1983. For further information, indicate your interest on the form on page 15 or phone Leslie B. Forrest at 202/833-3140.

Successful negotiators approach the negotiating table with some preliminary "getting to know you" activity and with extensive preliminary planning. They work to uncover the real needs of the other side versus its stated objectives. (For example, one's objective may be to get a gun, but the need is to feel safe and secure.) Once these needs are on the table, it is possible to offer "alternative currencies" that might satisfy those needs as well as, or, perhaps, better than, the original objective. (In the case of the need to feel safe, perhaps the promise of additional locks, a guard dog, or increased police patrol would answer the need.) This is the real heart of a successful negotiation because the original objective may not be attainable. Successful negotiators offer many more of these alternative currencies than do other negotiators.

Successful negotiators also emphasize areas of common ground versus areas of conflict and they avoid the use of "irritators" which, surprisingly, are not direct insults but saying gratuitously favorable things about themselves. Words like "fair" and "reasonable" when used to describe the negotiators own offer are irritants to the other side. Instant counter-proposals, which betray a lack of interest and respect for the other side's ideas, and "attacking/defending spirals" are also scrupulously avoided by successful negotiators.

Because the participants were about to attend a conference on US-Soviet Relations, Raider also discussed a special aspect of

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OPTIONAL COURSES *(continued)*

international negotiations -- the "cultural filter". Different cultures have different behavioral approaches to a negotiation. For example, if a Latin is late to a meeting with an American, the American may interpret this as an insult and allow his/her anger to botch the negotiations; yet, the tardiness merely reflects a different cultural attitude toward time. The ability of an Eastern Bloc negotiator to "go with the flow" may be severely restricted. Thus, if the American negotiator presses for an immediate decision on a new direction the discussion has taken, it will anger and embarrass the Eastern Bloc representative, who must then lose face by admitting he/she does not have the same authority as his/her American counterpart.

At the end of the day, the participants were divided into negotiation teams and practiced what they had been taught in a trade negotiation between two fictitious countries that bore an amazing resemblence to the US and Japan -- with tractor imports under discussion, instead of auto imports.

The negotiations were taped and later analyzed sentence by sentence. This exercise proved that it is much easier to assimilate new approaches to negotiations mentally than it is to put them into practice. Old habits, especially regarding negotiating, die hard.

From the CNS staff, Louise Mead Walker attended the Speakers' Training and Lawrie Ryerson Harris attended the Conflict Resolution course.

REGIONAL CONFERENCES

Two regional conferences are planned for October.

Cleveland, Ohio

The Ohio Women's Leadership Conference on National Security will be Friday, October 7-Sunday, October 9, 1983 at the Hollenden House Hotel, East 6th & Superior, Cleveland, Ohio. CNS Director Anne H. Cahn will speak on "What is National Security?" Other speakers include Dr. Helen Caldicott, President of Physicians for Social Responsibility on "The Consequences of Nuclear War" and Frances Farley, former State Senator of Utah on "The MX: A Case Study of Citizen Involvement." Mary Dent Crisp, former Co-Chair of the Republican National Committee, will deliver the keynote address.

For further information contact Beverly Quist, YWCA, 3201 Euclid, Cleveland Ohio 44115, 216/391-6758.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

The Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference on National Security will be Friday and Saturday October 28-29, 1983 at the Sofitel Hotel in Minneapolis. CNS Director Anne H. Cahn will speak on "The History of Arms Control Negotiations".

For further information, contact Barbara Stuhler at 612/373-3900 or Gladys Brooks at 612/823-7672.

SPEAKERS BUREAU

The National Security and Foreign Policy Speakers Bureau, which is managed by CNS, began operation in January 1983. Fourteen organizations combined their lists of speakers to create a central file. The initial master list contained over 350 names of people across the country willing to speak on a variety of foreign policy and national security topics. This list now contains over 400 names and another 500 are expected in the fall.

All the participating organizations report that they are making extensive use of the bureau. For example, Ground Zero used the list to assist its community groups in devising their Spring 1983 activities; the Union of Concerned Scientists will use the list in planning the convocations they will hold on some 1000 college campuses this fall. All find the larger list of names to draw from helpful, especially for filling requests from outside the Washington-New York-Boston area.

Lists of speakers cross-referenced by state and topic are kept. The present list of topics includes: Nuclear Weapons Programs; Nuclear Strategy; Effects of Nuclear War; NATO Warsaw Pact Balance/European Security; Comprehensive Test Ban; Nuclear Proliferation; Arms Control/Disarmament; Nuclear Weapons Freeze; Arms Race in Space; US-Soviet Relations Soviet Foreign Policy; Conventional Weapons and Strategy Defense Budget/Procurement; Manpower/Draft; Conflict Resolution/Negotiations; International Economics/Energy; International Organizations/World Order; Human Rights; Africa; Asia; Latin America; the Middle East; Organizing/Lobbying.

For further information or help in finding a speaker, contact Jo L. Husbands at 202/833-3140.

Editorial

The Reagan Administration contends that the United States should emphasize arms transfers as a foreign policy instrument. Security assistance, they say, is the most cost-effective investment we can make both to meet the challenges of today and to enhance the prospects for a safer future. By increasing security assistance the Administration hopes to: promote peaceful solutions to regional rivalries; assure access to military facilities and strategic raw materials; confront military threats from the USSR and its "proxies"; revitalize American alliances; and boost American defense production capabilities.

Despite the Administration's high hopes, increased transfers of conventional weapons, however, will not necessarily expand the influence of the US, nor will the military and strategic benefits always be realized. It is important to remember that recipient nations will always follow their own national interests and these may not be congruent with those of the US. As a result, the US does not always acquire influence through arms sales, and the strategic and military impact of security is difficult to predict. In fact, arms transfers to the Third World may exacerbate tensions in a region instead of deterring aggression. Furthermore, arms transfers may contribute to internal tensions, thereby contributing more to instability than to stability.

Although arms transfers appear to be viable solutions to the problems of friendly regimes beset with growing internal dissent or aggression from neighbors, and in the short run may boost US national security, their impact is unpredictable in many cases. Because most arms transfers are cash sales, recipients do not always feel obligated to heed the wishes of the supplier, be it the US or the USSR. For example, shortly after Congress approved the sale of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Saudi Arabia raised the price of oil, condemned Oman for permitting US military equipment to be based there, and resumed diplomatic relations with Libya -- hardly a manifestation of US influence! The USSR has also experienced similar difficulties with major clients, such as Egypt, Somalia, and Indonesia.

Although there are a few instances in which a friend of the US is challenged by a Soviet client state, the Administration, when assessing the security implications of security assistance, should also consider the situation from a perspective which does not stress conflict in a bipolar context. A notable example of failure to do so is the agreement to sell Venezuela twenty-four F-16s. The deal represents the introduction of highly sophisticated aircraft into Latin America. Although Cuba may pose a threat to Venezuela, the nature of the threat does not warrant such advanced aircraft. Besides possibly provoking a Cuban response, the sale heightens tensions with other South American states such as Guyana and Columbia. Other Latin American nations will now also desire sophisticated weaponry, and the United States, to be viewed as a reliable ally, may feel compelled to make available advanced armaments to other nations in the region. Thus, in attempts to achieve regional stability through a balance of power, arms transfers may actually foster continuing imbalances.

The question of who derives political influence over whom from an arms transaction is a complicated one. The relationship is neither linear nor uni-directional. That is, the amount of influence does not necessarily increase with the size of the transaction nor does the influence necessarily flow from supplier to the recipient. Many variables can intervene. A supplier's influence is maximized when the recipient: has no alternate source of supply; cannot pay for the arms; is a "pariah" state within the international community; has no indigenous weapons-production capability; has a small storage capacity for spare parts; perceives a real threat to its national survival; does not possess scarce unsubstitutable raw materials; requires supplier personnel for weapons maintenance and training; perceives that receiving arms from that supplier is particularly prestigious; or has such a strong ideological orientation that switching suppliers is precluded.

It is a fallacy to assert that selling arms brings influence or that the more arms you sell, the more influence you obtain. As an implement of foreign policy, security assistance has a role to play but that role is perhaps better suited to be a supporting actor, rather than the featured player.

This editorial is taken from Dr. Cahn's testimony before the Carlucci Commission, which was formed by President Reagan in February 1983 to review the goals and activities of US foreign assistance programs. The testimony was prepared with the assistance of David Voisin, CNS intern.

Standing Consultative Commission

What is the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)? What are its functions? To explore these questions, CNS sponsored a round-table discussion on the SCC in June.

The SCC was established under the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaties to settle disputes and clarify questionable practices by either superpower connected with those agreements.

Discussing the SCC in the round-table were: Robert Buchheim, former Deputy Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA; 1973-76), former US Commissioner of the SCC (1976-81), and former head of the US delegation to the Anti-Satellite Talks with the Soviet Union (1978-79); Sidney Graybeal, former member of the US delegation to SALT (1969-73), former US Commissioner of the SCC for implementing SALT I (1973-77); and Manfred Eimer, Deputy Assistant Director of Verification and Intelligence at ACDA. The discussion was moderated by Stephen Flanagan, Professional Staff, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Flanagan explained that the purpose of the roundtable discussion was not to discover whether the Soviets are actually cheating on arms control agreements; the proceedings of the SCC are secret and, for this reason, specifics cannot be discussed. Instead, the objective was to gain a better understanding of the utility and functions of the SCC.

Graybeal emphasized that, from the beginning of SALT I, both sides readily agreed to the utility of a permanent, bilateral body to implement the agreement and consider questions of compliance with its provisions. Graybeal pointed out that although the consideration of Treaty compliance is the most publicized function of the SCC, it is not the sole SCC activity. Other functions are "to provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed". Information has been offered by both sides, mainly in the context of support for a position on a compliance issue, but the SCC has not been an effective forum for voluntary exchange of information.

In addition, the Commission was to "agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components . . ., consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments . . ., [and] consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms." These last two provisions were added to ensure that, when the SALT I agreements expired, a forum for further arms control agreements would still exist.

Graybeal stated that regulations under the Treaty encourage advance communication between the two sides concerning the agenda and the use of advisors or working groups, and provide for alternating Commissioners to preside over the meetings. The most controversial regulation is that the proceedings shall be conducted in private. "The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners." This regulation has stimulated debate within and between both countries. While the Soviets are concerned with privacy and secrecy, the United States conducts its affairs openly. This issue remains controversial and is often raised by the Soviets.

Graybeal discussed the major activities of the SCC to date, which include: 1) agreement on the procedures for replacing, dismantling or destroying strategic offensive arms and ABM systems and their components; 2) consideration of compliance questions (since 1975, concerns have been raised by both sides and have been satisfactorily resolved; two White Papers, in 1978 and in 1979, have been issued on the status of compliance issues); 3) clarification of terms (for example, the SCC has discussed exactly what is meant by an "ABM mode" and has defined unilateral statements made by both sides); 4) ABM Treaty reviews (reviews are required by the treaty every five years and have been conducted in 1977 and 1982); and 5) improved implementation of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War.

Graybeal concluded with some personal lessons gained from his SCC experience. He emphasized an important characteristic of the SCC which is often misunderstood: it is essentially an implementing body and not designed for the negotiation or enforcement of treaties. Graybeal, like most other SCC participants--former and present--believe that the privacy of SCC activities greatly contributes to its effectiveness. He does

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not believe that compliance issues should be linked to other international issues or activities. These issues should be dealt with separately and on their own merits. He observed that the Soviets tend to "keep score" on compliance issues and, in fact, try to find issues similar to those raised by the US where possible. Finally, Graybeal believes it is extremely important that Congress be informed, and that keeping the key Committees continuously aware of important issues will avoid numerous problems in the long run.

Buchheim commented on the role of the SCC in narrowing the uncertainties concerning each side's behavior. While the SCC is not a perfect forum for verification, clarification of uncertainties before they get out of hand eases the task of verification and reduces the risk of overreaction by either side.

Eimer pointed out that his role in the SCC is much different from that of the last two speakers; his concern is primarily with the resolution of compliance questions. Eimer noted that there are two aspects of the SCC that are particularly valuable. First, and most importantly, the SCC has been useful in defining and detailing provisions for the dismantling of weapons systems. However, Eimer questioned the utility of the SCC in the resolution of compliance issues. He asserted that secrecy has been both good and bad in this regard, for public perception of the arms control process is a crucial element in achieving a final agreement. While the polls show that the public does favor arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, it does not trust the Soviets to comply with these agreements. The SCC was established to deal with compliance issues, but if the public has no faith in its utility, it cannot achieve its purpose. Public ignorance is partly responsible for this lack of faith. Thus, secrecy, though beneficial in allowing uninhibited discussion, prohibits the public education necessary to foster a supportive position.

Eimer claimed that we cannot achieve arms control agreements without changing public opinion; and such change is possible only if the SCC has, at least, the "theoretical capability" to carry out compliance functions. He questioned whether this is possible. He explained that the act of raising a compliance question is, in itself, accusatory. Therefore, no issue is lightly taken up at the SCC; it is first debated over a long period of time within the US government. Then, once an issue is, in fact, raised, other problems arise. Eimer contended that the Soviets will not provide any evidence to confirm that they have committed a violation. Instead, there is a long debate within the Soviet Union about our question -- perhaps as long as we debated whether to ask the question -- and a response telling us why they are not in violation. The typical American reaction to this response is a polarization of opinion within the delegation. Those who did not favor asking the question in the first place will say, "I told you they had done nothing wrong." Those who encouraged the questioning say, "They're lying again." From Eimer's experience, this has been the history of the SCC dialogue.

On balance, Eimer feels the SCC has been extremely useful, but there is a definite need to review and change the procedure for dealing with compliance issues; the current practice is ineffective.

Graybeal pointed out that the public tends to respond to the President's lead and to the media, and with all the talk about the Soviets being "cheaters" and "liars," what else can the public conclude? In addition to being "liars and cheaters" the Administration has accused the Soviets of having violated, if not the letter, then the spirit of the treaties. This spirit does not exist in the Soviet Union; they are bound only by the written word.

In regard to Eimer's comments about the length of the process, Graybeal argued that it is lengthy because it is extremely important to get the facts straight before going to the Soviets, for, as Eimer said, posing a question is almost an accusation. However, if US security is seriously threatened, it is possible to go to a higher authority right away; the process is not designed to jeopardize American interests.

Buchheim responded to Eimer's remarks in a more blunt fashion, asking: "Fred, what's bothering you? So what if a question of compliance takes six months? Murders and divorces take longer than that. It's better than making a mistake!" To this Eimer responded by saying that he was interested in improving the system which involves a change in bureaucratic attitude. The policymakers should not set an agenda for the SCC if there are no questions of compliance or if there is a better channel for resolution. Eimer continued to explain

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that six months is not long to wait to resolve a compliance question, but the problem is not solved in six months; that is just how long it takes to get a response. Then comes the polarization; some are satisfied and some are not. Thus, it is not a productive six months, but these problems are built into the current system.

Buchheim suggested that if the "bureaucracy" was truly so inefficient, Eimer was in the best position to remedy that and should do so right away. He added that we do not just sit and wait for the Soviets to respond to our questions; we have our own intelligence sources and methods at work as well. The Soviet's explanation is just one of many possible interpretations, and we must test it against our own findings. We must only satisfy ourselves.

Before inviting questions, Flanagan added his thoughts on the length of the SCC process. He noted that delaying the question may be important so as not to reveal our intelligence sources or methods; on the other hand, we may choose to ask the question right away in order to avert the problem before it gets out of hand.

QUESTIONS:

1) Why is the Administration publicly raising questions about Soviet cheating, although we are not allowed to raise questions of compliance at the SCC in Geneva? And, what is the purpose of the accusations? -- propaganda?

Eimer: The US can raise whatever issues it likes in Geneva, or it may chose to protect its intelligence sources. It is not necessary to raise issues that the policymakers do not wish to act on.

2) How often does the SCC meet, and for how long?

Graybeal: The SCC meets twice a year in Geneva. They may agree to meet elsewhere but have not done so. The sessions will run anywhere from 6-10 weeks; there is no specified time limit.

3) Do we respond to the Soviets' questions promptly?

Buchheim gave an example of an incident when the US undertook to improve the hardness of Minuteman silos. During construction, the Air Force put large covers over the work site to protect the workers from the inclement weather. The Soviets could not see under these covers and asked us to remove them. There are provisions in the treaty governing concealment, but we did not remove the covers. We did explain, however, what they were; nevertheless, the issue took about three years to settle.

4) What about the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty? Can we be certain when there is a violation?

Eimer: To some degree yes, though we can never be absolutely certain.

Buchheim added that, to his knowledge, neither side has ever accused the other of a violation. Questions have been raised early and settled before the situation gets out of hand. As a result, the SCC has never dealt with any clear-cut case of violation.

Eimer interrupted to say that the President has said he believes the Soviets to be in violation of the Biological Warfare Convention. However, there is no body similar to the SCC provided for in that Convention except the United Nations, which is not capable of resolving this conflict.

5) How effective is the SCC as a vehicle of enforcement?

Buchheim: The SCC is not an enforcement body; there is no such body in the whole international system, except war and that is hardly appropriate.

6) What effect do the recent comments by the President about Soviet cheating have on the SCC process?

Eimer: None, they are ignored.

7) There have been reports that we are not taking compliance questions about SALT II to the SCC for fear of legitimizing the treaty. If we don't legitimize the treaty, how can we make an issue out of the violations?

Eimer: We are concerned about compliance with SALT II, but we will deal with those issues in whatever way we think will best resolve them, not necessarily through the SCC.

Book Review

The Soviet Union and The Arms Race
David Holloway, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.; 1983. $14.95

This a superb book. Comprehensive, judicious, and lucid, it illuminates a subject that could not be more timely and relevant. Many Americans have been deeply concerned by the continuing growth of Soviet military power, Soviet nuclear doctrines, and increasing use of military power to support expansion of its influence. This volume will put many of these fears into a more understandable, and therefore less sinister, perspective. Amazingly, all this is done with great succinctness in a volume of only 184 pages.

Three characteristics of the book seem to me responsible for its success: a strong reliance on historical material; a comprehensive approach to different aspects of Soviet military power which permits a rounded view; and an obvious dedication to balance and fairness.

Historical perspective is essential to comprehend the great political and human problems of our times. The enormous role of the military effort in Soviet life is no exception. Soviet attitudes toward war, weapons, strategy, and policy are not aberrant phenomena to be explained by simplistic notions such as a desire for world conquest. They derive from long, complex, and often painful, historical experience.

Several of Holloway's historical insights deal in unusual ways with the impact of the Second World War. For example, he shows that there has been a consistent Soviet feeling from 1946 to the present that its victory over Germany entitles it to participate in all the great world problems. In other words, the Soviet Union's assertion of global status did not originate in the 1970s as it began to acquire strategic parity with the United States.

Another important, and little recognized, insight concerns the Soviet preoccupation with surprise attack stemming from Hitler's shattering invasion of Russia in 1941. Holloway explores the profound effect which this fear has had on Soviet thinking about nuclear war. Although Holloway does not mention it, as a result of Pearl Harbor, the United States shares with the Soviet Union the nightmare of surprise attack. This surely must be one of most baleful historic coincidences affecting the nuclear era.

The extraordinarily broad scope of Holloway's study may be seen by even a partial listing of some of the subjects explored. These include: Soviet thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear war; managing parity; competition in the Soviet and US nuclear strategies in Europe (this is an innovative analysis by Holloway); military power and Soviet foreign policy (detente, Afghanistan Poland, etc.); the defense economy; military production; and the politics of defense.

The inclusion of material about Soviet institutions and its bureaucracy adds a flesh-and-blood dimension not always present in more abstract analyses. For example, Soviet secrecy about defense issues is widely presumed to result from a sinister desire to disadvantage the West. Perhaps this is partly true, but Holloway shows the existence of more mundane motives. "Secrecy helps the General Staff to maintain its monopoly of expertise... The secrecy that surrounds defense production helps to buttress its priority by preventing criticism...."

Holloway's scrupulous fairness with issues that are both complex and controversial serves him particularly well in tracing how the Soviets view the military utility of nuclear weapons. He paints a convincing picture of men without satisfactory answers. Soviet leaders and generals, it appears, have been as tormented by the indigestible realities of nuclear weapons as have ours. Holloway rightly observes that it would be wrong to dismiss as worthless the disavowals by Soviet leaders of the pursuit of military doctrine and its adaption to the relationship of parity with the United States."

Holloway's policy conclusions are especially weighty. He believes there may be an historic opening for arms control. But of greater significance, he suggests that the West can, by itself, take actions reducing the risk of nuclear war. "While Soviet military power cannot be ignored, we should not allow the fact of that power to deprive us of all freedom of action in the course of action we pursue."

At a time when official discourse about the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons has deteriorated grossly, often to a level of pure egocentrism, it is good to have Holloway's book.

Alan Neidle, a member of CNS, is a former official of the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Publications

Organizations Involved in Soviet-American Relations: A Handbook
The Forum Institute (1225 15th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005); June 1983.

This compilation of 187 national groups involved in US-Soviet relations is published by the same organization that produced the 1983 Handbook: Arms Control and Peace Organizations/Activities. Following that successful format, it lists the groups alphabetically, describing their goals, activities, resources, and publications. Valuable appendices give a cross-reference of organizations by category and a brief summary of national and international government programs which have promoted Soviet-American interchange and dialogue.

Copies of the Handbook are available through CNS for $15.00 including postage.

Military Expansion, Economic Decline
Robert W. Degrasse, Jr., A Council on Economic Priorities Publication (84 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10011); 1983

This latest book, published by the Council on Economic Priorities, attempts to dispel the myth that military spending is good for the economy. A cross-national analysis of eleven Western industrial nations concludes that a higher percentage of the gross national product devoted to defense leads to lower productivity growth. For example, Japan, with the lowest defense budget, had the highest reinvestment and productivity growth rates. Other topics discussed are military spending and job creativity, inflation, the effects of military programs on technological progress, and the implications of the present administration's buildup. Of particular interest is a case study describing the role of military research on the semiconductor industry.

We Can Avert a Nuclear War
Edited by William Epstein and Lucy Webster; Oelgeschloger, Gunn & Hain, Inc., Cambridge, Mass.; 1983.

This book reports a special commemorative meeting marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first Pugwash Conference. Topics include: the nuclear freeze, no-first-use of nuclear weapons, the World Disarmament Campaign, the role of scientists and the public, banning weapons from outer space, and establishment of an international satellite monitoring system. Among their recommendations, the Conference participants urge the usefulness of the two superpowers taking unilateral initiatives and national actions, on a reciprocal basis, to halt and reverse the spiraling arms race.

MORE BUCKS, LESS BANG: How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons
Dina Rasor, Ed. Fund for Constitutional Government (P.O. Box 8807, Washington, DC 20003); 1983

This collection of articles was compiled to alert the US public to its inefficient and ineffective weapons procurement system. The authors follow the development of controversial weapons such as the M-1 tank, F-16 fighter airplanes, Trident submarine and the Pershing and Maverick missiles. All conclude that, unless serious procurement reforms are implemented, the US arsenal will consist of exotic, highly expensive weapons that are substandard and impractical.

This book differs from the many other studies on military waste in its rather drastic recommendations. Among them are: 1) consolidate missions and promote interservice and contractor competition; 2) penalize high-ranking military officers for accepting positions with contractors after retirement from the service; 3) separate operational testing from the research and development community; and 4) hold defense and contractor officials accountable for cost overruns and poor weapons performance.

Understanding Nuclear Weapons
Teena Mayers; Arms Control Research (Box 1355, Arlington, VA 22210); 1983. $2.95

This well-organized and concise pamphlet includes a brief history of the nuclear arms race, a description of the characteristics of nuclear weaponry, a comparison of US and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and a discussion of arms control treaties and current negotiations. It is excellent introductory reading on national security.

Congressional Testimony

CNS Chairman Paul Warnke and CNS member William E. Colby testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 22, 1983 regarding U.S. arms control policy.

PAUL WARNKE

Warnke emphasized the role of technological developments in fueling the arms race. Pointing out that the current push for first-strike weaponry was "inimical to our national security," he recommended the Committee's START proposal as a realistic formula for achieving reductions.

He said: "There are some who express hope that greater 'flexibility' is becoming apparent in the arms control stance of the Reagan Administration. Some profess to see movement toward the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. But here again I must say that I see only a greater rhetorical flexibility and that I find in the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission nothing that will stop or even slow the slide toward nuclear confrontation....

"...the theory seems to be that we can make the Soviet Union 'cry uncle' at the bargaining table by, for example, deploying 100 MXs and threatening to build still more. But this is not bargaining. It is, instead, the arms race theory of arms control and it won't work....

"The Committee for National Security, of which I am the Chairman, proposed some weeks ago, an approach to strategic arms that I believe does hold some promise of improving, rather than reducing, our national security. This would involve building on the provisions that were agreed upon in the SALT negotiations and moving away from greater emphasis on MIRVed counterforce missiles....

"In the curious but inescapable logic of the nuclear age, the security of the United States is not advanced by putting the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union at risk. At a time of serious international crisis, this can only lead Soviet leaders to wonder whether and when they should launch their weapons to avoid their destruction.

"Greater security and lower risk of nuclear war requires movement toward strategic forces that are the most survivable and the least threatening to the survivability of the other side's deterrent...."

WILLIAM E. COLBY

Colby, former CIA Director, drew on his expertise in intelligence matters to counter those skeptical of current verification techniques.

He said: "On behalf of the Committee for National Security, let me assure you that verification should not be an obstacle to conclusion of an arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.... This conclusion comes, in part, from the marvels of our present intelligence systems, but especially from a clear understanding of relationships with the Soviet Union.

"It is essential first to recognize that the United States will be monitoring the development of Soviet military forces and weaponry whether there is an agreement between our two countries or not....

"The second important aspect of the verification procedure is to realize that monitoring Soviet forces and weaponry is easier under a negotiated arrangement such as a freeze than it is without one. Recent arms control treaties negotiated with the Soviets contain a number of provisions designed to ease the process of monitoring the forces and weapons covered by those agreements....

"The third aspect... is the additional communication which would be opened with the Soviet Union under an arms control agreement.... With an arms control agreement, a special communications channel is established specifically for the discussion of ambiguities or challenge of possible violations....

"The final point to consider in a discussion of verification is its purpose. This is the protection of the security of the United States, not the assembly of evidence for a breach of contract suit in a court of law. The purpose of verification is to prevent our being surprised by some violation of an accord between us to the extent that we could be placed at a strategic disadvantage....

"Thus, it is not essential to insist that verification must absolutely identify any single action by the Soviet Union in violation of its commitments. Rather, the safety of the United States can be better obtained through an arms control agreement.... The safety of our country can better be protected by convincing the Soviets not to develop new weapons systems than by developing the weapons necessary to shoot them down ...."

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The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How

Alamogordo, New Mexico, July 16, 1945: the United States opens the nuclear era. September 23, 1949: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. October 19, 1952: the United Kingdom. February 19, 1960: France. October 16, 1964: the People's Republic of China. May 18, 1974: India. 50,000 nuclear weapons... 150,000 tanks... 40,000 combat aircraft... 600 billion dollars currently spent annually on military budgets. *This is the arms race.*

The Antarctic Treaty... the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water... the Non-Proliferation Treaty... the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. *These are arms control agreements.*

The pursuit of self-interest is a fundamental premise of national political behavior. Yet, because each nation interprets its interests differently, competition is inevitable. The *arms race* is the military result of this competition. In the nuclear arena, the arms race has taken the form of an increasingly sophisticated weapons rivalry evolving over nearly four decades, from the relatively small (by today's standards) bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 to a triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intercontinental bombers in both the United States and the Soviet Union (see *Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader,* LWVEF Pub. #531, $1.25). *Arms control* stems from the recognition that even in the midst of political and military rivalry, areas of agreement can be found to help maintain world stability—by reducing the risk of war, the cost of defense or the devastation of war should it occur. Arms control methods run the gamut—from limits on the further growth of weapons, to reductions, to complete disarmament.

Arms control is not a new concept. Throughout history societies have tried to limit weapons and outlaw war. At the turn of this century, the proliferation of arms production and other factors prompted the first serious arms control efforts, including the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which codified rules of war and banned certain weapons. Many of the agreements of this period, however, disintegrated in the anarchy of World War I.

The devastation and fear unleashed when the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945 gave new urgency to arms control. In 1946, the United States proposed the far-reaching Baruch Plan, under which an independent international authority would own all atomic resources, control all stages of nuclear production and eventually oversee the destruction of nuclear weapons. But when the negotiations surrounding the plan failed to make any real progress, the arms race acquired a new and more dangerous shape.

By the mid-1950s the arms race and the concurrent development of nuclear power for energy had complicated attempts to control nuclear materials. Disarmament schemes of the 1950s were replaced by proposals for step-by-step measures to control arms and reduce the danger of war. Major efforts since the 1960s include treaties to limit nuclear weapons tests to underground locations (Limited Test Ban), to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and to limit the number of strategic nuclear weapons possessed by the superpowers (SALT I and II). Current efforts focus on proposals for reductions in and limits on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons (respectively START and INF), a ban on all nuclear weapons testing (Comprehensive Test Ban), a "freeze" on the further testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and launchers, and reductions in European troop levels (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions).

In general, arms control proposals, negotiations or agreements have focused on or theoretically could address one or more of the following specific objectives:

- **quantitative limits or reductions** often aimed at controlling "vertical proliferation" (increases in the nuclear arsenals of states already possessing nuclear weapons). These agreements might focus on nuclear missiles and bombers, nuclear warheads, anti-ballistic missiles, conventional weapons or troop levels;
- **bans on the possession or use** of weapons. These bans can apply to existing weapons as well as to those not yet developed. Countries may agree, for example, not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire biological weapons, not to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict or not to use a particular weapon under hostile circumstances;
- **constraints on the development and improvement** of weapons. Constraints may be imposed through qualitative restrictions (such as limits on the types of new ICBM systems) or through limits on the testing of weapons;
- **limits on the spread** or proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such limits may apply to "horizontal proliferation" (the transfer of nuclear weapons from nuclear-weapons to non-nuclear-weapons states) or proliferation to a geographic region or zone; and
- **reduction of tensions** and the risk of miscalculation and accidents. Agreements may provide for better means of communication, exchange of information or prior notification of military tests and maneuvers.

Making choices

What makes this nation—or any other—choose to pursue arms control at a particular time? Many factors influence the decision: the prevailing international political climate, the capabilities of existing weapons and the likelihood of new and more deadly weapons, relationships between arms control objectives and other national goals, the willingness of political leaders to seek arms control, and public pressure at home. But a decision to pursue arms control is only the first step. It must be followed by the selection of *specific* arms control objectives.

Several questions may be helpful in sorting out these objectives and providing an indication of which should be pursued.

- In what way does the proposal, negotiation or agreement attempt to reduce the risk of war, help to bring the arms race under control or reduce reliance on weapons? (e.g., does it attempt actual *reductions* in weapons or does it attempt to limit the further growth of weapons?)
- Which weapons does it affect? (e.g., are certain types of weapons more critical to control than others?)
- To which channels of negotiation is it best suited? (e.g., will pursuing it in a particular forum influence its chances for success?)
- Is it negotiable? (e.g., how will it be translated into a reasonable negotiating position and ultimately gain national approval?)

The following sections consider these questions and provide a framework for evaluating arms control objectives.

League of Women Voters Education Fund

Arms control agreements the U.S. has signed and/or ratified

1959: Antarctic Treaty demilitarizes the Antarctic. 23 nations.

1963: Limited Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. 109 nations.

1963: U.S.-Soviet Hot Line Agreement establishes a direct emergency communications link between the superpowers.

1967: Outer Space Treaty bans placing of nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction in outer space and the establishment of military bases, installations or fortifications on the moon or other celestial bodies. 80 nations.

1967: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty prohibits the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Under Protocol II the nuclear-weapons states agree to respect the military denuclearization of Latin America. 22 nations, including all Latin American states except Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba.

1968: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons by states that have them and the acquisition of such weapons by those that do not and requires nuclear-weapons states to seek nuclear disarmament. 117 nations.

1971: Seabed Treaty bans placement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed beyond a 12-mile zone outside a nation's territory. 68 nations.

1971: U.S.-Soviet "Accidents Measures" Agreement pledges each party to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and provides, *inter alia,* for immediate notification of any accidental, unauthorized incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon.

1972: Biological Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of biological agents and any weapons designed to use such agents. 90 nations.

1972: ABM Treaty and 1974 protocol limit U.S. and Soviet deployment of antiballistic missile defenses to a single site.

1972: Interim Offensive Weapons Agreement (technically expired October 3, 1977 but is still observed) froze the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic ballistic missile launchers for five years. (This agreement and the ABM Treaty are known as SALT I.)

1973: Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War provides that the United States and USSR will make the removal of the danger of war and the use of nuclear weapons an objective of their policies, practice restraint in their relations toward each other and all countries, and pursue policies dedicated to peace and stability.

1974: Threshold Test Ban Treaty limits U.S. and Soviet underground tests of nuclear weapons to 150 kilotons. Signed by both U.S. and USSR but not ratified by U.S.

1976: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNE) limits U.S. and Soviet underground nuclear explosions for *peaceful* purposes to 150 kilotons. Signed by both U.S. and USSR but not ratified by U.S.

1977: Environmental Modification Convention prohibits the hostile use of techniques that could produce substantial environmental modifications. 32 nations.

1979: SALT II sets equal aggregate ceilings on a number of strategic nuclear systems, including the maximum number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and intercontinental bombers), the maximum number of launchers of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs) and the maximum number of launchers of MIRVed ICBMs. The treaty also bans construction of additional, fixed ICBM launchers and a number of other improvements to existing weapons. Signed by both U.S. and USSR but not ratified by the U.S.

In what way?

For the last 20 years most arms control efforts have been designed to **restrict already existing weapons or technology** through *quantitative limits, bans on the use of weapons, constraints on further development and improvements, or limits on proliferation.* These types of arms control measures acknowledge that capabilities for waging war already exist and attempt to control either weapons or conditions conducive to conflict. The attractiveness of efforts to restrict existing weapons or technology rests in a simultaneous recognition of national defense needs and the importance of maintaining the international equilibrium.

Quantitative limits are a major component of the SALT I and SALT II Treaties (see p. box). Bans on the use of nonnuclear weapons include the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of poison gas and biological weapons in war (interpreted by some to prohibit only *first* use and not retaliation) and the Environmental Modification Convention of 1977, which prohibits the hostile use of weather control and other environmental-modification techniques. While not a subject of negotiation, proposals calling for the United States to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons were made by several former government officials in 1982. Constraints on the further development and improvement of weapons are central to the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and proposals for a nuclear weapons freeze (see box, p. 4). Efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons include the prevention of "horizontal proliferation," e.g., the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or the spread of nuclear weapons to a region (such as Latin America) or zone (such as the seabed or outer space).

A few attempts have been made to go a step further and achieve arms **reductions.** Such agreements could include proposals to *reduce the number of existing weapons or to ban possession of existing weapons.* By reversing the trend toward accumulation of larger arsenals, such reductions could change the face of the arms race and greatly add to a sense of mutual security. But *because* they signal real changes in national behavior, such agreements are usually difficult to bring to fruition.

Reduction efforts include proposals put forth, but never adopted, by the United States, the Soviet Union and others for general and complete disarmament between 1946 and 1962. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention culminated efforts to ban possession of existing biological weapons. Current reduction efforts include proposals to reduce theater and strategic nuclear weapons.

A third category of arms control objectives does not control the number of weapons per se but attempts to **prevent situations in which weapons might be used.** Measures that *ban possession of weapons not yet deployed or that seek to maintain a political and military equilibrium* through communication and the exchange of information may prevent an escalation of tensions that could lead to war. A well-known example is the U.S.-Soviet Hot Line Agreement.

Which weapons?

The choice of weapons for an arms control negotiation depends on the danger a weapon poses and the likelihood of its being used—or, more precisely, on nations' perceptions of these two points. Six nations have exploded nuclear devices (see introduction). Several others, including Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Pakistan, are believed to be able to develop nuclear weapons or to be acquiring nuclear technology that may enable them to do so. Conventional weapons sales by industrial nations continue to grow—a trend that may contribute to armed conflict throughout the world. Chemical, biological and radiological weapons do not currently play a significant role in military planning but remain a possible source of military competition.

Nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapons are produced by the splitting (fission) or joining (fusion) of atomic nuclei and have three primary effects—blast, heat and radiation. Each effect can be enhanced or reduced; the neutron bomb, for example, is designed to kill people with radiation while reducing blast damage.

Most current arms control discussions focus on limits or reductions of nuclear weapons and their launchers—controlling the *vertical proliferation* of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. The impetus for controlling nuclear weapons arises from different quarters: some believe that both the United States and Soviet Union possess "overkill" in the number of nuclear weapons they possess and that the arms race is out of control; others fear that either the U.S. or USSR will develop first-strike nuclear weapons that may be destabilizing; still others believe that the USSR has developed nuclear superiority over the United States and must be restrained.

The vehicle for U.S.-Soviet efforts to limit vertical proliferation was initially the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), formally launched in 1969. The first step concluded with the SALT I Treaty (see box, p. 2), ratified by both the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. Next were the SALT II negotiations, which began in 1972 and resulted in an agreement (not ratified by the United States) in 1979. The third stage of SALT has been replaced by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The START negotiations attempt to reduce, not just limit, strategic nuclear weapons.

U.S.-Soviet negotiations involving theater nuclear weapons began in Geneva in 1980. Proposals for a joint U.S.-Soviet freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons have been considered by the U.S. Congress, other national governments and the United Nations General Assembly (see box, p. 5).

Other negotiations involving nuclear weapons focus on their spread or proliferation to nonnuclear states. Controlling the *horizontal proliferation* of nuclear weapons has two facets:

- the outright production or acquisition of nuclear weapons;
- access to nuclear energy sources that could be diverted to weapons production.

One important step has already been taken on the first point. According to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, countries that have not acquired nuclear explosives pledge not to do so and to submit their peaceful nuclear activities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "safeguards." Countries that possess nuclear weapons pledge not to transfer them—or control over them—to other nations and to proceed with negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Still, the treaty leaves many problems unresolved, for among the nonsignatories are actual or potential nuclear-weapons states such as France, the People's Republic of China, India, Israel, Brazil, South Africa and Pakistan.

What makes a nation decide to develop or acquire nuclear weapons? Among the important considerations are security and prestige. The disincentives, however, are also powerful: many nonnuclear-weapons states are concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the substantial costs involved in developing and manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Regulating peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on the other hand, is a more complex issue. Many developing nations view nuclear power as an important source of energy and an impetus to development. By 1985, some 25 non-nuclear-weapons states will have in operation nuclear power reactors that in most cases will generate sufficient plutonium (an element created by nuclear reactions) to manufacture a substantial number of nuclear weapons each year if the country chose to separate the plutonium from spent fuel. Some of these countries do, in fact, plan to build reprocessing facilities capable of extracting that plutonium; others plan to build uranium enrichment plants that could be used to ready uranium for use in nuclear weapons. (For more information, see *A Nuclear Power Primer,* LWVEF Pub. #575, $6.95.) This accumulation poses two threats: a non-nuclear-weapons state suddenly faced with a foreign challenge could abrogate its agreements and use accumulated nuclear materials to produce weapons, or terrorists or foreign governments could steal weapons-usable materials and develop nuclear weapons of their own.

Some governments, including the United States, believe that IAEA safeguards should be strengthened to minimize the opportunity for nations to divert nuclear materials for use in weapons. Canada, Australia and the United States, for example, require countries to which they supply nuclear fuel to submit their entire, peaceful, nuclear energy programs to IAEA safeguards. Some recipients object to this policy, contending that it is meddlesome and unfairly weighted against non-nuclear-weapons states.

In 1978 the United States proposed two possible solutions to problems posed by the accumulation of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. One was the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), one purpose of which was to consider fuel cycles that do not use large quantities of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. This effort produced few results. The second was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, in which the U.S. Congress imposed tighter restrictions on new nuclear export agreements, sought to renegotiate existing agreements and offered incentives to recipient countries in exchange for tighter controls.

Efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons also include attempts to prevent their introduction into geographic regions or zones previously free of them. The Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America. The Antarctic, Seabed and Outer Space Treaties prohibit the placing of weapons of mass destruction in those geographic zones.

Nonnuclear weapons

Arms control efforts have also focused on nonnuclear weapons, which can be divided into *conventional weapons* (nonnuclear ships, aircraft, tanks, rifles, etc. and related military personnel) and *chemical, biological and radiological weapons.*

Conventional weapons

Efforts to control conventional weapons and related military personnel have been less frequent than those involving nuclear weapons and have focused on quantitative limits, reductions or limits on proliferation for several reasons. Since *all nations* possess some type of conventional weapons, it would be extremely difficult to ban their possession or prohibit their development and improvement. In addition, nations are presumed to have some legitimate uses for conventional weapons (e.g., national police forces) so prohibitions on their use would be politically impractical. Nevertheless, conventional weapons are important to consider for a number of reasons.

- Although the potential scope of destruction of conventional weapons is less than that of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons are *used* often.
- Conventional weapons constitute the major portion of military budgets.
- A conventional conflict could escalate into nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

One of the earliest attempts in modern times to limit nations' supplies of conventional weapons was the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 limiting U.S. and British naval forces on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain. Later efforts include the Washington (1921) and London (1930) Naval Treaties limiting U.S., British and Japanese naval forces in the Pacific. Post-World War II disarmament plans included conventional weapons but produced no results. Since that time, few efforts have been made to regulate national arsenals of conventional weapons. The only current example is the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact personnel in Central Europe.

Aside from governments' own conventional weapons supplies, a substantial arms trade exists between nations. The United States and the Soviet Union are the world's leading arms merchants, with the Soviet Union leading the United States in dollar value of arms transfers—the international transfer under grant, credit or cash sales of military equipment (excluding construction, training and technical services)—since the late 1970s. France, the United Kingdom and West Germany also transfer arms, though not as many as the superpowers.

Control of conventional arms transfers has been achieved primarily by unilateral efforts of supplier nations. During the 1970s, the U.S. Congress imposed a variety of legislative controls over arms transfers, including restrictions on the dollar volume of sales to certain regions. The Carter administration attempted to limit the use of arms sales as a foreign policy tool through unilateral restraint in arms transfers but found that its own curbs had too many loopholes

and were too inflexible for dealing with requests from friendly nations. President Carter also initiated talks on Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT) with the Soviet Union in 1977–78 and informal discussions with European suppliers, both designed to reduce the level of the international arms trade. These efforts were complicated by the fact that arms transfers are highly political and play a significant role in nations' foreign policies, and both were ultimately abandoned by the United States.

Chemical, biological and radiological weapons

Arms control efforts also can be directed at chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Like nuclear arms, these weapons have the potential for mass destruction, but unlike nuclear weapons they affect only living matter.

Chemical weapons are usually classified by their physiological effects, e.g., nerve agents, toxins, herbicides. Toxic gases were used by both sides in World War I but stirred up so much controversy that the Soviet Union and other countries signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. Although the United States currently possesses chemical weapons for defensive purposes, a "no first use" pledge regarding lethal chemical weapons has been in effect since President Roosevelt announced the policy in 1943. President Nixon reaffirmed the policy in 1969 and extended it to cover incapacitating chemicals. No chemical weapons have been produced since 1969, although the Reagan administration has proposed to develop a new generation of chemical arms called "binary" weapons. The United States ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1975. The Soviet Union and France, also parties to the Protocol, maintain and produce chemical weapons, with the USSR controlling a large supply.

Since 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating to prohibit the development, production, and stock-piling of chemical weapons. After nearly four years of talks, they agreed on many of the major provisions for a chemical weapons treaty and gained partial agreement on verification issues, including a U.S.-backed provision for on-site inspection by challenge. At the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982, the Soviet Union tabled a treaty that embodied the progress made in the bilateral discussions. The Reagan administration, partly in response to allegations that the Soviet Union has used chemical weapons in Afghanistan and has directed or supported their use by Vietnamese and Laotian troops, has not pursued further negotiations with the Soviet Union. (The UN Commission investigating these charges has gathered strong circumstantial but no conclusive evidence.)

Biological weapons are microbial or other biological agents or toxins developed for hostile purposes. The United States renounced the production of biological weapons in 1969, and all existing stockpiles were subsequently destroyed. Negotiations then began that led to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production or stockpiling of these weapons for hostile purposes. The negotiations were successful in part because nations saw no military value in these weapons.

Radiological weapons make use of radioactive material to cause destruction, damage or injury on a massive scale. Radiological weapons differ from nuclear weapons in that they produce only one of the three primary effects of nuclear weapons: radiation. Although these weapons have not yet been developed by the United States or the Soviet Union, the possibility of their future military application led the two nations to negotiate and submit a draft treaty banning radiological weapons to the UN Committee on Disarmament in 1979, where it is currently under discussion.

Which channels?

Arms control can be advanced through three principal channels: bilateral negotiations, multilateral negotiations and unilateral or national initiatives designed to produce a reciprocal response by other parties.

Bilateral negotiations are conducted, as the phrase indicates, between two countries—today, usually between the world's principal adversaries: the United States and the Soviet Union. This type of negotiation achieved prominence in the arms control arena with U.S.-Soviet efforts to limit their strategic nuclear arsenals in the late 1960s and continues today in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. While European nations are indirectly involved in negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States and the Soviet Union are the negotiating parties, reflecting the critical importance of the superpowers in matters involving nuclear weapons.

Multilateral negotiations, those involving more than two countries, can take place among a specific group of nations or in a more universal setting such as the United Nations. The central forum for multilateral negotiations is the UN Committee on Disarmament (CD) composed of delegations from 40 nations representing the major political and geographic areas of the world. The committee (and two predecessor bodies) negotiated several major arms control agreements, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention. Current committee discussions focus on efforts to control antisatellite and chemical weapons, though neither has made significant progress. In addition, the UN General Assembly has served as a forum for airing arms control and disarmament issues, suggesting new initiatives for negotiation by the CD or other forums and building public understanding of and support for arms limitations and disarmament. The General Assembly served successfully as the negotiating forum for the Outer Space Treaty, following submission of draft treaties by the United States and Soviet Union. Multilateral negotiations can also take place outside the UN, as was the case in the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone negotiations and the current Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations.

Unilateral or national initiatives may occur when a nation perceives a weapon to be so destructive or destabilizing that it *must* be controlled; when a nation regards a weapon as nonessential to its security; or when a nation perceives that agreement to control a weapon may be possible and takes unilateral action in the hope that other nations will reciprocate. Sometimes these initiatives succeed; sometimes they don't. The United States unilaterally renounced biological weapons and the hostile use of environmental modification techniques, perhaps contributing to the successful conclusion of agreements. In 1958 the Soviet Union unilaterally suspended all nuclear testing in an effort to encourage agreement on a nuclear test ban. The other major powers reciprocated, and for three years no nuclear tests were conducted, though without a formal agreement. In 1961, however, the Soviet Union resumed testing and the United States followed suit. President Kennedy initiated a second unilateral moratorium in 1963, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty was negotiated shortly thereafter.

Several prominent Americans have called for a unilateral U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, pointing out that the Soviet Union and China have already done so. The current U.S. position is that nuclear weapons would only be used in response to an attack—including a conventional attack on troops in Europe. Advocates of "no first use" argue that such a policy would not put the United

Current proposals

A number of arms control proposals are currently under discussion. The objectives of these proposals run the gamut from constraints on the development and improvement of weapons, to quantitative limits, to actual reductions. Some are being pursued bilaterally; others are being debated in multilateral forums. Most of the proposals affect nuclear weapons; one, however, concerns reductions in European troop levels.

Brief discussions of five current proposals follow.

Comprehensive Test Ban For two decades the international community has sought agreement on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) that would prohibit all testing of nuclear devices, thereby impeding further improvements in existing weapons. Because it would demonstrate that the major powers are indeed committed to slowing the nuclear arms race, CTB could also help persuade other countries not to acquire or test nuclear weapons.

Steps towards achieving a comprehensive test ban have already been taken.

1963: the Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits all but underground testing for countries that have ratified it. One hundred nine nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, have ratified the treaty; an additional 15 have signed but not yet ratified. (Neither France nor the People's Republic of China has signed.)

1974 and 1976: the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties together impose a limit of 150 kilotons on any underground nuclear explosion, whether for military or peaceful purposes. (Neither has been ratified by the United States.)

1977-81: In 1977 the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom renewed attempts to draft a CTB. Significant areas of agreement were reached, including verification procedures involving on-site inspection. The Reagan administration suspended these negotiations in 1981, indicating that it now regards CTB as a "long-term goal" and wishes further discussion of verification before proceeding. Negotiations are currently under way in the Committee on Disarmament.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations were initiated in 1973 by twelve Western and seven Eastern nations that are considering troop reductions in an area encompassing the two Germanies, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Poland and Czechoslovakia, all of which are involved in the negotiations. The NATO countries, believing they are outnumbered by Warsaw Pact forces stationed in Eastern Europe, have pressed for reductions that would lead to a *mutual balance* (an equal number) of total forces on both sides in the reductions area. The Warsaw Pact nations originally sought *mutual percentage reductions,* which would preserve the current ratio of troops—but at a significantly lower level.

Some progress has been made. The Warsaw Pact countries have agreed in principle to the objective of a "common collective ceiling" or mutual balance and to NATO's view that reductions of military personnel should focus on ground forces. But many points are still being disputed, chief among them, the actual number of Warsaw Pact personnel to be counted. An agreement does not appear to be imminent.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations (begun in 1980 as the Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces negotiations) continued in 1981 in conjunction with NATO's "dual-track" decision to deploy in Western Europe 572 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (weapons capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union) to counter the Soviet advantage in land-based, intermediate-range (theater) nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has in recent years significantly improved its theater nuclear weapons capability by deploying 342 SS-20 missiles (228 directed at Europe) in addition to 280 (all directed at Europe) already deployed SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. According to the 1979 NATO plan, American cruise and Pershing II missiles will be deployed beginning in late 1983 *unless* an agreement to reduce Soviet intermediate-range nuclear weapons is reached.

In November 1981 the U.S. proposed a "zero option"—elimination of all Soviet intermediate-range missiles in exchange for no American deployments. The Soviet counterproposal made in December 1982 would reduce the number of its intermediate-range nuclear weapons to 162 (the number of missiles held by Britain and France) *if the U.S. cancelled its plans.* Each rejected the other's proposals. Although the INF negotiations are taking place in a bilateral context, European nations have played a key role in formulating the U.S. position. Some European leaders have proposed an interim solution that would allow both the USSR and the U.S. some missiles as a first step in the elimination of this class of weapons. The United States responded favorably to this initiative. Negotiations resumed in January 1983.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), initiated by President Reagan in May 1982, formally began on June 29 in Geneva, Switzerland, The two-phased U.S. proposal would:

- reduce ballistic missile warheads by at least a third, to about 5,000 *warheads* each, of which no more than half (2,500) would be deployed on ICBMs; in addition, the U.S. proposal would reduce the total number of all deployed ballistic *missiles* to an equal level—about half of current levels, or 850 missiles;
- reduce the throw weight (the weight of warheads, decoys and guidance systems lifted by a missile and carried to target) of the two nations' forces to an equal level, below that which the U.S. now holds.

In summer 1982 the Soviet Union submitted a counterproposal. Though specific details have not been made public, it is known that the Soviet proposal would:

- reduce long-range missiles and bombers on each side to a maximum of 1,800; put an overall ceiling on the number of nuclear warheads carried by long-range missiles and cruise missiles carried by bombers; and limit new, missile-carrying submarines being developed by both nations.
- freeze what the Soviets call "forward-based systems" (aircraft based in Europe) at current levels;
- put a total ban or limits on cruise missiles; and
- extend "confidence-building" measures such as advance warning of missile test flights.

Progress in the negotiations is hampered by conflicting views of the present balance of power. While the Reagan administration believes that the Soviet Union has a "definite margin of superiority," Moscow argues that "parity" in nuclear forces exists. While Washington says that the central issue is large Soviet land-based missiles capable of a first strike, Moscow sees the problem as that of containing superior American weaponry at sea and in the air and stopping the deployment of new American land-based missiles such as the MX and those in Europe. Thus, the U.S. proposals attempt to reduce the number of missiles, particularly land-based missiles, which the United States believes gives the Soviet Union a first-strike capability. The Soviet proposals, on the other hand, cover land- and sea-based missiles, as well as intercontinental bombers and cruise missiles. The negotiations are ongoing.

Proposals for a **joint U.S.-USSR nuclear weapons freeze** were considered in several forums in 1982, including the U.S. Congress and the UN General Assembly. Nuclear weapons freeze proposals have also been widely debated in Europe, principally in connection with the planned deployment of new U.S. land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Most of the nuclear weapons freeze resolutions propose to freeze the number of nuclear weapons and their launchers at current levels by suspending testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems. In making this proposal, advocates are seeking to inhibit further development and improvement of these weapons.

Some of the resolutions, such as the one proposed by Senators Edward Kennedy (D MA) and Mark Hatfield (R OR) in March 1982, would follow the freeze with "major, mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems through numerical ceilings, annual percentages or any other equally effective means." This "freeze first, reduce later" formula was reversed in House action in August 1982 with adoption of an Administration-backed bill calling for endorsement of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and an "equitable and verifiable agreement which freezes strategic nuclear forces at equal and substantially reduced levels." Freeze resolutions do not have the force of law, but supporters hope that continued public and congressional pressure will lead to Administration endorsement or, at a minimum, continue momentum toward conclusion of further arms control measures.

States at a military disadvantage and would have potentially large benefits in terms of reduced tensions and increased cooperation. Others believe that no-first-use declarations would not reduce capabilities for nuclear attacks and might expose Western Europe to a conventional attack from the east.

Is it negotiable?

In assessing a negotiation's prospects for success, it is helpful to understand that the arms control process is an evolutionary one. In its first stage, one nation informs another that it is interested in negotiations on a particular issue. The idea is then discussed within national bureaucracies by political advisors and experts. This stage is often followed by technical investigations of the issues and informal, nonbinding conversations among national representatives. These representatives then formulate initial national positions and formal negotiations begin.

The President of the United States is represented in most cases by negotiators from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, working under the close direction of the State Department. These negotiators come to the table with initial positions. Their goal at the start is to find some common areas of agreement and compromise. Any changes in positions that would bind the U.S. government require reexamination and approval by officials at home. After negotiations are satisfactorily completed, the chiefs of state often meet to sign the treaty publicly. The signature of the Soviet Chairman demonstrates approval of the Soviet government, whereas an American President's signature is subject to ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate.

Why do some negotiations succeed, while others fail to produce agreements that are signed, ratified and observed?

- Some objectives are politically more attainable than others. For example, limiting future growth may be more acceptable than reducing forces; banning nonexistent weapons is simpler than outlawing existing weapons.
- A new head of state may be less or more interested in arms control than the preceding leadership.
- Events outside the negotiating arena may contribute to or detract from the political environment in which negotiations take place.
- The level of citizen advocacy in support of or opposition to the government's negotiating position may vary in intensity.
- Ongoing weapons programs and their constituencies can influence the course of arms control.
- Subsequent actions taken by a government for other national purposes may reinforce or conflict with a negotiating position or a completed agreement.

Arms control criteria

In this country, and in others as well, citizens' interest in the arms control process and its results has become increasingly important to the political climate surrounding negotiations and the ensuing ratification procedure. Many citizens, however, opt out of judgment on arms control matters, fearing that they lack the ability to evaluate national defense issues. But in spite of their reticence, citizens *can* become well informed on arms control objectives and criteria and thereby hold government officials accountable for decisions that are made throughout the negotiating process.

Seven criteria used to evaluate arms control proposals are discussed in this section. Some of these criteria or factors affect the *terms* of an agreement—equity, verifiability and confidence building, for example. Others—linkage to other issues, continuity with past and future agreements, environmental protection and widespread agreement—relate the terms of an agreement to broader considerations.

While each criterion is important, its significance may vary depending on the arms control objective being pursued. And in some cases, it may be desirable to "trade off" one criterion to some degree in order to fulfill another criterion that is perceived to be more important. Underlying all of these criteria are the ultimate considerations: Will a proposal increase stability and thereby help to reduce the risk of war? Are we as a nation better off with this agreement than without it?

Equity

Are the terms of an agreement mutually beneficial? Are each party's security and interests adequately protected, or is one party left vulnerable? These are the keys to determining whether or not an arms control agreement is "equitable."

Equity is sometimes a simple matter of the parties agreeing to identical terms—the same number of weapons or troops or the same obligations. Alternatively, equity can be sought in the form of "parity," that is, imbalances exist—some favoring one party, some favoring the other—but a rough balance is achieved overall. Equity through parity is most often attempted because asymmetries in nations' military forces make direct numerical comparisons difficult.

Most arms control agreements since World War II have contained identical terms for all parties, i.e., equal prohibitions or limits. The SALT II Treaty set out largely identical *terms* (equal aggregate ceilings on a number of strategic systems and the same prohibitions on certain technologies). But some U.S. analysts considered the results to be inequitable, because they believed the Soviets retained a first-strike capability in land-based missiles.

As discussed earlier, the Non-Proliferation Treaty provided different terms for nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapons states. The SALT I Interim Agreement also provided different terms to each party, by essentially freezing the number of ICBM launchers on each side at existing levels (giving the USSR a numerical advantage) and permitting an increase in SLBM launchers up to an agreed ceiling (which was higher for the USSR) if each party dismantled an equal number of older ICBMs or SLBMs. This imbalance in numbers of launchers was offset by a U.S. advantage in warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. The results were generally perceived to be equitable; in fact, the Interim Agreement is still observed, even though it technically expired in 1977.

A few generalizations about the importance of equity are possible:

- Equity has generally been perceived as especially important in agreements that limit nuclear weapons.
- Negotiations based on parity are always examined with greater caution by both parties than those based on identical terms.
- Equity has been viewed as less important when an agreement limits something that none of the parties plans to develop or use.

Verifiability

Verification—the process of determining whether each party is complying with the terms of an agreement—is a relative concept. Most experts agree that being able to verify every provision of an agreement with 100-percent certainty is unattainable and unnecessary. Rather, the object of verification is to ensure compliance to the extent necessary to safeguard national security. Hence, typical test questions are: How much might the other party or parties violate an agreement before it could be detected? Could the other party gain a significant military advantage by violation before being detected? Could a nation respond in time to protect itself adequately if it discovered a violation?

Verification is accomplished by two methods:

- *National technical means* (NTM) are the combination of intelligence activities—including satellite photographic surveillance, radar, seismic sensors and electronic monitors—by which one country can monitor another's compliance, without necessarily entering the other nation's territory and without the nation's approval or cooperation.
- *On-site inspection* is the direct observance of a nation's forces, weapons systems and research and production facilities by representatives of an international or other designated organization or by one of the other parties to an agreement.

Most existing arms control agreements are policed by national technical means, both because nations are reluctant to allow access to military facilities and because NTM have improved rapidly in

The great SALT debate

The 1979 signing of the SALT II Treaty capped seven years of effort to achieve an equitable, verifiable arms control agreement that satisfied both U.S. and Soviet national security requirements. But the signing of the SALT II Treaty was only the beginning of the U.S. debate. Treaties have to be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate—and in this case the Senate did not ratify the agreement. President Carter finally withdrew the treaty from consideration in 1980. The Reagan administration pledged to abide by SALT II as long as the USSR did. The SALT debate focused on several criteria.

Equity Did the treaty's limitations maintain a rough U.S.-USSR balance or did they allow Soviet advantages? The answer depends on an assessment of U.S. and Soviet capabilities, but on this issue experts disagreed. Each country has selected a different mix and emphasis in its strategic forces. The United States has emphasized a balanced "triad" of ICBMs, SLBMs and intercontinental bombers; the Soviets have emphasized ICBMs within their triad. Because of these differences, direct numerical comparisons are misleading. Soviet missiles have greater throw weight than U.S. missiles. On the other hand, the United States can deliver more warheads. The Reagan administration stated that SALT II "perpetuated and codified dangerous, destabilizing asymmetries" (e.g., an alleged Soviet first-strike capability) and would allow a continuing Soviet buildup of ballistic missiles. Others argued that SALT II would preserve "parity" in nuclear forces and thereby increase stability.

Verification The Carter administration contended that years of experience in verifying the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement demonstrated that NTM for monitoring Soviet activities were adequate to assure that no major violations could occur without U.S. knowledge. Opponents (and later the Reagan administration) believed that U.S. verification capabilities were insufficient to monitor Soviet compliance with certain provisions of SALT II.

Linkage Many Americans questioned whether the United States should conclude a SALT treaty when the Soviets were engaged in activities of which the United States disapproved (for example, in Afghanistan). SALT II supporters replied that the treaty was not a reward; it was needed as much by the United States as by the Soviet Union.

Continuity Advocates of SALT II believed that the treaty was important because it continued efforts begun with SALT I to limit the further growth of strategic nuclear arsenals. Opponents contended that SALT II, by allowing both nations to increase nuclear forces, failed to build on earlier progress. The Reagan administration subsequently put forth proposals for START, which it considers to be a "fresh, new" approach.

the past 20 years. There are signs, however, that opposition to on-site inspection may be moderating. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed but not ratified by the United States, includes on-site inspection of peaceful nuclear explosions. Existing agreements concerning nuclear nonproliferation also include on-site inspection through IAEA safeguard provisions.

Since SALT I, "cooperative" measures of verification have received greater attention. In SALT I, the superpowers agreed not to engage in deliberate concealment of weapons or interference with each other's NTM and established the Standing Consultative Commission to resolve differences. In SALT II, "counting rules" require that once a missile has been tested with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), all missiles of that type are considered to have been equipped with MIRVs, thereby eliminating the need to distinquish between MIRVed and non-MIRVed versions of the same missile type.

What constitutes "adequate" verification? That depends very much upon the specifics of an agreement. It is relatively simple, for example, to count missile silos using NTM. Verification of missile accuracy, on the other hand, is much more difficult.

Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has stated that "a somewhat less than even chance of U.S. detection would probably appear as a prohibitively high risk to a Soviet planner contemplating cheating, particularly when he considered the likely U.S. response to such a discovery." Yet our *own* standards for detecting violations, Brown noted, regard "anything less than a 50-percent chance of detection... as providing 'low confidence' in our monitoring capability." Most analysts agree that it takes about ten years to introduce a significant new military technology—from research, development and testing to production and deployment. "At any one of these stages," according to Rep. Les Aspin (D WI), "the present ability of the U.S. to detect clandestine activity on the part of the USSR ranges from fair to excellent." Technical means aside, some political experts argue that the consequence of violating a treaty—primarily the possibility that the other party would abrogate the agreement when it discovered the violation—is so grave that it constitutes a powerful deterrent.

Others, however, believe that U.S. verification capabilities are insufficient to judge "qualitative" factors such as changes in the range of aircraft or cruise missiles and improvements in existing types of ICBMs. The Reagan administration has stated that it wants more discussion with the Soviet Union of verification procedures in the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties before submitting them for ratification.

Over the years, each superpower has challenged the other's compliance with treaty terms. The SALT I record is instructive. The United States and the Soviet Union have each raised verification issues with the Standing Consultative Commission. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "In each case... the Soviet activity in question has either ceased or additional information has allayed U.S. concern." The Nixon, Ford and Carter administration officials charged with monitoring SALT I compliance agree that while the Soviet Union has attempted to exploit ambiguities and ignored U.S. interpretations of the agreement, there is little evidence to support charges that the Soviets have violated the treaty.

How important a criterion is verification? It depends on the objective pursued, the types of weapons being considered and the degree of confidence in verification capabilities. The greater the perceived impact of violation, the more important verification is likely to be. Verification may also be important in negotiations that pursue an objective for the first time (as was the case in the Limited Test Ban negotiations and the current START reduction proposals) or that limit a particular weapon or technology for the first time (as was the case in the SALT I ABM Treaty). It should also be noted that a demand for perfect verification in an imperfect world may be just a tactic for stalling or stymieing action.

Verification may be viewed as less important when the possibility of violation is small or when violation would have little military impact. It has been suggested, for example, that the Seabed Arms Control Treaty was drafted to allow the parties to continue all militarily *useful* activities (placing nuclear weapons on submarines) and prohibited only those that the parties had little interest in pursuing (placing nuclear weapons on the ocean floor).

Linkage

Linkage—often described as the "carrot and stick" approach to international relations—is an attempt to link the offer of cooperation in arms control to specific political issues, e.g., human rights or foreign intervention. It has been used principally by the U.S. in arms control negotiations with the USSR.

Linkage can be used in several ways:

- as a crisis management tool to warn a nation during a tense political or military situation that certain actions on its part would jeopardize arms control negotiations.
- as a way of inducing a third party to act by exploiting a relationship between a negotiating partner and one of its client nations.
- as a bargaining chip in negotiations.
- as a way of avoiding serious arms control negotiations.

Those who favor the use of linkage contend that linkage between military and political issues is unavoidable and that the only choice is to what *degree* a nation chooses to connect such issues. They

also contend that isolating arms control from other U.S. policy considerations would be unrealistic and would forfeit valuable opportunities to influence other nations' behavior. In the words of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the "architect" of linkage, "We must seek to advance on a front at least broad enough to make clear that we see some relationship between political and military issues." The Nixon administration attempted to link progress in SALT I to Soviet cooperation in the Middle East and Vietnam.

Opponents of linkage contend that arms control, particularly *nuclear* arms control, should not be held hostage to the changing winds of political relationships because of the importance of preventing nuclear war. They cite numerous recent events (e.g., Soviet actions in Afghanistan) indicating that linkage has done little to moderate Soviet behavior and argue that we should stop using it and concentrate on nuclear arms control as an end in itself. Such a policy, they say, does not condone Soviet actions; it simply recognizes that arms control "carrots" are not sufficient to influence them and that the goal of nuclear arms control should be arms control, not Soviet behavior modification. As former Senator Frank Church argued during the SALT II debate, "If we persist in tying SALT to Russian behavior in the Horn of Africa, in Central America, or even in Moscow, we are quite unlikely to find that perfect moment in the flow of events at which we can say, 'At last, our persistent competitor, the Soviet Union, is comporting itself to our complete satisfaction. Now, we should discuss the conclusion of a SALT agreement.'"

Continuity

Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk captured the essence of "continuity" when he described the SALT process as "history's longest permanent floating crap game." The record of SALT and the entire history of arms control are proof that arms control negotiations are a continuous process—not without interruptions, disappointments and risks—capable of producing beneficial agreements if patiently pursued. In the arms control arena, continuity means either building on past agreements and continuing earlier progress or providing a framework for future negotiations. A negotiation may, for example, consider further limits on previously negotiated weapons, move from limits to reductions, reexamine issues of contention in prior efforts or pursue related arms control issues. Continuity may be achieved through specific provisions of an agreement binding parties to future negotiations, or an agreement itself may serve as a model for a subsequent agreement. A few examples follow.

- The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the *use* in war of chemical and biological weapons. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention went a step further and prohibited the *possession* of biological weapons.
- In 1961 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the McCloy-Zorin Agreement, a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, later adopted by the UN as the foundation for future negotiations toward general and complete disarmament.
- SALT began with limits on antiballistic missiles and partial limits on strategic offensive nuclear weapons, moved in SALT II to additional limits and was to continue in SALT III with negotiations on actual reductions in strategic weapons. The third stage has been taken up in the START negotiations.
- The Antarctic Treaty served as a model, in its approach and even provisions, for the Outer Space, Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone and Seabed Treaties.

Confidence building

In addition to weapons control, arms control agreements may have a second beneficial effect: greater political confidence between nations that may extend beyond the negotiating table. Provisions written into an agreement for a specific purpose (e.g., verification through on-site inspection or through mutual agreement not to interfere with NTM) may also help to prevent miscalculations about other nations' intentions and thus build confidence in the arms control process.

How important is confidence building? It may depend on a nation's perceptions of the military risk it is taking by agreeing to limit or reduce a particular weapon or on a previous experience with similar weapons controls. How specific should provisions be to build confidence? The 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe established procedures for 21-day advance notice of maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops in Europe and encouraged nations to invite observers during military exercises.

Environmental protection

Evidence of the destructive impact of weapons on the earth's environment is certainly not new. Since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the effects of nuclear tests on the atmosphere were observed with growing alarm. These worldwide concerns helped to generate political pressure for a nuclear test ban in the early 1960s and culminated in the series of test ban treaties listed on page 2.

During the 1970s, continuation of these concerns contributed to agreement on the Biological Weapons Convention and the Environmental Modification Convention (see box, p. 2). Nonetheless, environmental protection has so far been of secondary importance in judging arms control agreements and, indeed, may not apply to many agreements.

Widespread agreement

Widespread agreement refers to the ratification or approval of an agreement by "appropriate" parties. How many and which nations are appropriate may differ depending on the objectives being sought, the weapons considered and the forum used to negotiate an agreement. In some cases, widespread agreement may only require two signatories if they are the only parties possessing the weapons or technology in question or if they can ensure the success of an agreement, e.g., the SALT I ABM Treaty. In other cases, it may be desirable to have a large number of signatories in order to ensure an international consensus and thereby increase the agreement's chances of being kept.

What happens when essential parties fail to adhere to an agreement? Case in point: the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. Brazil and Argentina, though signatories, have not fulfilled all of the conditions necessary for the treaty to enter into force. Without these two parties, both of which have nuclear power programs potentially capable of producing nuclear weapons, the prospects for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America are considerably diminished.

Is it likely that progress will be made on arms control in the near future? A number of proposals concerning nuclear weapons are currently on the negotiating table. Other concerns include a comprehensive test ban agreement, renewal of U.S.-Soviet talks on antisatellite weapons, limits on the use of outer space for military purposes, strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, revival and expansion of talks on conventional arms transfers, and imposition of strict limits on chemical weapons.

The historical record indicates that arms control negotiations take time. The record also indicates that what is desirable is not always negotiable. There are powerful negatives: each party wants to preserve its advantages; the superpowers' force structures are asymmetrical; and proposals to limit or reduce these forces pose serious national security concerns for political leaders.

The success or failure of current arms control efforts will be influenced by the role of weapons in national policy, the political willingness—or lack thereof—of leaders to pursue meaningful arms control agreements and nations' concerns about the growing costs of defense. It will also depend on the degree to which constituencies for arms control develop among the public. Recent events show a growing involvement by individuals, churches and organizations in the arms control debate—a trend that is likely to continue. Pressures for the superpowers to make a greater commitment to arms control appear to be mounting. As journalist Robert Toth has said, "On the broad canvas of this century, (current arms control efforts) may one day be seen as a critical turning point." Will the governments of the world live up to this challenge?

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Dollars for Defense: Translating Military Purposes into Spending Choices

The Administration's fiscal year (FY) 1984 defense budget request of $281 billion, reduced to $269 billion by the Congress, reflects the government's most recent assessment of the weapons, technology and personnel needed to provide for the nation's military security. As with previous defense spending requests, the debate over the defense budget centers around a key question: How much is enough?

The current Administration and a number of defense analysts believe that the United States must make increasing both the numbers and capabilities of its military forces in response to growing Soviet military strength and adventurism a top priority. Others challenge the need for such a massive military buildup and assert that the dollars being spent on defense do not accurately reflect U.S. interests in today's world.

Complicating this debate is the fact that many Americans believe that the United States should put greater emphasis on strengthening cooperative, nonmilitary relationships with other countries through multilateral organizations, bilateral diplomacy and other mechanisms designed to promote international economic well-being and strengthen global security. Still others believe that priority should be given to enhancing political and economic security *within* U.S. borders.

These judgments about policy direction are ultimately translated into spending choices through the federal budget. Over time, U.S. budget priorities have shifted, depending on national needs, political considerations and special interests (see charts, page 2). Judging from the debate over the federal budget in recent years, a priority shift between "guns" and "butter" has once again occurred. The Reagan administration has prescribed increased defense spending, greater private initiatives and a reduced federal presence as the appropriate medicine for enlarging social and economic opportunities for citizens.

Who is right? How much defense *is* enough? Are the recent increases in defense spending required to ensure the nation's security, or has the government allocated more resources than necessary to defend the nation against a realistic number of threats?

The answers to these questions are difficult, partly because to define "necessary" we must guess as to what we believe would deter an *opponent*—a judgment that requires us to think like people whose perceptions may differ radically from ours. In general, we may conclude that we need enough nuclear capability to deter attacks on ourselves and our allies and sufficient conventional capabilities to avoid having to resort to nuclear weapons. But does that give us any clearer picture of how *much* of each we need and what we should spend to obtain it?

While there are no simple answers, an overall look at the many purposes of military forces helps to lay a rational framework for deciding what selection the United States faces when shopping for an adequate defense. Only after establishing the many reasons why the military can be used—and how much each option will cost—can the means for translating these purposes into spending choices be considered—a logical point of departure for the debate over "how much is enough."

Missions of the military

Although in strict military parlance the term "military missions" is used to denote a specific military task (e.g., taking a hill), it may be more helpful to think of military missions as those fundamental military purposes that justify the existence of sophisticated nuclear arsenals and well-armed conventional forces. Military missions flow from the nation's worldwide interests, which include the preservation of U.S. territory, political identity and institutions; an international order supportive of U.S. interests; and maintenance of the nation's economic well-being. Military missions can be one way of protecting these interests, as are foreign aid, diplomacy, trade or arms control negotiations.

The implicit missions of U.S. armed forces since the end of World War II have been defense of the homeland (through nuclear deterrence) and the prevention of Soviet attack on Western Europe and Japan. Later, the protection of vital resources such as oil was added. The principal opponent against which these missions have been directed is the Soviet Union, which emerged from World War II as the sole geographical and military rival capable of challenging U.S. power.

These military missions have resulted in the development of an arsenal of nuclear weapons and the deployment of ground and air forces in Europe, Japan and South Korea and aircraft carriers and amphibious forces in the North Atlantic, Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. (For more information on the development of U.S. military capabilities, nuclear strategy and comparisons of U.S.-Soviet and NATO-Warsaw Pact forces, see *Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader*, #531, $1.25, 75¢ for members.)

Defending the homeland

Few would disagree that the least questioned and most responsible mission of U.S. military forces is defense of the homeland—U.S. territory, institutions and people—a purpose described in Department of Defense (DOD) policy documents today as follows: "To deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the United States; in the event of an attack, to deny the enemy his objective and bring a rapid end to the conflict on terms favorable to our interests and to maintain the political and territorial integrity of the United States."

Can the basic right to national self-defense, legitimized in the United Nations Charter, be questioned? Those who do raise questions focus not so much on the legitimacy of self-defense as on the role of nuclear weapons in defending the homeland. In a strictly physical sense, the development of powerful and accurate nuclear weapons capable of traveling intercontinental distances in less than 30 minutes has made real "defense" of the homeland impossible. Nevertheless, most believe that by maintaining a balance of power—or balance of terror, as some would call it—with the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons, the United States can successfully deter or defend against a nuclear attack.

The strategy for maintaining this balance of power, however, has shifted in the last decade or so. While not excluding military targets, U.S. nuclear deterrence policy of the 1960s and early 1970s emphasized retaliation against Soviet industrial centers as its basic strategy, a policy known as "mutual assured destruction." Later policy statements, however—including the 1974 Schlesinger retargeting plans and the 1980 Carter administration Presidential Directive 59—suggested that the U.S. government was increasingly prepared to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack against U.S. military forces by striking Soviet *military* targets (missile silos and military installations).

In 1982 the Reagan administration further refined U.S. nuclear policy: in order to make deterrence effective, the United States must convince the Soviet Union of its ability to survive Soviet nuclear strikes over an extended period with sufficient strength to retaliate so that Soviet losses would exceed any possible gains from attack. According to the *Department of Defense Annual Report* for FY 1984, successful deterrence will result only if the Soviets recognize

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TABLE 1
The Federal Budget Pie
(Outlays)







Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1984,* March 1983 and *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1984.*

[1]The addition of trust funds to the federal budget in 1970 (monies earmarked for special purposes such as Social Security and Medicare, which cannot be used for general government spending) caused social and economic expenditures to grow and defense to decline as a percentage of the total budget, though in reality defense continued to increase along with other categories of federal spending.

[2]The FY 1984 first concurrent budget resolution allocates 58% to social and economic, 28% to defense, 5% to veterans, space and international, and 11% to net interest.

that U.S. forces "can and will deny them their objectives at whatever level of nuclear conflict they contemplate and, in addition, that such a conflict could lead to the destruction of those political, military and economic assets that they value most highly." To accomplish these purposes, the Administration has continued its predecessors' efforts and initiated its own programs to improve the destructive capability, accuracy and survivability of strategic forces.

These policy statements and programs have, however, led many citizens to perceive that the United States seeks the capability to fight a *protracted* nuclear war, a prospect that some believe may increase the likelihood of war rather than lessen it. Adequate deterrence, these critics say, requires that the United States be *perceived* to be capable of retaliating against nuclear attack. Given the number and capabilities of existing U.S. strategic forces, they argue that we should have high confidence in the present strength of our strategic deterrent.

Extended deterrence: The NATO connection

While U.S. security is seen to be intrinsically linked to general world stability, the survival of Western Europe (because of its close cultural, political and economic ties with the United States) is thought to be absolutely essential to maintaining western values and preventing Soviet domination. Hence, in 1949 the United States, Canada and ten European nations formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—a political/military alliance that has come to dominate U.S. treaty commitments. In joining NATO, the United States pledged, along with the other allies, that an "armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" and that should such an attack occur, each "will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith...such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force."

The United States has backed its commitment by extending a strategic nuclear "umbrella" over NATO and by deploying land, naval and air forces in and around Western Europe, including tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. In return, other NATO member governments contribute substantial numbers of ground troops, naval forces and aircraft to NATO's defense. (For more on alliance issues, see *Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader.)*

NATO's conventional forces are intended to stop or at least delay a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe and are thus the alliance's first line of defense. If these conventional forces were unable to stop a determined Warsaw Pact invasion, the alliance's policy is to respond with short-range, tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons and to escalate the conflict, if necessary, to intermediate-range and/or strategic nuclear weapons, a policy commonly referred to as "first use." Together, NATO's conventional and nuclear policies are intended to convince the Soviet Union that in attacking Western Europe, it risks an American nuclear response.

Some analysts believe that the time has come for NATO to make two key decisions: first, to either reaffirm or abandon the "first use" policy; and second, to choose among maintaining, increasing or decreasing reliance on conventional deterrence relative to nuclear deterrence. These choices are closely linked: those who favor increased reliance on conventional deterrence believe that it would raise the "nuclear threshold"—the point at which NATO might be forced to use nuclear weapons to defend itself. Those who believe that nuclear deterrence is the most effective way of deterring conventional and nuclear attack urge that greater emphasis be placed on upgrading NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces.

The current U.S. Administration has continued and expanded its predecessor's efforts to improve the capabilities of the NATO triad (conventional forces, tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons) while spreading the burden for their cost within the alliance. The planned deployment of 108 Pershing II and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles beginning in late 1983 is intended to give NATO an intermediate option between conventional and strategic weapons, thus increasing the credibility of the U.S. capability and willingness to defend Europe. At the same time, NATO plans to develop new nonnuclear technologies to strengthen conventional deterrence.

Those who support continued reliance on NATO's first use policy contend that, given Warsaw Pact advantages in some measures of capability (e.g., ground forces in Central Europe) and the high cost of conventional deterrence, NATO must continue to rely on the threat of first use to deter both nuclear and conventional attack. Even with planned improvements in NATO's conventional capabilities, some argue, the alliance will not achieve ground force combat ratios necessary for successful defense. Partisans of this viewpoint often urge improvements in NATO's conventional forces to increase confidence in NATO's ability to defend effectively at the conventional level, but they assert that it is nuclear deterrence—not conventional—that prevents Western Europe from being overrun.

Many critics of first use claim that the policy is no longer credible, arguing that neither the NATO allies nor the Soviet Union is confident that the United States would risk nuclear war with the Soviet Union over Europe. Others oppose first use because they believe that the United States *would* use its nuclear weapons in Europe, with the hope that U.S. territory would remain untouched.

Critics of first use also claim that *threatening* to introduce nuclear weapons into a conventional conflict heightens the risk that they *will* be used, thus increasing the likelihood of escalation to a larger, perhaps global, nuclear war. Furthermore, critics contend that because of its accuracy and short flight time, the Pershing II would be able to destroy Soviet command facilities, thus increasing the Soviet incentive to strike first in a crisis. For these reasons, many critics advocate the adoption of a policy of *no* first use and support increased reliance on conventional capabilities and the plans to modernize these forces over the next several years. Apart from questions of military effectiveness, supporters of no first use also contend that the notion of responding to conventional attack with nuclear weapons is highly inappropriate, if not immoral, given the destructiveness of these weapons.

Other allies and friends

To protect U.S. interests around the world and enhance global security, the United States has entered into other collective defense arrangements much like the NATO alliance, including the Rio Treaty, Manila Pact and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) alliance. The United States has also concluded major bilateral security agreements with Japan and South Korea. U.S. commitments to these allies are supported by U.S. land and air forces in Japan and South Korea and by the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and naval forces in the Indian Ocean. In the case of friends such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan, the United States has made no security guarantees but sells arms or provides military equipment and training.

The DOD *Annual Report* outlines U.S. interests in every region of the world. For each area, two objectives are standard: to support the independence of nations sympathetic to the United States and to prevent the spread of Soviet influence or interference. Other objectives are regionally specific: for example, in the Far East, the United States seeks to maintain the security of sea lanes and to build a durable relationship with China, which is viewed as an important counterbalance to Soviet power in Asia.

In Southwest Asia (the Middle East/Persian Gulf region), U.S. objectives include a "lasting peace for all the peoples of the Mideast," the preservation of Israeli sovereignty and the security of key sea lanes. U.S. objectives in the Western Hemisphere include the promotion of economic development and the strengthening of democratic institutions in Latin America. Although the United States has no major treaty commitments to African nations, U.S. interests in the continent are substantial, and objectives are "to maintain and, as required, expand access and transit rights in pro-Western African states for the deployment of U.S. forces" and "to work to deny or reverse similar access and transit to the Soviets."

Current U.S. policies for protecting non-NATO allies and friends include extending the U.S. nuclear "umbrella" over nations such as Japan and South Korea. Conventional policy regarding non-NATO commitments is less clear. In the DOD *Annual Report* Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated that in recognition of the Soviet ability to conduct simultaneous campaigns in more than one geographic region, current plans call for resources "to provide us with sufficient naval power and sealift capability to assure our success in a single or multitheater conflict." Weinberger also described the possibility of responding to naval attacks in one region by counterattacking in another and stated that "our long-range goal is to be capable of defending all theaters simultaneously."

Later public statements by national security advisor William P. Clark emphasized that the United States continues to assign priority to the Western Pacific, Europe and the Middle East. Yet concerns persist about a lack of clarity regarding the number of conventional conflicts the U.S. is prepared to fight and whether requirements for fighting multiple conflicts are necessary, given doubts about the Soviet capability to do the same.

In evaluating whether non-NATO commitments are appropriate today, one must consider the possible consequences of failing to maintain them. Without such commitments, backed in some cases by U.S. conventional forces in place, the temptation for an aggressor to attack a U.S. friend or ally might increase measurably. In addition, the deployment of U.S. forces around the world gives the United States flexibility to choose among a range of possible responses, including the use of military force, should conflict break out in a nation or region. The absence of such deployments would undoubtedly lengthen response times should the United States choose to use military force to aid a nation under attack.

On the other hand, some argue that the very existence of these myriad commitments tends to obligate the United States to respond militarily in a conflict and reduces the opportunity to explore nonmilitary solutions. The large cost of maintaining conventional forces around the world is another negative factor. Some who would limit U.S. commitments urge that U.S. vital interests be defined carefully and point out that in its determination to oppose Soviet influence, the United States has uncritically supported nondemocratic and oppressive regimes.

The issue of nuclear guarantees does not involve significant questions of cost. The U.S. nuclear umbrella is already in place; extending it to other nations would not necessarily require additional forces. Yet, nuclear guarantees raise serious questions about whether the U.S. government is willing to risk nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union over non-NATO allies and friends and whether the nuclear threat is credible.

Defending access to resources

Access to vital resources—those a nation needs to continue functioning as a viable sovereign entity—has long been an economic interest of the United States, but in the last decade or so the use of military force to protect supplier nations and the sea lanes used to transport resources has been a frequent topic of debate. Vital resources for the United States include oil and strategic minerals.

A major factor to consider in evaluating this mission is the degree to which consumers, industry and the military depend on foreign resources. The United States imports 29 percent of its oil supply (though the percentage is declining), the NATO allies 69 percent, and Japan a staggering 99 percent. Collectively, these nations depend on Southwest Asia for 27 percent of their oil supply. Clearly, the strategic importance of Southwest Asia to the United States is at least partly due to our allies' dependence on the region's resources and a desire to prevent their falling under Soviet control.

Strategic minerals—chromium, manganese, vanadium and the platinum group metals—are of similar importance to defense, aerospace, power generation and transportation industries and are imported in significant amounts by Western industrial nations and Japan. Together, South Africa and the Soviet Union dominate world supply and production of these minerals. A recent study by the National Defense University indicates that current U.S. dependence on South Africa for these materials is a major strategic consideration, with imports from that nation accounting for more than 90 percent of U.S. consumption of platinum group metals, chromium and manganese. However, the study offers several options for lessening U.S. dependence and reducing the impact of a supply

Reforming the defense budget

Amid widespread congressional and public concern that the Department of Defense may not be buying the best technology at the lowest price, the Pentagon has implemented 32 proposals—the "Carlucci initiatives," named for former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci—designed to produce more realistic cost estimates, increase competition among contractors and provide stable funding for weapons programs.

How well are the Carlucci reforms working? Secretary of Defense Weinberger says that the Pentagon is making progress in increasing competition for contracts, providing funding stability for highest-priority programs and improving inflation projections. Action so far, however, has concentrated on directives to program managers. Complete success, according to Weinberger, will require "pushing policy decisions to the working level" and "the continued support of industry, the services and Congress."

Others are less optimistic about the reforms, though they admit that it may be too early to judge the ultimate effect. In the Council on Economic Priorities' *Controlling Weapons Costs: Can the Pentagon Reforms Work?,* author Gordon Adams (currently director of the Defense Budget Project at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities) concludes that some of the initiatives "could have a significant effect if they were strongly enforced," but that they "fail to correct the most persistent causes of cost growth: lack of competition, contracting practices that reward cost maximization, weak supervision and auditing of weapons contracts, and the establishment of extravagant weapons performance goals."

Continuing congressional concerns have led to more stringent monitoring of weapons procurement practices. For example, Congress has increased the information required on Selected Acquisition Reports (quarterly statements on cost increases of major weapons systems) and has proposed an independent office for weapons testing. In addition, legislation now requires that weapons systems cost increases substantially above established levels be justified.

Given the long lead times involved in weapons production and the requirements for planning budgets five years at a time, defense managers need to focus their reform efforts on the future. Yet military commanders and elected officials tend to be more concerned with present-day realities. These competing perspectives indicate that reforming the defense budget will not be a simple task.

cutoff, including the cultivation of alternative sources (e.g., Zimbabwe, Australia and Brazil), recycling and reduced consumption.

Some would argue that U.S. and allied dependence on foreign resources justifies the use of military force to protect them. Others question the propriety of using military force to defend resources and argue that U.S. and allied interests are better served by lessening dependence and promoting long-term economic and political stability in regions where much-needed resources are located.

Existing U.S. capability for defending access to resources is embodied in the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), established after the invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979–80 as a highly mobile naval and ground force capable of quick response to emergency situations. The RDF's primary mission is the deterrence of Soviet-aggression and the protection of U.S. and allied oil interests in Southwest Asia, but it is also meant to provide the United States with forces flexible and adaptable enough to deter war and, if necessary, to fight anywhere during the early days of a conflict. No new forces have been created for the RDF; rather, emphasis has been placed on enhancing the readiness of existing forces for distant deployment.

The effective use of the RDF to defend interests in Southwest Asia is considered to be hampered by several factors, including an inadequate infrastructure (road, rail, air transport, communications and similar facilities), a harsh climate and difficult terrain. Moreover, because U.S. forces have been designed primarily for use in Europe, according to the Pentagon, several types of support units essential to the Southwest Asian environment do not exist or are in short supply.

Less often considered is the use of nuclear weapons to defend access to resources. While many would not consider resources—however important—worth the risk of nuclear conflict, others assert that in order to defend resources, the United States might be forced to rely on nuclear weapons. Analyst George Kuhn, writing for the Heritage Foundation, states, "It is highly doubtful that we can today defend Southwest Asia's oil fields conventionally. We are forced to rely on the nuclear threat in an era when we no longer possess, and are not promised, nuclear superiority." If this government determines that defending access to resources is an appropriate military mission but does not wish to rely on nuclear deterrence, it must ensure that conventional forces are capable of doing the job alone.

Responding to conflicts around the world

A fourth potential military mission is that of maintaining the capability to respond to conflicts around the world. Though the U.S. government does not specifically delineate such a mission, the use of U.S. military forces may increasingly be considered for this purpose as the incidence of non-NATO conflicts grows. This mission would differ from defending access to resources in that its context is one of political conflict. And unlike the protection of allies and friends, this mission would result not from formal or even stated U.S. commitments but from the desire to maintain flexibility to respond to situations that threaten U.S. interests and warrant the use of military force whenever and wherever they arise.

Those who would support the maintenance of U.S. military capabilities for this purpose contend that because events in non-NATO regions are difficult to predict, it is prudent for the U.S. to expect the unexpected and maintain a flexible response. Skeptics, however, might question the uses to which such forces would be put. Without formal treaty obligations or commitments, critics fear that U.S. forces could be used to support actions for which there is little American public support or for which U.S. military intervention may not be effective (e.g., combating guerilla forces).

Recent events suggest that future decisions about U.S. involvement in military conflicts may be increasingly focused on the Third World. The current Administration, for example, has provided support to Chad in the form of surveillance activities, sent military aid and advisors to El Salvador and dispatched peace-keeping forces to Lebanon. These actions illustrate the need to consider the purposes for which existing conventional forces may be used in the future and the kinds of forces that would be needed to carry out these purposes.

Little consideration is generally given to nuclear policy regarding non-NATO conflicts. Any U.S. policy concerning the use of nuclear deterrence in such conflicts would need to include careful consideration of whether such conflicts threaten U.S. strategic interests, whether such a policy would be credible (to the Soviet Union or any other nation) and whether the U.S. government is indeed willing to risk nuclear war over a Third World conflict. If such a policy were thought to be credible and worth the risks entailed, nuclear weapons might lessen the need to deploy costly conventional forces.

Military purposes and defense budgets

Defense budgets may be viewed as a tool for translating military purposes into spending choices or, put another way, as a means of reducing complex policy questions to dollars and cents. Even though this link between military purposes and defense budgets is often clouded by political considerations and special interests, examining defense spending in this way helps to make clear that there is, and should be, a relationship between the basic purposes of military forces and the resources spent on them. Two common breakdowns of the defense budget help to relate military purposes to dollars spent for defense: **strategic** and **general purpose** forces; and **investment** and **readiness** expenditures.

Strategic forces are those forces capable of directly threatening another nation's war-making potential and include the U.S. nuclear triad (land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and bombers); defensive systems (e.g., air defense, interceptor aircraft); command and control capabilities for directing and controlling forces; and related personnel. These forces are primarily intended to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies but also to retaliate if an attack occurs.

Each leg of the U.S. triad possesses unique features: ICBMs are fast, accurate and can be easily retargeted. Submarines (carrying SLBMs) can remain hidden and thus hold their missiles in reserve without fear of attack. Bombers can be launched and then recalled easily, if necessary, and their weapons are highly accurate. Strategic forces represent a small share of the defense budget, accounting for only ten percent of the total in 1984.

The importance of the triad to U.S. defense strategy dictates that policy makers keep a close watch on its capabilities. General options (each with different budget implications) are to **modernize** one or more legs of the triad (use new technology to increase capabilities of existing forces or to develop new weapons); **retain as is** one or more legs (maintain existing levels of capability by making limited improvements to existing weapons); **reduce reliance** on one or more legs (make no improvements and allow capability to deteriorate over time); and **eliminate** one or more legs (dismantle existing weapons). For more discussion of triad issues, see "Strategic Force Issues," page 6.

Current plans to modernize the triad include:

—deployment of 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos;

—deployment of a new, small, single-warhead missile;

—continued procurement of Trident submarines, deployment on most Trident submarines of the Trident II missile, capable of destroying hardened Soviet missile silos, and deployment of nuclear-armed cruise missiles on some submarines and ships; and

—deployment of new B-1 and "Stealth" bombers and continued installation of air-launched cruise missiles on B-52 and eventually on B-1 bombers.

General purpose forces refer to all nonstrategic forces: conventional ground forces, aircraft and ships, as well as tactical (battlefield) and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. These forces are intended to deter or defend against conventional attack and to support strategic forces. The lion's share of the FY 1984 defense budget (54 percent) is earmarked for general purpose forces.

General purpose force plans include:

—new intermediate-range nuclear missiles (Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles) for NATO defense;

—land force modernization, including procurement of new M-1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters and anti-tank weapons, and greater funding for "readiness" items such as replacement equipment, spare parts, ammunition and fuel (see below);

—increased tactical aircraft (e.g., F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft and AV-8B light attack aircraft) and provisions for additional spare parts, improved training and better maintenance;

—additional naval forces, including an aircraft carrier, attack submarines, guided missile cruisers and destroyers, and a variety of escort and support ships; and

—additional mobility aircraft (e.g., C-5 and KC-10 airlift and tanker aircraft), improvements in sealift forces and additional storage or "prepositioning" of wartime supplies in Europe.

The defense budget can also be examined in terms of **investment** and **readiness** expenditures. Investment expenditures refer to funds used in the procurement of new strategic and general purpose weapons, research and development of new weapons technology and construction of military facilities. Investment thus measures largely the costs of providing *future* combat capabilities. Readiness measures the resources necessary to maintain *current* forces and obligations and includes military pay, operations and maintenance expenditures, and retirement pay. (These categories are not mutually exclusive: the procurement of spare parts, for example, contributes to both "investment" and "readiness.")

While the current Administration has increased funding for both investment and readiness, it has devoted a growing percentage to the purchase of new strategic and general purpose weapons, i.e., investment. Its weapons programs are long-term investments (owing to the long lead times necessary for developing and producing new weapons); therefore, decisions to make large investments in new weapons systems now may restrict spending flexibility later.

TABLE 2
The FY 1984 Defense Budget: A Closer Look
President's Request
(Budget Authority)*



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1984.* March 1983.
*Budget Authority represents legal authority to enter into obligations that will result in immediate or future outlays.

In addition to strategic/general purpose forces and investment/readiness expenditures, defense spending can also be measured in terms of its **rate of growth.** In this context, the debate centers around how much "real growth" for defense—the percentage increase after discounting the effects of inflation—is necessary. Though increases in rate of growth mean little without consideration of the forces such growth levels will buy, the debate does help to focus on the aggregate impact of defense spending and the implicit tradeoffs required relative to the rest of the federal budget.

For example, the Administration's five-year defense budget request of $1.8 trillion (beginning at $281 billion in FY 1984 and growing to $433 billion by FY 1988) includes average real growth of 6.8 percent a year in the period from 1984–88, causing both the defense share of the federal budget and its size in relation to the rest of the economy to grow. An alternative proposal by MIT professor William Kaufmann would require increases of less than 6 percent a year. The first concurrent budget resolution for FY 1984 provides real growth of 5 percent for each of the fiscal years 1984–86.

The reasons for proposing different levels of defense growth vary as widely as the actual figures. For some, the crucial issue is reducing the deficit. It is important to note, however, that for many defense programs (e.g., ship construction) the authority to enter into

Table 3
At a glance: Military resources of NATO,* Warsaw Pact and People's Republic of China

(U.S. and Soviet figures represent those nations' shares of the NATO and Warsaw Pact totals.)

	NATO	U.S.	Warsaw Pact	USSR	China
Population	626 million	232 million	380 million	272 million	1 billion
GNP	$6 trillion	$3 trillion	$2 trillion	$1.6 trillion	$552 billion
Military spending	$287 billion	$176 billion	$211 billion	$191 billion	$57 billion
Military manpower	5.8 million	2.1 million	4.8 million***	4.3 million***	4.8 million
Strategic nuclear weapons	10,000	9,975	7,226	7,226	Several Hundred
Total nuclear weapons	31,000	30,000	20,000	20,000	Several Hundred
Tanks	29,000	13,000	63,000	50,000	11,600
Anti-tank weapons	400,000**	150,000**	data not available	—	—
Other armored vehicles	54,000	21,000	83,000	62,000	4,000
Heavy artillery	17,000	5,500	24,000	20,000	18,000
Combat aircraft	12,000	7,200	12,000	6,300	6,100
Helicopters	12,400	8,500	4,500	3,000	350
Major surface warships	428	206	296	290	32
Attack submarines	232	95	298	273	104

*NATO totals include France and Spain.

**Rough estimate.

***Excludes some 560,000 Soviet border guard, internal security, railroad, and construction troops.

Sources: IISS, DOD, CIA, CDI. Adapted from chart by Center for Defense Information in *The Defense Monitor,* "U.S.-Soviet Military Facts," 1982.

obligations ("budget authority") is appropriated in one year but actually spent (in "outlays") over a number of years. (For more on the budget process, see *Congress and the Budget Revisited,* #365, 65¢, 40¢ for members.) Thus, decisions to cancel large investment programs to lessen deficit problems are likely to have only a very small savings impact in the short term.

Others arrive at real growth figures in order to provide greater resources for other federal programs. The House and Senate Budget Committees were established to examine the federal budget as a whole and to set spending priorities for defense and other federal programs within overall budgetary ceilings. The FY 1984 first concurrent budget resolution reflected the Congress's judgment that the defense request should be reduced by $12 billion and social and economic expenditures increased by $39 billion.

Still others (such as Kaufmann) arrive at real growth targets as the result of judgments about the forces necessary to carry out a particular defense strategy. Kaufmann's proposal would provide fewer resources for strategic modernization, naval forces and Army modernization and greater resources for fast sealift capabilities and reserve forces. The FY 1984 defense authorization bill, which establishes defense programs for the coming year within the budget resolution ceiling of $269 billion, made reductions in investment and readiness but left the Administration's basic plan intact.

There is, consequently, more than one way to assess the defense budget. The next section focuses on strategic and general purpose forces because they are an easily understandable measure. The issues of investment and readiness and real growth are, however, intrinsic to this discussion and should be kept in mind because whatever the chosen measure, the underlying questions remain the same: What roles should U.S. military forces serve and what level of resources is necessary to carry out those roles?

Strategic force issues

One of the major issues of the 1980 election campaign was the so-called "window of vulnerability," described as a susceptibility of the land leg of the triad to Soviet attack. The debate has revolved around two questions:

—Does ICBM vulnerability to attack exist? If so, to what extent, and what should be done about it?

—Does the United States need to maintain all three legs of the triad?

The debate has not ended. Because decisions about the ICBM force affect decisions about the rest of the triad, these questions need to be considered together.

Regarding vulnerability, many analysts from all points on the political spectrum believe that, because of multiple warhead (MIRV) technology and improvements in weapon accuracy, the Soviet ICBM force is or will soon be capable of destroying as much as 90 percent of the U.S. ICBM force in a first strike. The Administration contends that the survivability of the ICBM force is necessary to "serve as a hedge against possible vulnerabilities in our submarine force; to introduce complexity and uncertainty into any plan of Soviet attack, because of the different types of attacks that would have to be launched against our ICBMs and our bombers; and to help deter Soviet threats of massive conventional or limited nuclear attack by the ability to respond promptly and controllably against hardened military targets."

Other analysts dispute the significance of ICBM vulnerability, pointing out that the United States has deployed the largest share of its warheads (about 50 percent) on its most survivable force—SLBMs—and the smallest (22 percent) on its most vulnerable—ICBMs. Even if U.S. ICBMs are vulnerable, they argue, the other two legs of the triad can ensure that *overall* U.S. retaliatory capability remains secure.

Land-based forces The decision to deploy both the MX and a single-warhead missile reflects the judgment of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Commission) that fulfilling all ICBM requirements—including survivability, capability to destroy hardened land-based missiles ("hard target capability"), accuracy and stability—with a single weapon and basing system is virtually impossible. The MX missile, expected to cost $18 billion in 1984 and beyond, is intended to meet the immediate requirements for the ICBM force: removing the Soviet advantage in hard-target capability and deterring the threat of conventional and limited nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies. Critics of the MX, however, contend that it would be destabilizing: if the MX is deployed in a vulnerable basing system, they say, it might increase the Soviet incentive to strike first in a period of crisis. In addition, one analysis (the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) *Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces)* concludes that the MX's contribution to total U.S. retaliatory capability is fairly small, given its limited survivability (if based in existing silos) and the planned modernization of other triad elements.

The purpose of the new single-warhead missile (for which preliminary cost estimates are $107 billion, assuming 1,000 land mobile missiles) is to enhance stability and provide flexibility in responding to future Soviet actions. Stability would be achieved, according to supporters, in two ways: first, the small missile could be deployed on a mobile system, increasing its survivability; and second, it would present a far less attractive target than would a large missile with many warheads. The missile's small size would allow the flexibility of choosing among several different basing options.

Problems associated with such a missile include the high cost of maintaining a mobile land-based missile system, should that basing option be chosen. The $107 billion lifetime cost estimate is subject to uncertainties concerning the availability of land for basing such a system and the degree to which missile transporters must be hardened against nuclear blast, and costs could be larger. If a mobile system included land outside military installations, public acceptance and adequate security might also prove to be serious problems.

Some analysts who are concerned about the costs and inherent vulnerability of land-based missiles advocate drastic solutions: continuing to operate the Minuteman force without improvements (effectively reducing reliance on it) or abandoning the land leg altogether and relying on sea-based forces and bombers.

Sea-based forces Modernization plans for sea-based strategic nuclear forces are intended to enhance their survivability and achieve a capability to destroy hardened Soviet targets. The Trident submarine, which can patrol large areas and is hard to detect, and the Trident II SLBM, which is highly accurate, will help to achieve these goals. The cost of operating existing and new sea-based strategic forces is estimated to be $42 billion in the period from 1982–87 (in 1982 dollars).

Because of the submarines' invulnerability and the Trident II's accuracy, some critics of the Administration's ICBM plan advocate expansion of the Trident II missile program in lieu of ICBM modernization. CBO's strategic modernization study cited previously estimates that five to nine additional Trident submarines would provide the same retaliatory power as the MX and single-warhead missile programs, and, if substituted for the ICBM plan, would save $61 billion between 1984 and 2000. Critics of this approach contend that such a proposal would require that a larger share of strategic deterrence be performed by submarines and bombers, for which command and control problems are greater, and would allow the Soviets to concentrate their strategic efforts on two legs instead of three.

Bombers U.S. strategic bombers were originally designed to penetrate Soviet defenses and deliver bombs or short-range attack missiles. Improved Soviet defenses, however, have heightened the risk that U.S. bombers would be destroyed before reaching their targets. For this reason, air-launched cruise missiles—which can be launched far from their targets—are being installed on some B-52 strategic bombers.

However, the Administration believes it is necessary to maintain the ability to *penetrate* Soviet air defense with bombers and is building the B-1 and "Stealth" bombers for this purpose. (One hundred B-1s would be fielded in the mid-1980s, followed by an

Defense spending and the economy

The recent increases in defense expenditures, coupled with reductions in taxes and some categories of nondefense spending, have led to concerns about possible adverse effects on the economy, specifically on federal deficits, inflation, employment and productivity. Two recent studies—*Defense Spending and the Economy* by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and *The Cost and Consequences of Reagan's Military Build Up* by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP)—highlight the major points of the debate.

☐ **Deficits** Nearly all analysts agree that continuing defense spending increases, if financed by large federal deficits, could have serious economic consequences. Without *any* further legislated increases in spending, CBO predicts that deficits will remain around $200 billion through FY 1984 and increase to nearly $270 billion by FY 1988. Even if the economy recovers significantly, the deficit will still be hovering around $200 billion by 1988. If defense spending continues to increase as the economy recovers from recession, CBO concludes that cuts in nondefense spending or tax increases will be necessary to keep deficits in line. The CEP analysis acknowledges that deficit spending can help stimulate the economy in a period of recession but warns (as do Wall Street economist Henry Kaufman and MIT economist Lester Thurow) that if the federal government borrows from private capital markets to pay for defense production after the recession ends, interest rates could rise, making it more difficult for civilian investors to borrow.

☐ **Inflation** There is more uncertainty about the inflationary effects of defense spending. The CEP study indicates that as competition for resources increases between military and civilian industry, prices of highly skilled labor and high-technology goods may increase. CEP also warns that growing demand for these goods and services could lead to backlogs or bottlenecks in production and further raise prices. The CBO analysis, on the other hand, claims that if the economy recovers from the current recession at the sluggish, gradual rate predicted by most forecasters, additional defense increases should not contribute to inflation in the immediate future (through 1985) because of continuing low resource utilization, high unemployment, high interest rates, and moderation in food and energy price increases owing to good harvests and ample oil supplies. CBO does, however, warn that the risk of inflation could increase if private spending recovers faster than expected.

☐ **Employment** Estimates of the numbers and types of jobs created by defense spending compared to nondefense or private spending vary. CEP contends that military spending creates fewer jobs than civilian spending because arms production requires highly skilled labor. CEP's conclusions are based on a comparison of the job-creating potential of alternative uses of $1 billion: the MX missile (29,400 jobs) and mass transit, public utility, railroads, housing, and solar energy/energy conservation, which would create jobs in the range of 30,900–45,400. (It should be noted, however, that the MX is one specific use of defense funds; a more representative sample would include a range of defense purchases that would be more likely to create more jobs.) CEP also contends that defense employment shifts jobs from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and Southwest, where most defense contractors are located, thus adding to regional unemployment problems. CBO concludes that the military buildup should not stunt employment growth over the next few years. Its analysis indicates that an additional $10 billion spent on either defense or nondefense purchases would create roughly the same number of jobs—about 250,000—assuming the $10 billion for defense is used to purchase all types of defense work; if it is spent on purchases from defense contractors (i.e., weapons), the number of jobs created would decline to about 210,000.

☐ **Productivity** Experts also differ about the effect of increased defense spending on U.S. productivity and competitiveness. CEP contends that increased defense expenditures would lead to lower investment in other sectors and a loss of efficiency and competitive edge. The conclusion is based on CEP's analysis of the investment and military spending patterns of 13 industrial nations, which shows that those nations that spend a larger portion of their gross domestic product on defense generally experience a slower economic growth. CBO finds that defense spending may have both adverse and beneficial effects on productivity growth. By employing scarce engineering and scientific talent and using capital that could otherwise be used for private investment, defense spending may harm productivity. Conversely, defense investment can lead to important civilian applications of military technology (e.g., the computer).

estimated 132 Stealth bombers starting in the early 1990s.) Once the Stealth bomber is introduced, it will serve as the "penetrating" bomber, and the B-1 will carry cruise missiles and become a "stand-off" bomber. The cost of strategic bomber programs is expected to be $63 billion in the period from 1982 to 1987 (in 1982 dollars).

Advocates say that the key advantage of the B-1 is that it would provide a near-term improvement in the U.S. ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses while development proceeds on the Stealth bomber. Supporters also point out that the B-1 would provide insurance against possible disappointing results in Stealth technology, would modernize the bomber fleet and could be used to support conventional forces. But critics question the need for the B-1, given that the Stealth bomber is due to be deployed in the early 1990s and the fact that the B-52 has been continually modernized and armed with cruise missiles. Moreover, opponents assert that continuing improvements in Soviet air defenses may make the B-1 outmoded as a penetrating bomber by the time it is deployed.

A proposed alternative is to cancel the B-1 and to rely on B-52s and cruise missiles while awaiting the Stealth bomber. Such a strategy could include producing more cruise missiles than currently planned in order to improve the capabilities of a portion of the existing B-52 fleet and continuing to use the remainder of the B-52 fleet as penetrating bombers until the Stealth bomber is ready. Estimated savings from this plan, according to CBO, would total $15.5 billion from 1984 to 2000.

General purpose force issues

Although strategic forces garner most of the headlines, general purpose forces are significant because of the hope that they will help to deter conventional conflicts and reduce the possible need to resort to the nuclear option. In addition, budget decisions regarding general purpose forces—the level of spare parts, ammunition and fuel that should be maintained for wartime; levels of pay necessary to retain qualified personnel in the military; and whether new weapons being procured can be adequately operated and maintained—involve substantial resources.

Major budget issues concerning ground forces include the question of whether greater resources should be used to improve fixed defenses in Europe or to strengthen the U.S. ability to deploy troops rapidly to non-European locations in the event of a crisis. Each of these options has significant budget implications.

Costs of the Rapid Deployment Force are expected to total $2.2 billion in fiscal year 1984, of which $622 million is identified with Southwest Asia-specific missions and $1.6 billion with programs designed primarily for Southwest Asia but needed to support missions in other regions (such as NATO). Since these forces are intended to fight in any location, they might provide needed flexibility to respond to non-European conflicts in the future. Yet, because many of the RDF's components also serve NATO missions, the use of the RDF in a Southwest Asian or other non-European conflict might detract from NATO readiness in the event of a simultaneous crisis in Western Europe. (See "Defending Access to Resources.")

Despite indications that future conflicts are likely to be non-European, as noted earlier, many analysts believe that strengthening NATO's conventional forces is prudent . A recent report on *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe* by a panel of American and European defense analysts and former NATO officials concluded that improvements in conventional forces would serve NATO's two main purposes: deterrence of Soviet attack and reassurance of the peoples of the alliance.

The study focused on weapons systems and related measures that would enable NATO to use conventional weapons to strike targets now covered by nuclear weapons. The panel concluded that emerging conventional weapons technologies and changes in existing procedures, coupled with arms control and efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union, could result in a lessening of the likelihood of having to use nuclear weapons.

Others, however, question whether NATO could afford a substantial conventional buildup and even whether such improvements would tip the balance in ground capabilities in NATO's favor. According to a CBO study, *Army Ground Combat Modernization for the 1980s,* if the Warsaw Pact continues to modernize its forces at current rates, planned U.S. modernization would maintain—but not improve—the current ratio of NATO to Warsaw Pact ground forces. (The study does not evaluate naval or air capabilities.) Even with modernization, the chances are good, according to CBO, that ground force ratios between the Soviet Union and NATO would continue to exceed those considered permissible by NATO for successful defense. To improve these ratios, CBO concludes, the United States would have to add two fully supported armored divisions (100,000 personnel plus equipment) at a cost in investment and operating expenses of over $60 billion during the next five years.

If NATO chose not to proceed with full-scale modernization, the CBO study outlines several cost-savings options. One would procure the same weapons at slower rates and postpone further storage or "prepositioning" of wartime equipment in Europe for investment costs of slightly over $31 billion compared to the $38 billion cost of the current 1983–87 plan. Another option is to continue buying at high rates those weapons used to combat the Warsaw Pact's strength in ground forces (e.g., tanks and armored fighting vehicles) and cut back on such things as helicopter improvements. The five-year investment costs of this plan would be about $31 billion. Remaining options might include continuing to rely on NATO's substantial existing capabilities or encouraging NATO allies to provide greater resources for modernization.

Another significant budget issue involves naval forces. The Administration believes a larger navy is necessary to counter the Soviet development of a "blue water" (ocean-going) navy able to deploy worldwide. A larger U.S. navy would presumably serve the traditional wartime objectives of sea control (making a section of ocean safe for U.S. forces) and sea denial (making it unsafe for enemy forces). A recent CBO analysis reports the navy's position that in order to counter the growing Soviet threat to U.S. shipping, it would also have to "bring the war to the Soviets" by attacking Soviet ports and bases with aircraft carriers (instead of attacking Soviet naval forces on patrol). In addition to these wartime objectives, the Administration states that new naval forces, coupled with planned changes in deployment patterns for aircraft carriers, would allow increased peacetime operations in areas where carriers have rarely operated (i.e., the Caribbean).

In the Brookings Institution's *Setting National Priorities: The 1984 Budget,* William Kaufmann contends that the current fleet of U.S. and allied naval forces could accomplish the traditional goals of peacetime presence and sea control with high probability. The proposed larger fleet would not, in Kaufmann's view, greatly increase the navy's ability to attack the main Soviet fleets in their home waters. For these reasons, Kaufmann proposes the elimination of three aircraft carriers (including the two authorized in 1983), a number of cruisers, attack submarines, battleships and destroyers, and a freeze of naval personnel at 1983 levels (at a substantial cost savings).

How much is enough? One way of making the judgment, as we have seen, is to assess the basic purposes of military forces and the options available to fulfill them. In reality, many other factors must be considered in making defense budgets, including citizens' intuitive perceptions about other nations and the resources necessary for defense, the search for nonmilitary solutions to world problems, rivalries between the military services, the efforts of defense manufacturers to obtain contracts and the desire of many citizens to protect nondefense federal programs from being reduced.

Nevertheless, examining the many reasons for having armed forces helps to focus on the ultimate goal of defense policy and to establish a link between military purposes and spending choices. Analyzing defense spending in this way will not necessarily determine how much is enough, but it suggests, at the very least, that there is a rational approach to solving what is often a very complex problem.

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Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader

The President of the United States, it is true, is the commander-in-chief of the army, but the army is composed of only six thousand men; he commands the fleet, but the fleet (is small); he conducts the foreign relations of the Union, but the United States is a nation without neighbors. Separated from the rest of the world by the ocean, and too weak as yet to aim at the dominion of the seas, it has no enemies, and its interests rarely come into contact with those of any other nation of the globe. Democracy in America

U.S. interests have changed dramatically in the 150 years since de Tocqueville wrote these words. From a weak, fledgling nation with limited interests and military power, the United States has evolved into a military giant with interests that span the globe.

Since World War II, military spending has consumed a substantial portion of the federal budget, with shares ranging from 50% or more in the 1950s to as little as 24% in recent years. (The decline is less than the figures suggest: when Social Security was added to the federal budget structure in the 1970s, the percentage of the budget allocated for defense automatically declined.) The Reagan administration has pledged to bring the share of the budget allocated for defense up to 29% or more. In dollars, the defense budget is expected to increase from $178 billion in fiscal year 1981 to an estimated $400 billion by fiscal year 1987.

These defense expenditures, however, are only the means of implementing military policy, and military policy is in turn a way to achieve national security—but not the only way, for as the nation's interests have changed, so has our conception of national security. Though it has traditionally implied a strong military policy with enough weapons to "provide for the common defense" and protect vital interests, over the years it has come to encompass the need to "promote the general welfare" as well, by providing resources to ensure social justice, economic prosperity and domestic tranquility. Many also believe that achieving a just and stable international order, in which all persons have access to the world's resources, is also a vital component of U.S. national security.

The tensions of life in a nuclear era also have led to a sharp questioning of traditional military assumptions:

- Is the physical protection of a nation's people, territory and interests possible in an age of strategic nuclear arsenals?
- Are there any alternatives to armed strength that would provide better ways to manage tensions with the Soviet Union, e.g., negotiated arms limitations or reductions, a nuclear "freeze" or improved conflict resolution techniques?
- Is military security possible without a strong economy and an educated citizenry?
- How else can the world be made more secure, e.g., eliminating world hunger?
- How much can the United States spend on its military in an era of competing needs and constrained budgets?

In more general terms, any close examination of U.S. military policy in the 1980s must address these issues:

- What are U.S. military security goals? What alternatives have been proposed and why?
- What kind of military policies will best enable the United States to achieve its goals? What policies would support the alternative goals?
- What types and levels of military forces are necessary to implement each of these military policies?
- How do these military policies affect U.S. relations with other countries?

When answering these questions, it is important to recognize the following points. Military policies are as much a product of *past experience* as they are responses to *present realities*. Military policies also reflect *theories* about military conflict and national behavior, and, once formulated, they are implemented by the *weapons of war*. To provide a clear, well-rounded basis for thinking about military policy, therefore, the following topics will be addressed in this publication: the history of U.S. military policy since World War II, the theories underlying current U.S. and Soviet military capabilities and alliance systems, and the effects of U.S. military policy on other nations.

Author's note: the discussion of U.S. military policy included here is intended to provide a general overview of U.S. military policy. For more details, consult two League of Women Voters Education Fund (LWVEF) publications: *The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How* (Pub. #530, $1.25, non-members, 75¢, members) and an upcoming publication on U.S. military spending issues.

Lessons of the past

It is not possible to examine military policy—the way in which the United States defends it people, territory and interests—in isolation from foreign policy—the way in which it manages economic and political relationships with other countries. U.S. actions since World War II have demonstrated just how closely related military and foreign policy are, sometimes complementing, sometimes conflicting with each other. Hence, it is difficult to determine whether military policy is the *result* of foreign policy, as many believe it should be, or the *cause* of foreign policy.

The traditional basis of U.S. military policy has been deterrence: to deter attack or, should that fail, to fight and win a military conflict. First priority is given to protecting the United States itself, generally followed by Western Europe, and then all other interests—for example, ensuring access to Middle East oil and defending allies such as Japan. The Soviet Union, our principal potential opponent since the end of World War II, is assumed to have similar goals: the protection of the Soviet homeland, its allies (principally the other Warsaw Pact nations), and finally its other interests, including access to resources and support of client states.

To carry out the goal of deterrence or defense, the United States has used a variety of tools, including armed strength, alliances and negotiations. This blending of foreign and military policy tools is especially evident in U.S.-Soviet relations since World War II and in the development of nuclear weapons.

U.S.-Soviet relations

Although U.S.-Soviet tensions can be traced as far back as the late nineteenth century, when American and Russian interests clashed in Asia, in the post-World War II era these tensions assumed central importance. Since then, a primary aim of U.S. foreign and military policy has been the containment of Soviet influence and communist ideology. (Yet, even while pursuing containment, the United States also sought to reduce the possibility of conflict with the Soviet Union through arms control.)

Soviet-American disagreements at the end of World War II ended a strained four-year wartime partnership—disagreements concerning the division of Germany into occupation zones, the composition of the Polish government and the division and occupation of Korea, among others. The United States also feared that the Soviet Union

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would attempt to control former colonial areas such as Egypt, India and Indochina and viewed with alarm growing Soviet influence on Eastern European governments. Soviet support of communist rebellions in Greece and Turkey, as well as Soviet unwillingness to withdraw from Iran in 1946, furthered these fears.

Unquestionably, the Soviet Union adopted a strong military posture after World War II. Historians differ, however, in assigning reasons for this behavior. Some point to the fact that the Soviet Union had borne the brunt of the Nazi onslaught in Europe, leaving the nation deeply scarred by the latest in a history of invasions by foreign powers. Others cite the longstanding Russian desire to ensure access to vital resources and warm water seaports, still others to a Soviet perception of being surrounded by enemies.

The United States, helped along by Soviet boasts about burying the capitalist world, became convinced that the USSR was bent on world domination and had to be contained politically, militarily and economically. The policy of containment, as initiated by President Truman in 1947, originally had an economic emphasis. In its first application, Greece and Turkey were given $400 million in economic aid to resist Soviet-supported rebellion. In 1948 the Marshall Plan was created as an economic recovery plan to stabilize and restore European national economies on the capitalist model.

The plan also laid the groundwork for a collective defense arrangement with Europe—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its chief purpose was to balance and defend against Soviet military strength in Eastern Europe while simultaneously forging stronger U.S. political commitments to its allies overseas.

In an effort to contain Soviet expansion in Asia as well, President Truman pledged to defend an area known as the "Asian defense perimeter," stretching from the Aleutian Islands to Japan, through the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) to the Philippines. After North Korea (supported by the Soviet Union) invaded South Korea in 1950, Korea became part of this defense perimeter, bringing the United States (under UN auspices) into its first direct military conflict since World War II. The Korean confrontation reinforced a growing perception that military strength was required, in addition to economic aid, to contain communism.

President Eisenhower's early plans to "liberate" the Eastern European satellite countries from Soviet domination continued the containment policy. The announced tools for achieving liberation were political and psychological warfare and propaganda. In several instances when this policy could have been applied, however, (notably during the uprisings in East Berlin and Hungary) the United States chose not to act decisively, and the policy was in effect abandoned.

Foiled on one front, the Eisenhower administration then turned to "frontiersmanship," an effort to draw a political and military boundary around the Soviet Union and China. A number of alliances were used to enforce this boundary:

- In the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (1954), the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand pledged collective defense in Asia.
- Concern about possible Soviet interest in the Middle East led the United States to sponsor, but not sign, the Baghdad Pact in 1954 (also called the Middle East Treaty Organization and later renamed the Central Treaty Organization), which pledged Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan to collective defense in the Middle East.
- In 1957, the United States pledged to assist any nation in the Middle East against armed aggression by a country controlled by international communism.

During the sixties, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson cultivated more broad-based, less defense-oriented regional alliances. The developing nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America had become increasingly important in U.S. efforts—both to contain Soviet influence and to help alleviate economic, political and social conditions that breed revolutions. The United States used military, economic development and technical assistance, as well as educational and cultural programs, to encourage key friendships with these countries. The Alliance for Progress (a plan to provide billions of dollars in U.S. aid to Latin America over a ten-year period), the Food for Peace program, the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development programs are a few examples.

By the late 1960s, decades of effort to contain Soviet and communist expansion had produced a globe-girdling U.S. presence, epitomized by our escalating Vietnam involvement. But at the time when this presence peaked, other factors were contributing to a climate of withdrawal: detente and a perceived lessening of the Soviet threat... the inflationary effects of the Vietnam war on the economy... devaluation of the dollar in 1971... the 1973–74 Arab oil embargo... the emergence of an independent developing-nation bloc known as the Group of 77... increased economic competition from allies... the rising cost of social programs at home. These events and others led to a reevaluation of the nation's ability and desire—political, military and economic—to serve as global protector. The result of these reflections was the "Nixon Doctrine," in which the United States reaffirmed its commitments to its allies while underlining a new posture: that it expected allies to assume *primary* responsibility for their defense. One visible result of the Nixon Doctrine was increased military aid to countries such as Egypt, Israel and Iran, to enable them to defend themselves. Since that time, each president has sought to provide similar economic and military support to selected countries in an effort to limit *direct* U.S. military involvement in the containment of Soviet influence. However, events in recent years have triggered a partial reevaluation of this policy and a more active U.S. role worldwide.

Development of nuclear weapons

Since their development, nuclear weapons have played a major role in U.S. foreign and military policy. Although their first and only use was by the United States against Japan, it is in U.S.-Soviet relations that they have assumed critical significance.

After World War II, the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons served to balance Soviet troop strength in Europe and to provide a nuclear "shield" for European nations. Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and the victory of Mao Tse-tung in China in 1949 led President Truman to authorize the "super bomb." With the U.S. testing the hydrogen bomb in 1952 and the USSR in 1953, the nuclear arms race was on.

Massive retaliation During the Eisenhower administration (1952–1960) nuclear weapons became critical, both to deterring the Soviet Union and to limiting U.S. military expenditures (since they were less costly than conventional forces). During this period, the United States declared its willingness to use "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons to counter both conventional and nuclear Soviet attacks. As then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated the policy: "There is one solution and only one: that is for the free world to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our choosing." Since this policy provided no limited or low-level military means of responding to hostile actions, President Eisenhower continued to support the use of conventional forces and the expansion of U.S. alliances.

Flexible response In order to avoid the excessive reliance on nuclear weapons that massive retaliation had entailed, the Kennedy administration (1960–1963) developed a policy involving the use of a variety of means—diplomacy, covert action, guerrilla operations, and conventional and nuclear weapons—to counter Soviet aggression. As part of this "flexible response," conventional forces were built to levels capable of sustaining "two and a half wars"—two *simultaneous* conventional conflicts (against the Soviet Union in Europe and against China in Asia) and a smaller conflict elsewhere.

(The two-and-a-half wars policy was abandoned after the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement of the early 1970s. U.S. military policy was subsequently based on a one-and-a-half wars policy, on the assumption that a simultaneous Warsaw Pact attack in Europe and a Chinese conventional attack in Asia were unlikely.)

Although rumors of a "missile gap" with the Soviet Union (which had first surfaced after the launching of Sputnik in 1957) were disproven, the Kennedy administration began to upgrade nuclear forces, as part of its "flexible response," and established the U.S. strategic nuclear triad of land-, air- and sea-based forces (see "Military Machine") and a goal of 1,000 land-based missiles and 41 submarines. Some officials of the Kennedy administration have since stated that this number was rather arbitrary; nevertheless, it served to generate exhaustive restudy and expansion of war plans

that came to include increasing numbers of Soviet targets.

During this time of arms buildup, the United States also pursued efforts to reduce the chance of conflict with the Soviet Union, partly in response to the knowledge of how close to the nuclear abyss both nations had come in the Cuban missile crisis. These efforts included the Hotline Agreement and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

Mutual Assured Destruction The Johnson administration (1963–68) shifted to a strategic policy of "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD), in which each nation would be capable of inflicting devastating damage on the other's *population* (rather than weapons) after surviving a nuclear attack. Despite this shift in emphasis, the threat to use nuclear weapons to escalate a conventional conflict in Europe remained an element of U.S. policy, and to this day it forms the basis of NATO's policy (see "Alliances for Security").

Detente By the late 1960s and early 1970s the tremendous growth in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers made possible by MIRV (multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle) technology aroused fears that the arms race was out of control. These fears, coupled with recognition that a rough balance or parity existed, opened the way for an era of negotiations. "Detente," the term adopted for a perceived relaxation of tensions between the superpowers during the Nixon and Ford administrations (1968–76), became an important foreign and military security goal. Many see in the SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979) Treaties significant progress in reducing the risk of war.

Despite these positive steps toward arms control, a number of events in recent years led to a gradual toughening of U.S. military policy: a large Soviet strategic nuclear buildup, conflicts in the Middle East that generated fears about U.S. access to Middle East oil, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet intervention in Poland. These events resulted, in whole or in part, in the following shifts in U.S. weapons policy:

- **1977.** The NATO allies agreed to increase national defense spending by 3% annually, excluding inflation.
- **1979.** Five NATO governments agreed to accept deployment of U.S. land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles.
- **1980.** President Carter pledged to improve U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities over five years and proposed significant increases in U.S. defense spending.
- **1980.** The U.S. Senate declined to ratify the signed SALT II Treaty.
- **1980.** President Carter announced U.S. readiness to respond with force to any outside attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf region. To carry out this pledge, President Carter proposed the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force—a combination of aircraft and naval forces capable of responding quickly to conflicts around the world—and sought basing rights for these forces in Egypt, Kenya, Oman and Somalia.
- **1981.** Arguing that Soviet nuclear capabilities were increasing faster than U.S. capabilities, the Reagan administration proposed a five-year modernization program for U.S. nuclear forces—including powerful, highly accurate new weapons, such as the MX missile (see "Comparing U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces").

These harsher stances evoked intense debate, especially over U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Critics of the Reagan plan charged that the arms race had gotten out of control and that new approaches to managing conflict with the Soviet Union were needed. Some NATO governments, concerned that Europe might become a nuclear battleground, indicated they might not accept new U.S. missiles after all. A growing number of U.S. citizens, believing that the possibility of nuclear annihilation increases with the growth in strategic nuclear arsenals, urged their government to negotiate with the Soviet Union a "freeze" on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and to pursue other efforts to reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons as a tool of military policy.

Theories underlying current U.S. and Soviet military policies

From the Congress of Vienna in 1815 until the end of World War II, nations attempted to prevent war and to win wars through successive and changing alliances. Although today's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact are a continuation of this pattern, the balance of power since the end of World War II has consisted mainly of a bipolar balance between two nations—the United States and the Soviet Union.

U.S. strategic policy

Since the mid 1960s, when the Soviet Union developed significant nuclear capabilities, U.S. efforts to maintain the nuclear balance have flowed from either of two "strategic" theories: deterrence, which sets a comprehensive rationale for *preventing* a nuclear war; and counterforce, which sets a comprehensive rationale for *fighting* a nuclear war.

Although these two theories share a common objective—to deter war—they imply different ways of thinking about nuclear war. They are not neat categories into which hard and fast concepts can be separated; nor is it any easier to assign particular weapons with certainty to one or the other. Elusive as the two theories are, it is important to grapple with them because they have guided U.S. military planning for many years—and are likely to do so in the years ahead.

Deterrence-based policy—which has generally dominated U.S. military policy since the dawn of the nuclear age—is designed to deter or discourage a potential adversary from initiating an attack (called a "first strike") by making clear the threat, the will and the capability to retaliate with devastating damage. Deterrence supports the production and deployment of nuclear weapons in the hope that they will *never be used*. To achieve *nuclear* deterrence the United States has sought to create an image so intimidating that the Soviet Union would not dare to attack the United States or its allies with nuclear weapons and to make clear that if it did, the United States would retaliate in a "second strike" with crippling force. For nuclear deterrence to succeed, the United States must have both command capabilities and nuclear weapons that are so well protected or hidden that they could survive to carry out devastating retaliation after a Soviet attack.

Deterrence does not, however, rely entirely on nuclear weapons. The United States also maintains highly visible conventional (nonnuclear) forces as part of its deterrence policy. U.S. strategists consider force ratios no worse than 1:2 or 1:2.5 (U.S.:USSR) to be necessary for conventional deterrence. Conventional forces must also be sustainable in battle, i.e., they must have a support structure to provide necessary organization and personnel, ammunition and parts for weapons (see "Comparing General Purpose Forces").

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which the U.S. is a key member, plays a major deterrent role. Through its "flexible response" policy, NATO attempts to deter Soviet attack by threatening to respond to attack with a triad (not to be confused with the U.S. strategic nuclear triad) of forces—conventional forces, tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. Though a Soviet conventional attack would presumably be countered first with conventional forces, NATO reserves the option to introduce tactical or strategic nuclear weapons into a conflict—a policy commonly referred to as "first use."

Many analysts believe that in order to preclude the necessity of introducing nuclear weapons into a conflict, NATO should maintain a strong and visible conventional defense. Others believe that nuclear weapons provide the ultimate deterrent against Soviet attack and should be emphasized over conventional forces.

Although the goal of counterforce theory is, like deterrence, the prevention of nuclear war, counterforce prepares the U.S. to fight either a limited or general nuclear conflict *in the event that deterrence fails*. The theory's basic assumption is that the ability to hit and incapacitate *military targets*—hence the term "counter force"—will deter Soviet attack or, if that fails, will enable the United States to win a nuclear conflict. A counterforce policy requires weapons with great speed, power and, most important, accuracy; however, these weapons have "first strike" implications, i.e., if the U.S. acquires the ability to destroy a significant portion of the USSR's retaliatory capability, the U.S. may be encouraged to launch a surprise attack.

Historically, both "massive retaliation" and "mutual assured destruction" were essentially deterrence policies. Massive retaliation envisaged using nuclear weapons to deter any type of Soviet

attack—limited or strategic, conventional or nuclear. Mutual assured destruction sought to deter strategic nuclear attack by threatening to retaliate against Soviet cities. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's early sixties proposal for a "controlled response" to a Soviet nuclear attack, however, was consistent with counterforce principles: it was based on attacking Soviet military targets, not cities. So was Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's 1974 effort to develop greater capability for limited nuclear strikes against military targets on the assumption that this might limit the scope and damage of nuclear war. The MX missile was originally proposed as part of this program.

To some degree, President Carter also emphasized military targets. In Presidential Directive 59, issued in 1980, U.S. planning began to include more military targets. The Reagan administration appears to be continuing this trend. The Reagan strategy, outlined in the *Fiscal 1984–1988 Defense Guidance,* requires U.S. forces to be able to "render ineffective the total Soviet (and Soviet-allied) military and political power structure." It requires the assured destruction of "nuclear and conventional military forces and industry critical to military power."

In general, much argument surrounds any discussion of deterrence or counterforce theories. Advocates of deterrence-based policies marshal these arguments:

- Deterrence has been successfully tested for more than thirty years; no nuclear conflict has occurred since World War II.
- No nation would risk its own annihilation by attacking another nation with nuclear weapons; therefore, retaliatory weapons are sufficient to deter attack on the United States.
- Policies based on counterforce theory offer an illusion of victory that makes nuclear war more likely. A small nuclear attack would generate irresistible political and psychological pressures to escalate a conflict; hence, any use of nuclear weapons would lead to global holocaust.

Proponents of counterforce-based policies, on the other hand, contend that the world has become less stable and that deterrence has lost its effectiveness. They believe that the ability to retaliate is not sufficient by itself and that true deterrence will result only when the Soviet Union perceives that the United States is prepared to fight and win a nuclear war.

Soviet strategic policy

Soviet strategic policy is more difficult to state with certainty because of the lack of access to Soviet defense plans. U.S. experts generally analyze Soviet policy according to deterrence and counterforce theories, just as they do U.S. policy, but interpretations of Soviet intentions and capabilities vary widely.

Some analysts believe that the large-scale Soviet military buildup of recent years suggests an emphasis on counterforce principles within the Soviet Union. This buildup includes powerful, accurate new weapons theoretically capable of destroying U.S. land-based missiles in a first strike. Other observers believe that with each successive weapons system, the Soviets have armed to catch up with the United States.

Not surprisingly, the Soviets believe that the United States seeks to prepare for, fight and win a nuclear war. According to Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, the Soviet Union's top professional soldier, "even a cursory analysis of the evolution of U.S. strategic concepts shows that they are all founded on the idea of nuclear war against the Soviet Union and have a clearly defined aggressive character."

In spite of their arms buildup, from Khruschev to Brezhnev to Andropov, Soviet leaders have stated that nuclear war would be a disaster to humankind. Ogarkov has indicated that the Soviet Union views nuclear war as a cataclysmic and instant exchange—a view consistent with the deterrence theory that nuclear war, if it were to occur, would probably be final. And, at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in July 1982, the Soviet Union pledged (as has China) not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and called on the United States to do the same.

In sum, Soviet strategic policy, like that of the United States, claims to be defensive rather than offensive, aimed at deterring war rather than fighting it. Yet both nations have developed or plan to develop powerful weapons that would enable them to fight a nuclear war and perhaps to launch a first strike against the other. To put it mildly, neither nation's military policy is a model of theoretical consistency.

The military machine

Comparing U.S. and Soviet strategic forces

The power and accuracy of the world's strategic (i.e., intercontinental) nuclear weapons have increased dramatically since World War II. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 took several hours to deliver and had an explosive power equal to about 15,000 tons of TNT. It leveled a city of 350,000 and killed one out of four persons immediately. Today, strategic nuclear weapons can travel from one continent to another in less than 30 minutes. Each of the 160 warheads on a U.S. Poseidon submarine has over three times the explosive force of the Hiroshima bomb. And a single Poseidon submarine could theoretically destroy 160 Soviet targets and deliver more than twice as much explosive force as all the munitions used in World War II.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have a triad of strategic nuclear weapons:

- land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs);
- intercontinental bombers; and
- missiles carried on submarines (submarine-launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs).

Both nations also possess "command, control, communications, and intelligence" capabilities to control and coordinate the forces behind each element of the triad through a secure chain of command.

ICBMs, SLBMs and the intercontinental bombers, also called "launchers," are often used as a measure of strategic nuclear capability. Another significant measure is the number of warheads or explosive devices carried on each missile. Although the capabilities of launchers, their numbers and their warheads vary, they form—for each nation—a comprehensive and integrated strategic force. Though the differing capabilities and somewhat overlapping missions of each leg of the triad complicate an adversary's military planning, they also have an important insurance value. Should one of the superpowers make advancements in one "leg" of the triad, the other could continue to feel secure because of the variety and overlap in *its* own triad.

Comparing launcher capability

The U.S. triad

Land-based missiles More than half (57%) of U.S. strategic launchers are Minuteman I, II and III and Titan ICBMs. Many of these silo-based ICBMs are equipped with multiple warheads or MIRVs that allow a single missile to deliver weapons against several targets at once. Because of their power and accuracy, ICBMs hold primary responsibility for attacking Soviet military targets.

Bombers Of U.S. strategic launchers, 15% are B-52 bombers and FB-111 fighter/bombers carrying missiles. Despite their age, these bombers are both accurate and powerful. They take too long to arrive on target to be used against missile silos, however, and so are primarily relied upon to attack "soft" (unprotected) targets such as industrial centers. Around 3,000 air-launched cruise missiles—small, pilotless jet aircraft with very accurate guidance systems that enable them to fly close to the ground and avoid enemy radar—are currently being installed on part of the B-52 fleet. Since they are carried by the B-52, air-launched cruise missiles are also slow in reaching their targets, but have a greater ability than the B-52 to penetrate to their targets. Many U.S. bombers are "forward-based" outside U.S. territory, shortening their flight time to target considerably.

Sea-based missiles More than a quarter (28%) of U.S. strategic launchers are MIRV-equipped missiles based on Poseidon and Trident submarines. Because submarines operate over a large area and are difficult to detect, their missiles are considered to be the most "survivable" leg of the triad. While SLBMs are capable of attacking unprotected Soviet military targets, they are not thought to be currently capable of destroying hardened missile silos. Thus, their role in a conflict would be to retaliate primarily against soft targets.

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence U.S. command, control, communications and intelligence (also referred to as "C^3I")includes satellites and radar to detect an attack on the United States; command centers to evaluate information from sensors; a chain of command to make decisions about U.S. retaliation; communications links to connect sensors, command centers and nuclear forces; and intelligence resources. The C^3I system is often criticized as the weakest link in the U.S. deterrent because it is largely unprotected and thus highly vulnerable to attack.

The USSR triad

(The names of Soviet weapons and estimates of their numbers are those assigned by the U.S. government.)

Land-based missiles Of all Soviet strategic launchers, 56% are SS-11, 13,17,18 and 19 ICBMs, over half fitted with MIRVs, and larger and more powerful than U.S. ICBMs. Though they have been less accurate in past tests, their accuracy is believed to be increasing rapidly. Some U.S. analysts believe they can now destroy hardened U.S. missile silos. Since the Soviet Union has devoted a large portion of its strategic strength to ICBMs, their ability to survive under attack is considered crucial. In recent years, the Soviet Union, like the United States, has hardened or reinforced its land-based missile silos to make destruction by U.S. missiles even more difficult.

Bombers Bear and Bison bombers armed with short-range missiles make up 6% of Soviet strategic launchers. Some U.S. administrations have also classified the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic weapon, but its range is not known for certain. Soviet bombers, like U.S. bombers, are suited only for attacking soft targets.

Sea-based missiles Missiles based on Yankee and Delta submarines constitute 38% of Soviet strategic launchers. Few are fitted with MIRVs. Soviet submarines are relatively "noisy" compared to U.S. submarines and are therefore easier to detect and also more vulnerable because a large portion of the force is thought to be in port at any given time. Soviet SLBMs currently lack the accuracy to attack hard targets and are therefore suited for attacking only soft targets.

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence The Soviet Union possesses C^3I capabilities similar to those of the United States. Soviet sensors, like those of the U.S., are thought to be highly vulnerable to attack. Less is known about other elements of Soviet C^3I. A potential danger to both U.S. and Soviet C^3I is electromagnetic pulse (EMP), one of the results of a nuclear explosion. Although the effects of EMP on C^3I capabilities are not known for certain, it is thought that this phenomenon may cause widespread disruption of communications, a factor that would certainly limit a nation's ability to control and coordinate forces following a nuclear attack.

Other strategic comparisons

Warheads In measuring strategic nuclear forces, it may be more accurate to count warheads—the actual number of explosive devises that can be delivered against a target—than launchers, since many U.S. and Soviet missiles carry multiple warheads (MIRVs). The U.S. distribution of warheads is a balanced one: 23% on ICBMs, 50% on SLBMs and 27% on bombers. The Soviet Union, because of its lack of sea access, has placed 71% of its warheads on ICBMs, 25% on SLBMs and 4% on bombers. The United States has the lead, though diminishing, in this measure.

Other measures of strategic capabilities include:

payload, the explosive charge carried in a warhead;

throwweight, the "lift" capacity of a missile, i.e., the weight of warheads, decoys and guidance systems that the missile can lift into orbit and carry to a target;

equivalent megatonnage, a measure of the destructive potential of varying combinations of warhead yields against cities or industrial centers; and

hard-target kill potential, the capability to destroy "hardened" targets such as missile silos.

The United States is thought to have an advantage in payload, the Soviets an advantage in throwweight and equivalent megatonnage. In hard-target kill potential the two nations are believed to be about equal.

Amount of national resources devoted to preparations for war The USSR annually publishes figures on defense spending that are disregarded by U.S. experts because they have not changed appreciably in 20 years. In this country, the most widely quoted figures come from the Central Intelligence Agency, whose periodic estimates of Soviet defense spending show the Soviet Union outspending the United States in most areas. Other sources, however, reflect different conclusions. For example, World Priorities, an organization headed by a former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency official, estimates that the United States outspent the Soviet Union in 1979.

In 1980, CIA estimates showed the Soviet Union spending 50% more than the United States in dollar terms and 30% more in rubles. Though useful, these estimates should, as the CIA itself warns, be used cautiously. First, it is difficult to get accurate information about Soviet prices, equipment specifications, operating procedures and maintenance standards. A second problem is inherent in the way the CIA makes its calculations. In its dollar estimates, for example, the CIA estimates the size and composition of the Soviet military and then prices it according to U.S. military pay scales. But because U.S. military pay scales are much higher than Soviet pay scales, pricing Soviet personnel in dollars overstates their cost to the Soviet Union. Similarly, pricing U.S. research and development in rubles overstates the cost to the United States, because research and development are costlier in the Soviet Union.

It is clear, therefore, that a broad range of measures, not just one, must be examined in order to obtain a reasonably accurate picture of the U.S.-Soviet defense balance. But confusion invariably results from the use of different yardsticks. For example, in his November 22, 1982 nationwide address President Reagan stated, "Today, in virtually every measure of military power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage." As proof, the President offered data that pointed to a Soviet advantage in strategic ballistic missiles and bombers. Critics of the President's presentation counter that he failed to tell the whole story by leaving out a basic measure—the number of warheads in each country's arsenal, which most experts believe give the United States an edge.

Some experts argue that the United States has other advantages over the USSR. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recently argued that the Soviets "are in a weaker position today than they were 14 to 15 years ago." He and others stress another measure of Soviet military strength—economic growth—which has slowed from an annual rate of greater than 5% in the 1950s and 1960s to 1.5% in 1980. Some analysts note that the rapid expansion and modernization of its military force has weakened the USSR's overall economic strength. Still others look at NATO and Warsaw Pact totals, which, according to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, show NATO outspending the Warsaw Pact in all but three years since 1970. This spread would be even greater if Soviet military spending directed toward China were excluded.

Planned improvements in U.S. strategic forces

Recent discussion about U.S. military policy has centered on whether there is a strategic "window of vulnerability": a weakness in the ability of U.S. land-based missiles to survive a Soviet attack. Some analysts believe that by the mid-1980s the improved accuracy of Soviet ICBMs may enable the Soviet Union to destroy 90% or more of the U.S. land-based ICBM force in a surprise attack.

Other analysts question this conclusion, stressing continuing uncertainty about missile accuracy, the effect of fratricide (one attacking warhead destroying another) and U.S. capability for counter attack with its own ICBM force.

To address the problem of vulnerability, Presidents Ford and Carter and, just recently, President Reagan have successively endorsed the development and production of the MX missile, a powerful and accurate new land-based missile with a basing system that would enable it to survive a Soviet attack. Much controversy has surrounded the MX system, primarily concerning its basing system.

In fall 1982 President Reagan, who is strongly committed to the MX missile, proposed that 100 MX missiles be placed in hardened silos in a 15–20 square mile area in Wyoming. The theory behind this "dense pack" plan (later abandoned because of congressional opposition) was that as incoming warheads exploded over the MX silos, their radiation, heat, debris and blast effects would destroy warheads that followed, ensuring that a portion of the MX missiles would survive to be launched in a retaliatory strike.

The Reagan administration contends that it would take the Soviet Union years of costly research and development to overcome the "dense pack" plan, thereby making it a viable solution until the early 1990s. At that time, MX deployment would be expanded, using either anti-ballistic missiles (requiring abrogation of the SALT I ABM treaty) or deceptive practices involving empty silos.

Critics of the MX or of the basing system make these arguments:

- The MX would add little to the overall U.S. deterrent.
- The MX is a first-strike weapon and is thus destabilizing to the existing strategic balance.
- Land-based missiles are inherently vulnerable.
- Strategic nuclear arsenals are already too large and should be reduced.

The United States is also developing air-launched cruise missiles for B-52 bombers, a new intercontinental bomber (the B-1) that will carry cruise missiles, an advanced-technology bomber still on the drawing board (the "Stealth" bomber), sea-launched cruise missiles to be carried on attack submarines, and the Trident II SLBM. The Trident II missile, like the MX missile, will theoretically be able to destroy hardened Soviet missile sites, prompting fears both at home and abroad that the United States is developing a first-strike capability.

Comparing general purpose forces

In addition to their strategic nuclear forces, both superpowers maintain substantial general purpose forces, including both conventional (nonnuclear) forces and theater and tactical nuclear weapons. These forces are intended both to support strategic nuclear policy and to provide capabilities for deterring or fighting a limited war.

It is extremely difficult and potentially misleading to offer general comparisons of U.S. and Soviet general purpose forces, because the types of weapons and their purposes vary greatly. The comparisons in this section give the reader only a bare-bones description of general purpose forces and should therefore be used cautiously. (Estimates of the numbers of weapons were obtained from U.S. government sources.)

Although Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated in 1981 that the United States should be prepared to fight a protracted conventional war with the Soviet Union on all fronts, President Reagan later acknowledged that this goal was not feasible. Thus, the United States retains, in essence, the one-and-a-half wars policy in effect since the Nixon years, and general purpose forces are designed accordingly. It is difficult to know for certain how many conflicts Soviet general purpose forces are prepared to support simultaneously, but it is accepted that they are currently deployed against three fronts: NATO, China and the Middle East.

Land forces U.S. land forces include 19 active-duty and 9 reserve Army and Marine Corps divisions and supporting equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers and helicopters. Soviet land forces include 180 divisions and similar supporting equipment. Because Soviet divisions are much smaller than U.S. divisions, the difference in number of military personnel is much less than those figures suggest, with an actual ratio of 2¼ to 1. (Total U.S. military personnel equals 2.1 million; total Soviet military personnel equals 3.7 million.) Of U.S. divisions, 86% are based at home. The comparable Soviet percentage is 79%.

Tactical and theater nuclear forces U.S. nuclear weapons with ranges of only a few miles (tactical) to over 1,000 miles (theater) include Poseidon missiles assigned to European defense, Pershing 1-A, Lance and other surface-to-surface missiles, missiles carried by F-111, A-6, A-7 and F-4 aircraft, and a variety of nuclear cannons. Soviet tactical and theater nuclear forces include SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 long-range missiles and missiles carried by the Backfire bomber, other aircraft and submarines. The USSR's recent deployment of SS-20 missiles (175–300 in number, depending on the source) has given it an edge in long-range theater nuclear forces, for of the 6,000 or so U.S. nuclear warheads in Europe, a large number are tactical—that is, short range. In comparing theater nuclear strength, U.S. officials tend to compare only land-based weapons, whereas U.S. theater nuclear weapons carried on aircraft and submarines constitute significant capabilities.

Tactical air forces U.S. tactical air forces include Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft such as the F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 fighters, the F/A-18 fighter attack aircraft and the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). Soviet tactical air forces include the Backfire, Blinder and Badger bombers and a number of fighter aircraft. The Soviet Union has about twice as many tactical aircraft (fighter and attack planes) as the United States, but the United States is believed to have a lead in technological sophistication.

Naval forces U.S. naval forces include aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, battleships, frigates, attack submarines and amphibious ships. Soviet naval forces include aircraft carriers, aviation cruisers carrying helicopters, submarines, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, and a variety of small combatant and auxiliary ships. The Soviet Union has more surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers and frigates), submarines and amphibious ships than the United States, but many of them, especially the frigates, are quite small, with a questionable military value. The United States has 13 aircraft carriers with close to 800 aircraft; the Soviet Union has two carriers with about 120 aircraft.

Mobility forces U.S. mobility forces include1,000-plus C-5, C-141, C-130 and other aircraft, helicopters and various ships. Its mobility plans also include use of a wartime Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Soviet mobility forces include an estimated 600 medium- and long-range aircraft. Comparisons of these forces are questionable because their effectiveness depends on the type and location of conflict.

U.S. military policy: Impact on world relations

Military policy is not made in a vacuum. As we have seen, strategic theories and historical experience create different sets of options for policy makers to consider. Neither is military policy implemented in a vacuum. By its very nature, it affects U.S. relations with other nations—most evidently, relations with the Soviet Union.

The arms race

In order to support and sustain deterrence, the superpowers have developed and deployed increasingly more powerful and accurate nuclear weapons, each commiting a substantial share of national resources toward creating these new weapons and modernizing existing ones. And each country constantly monitors the actions and statements of the other in order to react and respond to perceived new threats.

The MX missile provides a classic example. When President Reagan proposed to deploy the MX missile in the "dense pack" mode in late 1982, the Soviets immediately announced that they would match it with a similar capability. But the United States had been citing the need to keep up with a Soviet strategic buildup as the justification for the MX. The Soviets respond, however, that their buildup has been necessary to catch up with the United States. And so the arms race spirals.

Many analysts have concluded that the arms buildup has taken on a life of its own. Two notable arms control experts, Spurgeon Keeny, Jr. and Wolfgang Panofsky, question "whether declaratory doctrine has generated requirements or whether the availability of weapons for targeting has created doctrine." They and others cite facts that show "overkill" (or duplication relative to numbers of targets) of nuclear weapons. For example, there are approximately three times as many U.S. nuclear warheads as there are Soviet targets.

Efforts to curb the arms race have proceeded alongside the arms race itself and have met with some success. Among the most important agreements involving nuclear weapons are the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the SALT I treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and SALT II. In addition, superpower negotiations on strategic and theater nuclear weapons are currently underway.

Beyond these efforts, many present and former government officials and independent activists are proposing initiatives that they consider to be essential to halting the arms race.

- George Kennan, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, has proposed an immediate, across-the-board 50% reduction in the superpowers' arsenals—a reduction affecting in equal measure all strategic, medium-range, and tactical weapons, as well as all means of delivery. Kennan cautions that "whoever does not understand that when it comes to nuclear weapons the whole concept of relative advantage is illusory. . . is never going to guide us out of this increasingly dark and menacing forest of bewilderment into which we have all wandered."
- George Kennan also recently joined with other former top-level government officials—McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith—in calling for a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. They assert in a much-heralded *Foreign Affairs* article, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," that "it is time to

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact: Alliances for security

As discussed earlier, the protection of principal allies is an important military security goal of the United States and the Soviet Union. But this goal entails substantial costs, including stationing nuclear weapons and personnel in a number of European countries. For the USSR, the costs are even larger, since it spends more on the Warsaw Pact's defense than does the United States for NATO.

NATO

The current U.S. role in NATO is two-fold: to provide a nuclear "shield" intended to deter a Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe and to deploy ground troops to give credibility to the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe. Relying on its nuclear deterrent, the 15 nations of the NATO alliance have not tried to match USSR troop deployments in Europe one for one. However, NATO conventional strategy does call for a strong "forward defense," capable of defending Europe as far as West Germany's eastern border. It is designed to convince the USSR of NATO's ability to wage extended war and to keep the Soviets uncertain about when nuclear weapons might be introduced into a conflict.

The U.S. contribution to NATO The United States deploys tactical and theater nuclear weapons in several NATO countries and maintains military bases and over 300,000 personnel in Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and West Germany. The United States also contributes substantial aircraft and naval forces. In addition, the United States plans to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles in Europe to improve its theater nuclear capabilities and to counter the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles.

European contributions to NATO Besides permitting the United States to deploy troops and nuclear weapons on their territory, the European NATO members also provide troops and nuclear weapons. European NATO members account for over half of total NATO military personnel, half of total naval tonnage (over 500 ships) and a little over half of NATO's air force (about 3,000 aircraft). In addition, the United Kingdom has about 400 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons that would be used in NATO's defense. If French weapons are included, this total rises to about 800. (France is a NATO member, but does not participate fully in NATO military planning and command structure in order to retain national authority over all military decisions.)

The Warsaw Pact

The Soviet Union possesses all of the Warsaw Pact's nuclear capabilities and has nuclear weapons deployed in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. The Soviet Union also has 30 divisions stationed in Eastern Europe, all estimated to be combat-ready (i.e., at 75–100% of wartime strength). The role of these troops is to ensure Soviet control over Eastern Europe and to deter a NATO attack. In addition, the Soviet Union maintains substantial conventional aircraft and naval forces. The other Warsaw Pact governments maintain 53 divisions in Eastern Europe, of which 62% are estimated to be combat-ready; 21% are at 50—75% of wartime strength, and 17% are below that level.

NATO/Warsaw Pact comparisons

At first glance, most measures of NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons and personnel show the Pact at an advantage. For an accurate comparison, however, other factors must be considered.

- Which forces should be counted? In a European conflict, the Soviet Union would probably retain troops along its Chinese border and in locations such as Afghanistan, lessening the strength of forces it could muster. On the NATO side, there are uncertainties about France's participation: Could French territory be used for defensive purposes? Could French ports be used for supplies? Would French troops be available as reinforcement? Although most Western analysts believe that France would certainly participate in NATO efforts to defend against invasion, France's initial effectiveness would probably be hampered by the fact that its forces are not fully integrated into the NATO structure. Although NATO is outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact in terms of troops stationed *in Europe*, NATO's total military strength slightly exceeds that of the Warsaw Pact: 4.9 million, including Spain (with France, 5.3 million) versus 4.8 million for Pact countries.
- How quickly can forces be mobilized and deployed? Since the Soviet Union controls military decisions within the Warsaw Pact, the Pact's ability to act quickly in the event of a conflict might surpass that of NATO. In a European conflict, moreover, the Soviet Union would move troops far shorter distances over land than the United States, which would have to move most of its forces over sea. However, many Pact divisions are below the 50% readiness level, a factor that might affect their ability to deploy quickly.
- Can force structures be compared? The Pact countries could probably field more combat power on short notice, but these forces might not have as favorable a support situation (transportation of personnel and maintenance of equipment) over the long run, since Soviet troops would be moving through generally hostile territory.

Definitive conclusions concerning the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance are, obviously, difficult to reach. In ground forces, an important measure, the Warsaw Pact holds an advantage in personnel and equipment. NATO plans, however, to modernize its ground forces substantially, thereby reducing this edge. Conclusions regarding other measures of capability—firepower, support and technology—are much less certain.

recognize that no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to remain limited." The authors acknowledge that "as long as the weapons themselves exist, the possibility of their use will remain" but argue that the "posture of effective conventional balance and survivable second-strike nuclear strength is vastly better for our own peoples and governments. . . ."

■ Among many other proposals are calls for a comprehensive test ban; more nuclear weapons-free zones; a joint U.S.–USSR freeze on further testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons; and a commitment to abolish both national military arsenals and the war system.

Alliances

In the past 30 years numerous frictions have arisen from Western Europe's dependence on the United States for its security and from the economic interdependence of the allies. According to historian and political scientist Stanley Hoffman, these sometimes "major breakdowns or misunderstandings... reveal not simply an inevitable divergence of interests but dramatically different views of the world and priorities."

Ever since NATO was established, Europeans have been plagued by doubts about U.S. willingness to use its nuclear forces in defense of NATO. Would the United States risk its own survival for the sake of its allies? Or would the United States seek to separate its own security from theirs? The 1979 NATO theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization plan surfaced these and other doubts once again. In proposing to deploy U.S. Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles in Europe, the United States sought allied consent before the weapons were even to be produced. (Consent, in any case, would have been required for deployment.) Some observers believe that this departure from most nuclear procurement decisions of the past 30 years not only prolonged the decision process but also intensified European antinuclear sentiment.

Compounding the problems associated with deployment was the simultaneous U.S. decision to negotiate their limitation in *bilateral* U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. As Christoph Bertram, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, has pointed out, "The 'two-track' nature of the 1979 decision to multilaterally arm and bilaterally negotiate [arms control] has been an awkward one for European domestic, for East-West and for West-West relations."

The U.S. role in NATO's defense is not the only point at issue in the TNF plan. Basic questions about what NATO's long-range strategy should be also exist. Many Europeans fear that the presence of the new Pershing II missiles, capable of attacking targets within the Soviet Union in minutes, would make the possibility of nuclear war in Europe *more* likely rather than less likely. NATO's "flexible response" policy calling for the possible first use of nuclear weapons by the United States similarly heightens concerns about nuclear war in Europe.

Another long-standing issue within NATO and also with Japan is that of sharing the cost of defense. As Secretary of Defense Weinberger puts it, "In view of the changing nature of the Soviet threat, I am convinced that all the allies, including the United States, can and should do more if the Western democracies are to survive the challenges of the 1980s." And yet, the 1977 pledge by all NATO governments to increase real defense spending by 3% annually is generally not being met. Japan, which the United States considers to be vital in countering Chinese power in Asia, has in the past also resisted U.S. calls to increase defense spending; pressure by the United States to balance a growing Soviet buildup in the Pacific, however, has recently brought some increases in Japanese defense expenditures.

The United States and its allies are also increasingly at odds over the direction of economic policies. After World War II, the United States took the lead in restructuring the international economy, with the Bretton Woods system controlling monetary affairs and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regulating international trade. The 1971 decision by the United States to suspend gold convertibility of the dollar and subsequent periods of slow growth, high inflation and high unemployment in Europe and the United States have destroyed Bretton Woods and fragmented GATT. Europeans blame the U.S. for failing to bring down high interest rates and to get its own domestic economy on its feet. Americans charge that Western Europe has not kept its pledges to reduce government spending.

Economic relations with the allies have been further strained by U.S. policies on East-West trade, most recently by a ban (later removed) on the sale of technology to the Soviet Union for use in its natural gas pipeline—a ban that was to apply to equipment manufactured in Europe under license from U.S. companies. The allies regarded this policy as meddlesome and insensitive to their current energy and economic needs. President Reagan defended it as a necessary measure to achieve an effective alliance position on East-West trade and to encourage the Soviet Union to modify its policies in Afghanistan and Poland, and he expected European nations to follow suit. But the experience of detente has somewhat transformed the West European view of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Europeans faced with a Soviet presence at their very doorsteps and, in West Germany's case, lacking any nuclear defense against the Soviet Union, feel the need to follow a middle course so as not to provoke the Soviets needlessly.

The Third World

The 1960s introduced a new reality into military policy reckonings—the newly independent nations in Asia and Africa. These developing countries and others in Latin America quickly became embroiled in superpower competition, as the United States and the USSR armed these "third world" nations in order to restrain each other's influence and to further their own interests by proxy. As a result, developing countries have become armed with highly sophisticated weapons, a situation with many potentially undesirable effects: not only is it destabilizing, but it diverts national resources from economic and social needs.

Energy-poor, less developed countries that see nuclear power as an important alternative source of energy and an impetus to development are highly critical of U.S. attempts to restrict their use of nuclear technology. Fear of nuclear accidents and the potential use of nuclear technology for weapons development have figured prominently in U.S. efforts to curb nuclear proliferation.

The evolution of U.S. military policy since the end of World War II has brought tremendous growth in nuclear weapons, and possession of these weapons has, in fact, become integrally associated with the concept of national security. Not everyone agrees, however, that these weapons reinforce the nation's safety net. Many even see in the continuing nuclear buildup a threat to "the general welfare" and a stable international order. Consequently, no consensus exists as to what kind of military policy the United States should pursue. The challenge for the United States continues to be to find ways to manage relations with the Soviet Union, Europe and the rest of the world that reduce tensions, lessen the danger of conflict, and avoid the ultimate test of national military capabilities: the use of nuclear weapons.

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As citizens, women have a vital stake in our national security; however, they are generally silent in the current debate. Knowledge of the issues and alternatives can draw women into active participation in this area of public policy.

The UPPER MIDWEST WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY will provide balanced information and analyses of the political, economic, ethical and military aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations. Issues of U.S.-Soviet competition in the Third World will also be considered. Speakers, panelists and discussion leaders will include nationally recognized experts with varying views.

Women leaders, making use of the resources and expertise available at this conference, can promote reasoned debate within their organizations on the nature of national security and how best to achieve it.

This conference is one of several being held around the country patterned after the national women's leadership conference, sponsored by The Committee for National Security, which was held last June in Washington, D.C.

SPEAKERS

HAROLD DITMANSON

FRANCES FARLEY

MARK GARRISON

AGENDA

Friday, October 28

8:15 a.m. Coffee, Rolls, Registration

9:00 WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS

Barbara Stuhler
Marlene Johnson
Jean Tews
Anne Cahn

9:15 ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Chair: Norma Noonan

Speakers: Elbridge Durbrow, Retired Foreign Service Officer with the rank of Career Minister; former Ambassador to South Vietnam.

Mark Garrison, Brown University; former Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow.

10:45 Break

11:00 Concurrent Workshops: PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF SOVIET SOCIETY

a) William George, Executive Vice President, Honeywell's Control Systems Businesses

Chair: Joann Paden

b) Nicholas P. Hayes, Executive Director, Associated Colleges of the Twin Cities; former visiting professor, Moscow State University.

Chair: Sue Rockne

c) Charles Ritchie, Director of Admissions, Instructor of Russian, Blake School.

Chair: Fran Paulu

SPEAKERS

P. TERRENCE HOPMANN

ROBERT E. HUNTER

NOEL C. KOCH

Friday, October 28

12:30 p.m. Lunch - ECONOMIC FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Chair: Gladys Brooks

Speaker: Ellen Frost, Director of Government Programs, Water Reactor Division, Westinghouse Electric Corporation; former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International, Economic and Technology Affairs, Department of Defense

2:15 THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Chair: Emily Anne Staples

Speakers: Representative Jim Leach, (R) Iowa, Foreign Affairs Committee

~~Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense~~ Vincent Kern

3:45 Break

4:00 Concurrent Workshops: THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS

a) Barbara Knudson, Professor, Quigley Center of International Studies, University of Minnesota Africa

Chair: Judy Duffy

b) Emily Rosenberg, Associate Professor, History Department, Macalester College Latin America

Chair: Pat Llona

c) C. Patrick Quinlan, Retired Foreign Service Officer; Consultant to State Department on Middle East questions

Chair: Mary Ellen Lundsten

d) Angus McDonald, Senior Consultant for International Education Services, Control Data Far East

Chair: Kathleen Scott

SPEAKERS

BETTY LALL

JOHN LAWYER

CONGRESSMAN JIM LEACH

ADM. HARRY D. TRAIN, II

Friday, October 28

5:45 p.m. Social Hour

6:30 Dinner - POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL

Chair: Barbara Stuhler

Speakers: Frances Farley, Congressional Candidate from Utah, political activist

John Lawyer, Professor of Political Science, Bethel College; International Relations Specialist

Saturday, October 29

9:00 a.m. THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL - LESSONS FROM THE PAST

Chair: Ann Cahn

Speakers: P. Terrence Hopmann, Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota

Betty Goetz Lall, Secretary, Arms Control Association

10:30 Break

10:45 ETHICAL AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARMS RACE

Chair: Lois Rand

Speakers: Ruth Adams, Editor, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Harold Ditmanson, Chairman, Department of Religion, St. Olaf College

Adm. Harry D. Train, II, USN (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, NATO

Saturday, October 29

12:30 p.m. Lunch - NATIONAL SECURITY - 1983 AND BEYOND

Chair: Geri Joseph

Speaker: Robert E. Hunter, Director of European Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University

Wrap-up: Gladys Brooks

Conference Exit Visa:

You will find an evaluation sheet in your conference folder. We would appreciate your evaluation for future planning. Please complete and turn yours in at the registration desk.

Conference Steering Committee

Gladys Brooks*
Chair, Advisory Board,
World Affairs Center
U of M

Geri Joseph
Former Ambassador
to the Netherlands

Lois Rand
Chair, Board of
The Ebenezer Society

Kathleen Scott
Community Volunteer

Emily Anne Staples
Chair, Government
Relations Committee
United Way of
Greater Minneapolis

Barbara Stuhler*
Associate Dean,
Continuing Education
and Extension, U of M

Jean Tews
President, League of
Women Voters of
Minnesota

*Conference Co-Chair

This conference is made possible by contributions to the League of Women Voters Education Fund.

Primary support has been provided by the Honeywell Foundation with additional support from the Patrick and Aimee Butler Family Foundation, the Somerset Foundation, The Committee for National Security and from contributions by individuals.

Jim Leach -

Republican member of Congress from 1st Dist of Iowa. first elected in 1976

received his BA (cum laude) from Princeton in Political Science -

Masters Degree from School of Advanced International Studies ~~from~~ Johns Hopkins University in Soviet Politics.

He also ~~did~~ was a research student in Economics and Soviet Politics - London School of Economics

Former Foreign Service Officer

Member of Committees —

Deba vice chair of Peace Links
Peace Links

sharing very provocative observations

Vincent Kern - Deputy Dir. African Region
Office of Intl Sec. Affairs in the
Pentagon -

BS Albright - Reading PA
MS. Geo Washington - Intl Politics concentration
in African Studies
In Pentagon as a civilian since 1977
ISA since 1979 - until July 1982
director of the office of Policy analysis on
Near East, Africa, and S & Asia

live in Falls Church - 2 children
Jazz fan

Certainly makes us
proud virtuous!

Program changes have been made since the invitation was printed. Below is the revised program including confirmed speakers.

Friday

9:15 am ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Mark Garrison, Brown University, former Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow.

11:00 Workshops: PERCEPTIONS & EXPERIENCES OF SOVIET SOCIETY
William George, Executive Vice President, Honeywell's Control Systems Businesses.
Nicholas P. Hayes, Executive Director, Associated Colleges of the Twin Cities; former visiting professor, Moscow U.
Charles Ritchie, Director of Admissions, Instructor of Russian, Blake School.

12:15 pm ECONOMIC FACTORS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Ellen Frost, Director of Government Programs, Westinghouse; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

2:00 THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Rep. Jim Leach, (R) Iowa, Foreign Affairs Committee.
Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

3:45 Workshops: THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS
Barbara Knudson, Professor, Quigley Center of International Studies, University of Minnesota.
Emily Rosenberg, Associate Professor, History Department, Macalester College.
C. Patrick Quinlan, Retired Foreign Service Officer; Consultant to State Department on Middle East questions.
Angus McDonald, Senior Consultant for International Education Services, Control Data.

6:30 POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL
Frances Farley, Congressional Candidate from Utah; political activist.

Saturday

9:00 am THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL - LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Terrence Hopmann, Professor, Political Science, University of Minnesota.
Betty Goetz Lall, Secretary, Arms Control Association.

10:45 ETHICAL & MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARMS RACE
Ruth Adams, Editor, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
Harold Ditmanson, Chairman, Department of Religion, St. Olaf College.
Adm. Harry D. Train, II, USN (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, NATO.

Noon NATIONAL SECURITY - 1983 AND BEYOND
Robert E. Hunter, Director of European Studies, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University.

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Adm. Harry D. Train, II, USN (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, NATO.

Noon NATIONAL SECURITY - 1983 AND BEYOND
Robert E. Hunter, Director of European Studies, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University.

Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference on National Security

League of Women Voters of Minnesota, 555 Wabasha, St. Paul, MN 55102 (612) 224-5445

October 12, 1983

CONTACT: Karen Gochberg, 224-5445

COMING EVENT - Fact Sheet

WHAT: Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference on National Security (one of several across the nation, patterned after a similar conference in Washington, D.C. in June, 1983, sponsored by the Committee for National Security).

WHEN: October 28-29, 1983 (Friday morning through Saturday noon)

WHERE: L'hotel Sofitel, Bloomington, MN

WHY: ...To provide women leaders with balanced information and varied views on the political, economic, ethical and military aspects of issues relating to our country's national security and its relations with other countries.

...To stimulate, through broadened knowledge, intellegent participation by women in these critical areas of public policy.

FUNDING: Primary support to the League of Women Voters Education Fund for this Conference from Honeywell Foundation; other support from Patrick and Aimee Butler Family Foundation, Somerset Foundation and contributions by individuals.

FEATURED TOPICS AND SPEAKERS:

Views of U.S.-Soviet Relations

Mark Garrison - Brown University, former Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow

Economic Factors of International Security

Ellen Frost - Director of Government Programs, Westinghouse; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Third World Problems and International Security

Rep. Jim Leach, (R) Iowa - Foreign Affairs Committee

Noel C. Koch - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

more

This conference is made possible by contributions to the League of Women Voters Education Fund

Political Perspectives of Arms Control

Frances Farley - Congressional Candidate from Utah, political activist

The Future of Arms Control - Lessons from the Past

Terrence Hopmann - Professor, Political Science, University of Minnesota

Betty Goetz Lall - Secretary, Arms Control Association

Ethical and Moral Inplications of the Arms Race

Ruth Adams - Editor, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Adm. Harry Train, II, USN (Ret.) - Former Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Forces (NATO)

Dr. Harold Ditmanson - Chairman, Department of Religion, St. Olaf College

National Security - 1983 and Beyond

Robert E. Hunter - Director of European Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University

-plus workshops featuring specialists on various topics.

REGISTRATION:

Pre-registration is required. Fee for entire conference, including meals, is $50.

For information or to register, call Karen Gochberg, Project Director, League of Women Voters of Minnesota at 224-5445.

# # #

Sept. 29-30

Talk to Tom Colwell re invitations – 1200

Project: Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference on National Security

Purpose: To involve women more fully in the discussion and decision-making process in a critical area of public policy from which they have largely been excluded. Traditionally, women have been opposed to violence, a tradition affirmed by public opinion polls measuring gender differences on such issues as gun control and military spending. Consequently, they have tended either to withdraw from discussions or to take a passionate position for peace that overlooks or oversimplifies the requirements for national security. Women have also been excluded because they suffer from "defense anxiety," a sense that they are not competent to make judgments regarding such matters as weapons systems and deterrence. As a matter of fact, these so-called "technical" considerations are no more complex than the elements of health care or environmental safety or quality education - issues which women have not been hesitant to address.

The proposed Upper Midwest Leadership Conference on National Security is intended to be a confidence-building educational program. It is designed to introduce women to the basics of current national security issues and remove the mystery from defense policies. If it succeeds in its objectives, the Conference will close with women able to speak the language of national security, able to understand concepts relating to defense and arms control, eager to learn more, and ready to join the national debate.

To this end, the Conference will: 1) provide balanced presentations of information and analyses of current national security policy; 2) examine alternatives to that policy, and 3) encourage individuals and representatives of organizations attending the Conference to return to their businesses, pro-

fessions and communities well-informed and well-equipped to participate (and even help organize) the continuing discussion and debate about national security.

Participants: Women from Minnesota will host the Conference to which women from North and South Dakota, Iowa and Wisconsin will also be invited. They will be business and professional women and volunteer leaders in their communities.

Time and Place: Thursday and Friday, September 29 & 30, Thunderbird Motel, Bloomington, MN

Organizers: The two women who took the initiative in proposing such a conference will serve as co-chairs. They are:

Gladys Brooks, Chair
Advisory Board
World Affairs Center
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455

Barbara Stuhler, Associate Dean
Continuing Education and Extension
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455

Committee Chairs

Geri Joseph, Program

Lois Rand, Promotion & Public Relations

Kathleen Scott, Arrangements

, Fund Raising

The two co-chairs together with the committee chairs constitute the Steering Committee. (Members of the other committees are listed in Appendix A.)

Evidence of Commitment:

On April 7, 1983, 30 women responded to an invitation from Gladys Brooks and Barbara Stuhler to attend a meeting for the purpose of discussing the organization of a nonpartisan conference on national security. (Appendix B lists those in attendance and those who were unable to attend but expressed interest. There were only nine who did not respond but some of those were out of town and later expressed support for the idea.) At the meeting itself, Anne Cahn, Director of the Committee for National Security, which sponsored the National Women's Leadership Conference in Washington, D.C. in the summer of 1982 spoke. Those attending the April 7 meeting at the Woman's Club in Minneapolis were enthusiastic about the prospect of a similar Conference for women in the Upper Midwest. We took their enthusiasm as a mandate to proceed. The fact that 30 women volunteered their service in committee assignments is further testament to their commitment.

250-396

Program: The speakers are not yet confirmed but the program will include these subjects and these possible speakers:

Bob Schmitt
East-West accord

U.S.-Soviet Relations

George Kennan or Thomas Watson —

Malcolm Toon

(all former ambassadors to the Soviet Union)

Day 1

The Military Budget — Economics

Alice Rivlin or Gordon Adams - Ellen Frost

Ethical and Moral Implications of the Arms Race

Archbishop John Roach — Priscilla Buk

David Preus

(someone from Jewish community)

National Security 1983 and Beyond — Evening

Robert McNamara or McGeorge Bundy

Richard Pipes — Dimitri Simis

Day 2

Arms Control: Two Viewpoints

Kenneth Adelman

Betty Goetz Lall

National Security and Third World Problems

Congressman Jim Leach (R. Ia.) - She is Jim Leach's niece

Department of Defense speaker — Richard Armitage asst. Secy. Def. 3rd World

The format will be a mix of presentations, reactor panels and workshops so that a variety of views can be articulated and so that the participants can be involved in the discussions.

Speakers: We intend to invite speakers who will bring a variety of perspectives to these issues. The Committee for National Security will assist us in securing speakers of national reputation, and we will also involve as speakers or reactors individuals from the Upper Midwest who are well-qualified to speak to the subjects of the Conference.

Fiscal Agent: The League of Women Voters Education Fund is a public educational and charitable trust under 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and contributions to it are tax deducitlbe. The Education Fund will receive the money and allocate it to the League of Women Voters of Minnesota which will manage the funds and staff the Conference.

Appendix A

Name	Activity	Community
1. Gladys Brooks	Chair, Advisory Board World Affairs Center	Minneapolis
2. Lois Cleveland	Community Volunteer	Edina
3. Judy Duffy	International Relations Chair, LWV of MN.	North St. Paul
4. Phyllis France	Community Volunteer	Duluth
5. Dorothea Franzel	U.N. Rally Board	Mound
6. Dr. Phyllis Goldin	Physicians for Social Responsibility	Forest Lake
7. Kathy Gretsch	St. Paul Junior League	St. Paul
8. Jean Heilman	Assistant Attorney General	St. Paul
9. Anne Heegard	Hoffman and Heegard Assoc.	Minnetonka
10. Hella Mears Hueg	Community Volunteer	St. Paul
11. Geri Joseph	Journalist Former Ambassador to the Netherlands	Minneapolis
12. Jeanne Justus	President, UNA-Minnesota	Minneapolis
13. Anita Kunin	Coordinator, Minnesota Women's Campaign Fund	Minneapolis
14. Mary LeTourneau	Community Volunteer/ Businesswoman	Crystal
15. Perrin Lilly	Community Volunteer	St. Paul
16. Pat Llona	Former International Relations Chair LWV of MN.	Edina
17. Mary Ellen Lundsten	Professor Augsburg College	Minneapolis
18. Betty Ann Malcolm	President Business & Professional Women	Inver Grove Heights
19. Martha Morgan	Community Volunteer	St. Paul
20. Frances Naftalin	Chair, Library Board	Minneapolis
21. Joanne Padden	President Minneapolis AAUW	Edina

22. Frances Paulu	Executive Director Minnesota International Center	Minneapolis
23. Martha Platt	Community Volunteer	Minneapolis
24. Kathleen C. Ridder	Chair, Senator Durenberger's Women's Network	St. Paul
25. Sue Rockne	Democratic National Committee	Zumbrota
26. Kathleen Scott	Community Volunteer	St. Paul
27. Barbara Stuhler	Associate Dean, U of M Continuing Education and Extension	Minneapolis
28. Mary Vaughan	Community Volunteer	Minneapolis
29. Jean M. West	Business Owner/ Community Volunteer	St. Paul
30. Marcia Yugend	Anti-Defamation League	Minneapolis
31. Martha Alworth	Community Volunteer	Duluth
32. Martha Cammack	Community Volunteer	St. Paul
33. Sage Cowles	Community Volunteer	Minneapolis
34. Alida Dayton	Community Volunteer	Minneapolis
35. Arvonne Fraser	Senior Fellow HHH Institute, U of M	Minneapolis
36. Martha Head	Community Volunteer	Minneapolis
37. Mildred Joel	Formerly at Augsburg College	Minneapolis
38. Reatha Clark King	President Metropolitan State University	St. Paul
39. Nancy Latimer	Consultant	St. Paul
40. Anne LeDell-Hong	Nurse Practitioner	Minneapolis
41. Sister Merle Nolde		St. Cloud
42. Norma Noonan	Professor Augsburg College	Bloomington
43. Lois Rand	Community Volunteer	Minneapolis
44. Emily Anne Staples	Consultant/Community Volunteer	Plymouth

45. Mary Van Evera	Community Volunteer	Duluth
46. Marion Watson	Manager, KUOM	St. Paul

Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference
on National Security

Project Budget

Expenses:

Honoraria and expenses (speakers, panelists, discussion leaders)		$12,000
Facilities Rooms, meal arrangements at Thunderbird Motel		9,000
Invitations and program Printing, mailing @ 1st class to target group of 2,000		3,000
Materials for participants Purchase and copying costs		1,400
Scholarships for out-of-state participants (20 @ $100)		2,000
Staff		
Project Director (part-time for 3 months)	$2,200	
Support staff (secretarial/clerical)	1,200	
Administrative costs		3,670
Supplies/phone/stationery	500	
Office costs, LWVMN	2,000	
Education Fund 5% fee (5% x 23,500)	1,170	
TOTAL		$34,470

Income:

Registration Fees 200 @ $45	9,000
Foundation Grants Proposals will be submitted to: Northwest Area Foundation The Bush Foundation General Mills Foundation Patrick & Aimee Butler Family Foundation General Service Foundation	
TOTAL	$34,470

Fiscal Agent: by the
League of Women Voters Education Fund
League of Women Voters of Minnesota
555 Wabasha, St. Paul, Minnesota 55102
(612) 224-5445

LAW OFFICES

ARENT, FOX, KINTNER, PLOTKIN & KAHN

1100 FEDERAL BAR BUILDING

1815 H STREET, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

CABLE ARFOX

202 347-8500

December 3, 1970

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The League of Women Voters Education Fund is an organization exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. On April 24, 1970, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that the Education Fund qualifies under Section 509(a)(1) and is, therefore, not subject to the provisions governing private foundations. Further, on September 8, 1970, the Education Fund filed Form 4653 with the Internal Revenue Service seeking supplemental confirmation that it is not subject to the provisions relating to private foundations. On November 9, 1970, Internal Revenue formally notified the Education Fund that it had been classified as an organization that is not a private foundation. Accordingly, contributions to the Education Fund will be treated as contributions to a publicly supported charity.

Sincerely,

Albert E. Arent

Albert E. Arent, Counsel
League of Women Voters
Education Fund

PROJECT REQUEST FORM

TO: LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS EDUCATION FUND
1730 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Date May 18, 1983

FROM: Name Sally Sawyer, Executive Director

League of Women Voters of Minnesota

Address 555 Wabasha, Suite 212

St. Paul, Minnesota 55102 (612) 224-5445

Proposed project: "Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference on National Security," (Project # 83-2), to be held Thursday and Friday, September 29 & 30, 1983, at the Thunderbird Motel in Bloomington, MN. Invited participants will be women from Minnesota, North and South Dakota, Iowa and Wisconsin who are business and professional women and volunteer leaders in their communities. The purpose of the conference is to involve women more fully in the discussion and decision-making process in national security issues, a critical area of public policy from which they have largely been excluded.

Details of the project to be considered, including plans for execution:
The event organizers are: Barbara Stuhler, Associate Dean of Continuing Education and Extension, University of Minnesota (LWV-St. Paul member) and Gladys Brooks, Chair of the Advisory Board of the World Affairs Center at the Univ. of MN (LWV Minneapolis member). On April 7, 1983, 30 women responded to their invitation to discuss a possible conference. That enthusiastic commitment provided the impetus for planning the event. Sixteen of the 45 women either attending or expressing an interest in the April 7 discussion (list enclosed) are LWV members. On April 12, 1983, the LWVMN Board of Directors voted to co-sponsor the event. On May 16, LWVMN was asked to be the fiscal agent for the conference through the LWV Education Fund.

Conference objectives are: 1) provide balanced presentations of information and analyses of current national security policy; 2) examine alternatives to that policy, and 3) encourage individuals and representatives of organizations attending the Conference to return to their communities well-informed and well-equipped to participate in continuing discussion and debate about national security. Speakers are being chosen to bring a variety of perspectives to the issues; conference format will include opportunities for participant discussion. Three of the ten-member program committee are LWV members (two current or past LWVMN Board) to ensure nonpartisan/educational program content. As fiscal agent, LWVMN will provide project director, support staff and office space for project coordination.

Donors:
Project proposals will be submitted to: Northwest Area Foundation, The Bush Foundation, General Mills Foundation, and Patrick & Aimee Butler Family Foundation.

Proposed budget for the use of the grant (including 5% overhead due Education Fund):

Income (detailed budget attached)	
Registration fees	$ 7,500
Foundation grants	24,670
Total	32,170

Expenditures	
Speakers honoraria & expenses	$12,000
Facilities	6,700
Invitations/program	3,000
Materials for participants	1,400
Scholarships	2,000
Staff	3,400
Administrative costs (includes Ed Fund fee)	3,670
Total	$32,170

Distribution plans for printed material (if such material is part of the project):

There are currently no plans for a post-conference report. The invitations, programs, participant materials and publicity will acknowledge that the conference is made possible by contributions to the League of Women Voters Education Fund.

Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference
on National Security

Project Budget

Expenses:

Speakers honoraria and expenses		$12,000
Facilities		
rooms, meals arrangements at Thunderbird Motel		6,700
Invitations and program		3,000
printing, mailing @ 1st class to target group of 2,000		
Materials for participants		1,400
Purchase and copying costs		
Scholarships for out-of-state participants		2,000
(20 @ $100)		
Staff		3,400
Project Director (part-time for 3 months)	$2,200	
Support staff (secretarial/clerical)	1,200	
Administrative costs		3,670
supplies/phone/stationery	500	
Office costs, LWVMN	2,000	
Education Fund 5% fee (5% X 23,500)	1,170	
TOTAL		$32,170

Income:

Registration Fees	
250 @ $30	7,500
Foundation Grants	24,670
Proposals will be submitted to:	
Northwest Area Foundation	
The Bush Foundation	
General Mills Foundation	
Patrick & Aimee Butler Family Foundation	
TOTAL	$32,170

Fiscal Agent: League of Women Voters Education Fund
by the League of Women Voters of Minnesota
555 Wabasha, St. Paul, Minnesota 55102
(612)224-5445

5/16/83

UPPER MIDWEST WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Budget Report November 11, 1983

Expenses:

Speakers	Honoraria	$3,400.00	
	Travel expenses	450.00	3850.00
Facilities	Thunderbird	750.00	
	Sofitel meals	5,615.72	
	Guest rooms	436.00	6801.72
Invitations and Program			
	Invitations	639.76	
	Stamps	370.00	1009.76
Travel Scholarships			
	(7)	652.00	652.00
Registration Scholarships			
	(1)*	25.00	25.00
*(7 deducted, but not reimbursed = $100.)			
Materials for Participants			
	LWV Publications	355.62	
	Zerox	64.21	
	Folders	60.00	479.83
Staff			
	Project Director	2.200.00	
	Support Staff	1.213.95	3413.95
Administrative Costs			
	Stationery	103.75	
	Phone	107.52	
	Overhead	1,904.13	
	Postage	88.65	
	Supplies	78.25	
	Xerox	102.77	
	Education Fund based on $17,050.00	852.00	3237.57
Volunteers		15.00	15.00
			$19484.83 TOTAL

Income:

Registration Fees			
	128 @ $50, 6 @ $40, 8 @ $25, 17 @ $20	7,230.00	
Grants & Contributions		17,050.00	$24280.00 TOTAL
			-19484.83
			$ 4795.17

Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference on National Security

October 28-29, 1983

CONFERENCE ATTENDANCE AND FEES PAID

Types of Payments	# of Paid Participants	# of Paid No-Shows	Total Paid Registrants	Total Fees Collected	Participant Fees	No-Show Fees
$50	122	6	*159	$7230.00	$6100.00	$300.00
40	5	1			200.00	40.00
25 (FC)**	3				75.00	
25 (1 day)**	5				125.00	
20	14	3			280.00	60.00
Total	149*	10			$6805.00	$400.00***
				(contribution)	25.00	
					$6830.00	

L'hotel Sofitel	
Meals & Breaks	$5615.72
Lodging Rooms	436.00
Total Bill	$6051.72

* Plus those who shared a registration.

** (FC) = Full Conference; scholarships: FC subsidized $25 each = $75
1 day " $15 " = 75
$150 total scholarships

*** 3 No-Shows have requested a refund.

November 9, 1983

11/11/83

Bills Outstanding:

Skyway Printing (program covers & photo processing)	$ 140.00	?
Tschida Printing (nametags & labels)	69.00	
Speaker Expenses	2000.00	?
Unpaid Honoraria	1800.00	
	$ 4009.00	

Speaker Costs:	Honoraria	$ 5200.00	
	Expenses Paid	450.00	
	Hotel Rooms	325.00	
	Expenses owed	2000.00	?
	Conference Meals	211.38	
		8186.38	Total (?)

Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference on National Security

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Portland, Maine next week
Montana -
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Simeha

Nov. issue
Science '83 - Submarines

Dubrow -

Russians don't understand what freedom means. 7% of pop. runs the country. Find it difficult to understand our concern over human rights. They don't want direct confrontation with U.S. War for national liberation - use surrogates - front groups. Chili - El Salvador.

Garrison -

Can't expect politician to be realistic and consistant unless public is. Nixon + Kissinger were realistic but tended to treat Russians like Americans - just not so. Americans not mature enough to understand. Carter - public lather rather than behind scenes work. We have been unable to keep priorities straight + National interest has suffered. Major point should have been SALT.

(1) Soviet military power, (2) expansion + (3) morality

(1) Soviets remember well the lessons of WW II. Neither US or USSR understand really the power of nuclear weapons - equality of weapons is terribly impt. for Soviets

(2) on or near Soviet borders - tied up with self image as a super power.

(3) Must be dealt with - but not at risk of war. Can't rely only on simplistic belief that the only way to keep the peace is to prepare for war.

need to pursue economic and political means. Must respect each others right to exist. We need tolerance + flexibility.

American policy is something we can deal with. Solid consensus needed. If our motives are obscure we risk confrontation. Need to demonstrate rationality.

Nick Hayes:
Read Washingtons second farewell address
Broadcast journalism Shapes our perceptions
Our morally superior position -
Culturally we can build important ties.
Purges - ethnic minorities - jewish - intellectuals
1937-39 - 46

More Recently - More selective.
Brutal mass repression is gone.
Etno - cultural bias toward Eqrician
Rhetoric is insulting to Russians

Concern over our unreliability as a trading partner.
If we want to make an impact send them more and more goods.
Edward Hulbag - A grand Design
Prof Pipes - 18th Cent. Russian History
- Sam Rafkin Danish journalist to watch - PBS
George Kenon + Malcolm Toon - 2 fine ambassadors
General cultural preparation for service in Moscow is not great

Ellen Frost –

Don't try to redefine the dialogue
Don't get sidetracked on other issues
Watch out for groups.
Join them with clout
Assume good will & competence on the
part of bureaucrats – learn to talk
policy language

Bob Russell IMF for Preservation

Deputy Director - African Regional Office

Vine Kerr –

Noel Koch's speech

security assistance – large part goes as loans. FMS sales credits

Grants – Economic Support Fund administered by AID. – no military aid.

International Military Education & Training –

Military Assistance Funds

In Africa today 40,000 Soviets in Africa – 150 U.S.

Nations neither leaning toward Soviet Union or U.S. – fall through the cracks.

Taylor security assistance –

Soviets build dependency – thus requiring maintenance personnel in the country.

obsolete – obsolescence

Jim Leach

7 nuclear powers

Challenge – how to learn w/o experiencing –

Pope in Austria – move from post war to pre war mentality.

Mischevious notion – window of vulnerability

Leadership in arms control has come from those who are not elected.

Comprehensive arms control - now.

Some current thinking - small scale nuclear weapons are moral.

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are all possible. Biological are the most "scary."

UN - critical for arms control. bi lateral but even more multi-lateral.

Conflict resolution

International problem solving -

Peace corps. down from 15,000 to 5,000.

Retarding policies that work.

Us policeman to the world - potential to be held hostage

Diane

Barbara Knudsen
In Africa - agricultural productivity is dropping
Growth rate increasing—
disaffected turn to leftest governments
Somalia - secessionist forces internally - Islamic
Kenya - 9,000,000 in 1967
18,000,000 in 1983
35,000,000 by 2000
Tremendous environmental degradation
Soviets recruit in Africa for graduate programs
(but when they get to USSR are ghettoized?)
Practice of Islam growing in Kenya.

Mike and Nan

John Sawyer

What level of military strength do we need? Ballistic capability?
Soviets building defenses at 4-5% to 1 year.
Strategic triad - by 1980's 20-30 yrs old.
Need to upgrade conventional forces as well as strategic forces. US military manpower at lowest strength since 1950. Last major military US success was Inchon landing in 1950. Need stronger military to underlay diplomacy. Should discuss disarmament but back up with strength.

USSR has relied on numbers. US has relied on sophistication of weapons.

Frances Farley —
Must face the danger
Must learn about weapons to be effective at very level.

Chase Peterson - pres of U. of Utah
Greta Peterson is his wife - Esther Peterson's niece.
Can't talk to each other. Need to make people understand emotionally and intellectually.

(Bell green's dist)

Betty Goetz Hall (former Arms Control Agency)

Co-founder of nuclear weapons freeze movement people (citizens) must lead the government.

President is a lay person. must rely on technical advice - especially Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Chiefs (as a group) have veto power over any arms control proposal

① Verification capability - by seismic tests

② Need for third parties - mediators - especially to ask necessary questions

③ Proliferation of agencies which are involved in decisions

④ Decision by experts made that 200-500 nuclear warheads would knock out 50% of pop and 2/3 land in Soviet Union - now 10,000 stockpiled by US

⑤ Soviets want to negotiate but they are tough negotiators. Relationship between arms control and international security.

Jerry Hopmann -

20th Anniversary of first arms control agreement with Soviet Union

Lessons to be learned.

① Stabilize mutual deterrent - identify provisions which will stabilize situation We tried to move to far to fast in the beginning

There is a need to work step by step toward a long term process.

Need to lead of production of destabilizing weapons in the long run.

Must avoid unilateral advantages - which we seem not to be doing at the moment. We are trying to constrain Soviet Union in areas in which they've been most successful. Salt I made some strides.

② Controlling arms race per se is more important than numbers. Technology is the critical issue. Precise numbers are not so significant. US debate in recent years has concentrated on quantity. Monitoring is possible which answers verification concern.

③ Ban to flight testing missiles is one important possible step. Another area - anti submarine warfare.

④ Anti satellite warfare.

If we want to control qualitative arms race why not do so prior to testing. Need for control prior to deployment.

New missile guidance systems

Arms control is part of the whole political process. It is more likely to be successful

in a political climate of reduced tension. We are now in a vicious cycle - fear - tension - Political leaders are endangering process of reduction of tension

Someone must take initiative — ~~Expectations~~ Expectations for detente were too high but that does not mean that the idea was faulty.

California has about 1/4 to 1/5 of all contracts for research & development in defense.

Robert Scheer - With Enough Shovels

Nuclear Freeze - aimed at stopping qualitative race.

Uncertainty deters

Ban on nuclear weapons testing. funds for

Ruth Adams -

For 45 yrs our defense policy has violated ethics + morality of our democracy
Parity + superiority have no meaning.
Weinberger called for 17.7% increase in arms spending for next budget just last week.
Need to think of humanity as a whole -
Major powers have tremendously increased arming of the Third World.
Flexible Respose - strategy for fighting a war.
Bankruptcy of our national thinking about nuclear weapons - must break deadlock.
Must change perceptions of the Soviet Union - we can only be as secure as they are.
Lewis Thompson Late Night Thoughts on Listening to Mahlers Ninth Symphony.

Harold Ditmanson

security - to be without care.
security + justice are inseparable. -
Preventing world hunger - this is critical.
We have been conditioned to equate security with arms race. 9 mil people killed in conventional war since 1945. Need for sustained public debate.

Just War - plato Cicero (limited ends - limited gains)
theory 1) legitimate authority must declare war.
Conditions + settlement published

2) cause must be just (self defense)
3) must be last resort
4) must be reasonable hope of success.
5) Due regard for proportionality of means to ends.
6) Due regard for principal of discrimination.
7) War must be conducted with the aim of just and lasting peace

Manufacture + use of nuclear weapons is immoral + unjust.
Arms race a threat to the poor of the world.

Harry Train

US Unified Commander. Chain of release for release of sea based nuclear weapons.
US military has no separate life of its own.
Defense objectives for last 15 yrs.
1) To deter attack against US, allies + friends
2) " prevent coercion " " " "
3 to Protect citizens abroad
4) to protect flow of oil
5 To reverse geographic expansion of Soviets abroad

Deterrence = capability X will
Danger of incorrect perceptions

need for mutually advantageous position.
between US and USSR.
We are part of a collective security alliance -
under which security of Western Europe is
second only to security of the United States

Objectives of Military
Force Structure
Modernization
Readiness
Sustainability

Robert Hunter –

Thinking about national security. How do we do it?

Will depend on a strong economy
Education is critical
Health care
A nation at peace with itself – commitment to social justice
More self confidence.

New way to look at issues – foreign policy is for all. Domestic and economic policy are all part of the same equation. Foreign trade has grown from 4% 15 yrs ago to 12%
Food and fuel issues.

Profound shift of power in the world which was irrevocable.

No longer are we a giant among pigmys – now 1st among equals.

We are going to have to share leadership.

We are going to have to give up our pragmatism and we are going to have to do some planning.

US 1½ crises govt. in 10 crisis world.

Concern over continuity in succession of government. Too much specialization in government.

Stop paying the members game
Mutual assured destruction – cornerstone of U.S policy.

We are going to need strong conventional forces. — maybe stronger. 90% of oil passes through Straits of Hormuz —

Military force should only used as a last resort.

Arms control — a support for security rather than an enemy of it. Arms Control + security are complimentary.

How do we think about the Soviet Union. It is an "evil ~~power~~ empire." We have to live in the same world. The American attitude should reflect this. ① Posture like that is not useful In getting rid of nuclear weapons Soviets have been better than U.S

What's needed is consistency and clarity. You don't get arms control in a vacuum. European allies - we don't see nature of the Soviet threat in the same way.

Economics - severe period of protectionism

Successor generation problem. With Europeans. a national security problem

Level of tolerance and of sensibility. must increase.

Central America - Mexico is about to explode. economic aid. Social infrastructure are topics which we must address in central America. Problems for future: Population Poverty Proliferation.

National security issue: Human Rights

We don't use power well. Power can be used well only in support of our core values.

Upper Midwest Women's Leadership Conference on National Security

League of Women Voters of Minnesota, 555 Wabasha, St. Paul, MN 55102 (612) 224-5445

ABOUT OUR SPEAKERS

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* Member and officer, Governing Board of the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology, Nairobi, Kenya, 1971-79
* Adlai Stevenson Award for International Human Understanding, 1978
* Participant, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, 1957-83

HAROLD H. DITMANSON

* Chair and Professor, Department of Religion, College of St. Olaf
* Author of books and articles for theological journals; editor, Lutheran Quarterly journal, 1970-80
* Representative of the American Lutheran Church on the Faith & Order Commission of the World Council of Churches, 1982; visiting professor and guest lecturer; delegate and representative to Lutheran and ecumenical assemblies, conferences, committees and commissions
* Ph.D., Yale University

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* 38 years in the Foreign Service with extended tours in Eastern Europe, Western Europe and Southeast Asia
* American Embassy in Moscow, 1934-38; post-Yalta Conference, 1945; Deputy Chief of Mission with Ambassador (General) Walter Bedell Smith, 1946-48
* U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1957-61
* Writer and lecturer on foreign affairs
* Ph.D., Yale University

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* First woman elected to Utah State Senate in 20 years, 1977, reelected in 1980
* Candidate for U.S. Congress, 1982
* Led campaign against MX missile deployment in Utah
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* Taught Soviet history at the Universities of Texas - El Paso, Northwestern, Massachusetts - Amherst and Minnesota
* Visiting professor at Moscow State University and the Academy of Sciences USSR, 1978-79
* B.A., University of Minnesota (summa com laude), Ph.D. in Russian and Soviet history, University of Chicago

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* Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota; Adjunct Professor, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota
* Fulbright-Hays Senior Lecturer in Belgium, 1982-83 (conducted research on security and arms control in Europe)
* Faculty, Salzburg Seminar, session on European-American Relations, Salzburg, Austria, February 12-20, 1983
* Author of many articles on arms control initiatives and negotiations
* Ph.D., Stanford University

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* Director of European Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University
* Lead consultant to the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (chaired by Henry Kissinger)
* National Security Council staff during the Carter Administration, initially as Director of West European Affairs, subsequently as Director of Middle Eastern Affairs
* Foreign policy adviser to Senator Edward Kennedy; speech writer for Senator Hubert Humphrey
* B.A., Wesleyan University; Ph.D., London School of Economics

BARBARA KNUDSON

* Professor of International Studies and Director of Women and International Development Research and Information Center, University of Minnesota
* Extended experience in Kenya, Africa
* Current research interest - different models of governmental structure in dealing with women's issues
* Ph.D. in Sociology, University of Minnesota

BETTY GOETZ LALL

* Director of the New York City Urban Affairs Program at the Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations
* Secretary, Arms Control Association
* Candidate for U.S. Congress (15th District, New York City's East Side), 1980
* Formerly, Staff Director of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey's Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament (first woman to serve as director of a Senate Subcommittee); senior official, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and arms control negotiator in the Kennedy Administration
* First Assistant Director, World Affairs Center, University of Minnesota
* B.A., University of Minnesota (magna cum laude); Ph.D., University of Minnesota

JOHN E. LAWYER, JR

* Chair and Professor, Department of Political Science, Bethel College
* Civilian policy analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
* Served eight years as an active duty Air Force Officer
* Graduate of Harvard College, M.P.A., John F. Kennedy School of Government (active in Defense Studies Program under Dr. Henry Kissinger), Ph.D., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Anne K

JIM LEACH

* Republican Congressman, First District of Iowa, 1976-present
* Member, Committee on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs and Committee on Foreign Affairs; Chair, Arms Control & Foreign Policy Caucus; Secretary, Congressional Arts Caucus; Chair, Ripon Society
* Former Foreign Service Officer, Department of State and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
* Research student in Economics and Soviet Politics, London School of Economics
* M.A., Soviet Politics, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; B.A. (cum laude), Political Science, Princeton University
* President of Flamegas Companies and Chairman of the Board, Adel Wholesalers, 1973-76

ANGUS MC DONALD

* Senior Consultant for International Education Services, Control Data, with special responsibilities for the Far East and Europe
* Served as a faculty member at the University of Minnesota, Stanford University, and for four years in Japan
* Edited AMPO, a contemporary affairs magazine in Japan
* Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley in Modern Chinese History; President, Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars

C. PATRICK QUINLAN

* Retired Foreign Service Officer, 1950-80, including five assignments to Middle East countries as principal or political officer
* Public Affairs Officer for Near East Affairs, Department of State; Middle East Adviser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations
* Born in Canby, Minnesota - currently a resident of Edina. While a student at the University of Minnesota, he served as a student volunteer on Mayor Hubert Humphrey's pioneering human relations survey of Minnesota
* B.A., International Relations, University of Minnesota (cum laude), B.S. in Foreign Service, Georgetown University

CHARLES RITCHIE

* Teacher of Russian at the Blake Schools
* Dean of the Russian Village at the Concordia International Language Villages
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* Associate Professor of History, Macalester College
* Author of numerous articles on U.S.-Latin American relations; teaches history of U.S. foreign relations
* Ph.D., State University of New York, Stoney Brook

HARRY D. TRAIN, II

* Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired) - 33 years of service
* Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Command and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
* Served three times as the United States Incidents at Sea Delegation to the Soviet Union and in other top-level staff assignments
* A 1949 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis and attended the Navel Postgraduate School in Monterey
* Recipient of awards and medals from several foreign governments and from the United States including the U.S. Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Navy Distinguished Service Medal with three gold stars, the Navy Legion of Merit with three gold stars and the Navy Meritorious Service Medal

Emily Anne

VINCENT D. KERN, Acting Deputy Director for African Affairs, Special Assistant for African & Inter-regional Policy, Department of Defense.

February '79 - June "82 he was Director of Policy Analysis, Dept. of Defense and served as Program Analyst.

BA 1969, Albright College, Reading PA - Political Science major with a History minor. Graduated cum laude.

Masters - George Washington University in International Politics with concentration in African Studies

~~Master of Arts equivalency 1974, Doctoral candidaTE.~~

~~Military: 1969-71~~

~~Publications: (Political Section) Revised the edition of the "Area Handbook for the Ivory Coast"~~

~~Professional Association: African Studies Association~~

He has served in the Pentagon as a civilian since 1977

Preceding his current assignment he was Director of an office of Policy Analysis for the Near East, Africa and S.E. Asia.

Lives in Falls Church, Va with family including 2 children and is a Jazz Fan

Upper Midwest
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S.T.A.R.T.
Strategic Arms Recognition Test

This quiz (answers on the back page) was prepared by the Committee for National Security. Take it and test your knowledge.

1. The atomic bomb dropped on Heroshima had an explosive power equivalent to:

   a) 5 thousand tons of TNT
   b) 15 thousand tone of TNT
   c) 1 ton of TNT
   d) 100 tons of TNT

2. The U.S. nuclear arsenal now contains weapons with a total explosive power equivalent to:

   a) 200,000 Hiroshima bombs
   b) the starting team on the Los Angeles Lakers
   c) 50 Hiroshima bombs
   d) 75,000 Hiroshima bombs

3. Counterforce capability is _____.

   a) the ability to push one's way off the subway when everyone else is trying to get on
   b) the guidance package on a ballistic missile that seeks out enemy targets
   c) the ability to counter effectively the military forces of a potential adversary
   d) something the Soviet Union has and the United States wants

4. The triad is _____.

   a) an American version of a menage à trois
   b) the three versions of the cruise missile now under development
   c) the strategic bombers, land-based missiles, and nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles that make up U.S. strategic nuclear forces
   d) a nuclear power balance between three nations

5. The Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal contains more total explosive power than the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

   a) True
   b) False

6. President Reagan's recent START proposal focuses on:

   a) U.S. and Soviet intermediate range missiles in Europe
   b) heavy bombers and cruise missiles
   c) ballistic missile defense and air defense systems
   d) ballistic missiles and warheads

7. "ABM" stands for _____.

   a) A Broad Movement (for Peace)
   b) antiballistic missile (a ballistic missile defense system)
   c) air-breathing missile (i.e., cruise missiles)
   d) Anytime But Monday (an old Army expression)

8. The U.S. nuclear arsenal contains a larger number of nuclear warheads than the Soviet Union's:

   a) True
   b) False

9. How many nations presently admit to having exploded a nuclear device?

   a) 3
   b) 10
   c) 6
   d) 12

10. To "deploy" a weapon means _____.

    a) to take it out of service
    b) to put it in place for operational use
    c) to detonate it
    d) to load it aboard a ship

11. The first proposal for a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons came in

    a) 1982 in the Kennedy-Hatfield amendment
    b) 1960 from the Swedish representative to the United Nations
    c) 1977 from Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev
    d) 1946 from Bernard Baruch, U.S. representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission

12. The "Window of Vulnerability" is _____.

    a) any target not protected against blast or other effects of a nuclear explosion
    b) the display case in a bakery when one is on a diet
    c) a situation in which the U.S. feels it cannot depend on its European allies in a political confrontation with the Soviet Union
    d) a time period in which U.S. land-based missiles might be vulnerable to Soviet attack

13. Today, military expenditures world-wide are how many times larger than the total aid provided annually by the industrialized nations to the developing countries?

    a) 5 times
    b) 20-25 times
    c) 10-15 times
    d) 50 times

14. National technical means are _____.

    a) the application of advanced technology to military needs
    b) the methods, such as reconnaissance satellite photography, that a nation uses to monitor compliance with the provisions of an arms control agreement
    c) improved methods of catching speeders on the interstate highways
    d) the methods developed to protect population and industry from the effects of a nuclear attack

ANSWERS:

1. (b)	6. (d)	11. (d)
2. (a)	7. (b)	12. (d)
3. (c)	8. (a)	13. (b)
4. (c)	9. (c)	14. (b)
5. (a)	10. (b)	

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OUR NATIONAL SECURITY: WHY WE SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED

If war is too important to be left to the generals and admirals, as some say, then other issues of national security may be too important to be left entirely in the hands of our elected officials.

Barbara Tuchman, a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, recently said, "Control of nuclear war is too serious a matter to be left any longer to governments. They are not going to get it for us; in fact, they are the obstacle."

Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower once observed that "the true security problem of the day" is "not merely man against man or nation against nation. It is man against war." As long ago as 1956, he wrote in a letter to a friend:

> "When we get to the point, as we one day will, that both sides know that in any outbreak of general hostilities, regardless of the element of surprise, destruction will be both reciprocal and complete, possibly we will have enough sense to meet at the conference table with the understanding that the era of armaments has ended and the human race must conform its actions to this truth or die."

While many in the nation would subscribe to this sentiment, they would not agree on the means to this end. And that, of course, is what the national debate is all about. Barbara Tuchman states that "The ultimate objective must be kept in view: not to control weapons per se but to control war." She describes the process:

> Through existing antiwar organizations, national and local, statewide and town-based, myriad in variety and membership, the public voice must continue to make itself heard. It has been growing in Europe and the United States in the last few years, and it must not now falter or fade.
>
> One lesson has been learned since Vietnam: the executive cannot conduct a war without public support or against the national wish. The course we take rests with the people and their votes.

As citizens, yes, we can exercise our right to vote. But that is just the tip of the iceberg. If citizens are to influence public policy and help shape the opinions of candidates, they must be involved in discussion in the community, attend party caucuses, and - in all kinds of ways - engage in the process of learning, informing and persuading.

It is the purpose of this conference to encourage that discussion of these vital issues and to broaden the participation of citizens in dialogue and action.

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OUR NATIONAL SECURITY: HOW WE CAN BECOME INVOLVED

By Planning a Community Program

1. Before you plan your program, you should assess the level of public understanding and awareness of national security issues in your area. For example, what are the issues that concern the public most? Are some people more interested in these topics than others? What kinds of assumptions do people make that may influence their understanding of the issues? What is their main source of information on these topics? Are some people afraid to express an opinion on these issues for some reason?

2. Given your assessment of the level of public awareness of the issues, what information do you think people should have in order to improve their understanding of the issues? Consider what has been most helpful to you in learning about these topics.

3. As your group begins to design a program, you might want to consider:

   -What audience should be targeted? Should you aim for a general audience or a more selected group? Why? How will you attract that audience?

   -What resources are available? (Expertise, facilities, funding, interested individuals and community organizations, etc.)

   -Would it be more effective to work with other groups? If so, in what way?

When getting down to the format, consider:

-Should the media be involved? As a vehicle for the program itself, as a publicity tool, or as a reporting mechanism?

-Is it desireable to personalize or localize the issue? How could this be done?

-How can you assure that balanced perspectives will be presented or in some way represented in the program?

-Is it desireable to involve public officials to give the program more visibility and impact?

-What kinds of funds are available and how can more be obtained? Are there small foundations, family trusts, state education programs, corporations or businesses that might be interested in giving funds or in-kind services for all or part of the program?

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OUR NATIONAL SECURITY: SOME DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What factors do you think contribute to U.S. national security? Are some more important than others? If so, why? Do we need to worry about what other countries are doing? How serious is the Soviet threat?

2. What do you think should be the U.S. role in the world? Does the U.S. have interests to protect and promote abroad? If so, which are the most important? Can the United States protect and promote its interests alone, or does the U.S. need to develop and maintain alliances? Are some more critical than others?

3. What do you think should be the function of military power in fulfilling those objectives? What is the appropriate role of conventional forces in fulfilling those objectives?

4. There is much discussion as to the amount this country should spend for national defense. How do you feel about this - do you think we are spending too little, too much or about the right amount? What would you change in the way the U.S. spends its defense dollars? What do you think is the current balance of spending between conventional and nuclear weapons? What should be the balance between conventional and nuclear spending? A moment ago you talked about the amount the U.S. should spend on defense. What impact do you think that amount of defense spending would have on the rest of the economy?

5. What is your main source of information about foreign and military affairs? What would you be willing to do to learn more about these issues? And what kinds of information about foreign and military affairs do you think you most need and want to learn?

Excerpted from material from the League of Women Voters Education Fund

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*SPEAKERS AT THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

G. JOURNALS AND PERIODICALS[1]

There are many journals that occasionally publish materials related to arms control and disarmament; however, the following are the most important.

Arms Control Today: published monthly by the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C.; pro-arms control orientation; contains an excellent bibliography in each issue.

Aviation Week and Space Technology: weekly publication; the best available source on technical questions.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: monthly; pro-arms control.

The Defense Monitor: published monthly by the Center for Defense Information; pro-arms control.

Foreign Affairs: published quarterly; one of the most respected journals in the international relations field; contains occasional articles on arms control and SALT.

Foreign Policy: quarterly publication; occasional articles on SALT.

International Security: published quarterly by the Harvard Program for Science and International Affairs; specializes in articles related to arms control issues.

Orbis: quarterly journal with a conservative orientation.

Policy Review: published quarterly by the Heritage Foundation; conservative.

Science: published weekly; contains occasional articles on arms control and disarmament.

Scientific American: published monthly.

Survival: published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

Strategic Review: published quarterly by the United States Strategic Studies Institute; conservative orientation.

World Politics: published quarterly; articles are generally excellent; publishes occasional articles on arms control and SALT.

In addition to the above journals, military journals often contain articles related to arms control. These include: Army, Air Force Magazine, Air University Review, Military Review, Naval War College Review, Parameters and the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

[1]Compiled by Dan Caldwell, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, Providence, R.I.

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