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Minnesota.

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DEFECTIVE PAGE

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INTENTIONAL DUPLICATE EXPOSURE
DEFECTIVE PAGE

DAKOTA CONFLICT OF 1862 MANUSCRIPTS COLLECTIONS
MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY. ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA 55102

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war. None of them were ever mustered into the service of ~~the State~~ ^{the United States}, and where an ^{original} roll of any company is to be found it is a mere accident. I have expended much time and labor in my endeavor to comply with this part of the requirement of the act, but from the very nature of the case my success has been limited.

In the division of space among the various organizations, in which to narrate the history of their military operations, there has been set apart to one forty-five pages in which to write the history of the most important Indian war that ever occurred since the first settlement of the continent, and which extended over ~~two~~ ^{three} years of active operations. I shall be confined therefore to a mere statement of the various military movements embraced in the campaigns of 1862-1863. ^{and 1864} without any opportunity for comment or discussion, and trust that all apparent omissions to do justice to individual prowess, will be attributed not to any

desire on my part to withhold well merited praise from brave men, but to the necessity of close condensation in the presentation of the mere facts. Having personally participated in only a limited part of the war, I am compelled to resort to such records as exist; and the memory of living men for the facts and movements outside of my own command, which I regret to say are far from complete. All the Reports of the Adjutant of Col. Sibley's first command of 1862, together with the order book of that expedition have been lost, and with them the rosters of all the citizen organizations embraced in that command which were quite numerous. Very few of the other citizen companies kept any record of their men, and where I have succeeded in finding a roster of any company, it has been from some newspaper publication of the time, or the memory of some member of the body, ^{aided by some records in the Adjutant's Office.} I am especially indebted to "The Sioux War and Massacres of 1862 & 1863" by L. V. D. Heard published in 1864. The

* And the memoirs of Genl. Henry H. Sibley
recently published by the Rev. Dr. West-

"Minnesota Indian Massacre" by Charles S. Bryant & M. also published in 1864. and the official Report of the Adjutant General of Minnesota Hon. Oscar Malmgren for 1862, found in the Executive Documents of the State that year * for much information; and I refer any reader who may desire more extended and detailed knowledge of the war to those works. Many of the participants in the struggle in various parts of the State, have also supplied me with the facts and dates, which though constituting a poor foundation for history, have been serviceable. With these materials and the space allotted me I enter upon my narration.

The Territory of Minnesota was organized by Act of Congress passed on the Third of March 1849. Its boundaries extended to the Missouri River on the west. Within the portion of the Territory which is now embraced in the State of Minnesota, were, at the time of its organization in 1849, the following Indians. Four bands of Sioux

known as the M'day-wa-kan-tons and Wak-pay-ku-lays and the Si-Si-tons and Wak-pay-tons. Together with a considerable band known as the upper Si-Si-tons who occupied the extreme upper waters of the Minnesota River. The first mentioned four bands possessed all the lands now in Minnesota lying west of the Mississippi River and South of ~~about~~ ^{portion} Big Stone Lake, including some of the northern part of Iowa, these being numbered exclusive of the upper Si-Si-tons about eight thousand men women and children.

There were also in the Territory Chippewas about as follows. At Lake Superior, whose agency was at La Pointe Wisconsin, about sixteen hundred and fifty, on the upper Mississippi about three thousand four hundred and fifty. Pillagers, fifteen hundred & fifty. At Red Lake eleven hundred and thirty. Making a total of seven thousand eight hundred and thirty four.

There were also at Long Prairie west of the Mississippi, now

* The Winnebagoes were removed from Long Prairie in 1854, or 1855, to the Kanabosaucon Reservation, and at the time of the outbreak were on their Reservation about ten miles from Clear Lake Co.

in Todd County, about fifteen hundred Winnebagoes. # On the Missouri both east and west of that River were many wild and warlike bands of Sioux. The Sissetons, the Yanktons, the Cut Heads, the Yanktonais and others. No actual census of these Missouri Indians had ever been taken, but the writer has known from eight to ten thousand of them to attend a payment of the Minnesota Sioux in 1855 and 1856. The Sioux and Chickawas were deadly enemies, the Winnebagoes were at peace with all the other tribes.

In 1851 a treaty was negotiated with the Waik-pa-wa-Kan-tons & Waik-pa-Ku-tays, (which bands we will hereafter call the Lower Sioux) for the purchase of their lands in Minnesota & Iowa. This treaty was made at Mendota, Alexander Ramsey and Luke Lea representing the United States, and in the same year another treaty was negotiated by the same commissioners with the Si-Si-ton and Waik-pa-ton (which bands we

will hereafter call the Upper Sioux) at Traverse des Sioux on the Minnesota River for the purchase of their lands in Minnesota and Iowa. These treaties set apart a Reservation for these Indians composed of a strip of land ten miles wide on each side of the Minnesota River, extending from a short distance south of Fort Ridgely to the source of that River. The Lower Sioux to occupy it as far up as the Yellow Medicine River, and the Upper Sioux the northern part of the reservation. The Senate made amendments to these treaties, and this postponed their final ratification until February 1853. and the ^{Indians} did not take possession of their reservations until 1854-5. and many not until some years later.

Much dissatisfaction was engendered among the Indians by occurrences taking place at the time of the negotiation of these treaties. Whether there was any good ground for it or not, is of very little consequence now, the fact that a

hostile feeling existed is all that is material here. This dissatisfaction was increased rather than diminished by the subsequent administration of the treaties under the General Government. The Indians had sold an empire, and taken in exchange a limited area of country ill adapted to their wants. The provisions of the treaties for periodical payments of money and goods, ^{and other necessities} although carried out with substantial honesty, failed to fulfill the exaggerated expectations of the Indians. All these matters of irritation added fuel to the fire of hostility which always has, and always will exist between a civilized and a savage nation when brought into immediate contact, and especially was this the case where the savages were proud, brave and lordly warriors who looked with supreme contempt upon all civilized methods of obtaining a living, and who felt amply able to defend their rights and revenge their wrongs. Nothing special has been discovered to have taken place to which the outbreak can be immediately attributed.

It was charged to emigrants from the Confederates in the South, but there was no foundation for these surmises. The Rebellion of the Southern States was at its height. Large bodies of troops were being sent out of Minnesota. The payment due in June or July ¹⁸⁶² was much delayed. The Indians were hungry and angry. Threats were made of attacking the government warehouses at the Agency, to which concessions were made, and provisions distributed. Some of the Chiefs were ambitious, and thought it a good opportunity to regain their lost country, and exalt themselves in the eyes of their people. This combination of circumstances operating upon a deep seated hatred of the whites, in my opinion precipitated the outbreak at the time it occurred.

Everything about the Agency up to the 15th day of August 1862 presented the normal appearance of quiet and security. On the 17th of August a small party of Indians appeared at Lake and surrounded

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The first Indian trouble that occurred in Minnesota was at Spirit Lake in the South Western corner of the State. and is known as the Ink-pa-du-ta war. In March 1857 Ink-pa-du-ta's band had a quarrel with some settlers on the Rock River in the North Western part of Iowa. In consequence of this they come north into Minnesota and killed a good many people at Spirit Lake and Springfield on the head waters of the Des Moines. about forty two in all. and carried into captivity four women Mrs. Marble, Mrs. Noble. Mrs. Thatcher and Miss Gardner. The news reached my agency on the 18th of March. Colonel Alexander of the 10th U.S. Infantry commanding at Fort Ridgely sent ^{to Spirit Lake} over Company "A" of that Regiment commanded by Capt. Barnard E. Bee and Lieut. Murray. They found the dead but did not catch the Indians. In May following I succeeded in recovering Mrs. Marble, and in June Miss Gardner. And in July I succeeded with a squad of Regular Soldiers ^{and a party of citizens in company} under the same Lieut. Murray in killing on the Yellow Medicine River one of Ink-pa-du-ta's sons who had been engaged in the massacre. A very full account of this whole affair will be found in "Collections of the Minnesota

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Historical Society Vol. 111. Part 3. of 1880. pages 386. to 407. which was prepared by myself. And also in a book published in 1885 by Miss Gardner, entitled "History of the Spirit Lake Massacre, and Captivity of Miss Abbie Gardner." which was revised by myself and is accurate.

Everything about the Agencies up to the 18th day of August 1862 presented the usual appearance of quiet and security. On the 17th of August a small party of Indians appeared at Acton and murdered

several letters, whether these Indians had previously left the Agency with this intention is doubtful, but on the news ^{of the murdering} reaching the Indians at the upper Agency on the 18th, open hostilities were at once commenced, and the traders and whites were indiscriminately massacred. The missionaries residing a short distance above the Yellow Medicine Agency and their people with a few others were notified in time, by friendly disposed Indians and to the number of about forty made their escape to Hutchinson. Similar events occurred at the Lower Agency on the same day, where nearly all the traders and whites were butchered, and several who got away before the general massacre commenced, were killed before reaching ~~the~~ ^{Ridgely} Fort, fifteen miles below, or other places of safety to which points they were fleeing. Nearly all the buildings at both agencies were destroyed, and such property as was valuable to the Indians was carried off and appropriated by them.

The news of the outbreak reached Fort Ridgely about eight A.M. of the 18th of August, through the arrival of a team from the Lower Agency which brought a citizen badly wounded, but no details could be obtained. The Fort was in command of Capt. John F. Blanch of Company B, 5th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. He had eighty-five men in his company from which he selected forty-five, leaving the balance under Lieut. J. P. Lane to defend the Fort. This little squad under the command of Capt. Marsh, with a full supply of ammunition, provisions, blankets, &c, accompanied by a six mule team left the Fort at 9 A.M. of the 18th of August for the Lower Agency which was distant about thirteen miles up the Minnesota River, and ^{situated} on the other side of the River from the Fort, being reached by a ferry at the Agency. On the march up the command passed nine or ten dead bodies lying in the road, bearing evidence of having been murdered that morning by

one of whom was Dr. Humphrey Surgeon at the agency. The Indians, on reaching the vicinity of the ferry no Indians were in sight except one on the other side of the River who endeavored to induce them to cross. A dense Chaparral bordered the river on the Agency side, and tall grass covered the bottom on the ^{side} where were the troops. Suspicion of the presence of Indians was aroused by the disturbed condition of the water of the river which was muddy and contained floating grass; then a group of ponies was seen; at this point and without a moment's notice Indians in great numbers sprang up on all sides of the troops and opened upon them a deadly fire. About half of the men were killed instantly. Finding themselves surrounded, the men became with the survivors a question of laure qui perd. Several desperate hand to hand encounters occurred with varying results, and the remnant of the command made a point down the River about two miles from the Ferry, Capt. March being of the number. They attempted to cross but the Captain was

* General Custer was led into an ambush of Indians by the agency character, which was prepared for him by many of the same Indians who attacked March, and he lost five companions of the 7th U.S. Cavalry not a man escaping.

drowned in the effort; only from thirteen to fifteen of the command reached the fort alive.

Much criticism has been indulged in as to whether Capt. March when he became convinced of the general outbreak, should not have returned to the Fort. Of course forty five men could do nothing against the five or six hundred warriors that were known to be at and about the Agency. The Duke of Wellington when asked what was the best test of a General, said, "To know when to retreat, and to dare to do it." Capt. March cannot justly be judged by any such criterion. He was not an experienced General. He was a young, brave and enthusiastic soldier. He knew little of Indians. The country knows ^{that} he thought he was doing his duty in advancing. I am confident whether the judgment is intelligent or not, posterity will hold in warmer esteem the memory of Capt. March and his gallant band, than if he had adopted the more prudent course of retracing his steps. **

The facts about the expedition

and ambuscade of Capt. Anash's company I have from John F. Bishop who was one of the escaped members of the company, and was its 5th sergeant, and who took command and brought the remnant of the company into the fort.

Having massacred the people at the agencies, the Indians at once sent out marauding parties in all directions. They covered the country to the North East as far as Glencoe and Hutchinson. To the South East nearly to St. Peter. To the South as far as Spirit Lake which is partly in Dickinson County Iowa - and they carried death and devastation wherever they went - murdering men, women and children quite one thousand. The settlers being accustomed to their friendly visits were taken entirely unawares, and were shot down in detail without an opportunity of defence.

The Agent for the Sioux at this time was Maj. Thomas Galbraith. He had raised a company of men for service in the civil war called the Remond Rangers, and was on his way down to Fort Snelling

to muster them in. He arrived at St. Peter on the evening of the 18th of August, and there received news of the outbreak at the agencies. And taking the muskets of a militia company at St. Peter, he immediately started to return to Fort Ridgely where he arrived on the 19th. On the same day Lieut. J. J. Sheehan of Company C. 5th Minnesota Vol. Infantry with fifty men also arrived. Lieut. Sheehan had previously been at the Yellow Medicine Agency with his company to aid in preserving order among the Indians, and was there when the threats were made to attack the Government ware house. He had returned to Ridgely, and was on his way to Fort Ripley and on the 18th had reached a point near Glencoe about forty two miles from Fort Ridgely. On the evening of the 18th he received this dispatch.

"Head quarters Fort Ridgely
August 18th 1862,

Lieut. Sheehan.

It is absolutely necessary that you should return with your command immediately to this post. The Indians are raising hell at the Lower Agency.

Return as soon as possible

John S. Marsh

Captain Commanding Post

Lieutenant Sheehan was then a young fishman of twenty five years of age with immense physical vigor, and corresponding enthusiasm. He immediately broke camp and arrived at the Fort on the 17th of August having made a forced march of forty two miles in nine and one half hours. He did not arrive a moment too soon. He had with him fifty men, and being the ranking officer after the death of Capt Marsh he took command of the post. The garrison consisted of the remnant of Company D, 5th Reg^t 51 effective men, Company E, 5th Reg^t 50 men. Renville Rangers, 50 men, with several men of other organizations including Sergeant Jones of the Regular Artillery, and quite a number of citizen refugees. Together with C. G. Wyckoff Secretary of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, A. Van Voorhies, J. S. Ramsey, and Major E. C. Hatch a man of much experience with Indians, having long been a trader among them, and once Agent

for the Black foot tribe. This party brought up the money to pay the Indians and remained at the Fort. I will here leave the Fort with its new commander preparing for the coming storm, and relate hereafter how well he met and treated it.

New Ulm, On the night of the 18th, the day of the outbreak, the news reached St. Peter as I have before stated, and turned the Renville Rangers back to the Fort. About four o'clock A. M. of the 19th the news reached me at my home about one mile from St. Peter through Mrs. Henry Behrke of New Ulm who had been dispatched from that town to notify the Settlers in the Valley. Having disposed of my impediments in the way of women and children, I repaired to St. Peter where the situation was fully comprehended. Volunteers were called for, and in a very short time about one hundred and fifty men were enlisted for my duty that might present itself. An organization was formed by the selection of myself as Captain, William B. Dodd as First Lieutenant, and Wolf H. Meyer as Second Lieutenant,

I don't think we had time or inclination to complete the organization by Sergeants and corporals. Immense labor was performed in the next few hours in the way of outfit. Suffice it to say that before noon, two men, Henry A. Swift afterwards Governor of the State, and William G. Hayden had started ~~to the front~~ in a buggy, and by noon, sixteen mounted men under the Sheriff of the County, L. H. Boardman, had started to the front, and by one ^{o'clock} in the afternoon the main body of the company was on its way towards the enemy wherever he might be found. Each man had a gun of some kind, a bottle of powder, a box of caps, and a pocket full of bullets. The advance parties had been sent out to determine whether we should go to Fort Ridgely, or New Ulm which was ^{than the fort,} thirteen miles nearer, but on the other side of the river. We did not see our advance guards on the march, and in fact on judgment it is difficult to say which ^{one} guided us to New Ulm. I should say here, that a large squad from Le Sueur, under Capt. Toniley Sheriff of Le Sueur County accompanied us from St. Peter.

and that at an earlier hour in the day a squad from Swan Lake, some fifteen miles nearer to New Ulm than St. Peter, under Samuel Coffin, had gone to New Ulm to find out what was the matter. Our advance guard reached New Ulm about four or five o'clock P.M. just in time to aid the inhabitants in repelling an attack of about one hundred Indians upon the town. They succeeded in driving the enemy off, several citizens being killed, and about five or six houses in the upper part of the town being fired and destroyed. The main body of my company reached the ferry about two miles below the settled part of the town about eight p.m., having made thirty two miles in seven hours in a dreadful rain storm. The blazing houses in the distance gave a very threatening aspect to the situation, but we crossed the ferry successfully and made the town without accident. The next day we were reinforced by a full company from Blankato under

* Edited by a note from Gov. Swift

Capt. William Bierbauer, of whose company I am happy to say I have a complete roster. Several companies were formed of the citizens of St. Cloud. A full company on the 20th or 21st arrived from South Bend, and various other squads greater or less in numbers, came in during the week before Saturday the 23rd, swelling our effective force to about three hundred men, but nearly all very poorly armed. We threw up barricades, and sent out daily scouting parties through the surrounding country, who succeeded in bringing in many people who were in hiding and would undoubtedly have been lost without this aid. It soon became apparent that to maintain any discipline or order, some one man must be in command of all the forces. The officers of the various organizations assembled and chose a commander. The selection fell to me. A provost guard was at once established, and order inaugurated. The defenses were strengthened, and we awaited results. Capt. William

B. Dood My 1st Lieutenant was made second in command, and S. A. Buell Provost Marshal, chief of staff and general manager; he had been a naval officer and was a good organizer. Capt. S. A. George a young man who had been for a short time in some Eastern Regiment, who joined us at St. Cloud, was made an aid, and proved very efficient in reducing matters to a manageable condition.

Nothing of serious consequence occurred until Saturday morning, when at about 9³⁰ A.M. the Indians came down from Fort Ridgely thirteen miles above us, which post they had been vigorously but ineffectually besieging since the 20th. As I have learned since from educated Half breeds who were among the attacking party, the enemy comprised about six hundred and fifty fighting men, all well armed and many mounted. The assault was well executed, and resulted in driving in our lines, temporarily. We soon rallied however and steadily held the enemy off. The Indians soon

I cannot however omit the entire event of the day. At about two P.M. a great confusion was raging on both sides of the main street in the lower part of the town, and the action seemed very close. A squad of about fifty men was collected, a charge made down the burning street, and the Indians driven out beyond the houses, we then burned every thing behind us, and then ran away.

Surrounded the whole town, and commenced firing the buildings on the windward side. I wish I could describe the fight from the beginning up to about 3 o'clock P.M. It was a lively and interesting one, but my allotted space forbids. The desperate character of the fighting is well told when I say we lost thirty men in about an hour and a half, ten killed and fifty wounded. And then out of a much depleted force. Lieutenant Wm Huey having gone with about seventy-five men to guard the approach by the ferry, and crossing to the other side of the river was cut off, and forced to retreat towards St. Peter. It was simply a mistake in judgment to put the River between himself and the main force, but in his retreat, he met Capt. E. St. Julien Cox with reinforcements, joined them and returned the next day. He was a brave and willing officer. The company from South Bend having heard that the Winnebagoes had joined in the outbreak, returned to their homes before the attack.

to protect their families.
On Saturday, and on the morning of the attack a wagon load left us and went down the River. I doubt if we could muster over two hundred guns at any time during the fight.

About one hundred and thirty houses were burned by the enemy and ourselves during the encounter. Leaving nothing of the town but the small portion embraced within the barricades. The fighting continued all Saturday night, and with desultory firing up to Sunday forenoon. The Indians then drew off to the north-west in the direction of the Fort, and disappeared. About noon on Sunday Capt. E. St. Julien Cox arrived with about fifty men, sent by Col. H. H. Sibley from St. Peter to reinforce Genl. Wm. Lieut. Huey with part of his detachment which had been cut off on Saturday was with them. That they were welcome guests can well be imagined.

There were in the town at the time of the attack on the 23^d as near as can be learned about twelve to fifteen hundred non-combatants.

consisting of women, children, refugees and unarmed citizens. every individual of whom would have been massacred to a certainty had our little force been overcome. Such a stake was well worth fighting for. #

On Monday, the 25th we decided to evacuate the town and try to reach Mankato; this destination was chosen to avoid crossing the Minnesota River, which we deemed impracticable, the only obstacle between us and Mankato being the Big Cottonwood River, and that was fordable. We made up a train of one hundred and fifty three wagons, loaded them with women, children and about eighty wounded men, and started. A more heart-rending procession was never witnessed in America. The disposition of the guard was confided to Capt Cox. The march was successful; no Indians were encountered; we reached Crookston toward evening, which was about half way between New Ulm and Mankato, I pushed the main column on, fearing danger from various sources, but camped

We were fortunate in having as fine a body of soldiers as the soldiers who were killed by the Indians at the battle of New Ulm. The soldiers who were killed by the Indians at the battle of New Ulm were the 3rd Dragoon of St. Paul, the 1st Cavalry of Mankato, the 1st Cavalry of New Ulm, and the 1st Cavalry of Mankato.

at this point with about one hundred & fifty men, intending to return to New Ulm, or hold this point as a defensive measure for the exposed settlements. On the morning of the 26th we broke camp, and I endeavored to make the command return to New Ulm, or remain where they were, my object of course being to keep a force between the Indians and the settlements. The men had not heard a word from their families for more than a week, and declined to return, or remain; I did not blame them, they had demonstrated their willingness to fight when necessary, but held the protection of their families as paramount to ^{mere} military possibilities. I would not do justice to history did I not record, that when I called for volunteers to return Capt Cox and his whole squad of forty or fifty men stepped to the front ready to go where commanded, although I had not heard of Capt Marsh's disaster, I declined to allow so small a command

to attempt the reoccupation of
New Ulm; my Staff stood by me
in this effort, and a gentleman
from Le Sueur County Mr. Free-
man Talbot made an eloquent
and impressive speech to the
men to induce them to return.

The train arrived safely at Man-
kalā, ^{on the 25th} and the balance of the command
on the following day. Whence the
men generally sought their homes.

For a detailed account of the
fight at New Ulm, the reader is
referred to "The Sioux War and Massacres
of 1862-3" by H. D. Heard, from pages
86, to 95, inclusive, where long extracts
from my official report to Governor
Ramsey will be found.

Fort Ridgely. We left Fort Ridgely on the arri-
val of Lieut. Sheehan with his command
on the 19th of August. Ridgely was in
no sense a Fort. It was simply a collec-
tion of frame buildings forming a
square, and facing inward. It con-
tained one large Stone Barrack which
was about the only defensible part
of it.

On the 20th of August at about three
P.M., an attack was made upon the

Fort by quite a large body of Indians.
The first intimation the garrison had of
the assault, was a volley poured through
one of the openings between the build-
ings. Considerable confusion ensued,
but order was soon restored. Sergeant
Jones attempted to use his cannon, and
to his utter dismay found them disa-
bled. They were found to have been spiked
by ramming old rags into them. This
was discovered to have been the work
of several half-breeds belonging to
the Rennece Ranges, who had deserted
to the enemy. The Sergeant soon re-
trieved this difficulty and brought
his pieces into action. His attack
lasted for about three hours, when
it ceased in the loss to the garrison
of three killed and eight wounded.

On Thursday the 21st two
further attacks were made on the
Fort one in the morning, and one
in the afternoon lasting about
half an hour on each occasion.
but with apparently a much reduced
force, and with less earnestness, and
with little damage. On Friday
the 22^d the savages seemed deter-
mined to carry the post at all

hazards. About four hundred and fifty under the leadership of Little Crow, came down from the Agency and concealing themselves in the ravines which lay on several sides of the Fort, they made a feint by sending about twenty warriors on the prairie for the purpose of drawing the garrison out of the Fort and cutting them off. Such a movement would have been fatal to the defenders of the Fort, and forunately there were men among them of much experience in Indian warfare, which prevented the success of the manoeuvre. Then followed a shower of bullets upon the Fort from all directions. The attack continued for nearly five hours or until about seven P.M. It was bitterly fought, and ~~the~~ ~~defence~~ ~~was~~ courageously and intelligently resisted. Sergeant Jones handled his guns with great skill, exploding shells in the outlying buildings and burning them over the heads of the Indians. While the latter endeavored to fire the wooden buildings composing

For a very interesting account of the Siege of Fort Ridgely, see the history of the 5th. Regiment by Gen. James H. Kibb in this volume. Parts of several companies of which regiment having participated in that fight.

the Fort by shooting fire arrows on their roofs. One white was killed and seven wounded in this engagement. Lieut. Sheehan who commanded the Fort through all these trying occurrences. Lieut. Gorman of the Renville Rangers, Lieut. Whipple, and Sergeants Jones and McEwen, all did their duty in a manner becoming veterans. and the men seconded their efforts handsomely. There was \$72,000, in gold and silver in the Fort with which to make the payment, besides many refugees of all kinds and sexes. some badly wounded, and some exhausted by exposure and suffering. The Indians finding their efforts baffled, drew off, and concentrating all their available forces, descended upon New Ulm the next morning, August 23^d for a final effort. and with the result heretofore narrated. #

I look upon the success of the whites in these several attacks on the Fort and New Ulm as the most important events of the war. not perhaps when viewed in the light of more military encounters,

but in their effect upon the future course of the Savages. Finding such stubborn resistance in the very outset of the rebellion, they could not advance, but were compelled to withdraw to their own country. Had they carried the Fort and other places, they would undoubtedly have pushed their success through the length of the Minnesota Valley, and have carried the Winnebagoes into the war. The advantage gained to the whites by this check, enabled them to organize, and advance, and although the Indians as will appear hereafter, gave us some hard fighting after Ridgely cut them off, their opposition had passed from them, and they were on the defensive. The Battle of Ojibway which was fought in the Revolutionary war in the Valley of the Machawak, was not much more of a fight than those we have been describing. Yet it had been characterized as one of the decisive battles of the world, because it prevented a junction of the British forces under St. Ledger in the west, and Burgoyne in the

The importance of the Battle of New Ulm, has been recognized by the State in the appropriation of \$3000 to erect a monument on the grounds to commemorate the event, and in honor of the brave men who died in defence of it in battle.

East and made American Independence possible. #

The news of the outbreak reached Governor Alexander Ramsey at St. Paul on Tuesday the 19th of August. He at once hastened to Mendota at the mouth of the Minnesota River, and requested Gov. Henry H. Sibley to accept the command of such forces as could be put into the field to pursue the Indians. Gov. Sibley was the most experienced man in the State with the Sioux, having lived and traded among them since 1835, and besides that, was a distinguished citizen of the State, having been its first Governor. He immediately accepted the position with the rank of Colonel in the State Militia. Fort Snelling, an old military post at the junction of the Minnesota and Mississippi Rivers, had been utilized as a rendezvous for troops being recruited for the civil war, and soldiers men were rapidly being mustered in. Col. Sibley started up the Valley of the Minnesota on the 20th with four companies of the 6th Regiment, and arrived at St. Paul on Friday the 22nd. Capt. A. D. Nelson of the Regular Army had been appointed Colonel of the 6th

and Wm Crooks had been appointed Lieut. Colonel of the 7th. Col. Crooks conveyed the orders of the Governor to Col. Nelson, overtaking him at Bloomington Ferry. On receipt of his orders, finding he was to report to Col. Sibley, he made the point of military etiquette, that an officer of the Regular Army could not report to an officer of Militia of the same rank, and turning over his command to Col. Crooks, he returned to St. Paul and handed in his resignation; it was accepted and Col. Crooks appointed Colonel of the 6th.

On Sunday the 24th Col. Sibley's force at St. Peter was augmented by the arrival of some two hundred mounted men under command of William J. Cullen formerly Superintendent of Indian Affairs, called the Cullen Guard. On the same day six more companies of the 6th arrived making up the full Regiment also about one hundred more mounted men, and several squads of volunteer Militia. The mounted men, were placed under the command of

Colonel Samuel McPhail. By these accessions Col. Sibley's command numbered about 1400 men; Although the numerical strength of this force was considerable, it was actually almost useless. The ammunition did not fit the guns of the 6th Regiment, and had to be made over, the horses of the mounted men, and the men themselves were utterly inexperienced and disciplined, and practically unarmed. It was the best that the country afforded, but was probably about as poorly equipped an army as ever entered the field to face what I regard as the best warriors that ever fought on the North American Continent: but fortunately the officers and men were all that could be desired. Col. Sibley I have spoken of. Col. Crooks was educated at West Point and is a natural soldier and commander of men. These leaders were seconded by intelligent subordinates, and enthusiastic men, and soon overcame their physical difficulties, but they were in utter ignorance of the strength, position or previous movements

of the enemy, no news having reached them from either Ridgely or New Ulm. A mistake resulting in defeat would have been fatal; the mistake was not made.

On Saturday the 23^d a detachment under Capt. E. St. Julien Cox was sent to the relief of New Ulm, and as has been related reached there on Sunday following. On Monday the 25th another squad under Capt. E. Anderson consisting of forty mounted men and twenty soldiers conveyed in wagons was also sent to New Ulm. They started about noon and made twenty miles. The next day they crossed the ferry and entered the town to find it utterly deserted, all the inhabitants having been carried to Mankato the previous day as before stated. Capt. E. Anderson's company immediately returned to St. Peter, reaching there about midnight. In this company were some of the leading men of St. Peter. Isaac V. D. Heard who wrote ~~the~~ the History of the Sioux War, Col. Girard Hewitt one of the oldest settlers and most respected Real Estate Dealers, and

many others who deserve mention. Col. Sibley left St. Peter on Tuesday the 26th of August, and Capt. E. Anderson followed him on Wednesday the 27th. The mounted men of the command under Col. McPhail, with whom was a company from Minneapolis under Anson Northrup an old frontiersman, arrived on the 27th at the fort and were the first relief that garrison received. Accompanying this advance guard was Capt. R. H. Chittenden of the 1st Wisconsin Cavalry. The main command under Col. Sibley reached the fort on the 28th in the morning.

Intrenchments were thrown up around the fort, cannon were properly placed, and a strong guard maintained. All the men of the Cullen Guard but thirty under Capt. E. Anderson returned home as soon as they found that the fort was safe. They were soon increased by the arrival of forty seven men under Capt. E. St. Julien. On the 1st of September ^{Lieut. Col.} Col. Wm R. Marshall of the 7th Regiment, arrived with a portion of his command. The force could have made a forward

movement, but for lack of ammunition and provisions which were long delayed.

On the 31st day of August a detail of Capt. Grant's Company of Infantry, seventy men of the Cullen Guard under Capt. E. Anderson, and some citizens and other soldiers, in all about one hundred and fifty men under command of Major Joseph R. Brown, with seventeen teams and teamsters, were sent to the Lower Agency to feel the enemy, buy the dead and perform any other service that might arise. They met no signs of Indians, and on Monday evening Sept 1, they encamped at the head of Birch Creek, about thirteen miles above the Fort. Lulled into a sense of security by not having seen any signs of Indians the camp was chosen for its convenience to access water, regardless of the question of defence. The result demonstrated the danger of ever feeling safe, or of ever omitting any precautions while in a hostile Indian country.

As I have learned since from reliable Indian sources, the hostiles had gone towards the upper agency, after

leaving New Ulm and the Fort, where they concentrated all their forces, and matured a plan to proceed down the Valley of the Minnesota, divide the command and attack Mankato and St. Peter simultaneously, taking the risk of evading the troops he could throw. Had this programme been carried out, St. Peter would certainly have fallen, as it was entirely incapable of defence. And Mankato, might have shared the same fate, although it had quite an efficient home guard, and I had a small force at South Bend and other outlying points placed there for its defence. In starting down the Valley, the attention of the Indians was attracted by Major Brown's detachment going into Birch Creek. They stopped, and during the night, surrounded the camp, and in the gray of the morning opened a murderous fire upon it, keeping cover in some brush and timber, and behind rolls in the prairie, and in ravines. The slaughter was immense, twenty three were killed outright or mortally,

wounded, and forty five were severely
wounded, while many received slight
injuries; all the horses but one were
killed amounting to about ninety. The
tents were made to resemble lace work
so completely were they perforated
with bullets, one hundred and four
holes having been counted in one tent.

The men fought like tigers, they used
the dead horses for barricades fighting
behind their carcasses. They also dug
pits with their knives, bayonets and
any available implement. The fight
continued uninterruptedly ^{all} Tuesday
and Wednesday the 2^d and 3^d of Septem-
ber, the men suffering dreadfully from
want of water among their other mis-
eries; but they held the enemy off
gallantly all this time. On Wednes-
day morning sentinels at the Fort
reported firing in the direction of the
Agency. Col. Sibley dispatched Col. Mc-
Phail with fifty mounted men, Maj.
McLaren with one hundred and five
infantry, and Capt. Frank Hendricks
with a mountain Howitzer to their
relief. They reached that afternoon
a point supposed to be about three
miles from where Maj. Brown's

partly were engaged; Here they were
attacked by a large party of Indians
and sent back for reinforcements.
The entire command of Col. Sibley
at once moved forward, and met
the second detachment after dark;
at daylight the combined forces
marched to Birch Creek, and ^{they attacked the command in the morning}
Indians were off. The scene that
presented itself was heart-rending.
Fifteen were buried on the field and
the wounded carried back to the
Fort. Dr. J. W. Daniels was fortunately
with Maj. Brown's squad and re-
mained uninjured, and with him
and Dr. Alfred Muller Surgeon of
the Fort the wounded fared well.
The Indians having erected a monument
in the battle field to commemorate
the gallantry of the defenders - Birch
Creek forms a most interesting event
in the Sioux war; a detailed account
of it may be found in Bates' ^{and} Heard's
Book and the Report of the Adjutant-
General of the State for 1862. Its occurrence
horrible as it proved to be, probably saved
a few. It was near St. Peter and
Mankato.

Here Capt. Sheehan's battery again made itself
opposite, he carried the dispatch, and ran the
quantity of many Indians, his other horses being
twice wounded and dying at the moment he fell
in the
at the
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While these events were passing, other portions of the State were being prepared for defence. In the region of Forest City, in Trecker County, and also at Hutchinson and at Glencoe the excitement was intense. Capt. George C. Whitcomb obtained at St. Paul seventy-five stands of arms, and some ammunition. He left some of these arms at Hutchinson, and with the rest armed a company at Forest City of fifty ^{men} three, twenty five of whom were recruited.

Capt. Richard Stout of Co. B, 9th Regiment was ordered to Forest City and went there with his company. Genl. John H. Stevens of Glencoe was commander of the State Militia for the counties of McLeod, Carver, Sibley & Renville, and as soon as he learned of the outbreak erected a very substantial fortification of saw logs at Glencoe, and that place was not disturbed by the savages. A company of volunteers was formed at Glencoe under Capt. R. H. Pence. Company F of the 9th Regt under Lieut. O. P. Stearns, and company H of the same Regiment, Capt. W. R. Bayler, also an independent company from Excelsior, and the Goodhue County

Ranges, Capt. David L. Davis, all did duty at and about Glencoe during the continuance of the troubles; Captains Whitcomb and Stout with their companies making extensive reconnoissances into the surrounding counties, rescuing many refugees, and having several brisk and sharp encounters with the Indians, in which they lost several in killed and wounded. The presence of these troops in this region of country and their active operations prevented its depopulation, and saved the towns, and much property from destruction; many prominent citizens of this region were energetic in the work of defence, one in particular Mrs. J. E. Wheelock then residing at Glencoe, was made a temporary aid of Genl. Stevens, and did good work. I wish I had space to record the many individual acts of bravery of these gentlemen, all I can say is that they all did their duty and saved that portion of our State from destruction.

On the 29th of August I received a commission from the Governor of the State authorizing me to take

command of the Blue Earth Country extending from New Ulm to the Iowa line, embracing the then western & southwestern frontier of the State. My powers were general, to raise troops, commission officers, subvert upon the country and generally, to do what in my judgment was best for the protection of this frontier. Under these powers, I located my head quarters at South Bend being the extreme southern point of the Minnesota River, thirty miles below New Ulm - Four from Mankato, and about fifty from the Iowa line. Here I maintain a guard of about eighty men principally of Capt. Pierbauer's Mankato Company, which was in my command at New Ulm, ^{and regulars} together with some citizens of St. Peter, we threw up some small intrenchments but nothing worthy of mention. Troops began pouring in upon me from all quarters. Enough citizens of New Ulm had returned home to compose two good companies at that point. Company E, of the 9th Regiment, was stationed at Crisp's Farm about half way between New Ulm and South Bend. Col. John R. Jones

under Capt. E. Jerome Dene

of Chatfield then Colonel of the 3d ^{Regiment of} Minnesota Militia, collected about three hundred men, and reported to me at Garden City. They were organized into companies under Captains ^{N.P.} Colburn and Post, and many of them stationed at Garden City where they erected a very complete fortification of saw logs and other similar material, others of this command were stationed at points along the Blue Earth River.

Capt. Cornelius F. Beck of Winona raised a company of fifty three men, all mounted and started west, they reached Wilmabago City in the County of Faribault on 7th of September, where they reported to me, and were stationed at Chain Lakes about twenty miles west of Wilmabago City. #

In the latter part of August Capt. A. J. Edgerton of Company B. 10th Regiment arrived at South Bend and having made his report was stationed at the Wilmabago agency to keep watch on the Wilmabagoes and cover Mankato from that direction.

and vicinity of this company were afterwards sent to Mankato, a stockade was erected by this company at Mankato -

About the same time Company F, of the Eighth Regiment, under Capt. L. Aldrich, reported and was stationed at New Ulm.

E. St. Julien Coy who had previously reinforced one at New Ulm, was commissioned a Captain and put in command of a force stationed at Madelia in Watonwan County, composed of part of Capt. Bierbaum's ^{and Capt. G. B. Buckles} companies and some citizens, where they erected quite an artistic fortification of logs, with bastions, while there, an attack was made upon some citizens by the Indians and several were killed.

It will be seen from this statement, that almost immediately after the evacuation of New Ulm on the 25th of August, the most exposed part of the Southern frontier was occupied by quite a strong force. It was not expected by me that any serious incursions would be made along this line, but the state of alarm and panic that prevailed among the people, rendered it necessary to establish this cordon of military posts to prevent an

exodus of the inhabitants. No one who has not gone through the ordeal of an Indian invasion, can form any idea of the terrible apprehension that takes possession of a defenceless and non-combatant population under such circumstances. There is an element of mystery and uncertainty about the magnitude and movements of this enemy, and a certainty of his brutality, that inspires terror. The first notice of his approach is the crack of his rifle, and no one with experience in such struggles, even blames the timidity of citizens in exposed positions when assailed by these savages. I think all things being considered the people generally behaved very well.

If the map of the State is consulted, taking New Ulm as the most Northern point on the Minnesota River, it will be seen that the line of posts covered the frontier from that point down the River to South Bend, up the Blue Earth Southwesterly to Winnebago

But this country was so little known by all directions, and a system of dispatches established by which head quarters was informed daily of everything that happened at each point.

city, and nearly to the Iowa line. These stations were about sixteen miles apart, with two advanced points at Madelia and Chain Lakes to the westward. No serious attack was made except at Madelia while this line was held. ##

Maj. General John Pope of the United States Army was ordered into Minnesota to conduct the Indian war in September. He made his head quarters at St. Paul and by his high rank, took command of all operations, though not exerting any visible influence on them, the fact being that all imminent danger to the frontier having been overcome by the State and its citizens before his arrival.

In the latter part of September the citizen troops ^{in my command} were anxious to return to their homes, and on presentation of the case to General Pope, he ordered into the State a new Regiment first mustered in in Wisconsin, the 25th, commanded by Colonel M. Montgomery who was instructed to relieve my force. He appeared at South Bend about

the first of October, and after having fully informed him of all that had transpired, and given him my views as to the future, I turned my command over to him in the following order; I give it because it succinctly states the situation of affairs at the time.

"Order No. 203.

Head quarters Ind. Ex. Southern Frontier, South Bend Oct. 5, 1862.

To the Soldiers and citizens who have been, and are now engaged in the defence of the Southern frontier.

On the 18th of August last your frontier was invaded by the Indians. You promptly rallied for its defence. You checked the advance of the enemy and defeated him in two severe battles at New Ulm. You have held a line of frontier posts extending over a distance of one hundred miles. You have created six substantial fortifications, and other defensive works of less magnitude. You have dispersed marauding bands of savages that have have long

upon your lines. You have been uniformly brave, vigilant and obedient to orders. By your efforts the war has been confined to the border; without them it would have penetrated into the heart of the State.

Major-General Pope has assumed the Command of the North-west and will control future operations. He promises a vigorous prosecution of the war. Five companies of the Twenty-fifth Wisconsin regiment and five hundred Cavalry from Iowa are ordered into the region now held by you, and will supply the places of those whose terms of enlistment shortly expire. The Department of the Southern Frontier which I have had the honor to command, will, from the date of this order, be under the Command of Colonel M. Montgomery of the Twenty-fifth Wisconsin, whom I take pleasure in introducing to the troops and citizens of that department, as a soldier and a man to whom they may confide their interests, and the safety of their country with every assurance that they will

be protected and defended.

Pressing public duties of a civil nature demand my absence temporarily from the border. The intimate and agreeable relations we have sustained toward each other, on union in danger and adventure, cause me regret in leaving you, but will hasten my return.

Chas. E. Flanagan.

Col, Comdg. Southern Frontier

This practically ended my connection with the war; all matters yet to be related took place in other parts of the State, under the command of Colonel Sibley and others.

We left Colonel Sibley on the 4th of September at Fort Ridgely having just relieved the unfortunate command of Maj. Joseph R. Brown after their fight at Birch Creek.

Knowing that the Indians had in their possession many white captives, and having their rescue alive uppermost in his mind, the Colonel left on the battle field at Birch Creek the following communication

attached to a stake, driven in the ground, feeling assured that it would fall into the hands of Little Crow, the leader of the Indians.

"If Little Crow has any proposition to make, let him send a half-breed to me, and he shall be protected in and out of camp."

H. H. Sibley Col, Comdg. Mil. Expn.
The note was found and answered by Crow in a rambling ^{unmeaning} letter, dated at Yellow Medicine September 7th and delivered by two half-breeds.

Col. Sibley returned the following answer by the bearers.

"Little Crow, You have murdered many of our people without any sufficient cause. Return me the prisoners under a flag of truce, and I will talk with you then like a man."

H. H. Sibley Col, Comdg. Mil. Expn."

No response was received to this letter until Sept. 12th when Crow sent another, saying he had 155 prisoners not including those held by the Sisseton & Wapeton, who were at Lac qui parle, and were coming down. He also gave assurances that the prisoners were faring well.

Col. Sibley on the 12th of Sept. sent a reply by Crow's messengers. Saying no peace could be made without a surrender of the prisoners, but not promising peace on any terms, and charging the commission of nine murders since the receipt of Crow's last letter.

The same messengers that brought this letter from Crow also delivered quite a long one from Wabashaw and Lacpee, two ^{Lower} chiefs who claimed to be friendly, and desired a meeting with Col. Sibley, suggesting two places where it could be held.

The Colonel cautiously replied that he would march in three days. That he was powerful enough to crush all the Indians. That they might approach his column in open day with a flag of truce, and place themselves under his protection. On the receipt of this letter, a large council was held at which nearly all the Amnity Indians were present, several speeches were made by Upper and Lower Sioux. Some in favor of continuance of the war, and "dying in the last ditch," and some in

Several a surrender of the prisoners and seeking peace. I will give one of the Karanguas on each side in order that the reader may know the feeling that existed.

Mazga-wann-nu-na a Lower Indian spoke as follows. "You men who talk of leaving us and delivering up the captives, talk like children. You believe if you do so, the whites will think you have acted as their friends, and will spare your lives, they will not, and you ought to know it. You say that the whites are too strong for us, and that we will all have to perish. Well by sticking together and fighting the whites, we will live at all events for a few days, when by the course you propose we would die at once. Let us keep the prisoners with us, and let them share our fate. That is all the advice I have to give."

Paul, Mazga-Ku-lā-ma-ni-on the other hand, spoke as follows.

"I am going to tell you what I think, and what I am ready to do, now and hereafter. You the Sewardson and Wakefield Indians, have been

with the white men a great deal longer than the Upper Indians, yet I who am an Upper Indian have put on white men's clothes, and consider myself now a white man, I was very much surprised to hear that you had been killing the settlers, for you have had the advice of the preacher, ^{for} so many years. Why did you not tell us you were going to kill them? I ask you the question again, why did you not tell us? You make no answer. The reason was, if you had done so, and we had counselled together, you would not have been able to ^{have} convinced our young men with you. When our older men heard of it, we were so surprised that we knew not what to do. By your involving our young men without consulting us you have done us a great injustice, I am now going to tell you something you don't like. You have gotten our people into this difficulty through your incitements to its rash young soldiers without a council being called and our consent being obtained, and I shall use all the

means I can to get them out of it without reference to you. I am opposed to their continuing this war, or of committing further outrages, and I warn you not to do it. I have heard a great many of you say, you were brave men, and could whip the whites, this is a lie. Persons who will cut women and children's throats are squaws and cowards. You say the whites are not brave, you will see. They will not it is true kill women and children, as you have done, but they will fight you who have arms in your hands. I am ashamed of the way you have acted toward the captives. Fight the whites if you desire to, but don't like brave men, give me the captives and I will carry them to Fort Ridgely. I hear one of you say that if I take them there the soldiers will shoot me, I will take the risk. I am not afraid of death, but I am opposed to the way you act toward the prisoners. If any of you have the feelings of men, you will give them up, you may

These speeches were taken down by Mr. J. V. D. Heard from the lips of the man who made them shortly after their surrender at Camp Release.

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look as fierce at me as you please, but I shall ask you once, twice and ten times to deliver these women & children to their friends. That is all I have to say."

Ma-ga-ku-ta-sua-ne, or the man who shoots metal ^{the last speaker} as he walks, it will be remembered was one of the Indians who volunteered to go and ransom Miss Gardner in 1857, from captivity in Luk-pa-du-ta's hands. He was ~~was~~ a very sensible man, and before this outbreak, the President of the Redwood Republic, an organization perfected by Messrs. Riggs and Williamson, missionaries at the Yellow Medicine River. So fully appreciate the courage necessary to stand before this infuriated crowd of savages and talk to them as he did, the reader must know that every man of them had a gun in his hand with no restraint upon his using it at any moment, and had some young fellow shot him down he would undoubtedly have revived the plaudits of the assembly. #

La-tan-ka Na-ji - Standing Buffalo arrived shortly afterwards

and another great council was held at which Paul made another strong speech in favor of peace and the surrender of the prisoners. Among other things he said "In fighting the whites you are fighting the Thunder and lightning." In reference to a remark some one had made about getting aid from the British, he said, "You say you can make a treaty with the British government, that is impossible. Have you not yet come to your senses? They are also white men, and neighbors and friends to the soldiers. They are ruled by a petticoat, and she has the tender heart of a squaw, what will she do for men who have committed the murders you have?"

This correspondence was kept up for several days, quite a number of letters coming from the Indians to Col. Sibley, but with no satisfactory results. On the 18th of September Col. Sibley determined to move on the enemy, and on that day camp was broken at the fort. A boat was constructed and the crossing of the Minnesota River effected near the fort to prevent the possibility

of an ambuscade. The expedition safely across the river, the first camp was made two miles above the crossing point. Col. Sibley's force consisted of the 6th Regiment under Col. Crooks. About three hundred men of the 3rd Regiment under Major Welsh. Several companies of the 7th Regiment under Col. Wm R. Marshall. A small number of mounted men under Col. McPhail a battery under ~~the~~ command of Capt E. Mark Hendricks. The Third Regiment had been mustered into the service of the United States, but had been surrendered to the Confederates at Murfreesboro in Tennessee; the officers were ^{nearly} all made prisoners and held for exchange, and the privates paroled. They were sent to Jefferson Barracks in Missouri, and on the breaking out of the Indian war, were called home to aid in its suppression. Major Welsh was the only commissioned officer in the Regiment when it was with Col. Sibley.

The expedition moved up the River without encountering any

apparition until ~~the~~ the morning
 after the 23^d of September, Indians
 had been in sight during all
 the march, carefully watching the
 movements of the troops, and several
 messages of defiance were found
 attached to fences and houses. On
 the evening of the 22^d the expedition
 camped at Lone Tree Lake about ^{two} mile
 from the Tolland Medicine River,
 and about three miles east from
 Wood Lake. Early next morning
 several foraging parties were fired
 upon. They returned the fire and
 retreated towards the camp. At
 this juncture the 3^d Regiment with
 orders sallied out crossed a
 deep ravine and soon engaged the
 enemy. They were ordered back
 by the Commander, and had not
 reached camp before Indians ap-
 peared on all sides in great num-
 bers. Many of them in the ravine
 between the Third Regiment and
 the camp. Thus began the Battle
 of Wood Lake. Capt. Hendricks
 opened with his cannon, and the
 Howitzer under the direct com-
 and of Col. Sibley, poured in

shells. It has since been learned that
 Little Crow had appointed ten of
 his best men to kill Col. Sibley at
 all hazards, and that the Colonel's
 shells directed by his own hand
 fell into this special band, and
 dispersed them. Capt. Hendricks
 pushed his cannon to the head
 of the Ravine and raked it with
 great effect, and Col. Marshall
 with ^{the} three companies of the 1st
 and Capt. Grant's company of the
 6th charged down the ravine on
 a double quick and routed the
 Indians. About eight hundred
 of the command were engaged in
 the fight, and met about an
 equal number of Indians. Our
 loss was ten killed and between
 forty and fifty wounded. Maj. Welsh
 was shot in the leg, but fortunately
 not fatally. The 3^d, and the Penwell
 Rangers under Capt. James Gorman
 bore the brunt of the fight, ^{which lasted an hour and a half} and sus-
 tained the most of the losses. Col.
 Sibley in his official Report of the
 engagement, gives great credit to
 his staff, and all his command.
 An-pay-tu-tok-a-cha. or other

Say. was with the whites and took a conspicuous part in the fray. ^{He was with} Paul Ma-za-Ku-tay-ma-ni, ^{who} rescued Miss Gardner from the Inkpa-dula Band, acted as my guide on the expedition in which we killed Inkpa-dula's son. and was the means of saving the forty odd whites at the Yellow Medicine Agency by giving them timely notice of the coming storm.

Thus ended the Battle of Wood Lake. It was an important factor in the war, as it was about the first time the Indians engaged large forces of well organized troops in the open country, and their utter discomfiture put them on the run. It will be noticed that I have not in any of my narrations of battles fought, used the stereotyped expression, "Our losses were so many, but the losses of the enemy were much greater, but as they always carry off their dead and wounded, it is impossible to give exact figures". The reason why I have not made use of this statement, is because I don't believe it. The philosophy of Indian war, is to kill your

enemy and not get killed yourself. and they take cover when they can better and more effectually than any other people. In all our Indian wars South and North, East and West, ^{with regulars or militia,} I believe it would not be an exaggeration to say that the whites have lost ten to one in killed and wounded. But the Battle of Wood Lake was quite an open fight, and so rapidly conducted and concluded, that we have a very accurate account of the loss of the enemy, he had no time or opportunity to withdraw his dead. Fifteen dead were found upon the field, and one prisoner was taken alive and wounded. No doubt many others were wounded who were able to escape.

After this fight Col. Sibley retired to ^{the highest part of} an Indian camp located nearly opposite the mouth of the Chippawa River where it empties into the Minnesota and there encamped. This point was afterward named "Camp Release" from the fact that the prisoners held by the enemy were ^{here} delivered to Col. Sibley's com-

- man -

We will leave Col. Sibley, and his troops at Camp Release, and narrate the important events that transpired on the Red River of the North at and about Fort Abercrombie, returning to Camp Release, where were the most interesting occurrences of the war outside of actual hostilities subsequently occurred.

Fort Abercrombie.

The United States Government ^{about the year 1854} early in the history of the Territory created a military post on the west side of the Red River of the North at a place then known as Graham's point, between what are now known as the cities of Breckenridge and Fargo; like most of the frontier posts of that day it was not constructed with reference to defence, but more as a depot for troops and military stores. It was then in the midst of the Indian country, and is now in Richland county, North Dakota. The troops that had garrisoned the fort had been sent South to aid in suppressing the Southern Rebellion and their place had been supplied

by one company of the 5th Regiment of Minnesota Volunteers which was commanded by Captain John Van der Horst. There was a place called Georgetown about fifty miles down the River and north of the fort at which were some settlers, and a depot of stores for the company engaged in the navigation of the River. At the commencement of the Indian outbreak, Capt. Van der Horst had detailed about half of his company to Georgetown to protect the interests centered at that point.

About the 20th of August news reached the Fort from the Yellow Medicine Agency that trouble was expected from the Indians. An expedition was on the way to Red Lake to make a treaty with the Indians, which consisted of the commissioners and party, accompanied by a train of thirty loaded wagons, and a herd of two hundred cattle. On the 23rd of August news reached the Fort that a large body of Indians, estimated at five hundred were on the way

to capture this party, a carrier was immediately dispatched to the train, and it at once sought refuge in the Fort. Miners were also sent to all the settlements in the vicinity, and the warning spread of the approaching danger; Happily nearly all the surrounding people gained the Fort before the enemy arrived. The detachment stationed at Georgetown was also called in. A mail coach that left the Fort on the 22^d fell into the hands of the Indians who killed the driver and destroyed the mail.

The garrison had been strengthened by about fifty men capable of duty, from the refugees, but they were unarmed. Capt. Van der Horst at once strengthened his post by all means in his power, and endeavored to obtain reinforcements. Captain Freeman with about sixty men started from St. Cloud to relieve the garrison at Abercrombie, but on reaching Sank Center the situation appeared so alarming, it was deemed impossible to proceed with so small a force. and

no addition could be made to it at Sank Center. Attempts were made to reinforce the Fort from other points. Two Companies were sent from Snelling, and got as far as Sank Center, but the force was even then deemed inadequate to proceed to Abercrombie. Part of the Third Regiment was also dispatched from Snelling to its relief on September 6th. Another expedition consisting of the Companies under command of Captain George Atkinson, and Bolla Banks, with a squad of about sixty men of the Third Regiment under command of Sergeant Dearborne, together with a field piece under Lieutenant Robert J. McKenny was formed and placed under the command of Captain Emil A. Berger. This command started on September 10th and after a long and arduous march reached the Fort on the 23^d of September finding the wearied and anxious garrison still in possession. Captain Berger had been reinforced at Wymans

Station on the Alexandria Road on the 19th of September by the companies of Captains Freeman & Barnett who ^{had} united their men on the 14th and started for the Fort. The relief party amounted to quite some hundred men by the time it reached its destination.

While this long delayed relief was on its way, the little garrison at the Fort had its hands full to hold its position. On the 30th of August a large body of Indians made a bold raid on the post, and succeeded in stampeding and running off nearly two hundred head of cattle and one hundred head of horses and mules which were grazing on the prairie, some fifty of the cattle afterwards escaped and were restored to the post ^{by a scouting party}. This band of marauders did not however attack the Fort. To one who has not experienced it, can appreciate the mortification of seeing an enemy despoil you of your property when you are powerless to resist.

An attack was made on

the Fort on the 3^d of September and some stacks burned and a few horses captured. Several men were killed on both sides and Capt Van der Horst was wounded in the right arm by an accidental shot from one of his own men.

On September 6th a second attack was made by a large force of Indians which lasted nearly all day, in which we lost two men killed and several wounded.

No further attack was made until the 26th of September, when Capt E Freeman's company was fired upon while watering their horses in the River. The Indians were routed and pursued by Capt E Freeman's company and a squad of the 3^d Regiment men with a howitzer. Their camp was captured which contained quite an amount of plunder. A light skirmish took place on the 29th of September in which the enemy was routed, and this affair ended the siege of Fort Abercrombie. #

For a full and detailed account of the siege of Abercrombie see history of the 5th Regiment in this volume

Camp Release.

Col. Sibley's command made Camp Release on the 26th day of September. This camp was located in the near vicinity of a large Indian camp of about one hundred teepees. These Indians were composed of upper and Lower Sioux and had generally been engaged in all the massacres that had taken place since the outbreak. They had with them some two hundred and fifty prisoners, ~~men~~ women & children, whites and half-breeds. Only one white man was found in the camp, George Spencer, who had been desperately wounded at the Lower agency and saved from death by an Indian friend of his.

The desire on the part of the troops to attack and punish these savages was intense, but Col. Sibley kept steadily in mind that the rescue of the prisoners was his first duty, and he well knew that any demonstration of violence would immediately result in the destruction of all the captives. He therefore wisely overruled all

hostile inclinations. The result was a general surrender of the whole camp, together with all the prisoners. As soon as the safety of the captives was assured, inquiry was instituted as to the participation of these Indians in the massacres and outrages which had so recently been perpetrated. Many cases were soon developed of particular Indians who had been guilty of the grossest atrocities, and the Commander decided to form a military tribunal to try the offenders. The State has occasion to congratulate itself on two things in this connection. First, that it had so just ^{and wise} a man as Col. Sibley to select this important tribunal, and second, that he had at his command such admirable material from which to make his selection. It must be remembered that this court entered upon its duties with the lives of hundreds of men at its absolute disposal, whether they ^{were} ~~are~~ Indians or any other kind of people, the fact must not be overlooked that

They were human beings and the responsibility of the Tribunal was correspondingly great. Col. Sibley at this date sent me a dispatch showing his intentions in the matter of the result of the trials. It is as follows—

"Camp Release 9 miles below
La C qui parle Sept 25th 1862,"

"Colonel,"

After speaking of a variety of matters concerning the disposition of troops who were in my command, the Battle of Wood Lake which he characterizes as a "Smart conflict we had with the Indians." The rescue of the prisoners, and other matters which are irrelevant to the question in hand, he adds.

"N. B. I am encamped near a camp of 150 lodges of friendly Indians & half breeds, but have had to purge it of suspected characters. I have apprehended sixteen supposed to have been connected with the late outrages and have appointed a military commission of five officers to try them. If found guilty, they will be forthwith executed. Although perhaps it will be a stretch of my authority, it so necessarily must be my justification, Yours H. Sibley."

Latin
order

x On the 28th day of September, an order was issued concerning this Court Martial. It was composed of William Crooks Colonel of the 6th Regiment, ^{prominent} Wm R Marshall Lieutenant Colonel of the 7th Regiment. Captains Grant & Bailey of the 6th and Lieutenant Olin of the 3^d. Others were subsequently added, as necessity required. All these men were of mature years, prominent in their social and civil general standing as citizens, and as well equipped as any persons could be to engage in such serious work. What I regard as the most important feature in the composition of this extraordinary Court, is the fact that the Hon. Isaac V. D. Heard an experienced lawyer of Saint Paul, who had been for many years the prosecuting Attorney of Ramsey county and was thoroughly versed in criminal law was on the staff of Col. Sibley, and was by him appointed Recorder of the Court. We Heard in the performance of a duty, was above prejudice and passion and could treat a case of this

nature as dispassionately as if it was a mere misdemeanor. Lieut Olm was Judge Advocate of the court, but as the trials progressed the evidence was all put in and the record kept by Mr. Heard. Some changes were made in the personnel of the court from time to time as the officers were needed elsewhere, but no changes lessened the dignity or character of the tribunal. I make these comments because the trials took place at a period of intense excitement, and persons unacquainted with the exact facts may be led to believe that the court was "organized to convict," and was unfair in its decisions. The names of Col. Wm Crooks and Governor Wm R. Marshall are a sufficient reputation of any charge of such nature if any was or ever may be made.

The court sat some time at Camp Reliance and disposed of quite a number of cases. It then adjourned to the Lower Agency and again heard many cases. From there it proceeded to

Mankato, and examined into the question of participation in the outbreak by the Winnebagoes but convicted none of that tribe, which proves that they acted judicially and not upon unreliable evidence. There was no lack of rumour and positive charges that many of the Winnebagoes were implicated. The court wound up its sittings at Fort Snelling after a series of sessions lasting from September 30th to November 5th 1862. During which time four hundred and twenty-five Indians and half-breed including the Maulto Godfrey were arraigned and tried, of these three hundred and twenty-one were found guilty of the offences charged of whom three hundred and three ^{were} sentenced to death, and the rest condemned to various terms of imprisonment according to the nature of their crimes.

The condemned prisoners were removed to Mankato where they were confined in a large jail constructed for the purpose of logs and guarded

by a strong command of troops.

On the way down, as the party having charge of the prisoners passed through New Ulm they found the people engaged in disintering their dead who had been hastily buried in the streets where they fell during the fight at that place. The sight of the Indians so enraged the people that a general attack was made on the wagons in which they were chained together. The attacking force was principally composed of women armed with clubs, stones, knives, hot water and similar weapons. Of course the guard could not shoot or bayonet a woman, but they got the prisoners through the town, with the loss of one killed and many battered and bruised.

While this court martial was in session the news of its proceedings reached the Eastern cities, and a great outcry was raised that Minnesota was contemplating a dreadful massacre of Indians. Many influential bodies of well intentioned but ill informed people, besieged President Lincoln to put a stop to the proposed

executions. The President sent for the records of the trials, and turned them over to his legal and military advisors to decide which were the more flagrant cases. On the 6th day of December 1862 President Lincoln made the following order.

"Executive Mansion

Washington December 6th 1862.

Brigadier General H. H. Sibley, St. Paul
Minnesota -

Ordered that the Indians and half-breeds sentenced to be hanged by the Military Commission composed of Colonel Crooks, Lieutenant Col. Marshall, Captain Grant, Captain Bailey and Lieutenant Olin and lately sitting in Minnesota, you cause to be executed on Friday the nineteenth day of December instant the following named traitors.

Here follows the names of thirty nine Indians and their numbers on the record of conviction.

"The other condemned prisoners you will hold subject to further orders, taking care that they neither escape, nor are subjected to any unlawful violence.

Abraham Lincoln
President of the United States.

Colonel Sibley had been appointed by Mr. Lincoln a Brigadier General on the 29th of September 1862 on account of his success at the Battle of Wood Lake. The announcement of his promotion being in a telegram as follows

"Washington D.C. September 29, 1862
Major General Pope St. Paul Minnesota,
Colonel Henry Haskins, Sibley is made Brigadier General for his judicious fight as fellow medicine. He should be kept in command of that column and every possible assistance sent to him.

H. W. Hallick

General in Chief."

His commission as Brigadier General was not issued until March 26th 1864, but of course this telegram amounted to an appointment to the position, and if accepted, as it was, made him subject to the orders of the President. So notwithstanding his dispatch to me stating that the Indians if cornered, would be forthwith executed, he could not very well carry out such an important duty without first submitting it to the Federal authorities, of which he

had become a part.

My view of the question has always been that when the Court Marshal was organized Colonel Sibley had no idea that more than twenty or twenty five of the Indians would be cornered, which is fairly inferable from his dispatch to me in which he says he had "Apprehended Sibley supposed to have been connected with the late outrages." But when the matter assumed the proportions it did, and he found some three hundred men to kill, he was very glad to shift the responsibility to higher authority. Any humane man would have been of the same mind. I have my own views ^{also} of the reasons for the action of the General Government in eliminating from the list of the condemned all but thirty nine. It was not because these thirty nine were more guilty than the rest, but because we were engaged in a great civil war, and the eyes of the world were upon us; had these three hundred men been executed, the charge would

undoubtedly have been made ^{by the South} that the North was murdering prisoners of war, and the authorities at Washington knew full well that the other nations of the Earth were not capable of making the proper discrimination, and deemed it safer not to incur the odium which might follow from such an accusation. The result of the matter was, that the order of the president was obeyed, and on the 26th of December 1862, thirty eight of the condemned Indians were executed by hanging at Mankato, one having been pardoned by the President. Contemporary history, or rather general public knowledge of what actually took place, says, that the pardoned Indian was hanged, and one of the others liberated by mistake. As an historian I do not assert this to be a fact, but as a citizen thoroughly well informed of current events at the time of this execution I believe it to be true. The hanging of the

thirty eight was done ^{on} one gallows constructed in a square form capable of sustaining ten men on each side. They were placed upon a platform facing inward, and dropped by the cutting of a rope, all at one time. The execution was successful in all its details, and reflects credit on the ingenuity and engineering skill of Capt. Paul of Stillwater who was intrusted with the construction of the deadly machine.

The remnant of the condemned Indians were after some time taken down to Davenport in Iowa and held in confinement until the excitement had generally subsided, when they were sent west of the Missouri and set free. An Indian never forgets what he regards an injury, and never forgives an enemy. It is my opinion that all the troubles that have transpired since the liberation of these Indians, with the tribes inhabiting the western plains and mountains, have

grown out of the evil councils of these savages. The only proper course to have pursued with them, when it was decided not to hang them, was to have exiled them to some remote post, say the Dry Tortugas, where communication with their people would have been impossible, set them to work on fortifications or other public works, and have allowed them to pass out by life limitation.

The execution of the Indians practically terminated the Indian campaign for the year 1862. No other event worthy of detailed record having occurred. But the Indian war was far from being over, and it was deemed prudent to keep within the State a sufficient force of troops to resist further attacks, and to inaugurate an aggressive campaign in the coming year. The whole of the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth regiments, the Mounted Rangers, and squads of artillery, scouts and other organizations were wintered in

the State at various points along the more exposed frontier, and in 1863, a formidable expedition under command of General Sibley was sent out ^{from Minnesota} to crush the enemy ~~from Minnesota~~, which was to be aided and cooperated with by another expedition of equal proportions under General Alfred Sully, which was to start from Sioux City on the Missouri.

Campaign of 1863.

The remnant of Little Crows followers were supposed to be rendezvoused at Devils Lake in Dakota Territory, and reinforced by large bodies of the upper Sioux. An expedition against them was devised by Genl. Pope, to be commanded by Genl. Sibley. It was to assemble at a point near the mouth of the Redwood River some twenty or twenty five miles above Fort Ridgely. On the 7th day of June 1863 General Sibley arrived at the point of departure which was named Camp Pope in honor of the Commanding

General. The force composing the expedition under Genl Sibley was as follows. One company of Pioneers under Capt Chase. Ten companies of the 6th Regiment under Col Crooks. Eight companies of the 10th Regiment under Col Baker. Nine companies of the 7th Regiment under Lieutenant Col Marshall. Eight pieces of Artillery under Capt Jones. Nine companies of Minnesota Mounted Rifles under Col McPhail. Seventy five Indian Scouts under Majors Brown, George McGee and Major Dooley, in all 3052 infantry. 800 cavalry. 148 artillery men. This command from the nature of the country it was compelled to traverse had to depend upon its own supply train, and was accompanied by 225 six mule wagons. The Staff was complete, consisting of Adjutant Genl Olin. Brigade Commissary Forbes. Assistant Commissary and Ordnance Officer. Atchinson. Commissary Clerk, Spencer. Quartermaster, Corning. Assistant Quartermaster

Kimbal. Aids-de-camp, Lieut. Pope. Beecher. ^{a. st. cecilia} Flandrau. and Hawthorne. Chaplain Rev. S. R. Riggs.

The Column moved from camp Pope June 16, 1863. The weather was intensely hot, and the country over which the army had to march was entirely wild and uninhabited. At first the Indian retreat was in the direction of the British line. But for some reason it was discovered that the movement of the Indians was changed in the direction of the Missouri River. They had probably heard that Genl Sully was delayed by low water and hoped to cross to the west bank of that stream before his arrival to intercept them; and with the further hope no doubt that they would be reinforced by the Sioux inhabiting the country west of the Missouri.

On the 4th of July the expedition reached the Big Bend of the Cheyenne River. On the 17th of July General Sibley received reliable information that the main body of the Indians were moving towards the Missouri.

which was confirmed at Camp Atchinson on the 20th of July by a visit to the camp of some three hundred chippewa half-breeds led by a catholic priest named Father Andre. On becoming satisfied that the best route of the march could be obtained by heading towards the Missouri; the General, decided to relieve his command of as much impedimenta as was consistent with comfort and safety, and would facilitate and increase the rapidity of its movements. He therefore formed a permanent ^{posy} at Camp Atchinson, which is located ~~which is located~~ about 30 miles this side of Devil's Lake

where he left all the sick and broken down men - and a large portion of his ponderous train, with a sufficient guard to defend them if attacked. He then immediately started for the Missouri with 1436 infantry, 520 Cavalry, 100 pioneers and artillery, and 25 days rations. On July 22 he crossed the James River forty eight miles west of Camp Atchinson. And on the 24th had reached the vicinity of Big Mound

beyond the Second Ridge of the Missouri Plateau. Here the Scouts reported large bodies of Indians with Red Plume and Standing Buffalo among them.

On the 24th of July in anticipation of an attack from the large force supposed to be in the neighborhood, the General corralled his train, and threw up earth works for its protection, so as to enable it to be defended by a smaller force than would be necessary if it was uncovered. The Indians soon appeared in considerable numbers, Dr. Weiser Surgeon of the First Minnesota Range who had resided at Shakopee many years, and supposed he recognized some old acquaintances among the Indians, incautiously approached them and was immediately shot dead. Lieutenant Freeman who was at some distance from the camp was also killed. At 3 P.M. in the midst of a terrific thunder storm the battle opened. The first battalion of Cavalry under Col. McPhail supported by two companies of

the Seventh Infantry advanced to divide the Indians. The Sixth Regiment under Col. Crooks and part of the Seventh deployed on the right of the camp, while Lieut. Col. Averie with two companies deployed on the left. Col. Marshall with five companies of the Seventh advanced up a ravine, Col. Baker with part of the Tenth was retained to guard the camp. Genl. Sibley supported by one company of the Tenth under Captain Edgerton took a six pounder on to an eminence and opened fire on the enemy who were occupying the head of the ravine; A general advance was ordered. The Indians ^{about 1500 strong} retreated before the troops in the direction of their camp situated some five miles to the southward, and a general panic ensued; the Indian camp was abandoned, and the whole throng men women and children fled before the advancing forces. They were closely pursued by Col. McPhail supported by the Seventh, part of the Tenth and Whipples section

of a battery. Numerous charges were made on the fleeing enemy amid the roaring of the thunder and the flashing of the lightning. One private was killed by lightning and Col. McPhail's saber was knocked out of his hand by the same force.

The Indians ^{are reported to have} lost in this fight ^{they also} eight killed and wounded - and lost nearly all their camp equipment which was strewn along their trail in reckless profusion, as it was abandoned in their flight. The cavalry pursued them about fifteen ^{miles} and the Infantry about ten miles beyond the original point of the engagement. An order sent by ^{to the prisoners to bivouac where night caught them} Lieutenant Beven was misunderstood, or misunderstood, and the pursuing column returned and was met the next morning by ^{the} advancing force just about the time of starting ~~the camp~~. This misfortune gave the Indians at least two days advantage and they did not fail to make the most of it, putting as wide a gap between themselves and their pursuers as possible.

The part of the command

which had joined in the pursuit were worn out with fatigue and want of water, and the whole force was compelled to rest for a day. The Battle of Big Blount, as this engagement was called, was a decided victory, and counted heavily in the scale of advantage as it put the Savages on the run for a place of safety and materially disabled them from prosecuting further hostilities.

On the 26th the command again moved forward in the direction of the fleeing Indians; their abandoned camp was passed on that day early in the morning; about noon the Scouts reported "Indians," and large bodies of them became visible. A skirmish line under Col. Crooks was thrown out supported by Capt. Chase and his pioneers, and Whipples section of Sip pomders. The Savages attempted a flank movement on the left which was checked by Capt. Taylor and his Mounted Rangers. Another attack was made which was repulsed by Lieut. Col. Averill with two

companies of the Sixth, aided by Capt. Taylor's Rangers, who came to his assistance. A running fight was kept up until about three o'clock in the afternoon when a bold dash was made to stampede the animals which were herded on the bank of a lake, but this attempt was promptly met and defeated by Wilson and Dury's companies of Cavalry and Sip companies of the Sixth under Major M. Loren, who were thrown out in an extended line to the left effectually protecting that flank from the enemy. The Indians failed at all points, and having suffered serious losses in killed and wounded retired from the field. At night earth works were thrown up to secure the camp from night surprise. Thus ended the battle known as "The Battle of Dead Buffalo Lake".

The General was now convinced that the Indians were going toward the Missouri with the purpose of putting that River between themselves and his command, and

expecting General Sully's force to be there to intercept them, he was determined to push them on as rapidly as possible, inflicting all the damage he could in their flight.

The Campaign was well conceived, and had Sully arrived in time the result would undoubtedly have been the complete destruction or capture of the Indians. But low water delayed Sully to such an extent that he failed to arrive in time, and as the sequel will show they succeeded in crossing the River before Sibley could overtake them.

The Battle of Stony Lake.

On the 28th of July 1863, Indians were again seen, and in immense numbers they endeavored to encircle the troops. They certainly presented a force of two thousand fighting men, and had undoubtedly been reinforced by friends from the west side of the Missouri. Col. Baker was directed to deploy two companies as

skirmishers, and the rest of the command was immediately placed in line. With Col. Crooks and the Sixths on the right, and Col. Marshall with the Seventh ^{and} McPhails Cavalry on the left. A tremendous effort was made to break our lines, but the enemy was repulsed at all points. Col. Baker with the Tenth bore the brunt of the fight being in advance where the assault was most furious and determined. The artillery did good work, but the Indians finally retreated and fled in a panic and rout toward the Missouri. They were hotly pursued and on the 29th the troops crossed Apple Creek, a small stream a few miles from the present site of Bismarck the capital of North Dakota, and pushing on struck the Missouri at a point about four miles above Burnt Boat Island. The Indians had succeeded in crossing the River with their families, but in a very demoralized condition as to supplies and camp equipment. They were plainly visible on the bluffs on the opposite side.

It was here that Lieut. Beaver lost his life while carrying an order; he missed the trail and was ambushed and killed. Lieut. Beaver was a young Englishman who had volunteered to accompany the expedition, and whom Genl. Sibley had placed upon his staff as an aid.

Large quantities of wagons and other materials abandoned by the Indians in their haste to cross the river were destroyed. The bodies of Lieut. Beaver and a private of the Sixth Regiment who was killed in same way were recovered, and buried.

It is very clear that the Indians on learning of the magnitude of the expedition which was moving against them, never contemplated overcoming it in battle, and made their movements with reference to delaying its progress, while they pushed their women and children with all expedition towards and across the river knowing there was no resting place for them on this side; they succeeded admirably but their success was solely attributable

to the failure of Genl. Sully to arrive in time. Genl. Sibley's part of the campaign was carried out to the letter, and every man in it from Commander to private is entitled to the highest praise.

On the 31st of July the order was given to prepare for the march homeward. And on August 1st the command moved from camp at 5³⁰ A.M. As was afterward learned Genl. Sully was then distant down the river 160 miles. His delay was no fault of his, but was occasioned by insurmountable obstacles. The march home was a weary but uneventful one. The campaign of 1863 may be summed up as follows, The troops marched nearly 1200 miles, they fought three well contested battles, they drove from 8000 to 10,000 Indians out of the State and across the Missouri River. They lost only seven killed and three wounded, and inflicted upon the enemy so serious a loss that he never again returned to his old haunts.

For his meritorious services Genl. Sibley was appointed a major Genl. by brevet on Nov. 29, 1865. While appointment was duly confirmed by the Senate, and he was commissioned on April 7, 1866.

Campaign of 1864.

The Government wisely concluded not to let the Indian question rest on the results of the campaign of 1863, which left the Indians in possession of the country west of the Missouri; rightly supposing they might construe their escape from General Sully into a victory. It therefore sent out another expedition in 1864 to pursue and attack them beyond the Missouri. The plan and outfit was very similar to that of the year previous. General Sully was again to proceed up the Missouri, ^{with a large command} and meet a force sent out from Minnesota which forces when combined were to march westward and find and punish the savages if possible. The expedition as a whole was under the command of Genl Sully. It consisted of two Brigades, the first composed of Iowa & Kansas Cavalry to the number of several thousand, which was to start from Sioux City and proceed up the Missouri in Steamboats. The second embraced the Eighth Regiment of Minnesota Volunteer

mounded on horses

Infantry under Col. Thomas and the Second Minnesota Cavalry under Col. McTear, the Second or Minnesota Brigade commanded by Col. Thomas.

This Brigade left Fort Snelling on June 1st and proceeded westward. General Sully and Staff accompanied it as far as Fort Bridgely which point it reached on the 5th of June. On the 9th it passed head Lake the scene of the fight in 1862. About this point it overtook a large train of emigrants on their way to Idaho who had with them 100 wagon loads of supplies. This train was escorted to the Missouri River safely. The march was wearisome in the extreme; intense hot weather and very bad water, only enlivened by the appearance of an occasional herd of Buffalo, a band of Antelope, or an ^{straggling} elk. The James River was reached June 21st. The movements of the command were carefully watched by flying parties of Indians during its whole march. On July 1st the Missouri was reached at the point

where now stands Fort Rice. Genl Sully and the First Brigade had arrived the day before. The crossing was made by the boats that had brought up the 1st Brigade. The column was immediately directed towards the Cannon Ball River where 1800. Lodges of Indians were reported to be encamped, all bands of the enemy in the line of march fled before approaching troops. On the last of July the Heart River was reached, where a camp was formed and the teams and tents left behind. The command thus relieved pressed forward for an Indian camp eighty miles to the northward. On the 2^d day of August the Indians were found in large numbers on the Big Knife River in the Bad Lands. These were Unci Papah Sioux who had murdered a party of Dakota miners the year before, and had given aid and comfort to the Minnesota refugee Indians. They were immediately attacked and a very spirited engagement ensued, in which the enemy was badly beaten and suffered

severe losses. The place where this battle was fought was called "La-Ka-ho-Ku-tay" or the Bluff where the man shot the deer.

On the next day August 3^d the command moved west through the Bad Lands, and just as they emerged from ^{this} terribly rugged country they were sharply attacked by a very large body of savages. The fight lasted through two days and nights when the enemy retired in haste. They were very roughly handled in this engagement.

Genl Sully then crossed to the west side of the Yellow Stone River at the point where Fort Stevenson now stands, where the weary soldiers found two Government Steamers awaiting them with ample supplies. In crossing this rapid river the command lost three men and about twenty horses. From this point they proceeded homeward by the way Fort Union, Berthold and Stevenson, reaching Fort Rice on the 9th of September.

On this trip Genl Sully located Forts Rice, Stevenson and Berthold.

On reaching Rice considerable anxiety was felt for the fate of Capt. Fick, who with a squad of fifty troops had left the Fort as an escort to a train of Indian emigrants and been attacked 180 miles west of the Fort, and been compelled to entrench. He had sent for reinforcements, and Sully sent him 300 men who extricated him from his dangerous position.

The Minnesota Brigade returned home by the way of Fort Wadsworth where they arrived on Sept. 27th. Here Major Rose with six companies of the Second Cavalry was left to garrison the fort.

The balance of the command reaching Fort Snelling on the 12th of October.

This expedition completed the Indian war of Minnesota so far as our troops were directly engaged in it. In the numbers of ~~the~~ Indians engaged in it, together with their superior fighting qualities, their ornament and the country occupied by them,

it ranks among the most important of the Indian wars fought since the first settlement of country on the Atlantic coast, but when viewed in the light of the numbers of settlers and others massacred, the amount of property destroyed, and the horrible atrocities committed by the savages it ^{far} surpasses them all.

Chas. E. Flannery.