



Committee on Resettlement of
Japanese Americans. Minneapolis
Chapter records, 1942-1944.

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The Total Evacuation

For the first time in American history the Government has evacuated all members of one racial group from their places of permanent settlement on the Pacific Coast to designated and confined areas. Of the 110,000 persons thus affected, 70,000 are American citizens. They are exiles in their native land.

In the fifteen months since the evacuation, there has been time to consider the implications of the evacuation for all minorities. A dangerous precedent has been established, and "to many citizens of alien parentage in this country it has come as a profound shock that almost overnight thousands of persons have discovered that their citizenship no longer stands between them and the treatment accorded to any enemy alien within our borders in time of war." (Congregational Committee on Defense Migration report, May 1942)

Resettlement

There is no question that resettlement is the only solution of this problem. The responsible government authority is bending every effort to relocate these people in different communities throughout the country. The return to normal society of the people of Japanese ancestry now detained behind barbed wire is closely tied up with the ideals which we as a nation are fighting for: a fair, free America, with justice and liberty for all.

A statement of the War Relocation Authority, a civilian agency appointed by the President, reads in part as follows:

"The relocation of these people—both citizens and aliens whose records indicate that they would not endanger the security of the country—in normal communities where they may enjoy the full benefits of American justice, is a national problem deserving the thoughtful consideration of every person who believes in American principles. All together, the Japanese American population evacuated from the West Coast comprises less than one-tenth of one percent of our total population. Dispersed throughout the interior of the country, only a few families to any one community, they should be able, with their wide diversity of skills, to contribute notably to the civilian and war-time needs of the Nation.

"Both the War Department and the Department of Justice have examined and approved the relocation proceedings of the War Relocation Authority, which includes an investigation of each evacuee's previous behavior and attitudes, and a record check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation before leave is granted from a Relocation Center."

The Christian Church is challenged to assume the leadership in repairing the damage to the faith, hope, and courage of the evacuated people. Christians have a special responsibility in helping to solve the problems created by the evacuation. The Government has officially sought our assistance. The evacuees need our help. Will you do your part?

The People

The older evacuees, the aliens, who comprise one-third of the relocation center population, are barred from citizenship by naturalization by our immigration laws, which do not permit Orientals to acquire citizenship, if born outside the United States and territories. They have lived here as "Permanent Residents" under

our laws at least since 1924—the majority of them for three decades or longer.

The Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department of Justice has said, "The loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the evacuees (to the United States) has not seriously been questioned by informed persons."

Milton Eisenhower, first director of the W.R.A., told the Tolan Committee that the second generation Americans of Japanese descent who were born in this country "have attended only American schools, with other American children. They have learned the democratic way. They know no other way. Many of them are in the American Army. Most of them can speak no other language but ours. They are thoroughly Americanized."

Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, states: "These Americans of Japanese origin are to Japan what you and I are to England, Scotland, Ireland, Germany, France and other European countries. They are Americans, but they are also the 'cousins of the New World.' I am proud of my trans-Atlantic cousins, and do not feel myself to be any the less American for that; and I would respect any American of Japanese descent who tried to contribute to our common, free American life those especially good qualities which he may inherited from his trans-Pacific origin. We in America are in a real sense the apostles of the future; we show the rest of mankind what men of diverse races and cultures can accomplish with a common good will. We Americans, of all races and creeds, fight the evils of despotic and selfish militarism."

But, the parents of many of the Japanese Americans who are serving as OUR soldiers in the South Pacific, Africa, and in the skies over Europe, are now living in the Relocation Centers. Their sons are good enough to fight and die for democracy, but we do not permit the benefits of democracy to be extended to them.

Loyalty cannot develop properly in an atmosphere of fear and discrimination behind barbed wire. It grows best in an atmosphere of freedom and trust.

Suggestions for Action

The War Relocation Authority is opening up work opportunities for the evacuees throughout the country. There is a shortage of competent manpower, and employers are anxious to use their idle skills and minds. But the problem of finding houses in which evacuees might live in the different communities threatens the whole resettlement program. The need for housing is urgent. This is true in all the large cities where there is much war work and applies to all newcomers to the community.

The YWCA, the YMCA, and hostels which have been opened under the auspices of the church boards, can provide only temporary residence. The need is for rooms and apartments where evacuees can make themselves at home for a considerable period.

Homes must be found. Will you help provide homes in which the evacuees can live like other citizens? Will you of the churches open your homes, allow them to rent your apartments, to rent or sub-lease your rooms? You may never have rented a room before; will you do so now in this present great need? Will you discuss this matter of housing with your friends and make a list or registry of available rooms and apartments in your community and send that information to this Committee, or to the committee cooperating

on relocation in your city? (For the addresses of local committees and War Relocation Offices, address this Committee.)

Christian Action

Every agency in the Church can participate in the resettlement program. The different organizations and clubs should plan to open up opportunities for social and religious fellowship. Invite the evacuees to participate in the meetings and different functions of the church. Do more than invite them; make them feel welcome. Call for them and bring them with you. Be friendly. A minister in each section of the community might assume the responsibility for directing the evacuees to the proper church and act as the clearing agent for his neighborhood.

Assimilation and Integration

Keep a record of each evacuee coming into your community, his address, church preference, special interests, etc. Set up districts and apportion responsibility for evacuee integration to the churches, the YMCA, and the YWCA in the particular area.

Special attention should be given to the development of a sound program to prevent the formation of a "Little Tokyo" or segregated district in your community. Do not plan large functions for the benefit exclusively of the Japanese Americans. The evacuees coming to your city are eager to find a place in the normal community life. Urge them to participate in the group life of the community. Make them feel they belong.

The evacuees will be lonely; they will need friends and activity. Explore the opportunities for evening classes for training and adult education in your community—folk dancing, and hobby groups, and special interest groups, such as art and music, social clubs, volunteer defense services, etc., so that they may find an outlet for interests outside the job.

The problems of maladjustment can best be handled by a person familiar with good standards in the field of social work. The Social Service Department of the city council of Churches and staff members of Councils of Social Agencies represent latent resources here.

Community Interpretation

This can best be done by informed people able to tell the whole story of the evacuation and resettlement of the people of Japanese ancestry. For current information call upon your nearest WRA office, the national headquarters of the WRA in Washington, or this Committee. Discussions in small church groups, service clubs, and other organizations concerned with current problems will be helpful. A few speakers able to lead public discussions might do much to develop a favorable community attitude toward evacuees.

Organization

If your community is large, it will be best if a committee is organized to explore the possibilities and to make this a community project. Invite ministers, local civic leaders, social workers, YM and YW Secretaries to sit on the committee. There may be one already established in your city. Consult us if you are in doubt.

Functions of Organized Efforts

Functions of organized efforts as well as the nature of any such organization will vary according to each

community situation, but the main tasks may be stated as follows:

1. Housing
2. Planning for assimilation and integration of evacuees into the community.
3. Public relations (locally)
4. Emergency care
5. Christian fellowship
6. Record-keeping (including correspondence with WRA and national cooperating agencies.)

Talking Points

If you need informative reinforcement for the statement that resettlement is a great challenge to our concepts of Christianity and democracy, we suggest the following to support the justice of resettlement efforts:

1. Two-thirds of the evacuees of the total 110,000 who have been in Relocation Centers are American citizens—fellow American citizens! Their parents have lived and worked in America for thirty or more years. They have been law-abiding and thrifty.
2. Their brothers, husbands, and sweethearts, are in the United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps fighting the war. There are over 8000 Americans of Japanese descent wearing American uniforms. Another 5000 have recently been recruited.
3. The great majority of Japanese Americans are loyal to the United States. This is not propaganda. The majority of them, when the order for evacuation was announced, said in a true patriotic spirit that they would take it and bear it as their duty and sacrifice for the cause of their country. We doubt if any other racial group would have taken such tremendous physical and mental discomfort as gracefully as did these citizens.
4. Among the letters and affidavits quoted in the Tolan Report (Fourth Interim Report, pp. 48-58) are found the following quotations:
 - a. "The War Department has received no information of sabotage committed by Japanese during the attack on Pearl Harbor." (Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, March 30)
 - b. "Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has advised me there was no sabotage committed there (in Hawaii) prior to December 7, on December 7, or subsequent to that time." (James Rowe, Jr., Assistant to the Attorney General, April 20, 1942)
 - c. "... There were no acts of sabotage committed in the City and County of Honolulu December 7, nor have there been acts of sabotage reported to the Police Department since that date." (Honolulu Chief of Police, Gabrielson)
 - d. "You can say, without fear of contradiction, that there has not been a single act of sabotage." (Chief Agent, Hawaii, Federal Bureau of Investigation to Blake Clarke, summer of 1942)
5. The criminal record of Japanese on the West Coast is the lowest of any racial group.
6. They have generously contributed to community philanthropic enterprises and to National Defense Bond sales. Public relief of persons of Japanese descent has been uniformly nil. Their pride in

self-support has been sorely hurt by dependence resulting from this evacuation.

7. The intellectual and educational standards of the Japanese Americans are among the highest of any racial unit in the country. Their Americanization has been more complete than that of most national groups in two generations. They speak English fluently, and Japanese little—if at all.
8. Japanese Americans who are released from the centers have been educated in our American schools. They have been reared according to American standards; they act and think as Americans.
9. Our great concern now is that the long inactivity of these desirable people will reduce their skills, and that forced segregation from normal life will have an un-American and un-Christian influence upon them.
10. We should not now, by our deliberate action, add to the flames of propaganda within Japan, and throughout Asia and Africa, against us and against the white man in general.
11. Relocation Centers are undesirable. Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director of the WRA, states: "After many months of operating Relocation Centers, the War Relocation Authority is convinced that they are undesirable institutions and should be removed from the American scene as soon as possible. Life in a Relocation Center is an unnatural and un-American sort of life. Keep in mind that the evacuees were charged with nothing except having Japanese ancestors; yet the very fact of their confinement in Relocation Centers fosters suspicion of their loyalties and adds to their discouragement. It has added weight to the contentions of the enemy that we are fighting a race war: That this nation preaches democracy and practices racial discrimination. Many of the evacuees are now living in Japanese communities for the first time, and the small group of pro-Japanese which entered the Relocation Centers has gained converts." (Office of War Information Release, May 14, 1943)

Let Us Go Full Speed Ahead!

7,000 evacuees have already been resettled throughout the country, many employed in defense plants, manufacturing bombs and aircraft. The United States Map Service employs twenty-four Japanese and Japanese Americans in one middle western city.

In the fall of 1942, 10,000 evacuees were employed in the beet fields in the west and saved enough sugar to supply 10,000,000 people with their annual sugar needs.

The Government is already over-taxed with the care of the evacuees. The cooperation of our citizens will relieve the Government materially and present a humane solution of the problems of individuals who are deprived of their citizenship rights temporarily.

Here is indeed a concrete Christian enterprise which is at the same time democratic and, in the best sense of the term, American.

Address all correspondence to
GEORGE E. RUNDQUIST, Executive Secretary
Committee on Resettlement of Japanese Americans
297 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y.
Telephone GRamercy 5-3475

Price 3c per copy

Planning Resettlement of Japanese Americans

Exiles in Their Native Land . . .

70,000 American-born citizens whose only crime is their racial visibility have been forcibly removed from their homes and deprived of their freedom. They are living behind barbed wire, exiles in their native land.

THE COMMITTEE ON RESETTLEMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS

sponsored jointly by

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America
and the Home Missions Council of North America

in cooperation with

The Foreign Missions Conference of North America

297 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y.

July, 1943

ORIGINAL DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM ON RELATIONS BETWEEN MINNEAPOLIS COMMITTEE AND W.R.A.

I. FUNCTION OF THE MINNEAPOLIS WAR RELOCATION VOLUNTEER COMMITTEE.

It is the function of the Committee to cooperate with the War Relocation Authority, in the interest of the Nisei, and of the Community at large, ~~to cooperate~~, in relocating and placing in employment Japanese-Americans now detained in War Relocation Centers under Government Authority. It is also the function of this committee to aid in the adjustment of these American Citizens to the life of the community by aiding them in finding proper housing and in helping them to participate in the normal life of the city.

II. WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LOCAL COMMITTEE AND THE W.R.A.

1. As of November, 1942, with Mr. Holland.

It was Mr Holland's proposal, at the initial meeting with Community representatives that the local committee would share in the responsibility of opening opportunities for employment for Nisei, and in selecting Nisei to be sent to the city to fill these positions, the number not to exceed two hundred persons.

As a result of this agreement, the ~~local~~ committee explored the community employment conditions together with the United States Employment Service and the War Manpower Commission area supervisor, determined those fields in which there is not a surplus of labor ~~to be exported~~, so that Nisei might be invited to the city to take jobs in these fields. In order to safeguard the community against a double-wage scale and a problem of race prejudice because of under-cutting or over-charging on local prevailing rates of pay, the committee established its work under the supervision of the War Manpower Commission, in the offices of the United States Employment Service.

In order to give satisfaction to the employer, it used USES-511 registration blanks for enrollment of Nisei in the centers. This constituted a bone-fide expression on the part of the Nisei of interest in employment in Minneapolis, and eliminated from consideration those Nisei not wishing to be considered for employment in this city.

In order to give satisfaction to the Nisei, the United States Employment personnel coded these registrations according to the dictionary of Occupations, so that placement could be made at the highest level of the applicant's skill and at prevailing wages.

In order to protect the Community from a pool of unemployed Nisei, the Committee adhered strictly, in its invitations to Nisei to those fields in which the community was short of labor and placed only with employers willing to pay the wage indicated by the USES as the prevailing wage for the type of work in question.

2. Proposed in March, 1943, by Mr Shirell, Area Supervisor.

It is the understanding of the Committee that previous working agreements between the local committee and the WRA were wiped out when Mr Shirell proposed that henceforth placement be entirely within the jurisdiction of the representative of the War Relocation Authority, Mr C.L.White.

"The WRA must do its own work," said Mr Shirell, "and the responsibility must rest with the man who is its representative."

Specifically this means, that in all matters of policy making in placement, selection of fields of employment, selection of candidates for employment, decision as to numbers of Nisei to be absorbed by the Community, sole authority rests with the War Relocation Authority State Representative.

Mr. Shirell spoke of "mass relocations," "Speeding up." "We hope you will continue to work as you have been working, but that all work will be done."

be centered in the office of Mr White."

If this proposal were to be accepted, the Committee on behalf of the Community would become a committee whose function it is to do its best to adjust to the life of the city whatever number, type of worker, at whatever wage the Authority sees fit to arrange for: ("Tell them to take a couple," said Mr Shirell in speaking of a job of gardening, "all they'll need is bowl of rice and a little pay,")

"We are going to be hard-boiled," said Mr Shirell, "once they are in the community and placed, we will wash our hands of them. Unless there is a particularly acute problem (a pogrom for instance?) the community committee must care for replacements."

III. POSITION OF THE LOCAL COMMITTEE ON PRESENT WAR RELOCATION POLICY AS PRESENTED BY MR SHIRELL.

1. The committee asserts that it is the right of the community to decide as to the number of Nisei it will absorb, and in what fields of labor they shall be used. Minneapolis is a reservoir of labor in most fields, from which labor is at present being exported. In those fields Nisei should not be invited to seek employment lest they create for themselves a problem of rejection and for the community a problem of race prejudice. In all cases where employed, Nisei should be placed, if college trained at the level of their training and experience, if unskilled at prevailing community pay for the work to be done.

2. While the Committee and the community as a whole have been friendly to the Nisei themselves, whom they consider a valuable addition to the city population where they are properly placed and employed in fields where there is not now a surplus of unemployed, it rejects the present policy of the WRA as presented by Mr Shirell. In so doing it is conscious that it may seem to be rejecting the Nisei. This is not true. It wishes to protect them, as American citizens, and the community, against the fruits of short-sighted relocation policies which will create problems for both.

3. It is the intention of the Committee to continue to help all American citizens who are Nisei who write to it, or approach it for assistance in sound placement, but to resist the War Relocation Authority's program through the cooperation of the Area War Manpower Commission and through the organizations of the city wherever it finds it irresponsible toward the Nisei and toward the democratic privilege of the city to decide on its own policies of absorption of a minority group. It takes this action in the interest of the Nisei themselves and of the community.

INTRODUCTION

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The story of the Japanese-Americans is that of a racial minority group eager to adapt itself to American culture, yet rejected at every point. The anti-Orientalists of the Pacific Coast are "race purists", and they emphasized the problem until even the fair minded and sincere citizens of that area supported the movement because of the fear of a situation which would "make the black problem of the South look white in comparison."* The lack of government regulation gave free reign to the opposition, and, inadvertently, the United States Government helped to create a problem which it most anxiously wished to avoid. The problem is here now; it must be solved. The Japanese-Americans themselves are willing to be assimilated, but there has been no real opportunity offered to them.

The solution of this problem will be a real test of our democracy, and it may well determine the future status of racial minority groups. For if we can successfully assimilate the Nisei and their children, we can set a world-wide example. If this is accomplished, we will have no more problem; if it is not, we may be entering into the most destructive and bitter conflicts the world has ever seen. This would be a race war between the white and colored races, and would probably result in the annihilation of the former. It is the fate we may very likely have at stake; this issue is of prime importance to every man, woman, and child in the United States.

* Carey McWilliams, Brothers under the Skin. (Boston, 1943) p. 184.

The history of the Japanese-Americans properly begins in 1853 when Commodore Perry of the United States Navy visited Japan on an official mission and effected the first outside contact which the Japanese Government had established since 1638. Japan would have preferred to preserve her policy of isolation, but both the internal and external pressure was too great for her to do so. Fifteen years later, in 1868, she was finally forced to come out of her seclusion to the extent of permitting her students to study abroad under the conditions of the "Charter Oath", which directed that "...knowledge shall be sought through out the world, so that the foundations of the Empire may be strengthened."¹ This decree and the Edict of 1871

1 Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States. (Stanford University, 1932) p.3.

abolished seclusion permanently in favor of contacts and dealings with the Western world.² However, it was not until 1884, when the

2 Ibid. p.4.

Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association asked for Japanese labor, that emigration became very noticeable.³ The labor and peasant emigrat-

3 Carey McWilliams, Brothers under the Skin. (Boston, 1943) p.147.

ion which ensued was prompted by two main causes. First, the economic conditions in Japan at that time were such that almost any employment in a foreign land would be more profitable to the lower caste Japanese, and, second, emigration was an excellent mode of escape from the national draft.⁴

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The first great exodus was to Hawaii where many settled, while others went on to Canada, the United States, and South America. The Hawaiian immigration and emigration continued steadily over a long period of time, but the greatest surge to America covered only a brief span of about twenty years, from about 1890, when there were 2,039 Japanese in the country, to 1910, when the total Japanese population reached 72,157.⁵ That amounted to approximately 70,000

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5 McWilliams, op. cit., p.148.
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people in two decades, 20,000 of whom arrived in 1903, and 31,000 more in 1907.⁶ Many came from Hawaii, but by far the greater number,

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6 Iohihashi, op. cit., p.
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54,834 to be exact, entered directly from Japan.⁷ This great influx

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7 R. D. McKenzie, "Oriental Immigration", The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
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consisted for the most part of lower caste Japanese, although a good many students settled in the United States after completing their studies.

As soon as the number of Japanese immigrants began to double and redouble each year, the inhabitants of the West Coast area took steps to check their advance and introduced restrictive and suppressive measures which grew progressively severer as the immigration increased. Organized labor, patriotic societies, and other pressure groups initiated a vigorous anti-Japanese campaign, which largely evolved from the "...smouldering fires of the earlier Chinese trouble... which was easily stirred by this new yellow menace."⁸ The first anti-Japan-

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3 Hale, op. cit., p.6.
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ese mass meeting was held in San Francisco, on May 8, 1900, at the peak of the first great influx.⁹ Others were held later, and alth-

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9 McWilliams, op. cit., p.149.
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ough tension between the United States and Japan was rapidly increasing, the people of the Pacific Coast did not seem to realize the international significance of their actions. For example, the San Francisco School Board passed a resolution in 1906 requiring children of Japanese immigrants to attend special Oriental schools in Chinatown, although there were only ninety three Japanese children in the whole city.¹⁰ This obvious insult elicited a vigorous protest from

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10 R. D. McKenzie, "Oriental Immigration", The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
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the Japanese Government, but the federal government of the United States was almost powerless to violate its States' Rights. In addition, "Japan had just emerged triumphant from the Russo-Japanese War, so a turning point in Japanese-American relations had been reached."¹¹

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11 Carey McWilliams, Brothers under the Skin. (Boston, 1943) p.150.
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At this point, on March 14, 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt, by authority of Congress, prohibited all "undesirable" Japanese from entering the United States by way of Canada, Hawaii, or Mexico. The crisis was still impending until a little later, when he negotiated the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907-1908, for "Japan preferred the prevention of immigration to humiliating legislation."¹² By the terms of

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12 Sidney L. Gulick, The American Japanese Problem. (New York, 1914), p.186.
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this treaty, Japan restricted immigration to "non-laborers" who were

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coming to America to join relatives or to assume control of an interest in a farming or business enterprise.¹³ There are various

13 William Q. Hale, "The Japanese-American Student Relocation."
(Haverford College, 1943) p.7.

opinions as to the effectiveness of the Agreement, but the figures indicate that the number of passports granted to Japanese fell from 30,824 in 1907 to 16,418 in 1908 and to 3,275 in 1909.¹ This constituted a drop of twenty-eight thousand entries within two years.¹⁴

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14 Ichihashi, op. cit., p.
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Japanese Immigration to the United States
1885-1932 15

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15 Francis James Brown and John Slabey Rousek, editors, Our Racial and National Minorities. (New York, 1937) p.476.
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Although there were doubtless many illegal entries, Gulick said in 1914 that "...under the effective operation of the 'Gentleman's Agreement' Japanese immigration has ceased and the number of Japanese in the United States is decreasing"¹⁶

16 Gulick, op. cit., p.190
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It would seem obvious that the Gentlemen's Agreement was successful in keeping out the Japanese for a while, at least, but the Californians and other Pacific Coast citizens did not feel that it kept them down. Accordingly, a series of anti-alien land laws were formulated which were supposed to protect the American farmers, but which really were aimed at keeping out new immigrants and discouraging those already settled.¹⁷ "Any ineligible alien was not permitted

17 Carey McWilliams, "Once Again the Yellow Peril," Nation, vol. CXL. (June 28, 1935) pp. 735-36.

to own land, form a corporation, sell stocks, or inherit property." In case of any violation of this law, the property or corporation so acquired automatically went to the State.¹⁸ "This act made it impos-

18 Gulick, op. cit., pp. 333-335.

ible for the Japanese to purchase, own, and inherit property, even for residential purposes."¹⁹ Formidable as this act was, it was not

19 Ibid., p. 333.

very strictly adhered to by either side, since each group found it to their convenience to violate it more often than not. Still, it was always a weapon, and it did block immigrants who wished to enter under the Gentlemen's Agreement, since they could not come to assume control of any farming or business enterprise. The suppression continued with new land bills enacted in 1920, 1923, and 1924,²⁰ while in 1914

20 Hale, op. cit., p.

feeling flared up when the Kaiser called the Japanese "the yellow peril" hoping to create dissension between the two countries.

Although Japan was our ally in the World War, the restricti-

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measures continued, and, in 1918, the dispute over the import of "picture Brides" started by the "Asiatic Exclusion League" was so hot that the Japanese on the West Coast themselves petitioned Japan to issue no more passports to females.³¹ In spite of this re-

31 "In Japan, most marriages are arranged by the parents of the parties involved, usually with the aid of a go-between. Naturally this institution was used in arranging marriages between men in the United States and women in Japan....The cost and difficulty of travel were additional reasons for its use." Brown and Roucek, op. cit., p.474.

quest and the resulting ban, a large number of women were smuggled in by way of Hawaii. Many "West Coast persons" felt this to be unfair; yet one can hardly blame the immigrants for desiring to establish homes and families, even against the wish of the "West Coast persons." As I said, the opposition increased as the immigration totals rose again after the Japan-United States treaty in 1911, so that well organized attempts were made again to cut down the flow and reduce competition in 1919-1921. As E. K. Stronge said,

It was fairly generally accepted that this the Gentlemen's Agreement had failed to exclude Japanese ~~immigrants~~ as desired. But men differed as to the degree of desirable restriction and the method of accomplishment.³³

33 E. K. Stronge, The Second Generation Japanese Problem. (Stanford University, 1934) p.8.

The answer to this problem was the Immigration Act of 1924, also called the "Oriental Exclusion Act." There was considerable opposition in Congress to the bill, but, because of the determined efforts of the Western and Southern Senators, it was finally passed. When the passage of the Act was announced, the respective ambassadors immediately resigned, and a tremendous blow to the international relations between the two countries was struck.³⁴ The law excluded all ineligible alien from citizenship in America, and it was obviously aimed at the

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k Japanese in America, and , through them, Japan itself.

Even after the Exclusion Act had been well established, incidents continued to multiply and tension to develop. There was a brief lull in 1930, but affairs were increasingly complicated thereafter. The Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, and, in 1940, Japan joined the Axis. These events had a profound effect on the Japanese in America and their children, the Japanese-Americans, which will be discussed later in the paper under the heading of, "Special Problems as the War Developed." The constant trouble affected our foreign policy, as well, for the Japanese could neither understand nor respect a government which was unable to control the actions of its citizens. This attitude doubtless contributed materially to the feeling of racial and national superiority with which Japan entered the present war, and may be reckoned as a cause of it, as well.

3. Important Factors in Race Relationships.

The reasons for the Japanese immigration to America were largely economic and political. Like most of the immigrants who came from the West, the Japanese wished to better their economic and political status in "democratic America." Their departure from Japan was not entirely self-motivated, however, since there were many concerns and groups such as agricultural, lumber companies, and railroads which desired cheap labor which was "...capable of independent subsistence, quick mobilization, submissive of instant dismissal, and entailing no responsibility upon the part of the employer for continuous employment."¹ In addition, there was a "labor vacuum." When the Chinese

1 Carey McWilliams, Brothers under the Skin. (Boston, 1943) p.158.

were excluded in 1882, the Japanese were brought in as replacement

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When the Japanese were debarred, the Mexicans were imported, and the cycle continued indefinitely.² The newcomers were welcome at

2 Francis J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, Our Racial and National Minorities (New York, 1937) p.475-6.

first, but, when the need was satisfied and the crisis was over, they became a sort of parasite on the rest of society, although through no fault of their own. California has a very sensitive economic system which must be kept in balance at all times. Her orchards, vineyards, and other agricultural enterprises need cheap labor, but only for a limited period in the year. Therefore, the new immigrants settled on farms of their own, prior to 1913, and began to make rapid progress in developing waste land into paying ventures. These farmers often married and established homes so permanent that return to Japan was out of the question.

As the American farmers saw the amazing strides which Japanese industry and thrift was producing, they began to fear that they would be pushed out and that the Japanese would eventually control Californian agriculture. To counteract this, they agitated for some form of restrictive measures, and got them in the land laws. These laws forced many Japanese to become tenant farmers, but when prices started to fall because of the removal of the superior Japanese produce, the laws became, to all effects, dead letters. Thereupon, the Japanese moved back on their farms not to be seriously disturbed till 1942.

The Japanese on the West Coast were subject to a great deal of antagonistic propaganda which accentuated and distorted the significance of their ties with Japan. The Japanese were suspect because of their clannishness, their dual citizenship, and their Japanese language schools.³ Actually they were no more clannish than the

3 Ibid. p.163.

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whites, who would have nothing to do with their Oriental neighbors. The claim of dual citizenship was founded on fact, since there was a law which made the children of Japanese nationals Japanese citizens regardless of the parents' wishes. However, the immigrants were quickly losing their closeness to their former homeland. The Japanese government has always had great concern over its nationals abroad, and, in this case, was always quick to protest any mistreatment. Nevertheless, they had some ulterior motives in doing so, for there were supposed to be Japanese agents in this country who had been sent for the express purpose of keeping the "pot boiling" and creating incidents. But the very presence of these agents would seem to indicate rather conclusively that the Japanese in America were not the ones to blame, nor were they co-operating very well with the Japanese Government!

Finally things got so bad that the immigrants themselves petitioned Japan to repeal the law, and, at last, the child was allowed to make his own choice. But the seeds of mistrust had been well sown, and this factor was to reoccur again in 1942. Actually, more than two thirds of all those born in America before 1935 repudiated their Japanese citizenship and became American citizens. This group was the Nisei, who were born here and became American nationals.

As for the language schools, the unbiased educators and investigators who had studied these institutions approved of them as creating closer family ties, since few of the first generation, or Issai, could really speak English very fluently. Besides, any import or export house had to have agents who could speak Japanese, and thus the schools served a double purpose. This campaign of economic and political propaganda was obviously unsuccessful in removing the Japanese; on the contrary, it consolidated them. For it is a sociologic

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axiom that groups segregate under persecution, and the Japanese were no exceptions.

When the Japanese immigrants first arrived in this country, a great many of them made a conscious effort to adopt American customs as best they could. They changed their apparel, their food, their names, their language, and even their religion, but, in spite of these friendly gestures, they had "two strikes on them from the start." The "great influx" occurred simultaneously with Japan's rise to the status of a World Power, so, to many Californians, the immigrants seemed to constitute the spearhead of a possible attack. Besides, the Japanese came to the wrong place. In 1900, California was largely "frontier rural" and had developed a "strong in-group feeling against all out-groups, and this feeling was particularly intense where Orientals were concerned."⁴ The West Coast is a paradise for political demagogues

⁴ McWilliams, op. cit., p.147-149.

and other persons who wish to become well known through racial issues, since the Californians are pugnacious of nature (possibly because of the climate). So it happened that 1900 to 1907 were the worst possible years "for the frontiers of Japan and America to make the first direct contact"⁴ in history, and, in spite of all efforts to the contrary, the ensuing period of conflict seems to have been an inevitable result.

The ecological arrangement of the Japanese in California and the rest of the West Coast followed a fairly consistent pattern. But first of all, it might be well to consider the actual distribution of the population. Eighty percent of the Japanese in America lived in the three Pacific Coast States of Washington, Oregon, and California, and about 88% of these lived in California.⁵ However, this total ma-

⁵ Brown and Roucek, op. cit., p.482.

11
up only one and seven tenths of the population of the state as a whole which is really not a very significant number. Reference to figure two will show the tendency to collect around the large cities in a radius of about one hundred miles. There were several reasons for

Distribution of Japanese Population in the Pacific
Coast States 1900-1930₆

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6 Brown and Rousek, op. cit., p.481.
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this. One was because of the nearness to Japan which was very important to the first generation, although this factor became less and less significant to the succeeding generations. A second reason was the encouragement of the consular offices which were the immigrants' only protection in the early years and which recommended localization on the theory that "in numbers there is strength." "In general, the number of Japanese residents has been greatest where economic activity has been highest," which, of course, was in and about the metropolises of Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.⁷ The city dwellers were mainly occupied by small retail stores which were owned by their own people, and the majority of urbanized Japanese were concentrated in constricted areas. These units were called "Little Tokyos" and were really communities within communities.⁷ These catered to

12
usively to the needs of their own people. Some Chinese and Filipinos also patronized the Japanese stores, but each unit was relatively self-sufficient. It could support only a limited number of college-trained doctors, lawyers, and journalists, so many educated Nisei had to compete with their more favored non-Oriental contemporaries.⁸ But by 1941,

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8 Carey McWilliams, Brothers under the Skin. (Boston, 1943) p.167.
-

Japanese services and retail stores had outgrown their resources and the "death sentence" had been passed on Little Tokyos without their even knowing it.⁹ This was the one phase in the Japanese-American's life which was not changed by the war, for the Nisei were being slowly assimilated by natural processes, and the solidarity of the West Coast Japanese was already starting to dissolve.

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9 Ibid, p.166.
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The immigrants who became farmers excelled, for the most part, in raising fresh vegetables and berries, over which industry they soon obtained a monopoly. Others settled on waste lands which they cultivated with irrigation. "The Japanese and non-Japanese fruit growers and vegetable garden owners "worked out a cooperative plan which enabled them to realize greater returns than the non-Japanese could secure alone."¹⁰ Nevertheless, this cooperation did not extend outside of business contacts, for the whites were always careful to maintain their superordinate social position.

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10 Brown and Roucek, op. cit., p.483.
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The actual cultural pattern of this racial minority group was
it around an internal framework which was made up of eight con-

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trolling elements. As Brown and Roucek describe them, they are as follows:

The basic unit of the social organization of the Japanese in the United States is still the family. Besides this, there are...the (1) ken, or prefectural, groups; (2) occupational groups such as trade unions, employers' organizations, and so forth, modeled after American organizations of this type; (3) the two chief political organizations, the Japanese Association, composed of federated local chapters, and the Japanese-American Citizens League, of American-born persons of Japanese parentage; (4) religious organizations, of Buddhist or Christian type or sectarian Shinto; (5) territorial groups, such as "the community of Winslow"; (6) the Japanese Hall or recreation center; (7) the press, in Japanese language at first, now in a combination of Japanese and English; (8) the economic organization, which is less and less of a natinality type distinct from that of the general population except for the exchange of specialized goods and services, and more that of a division of labor based upon individual ability and interest, with members functioning without much regard for physical characteristics or cultural antecedents.¹¹

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11 Brown and Roucek, op. cit., p.488.
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As time passed, some of these institutions lost much of their influence, but the family still remained supreme until the threat of war divided the Nisei and the Issei into almost hostile factions."

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2 See: "Special Problems as the War Developed", p. .
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But the eighth element, which was described in 1937, seems to bear out the statment that Little Tokyo was doomed before the war. It also indicates that the Nisei were being gradually assimilated, since there was less regard for racial and cultural type. Another noteworthy fact is that the Japanese-Americans have had "an enviable record for law observence and community control, chiefly because of their cultural background of respect for officials and for law and order, impressed by family and community training. I

84 -
proves the important role that the family life and cultural background of the Japanese played in their struggle for acceptance. Their independence is shown by the statement that "In spite of the influence of the economic depression of 1930 to 1936, very few Japanese have been recipients of public relief. Their own community, prefectural, and territorial organizations have supplied their needs mutually."¹³

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¹³ Brown and Roucek, op. cit., p 491.
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As members of the social whole, the Japanese-Americans have not been parasites nor have they been overly aggressive. They have caused little political or economic trouble on their own accord, but have been the victims of some rather unscrupulous groups and individuals. They have carried more than the share of economic and community responsibility which the non-Oriental "West Coast persons" had allotted to them as subordinate beings. "It was really fear of the future which offered the only valid reason for opposition of the Japanese."¹⁴ Certain people exploited this fear for their own ends--politicians, representatives of the people, representatives of the press, persons who were influenced by attitudes built up out of earlier American experience with the Indian, Negro, and Chinese."¹⁴

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¹⁴ Ibid, p.479.
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In summary, the contributions which the Japanese immigrants made in the way of forcing standards up by progressive competition, the development of new farming techniques, and simply in the producing of an intelligent and ambitious new generation outweigh by far the disadvantages and discomforts caused by accommodation.

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is true that they segregated, but not by choice. It is true that they present a competitive element, but on an upwards scale. It is also true that they are different socially and culturally, but they were never assimilated. This factor of assimilation is constantly being developed and it will not be long before the Nisei will be American in more than name and desire, but will be accepted at their true value.

3. Special Problems as the War Developed.

After 1930, it became increasingly difficult for the Nisei to get work. The depression of 1929 had even invaded the streets of Little Tokyo, although most of the unemployed were taken care of. As Fascism began to loom as a menace to world peace, Japan, who had long since adopted a militaristic form of government, also started to loom as our potential enemy. With so many Japanese Americans out of work, there was a great deal of discussion about world affairs. At one extreme were the Kibei (Nisei who had been educated and indoctrinated in Japan) who pointed out the fallacies of democracy, often using a personal application, and extolled the virtues of fascism as a contrast. The Issei wavered inbetween, being more conservative, yet still having an affectionate picture of Japan. At the other end, were most of the Nisei who had neither the indoctrination of the Kibei nor the habit of looking backwards which the Issei had never quite been able to get rid of. They had seen democracy in action, knew its faults, but, nevertheless, having had an occasional taste of freedom at school and on the athletic field were loath to change their minds. The educated Nisei were most pro-democratic of all, since they had long since foreseen what was coming.

When Japan invaded China in 1937, American sympathies were directed towards the Chinese, and this attitude was reflected in the

46
treatment accorded the respective racial groups here in A
It began to be increasingly obvious to the well informed Nisei,
there would be a war and that the Japanese-Americans would be afforded
few considerations. When they tried to convince their parents of
this, they were classed as impudent and radical. "Arriift between the
generations resulted and it widened as the tension between the two
countries increased.¹ But as FBI surveillance increased and as vol-
untary embargoes on Japanese made goods became more prevelant, even
the Issai began to realize the seriousness of the situation. Even so,
up to the last, the older generation as a whole believed that war
would be averted at the eleventh hour.

The position of the children as expressed by a young Nisei
is this.

We belong to ~~another~~ groups, the Japanese and the
Americans. In ancestry and physical appearance we
are Japanese, while in birth, education, in ideals,
and in ways of thinking we are Americans. Neverthe-
less, the older Japanese will not accept us, we are to
too independent, too pert, and too self-confidant,
and the Americans bar us from their group because
we retain the yellow skin and flat nose of the Oriental.
There we stand on the border line which separates
the Orient from the Occident. Though on both sides of
us flow the streams of two great civilizations- the
old Japanese culture with its formed traditions and
customs, and the American civilization with its
freedom and individualism- the chance to perceive
and to imbibe the best things from each has been
withheld from us."¹⁵

¹ Carey McWilliams, Brothers under the Skin, (Boston, 1943) pp.176-1.

It was in this state of dilemma that the Nisei were evacuated
from their homes, and it may be that the relocation and rehabilitation
process will be the decisive factor in the struggle between the gener-
ations for dominance. At the present time, the Nisei are on top, and
if the relocation task is done skillfully and purposefully, a great
step away from the past and towards the future will have been effect-

U.N. leader in state dies

Mrs. Genevieve Steefel, 72, a leader in the United Nations Association of Minnesota, died Wednesday.

She was the wife of Lawrence Steefel, a retired professor of history at the University of Minnesota, who survives. She served as a member of the Mayor's Council on Hu-

man Relations, the board of trustees of the First Unitarian Society of Minneapolis, the board of the Minneapolis Family and Children's Service and the Citizens League.

Services will be at 3 p.m. Monday at the First Unitarian Society of Minneapolis, 900 Mt. Curve Av.

p. 186

DIES, MARTIN, congressman; b. Colorado, Texas, Nov. 5, 1900; s. Martin and Olive M. (Cline) D.; student Wesley Coll. (Greenville) and U. Tex.; LL.B., Nat. U., Washington; m. Myrtle McAdams, June 3, 1920; children—Martin, Robert M., Jack. Began practice, Marshall, Tex., 1920; moved to Orange, 1922; sr. mem. Dies, Stephenson & Dies; mem. 72d to 78th Congresses, 2d Texas Dist.; mem. 83d-85th Congresses, at large; chmn. spl. com. investigate un-American activities. Democrat. Mem. Christian (Disciples) Ch. Home: Lufkin TX Died Nov. 14, 1972.

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[1943]

RELOCATION
of
JAPANESE-AMERICANS



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington, D. C.

MAY 1943



RELOCATION *of* JAPANESE-AMERICANS

Background

During the spring and summer of 1942, the United States Government carried out, in remarkably short time and without serious incident, one of the largest controlled migrations in history. This was the movement of 110,000 people of Japanese descent from their homes in an area bordering the Pacific coast into 10 wartime communities constructed in remote areas between the Sierra Nevada Mountains and the Mississippi River.

The evacuation of these people was started in the early spring of 1942. At that time, with invasion of the west coast looming as an imminent possibility, the Western Defense Command of the United States Army decided that the military situation required the removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry from a broad coastal strip. In the weeks that followed, both American-born and alien Japanese residents were moved from a prescribed zone comprising the entire State of California, the western half of Oregon and Washington, and the southern third of Arizona.

The Relocation Program

The United States Government, having called upon these people to move from their homes, also assumed a responsibility for helping them to become reestablished. To carry out this responsibility, the President on March 18, 1942, created a civilian agency known as the War Relocation Authority.

The job of this agency, briefly, is to assist in the relocation of any persons who may be required by the Army to move from their homes in the interest of military security. So far, the work of WRA has been concerned almost exclusively with people of Japanese descent who formerly lived close to the Pacific rim of the country.

At first, plans were made by the Western Defense Command and the WRA to build accommodations only for a portion of the 110,000 evacuated people. A considerable percentage of them, it was hoped, would move out of the restricted area and resettle inland on their own initiative. During March of 1942, some 8,000 actually did move, but the great majority were held back by limited resources, general uncertainty, and mounting signs of community hostility in the intermountain region. By



An American family of Japanese descent.

the latter part of March, it had become apparent that such a large-scale exodus could be handled effectively only on a planned and systematic basis. Accordingly, all further voluntary evacuation was halted by the Western Defense Command on March 29 and plans were initiated by WRA for establishing relocation centers with sufficient capacity and facilities to handle the entire evacuated population for as long as might be necessary.

The relocation centers, however, are NOT and never were intended to be internment camps or places of confinement. They were established for two primary purposes: (1) To provide communities where evacuees might live and contribute, through work, to their own support pending their gradual reabsorption into private employment and normal American life; and (2) to serve as wartime homes for those evacuees who might be unable or unfit to relocate in ordinary American communities. Under regulations adopted in September of 1942, the War Relocation Authority is now working toward a steady depopulation of the centers by encouraging all able-bodied residents with good records of behavior to reenter private employment in agriculture or industry.

The procedures are relatively simple. At a number of key cities throughout the interior of the country, the WRA has field employees known as relocation officers and relocation supervisors. These men, working in close collaboration with local volunteer committees of interested citizens and with the United States Employment Service, seek out

employment opportunities for evacuees in their respective areas and channel such information to the relocation centers where an effort is made to match up the jobs with the most likely evacuee candidates. Direct negotiations are then started between the employer and the potential employee and final arrangements are made ordinarily by mail.

Before any evacuee is permitted to leave a relocation center for the purpose of taking a job or establishing normal residence, however, certain requirements must be met:

1. A careful check is made of the evacuee's behavior record at the relocation center and of other information in the hands of WRA. In all questionable cases, any information in the possession of the federal investigative agencies is requested and studied. If there is any evidence from any source that the evacuee might endanger the security of the Nation, permission for indefinite leave is denied.

2. There must be reasonable assurance from responsible officials or citizens regarding local sentiment in the community where the evacuee plans to settle. If community sentiment appears so hostile to all persons of Japanese descent that the presence of the evacuee seems likely to cause trouble, the evacuee is so advised and is discouraged from relocating in that particular area.

3. Indefinite leave is granted only to evacuees who have a definite place to go and some means of support.

4. Each evacuee going out on indefinite leave must agree to keep WRA informed of any change of job or change of address.

The primary purpose of this program is to restore as many of the evacuees as possible to productive life in normal American communities.

Housing for the residents of relocation centers is provided in simple barracks of frame construction.





Improvements in family living quarters are made by the evacuees themselves from scrap materials.

The specific procedures being followed have been approved by the Department of Justice as sound from the standpoint of national security and have been endorsed by the War Manpower Commission as a contribution to national manpower needs. As the program moves forward, the costs for maintenance of the relocation centers will be steadily reduced.

Persons interested in employing evacuees from relocation centers for any sort of work should communicate with the nearest relocation supervisor of the WRA. The addresses and names of these supervisors are:

City	Street address	Relocation supervisor
Chicago, Ill.	226 West Jackson Blvd.	Elmer L. Shirrell.
Cleveland, Ohio.	Union Commerce Bldg.	Harold Fistere.
Denver, Colo.	Midland Savings Bldg.	Harold Choate.
Salt Lake City, Utah.	318 Atlas Bldg.	H. Rex Lee.
Kansas City, Mo.	1509 Fidelity Bldg.	Vernon Kennedy.
Little Rock, Ark.	Pyramid Bldg.	E. B. Whitaker.
New York, N. Y.	Room 1410, 50 Broadway ..	Robert M. Cullum.

The Evacuated People

In the interest of both accuracy and fairness, it is important to distinguish sharply between the residents of relocation centers and the militarists of Imperial Japan. Two-thirds of the people in the centers are American citizens, born in this country and educated, for the most part, in American public schools. At all centers, the residents have bought thousands of dollars worth of war bonds and have made significant contributions to the American Red Cross. Many of them have sons, husbands, and brothers in the United States Army. Even the aliens among them have nearly all lived in the United States for two decades or longer. And it is important to remember that these particular aliens have been denied the privilege of gaining American citizenship under our laws.

It is also important to distinguish between the residents of relocation centers and civilian internees. Under our laws, aliens of enemy nationality who are found guilty of acts or intentions against the security of the Nation are being confined in internment camps which are administered not by the War Relocation Authority but by the Department of Justice. American citizens suspected of subversive activities are being handled through the ordinary courts. The residents of the relocation centers, however, have never been found guilty—either individually or collectively—of any such acts or intentions. They are merely a group of American residents who happen to have Japanese ancestors and who happened to be living in a potential combat zone shortly after the outbreak

Meals are served cafeteria style at an average food cost of not more than 45 cents per person per day.





Work is available for able-bodied residents on the community farms and in many other lines of activity.

of war. All evidence available to the War Relocation Authority indicates that the great majority of them are completely loyal to the United States.

The Relocation Centers

The physical standards of life in the relocation centers have never been much above the bare subsistence level. For some few of the evacuees, these standards perhaps represent a slight improvement over those enjoyed before evacuation. But for the great majority of the evacuated people, the environment of the centers—despite all efforts to make them livable—remains subnormal and probably always will. In spite of the leave privileges, the movement of evacuees while they reside at the centers is necessarily somewhat restricted and a certain feeling of isolation and confinement is almost inevitable.

Housing is provided for the evacuee residents of the centers in tarpaper-covered barracks of simple frame construction without plumbing or cooking facilities of any kind. Most of these barracks are partitioned off so that a family of five or six, for example, will normally occupy a single room 25 by 20 feet. Bachelors and other unattached evacuees live mainly in unpartitioned barracks which have been established as dormitories. The only furnishings provided by the Government in the residence bar-

racks are standard Army cots and blankets and small heating stoves. One bath, laundry, and toilet building is available for each block of barracks and is shared by upwards of 250 people.

Food is furnished by the Government for all evacuee residents. The meals are planned at an average cost of not more than 45 cents per person per day (the actual cost, as this is written, has averaged about 40 cents), are prepared by evacuee cooks, and are served generally cafeteria style in mess halls that accommodate between 250 and 300 persons. At all centers, Government-owned or Government-leased farmlands are being operated by evacuee agricultural crews to produce a considerable share of the vegetables needed in the mess halls. At nearly all centers, the farm program also includes production of poultry, eggs, and pork; and at a few, the evacuees are raising beef and dairy products. Every evacuee is subject to the same food rationing restrictions as all other residents of the United States.

Medical care is available to all evacuee residents of relocation centers without charge. Hospitals have been built at all the centers and are manned in large part by doctors, nurses, nurses' aides, and technicians from the evacuee population. Simple dental and optical services are also provided and special care is given to infants and nursing mothers. Evacuees requesting special medical services not available at the centers are required to pay for the cost of such services. At all centers, in view of the crowded and abnormal living conditions, special sanitary precautions are necessary to safeguard the community health and prevent the outbreak of epidemics.

Education through the high school level is provided for all evacuee children at relocation centers.





Religion is practiced at relocation centers with the same freedom that prevails throughout the United States.

Work opportunities of many kinds are made available to able-bodied evacuee residents at the relocation centers. The policy of WRA is to make the fullest possible use of evacuee skills and manpower in all jobs that are essential to community operations. Evacuees are employed in the mess halls, on the farms, in the hospitals, on the internal police force, in construction and road maintenance work, in clerical and stenographic jobs, and in many other lines of activity. Most of those who work are paid at the rate of \$16 a month for a 44-hour week. Apprentices and others requiring close supervision receive \$12 while those with professional skills, supervisory responsibilities, or unusually difficult duties are paid \$19. In addition, each evacuee working at a relocation center receives a small monthly allowance for the purchase of work clothing for himself and personal clothing for his dependents. Opportunities for economic gain in the ordinary sense are almost completely lacking to the residents of the centers.

Education through the high-school level is provided by WRA for all school-age residents of the relocation centers. High schools are being built at most of the centers, but grade-school classes will continue to be held in barrack buildings which have been converted for classroom use. Courses of study have been planned and teachers have been selected in

close collaboration with State departments of education and in conformity with prevailing State standards. Roughly one-half of the teachers in the schools have been recruited from the evacuee population. Japanese language schools of the type common on the west coast prior to evacuation are expressly forbidden at all relocation centers.

Vocational training is provided at relocation centers as a part of the regular school program for youngsters and in connection with the employment program for adults. The purpose of this training is twofold: (1) To equip the evacuee residents so that they will be able to play a more productive role in agriculture or industry outside the centers and (2) to provide potential replacements at the centers for those who go out on indefinite leave.

Internal security at each relocation center is maintained by a special police force composed largely of able-bodied evacuee residents and headed by a nonevacuee chief plus a few nonevacuee assistants. Misdemeanors and other similar offenses are ordinarily handled within the center either by the Project Director or by a judicial commission made up of evacuee residents. The maximum penalty for such offenses is imprisonment or suspension of work and compensation privileges for a period of 3 months. Major criminal cases are turned over to the outside courts having appropriate jurisdiction. At each center, the exterior boundaries are guarded by a company of military police who may be called into the center in cases of emergency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is also called in from time to time as the need arises.

Consumer enterprises, such as stores, canteens, barber shops, and shoe-repair establishments, are maintained at the relocation centers in order that the residents may purchase goods and services which are not provided as part of the regular subsistence. These enterprises are all self-supporting and are managed by the evacuee residents mainly on a consumer cooperative basis. Each resident is eligible for membership in the relocation center cooperative association and all members are entitled to patronage dividends which are derived from the profits and based on the individual volume of purchases. As rapidly as possible, the cooperative associations are being incorporated under appropriate laws.

Evacuee government is practiced in one form or another at every relocation center. In some of the centers, formal charters have been drawn up and evacuee governments roughly paralleling those found in ordinary cities of similar size have been established. In others, evacuee participation in community government has been along more informal lines and has consisted largely of conferences held by small groups of key residents with the Project Director whenever important decisions affecting the population must be reached. The evacuee governmental set-up is not in any sense a substitute for the administration provided by the WRA Project Director and his staff, but residents are encouraged to assume responsibility for many phases of community management.

Religion is practiced at relocation centers with the same freedom that prevails throughout the United States. Nearly half of the evacuees are Christian church members. No church buildings have been provided by the Government but ordinary barracks are used for services by Protestants, Catholics, and Buddhists alike. Ministers and priests from the evacuee population are free to carry on their religious activities at the centers and may also hold other jobs in connection with the center administration. Such workers, however, are not paid by WRA for the performance of their religious duties.

Leisure-time activities at the centers are planned and organized largely by the evacuee residents. The WRA merely furnishes advice and guidance and makes certain areas and buildings available for recreational purposes. At each center, recreational activities of one sort or another have been organized for all groups of residents from the smallest children to the oldest men and women. Local branches of national organizations such as the Red Cross, the YMCA, the YWCA, and the Boy Scouts are definitely encouraged. At some of the centers, athletic contests are arranged periodically with teams from nearby towns.

Student Relocation

Although the War Relocation Authority is placing first emphasis on relocation of evacuees in private employment, student evacuees are also being permitted to leave the centers for the purpose of beginning or continuing a higher education. Applicants for student leave must meet the same requirements as all other applicants for indefinite leave and are permitted to enroll only at institutions where no objection to the attendance of evacuee students has been raised by either the War or Navy Department. The WRA provides no financial assistance to evacuees going out on student leave.

Conservation of Evacuee Property

When 110,000 people of Japanese descent were evacuated from the Pacific coast military area during the spring and summer of 1942, they left behind in their former locations an estimated total of approximately \$200,000,000 worth of real, commercial, and personal property. These properties range from simple household appliances to extensive commercial and agricultural holdings.

At the time of evacuation, many of the evacuees disposed of their properties, especially their household goods, in quick sales that frequently involved heavy financial losses. The majority, however, placed their household furnishings in storage and retained their interest in other holdings even after they were personally transferred to relocation centers. Since these people are now in the position of absentee owners and since many of their properties are highly valuable in the war production effort, the War Relocation Authority is actively assisting them to keep their

commercial and agricultural properties in productive use through lease or sale and is helping them in connection with a wide variety of other property problems.

To carry out this work, the Authority maintains an Evacuee Property Office in San Francisco with branches in Los Angeles and Seattle and employs an Evacuee Property Officer on the staff at each relocation center. Two principal types of service are rendered. In connection with personal properties, such as household furnishings, the Authority provides—at the option of the evacuee owners—either storage in a Government warehouse located within the evacuated area or transportation at Government expense to a point of residence outside. In connection with real estate, commercial holdings, farm machinery, and other similar properties, the Authority acts more in the role of intermediary or agent. At the request of evacuee property-holders, it attempts to find potential buyers or tenants, arranges for the rental or sale of both commercial and agricultural holdings, checks inventories of stored personal goods, audits accounts rendered to evacuees, and performs a variety of similar services. Any person who is interested in buying or leasing the property of evacuees should communicate with the nearest Evacuee Property Office in the West Coast evacuated area. The locations of these offices are:

Whitcomb Hotel Building, San Francisco, Calif.

Room 955, 1031 South Broadway, Los Angeles, Calif.

Room 6609, White Building, Seattle, Wash.

Wherever possible, these offices will try to put potential buyers or tenants in touch with potential sellers or lessors among the evacuee population. It should be emphasized, however, that the WRA has no authority to requisition the property of evacuees and cannot force any resident of a relocation center to sell or lease against his will. Final agreement on terms is solely a matter between the parties directly involved.

COMMUNITY PREPARATION *for* RESETTLEMENT *of* JAPANESE AMERICANS

THE TOTAL EVACUATION

For the first time in American history the Government evacuated all members of one racial group from their places of permanent settlement to designated and confined areas for reasons of military necessity. 104,000 persons, two-thirds of whom are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, have been assigned to ten relocation centers by the West Coast Military Command. The total evacuation has been accomplished. No further protest or objection will restore to these people their original homes and stores and farms, at least for the duration. There is, however, one thing that you can do. That is, you can help the Government and the evacuees by supporting the plan for dispersal resettlement.

DISPERSAL RESETTLEMENT

In a letter to the Committee on Resettlement of Japanese Americans, Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, writes:

"The W.R.A. has recently adopted regulations which should enable all of the evacuees who are qualified and care to do so to leave the Relocation Centers. These regulations were discussed with the War Department and the Department of Justice and have the approval of these Departments. These new regulations and the program of outside employment are meeting with the approval and receiving the assistance of other agencies of the Federal Government."

One might ask, if Japanese Americans were put in those centers by the Government, why should the same Government want to release them? The answer to that is simple. Since all the Japanese have been cleared from the Military zone, the military necessity under which the evacuation was accomplished does not now exist. But the Government alone cannot resettle them, except in congregated or isolated groups, which is undesirable. It is, therefore, calling upon organizations and individuals to provide employment and residence outside the relocation centers for the evacuees, so that they may once again find themselves in communities where they may pursue normal patterns of life and receive the benefits of and contribute to Democracy which is a principle of our national existence and for the defense of which we are engaged in this conflict. Christians have a special responsibility in this program. Action, as well as discussion, is the order of the hour. Will you do your part?

SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION

1. There is a *shortage of labor* everywhere. You or someone you know may need extra help. Japanese Americans represent a cross section of all American skills—farmers, laborers, engineers, mechanics, stenographers, typists, doctors, nurses, social workers, and all other professions. The skill of the Japanese people as farmers is especially well known. There are many college graduates among all categories. So, find a job and write to us. Ask for "Resettlement Hand Book."

2. The *standard wage* in your community must be assured. This is a protection not only for the evacuees but really for the employer and the community, because other-

wise the newcomer will be accused of lowering the living standard and we shall start all over again the unfortunate situation of labor discrimination that existed on the West Coast when the anti-Japanese labor sentiment was at its height.

3. *Placement.* Try and fit the job to the skill of the evacuee. Although many of the evacuees indicate that they will do any kind of work to get out of the camps, it will be unwise to offer a capable secretary employment as a domestic or a physicist, whose knowledge is greatly needed these days, a position as a porter or houseman. For the happiness of the evacuee and the satisfaction of the employer, as well as the urgent need for competent man-power during the present emergency, it is essential that job offers be filled with people qualified for the particular work offered. There will be exceptions, of course, but we should be guided by the fitness of the evacuee for the job.

4. *The community must be prepared.* If your community is not large, you can easily discover the possible reaction of your neighbors toward taking an evacuee. The Government wants to be sure that the resettlement will not disturb the peace and security of the community to which an evacuee is going. Employment must not be offered until you are reasonably sure of this. Of course, there should be no reason for fear of any kind. The Japanese American is an American citizen just as you are. All Americans are immigrants or descendants of immigrants. We do not show discrimination toward citizens of German or Italian descent. Let us be guided by the American spirit of fair play. Besides, these Americans of Japanese descent who come out of the centers do so only after a complete investigation by the War Relocation Authority and a check with the records of the F.B.I. This step is taken for your protection as well as that of the evacuee. Your community should welcome an evacuee from this standpoint. More precise steps regarding this matter are suggested in the "Hand-Book."

5. *Find a home.* Housing is often a more difficult problem. When you find a job, will you also investigate where an evacuee family might live temporarily. Preliminary housing facilities for single persons may be arranged through the facilities of the Y.M.C.A. or the Y.W.C.A. where such are available. The preferred procedure is for the head of the family to come out first and prepare the place for his family. It goes without saying that a friendly home is the ideal solution, if one can be found.

6. *Christian Action.* The whole problem is a challenge to the church to rise above hysteria and hatred and to assume the lead in the struggle for a Christian and Democratic America, and to demonstrate Christ's teaching that all men are brothers. Every agency in the church can participate in the resettlement program. The Ladies' Aid might undertake to find suitable housing. The Business and Professional Women's Club and the Men's Club are in a position to learn of job openings and through discussion of the facts involved can do much to allay local fears and prejudices. The young people of the church should be prepared to include the evacuees in their activities and fellowship. All can help to demonstrate that Christianity transcends war and prejudice; that it is a way of life.

7. *Organization.* If your community is large, it will be best if a committee is organized to explore the possibilities and to make this a community project. Invite ministers, local civic leaders, social workers, Y.M. and Y.W. Secretaries to sit on the committee. There is probably one already established in your city. Consult us if you are in doubt.

8. *Functions of organized efforts* as well as the nature of any such organization will vary according to each community situation, but the main tasks may be stated as follows:

1. Finding employment
2. Placement. (Fitting the job to the skills of the evacuees.)
3. Record keeping (including correspondence with W.R.A. and national organizations cooperating)
4. Housing
5. Follow-up for social adjustment
6. Emergency care
7. Public relations (locally)
8. Christian Fellowship

In the planning of a local committee through which the churches may assist in the resettlement program of the W.R.A. a central office or agency is desirable. The office of the council of churches will normally wish to function for the churches in rendering this service. Adequate secretarial help will be necessary to discharge those services which local organizations will be called upon to render to the evacuees, the Government and the local committee members and organizations.

Although skill is required at every point, special attention should be given to the need of a sound setup for placement and social follow-up. *The Social Service Department of a city council of churches and staff members of Councils of Social Agencies represent latent resources here. The responsibility for placement and social follow-up should rest in a designated office, which should be supervised by a worker who knows good standards of placement and of following through on social adjustment.*

It is desirable to avoid any widespread publicity lest, by misinformation about the doubtful loyalty of the evacuees, their dual citizenship and allegiance to the Emperor of Japan, etc., ill-advised persons cause undue difficulty before the work is under way. The job of a public relations person is to spread the idea on a personal basis among understanding individuals. Discussions in small church groups will be helpful. A large public meeting is apt to produce prejudice.

9. *Talking Points.* If you need informative reinforcements besides the fact that resettlement is a great Christian and Democratic challenge, we suggest the following to support the justice of our resettlement efforts:

1. Two-thirds of the evacuees of the total 104,000 in relocation centers are American citizens—fellow American citizens!
2. Their brothers, husbands, sweethearts, are in the United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps fighting the war. There are over 5,000 wearing American uniforms.
3. The loyalty of Japanese Americans to the United States is unquestioned. This is not propaganda. The majority of them when the order for evacuation was announced said in a true patriotic spirit that they would take it and bear it as their duty and sacrifice for the cause of their country. We doubt if any other racial group would have taken such tremendous physical and mental discomfort as gracefully as did these citizens.
4. The Tolan Committee's report on National Defense Migration, May 1942, states: "It has become clear that a curtailment of the rights and privileges of the American-born Japanese citizens of this country will furnish one of the gravest crises in the Nation's history, the preservation of liberties will depend upon the degree to which clear vision is applied to momentary difficulties. Realism must go hand in hand with a profound sense of responsibility for the maintenance of our way of life."

"Emergency measures must not be permitted to alter permanently those fundamental principles upon which this Nation was built.

"To many citizens of alien parentage in this country it has come as a profound shock that almost overnight thousands of persons have discovered that their citizenship no longer stands between them and the treatment accorded to any enemy alien within our borders in time of war.

5. Among the letters and affidavits quoted in the Tolan Report (Fourth Interim Report, pp. 48-58) are found the following quotations:

a) "The War Department has received no information of sabotage committed by Japanese during the attack on Pearl Harbor." (Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, March 30.)

b) "Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has advised me there was no sabotage committed there (in Hawaii) prior to December 7, on December 7, or subsequent to that time." (James Rowe, Jr., The Assistant to the Attorney General, written April 20.)

c) "... There were no acts of sabotage committed in the City and County of Honolulu December 7, nor have there been acts of sabotage reported to the Police Department since that date." (Honolulu Chief of Police Gabrielson.)

6. The criminal record of Japanese on the West Coast is the lowest of any racial group.

7. They have generously contributed to community philanthropic enterprises and to National Defense Bond sales. Public relief among Japanese has been practically nil.

8. The intellectual and educational standards of the Japanese Americans are among the highest of any racial unit in the country. Their Americanization has been more complete than most of us realize. They speak English fluently, and Japanese a little—if at all.

9. Japanese Americans who are released from the centers have generally been educated in our American schools. They have been raised according to American standards; they act and think as Americans.

10. The great concern of most of us now is that the long inactivity of these desirable people will reduce their skills, and that forced segregation from normal American life will have an un-American and un-Christian influence upon them. Moreover, if they are confined in camps for the duration of the war, their resettlement after the war—when competition and reaction will rise—will be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

11. The Government is already overtaxed with the care of the evacuees. The cooperation of our citizens will relieve the Government materially and present a humane solution of the problems of individuals who are deprived of their citizenship rights temporarily. Here is, indeed, a concrete Christian enterprise that is at the same time democratic and in the best sense of the term, American. For other material, bibliography, "Resettlement Hand-Book," etc., write to

THE COMMITTEE ON
RESETTLEMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS

297 Fourth Avenue New York, N. Y.

Telephone: GRamercy 5-3475, Ext. 48.

GEORGE E. RUNDQUIST, *Executive Secretary*