	CH-120	Response to Request for C Harassment Restraining O		Clerk stamps date here when form is filed.
Re Oi Fi Ha	ead How Can I Restributed Property (form CH-1) and this form and the someone age 1 are lawyer by mail we someone when the someone age 1 are lawyer by mail we some age 1 are lawyer by	espond to the Request (form CH-1) repond to a Request for Civil Harassment Re 20-INFO) to protect your rights. It take it to the court clerk. 8 or older—not you—serve the person in with a copy of this form and any attached part of Service by Mail.)	estraining  1 or his or	
1	Person Seeki Full name of pers	ng Protection on seeking protection (see form CH-100, in	tem ( <b>1</b> )):	Fill in court name and street address:
	Mario Lopez	S		Superior Court of California, County of
	_	N/I D ( // L D L /		Los Angeles Superior Court
2)		Whom Protection Is Sought		Metropolitan Courthouse
	_	Desiree Townsend		1945 S. Hill Street
	Your Lawyer Name:	(if you have one for this case) State Bar No	).:	Los Angeles, CA 90007
	Firm Name:			Court fills in case number when form is filed.
	b Your Address	s (If you have a lawyer, give your lawyer's	information	Case Number:
		have a lawyer and want to keep your home		25STRO03858
	private, you n	nay give a different mailing address instead elephone, fax, or email.)		
	Address: 290	Ocean Park Blvd, Ste. 201	Present y	your response and any opposition at the
		onica State: CA Zip: 90405		Write your hearing date, time, and place
	Telephone: 32		from for	m CH-109 item (3) here:
		s: desiree@sparktrademarks.com	Hearing Date	Date: $07/11/2025$ Time: 8:30 AM Dept.: 65 Room:
3	■ Personal C	onduct Orders		ere served with a Temporary
	a.   I agree to	the orders requested.		At the hearing, the court may make
		gree to the orders requested.  Phy you disagree in item (12) on page 4.)		gainst you that last for up to five years.
	c.  agree to	the following orders (Specify below or in it	tem (12) on pag	ge 4.)



a.  $\square$  I agree to the orders requested.

b. I do not agree to the orders requested. (Specify why you disagree in item 12) on page 4.)

c.  $\square$  I agree to the following orders (specify below or in item (12) on page 4):

Case Number:
25STRO03858

<b>5</b>	× Ad	ditional Protected Persons
	a. 🗌	I agree that the persons listed in item 3 of form CH-100 may be protected by the order requested.
	b. 🗷	I do not agree that the persons listed in item 3 of form CH-100 may be protected by the order requested.
6)	Firear	rms (Guns), Firearm Parts, and Ammunition
	(guns), used as CH-11 firearm with fo	were served with form CH-110, <i>Temporary Restraining Order</i> , you cannot own or possess any firearms firearm parts, or ammunition. This includes firearm receivers and frames, and any item that may be sor easily turned into a receiver or frame (see Penal Code section 16531). (See item 7 of form 0.) You must sell to or store with a licensed gun dealer, or turn in to a law enforcement agency, any ns (guns) or firearm parts in your immediate possession or control within 24 hours of being served orm CH-110. You must file a receipt with the court. You may use <i>Receipt for Firearms and Firearm</i> form CH-800) for the receipt.
	a. 🗷	I do not own or control any firearms (guns), firearm parts, or ammunition.
		I ask for an exemption from the firearms prohibition under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.9(f) because carrying a firearm is a condition of my employment, and my employer is unable to reassign me to another position where a firearm is unnecessary. (Explain):  Check here if there is not enough space below for your answer. Put your complete answer on an attached sheet of paper and write "Attachment 6b—Firearms Surrender Exemption" as a title. You may use form MC-025, Attachment.
		I have turned in my firearms (guns) and firearm parts to the police or sold them to or stored them with a licensed gun dealer.
		A copy of the receipt $\square$ is attached. $\square$ has already been filed with the court.
7	No Bo	ody Armor
		were served with form CH-110, <i>Temporary Restraining Order</i> , you are prohibited from owning, possessing, ng body armor. You must also relinquish any body armor you have in your possession.
	•	all that apply):
		I do not own or have any body armor.
	b. 🗌	I have relinquished all body armor that I have in my possession.
		I was granted an exception, or will ask for an exception, to have body armor. Note: This exception is granted by a chief of police or sheriff. See Penal Code section 31360(c). (Attach a copy of the letter granting permission, if you have one.)

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Case Number: 25STRO03858

8	×	Ро	ssession and Protection of Animals
	a.		I agree to the orders requested.
	b.	×	I do not agree to the orders requested. (Specify why you disagree in item (12) on page 4.)
	c.		I agree to the following orders (specify below or in item (12) on page 4):
9)	×	Otl	her Orders
	a.		I agree to the orders requested.
	b.	×	I do not agree to the orders requested. (Specify why you disagree in item (12) on page 4.)
	c.		I agree to the following orders (specify below or in item (12) on page 4):
10)	×	De	nial
	I d	id n	ot do anything described in item (7) of form CH-100. (Skip to (12) .)
44		1	stification or Excuse
11)	I£1		
			I some or all of the things that the person in (1) has accused me of, my actions were justified or excused for lowing reasons (explain):
			eck here if there is not enough space below for your answer. Put your complete answer on an attached sheet paper and write "Attachment 11—Justification or Excuse" as a title. You may use form MC-025, Attachment.
	_		
	_		

3	Check here if there is not enough space below for your answer. Put your complete answer on an attached sheet of paper and write "Attachment 12—Reasons I Disagree" as a title. You may use form MC-025, Attachment.					
_						
_						
_						
_						
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_						
-						
-						
-						
_						
_						
_						
_						
-						
_						
-						
	✓ No Fee for Filing					
a	I request that I not be required to pay the filing fee because the person in 1 claims in form CH-100 item to be entitled to free filing.					
t	2. I request that I not be required to pay the filing fee because I am eligible for a fee waiver. (Form <u>FW-001</u> , Request to Waive Court Fees, <i>must be filed separately.</i> )					

14)	<b>x</b> Lawyer's Fees and Costs			
	a. <b>x</b> I ask the court to order paymen The amounts requested are:	t of my 🗷 Lawyer's fo	ees 🗷 Court costs.	
	Item Electronic filing fees Attorney opposition templates	\$\frac{\text{Amount}}{\text{19.68}} \\ \frac{\text{19.68}}{\text{1,000}} \\ \frac{\text{1}}{\text{1.000}} \\ \frac{\text{1.000}}{\text{1.000}} \\ \text{1	<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u> \$ \$ \$
	Check here if there are more ite "Attachment 14—Lawyer's Fee"  b. ■ I ask the court to deny the reque	es and Costs" for a title.	You may use form MC-02	5, Attachment.
15)	costs.  Number of pages attached to this form.		F	
	Date:	·		
	Lawyer's name (if any)	<b>/</b> -	Lawyer's	signature
	I declare under penalty of perjury unde attachments is true and correct.	er the laws of the State of	California that the inform	nation above and on all
	Date: <u>07/06/2025</u>		and a	
	Desiree Townsend  Type or print your name	<u></u>	Sign yo	ur dame

Rev. January 1, 2025

Response to Request for Civil Harassment
Restraining Orders
(Civil Harassment Prevention)

**CH-120**, Page 5 of 5

## Attachment 12—Reasons I Disagree

1	Desirée Townsend			
2	2901 Ocean Park Blvd., Suite 201			
3	Santa Monica, CA 90405 Telephone: (323) 844-1338			
4	<u>desiree@sparktrademarks.com</u>			
5	Respondent, DESIREE TOWNSEND			
6	DESIREE TO WINSEIND			
7	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
8		OF LOS ANGELES		
9	101111111111111111111111111111111111111	TOT DOS IN (OEDES		
10	MARIO LOPEZ,	CASE NO.: 25STRO03858		
12	Petitioner,	RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM OF		
13	VS.	POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO ISSUANCE OF		
14	DESIREE TOWNSEND,	RESTRAINING ORDER		
15	Respondent.	DATE: July 11, 2025 TIME: 8:30 am PLACE: Dept. 65		
16				
17	COMES NOW, DESIREE TOWNSEND, and hereby submits this Memorandum of			
18	Points and Authorities in Opposition to Issuance	of Restraining Order pursuant to California Code		
19		be based on the enclosed memorandum of points		
20				
21 22	and authorities, and all evidence and other materials to be presented at the hearing.			
23	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES			
24	I.			
25	INTRODUCTION			
26	Respondent respectfully requests that the Court deny the petition for a civil harassment			
27	restraining order because it does not satisfy California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6. The			
28				
	DECRONDENTES MENODANINA OF DODITE AND	-1-		

RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO ISSUANCE OF RESTRAINING ORDER

petition is based almost entirely on allegations raised in Respondent's pending civil action against Petitioner and a single, lawful act of service of process that is absolutely privileged under California Civil Code § 47(b). Litigation privilege exists to ensure that "witnesses [are] free from intimidation by the possibility of civil liability for what they say." *Silberg v. Anderson*, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212 (1990) (quoting Prosser, *Law of Torts* (3d ed. 1964) at 797). The Court emphasized that "[t]he principal purpose of section 47(b) is to afford litigants and witnesses the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions." *Id.* at 213 (internal citation omitted). To fulfill that purpose, "the litigation privilege is held to be absolute in nature." *Id.* at 215.

Moreover, nothing about Respondent's conduct—whether the lawful service of process, the social-media comments quoted in the Petition, or pending civil action—contains a threat of violence or any advocacy of harm toward Petitioner, his family, or his three French bulldogs. These actions are entirely lawful, nonviolent, and nonthreatening. The speech in question constitutes protected rhetorical satire and commentary on matters of public concern, particularly given that Petitioner concedes he is a public figure and that Respondent's references to past sexual assault allegations relate to events that were publicly reported and investigated in 1993<sup>1</sup>. By contrast, Respondent has never been accused of, nor investigated for, any crime or criminal activity.

Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6, a civil harassment restraining order may only be issued where there is a "course of conduct" that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and that serves no legitimate purpose. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) Respondent's conduct—consisting of protected speech and lawful litigation activity—does not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Respondent largely referenced past allegations that were publicly reported in 1993. See, for example, the *Variety* article dated May 11, 1993, available at: https://variety.com/1993/scene/people-news/saved-by-the-bell-actor-hit-with-date-rape-charge-106708/.

meet this standard. The publications and lawful service of process at issue do not rise to the level of harassment, nor do they lack a legitimate purpose, particularly given their connection to a pending legal dispute and their incorporation of constitutionally protected commentary.

Petitioner has not come close to meeting that statutory threshold. Because the Petition is legally and factually insufficient, the requested restraining order should be denied in its entirety and instead order Petitioner to pay Respondent attorney's fees and costs incurred as a result of defending this action.

II.

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner and Respondent had never met, spoken, nor maintained any personal relationship prior to the filing of Respondent's civil action, which arises from a defamatory comment published on Petitioner's Instagram account on or about June 19, 2024, to his audience of over 3 million followers<sup>2</sup>. Upon information and belief, Petitioner's defamatory comment was followed by a coordinated smear campaign and the preparation of this Petition, one year to the day on June 19, 2025. The alleged smear campaign outlined in the civil action and the present Petition share nearly identical language and insinuations, underscoring a coordinated effort. Petitioner's Instagram post and the related campaign against Respondent are the subject of a civil action filed by Respondent on June 13, 2025, asserting claims for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Townsend v. Lopez, Los Angeles County Superior Court, No. 25NNCV04089.)

25


26

27

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Petitioner Lopez's Instagram post, which is the subject of a separate defamation action currently pending in Los Angeles Superior Court, can be accessed at the following link: <a href="https://www.instagram.com/reel/C8Zx0QdpG9c">https://www.instagram.com/reel/C8Zx0QdpG9c</a>.

Respondent's sole direct communication to Petitioner was made on or about March 10, 2025, through two Instagram comments on Petitioner's post about Respondent. The comments did not contain any threats of violence and merely expressed an intent to file a defamation lawsuit against Petitioner.



Upon information and belief on or about March 13, 2025, approximately three days after Respondent commented on Petitioner's Instagram post, Lopez, either directly or through agents acting on his behalf, initiated a coordinated online smear campaign targeting Respondent through an anonymous Reddit account operating under the handle "Top-Strategy-1261" which flooded existing threads regarding the Respondent with a barrage of malicious, defamatory statements that mirror the language Lopez now recycles in this restraining-order Petition. The campaign then spilled over to TikTok, where two similar videos were posted, both of which are referenced in the pending civil action.

	r/illnesstakers · Desiree Jennings- Dystonia
1	Top-Strategy-1261 replied to wet-otter 4 mo. ago  Check out her instagram handle @cheerleader4change. She's obsessed with Mario
	Lopez and James Franco. Runs multiple websites targeting them. It looks like she has
2	legitimate mental illness and I feel bad for her. Regardless, the vaccine court case proves she was still trying to connect vaccine injury to her "symptoms" and now is
3	claiming she has stiff person syndrome like Celine Dion. Except there's no proof of this,
4	and it's even addressed in the vaccine court case. All very strange.  ☆ 1 ↔ ○ Reply ⇔ Share …
5	
6	r/illnessfakers · Desiree Jennings- Dystonia  Top-Strategy-1261 replied to Connect-Membership 4 mo. ago
7	You should check out her current instagram handle @cheerleader4change and witness
8	the absolute madness that unfolded. I'm really surprised the media hasn't picked up on it. It's a bit sad as it looks like she's actually mentally ill, but with a huge axe to grind
9	against James Franco apparently?  ♦ 1 ♦ ♠ Reply ♦ Share ···
10	
11	On or about June 15, 2025, Respondent lawfully accompanied a process server to Mr.
12	Lopez's residence, a location Mr. Lopez himself has made public through multiple social media
13	posts:
14	1. https://www.instagram.com/reel/DE2u2pVyYjB/?igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ%3D%3D
15 16	(Posted to Instagram on or about January 15, 2025, with a total of 10.5 million views to
17	promote his shoe line and tequila during the L.A. fires.)
18	2. https://www.instagram.com/reel/DEsg0oFSIYo/?igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ%3D%3D
19	(Posted to Instagram on or about January 11, 2025, with a total of 1.1 million views
20	depicting the entire front of Petitioner's home and a fallen tree.)
21	3. <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZT6JM96xD/">https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZT6JM96xD/</a> (Posted TikTok on or about July 11, 2024, with a
22 23	total of 385,500 views showing the front of Petitioner's home, featuring him drinking and
23	expressing his love for tequila while running.)
25	Furthermore, Petitioner's home address was made publicly available as part of a separate
26	action Mr. Lopez filed on or about December 11, 2023, against the builder of his home (Mario
27	Lopez et al. v. Grandway Construction LLC et al., Los Angeles County Super. Ct., No.
28	

order Petition—Lopez's home-builder lawsuit was widely reported by <u>multiple</u> media outlets in 2023 and can still be found through a simple Google search.

23STCV30154). Unlike Respondent's pending civil action—or this clearly retaliatory restraining-

During service, Respondent stood several feet behind the process server, offering only brief instructions on where the documents should be left. She recorded the encounter on her personal phone solely to preserve proof of service, as Petitioner clearly attempted to evade service. A short clip of the service captured on Respondent's phone was initially posted to another individual's TikTok on June 15, 2025<sup>3</sup>. Later that day, Respondent posted the longer video to depict the events leading up to the slamming of the courtyard gate by Lopez outlined in the shorter clip<sup>4</sup>.

On or about June 19, 2025, Respondent reposted a video originally published on Mr. Lopez's TikTok page, in which he is seen spanking his wife's buttocks several times and pushing her toward a seat while on the set of *Access Hollywood* at NBCUniversal. The video can be viewed here: <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZT61o6bqx/">https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZT61o6bqx/</a>. Respondent believes that her republication of this publicly available footage was one of several motivating factors behind Petitioner's retaliatory request for this restraining order.

Petitioner claims that Respondent has "harassed" him. In particular, Petitioner claims the following:

1. Petitioner alleges that Respondent harassed Mr. Lopez by serving him with a lawsuit at his residence, despite the fact that this act was part of a legal proceeding and is expressly protected under litigation privilege.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The first video, which was posted to TikTok by another individual, is available at the following link: https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZT61EH1Xk/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The longer, second video was posted to Respondent's TikTok account and is available at the following link: https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZT61E5XjR/.

2. Petitioner alleges that Respondent "exposed" his family and home address to millions of viewers, however, the videos documenting the service of process do not display any address or identifiable location whatsoever. In any event, Petitioner himself has repeatedly posted videos on his own social media showcasing both the interior and exterior of his home. He also has ongoing litigation against the home's builder, in which his address has been publicly disclosed through widespread media coverage, reaching multiple outlets and millions of viewers.

3. Petitioner alleges that Respondent has engaged in "online harassment" and characterizes her as "obsessed with him." However, Respondent had barely even heard of Mr. Lopez prior to discovering his defamatory social media post about her, and the alleged coordinated smear campaign that followed, which has now extended to the filing of this Petition. This Petition includes language that is **nearly identical to the defamatory statements** alleged in Respondent's civil action, strongly indicating that Petitioner was, in fact, behind the smear campaign all along. This legal filing now serves as <u>direct evidence</u> linking Petitioner to the very conduct previously denied, thereby reinforcing Respondent's claims of a coordinated effort to defame her.

Both Petitioner and his wife, Courtney Lopez, filed declarations under penalty of perjury to support their § 527.6 Petition, <u>vet neither could correctly identify the date</u> on which Respondent lawfully accompanied the process server who served the summons in the pending Los Angeles Superior Court action. They each swore that service occurred on June 16, 2025, even though Respondent's proof of service—filed on June 23, 2025, in the pending civil action—and the very video cited in their Petition clearly show that service actually took place on June 15, 2025, the very event upon which their Petition is largely based.

Furthermore, in her signed declaration, Courtney Lopez expressly admits that Respondent had not targeted her or her children. While Mr. Lopez claims to have suffered significant "emotional disruption, fear, and distress," yet the facts suggest otherwise. It was Mr. Lopez who acted aggressively, refusing to accept service, forcefully slamming the courtyard gate, nearly striking the process server and locking his own son outside in the process, then directing a profane insult at Respondent, calling her a "crazy fucking bitch." In contrast, Respondent did not use any foul language nor engage in any violent or aggressive behavior during the lawful accompaniment of the process server. Moreover, if Mr. Lopez truly believed that Respondent posed a threat to his family, it is difficult to reconcile that concern with his decision to leave his son outside the gate in her presence<sup>5</sup>.

On or about June 19, 2024—Juneteenth, a national holiday commemorating the end of slavery and honoring the recognition of Black suffering, resilience, and liberation—and exactly one year after Petitioner Mario Lopez's defamatory post about Respondent, Mr. Lopez chose to revictimize Respondent by filing this Petition as evident by the signed Declarations and CH-100 form all dated June 19, 2025. Upon information and belief, the filing was made in retaliation for Respondent's lawsuit and for her decision to speak out against his alleged predatory behavior directed towards her.

III.

PRIOR RESTRAINTS

CIVIL HARASSMENT RESTRAINING ORDERS VIOLATE THE FIRST

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24

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<sup>5</sup> Please see Radar Online's exclusive coverage titled, "EXCLUSIVE: Watch Radar's Full Video of Mario Lopez Slamming Gate on His SON in Fit of Rage After Being Served Court Papers in \$25 Million Defamation Lawsuit," available at the following link: https://radaronline.com/p/mario-lopez-served-court-papers-defamation-lawsuit-flushot-cheerleader-video/.

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Petitioner's request for a restraining order is a thinly veiled attempt to chill Respondent's protected speech rights under the California Constitution and the First Amendment. The Petition arises from Respondent's public commentary, parody, and criticism of a high-profile public figure — all of which fall squarely within the protections afforded by Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e)(3) and (e)(4). This proceeding is not a legitimate attempt to seek protection from harassment, but rather a retaliatory maneuver designed to suppress speech critical of Petitioner — the very type of strategic action the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to prevent.

The allegations in the Petition mirror previous defamatory statements at issue in Respondent's civil suit and appear calculated to: (1) mischaracterize protected speech as harassment, (2) impose litigation costs on Respondent, and (3) create a chilling effect on lawful expression. Accordingly, this Petition may itself serve as evidence of retaliatory intent and a pattern of conduct consistent with a SLAPP, and Respondent reserves the right to seek relief under CCP § 425.16 if the Petitioner continues to use legal process to intimidate and silence her.

It is well-established that a civil harassment restraining order constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint where the speech in question has been judicially determined to be protected under the First Amendment. In *Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, the Court of Appeal made clear that courts may not enjoin speech unless it falls outside the bounds of constitutional protection, emphasizing that any prior restraint on speech is subject to strict scrutiny.

Petitioner's own brief cites Lou v. Volokh (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1213, yet that decision squarely undermines rather than supports his position. In Lou, as here, the petitioner sought a civil-harassment order to silence constitutionally protected commentary about an ongoing lawsuit. The Court of Appeal struck the petition at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, holding that (1) discussing a public controversy and identifying a litigant by name is core First-Amendment

activity, and (2) a request to bar such speech "does not allege any conduct proscribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6." (Id. at pp. 1223-1225.) Because the statute cannot be stretched to prohibit lawful speech—or to convert defamation allegations into a harassment theory—the court dismissed the petition and awarded fees to the respondent.

The parallels are unmistakable: Petitioner here likewise demands an order that would prevent Respondent from naming him and commenting on matters of public concern, even though no threat, violence, or unlawful conduct is alleged. Under *Lou v. Volokh*, a petition that tries to transform protected speech into "harassment" is fatally defective and cannot survive, much less justify the extraordinary remedy of a prior-restraint injunction.

IV.

## A SINGLE LAWFUL SERVICE OF PROCESS, ABSENT EVIDENCE OF FUTURE HARM, IS INSUFFICENT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

A prohibitory injunction is, by definition, a form of "preventive relief" that restrains only future conduct. (Civ. Code, § 3420.) The Court of Appeal emphasized this point in *Scripps Health* v. *Marin* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, where it explained that:

"[I]njunctive relief lies only to prevent threatened injury and has no application to wrongs that have been completed. It should be neither serve as punishment for past acts, nor be exercised in the absence of any evidence establishing the reasonable probability the acts will be repeated in the future. Indeed, a change in circumstances at the time of the hearing, rendering injunctive relief moot or unnecessary, justifies denial of the request. Moreover, not only can injunctive relief be denied where the defendant has voluntarily discontinued the wrongful conduct, there exists no equitable reason for ordering it where the defendant has in good faith discontinued the proscribed conduct. 'Thus, to authorize the issuance of an injunction, it must appear with reasonable certainty that the wrongful acts will be continued or repeated.""

(*Id.* at 332-333 [emphasis added].)

It follows that if there is no realistic prospect of future harm, the expedited injunctive remedy provided by Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6 is unnecessary. Subdivision (d) makes this explicit: a court may issue relief only upon "clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists," not merely that it occurred sometime in the past.

As stated in Section 527.6, subd. (b), "harassment" is:

unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.

## (Emphasis added.)

Section 527.6, subd. (b)(3), provides that "course of conduct" is: a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual...

The Court of Appeal underscored that distinction in *Russell v. Douvan* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 403-404 where the court held that a single unlawful act was not enough for injunctive relief. The appellate court reversed, holding that § 527.6 demands evidence of an ongoing or likely-to-recur course of conduct; an isolated past altercation, without any indication of continuing threats, cannot justify prospective relief. *Russell* thus makes clear that an injunction is reserved for situations where "unlawful harassment is present and will probably continue," not where it is "historic and unlikely to re-emerge."

Unlike in *Russell v. Douvan*, no unlawful act occurred in connection with the service of process. Here, the only conduct alleged is Respondent's single, lawful act of serving process—

1	conduct entirely free of violence, threats, or aggression. It caused no harm, and Petitioner has		
2	offered no evidence that any future harm is likely.		
3	Neither Petitioner, his family, nor his French Bulldogs were physically harmed or		
4	assaulted, nor was a single aggressive comment made in their presence — in stark contrast to		
5	Petitioner's own aggressive behavior and commentary directed at Respondent. Petitioner has		
6	failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that even this single lawful act involved any		
7	unlawful violence, let alone demonstrated a "pattern of conduct" sufficient to warrant injunctive		
8	relief.		
10	<b>V.</b>		
11	THE COURT SHOULD AWARD RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS		
12	Pursuant to C.C.P. § 527.6, subd. (i), "[t]he prevailing party in any action brought		
13	under this section may be awarded court costs and attorney's fees." Here, based on the fact that Petitioner's contentions are unsupported and without merit, and brought solely in retaliation for filing a defamation lawsuit against Petitioner, this Court should deny the relief requested an		
14			
15			
<ul><li>16</li><li>17</li></ul>	award Respondent attorney's fees and costs. It is clear from the above that Petitioner filed for		
18	injunctive relief in bad faith and without any basis whatsoever.		
19	VI.		
20	CONCLUSION		
21	For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny Petitioner's request for a restraining		
22	order and order the Petitioner to pay Respondent attorney's fees and costs.		
23			
24	Dated: July 6, 2025 Respectfully submitted,		
25	By: Desires Townson d		
26	Desiree Townsend Respondent		
<ul><li>27</li><li>28</li></ul>			
20			