Presented at NANOG 88



Distributing Trust in Critical Societal Scale Computing Infrastructure


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


Internet – Today's Critical Societal Infrastructure





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


Trust In Today's Internet Infrastructure

- 1. An increasing number of resources on the Internet today are served by a few large providers such as popular websites, or Content Delivery Networks
- Users interact with a lot of hidden infrastructure Routers, DNS resolvers, Network policy managers and Firewalls, etc..,
- 3. Burden on a few parties to maintain the security of the Internet today Certificate Authorities and Certificate Transparency.


"While invisibility is the hallmark of effective infrastructures, Infrastructure often becomes visible upon breakdown" ~ Susan Leigh Star

Plaintext DNS is Insecure – 92% of daily DNS Traffic to 1⁴






Secure Transports (DoH, DoT) Improve DNS Security






But ... Raise A Key Privacy and Trust Issue




Oblivious DNS over HTTPS (ODoH)






Comparing ODoH with Other DNS Protocols



Protocol	Request Path	Security	Privacy
Plain DNS (Do53)	$C \rightarrow R$	No	No
DNS over HTTPS (DoH)	$C \rightarrow R$	Yes	No*
Proxied DoH	$C\toP\toR$	Yes	No
Oblivious DoH (ODoH)	$\textbf{C} \rightarrow \textbf{P} \rightarrow \textbf{T} \rightarrow \textbf{R}$	Yes	Yes
Cleartext ODoH	$C \to P \to T \to R$	Yes	No
Co-located ODoH	$C \rightarrow P \rightarrow (T+R)$	Yes	Yes
DNSCrypt	$C \rightarrow R$	Yes	No*
Anonymous DNSCrypt	$C\toP\toR$	Yes	Yes
DoH over Tor (DoHoT)	$C \rightarrow \text{Tor} \rightarrow R$	Yes	Yes




Where are our connections going during a page load?




Most webpage resources are co-located on a few service providers despite being sharded by hostnames



Leveraging Colocation and Improving Privacy











Over 60% Reduction in Number of DNS/TLS Connections





Deployment of ORIGIN Frames with Certificate Changes



~50% reduction in number of new connections to the cdnjs hostname we attempted coalescing to.

Client: Reduced Number of Cryptographic Certificate Validations.

Client: Active measurements show ~65-70% connections coalesced.

Server: Reduced number of connections \rightarrow allow more client connections




Deployment of ORIGIN Frames with Certificate Changes





The benefits of DNSSEC cannot be

Next Steps! Requesting Your Feedback



What **incentives** can we provide for improved DNSSEC adoption? How would that **impact** various DNS operations today? Is the **tradeoff worthwhile**?

Thank You!

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Graduating January - March 2024.

Open for exciting full time research and engineering opportunities. Please reach out!

Publications:

- Singanamalla, Sudheesh, Suphanat Chunhapanya, Jonathan Hoyland, Marek Vavruša, Tanya Verma, Peter Wu, Marwan Fayed, Kurtis Heimerl, Nick Sullivan, and Christopher Wood. "Oblivious DNS over HTTPS (ODoH): A Practical Privacy Enhancement to DNS." Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 4 (2021): 575-592.
- Singanamalla, Sudheesh, Muhammad Talha Paracha, Suleman Ahmad, Jonathan Hoyland, Luke Valenta, Yevgen Safronov, Peter Wu et al. "Respect the ORIGIN! a best-case evaluation of connection coalescing in the wild." In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Internet Measurement Conference, pp. 664-678. 2022.