CIP Compliance Monitoring Updates

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Agenda

NERC ERT v8.1 Updates

Overview of FERC Staff Report:

"2023 Lessons Learned from Commission-Led CIP Reliability Audits"




Remort ID	* Standard *	NORTHEAST POWER COORDINATING COUNCIL Requirement Sample Set 19 Sample Set 19 Sample Set Source & Description Sample Set Evidence Request Sample Set Index Numbers & Date 9	., INC.
CIP-003-R2-12-01	CIP-003-8		9-00000,CIP-003-R2-L2-01 CIP-003-8 R252 2
CIP-003-R2-L2-02	CIP-003-8	NERC ERT v8.1	3P-003-R2-L2-02[CIP-003-8[R2S3.1]3.1
CIP-003-R2-L2-03	CIP-003-8		IIP-003-R2-L2-03 CIP-003-8 R2S3.2 3.2
CIP-003-R2-L2-04	CIP-003-8	R2 Sect 4.2 CSFL2-01 Description: Sample of Reportable Cyber Security Incidents	
CIP-003-R2-12-05	CIP-003-8	Evidence Request Tool (ERT) V7.0 to V8.1 Change List February 2, 2007 List of Change List of Change 1.0 - Opperform 72813	CIP-003-R2-L2-05[CIP-003-8]R2S5.1[5.1
CIP-003-R2-L2-06	CIP-003-8	No. 1 Post 1 Post 1 Post 2 Pos	IP-003-R2-L2-06 CIP-003-8 R2SS-2 S-2
CIP-003-R2-L2-07	CIP-003-8	Source Tab: RM For each use of Removable Media in Sample Set RM-L2-01, provide evidence of: N/A NPCC NCR99999 ME99-00000 ME9 CIP Evidence	0-00000,CIP-003-R2-L2-07 [CIP-003-8] R255.3[5.3
CIP-004-R2-L2-01		Request Tool User Guide Version 8.1 February 2, 2024 CIP ERT V8.1 User Guide REQUEST TOOL User Guide CIP ERT V8.1 User Guide	IP-004-R2-L2-01[CIP-004-7]R2-2 2-2
		A TONISAN	IP-004-R2-L2-02 CIP-004-7 R2.3 2.3
CIP-004-R2-L2-02	PUBLIC	electronic access to a high impact, or medium impact with R2 Part 2.3 Personnel-L2-02 External Routable Connectivity, BES Cyber System or associated EACMS or PACS , or authorized unescorted physical access to a high impact, or medium impact with	3



		NUR		EASIPU	WEK	COORDI	INAIING	COUNCIL, INC.
Request ID	* Standard *	Requirement	Sample Set	Sample Set Source & Description		Sample Set Evidence Request	* Sample Set Index	Numbers & Dat. * SEL Reference ID
CIP-003-R2-L2-01	CIP-003-8	R2 Sect 2		Description: Sample of BES Assets which contain a low impact BES Cyber System	For each BES asset containing physical security controls win. The asset or the locations 2. The Cyber Asset(s), as specontrol(s) implemented for for each BES asset control.	vased on vased on vased on	Assets-L2-01, provide evidence that need as determined by entity, to: et; and nic access Nsets-L2-02, provide the following N/A	NPCC NCR99999 ME99-00000 ME99-00000,CIP-003-R2-L2-01 CIP-003-8 R252 2 NPCC NCR99999 ME99-00000 ME99-00000,CIP-003-R2-L2-02 CIP-003-8 R253.1 3.1
CIP-003-R2-L2-02	CIP-003-8	R2 Sect 3.1		Description: Sample of BES Assets which contain a low impact BES Cyber System with routable protocol	evidence: 1. Representative d' 2. The inbound an 3. Documentation th	SEL Reference	v(s); y.	
CIP-003-R2-L2-03	CIP-003-8			Impact BES Cyber 5	y of imple		Updated CIP-004-6	NPCC NCR99999 ME99-00000 ME99-00000,CIP-003-82-L2-03 CIP-003-8 R2S3.2 3.2
CIP-003-R2-L2-04	CIP-003-8	R2 Sect 4.2		Source Tab: CS language revision		le Cyber Security Incident in Sample Set CSI-L2-01, pro	to CIP-004-7 and CIP-011-2 to	NPCC[NCR99999[ME99-00000[ME99-00000,CIP-003-R2-L2-04]CIP-003-8]R254.2]4.2
CIP-003-R2-L2-05	CIP-003-8	R2 Sect 5.1		Source Tab: TCA Description: Sample of the Responsible Entity for impact BES Cyber System	out Mare.	V/O 1	ptr Sc. CIP-011-3	NPCC[NCR99999]ME99-00000[ME99-00000,CIP-003-R2-L2-05]CIP-003-8[R2SS.1]S.1
CIP-003-R2-L2-06	CIP-003-8			Source Tab: TCA Description: Sample of Tran- managed by the Responsit contain a low impact Br	For each active (2), provide (2), provide (3), provide (4), provide (4	V8.1 Changes	entity in or more a.	NPCC NCR99999 ME99-00000 ME99-00000,CIP-003-R2-L2-06 CIP-003-8 R2SS.2 S.2
CIP-003-R2-L2-07	CIP-003-8			Source Tab: RM Divided CIP-009-R1-L1		set of declaration and the set of	CIP-005-R2-L1-04 (same as	NPCC NCR99999 ME99-00000 ME99-00000,CIP-003-R2-L2-07 CIP-003-8 R2S5.3 5.3
CIP-004-R2-L2-01		R2 Part 2.2		Description: Sample Caccess to a high impact, Routable Connectivity, BL EACMS or PACS, or initial inhigh impact, or medium impact, Connectivity, BES Cyber System or associated EACMS or PACS authorized during the audit period	ests In Derso	Divided CIP-008-R1-L1-01	CIP-005-R1-L1-03 but for R2)	NPCC NCR99999 ME99-00000 ME99-00000,CIP-004-R2-L2-01 CIP-004-7 R2-2 2-2
CIP-004-R2-L2-02	PUBLIC				For each individual of applicable Cyber Assert calendar months.	into four requests	rized unescorted physical access to completed at least once every 15	NPCC[NCR99999]ME99-00000[ME99-00000,CIP-004-R2-L2-02]CIP-004-7[R2.3]2.3



FERC Staff Report



The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission completed CIP Audits of several U.S.-based NERC registered entities

Staff from NERC and the Regional Entities participated in the CIP Audits, including the virtual and on-site portions

This <u>report</u> provides information and recommendations to NERC, Regional Entities, and registered entities



Four Lessons Learned

1 - Identify and categorize all BES Cyber Systems and their associated BES Cyber Assets 2 - Ensure reportable Cyber Security
Incidents and attempts to
compromise that were identified as
Cyber Security Incidents are reported
to the Electricity Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) and to
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA)

3 - Restrict all inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access and denying all other access by default

4 - Enhance supply chain risk management programs to include evaluating the supply chain risks of existing vendors and develop a plan to respond to the risks that are identified



Lessons Learned 1 - CIP-002-5.1a Identify and categorize all BES Cyber Systems and their associated BES Cyber Assets

Identified Failure

Some entities did not identify each medium impact BES Cyber System at a single plant location identified by a
Reliability Coordinator as critical to the derivation of IROLs and their associated contingencies, as required by
Attachment 1, Section 2.6.

Requirement Language R1.1.2 – Attachment 1 Section 2.6

 Identify each of the medium impact BES Cyber Systems, not included in Section 1, associated with "Generation at a single plant location or Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies."



Lessons Learned 1 - CIP-002-5.1a Identify and categorize all BES Cyber Systems and their associated BES Cyber Assets

Reliability Coordinators (RC), Planning Coordinators (PC), or Transmission Planners (TP)

Notify Generator Owners (GO) and/or
 Transmission Owners (TO) that their
 "Generation or Transmission Facility" is
 critical to the derivation of any
 Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits
 (IROLs) and their associated contingencies

For Generation Facilities:

Notifications should be specific to the plant location and applicable unit(s) associated with the IROL

For Transmission Facilities:

Notifications should be specific to the station or substation location and the applicable Transmission Facility (e.g., transformer, transmission line) associated with the IROL


Specific BES Cyber Systems pertaining to the specific Generation or Transmission Facility are left to the GO or TO for identification and categorization



Lessons Learned 1 - CIP-002-5.1a Identify and categorize all BES Cyber Systems and their associated BES Cyber Assets

Generator Owners

- <u>Upon notification</u> that you have specific Generation Facilities applicable to the derivation of an IROL:
 - Identify and categorize all BES Cyber
 Systems and associated BES Cyber Assets
 that are associated with the specific
 Generation Facility





Lessons Learned 1 - CIP-002-5.1a Identify and categorize all BES Cyber Systems and their associated BES Cyber Assets

Transmission Owners

- **Upon notification** that you have specific Transmission Facilities applicable to the derivation of an IROL:
 - Identify and categorize all BES Cyber Systems and associated BES Cyber Assets that are associated with the specific **Transmission Facility**

Systems installed specifically for a transmission line or transformer (e.g., protection relays)

SCADA and other shared components for the entire station or substation location (e.g., HMI's, RTU's, PLCs, networking devices)

BES Cyber


Systems



Lessons Learned 2 - CIP-003-8 R2 Section 4, CIP-007-6 R4, CIP-008-6 R4 Ensure reportable Cyber Security Incidents and attempts to compromise that were identified as Cyber Security Incidents are reported to Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

Cyber Security Incident Response Plan


- Compromise or attempt to compromise
 - Potential security events required by Reliability Standard CIP-007-6, Requirement R4





Lessons Learned 2 - CIP-003-8 R2 Section 4, CIP-007-6 R4, CIP-008-6 R4
Ensure reportable Cyber Security Incidents and attempts to compromise that were identified as Cyber Security Incidents are reported to Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

Three entities encounter malware



Incorrectly determined that the incident was not reportable

Entity 1

 BCS network isolation

Entity 2

 Malware in BCS recycle bin

Entity 3

BCS continued to operate



Lessons Learned 3 - CIP-005-7, R1.3 Restrict all inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access and denying all other access by default

Unrestricted Internet Control Message Protocol usage

No documented justifications for communications

Overly permissive access permissions

No 'deny all'



Lessons Learned 3 - CIP-005-7, R1.3 Restrict all inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access and denying all other access by default



FERC recommendations:

- Ensure all access permissions are accounted for
- Review policies quarterly
- Block IPv6 at the network border



Lessons Learned 4 - CIP-013-1, R1

Enhance supply chain risk management programs to include evaluating the supply chain risks of existing vendors and develop a plan to respond to the risks that are identified

Multiple entities did not properly implement their supply chain risk management plans

Plans did not include processes to respond to identified risks, specifically for "grandfathered" contracts

Recommend entities voluntarily apply CIP-013 to agreements that pre-date the standard.



Lessons Learned 4 - CIP-013-1, R1

Enhance supply chain risk management programs to include evaluating the supply chain risks of existing vendors and develop a plan to respond to the risks that are identified

FERC identified best practices

- Prioritize vendors based on risk
- Identify the vendor's country
- Ensure all purchases go through reviews that include a cybersecurity review
- Implement controls for purchasing IT equipment







Questions

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