// Copyright 2017 The BoringSSL Authors

//

// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");

// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.

// You may obtain a copy of the License at

//

//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0

//

// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software

// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,

// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.

// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and

// limitations under the License.

#include <limits.h>

#include <openssl/rand.h>

#include "../bcm_support.h"

#include "../fipsmodule/bcm_interface.h"

using namespace bssl;

int RAND_bytes(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {

  BCM_rand_bytes(buf, len);

  return 1;

}

int RAND_pseudo_bytes(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { return RAND_bytes(buf, len); }

void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num) {

  // OpenSSH calls |RAND_seed| before jailing on the assumption that any needed

  // file descriptors etc will be opened.

  uint8_t unused;

  RAND_bytes(&unused, sizeof(unused));

}

int RAND_load_file(const char *path, long num) {

  if (num < 0) {  // read the "whole file"

    return 1;

  } else if (num <= INT_MAX) {

    return (int)num;

  } else {

    return INT_MAX;

  }

}

const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t num) { return nullptr; }

void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy) {}

int RAND_egd(const char *path) { return 255; }

int RAND_poll() { return 1; }

int RAND_status() { return 1; }

static const struct rand_meth_st kSSLeayMethod = {

    RAND_seed, RAND_bytes,        RAND_cleanup,

    RAND_add,  RAND_pseudo_bytes, RAND_status,

};

RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay() { return (RAND_METHOD *)&kSSLeayMethod; }

RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL() { return RAND_SSLeay(); }

const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method() { return RAND_SSLeay(); }

int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *method) { return 1; }

void RAND_cleanup() {}

void RAND_get_system_entropy_for_custom_prng(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {

  if (len > 256) {

    abort();

  }

  CRYPTO_sysrand(buf, len);

}