/src/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/dh/dh.cc.inc
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1 | | // Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
2 | | // |
3 | | // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
4 | | // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
5 | | // You may obtain a copy of the License at |
6 | | // |
7 | | // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
8 | | // |
9 | | // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
10 | | // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
11 | | // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
12 | | // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
13 | | // limitations under the License. |
14 | | |
15 | | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
16 | | |
17 | | #include <string.h> |
18 | | |
19 | | #include <iterator> |
20 | | |
21 | | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
22 | | #include <openssl/digest.h> |
23 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
24 | | #include <openssl/mem.h> |
25 | | |
26 | | #include "../../internal.h" |
27 | | #include "../../mem_internal.h" |
28 | | #include "../bn/internal.h" |
29 | | #include "../service_indicator/internal.h" |
30 | | #include "internal.h" |
31 | | |
32 | | |
33 | | using namespace bssl; |
34 | | |
35 | 0 | DH *DH_new() { return New<DHImpl>(); } |
36 | | |
37 | 0 | void DH_free(DH *dh) { |
38 | 0 | if (dh != nullptr) { |
39 | 0 | FromOpaque(dh)->DecRefInternal(); |
40 | 0 | } |
41 | 0 | } |
42 | | |
43 | 0 | unsigned DH_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(FromOpaque(dh)->p.get()); } |
44 | | |
45 | 0 | const BIGNUM *DH_get0_pub_key(const DH *dh) { |
46 | 0 | return FromOpaque(dh)->pub_key.get(); |
47 | 0 | } |
48 | | |
49 | 0 | const BIGNUM *DH_get0_priv_key(const DH *dh) { |
50 | 0 | return FromOpaque(dh)->priv_key.get(); |
51 | 0 | } |
52 | | |
53 | 0 | const BIGNUM *DH_get0_p(const DH *dh) { return FromOpaque(dh)->p.get(); } |
54 | | |
55 | 0 | const BIGNUM *DH_get0_q(const DH *dh) { return FromOpaque(dh)->q.get(); } |
56 | | |
57 | 0 | const BIGNUM *DH_get0_g(const DH *dh) { return FromOpaque(dh)->g.get(); } |
58 | | |
59 | | void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_pub_key, |
60 | 0 | const BIGNUM **out_priv_key) { |
61 | 0 | auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh); |
62 | 0 | if (out_pub_key != nullptr) { |
63 | 0 | *out_pub_key = impl->pub_key.get(); |
64 | 0 | } |
65 | 0 | if (out_priv_key != nullptr) { |
66 | 0 | *out_priv_key = impl->priv_key.get(); |
67 | 0 | } |
68 | 0 | } |
69 | | |
70 | 0 | int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) { |
71 | 0 | auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh); |
72 | 0 | if (pub_key != nullptr) { |
73 | 0 | impl->pub_key.reset(pub_key); |
74 | 0 | } |
75 | |
|
76 | 0 | if (priv_key != nullptr) { |
77 | 0 | impl->priv_key.reset(priv_key); |
78 | 0 | } |
79 | |
|
80 | 0 | return 1; |
81 | 0 | } |
82 | | |
83 | | void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_p, const BIGNUM **out_q, |
84 | 0 | const BIGNUM **out_g) { |
85 | 0 | auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh); |
86 | 0 | if (out_p != nullptr) { |
87 | 0 | *out_p = impl->p.get(); |
88 | 0 | } |
89 | 0 | if (out_q != nullptr) { |
90 | 0 | *out_q = impl->q.get(); |
91 | 0 | } |
92 | 0 | if (out_g != nullptr) { |
93 | 0 | *out_g = impl->g.get(); |
94 | 0 | } |
95 | 0 | } |
96 | | |
97 | 0 | int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) { |
98 | 0 | auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh); |
99 | 0 | if ((impl->p == nullptr && p == nullptr) || |
100 | 0 | (impl->g == nullptr && g == nullptr)) { |
101 | 0 | return 0; |
102 | 0 | } |
103 | | |
104 | 0 | if (p != nullptr) { |
105 | 0 | impl->p.reset(p); |
106 | 0 | } |
107 | |
|
108 | 0 | if (q != nullptr) { |
109 | 0 | impl->q.reset(q); |
110 | 0 | } |
111 | |
|
112 | 0 | if (g != nullptr) { |
113 | 0 | impl->g.reset(g); |
114 | 0 | } |
115 | | |
116 | | // Invalidate the cached Montgomery parameters. |
117 | 0 | impl->method_mont_p = nullptr; |
118 | 0 | return 1; |
119 | 0 | } |
120 | | |
121 | 0 | int DH_set_length(DH *dh, unsigned priv_length) { |
122 | 0 | auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh); |
123 | 0 | impl->priv_length = priv_length; |
124 | 0 | return 1; |
125 | 0 | } |
126 | | |
127 | 0 | int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) { |
128 | 0 | boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test(); |
129 | |
|
130 | 0 | if (!dh_check_params_fast(dh)) { |
131 | 0 | return 0; |
132 | 0 | } |
133 | | |
134 | 0 | auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh); |
135 | 0 | UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new()); |
136 | 0 | if (ctx == nullptr) { |
137 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
138 | 0 | return 0; |
139 | 0 | } |
140 | | |
141 | 0 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&impl->method_mont_p, &impl->method_mont_p_lock, |
142 | 0 | impl->p.get(), ctx.get())) { |
143 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
144 | 0 | return 0; |
145 | 0 | } |
146 | | |
147 | | // Only generate a private key if there's already one. Otherwise, |
148 | | // `DH_generate_key` recomputes the public key. |
149 | 0 | const BIGNUM *priv_key = impl->priv_key.get(); |
150 | 0 | UniquePtr<BIGNUM> new_priv_key; |
151 | 0 | if (priv_key == nullptr) { |
152 | 0 | new_priv_key.reset(BN_new()); |
153 | 0 | if (new_priv_key == nullptr) { |
154 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
155 | 0 | return 0; |
156 | 0 | } |
157 | 0 | if (impl->q) { |
158 | | // Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56A Rev3 generates a private key uniformly |
159 | | // from [1, min(2^N-1, q-1)]. |
160 | | // |
161 | | // Although SP 800-56A Rev3 now permits a private key length N, |
162 | | // `impl->priv_length` historically was ignored when q is available. We |
163 | | // continue to ignore it and interpret such a configuration as N = len(q). |
164 | 0 | if (!BN_rand_range_ex(new_priv_key.get(), 1, impl->q.get())) { |
165 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
166 | 0 | return 0; |
167 | 0 | } |
168 | 0 | } else { |
169 | | // If q is unspecified, we expect p to be a safe prime, with g generating |
170 | | // the (p-1)/2 subgroup. So, we use q = (p-1)/2. (If g generates a smaller |
171 | | // prime-order subgroup, q will still divide (p-1)/2.) |
172 | | // |
173 | | // We set N from `impl->priv_length`. Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56A Rev3 |
174 | | // says to reject N > len(q), or N > num_bits(p) - 1. However, this logic |
175 | | // originally aligned with PKCS#3, which allows num_bits(p). Instead, we |
176 | | // clamp `impl->priv_length` before invoking the algorithm. |
177 | | |
178 | | // Compute M = min(2^N, q). |
179 | 0 | UniquePtr<BIGNUM> priv_key_limit(BN_new()); |
180 | 0 | if (priv_key_limit == nullptr) { |
181 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
182 | 0 | return 0; |
183 | 0 | } |
184 | 0 | if (impl->priv_length == 0 || |
185 | 0 | impl->priv_length >= BN_num_bits(impl->p.get()) - 1) { |
186 | | // M = q = (p - 1) / 2. |
187 | 0 | if (!BN_rshift1(priv_key_limit.get(), impl->p.get())) { |
188 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
189 | 0 | return 0; |
190 | 0 | } |
191 | 0 | } else { |
192 | | // M = 2^N. |
193 | 0 | if (!BN_set_bit(priv_key_limit.get(), impl->priv_length)) { |
194 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
195 | 0 | return 0; |
196 | 0 | } |
197 | 0 | } |
198 | | |
199 | | // Choose a private key uniformly from [1, M-1]. |
200 | 0 | if (!BN_rand_range_ex(new_priv_key.get(), 1, priv_key_limit.get())) { |
201 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
202 | 0 | return 0; |
203 | 0 | } |
204 | 0 | } |
205 | 0 | priv_key = new_priv_key.get(); |
206 | 0 | } |
207 | | |
208 | 0 | UniquePtr<BIGNUM> new_pub_key(BN_new()); |
209 | 0 | if (new_pub_key == nullptr || |
210 | 0 | !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(new_pub_key.get(), impl->g.get(), priv_key, |
211 | 0 | impl->p.get(), ctx.get(), |
212 | 0 | impl->method_mont_p.get())) { |
213 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
214 | 0 | return 0; |
215 | 0 | } |
216 | | |
217 | 0 | impl->pub_key = std::move(new_pub_key); |
218 | 0 | if (new_priv_key != nullptr) { |
219 | 0 | impl->priv_key = std::move(new_priv_key); |
220 | 0 | } |
221 | 0 | return 1; |
222 | 0 | } |
223 | | |
224 | | static int dh_compute_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *out_shared_key, |
225 | 0 | const BIGNUM *peers_key, BN_CTX *ctx) { |
226 | 0 | auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh); |
227 | |
|
228 | 0 | if (!dh_check_params_fast(dh)) { |
229 | 0 | return 0; |
230 | 0 | } |
231 | | |
232 | 0 | if (impl->priv_key == nullptr) { |
233 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE); |
234 | 0 | return 0; |
235 | 0 | } |
236 | | |
237 | 0 | int check_result; |
238 | 0 | if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) { |
239 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY); |
240 | 0 | return 0; |
241 | 0 | } |
242 | | |
243 | 0 | BN_CTXScope scope(ctx); |
244 | 0 | BIGNUM *p_minus_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
245 | 0 | if (!p_minus_1 || |
246 | 0 | !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&impl->method_mont_p, &impl->method_mont_p_lock, |
247 | 0 | impl->p.get(), ctx)) { |
248 | 0 | return 0; |
249 | 0 | } |
250 | | |
251 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out_shared_key, peers_key, |
252 | 0 | impl->priv_key.get(), impl->p.get(), ctx, |
253 | 0 | impl->method_mont_p.get()) || |
254 | 0 | !BN_copy(p_minus_1, impl->p.get()) || !BN_sub_word(p_minus_1, 1)) { |
255 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
256 | 0 | return 0; |
257 | 0 | } |
258 | | |
259 | | // This performs the check required by SP 800-56Ar3 section 5.7.1.1 step two. |
260 | 0 | if (BN_cmp_word(out_shared_key, 1) <= 0 || |
261 | 0 | BN_cmp(out_shared_key, p_minus_1) == 0) { |
262 | 0 | OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY); |
263 | 0 | return 0; |
264 | 0 | } |
265 | | |
266 | 0 | return 1; |
267 | 0 | } |
268 | | |
269 | | int bssl::dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(unsigned char *out, |
270 | 0 | const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) { |
271 | 0 | UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new()); |
272 | 0 | if (ctx == nullptr) { |
273 | 0 | return -1; |
274 | 0 | } |
275 | 0 | BN_CTXScope scope(ctx.get()); |
276 | 0 | int dh_size = DH_size(dh); |
277 | 0 | BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get()); |
278 | 0 | if (shared_key == nullptr || |
279 | 0 | !dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx.get()) || |
280 | 0 | !BN_bn2bin_padded(out, dh_size, shared_key)) { |
281 | 0 | return -1; |
282 | 0 | } |
283 | 0 | return dh_size; |
284 | 0 | } |
285 | | |
286 | 0 | int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) { |
287 | 0 | boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test(); |
288 | |
|
289 | 0 | return dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(out, peers_key, dh); |
290 | 0 | } |
291 | | |
292 | 0 | int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) { |
293 | 0 | boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test(); |
294 | |
|
295 | 0 | UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new()); |
296 | 0 | if (ctx == nullptr) { |
297 | 0 | return -1; |
298 | 0 | } |
299 | 0 | BN_CTXScope scope(ctx.get()); |
300 | 0 | BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get()); |
301 | 0 | if (shared_key == nullptr || |
302 | 0 | !dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx.get())) { |
303 | 0 | return -1; |
304 | 0 | } |
305 | | // A `BIGNUM`'s byte count fits in `int`. |
306 | 0 | return static_cast<int>(BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out)); |
307 | 0 | } |
308 | | |
309 | | int DH_compute_key_hashed(DH *dh, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, |
310 | | size_t max_out_len, const BIGNUM *peers_key, |
311 | 0 | const EVP_MD *digest) { |
312 | 0 | *out_len = SIZE_MAX; |
313 | |
|
314 | 0 | const size_t digest_len = EVP_MD_size(digest); |
315 | 0 | if (digest_len > max_out_len) { |
316 | 0 | return 0; |
317 | 0 | } |
318 | | |
319 | 0 | FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state(); |
320 | |
|
321 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
322 | 0 | const size_t dh_len = DH_size(dh); |
323 | 0 | uint8_t *shared_bytes = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(dh_len)); |
324 | 0 | unsigned out_len_unsigned; |
325 | 0 | if (!shared_bytes || |
326 | | // SP 800-56A is ambiguous about whether the output should be padded prior |
327 | | // to revision three. But revision three, section C.1, awkwardly specifies |
328 | | // padding to the length of p. |
329 | | // |
330 | | // Also, padded output avoids side-channels, so is always strongly |
331 | | // advisable. |
332 | 0 | DH_compute_key_padded(shared_bytes, peers_key, dh) != (int)dh_len || |
333 | 0 | !EVP_Digest(shared_bytes, dh_len, out, &out_len_unsigned, digest, |
334 | 0 | nullptr) || |
335 | 0 | out_len_unsigned != digest_len) { |
336 | 0 | goto err; |
337 | 0 | } |
338 | | |
339 | 0 | *out_len = digest_len; |
340 | 0 | ret = 1; |
341 | |
|
342 | 0 | err: |
343 | 0 | FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); |
344 | 0 | OPENSSL_free(shared_bytes); |
345 | 0 | return ret; |
346 | 0 | } |
347 | | |
348 | 0 | int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(FromOpaque(dh)->p.get()); } |
349 | | |
350 | 0 | int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) { |
351 | 0 | auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh); |
352 | 0 | impl->UpRefInternal(); |
353 | 0 | return 1; |
354 | 0 | } |
355 | | |
356 | 0 | DH *DH_get_rfc7919_2048() { |
357 | | // This is the prime from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1, |
358 | | // which is specifically approved for FIPS in appendix D of SP 800-56Ar3. |
359 | 0 | static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048Data[] = { |
360 | 0 | TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x886b4238, 0x61285c97), |
361 | 0 | TOBN(0xc6f34a26, 0xc1b2effa), TOBN(0xc58ef183, 0x7d1683b2), |
362 | 0 | TOBN(0x3bb5fcbc, 0x2ec22005), TOBN(0xc3fe3b1b, 0x4c6fad73), |
363 | 0 | TOBN(0x8e4f1232, 0xeef28183), TOBN(0x9172fe9c, 0xe98583ff), |
364 | 0 | TOBN(0xc03404cd, 0x28342f61), TOBN(0x9e02fce1, 0xcdf7e2ec), |
365 | 0 | TOBN(0x0b07a7c8, 0xee0a6d70), TOBN(0xae56ede7, 0x6372bb19), |
366 | 0 | TOBN(0x1d4f42a3, 0xde394df4), TOBN(0xb96adab7, 0x60d7f468), |
367 | 0 | TOBN(0xd108a94b, 0xb2c8e3fb), TOBN(0xbc0ab182, 0xb324fb61), |
368 | 0 | TOBN(0x30acca4f, 0x483a797a), TOBN(0x1df158a1, 0x36ade735), |
369 | 0 | TOBN(0xe2a689da, 0xf3efe872), TOBN(0x984f0c70, 0xe0e68b77), |
370 | 0 | TOBN(0xb557135e, 0x7f57c935), TOBN(0x85636555, 0x3ded1af3), |
371 | 0 | TOBN(0x2433f51f, 0x5f066ed0), TOBN(0xd3df1ed5, 0xd5fd6561), |
372 | 0 | TOBN(0xf681b202, 0xaec4617a), TOBN(0x7d2fe363, 0x630c75d8), |
373 | 0 | TOBN(0xcc939dce, 0x249b3ef9), TOBN(0xa9e13641, 0x146433fb), |
374 | 0 | TOBN(0xd8b9c583, 0xce2d3695), TOBN(0xafdc5620, 0x273d3cf1), |
375 | 0 | TOBN(0xadf85458, 0xa2bb4a9a), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), |
376 | 0 | }; |
377 | |
|
378 | 0 | UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ffdhe2048_p(BN_new()); |
379 | 0 | UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ffdhe2048_q(BN_new()); |
380 | 0 | UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ffdhe2048_g(BN_new()); |
381 | 0 | UniquePtr<DH> dh(DH_new()); |
382 | 0 | if (!ffdhe2048_p || !ffdhe2048_q || !ffdhe2048_g || !dh) { |
383 | 0 | return nullptr; |
384 | 0 | } |
385 | | |
386 | 0 | bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_p.get(), kFFDHE2048Data, |
387 | 0 | std::size(kFFDHE2048Data)); |
388 | |
|
389 | 0 | if (!BN_rshift1(ffdhe2048_q.get(), ffdhe2048_p.get()) || |
390 | 0 | !BN_set_word(ffdhe2048_g.get(), 2) || |
391 | 0 | !DH_set0_pqg(dh.get(), ffdhe2048_p.get(), ffdhe2048_q.get(), |
392 | 0 | ffdhe2048_g.get())) { |
393 | 0 | return nullptr; |
394 | 0 | } |
395 | | // `DH_set0_pqg` takes ownership on success. |
396 | 0 | ffdhe2048_p.release(); |
397 | 0 | ffdhe2048_q.release(); |
398 | 0 | ffdhe2048_g.release(); |
399 | |
|
400 | 0 | return dh.release(); |
401 | 0 | } |