/src/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/internal.h
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1 | | // Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
2 | | // Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
3 | | // |
4 | | // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
5 | | // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
6 | | // You may obtain a copy of the License at |
7 | | // |
8 | | // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
9 | | // |
10 | | // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
11 | | // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
12 | | // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
13 | | // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
14 | | // limitations under the License. |
15 | | |
16 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BN_INTERNAL_H |
17 | | #define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BN_INTERNAL_H |
18 | | |
19 | | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
20 | | |
21 | | #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(_MSC_VER) |
22 | | #include <intrin.h> |
23 | | #pragma intrinsic(__umulh, _umul128) |
24 | | #endif |
25 | | |
26 | | #include "../../internal.h" |
27 | | |
28 | | |
29 | | BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN |
30 | | |
31 | | #if defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT) |
32 | | |
33 | | #if defined(BORINGSSL_HAS_UINT128) |
34 | | // MSVC doesn't support two-word integers on 64-bit. |
35 | 28.6M | #define BN_ULLONG uint128_t |
36 | | #if defined(BORINGSSL_CAN_DIVIDE_UINT128) |
37 | | #define BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG |
38 | | #endif |
39 | | #endif |
40 | | |
41 | 327M | #define BN_BITS2 64 |
42 | 47.0k | #define BN_BITS2_LG 6 |
43 | 373k | #define BN_BYTES 8 |
44 | | #define BN_BITS4 32 |
45 | 107k | #define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffUL) |
46 | | #define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffUL) |
47 | | #define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000UL) |
48 | | #define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000UL) |
49 | 0 | #define BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS 1 |
50 | 18.8k | #define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000UL) |
51 | 206k | #define BN_DEC_NUM 19 |
52 | 0 | #define TOBN(hi, lo) ((BN_ULONG)(hi) << 32 | (lo)) |
53 | | |
54 | | #elif defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT) |
55 | | |
56 | | #define BN_ULLONG uint64_t |
57 | | #define BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG |
58 | | #define BN_BITS2 32 |
59 | | #define BN_BITS2_LG 5 |
60 | | #define BN_BYTES 4 |
61 | | #define BN_BITS4 16 |
62 | | #define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffUL) |
63 | | #define BN_MASK2l (0xffffUL) |
64 | | #define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffff8000UL) |
65 | | #define BN_MASK2h (0xffff0000UL) |
66 | | // On some 32-bit platforms, Montgomery multiplication is done using 64-bit |
67 | | // arithmetic with SIMD instructions. On such platforms, `BN_MONT_CTX::n0` |
68 | | // needs to be two words long. Only certain 32-bit platforms actually make use |
69 | | // of n0[1] and shorter R value would suffice for the others. However, |
70 | | // currently only the assembly files know which is which. |
71 | | #define BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS 2 |
72 | | #define BN_DEC_CONV (1000000000UL) |
73 | | #define BN_DEC_NUM 9 |
74 | | #define TOBN(hi, lo) (lo), (hi) |
75 | | |
76 | | #else |
77 | | #error "Must define either OPENSSL_32_BIT or OPENSSL_64_BIT" |
78 | | #endif |
79 | | |
80 | | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) |
81 | | #define BN_CAN_USE_INLINE_ASM |
82 | | #endif |
83 | | |
84 | | // MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN is the alignment needed for `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime`'s |
85 | | // tables. |
86 | | // |
87 | | // TODO(davidben): Historically, this alignment came from cache line |
88 | | // assumptions, which we've since removed. Is 64-byte alignment still necessary |
89 | | // or ideal? The true alignment requirement seems to now be 32 bytes, coming |
90 | | // from RSAZ's use of VMOVDQA to a YMM register. Non-x86_64 has even fewer |
91 | | // requirements. |
92 | 138 | #define MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN 64 |
93 | | |
94 | | // MOD_EXP_CTIME_STORAGE_LEN is the number of `BN_ULONG`s needed for the |
95 | | // `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime` stack-allocated storage buffer. The buffer is |
96 | | // just the right size for the RSAZ and is about ~1KB larger than what's |
97 | | // necessary (4480 bytes) for 1024-bit inputs. |
98 | | #define MOD_EXP_CTIME_STORAGE_LEN \ |
99 | 0 | (((320u * 3u) + (32u * 9u * 16u)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) |
100 | | |
101 | | #define STATIC_BIGNUM(x) \ |
102 | | { \ |
103 | | (BN_ULONG *)(x), sizeof(x) / sizeof(BN_ULONG), \ |
104 | | sizeof(x) / sizeof(BN_ULONG), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA \ |
105 | | } |
106 | | |
107 | | // bn_minimal_width returns the minimal number of words needed to represent |
108 | | // `bn`. |
109 | | int bn_minimal_width(const BIGNUM *bn); |
110 | | |
111 | | // bn_set_minimal_width sets `bn->width` to `bn_minimal_width(bn)`. If `bn` is |
112 | | // zero, `bn->neg` is set to zero. |
113 | | void bn_set_minimal_width(BIGNUM *bn); |
114 | | |
115 | | // bn_wexpand ensures that `bn` has at least `words` works of space without |
116 | | // altering its value. It returns one on success or zero on allocation |
117 | | // failure. |
118 | | int bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t words); |
119 | | |
120 | | // bn_expand acts the same as `bn_wexpand`, but takes a number of bits rather |
121 | | // than a number of words. |
122 | | int bn_expand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t bits); |
123 | | |
124 | | // bn_resize_words adjusts `bn->width` to be `words`. It returns one on success |
125 | | // and zero on allocation error or if `bn`'s value is too large. |
126 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_resize_words(BIGNUM *bn, size_t words); |
127 | | |
128 | | // bn_select_words sets `r` to `a` if `mask` is all ones or `b` if `mask` is |
129 | | // all zeros. |
130 | | void bn_select_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG mask, const BN_ULONG *a, |
131 | | const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num); |
132 | | |
133 | | // bn_set_words sets `bn` to the value encoded in the `num` words in `words`, |
134 | | // least significant word first. |
135 | | int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num); |
136 | | |
137 | | // bn_set_static_words acts like `bn_set_words`, but doesn't copy the data. A |
138 | | // flag is set on `bn` so that `BN_free` won't attempt to free the data. |
139 | | // |
140 | | // The `STATIC_BIGNUM` macro is probably a better solution for this outside of |
141 | | // the FIPS module. Inside of the FIPS module that macro generates rel.ro data, |
142 | | // which doesn't work with FIPS requirements. |
143 | | void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num); |
144 | | |
145 | | // bn_fits_in_words returns one if `bn` may be represented in `num` words, plus |
146 | | // a sign bit, and zero otherwise. |
147 | | int bn_fits_in_words(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num); |
148 | | |
149 | | // bn_copy_words copies the value of `bn` to `out` and returns one if the value |
150 | | // is representable in `num` words. Otherwise, it returns zero. |
151 | | int bn_copy_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, const BIGNUM *bn); |
152 | | |
153 | | // bn_assert_fits_in_bytes asserts that `bn` fits in `num` bytes. This is a |
154 | | // no-op in release builds, but triggers an assert in debug builds, and |
155 | | // declassifies all bytes which are therefore known to be zero in constant-time |
156 | | // validation. |
157 | | void bn_assert_fits_in_bytes(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num); |
158 | | |
159 | | // bn_secret marks `bn`'s contents, but not its width or sign, as secret. See |
160 | | // `CONSTTIME_SECRET` for details. |
161 | 24 | inline void bn_secret(BIGNUM *bn) { |
162 | 24 | CONSTTIME_SECRET(bn->d, bn->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); |
163 | 24 | } |
164 | | |
165 | | // bn_declassify marks `bn`'s value as public. See `CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY` for |
166 | | // details. |
167 | 0 | inline void bn_declassify(BIGNUM *bn) { |
168 | 0 | CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(bn->d, bn->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); |
169 | 0 | } |
170 | | |
171 | | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86) |
172 | | // See asm/bn-586.pl. |
173 | | #define BN_ADD_ASM |
174 | | #define BN_MUL_ASM |
175 | | #endif |
176 | | |
177 | | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && \ |
178 | | (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) |
179 | | // See asm/x86_64-gcc.c |
180 | | #define BN_ADD_ASM |
181 | | #define BN_MUL_ASM |
182 | | #endif |
183 | | |
184 | | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) |
185 | | // See asm/bn-armv8.pl. |
186 | | #define BN_ADD_ASM |
187 | | #endif |
188 | | |
189 | | // bn_mul_add_words multiples `ap` by `w`, adds the result to `rp`, and places |
190 | | // the result in `rp`. `ap` and `rp` must both be `num` words long. It returns |
191 | | // the carry word of the operation. `ap` and `rp` may be equal but otherwise may |
192 | | // not alias. |
193 | | #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
194 | | extern "C" |
195 | | #endif |
196 | | BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, size_t num, |
197 | | BN_ULONG w); |
198 | | |
199 | | // bn_mul_words multiples `ap` by `w` and places the result in `rp`. `ap` and |
200 | | // `rp` must both be `num` words long. It returns the carry word of the |
201 | | // operation. `ap` and `rp` may be equal but otherwise may not alias. |
202 | | #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
203 | | extern "C" |
204 | | #endif |
205 | | BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, size_t num, |
206 | | BN_ULONG w); |
207 | | |
208 | | // bn_sqr_add_words computes `tmp` where `tmp[2*i]` and `tmp[2*i+1]` are |
209 | | // `ap[i]`'s square, for all `i` up to `num`, and adds the result to `rp`. If |
210 | | // the result does not fit in `2*num` words, the final carry bit is truncated. |
211 | | // `ap` is an array of `num` words and `rp` an array of `2*num` words. `ap` and |
212 | | // `rp` may not alias. |
213 | | // |
214 | | // This gives the contribution of the `ap[i]*ap[i]` terms when squaring `ap`. |
215 | | #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
216 | | extern "C" |
217 | | #endif |
218 | | void bn_sqr_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, size_t num); |
219 | | |
220 | | // bn_add_words adds `ap` to `bp` and places the result in `rp`, each of which |
221 | | // are `num` words long. It returns the carry bit, which is one if the operation |
222 | | // overflowed and zero otherwise. Any pair of `ap`, `bp`, and `rp` may be equal |
223 | | // to each other but otherwise may not alias. |
224 | | #if defined(BN_ADD_ASM) |
225 | | extern "C" |
226 | | #endif |
227 | | BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, |
228 | | size_t num); |
229 | | |
230 | | // bn_sub_words subtracts `bp` from `ap` and places the result in `rp`. It |
231 | | // returns the borrow bit, which is one if the computation underflowed and zero |
232 | | // otherwise. Any pair of `ap`, `bp`, and `rp` may be equal to each other but |
233 | | // otherwise may not alias. |
234 | | #if defined(BN_ADD_ASM) |
235 | | extern "C" |
236 | | #endif |
237 | | BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, |
238 | | size_t num); |
239 | | |
240 | | // bn_mul_comba4 sets `r` to the product of `a` and `b`. |
241 | | #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
242 | | extern "C" |
243 | | #endif |
244 | | void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG r[8], const BN_ULONG a[4], const BN_ULONG b[4]); |
245 | | |
246 | | // bn_mul_comba8 sets `r` to the product of `a` and `b`. |
247 | | #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
248 | | extern "C" |
249 | | #endif |
250 | | void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG r[16], const BN_ULONG a[8], |
251 | | const BN_ULONG b[8]); |
252 | | |
253 | | // bn_sqr_comba8 sets `r` to `a`². |
254 | | #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
255 | | extern "C" |
256 | | #endif |
257 | | void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG r[16], const BN_ULONG a[8]); |
258 | | |
259 | | // bn_sqr_comba4 sets `r` to `a`². |
260 | | #if defined(BN_MUL_ASM) |
261 | | extern "C" |
262 | | #endif |
263 | | void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG r[8], const BN_ULONG a[4]); |
264 | | |
265 | | // bn_add_carry_words adds `carry` to `ap` and places the result in `rp`. `ap` |
266 | | // and `rp` are `num` words long and may alias. `carry` must be 0 or 1. It |
267 | | // returns the carry bit, which is one if the operation overflowed and zero |
268 | | // otherwise. |
269 | | BN_ULONG bn_add_carry_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG carry, |
270 | | size_t num); |
271 | | |
272 | | // bn_less_than_words returns one if `a` < `b` and zero otherwise, where `a` |
273 | | // and `b` both are `len` words long. It runs in constant time. |
274 | | int bn_less_than_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, size_t len); |
275 | | |
276 | | // bn_in_range_words returns one if `min_inclusive` <= `a` < `max_exclusive`, |
277 | | // where `a` and `max_exclusive` both are `len` words long. `a` and |
278 | | // `max_exclusive` are treated as secret. |
279 | | int bn_in_range_words(const BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG min_inclusive, |
280 | | const BN_ULONG *max_exclusive, size_t len); |
281 | | |
282 | | // bn_rand_range_words sets `out` to a uniformly distributed random number from |
283 | | // `min_inclusive` to `max_exclusive`. Both `out` and `max_exclusive` are `len` |
284 | | // words long. |
285 | | // |
286 | | // This function runs in time independent of the result, but `min_inclusive` and |
287 | | // `max_exclusive` are public data. (Information about the range is unavoidably |
288 | | // leaked by how many iterations it took to select a number.) |
289 | | int bn_rand_range_words(BN_ULONG *out, BN_ULONG min_inclusive, |
290 | | const BN_ULONG *max_exclusive, size_t len, |
291 | | const uint8_t additional_data[32]); |
292 | | |
293 | | // bn_range_secret_range behaves like `BN_rand_range_ex`, but treats |
294 | | // `max_exclusive` as secret. Because of this constraint, the distribution of |
295 | | // values returned is more complex. |
296 | | // |
297 | | // Rather than repeatedly generating values until one is in range, which would |
298 | | // leak information, it generates one value. If the value is in range, it sets |
299 | | // `*out_is_uniform` to one. Otherwise, it sets `*out_is_uniform` to zero, |
300 | | // fixing up the value to force it in range. |
301 | | // |
302 | | // The subset of calls to `bn_rand_secret_range` which set `*out_is_uniform` to |
303 | | // one are uniformly distributed in the target range. Calls overall are not. |
304 | | // This function is intended for use in situations where the extra values are |
305 | | // still usable and where the number of iterations needed to reach the target |
306 | | // number of uniform outputs may be blinded for negligible probabilities of |
307 | | // timing leaks. |
308 | | // |
309 | | // Although this function treats `max_exclusive` as secret, it treats the number |
310 | | // of bits in `max_exclusive` as public. |
311 | | int bn_rand_secret_range(BIGNUM *r, int *out_is_uniform, BN_ULONG min_inclusive, |
312 | | const BIGNUM *max_exclusive); |
313 | | |
314 | | // BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS is the maximum number of words allowed in a `BIGNUM` |
315 | | // used with Montgomery reduction. Ideally this limit would be applied to all |
316 | | // `BIGNUM`s, in `bn_wexpand`, but the exactfloat library needs to create 8 MiB |
317 | | // values for other operations. |
318 | | // |
319 | | // This limit is set so that one number fits within 2 KiB, giving room to |
320 | | // allocate a few of them on the stack. It is also set to limit the DoS impact |
321 | | // of large RSA, DH, and DSA keys, which scale cubically. |
322 | 24.3k | #define BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS (16384 / BN_BITS2) |
323 | | |
324 | | BSSL_NAMESPACE_END |
325 | | |
326 | | struct bn_mont_ctx_st { |
327 | | // RR is R², reduced modulo `N`. It is used to convert to Montgomery form. It |
328 | | // is guaranteed to have the same width as `N`. |
329 | | BIGNUM RR; |
330 | | // N is the modulus. It is always stored in minimal form, so `N.width` |
331 | | // determines R. |
332 | | BIGNUM N; |
333 | | BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS]; // least significant words of (R*Ri-1)/N |
334 | | }; |
335 | | |
336 | | BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN |
337 | | |
338 | | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \ |
339 | | (defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || \ |
340 | | defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) |
341 | | #define OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT |
342 | | // bn_mul_mont_words writes `ap` * `bp` mod `np` to `rp`, each `num` words |
343 | | // long. Inputs and outputs are in Montgomery form. `n0` is a pointer to the |
344 | | // corresponding field in `BN_MONT_CTX`. |
345 | | // |
346 | | // If at least one of `ap` or `bp` is fully reduced, `rp` will be fully reduced. |
347 | | // If neither is fully-reduced, the output may not be either. |
348 | | // |
349 | | // This function allocates up to 2 * `num` words (plus a constant allocation) on |
350 | | // the stack, so `num` should be at most `BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS`. |
351 | | // Additionally, `num` must be at least 128 / `BN_BITS2`. |
352 | | // |
353 | | // TODO(davidben): The x86_64 implementation expects a 32-bit input and masks |
354 | | // off upper bits. The aarch64 implementation expects a 64-bit input and does |
355 | | // not. `size_t` is the safer option but not strictly correct for x86_64. But |
356 | | // the `BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS` bound makes this moot. |
357 | | // |
358 | | // See also discussion in `ToWord` in abi_test.h for notes on smaller-than-word |
359 | | // inputs. |
360 | | extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
361 | | const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
362 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
363 | | size_t num); |
364 | | |
365 | | #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) |
366 | 1.39M | inline int bn_mulx_adx_capable() { |
367 | | // MULX is in BMI2. |
368 | 1.39M | return CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable() && CRYPTO_is_ADX_capable(); |
369 | 1.39M | } |
370 | | extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_nohw(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
371 | | const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
372 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
373 | | size_t num); |
374 | 248M | inline int bn_mul4x_mont_capable(size_t num) { |
375 | 248M | return num >= 8 && (num & 3) == 0; |
376 | 248M | } |
377 | | extern "C" void bn_mul4x_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
378 | | const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
379 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
380 | | size_t num); |
381 | 124M | inline int bn_mulx4x_mont_capable(size_t num) { |
382 | 124M | return bn_mul4x_mont_capable(num) && bn_mulx_adx_capable(); |
383 | 124M | } |
384 | | extern "C" void bn_mulx4x_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
385 | | const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
386 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
387 | | size_t num); |
388 | 69.8M | inline int bn_sqr8x_mont_capable(size_t num) { |
389 | 69.8M | return num >= 8 && (num & 7) == 0; |
390 | 69.8M | } |
391 | | extern "C" void bn_sqr8x_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
392 | | BN_ULONG mulx_adx_capable, const BN_ULONG *np, |
393 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
394 | | size_t num); |
395 | | #elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM) |
396 | | inline int bn_mul8x_mont_neon_capable(size_t num) { |
397 | | return (num & 7) == 0 && CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable(); |
398 | | } |
399 | | extern "C" void bn_mul8x_mont_neon(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
400 | | const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
401 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
402 | | size_t num); |
403 | | extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_nohw(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
404 | | const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, |
405 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
406 | | size_t num); |
407 | | #endif |
408 | | |
409 | | #endif // OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT |
410 | | |
411 | | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) |
412 | | #define OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 |
413 | | |
414 | | // The following functions implement `bn_mul_mont_gather5`. See |
415 | | // `bn_mul_mont_gather5` for details. |
416 | 554k | inline int bn_mul4x_mont_gather5_capable(int num) { return (num & 7) == 0; } |
417 | | extern "C" void bn_mul4x_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
418 | | const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np, |
419 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
420 | | int num, int power); |
421 | | |
422 | 543k | inline int bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5_capable(int num) { |
423 | 543k | return bn_mul4x_mont_gather5_capable(num) && CRYPTO_is_ADX_capable() && |
424 | 531k | CRYPTO_is_BMI1_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable(); |
425 | 543k | } |
426 | | extern "C" void bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
427 | | const BN_ULONG *table, |
428 | | const BN_ULONG *np, |
429 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], |
430 | | int num, int power); |
431 | | |
432 | | extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_gather5_nohw( |
433 | | BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np, |
434 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], int num, int power); |
435 | | |
436 | | // bn_scatter5 stores `inp` to index `power` of `table`. `inp` and each entry of |
437 | | // `table` are `num` words long. `power` must be less than 32 and is treated as |
438 | | // public. `table` must be 32*`num` words long. `table` must be aligned to at |
439 | | // least 16 bytes. |
440 | | extern "C" void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num, BN_ULONG *table, |
441 | | size_t power); |
442 | | |
443 | | // bn_gather5 loads index `power` of `table` and stores it in `out`. `out` and |
444 | | // each entry of `table` are `num` words long. `power` must be less than 32 and |
445 | | // is treated as secret. `table` must be aligned to at least 16 bytes. |
446 | | extern "C" void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, const BN_ULONG *table, |
447 | | size_t power); |
448 | | |
449 | | // The following functions implement `bn_power5`. See `bn_power5` for details. |
450 | | extern "C" void bn_power5_nohw(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
451 | | const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np, |
452 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], int num, |
453 | | int power); |
454 | | |
455 | 14.4M | inline int bn_power5_capable(int num) { return (num & 7) == 0; } |
456 | | |
457 | 7.22M | inline int bn_powerx5_capable(int num) { |
458 | 7.22M | return bn_power5_capable(num) && CRYPTO_is_ADX_capable() && |
459 | 7.22M | CRYPTO_is_BMI1_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable(); |
460 | 7.22M | } |
461 | | extern "C" void bn_powerx5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, |
462 | | const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np, |
463 | | const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], int num, |
464 | | int power); |
465 | | |
466 | | #endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM && OPENSSL_X86_64 |
467 | | |
468 | | uint64_t bn_mont_n0(const BIGNUM *n); |
469 | | |
470 | | // bn_mont_ctx_set_RR_consttime initializes `mont->RR`. It returns one on |
471 | | // success and zero on error. `mont->N` and `mont->n0` must have been |
472 | | // initialized already. The bit width of `mont->N` is assumed public, but |
473 | | // `mont->N` is otherwise treated as secret. |
474 | | int bn_mont_ctx_set_RR_consttime(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); |
475 | | |
476 | | #if defined(_MSC_VER) |
477 | | #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) |
478 | | #define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) ((low) = _umul128((a), (b), &(high))) |
479 | | #elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) |
480 | | #define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) \ |
481 | | do { \ |
482 | | const BN_ULONG _a = (a); \ |
483 | | const BN_ULONG _b = (b); \ |
484 | | (low) = _a * _b; \ |
485 | | (high) = __umulh(_a, _b); \ |
486 | | } while (0) |
487 | | #endif |
488 | | #endif // _MSC_VER |
489 | | |
490 | | #if !defined(BN_ULLONG) && !defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) |
491 | | #error "Either BN_ULLONG or BN_UMULT_LOHI must be defined on every platform." |
492 | | #endif |
493 | | |
494 | | // bn_jacobi returns the Jacobi symbol of `a` and `b` (which is -1, 0 or 1), or |
495 | | // -2 on error. |
496 | | int bn_jacobi(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); |
497 | | |
498 | | // bn_is_bit_set_words returns one if bit `bit` is set in `a` and zero |
499 | | // otherwise. |
500 | | int bn_is_bit_set_words(const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num, size_t bit); |
501 | | |
502 | | // bn_one_to_montgomery sets `r` to one in Montgomery form. It returns one on |
503 | | // success and zero on error. This function treats the bit width of the modulus |
504 | | // as public. |
505 | | int bn_one_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); |
506 | | |
507 | | // bn_less_than_montgomery_R returns one if `bn` is less than the Montgomery R |
508 | | // value for `mont` and zero otherwise. |
509 | | int bn_less_than_montgomery_R(const BIGNUM *bn, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
510 | | |
511 | | // bn_mod_u16_consttime returns `bn` mod `d`, ignoring `bn`'s sign bit. It runs |
512 | | // in time independent of the value of `bn`, but it treats `d` as public. |
513 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t bn_mod_u16_consttime(const BIGNUM *bn, uint16_t d); |
514 | | |
515 | | // bn_odd_number_is_obviously_composite returns one if `bn` is divisible by one |
516 | | // of the first several odd primes and zero otherwise. |
517 | | int bn_odd_number_is_obviously_composite(const BIGNUM *bn); |
518 | | |
519 | | // A BN_MILLER_RABIN stores state common to each Miller-Rabin iteration. It is |
520 | | // initialized within an existing `BN_CTX` scope and may not be used after |
521 | | // that scope is released with `BN_CTX_end`. Field names match those in FIPS |
522 | | // 186-5, section B.3.1. |
523 | | typedef struct { |
524 | | // w1 is w-1. |
525 | | BIGNUM *w1; |
526 | | // m is (w-1)/2^a. |
527 | | BIGNUM *m; |
528 | | // one_mont is 1 (mod w) in Montgomery form. |
529 | | BIGNUM *one_mont; |
530 | | // w1_mont is w-1 (mod w) in Montgomery form. |
531 | | BIGNUM *w1_mont; |
532 | | // w_bits is BN_num_bits(w). |
533 | | int w_bits; |
534 | | // a is the largest integer such that 2^a divides w-1. |
535 | | int a; |
536 | | } BN_MILLER_RABIN; |
537 | | |
538 | | // bn_miller_rabin_init initializes `miller_rabin` for testing if `mont->N` is |
539 | | // prime. It returns one on success and zero on error. |
540 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_miller_rabin_init(BN_MILLER_RABIN *miller_rabin, |
541 | | const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); |
542 | | |
543 | | // bn_miller_rabin_iteration performs one Miller-Rabin iteration, checking if |
544 | | // `b` is a composite witness for `mont->N`. `miller_rabin` must have been |
545 | | // initialized with `bn_miller_rabin_setup`. On success, it returns one and sets |
546 | | // `*out_is_possibly_prime` to one if `mont->N` may still be prime or zero if |
547 | | // `b` shows it is composite. On allocation or internal failure, it returns |
548 | | // zero. |
549 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_miller_rabin_iteration( |
550 | | const BN_MILLER_RABIN *miller_rabin, int *out_is_possibly_prime, |
551 | | const BIGNUM *b, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); |
552 | | |
553 | | // bn_rshift1_words sets `r` to `a` >> 1, where both arrays are `num` bits wide. |
554 | | void bn_rshift1_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num); |
555 | | |
556 | | // bn_rshift_words sets `r` to `a` >> `shift`, where both arrays are `num` bits |
557 | | // wide. |
558 | | void bn_rshift_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, unsigned shift, |
559 | | size_t num); |
560 | | |
561 | | // bn_rshift_secret_shift behaves like `BN_rshift` but runs in time independent |
562 | | // of both `a` and `n`. |
563 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_rshift_secret_shift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, |
564 | | unsigned n, BN_CTX *ctx); |
565 | | |
566 | | // bn_reduce_once sets `r` to `a` mod `m` where 0 <= `a` < 2*`m`. It returns |
567 | | // zero if `a` < `m` and a mask of all ones if `a` >= `m`. Each array is `num` |
568 | | // words long, but `a` has an additional word specified by `carry`. `carry` must |
569 | | // be zero or one, as implied by the bounds on `a`. |
570 | | // |
571 | | // `r`, `a`, and `m` may not alias. Use `bn_reduce_once_in_place` if `r` and `a` |
572 | | // must alias. |
573 | | BN_ULONG bn_reduce_once(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG carry, |
574 | | const BN_ULONG *m, size_t num); |
575 | | |
576 | | // bn_reduce_once_in_place behaves like `bn_reduce_once` but acts in-place on |
577 | | // `r`, using `tmp` as scratch space. `r`, `tmp`, and `m` may not alias. |
578 | | BN_ULONG bn_reduce_once_in_place(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG carry, const BN_ULONG *m, |
579 | | BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num); |
580 | | |
581 | | |
582 | | // Constant-time non-modular arithmetic. |
583 | | // |
584 | | // The following functions implement non-modular arithmetic in constant-time |
585 | | // and pessimally set `r->width` to the largest possible word size. |
586 | | // |
587 | | // Note this means that, e.g., repeatedly multiplying by one will cause widths |
588 | | // to increase without bound. The corresponding public API functions minimize |
589 | | // their outputs to avoid regressing calculator consumers. |
590 | | |
591 | | // bn_uadd_consttime behaves like `BN_uadd`, but it pessimally sets |
592 | | // `r->width` = `a->width` + `b->width` + 1. |
593 | | int bn_uadd_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); |
594 | | |
595 | | // bn_usub_consttime behaves like `BN_usub`, but it pessimally sets |
596 | | // `r->width` = `a->width`. |
597 | | int bn_usub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); |
598 | | |
599 | | // bn_abs_sub_consttime sets `r` to the absolute value of `a` - `b`, treating |
600 | | // both inputs as secret. It returns one on success and zero on error. |
601 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_abs_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, |
602 | | const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); |
603 | | |
604 | | // bn_mul_consttime behaves like `BN_mul`, but it rejects negative inputs and |
605 | | // pessimally sets `r->width` to `a->width` + `b->width`, to avoid leaking |
606 | | // information about `a` and `b`. |
607 | | int bn_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); |
608 | | |
609 | | // bn_sqrt_consttime behaves like `BN_sqrt`, but it pessimally sets `r->width` |
610 | | // to 2*`a->width`, to avoid leaking information about `a` and `b`. |
611 | | int bn_sqr_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); |
612 | | |
613 | | // bn_div_consttime behaves like `BN_div`, but it rejects negative inputs and |
614 | | // treats both inputs, including their magnitudes, as secret. It is, as a |
615 | | // result, much slower than `BN_div` and should only be used for rare operations |
616 | | // where Montgomery reduction is not available. `divisor_min_bits` is a |
617 | | // public lower bound for `BN_num_bits(divisor)`. When `divisor`'s bit width is |
618 | | // public, this can speed up the operation. |
619 | | // |
620 | | // Note that `quotient->width` will be set pessimally to `numerator->width`. |
621 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_div_consttime(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *remainder, |
622 | | const BIGNUM *numerator, |
623 | | const BIGNUM *divisor, |
624 | | unsigned divisor_min_bits, BN_CTX *ctx); |
625 | | |
626 | | // bn_is_relatively_prime checks whether GCD(`x`, `y`) is one. On success, it |
627 | | // returns one and sets `*out_relatively_prime` to one if the GCD was one and |
628 | | // zero otherwise. On error, it returns zero. |
629 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_is_relatively_prime(int *out_relatively_prime, |
630 | | const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, |
631 | | BN_CTX *ctx); |
632 | | |
633 | | // bn_lcm_consttime sets `r` to LCM(`a`, `b`). It returns one and success and |
634 | | // zero on error. `a` and `b` are both treated as secret. |
635 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_lcm_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, |
636 | | BN_CTX *ctx); |
637 | | |
638 | | // bn_mont_ctx_init zero-initialies `mont`. |
639 | | void bn_mont_ctx_init(BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
640 | | |
641 | | // bn_mont_ctx_cleanup releases memory associated with `mont`, without freeing |
642 | | // `mont` itself. |
643 | | void bn_mont_ctx_cleanup(BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
644 | | |
645 | | |
646 | | // Constant-time modular arithmetic. |
647 | | // |
648 | | // The following functions implement basic constant-time modular arithmetic. |
649 | | |
650 | | // bn_mod_add_words sets `r` to `a` + `b` (mod `m`), using `tmp` as scratch |
651 | | // space. Each array is `num` words long. `a` and `b` must be < `m`. Any pair of |
652 | | // `r`, `a`, and `b` may alias. |
653 | | void bn_mod_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, |
654 | | const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num); |
655 | | |
656 | | // bn_mod_add_consttime acts like `BN_mod_add_quick` but takes a `BN_CTX`. |
657 | | int bn_mod_add_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, |
658 | | const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); |
659 | | |
660 | | // bn_mod_sub_words sets `r` to `a` - `b` (mod `m`), using `tmp` as scratch |
661 | | // space. Each array is `num` words long. `a` and `b` must be < `m`. Any pair of |
662 | | // `r`, `a`, and `b` may alias. |
663 | | void bn_mod_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, |
664 | | const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num); |
665 | | |
666 | | // bn_mod_sub_consttime acts like `BN_mod_sub_quick` but takes a `BN_CTX`. |
667 | | int bn_mod_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, |
668 | | const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); |
669 | | |
670 | | // bn_mod_lshift1_consttime acts like `BN_mod_lshift1_quick` but takes a |
671 | | // `BN_CTX`. |
672 | | int bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, |
673 | | BN_CTX *ctx); |
674 | | |
675 | | // bn_mod_lshift_consttime acts like `BN_mod_lshift_quick` but takes a `BN_CTX`. |
676 | | int bn_mod_lshift_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m, |
677 | | BN_CTX *ctx); |
678 | | |
679 | | // bn_mod_inverse_consttime sets `r` to `a`^-1, mod `n`. `a` must be non- |
680 | | // negative and less than `n`. It returns one on success and zero on error. On |
681 | | // failure, if the failure was caused by `a` having no inverse mod `n` then |
682 | | // `*out_no_inverse` will be set to one; otherwise it will be set to zero. |
683 | | // |
684 | | // This function treats both `a` and `n` as secret, provided they are both non- |
685 | | // zero and the inverse exists. It should only be used for even moduli where |
686 | | // none of the less general implementations are applicable. |
687 | | OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_mod_inverse_consttime(BIGNUM *r, int *out_no_inverse, |
688 | | const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, |
689 | | BN_CTX *ctx); |
690 | | |
691 | | // bn_mod_inverse_prime sets `out` to the modular inverse of `a` modulo `p`, |
692 | | // computed with Fermat's Little Theorem. It returns one on success and zero on |
693 | | // error. If `mont_p` is NULL, one will be computed temporarily. |
694 | | int bn_mod_inverse_prime(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, |
695 | | BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p); |
696 | | |
697 | | // bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime behaves like `bn_mod_inverse_prime` but uses |
698 | | // `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime` instead of `BN_mod_exp_mont` in hopes of |
699 | | // protecting the exponent. |
700 | | int bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, |
701 | | BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p); |
702 | | |
703 | | // BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked takes `lock` and checks whether `*pmont` is NULL. If |
704 | | // so, it creates a new `BN_MONT_CTX` and sets the modulus for it to `mod`. It |
705 | | // then stores it as `*pmont`. It returns one on success and zero on error. Note |
706 | | // this function assumes `mod` is public. |
707 | | // |
708 | | // If `*pmont` is already non-NULL then it does nothing and returns one. |
709 | | int BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(UniquePtr<BN_MONT_CTX> *pmont, Mutex *lock, |
710 | | const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *bn_ctx); |
711 | | |
712 | | |
713 | | // Low-level operations for small numbers. |
714 | | // |
715 | | // The following functions implement algorithms suitable for use with scalars |
716 | | // and field elements in elliptic curves. They rely on the number being small |
717 | | // both to stack-allocate various temporaries and because they do not implement |
718 | | // optimizations useful for the larger values used in RSA. |
719 | | |
720 | | // BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS is the largest size input these functions handle. This |
721 | | // limit allows temporaries to be more easily stack-allocated. This limit is set |
722 | | // to accommodate P-521. |
723 | | #if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT) |
724 | | #define BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS 17 |
725 | | #else |
726 | 123M | #define BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS 9 |
727 | | #endif |
728 | | |
729 | | // bn_mul_small sets `r` to `a`*`b`. `num_r` must be `num_a` + `num_b`. `r` may |
730 | | // not alias with `a` or `b`. |
731 | | void bn_mul_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a, |
732 | | const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num_b); |
733 | | |
734 | | // bn_sqr_small sets `r` to `a`². `num_r` must be `num_a`*2. `r` and `a` may |
735 | | // not alias. |
736 | | void bn_sqr_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a); |
737 | | |
738 | | // In the following functions, the modulus must be at most `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS` |
739 | | // words long. |
740 | | |
741 | | // bn_to_montgomery_small sets `r` to `a` translated to the Montgomery domain. |
742 | | // `r` and `a` are `num` words long, which must be `mont->N.width`. `a` must be |
743 | | // fully reduced and may alias `r`. |
744 | | void bn_to_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num, |
745 | | const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
746 | | |
747 | | // bn_from_montgomery_small sets `r` to `a` translated out of the Montgomery |
748 | | // domain. `r` and `a` are `num_r` and `num_a` words long, respectively. `num_r` |
749 | | // must be `mont->N.width`. `a` must be at most `mont->N`² and may alias `r`. |
750 | | // |
751 | | // Unlike most of these functions, only `num_r` is bounded by |
752 | | // `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`. `num_a` may exceed it, but must be at most 2 * `num_r`. |
753 | | void bn_from_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, |
754 | | size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
755 | | |
756 | | // bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small sets `r` to `a` * `b` mod `mont->N`. Both inputs |
757 | | // and outputs are in the Montgomery domain. Each array is `num` words long, |
758 | | // which must be `mont->N.width`. Any two of `r`, `a`, and `b` may alias. `a` |
759 | | // and `b` must be reduced on input. |
760 | | void bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, |
761 | | const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num, |
762 | | const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
763 | | |
764 | | // bn_mod_exp_mont_small sets `r` to `a`^`p` mod `mont->N`. It returns one on |
765 | | // success and zero on programmer or internal error. Both inputs and outputs are |
766 | | // in the Montgomery domain. `r` and `a` are `num` words long, which must be |
767 | | // `mont->N.width` and at most `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`. `num_p`, measured in bits, |
768 | | // must fit in `size_t`. `a` must be fully-reduced. This function runs in time |
769 | | // independent of `a`, but `p` and `mont->N` are public values. `a` must be |
770 | | // fully-reduced and may alias with `r`. |
771 | | // |
772 | | // Note this function differs from `BN_mod_exp_mont` which uses Montgomery |
773 | | // reduction but takes input and output outside the Montgomery domain. Combine |
774 | | // this function with `bn_from_montgomery_small` and `bn_to_montgomery_small` |
775 | | // if necessary. |
776 | | void bn_mod_exp_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num, |
777 | | const BN_ULONG *p, size_t num_p, |
778 | | const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
779 | | |
780 | | // bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small sets `r` to `a`^-1 mod `mont->N`. If `a` is |
781 | | // zero, `r` is set to zero. `mont->N` must be a prime. `r` and `a` are `num` |
782 | | // words long, which must be `mont->N.width` and at most `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`. |
783 | | // `a` must be fully-reduced and may alias `r`. This function runs in time |
784 | | // independent of `a`, but `mont->N` is a public value. |
785 | | void bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, |
786 | | size_t num, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont); |
787 | | |
788 | | |
789 | | // Word-based byte conversion functions. |
790 | | |
791 | | // bn_big_endian_to_words interprets `in_len` bytes from `in` as a big-endian, |
792 | | // unsigned integer and writes the result to `out_len` words in `out`. `out_len` |
793 | | // must be large enough to represent any `in_len`-byte value. That is, `in_len` |
794 | | // must be at most `BN_BYTES * out_len`. |
795 | | void bn_big_endian_to_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *in, |
796 | | size_t in_len); |
797 | | |
798 | | // bn_words_to_big_endian represents `in_len` words from `in` as a big-endian, |
799 | | // unsigned integer in `out_len` bytes. It writes the result to `out`. `out_len` |
800 | | // must be large enough to represent `in` without truncation. |
801 | | // |
802 | | // Note `out_len` may be less than `BN_BYTES * in_len` if `in` is known to have |
803 | | // leading zeros. |
804 | | void bn_words_to_big_endian(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const BN_ULONG *in, |
805 | | size_t in_len); |
806 | | |
807 | | BSSL_NAMESPACE_END |
808 | | |
809 | | |
810 | | #endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BN_INTERNAL_H |