/src/botan/src/lib/tls/tls_record.cpp
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * TLS Record Handling |
3 | | * (C) 2012,2013,2014,2015,2016,2019 Jack Lloyd |
4 | | * 2016 Juraj Somorovsky |
5 | | * 2016 Matthias Gierlings |
6 | | * |
7 | | * Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt) |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | #include <botan/internal/tls_record.h> |
11 | | #include <botan/tls_ciphersuite.h> |
12 | | #include <botan/tls_exceptn.h> |
13 | | #include <botan/loadstor.h> |
14 | | #include <botan/internal/tls_seq_numbers.h> |
15 | | #include <botan/internal/tls_session_key.h> |
16 | | #include <botan/internal/rounding.h> |
17 | | #include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h> |
18 | | #include <botan/rng.h> |
19 | | |
20 | | #if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_CBC) |
21 | | #include <botan/internal/tls_cbc.h> |
22 | | #endif |
23 | | |
24 | | namespace Botan { |
25 | | |
26 | | namespace TLS { |
27 | | |
28 | | Connection_Cipher_State::Connection_Cipher_State(Protocol_Version version, |
29 | | Connection_Side side, |
30 | | bool our_side, |
31 | | const Ciphersuite& suite, |
32 | | const Session_Keys& keys, |
33 | | bool uses_encrypt_then_mac) : |
34 | | m_start_time(std::chrono::system_clock::now()) |
35 | 2.96k | { |
36 | 2.96k | m_nonce_format = suite.nonce_format(); |
37 | 2.96k | m_nonce_bytes_from_record = suite.nonce_bytes_from_record(version); |
38 | 2.96k | m_nonce_bytes_from_handshake = suite.nonce_bytes_from_handshake(); |
39 | 2.96k | |
40 | 2.96k | const secure_vector<uint8_t>& aead_key = keys.aead_key(side); |
41 | 2.96k | m_nonce = keys.nonce(side); |
42 | 2.96k | |
43 | 2.96k | BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(m_nonce.size() == m_nonce_bytes_from_handshake); |
44 | 2.96k | |
45 | 2.96k | if(nonce_format() == Nonce_Format::CBC_MODE) |
46 | 1.07k | { |
47 | 1.07k | #if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_CBC) |
48 | 1.07k | // legacy CBC+HMAC mode |
49 | 1.07k | auto mac = MessageAuthenticationCode::create_or_throw("HMAC(" + suite.mac_algo() + ")"); |
50 | 1.07k | auto cipher = BlockCipher::create_or_throw(suite.cipher_algo()); |
51 | 1.07k | |
52 | 1.07k | if(our_side) |
53 | 491 | { |
54 | 491 | m_aead.reset(new TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Encryption( |
55 | 491 | std::move(cipher), |
56 | 491 | std::move(mac), |
57 | 491 | suite.cipher_keylen(), |
58 | 491 | suite.mac_keylen(), |
59 | 491 | version, |
60 | 491 | uses_encrypt_then_mac)); |
61 | 491 | } |
62 | 585 | else |
63 | 585 | { |
64 | 585 | m_aead.reset(new TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption( |
65 | 585 | std::move(cipher), |
66 | 585 | std::move(mac), |
67 | 585 | suite.cipher_keylen(), |
68 | 585 | suite.mac_keylen(), |
69 | 585 | version, |
70 | 585 | uses_encrypt_then_mac)); |
71 | 585 | } |
72 | 1.07k | |
73 | | #else |
74 | | BOTAN_UNUSED(uses_encrypt_then_mac); |
75 | | throw Internal_Error("Negotiated disabled TLS CBC+HMAC ciphersuite"); |
76 | | #endif |
77 | | } |
78 | 1.89k | else |
79 | 1.89k | { |
80 | 1.89k | m_aead = AEAD_Mode::create_or_throw(suite.cipher_algo(), our_side ? ENCRYPTION : DECRYPTION); |
81 | 1.89k | } |
82 | 2.96k | |
83 | 2.96k | m_aead->set_key(aead_key); |
84 | 2.96k | } |
85 | | |
86 | | std::vector<uint8_t> Connection_Cipher_State::aead_nonce(uint64_t seq, RandomNumberGenerator& rng) |
87 | 2.45k | { |
88 | 2.45k | switch(m_nonce_format) |
89 | 2.45k | { |
90 | 2.45k | case Nonce_Format::CBC_MODE: |
91 | 801 | { |
92 | 801 | if(m_nonce.size()) |
93 | 491 | { |
94 | 491 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce; |
95 | 491 | nonce.swap(m_nonce); |
96 | 491 | return nonce; |
97 | 491 | } |
98 | 310 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(nonce_bytes_from_record()); |
99 | 310 | rng.randomize(nonce.data(), nonce.size()); |
100 | 310 | return nonce; |
101 | 310 | } |
102 | 606 | case Nonce_Format::AEAD_XOR_12: |
103 | 606 | { |
104 | 606 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(12); |
105 | 606 | store_be(seq, nonce.data() + 4); |
106 | 606 | xor_buf(nonce, m_nonce.data(), m_nonce.size()); |
107 | 606 | return nonce; |
108 | 310 | } |
109 | 1.04k | case Nonce_Format::AEAD_IMPLICIT_4: |
110 | 1.04k | { |
111 | 1.04k | BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(m_nonce.size() == 4); |
112 | 1.04k | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(12); |
113 | 1.04k | copy_mem(&nonce[0], m_nonce.data(), 4); |
114 | 1.04k | store_be(seq, &nonce[nonce_bytes_from_handshake()]); |
115 | 1.04k | return nonce; |
116 | 0 | } |
117 | 0 | } |
118 | 0 | |
119 | 0 | throw Invalid_State("Unknown nonce format specified"); |
120 | 0 | } |
121 | | |
122 | | std::vector<uint8_t> |
123 | | Connection_Cipher_State::aead_nonce(const uint8_t record[], size_t record_len, uint64_t seq) |
124 | 1.03k | { |
125 | 1.03k | switch(m_nonce_format) |
126 | 1.03k | { |
127 | 1.03k | case Nonce_Format::CBC_MODE: |
128 | 375 | { |
129 | 375 | if(nonce_bytes_from_record() == 0 && m_nonce.size()) |
130 | 0 | { |
131 | 0 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce; |
132 | 0 | nonce.swap(m_nonce); |
133 | 0 | return nonce; |
134 | 0 | } |
135 | 375 | if(record_len < nonce_bytes_from_record()) |
136 | 14 | throw Decoding_Error("Invalid CBC packet too short to be valid"); |
137 | 361 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(record, record + nonce_bytes_from_record()); |
138 | 361 | return nonce; |
139 | 361 | } |
140 | 361 | case Nonce_Format::AEAD_XOR_12: |
141 | 271 | { |
142 | 271 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(12); |
143 | 271 | store_be(seq, nonce.data() + 4); |
144 | 271 | xor_buf(nonce, m_nonce.data(), m_nonce.size()); |
145 | 271 | return nonce; |
146 | 361 | } |
147 | 392 | case Nonce_Format::AEAD_IMPLICIT_4: |
148 | 392 | { |
149 | 392 | BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(m_nonce.size() == 4); |
150 | 392 | if(record_len < nonce_bytes_from_record()) |
151 | 8 | throw Decoding_Error("Invalid AEAD packet too short to be valid"); |
152 | 384 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(12); |
153 | 384 | copy_mem(&nonce[0], m_nonce.data(), 4); |
154 | 384 | copy_mem(&nonce[nonce_bytes_from_handshake()], record, nonce_bytes_from_record()); |
155 | 384 | return nonce; |
156 | 384 | } |
157 | 0 | } |
158 | 0 | |
159 | 0 | throw Invalid_State("Unknown nonce format specified"); |
160 | 0 | } |
161 | | |
162 | | std::vector<uint8_t> |
163 | | Connection_Cipher_State::format_ad(uint64_t msg_sequence, |
164 | | uint8_t msg_type, |
165 | | Protocol_Version version, |
166 | | uint16_t msg_length) |
167 | 3.45k | { |
168 | 3.45k | std::vector<uint8_t> ad(13); |
169 | 3.45k | |
170 | 3.45k | store_be(msg_sequence, &ad[0]); |
171 | 3.45k | ad[8] = msg_type; |
172 | 3.45k | ad[9] = version.major_version(); |
173 | 3.45k | ad[10] = version.minor_version(); |
174 | 3.45k | ad[11] = get_byte(0, msg_length); |
175 | 3.45k | ad[12] = get_byte(1, msg_length); |
176 | 3.45k | |
177 | 3.45k | return ad; |
178 | 3.45k | } |
179 | | |
180 | | namespace { |
181 | | |
182 | | inline void append_u16_len(secure_vector<uint8_t>& output, size_t len_field) |
183 | 92.1k | { |
184 | 92.1k | const uint16_t len16 = static_cast<uint16_t>(len_field); |
185 | 92.1k | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(len_field, len16, "No truncation"); |
186 | 92.1k | output.push_back(get_byte(0, len16)); |
187 | 92.1k | output.push_back(get_byte(1, len16)); |
188 | 92.1k | } |
189 | | |
190 | | } |
191 | | |
192 | | void write_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& output, |
193 | | uint8_t record_type, |
194 | | Protocol_Version version, |
195 | | uint64_t record_sequence, |
196 | | const uint8_t* message, |
197 | | size_t message_len, |
198 | | Connection_Cipher_State* cs, |
199 | | RandomNumberGenerator& rng) |
200 | 92.1k | { |
201 | 92.1k | output.clear(); |
202 | 92.1k | |
203 | 92.1k | output.push_back(record_type); |
204 | 92.1k | output.push_back(version.major_version()); |
205 | 92.1k | output.push_back(version.minor_version()); |
206 | 92.1k | |
207 | 92.1k | if(version.is_datagram_protocol()) |
208 | 7.51k | { |
209 | 67.6k | for(size_t i = 0; i != 8; ++i) |
210 | 60.0k | output.push_back(get_byte(i, record_sequence)); |
211 | 7.51k | } |
212 | 92.1k | |
213 | 92.1k | if(!cs) // initial unencrypted handshake records |
214 | 89.7k | { |
215 | 89.7k | append_u16_len(output, message_len); |
216 | 89.7k | output.insert(output.end(), message, message + message_len); |
217 | 89.7k | return; |
218 | 89.7k | } |
219 | 2.45k | |
220 | 2.45k | AEAD_Mode& aead = cs->aead(); |
221 | 2.45k | std::vector<uint8_t> aad = cs->format_ad(record_sequence, record_type, version, static_cast<uint16_t>(message_len)); |
222 | 2.45k | |
223 | 2.45k | const size_t ctext_size = aead.output_length(message_len); |
224 | 2.45k | |
225 | 2.45k | const size_t rec_size = ctext_size + cs->nonce_bytes_from_record(); |
226 | 2.45k | |
227 | 2.45k | aead.set_ad(aad); |
228 | 2.45k | |
229 | 2.45k | const std::vector<uint8_t> nonce = cs->aead_nonce(record_sequence, rng); |
230 | 2.45k | |
231 | 2.45k | append_u16_len(output, rec_size); |
232 | 2.45k | |
233 | 2.45k | if(cs->nonce_bytes_from_record() > 0) |
234 | 1.84k | { |
235 | 1.84k | if(cs->nonce_format() == Nonce_Format::CBC_MODE) |
236 | 801 | output += nonce; |
237 | 1.04k | else |
238 | 1.04k | output += std::make_pair(&nonce[cs->nonce_bytes_from_handshake()], cs->nonce_bytes_from_record()); |
239 | 1.84k | } |
240 | 2.45k | |
241 | 2.45k | const size_t header_size = output.size(); |
242 | 2.45k | output += std::make_pair(message, message_len); |
243 | 2.45k | |
244 | 2.45k | aead.start(nonce); |
245 | 2.45k | aead.finish(output, header_size); |
246 | 2.45k | |
247 | 2.45k | BOTAN_ASSERT(output.size() < MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE, |
248 | 2.45k | "Produced ciphertext larger than protocol allows"); |
249 | 2.45k | } |
250 | | |
251 | | namespace { |
252 | | |
253 | | size_t fill_buffer_to(secure_vector<uint8_t>& readbuf, |
254 | | const uint8_t*& input, |
255 | | size_t& input_size, |
256 | | size_t& input_consumed, |
257 | | size_t desired) |
258 | 306k | { |
259 | 306k | if(readbuf.size() >= desired) |
260 | 454 | return 0; // already have it |
261 | 305k | |
262 | 305k | const size_t taken = std::min(input_size, desired - readbuf.size()); |
263 | 305k | |
264 | 305k | readbuf.insert(readbuf.end(), input, input + taken); |
265 | 305k | input_consumed += taken; |
266 | 305k | input_size -= taken; |
267 | 305k | input += taken; |
268 | 305k | |
269 | 305k | return (desired - readbuf.size()); // how many bytes do we still need? |
270 | 305k | } |
271 | | |
272 | | void decrypt_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& output, |
273 | | uint8_t record_contents[], size_t record_len, |
274 | | uint64_t record_sequence, |
275 | | Protocol_Version record_version, |
276 | | Record_Type record_type, |
277 | | Connection_Cipher_State& cs) |
278 | 1.03k | { |
279 | 1.03k | AEAD_Mode& aead = cs.aead(); |
280 | 1.03k | |
281 | 1.03k | const std::vector<uint8_t> nonce = cs.aead_nonce(record_contents, record_len, record_sequence); |
282 | 1.03k | const uint8_t* msg = &record_contents[cs.nonce_bytes_from_record()]; |
283 | 1.03k | const size_t msg_length = record_len - cs.nonce_bytes_from_record(); |
284 | 1.03k | |
285 | 1.03k | /* |
286 | 1.03k | * This early rejection is based just on public information (length of the |
287 | 1.03k | * encrypted packet) and so does not leak any information. We used to use |
288 | 1.03k | * decode_error here which really is more appropriate, but that confuses some |
289 | 1.03k | * tools which are attempting automated detection of padding oracles, |
290 | 1.03k | * including older versions of TLS-Attacker. |
291 | 1.03k | */ |
292 | 1.03k | if(msg_length < aead.minimum_final_size()) |
293 | 15 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BAD_RECORD_MAC, "AEAD packet is shorter than the tag"); |
294 | 1.02k | |
295 | 1.02k | const size_t ptext_size = aead.output_length(msg_length); |
296 | 1.02k | |
297 | 1.02k | aead.set_associated_data_vec( |
298 | 1.02k | cs.format_ad(record_sequence, |
299 | 1.02k | static_cast<uint8_t>(record_type), |
300 | 1.02k | record_version, |
301 | 1.02k | static_cast<uint16_t>(ptext_size)) |
302 | 1.02k | ); |
303 | 1.02k | |
304 | 1.02k | aead.start(nonce); |
305 | 1.02k | |
306 | 1.02k | output.assign(msg, msg + msg_length); |
307 | 1.02k | aead.finish(output, 0); |
308 | 1.02k | } |
309 | | |
310 | | Record_Header read_tls_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& readbuf, |
311 | | const uint8_t input[], |
312 | | size_t input_len, |
313 | | size_t& consumed, |
314 | | secure_vector<uint8_t>& recbuf, |
315 | | Connection_Sequence_Numbers* sequence_numbers, |
316 | | get_cipherstate_fn get_cipherstate) |
317 | 152k | { |
318 | 152k | if(readbuf.size() < TLS_HEADER_SIZE) // header incomplete? |
319 | 152k | { |
320 | 152k | if(size_t needed = fill_buffer_to(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, TLS_HEADER_SIZE)) |
321 | 621 | { |
322 | 621 | return Record_Header(needed); |
323 | 621 | } |
324 | 152k | |
325 | 152k | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(readbuf.size(), TLS_HEADER_SIZE, "Have an entire header"); |
326 | 152k | } |
327 | 152k | |
328 | 152k | const Protocol_Version version(readbuf[1], readbuf[2]); |
329 | 152k | |
330 | 152k | if(version.is_datagram_protocol()) |
331 | 71 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
332 | 71 | "Expected TLS but got a record with DTLS version"); |
333 | 151k | |
334 | 151k | const size_t record_size = make_uint16(readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE-2], |
335 | 151k | readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE-1]); |
336 | 151k | |
337 | 151k | if(record_size > MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE) |
338 | 410 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::RECORD_OVERFLOW, |
339 | 410 | "Received a record that exceeds maximum size"); |
340 | 151k | |
341 | 151k | if(record_size == 0) |
342 | 116 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::DECODE_ERROR, |
343 | 116 | "Received a completely empty record"); |
344 | 151k | |
345 | 151k | if(size_t needed = fill_buffer_to(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, TLS_HEADER_SIZE + record_size)) |
346 | 548 | { |
347 | 548 | return Record_Header(needed); |
348 | 548 | } |
349 | 150k | |
350 | 150k | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<size_t>(TLS_HEADER_SIZE) + record_size, |
351 | 150k | readbuf.size(), |
352 | 150k | "Have the full record"); |
353 | 150k | |
354 | 150k | const Record_Type type = static_cast<Record_Type>(readbuf[0]); |
355 | 150k | |
356 | 150k | uint16_t epoch = 0; |
357 | 150k | |
358 | 150k | uint64_t sequence = 0; |
359 | 150k | if(sequence_numbers) |
360 | 142k | { |
361 | 142k | sequence = sequence_numbers->next_read_sequence(); |
362 | 142k | epoch = sequence_numbers->current_read_epoch(); |
363 | 142k | } |
364 | 8.45k | else |
365 | 8.45k | { |
366 | 8.45k | // server initial handshake case |
367 | 8.45k | epoch = 0; |
368 | 8.45k | } |
369 | 150k | |
370 | 150k | if(epoch == 0) // Unencrypted initial handshake |
371 | 149k | { |
372 | 149k | recbuf.assign(readbuf.begin() + TLS_HEADER_SIZE, readbuf.begin() + TLS_HEADER_SIZE + record_size); |
373 | 149k | readbuf.clear(); |
374 | 149k | return Record_Header(sequence, version, type); |
375 | 149k | } |
376 | 1.03k | |
377 | 1.03k | // Otherwise, decrypt, check MAC, return plaintext |
378 | 1.03k | auto cs = get_cipherstate(epoch); |
379 | 1.03k | |
380 | 1.03k | BOTAN_ASSERT(cs, "Have cipherstate for this epoch"); |
381 | 1.03k | |
382 | 1.03k | decrypt_record(recbuf, |
383 | 1.03k | &readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE], |
384 | 1.03k | record_size, |
385 | 1.03k | sequence, |
386 | 1.03k | version, |
387 | 1.03k | type, |
388 | 1.03k | *cs); |
389 | 1.03k | |
390 | 1.03k | if(sequence_numbers) |
391 | 0 | sequence_numbers->read_accept(sequence); |
392 | 1.03k | |
393 | 1.03k | readbuf.clear(); |
394 | 1.03k | return Record_Header(sequence, version, type); |
395 | 1.03k | } |
396 | | |
397 | | Record_Header read_dtls_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& readbuf, |
398 | | const uint8_t input[], |
399 | | size_t input_len, |
400 | | size_t& consumed, |
401 | | secure_vector<uint8_t>& recbuf, |
402 | | Connection_Sequence_Numbers* sequence_numbers, |
403 | | get_cipherstate_fn get_cipherstate, |
404 | | bool allow_epoch0_restart) |
405 | 1.02k | { |
406 | 1.02k | if(readbuf.size() < DTLS_HEADER_SIZE) // header incomplete? |
407 | 1.02k | { |
408 | 1.02k | if(fill_buffer_to(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, DTLS_HEADER_SIZE)) |
409 | 31 | { |
410 | 31 | readbuf.clear(); |
411 | 31 | return Record_Header(0); |
412 | 31 | } |
413 | 990 | |
414 | 990 | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(readbuf.size(), DTLS_HEADER_SIZE, "Have an entire header"); |
415 | 990 | } |
416 | 1.02k | |
417 | 1.02k | const Protocol_Version version(readbuf[1], readbuf[2]); |
418 | 990 | |
419 | 990 | if(version.is_datagram_protocol() == false) |
420 | 1 | { |
421 | 1 | readbuf.clear(); |
422 | 1 | return Record_Header(0); |
423 | 1 | } |
424 | 989 | |
425 | 989 | const size_t record_size = make_uint16(readbuf[DTLS_HEADER_SIZE-2], |
426 | 989 | readbuf[DTLS_HEADER_SIZE-1]); |
427 | 989 | |
428 | 989 | if(record_size > MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE) |
429 | 2 | { |
430 | 2 | // Too large to be valid, ignore it |
431 | 2 | readbuf.clear(); |
432 | 2 | return Record_Header(0); |
433 | 2 | } |
434 | 987 | |
435 | 987 | if(fill_buffer_to(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, DTLS_HEADER_SIZE + record_size)) |
436 | 17 | { |
437 | 17 | // Truncated packet? |
438 | 17 | readbuf.clear(); |
439 | 17 | return Record_Header(0); |
440 | 17 | } |
441 | 970 | |
442 | 970 | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<size_t>(DTLS_HEADER_SIZE) + record_size, readbuf.size(), |
443 | 970 | "Have the full record"); |
444 | 970 | |
445 | 970 | const Record_Type type = static_cast<Record_Type>(readbuf[0]); |
446 | 970 | |
447 | 970 | const uint64_t sequence = load_be<uint64_t>(&readbuf[3], 0); |
448 | 970 | const uint16_t epoch = (sequence >> 48); |
449 | 970 | |
450 | 970 | const bool already_seen = sequence_numbers && sequence_numbers->already_seen(sequence); |
451 | 970 | |
452 | 970 | if(already_seen && !(epoch == 0 && allow_epoch0_restart)) |
453 | 43 | { |
454 | 43 | readbuf.clear(); |
455 | 43 | return Record_Header(0); |
456 | 43 | } |
457 | 927 | |
458 | 927 | if(epoch == 0) // Unencrypted initial handshake |
459 | 848 | { |
460 | 848 | recbuf.assign(readbuf.begin() + DTLS_HEADER_SIZE, readbuf.begin() + DTLS_HEADER_SIZE + record_size); |
461 | 848 | readbuf.clear(); |
462 | 848 | if(sequence_numbers) |
463 | 225 | sequence_numbers->read_accept(sequence); |
464 | 848 | return Record_Header(sequence, version, type); |
465 | 848 | } |
466 | 79 | |
467 | 79 | try |
468 | 79 | { |
469 | 79 | // Otherwise, decrypt, check MAC, return plaintext |
470 | 79 | auto cs = get_cipherstate(epoch); |
471 | 79 | |
472 | 79 | BOTAN_ASSERT(cs, "Have cipherstate for this epoch"); |
473 | 79 | |
474 | 79 | decrypt_record(recbuf, |
475 | 79 | &readbuf[DTLS_HEADER_SIZE], |
476 | 79 | record_size, |
477 | 79 | sequence, |
478 | 79 | version, |
479 | 79 | type, |
480 | 79 | *cs); |
481 | 79 | } |
482 | 79 | catch(std::exception&) |
483 | 79 | { |
484 | 79 | readbuf.clear(); |
485 | 79 | return Record_Header(0); |
486 | 79 | } |
487 | 0 | |
488 | 0 | if(sequence_numbers) |
489 | 0 | sequence_numbers->read_accept(sequence); |
490 | 0 |
|
491 | 0 | readbuf.clear(); |
492 | 0 | return Record_Header(sequence, version, type); |
493 | 0 | } |
494 | | |
495 | | } |
496 | | |
497 | | Record_Header read_record(bool is_datagram, |
498 | | secure_vector<uint8_t>& readbuf, |
499 | | const uint8_t input[], |
500 | | size_t input_len, |
501 | | size_t& consumed, |
502 | | secure_vector<uint8_t>& recbuf, |
503 | | Connection_Sequence_Numbers* sequence_numbers, |
504 | | get_cipherstate_fn get_cipherstate, |
505 | | bool allow_epoch0_restart) |
506 | 153k | { |
507 | 153k | if(is_datagram) |
508 | 1.02k | return read_dtls_record(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, |
509 | 1.02k | recbuf, sequence_numbers, get_cipherstate, allow_epoch0_restart); |
510 | 152k | else |
511 | 152k | return read_tls_record(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, |
512 | 152k | recbuf, sequence_numbers, get_cipherstate); |
513 | 153k | } |
514 | | |
515 | | } |
516 | | |
517 | | } |