/src/botan/src/lib/tls/tls_record.cpp
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * TLS Record Handling |
3 | | * (C) 2012,2013,2014,2015,2016,2019 Jack Lloyd |
4 | | * 2016 Juraj Somorovsky |
5 | | * 2016 Matthias Gierlings |
6 | | * |
7 | | * Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt) |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | #include <botan/internal/tls_record.h> |
11 | | #include <botan/tls_ciphersuite.h> |
12 | | #include <botan/tls_exceptn.h> |
13 | | #include <botan/internal/loadstor.h> |
14 | | #include <botan/internal/tls_seq_numbers.h> |
15 | | #include <botan/internal/tls_session_key.h> |
16 | | #include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h> |
17 | | #include <botan/rng.h> |
18 | | |
19 | | #if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_CBC) |
20 | | #include <botan/internal/tls_cbc.h> |
21 | | #endif |
22 | | |
23 | | namespace Botan { |
24 | | |
25 | | namespace TLS { |
26 | | |
27 | | Connection_Cipher_State::Connection_Cipher_State(Protocol_Version version, |
28 | | Connection_Side side, |
29 | | bool our_side, |
30 | | const Ciphersuite& suite, |
31 | | const Session_Keys& keys, |
32 | | bool uses_encrypt_then_mac) : |
33 | | m_start_time(std::chrono::system_clock::now()) |
34 | 2.98k | { |
35 | 2.98k | m_nonce_format = suite.nonce_format(); |
36 | 2.98k | m_nonce_bytes_from_record = suite.nonce_bytes_from_record(version); |
37 | 2.98k | m_nonce_bytes_from_handshake = suite.nonce_bytes_from_handshake(); |
38 | | |
39 | 2.98k | const secure_vector<uint8_t>& aead_key = keys.aead_key(side); |
40 | 2.98k | m_nonce = keys.nonce(side); |
41 | | |
42 | 2.98k | BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(m_nonce.size() == m_nonce_bytes_from_handshake); |
43 | | |
44 | 2.98k | if(nonce_format() == Nonce_Format::CBC_MODE) |
45 | 1.40k | { |
46 | 1.40k | #if defined(BOTAN_HAS_TLS_CBC) |
47 | | // legacy CBC+HMAC mode |
48 | 1.40k | auto mac = MessageAuthenticationCode::create_or_throw("HMAC(" + suite.mac_algo() + ")"); |
49 | 1.40k | auto cipher = BlockCipher::create_or_throw(suite.cipher_algo()); |
50 | | |
51 | 1.40k | if(our_side) |
52 | 858 | { |
53 | 858 | m_aead.reset(new TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Encryption( |
54 | 858 | std::move(cipher), |
55 | 858 | std::move(mac), |
56 | 858 | suite.cipher_keylen(), |
57 | 858 | suite.mac_keylen(), |
58 | 858 | version, |
59 | 858 | uses_encrypt_then_mac)); |
60 | 858 | } |
61 | 544 | else |
62 | 544 | { |
63 | 544 | m_aead.reset(new TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption( |
64 | 544 | std::move(cipher), |
65 | 544 | std::move(mac), |
66 | 544 | suite.cipher_keylen(), |
67 | 544 | suite.mac_keylen(), |
68 | 544 | version, |
69 | 544 | uses_encrypt_then_mac)); |
70 | 544 | } |
71 | | |
72 | | #else |
73 | | BOTAN_UNUSED(uses_encrypt_then_mac); |
74 | | throw Internal_Error("Negotiated disabled TLS CBC+HMAC ciphersuite"); |
75 | | #endif |
76 | 1.40k | } |
77 | 1.58k | else |
78 | 1.58k | { |
79 | 808 | m_aead = AEAD_Mode::create_or_throw(suite.cipher_algo(), our_side ? ENCRYPTION : DECRYPTION); |
80 | 1.58k | } |
81 | | |
82 | 2.98k | m_aead->set_key(aead_key); |
83 | 2.98k | } |
84 | | |
85 | | std::vector<uint8_t> Connection_Cipher_State::aead_nonce(uint64_t seq, RandomNumberGenerator& rng) |
86 | 2.53k | { |
87 | 2.53k | switch(m_nonce_format) |
88 | 2.53k | { |
89 | 1.15k | case Nonce_Format::CBC_MODE: |
90 | 1.15k | { |
91 | 1.15k | if(m_nonce.size()) |
92 | 858 | { |
93 | 858 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce; |
94 | 858 | nonce.swap(m_nonce); |
95 | 858 | return nonce; |
96 | 858 | } |
97 | 298 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(nonce_bytes_from_record()); |
98 | 298 | rng.randomize(nonce.data(), nonce.size()); |
99 | 298 | return nonce; |
100 | 298 | } |
101 | 597 | case Nonce_Format::AEAD_XOR_12: |
102 | 597 | { |
103 | 597 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(12); |
104 | 597 | store_be(seq, nonce.data() + 4); |
105 | 597 | xor_buf(nonce, m_nonce.data(), m_nonce.size()); |
106 | 597 | return nonce; |
107 | 298 | } |
108 | 778 | case Nonce_Format::AEAD_IMPLICIT_4: |
109 | 778 | { |
110 | 778 | BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(m_nonce.size() == 4); |
111 | 778 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(12); |
112 | 778 | copy_mem(&nonce[0], m_nonce.data(), 4); |
113 | 778 | store_be(seq, &nonce[nonce_bytes_from_handshake()]); |
114 | 778 | return nonce; |
115 | 0 | } |
116 | 0 | } |
117 | | |
118 | 0 | throw Invalid_State("Unknown nonce format specified"); |
119 | 0 | } |
120 | | |
121 | | std::vector<uint8_t> |
122 | | Connection_Cipher_State::aead_nonce(const uint8_t record[], size_t record_len, uint64_t seq) |
123 | 897 | { |
124 | 897 | switch(m_nonce_format) |
125 | 897 | { |
126 | 325 | case Nonce_Format::CBC_MODE: |
127 | 325 | { |
128 | 325 | if(nonce_bytes_from_record() == 0 && m_nonce.size()) |
129 | 0 | { |
130 | 0 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce; |
131 | 0 | nonce.swap(m_nonce); |
132 | 0 | return nonce; |
133 | 0 | } |
134 | 325 | if(record_len < nonce_bytes_from_record()) |
135 | 10 | throw Decoding_Error("Invalid CBC packet too short to be valid"); |
136 | 315 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(record, record + nonce_bytes_from_record()); |
137 | 315 | return nonce; |
138 | 315 | } |
139 | 229 | case Nonce_Format::AEAD_XOR_12: |
140 | 229 | { |
141 | 229 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(12); |
142 | 229 | store_be(seq, nonce.data() + 4); |
143 | 229 | xor_buf(nonce, m_nonce.data(), m_nonce.size()); |
144 | 229 | return nonce; |
145 | 315 | } |
146 | 343 | case Nonce_Format::AEAD_IMPLICIT_4: |
147 | 343 | { |
148 | 343 | BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(m_nonce.size() == 4); |
149 | 343 | if(record_len < nonce_bytes_from_record()) |
150 | 4 | throw Decoding_Error("Invalid AEAD packet too short to be valid"); |
151 | 339 | std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(12); |
152 | 339 | copy_mem(&nonce[0], m_nonce.data(), 4); |
153 | 339 | copy_mem(&nonce[nonce_bytes_from_handshake()], record, nonce_bytes_from_record()); |
154 | 339 | return nonce; |
155 | 339 | } |
156 | 0 | } |
157 | | |
158 | 0 | throw Invalid_State("Unknown nonce format specified"); |
159 | 0 | } |
160 | | |
161 | | std::vector<uint8_t> |
162 | | Connection_Cipher_State::format_ad(uint64_t msg_sequence, |
163 | | uint8_t msg_type, |
164 | | Protocol_Version version, |
165 | | uint16_t msg_length) |
166 | 3.39k | { |
167 | 3.39k | std::vector<uint8_t> ad(13); |
168 | | |
169 | 3.39k | store_be(msg_sequence, &ad[0]); |
170 | 3.39k | ad[8] = msg_type; |
171 | 3.39k | ad[9] = version.major_version(); |
172 | 3.39k | ad[10] = version.minor_version(); |
173 | 3.39k | ad[11] = get_byte(0, msg_length); |
174 | 3.39k | ad[12] = get_byte(1, msg_length); |
175 | | |
176 | 3.39k | return ad; |
177 | 3.39k | } |
178 | | |
179 | | namespace { |
180 | | |
181 | | inline void append_u16_len(secure_vector<uint8_t>& output, size_t len_field) |
182 | 101k | { |
183 | 101k | const uint16_t len16 = static_cast<uint16_t>(len_field); |
184 | 101k | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(len_field, len16, "No truncation"); |
185 | 101k | output.push_back(get_byte(0, len16)); |
186 | 101k | output.push_back(get_byte(1, len16)); |
187 | 101k | } |
188 | | |
189 | | void write_record_header(secure_vector<uint8_t>& output, |
190 | | uint8_t record_type, |
191 | | Protocol_Version version, |
192 | | uint64_t record_sequence) |
193 | 101k | { |
194 | 101k | output.clear(); |
195 | | |
196 | 101k | output.push_back(record_type); |
197 | 101k | output.push_back(version.major_version()); |
198 | 101k | output.push_back(version.minor_version()); |
199 | | |
200 | 101k | if(version.is_datagram_protocol()) |
201 | 7.01k | { |
202 | 63.1k | for(size_t i = 0; i != 8; ++i) |
203 | 56.0k | output.push_back(get_byte(i, record_sequence)); |
204 | 7.01k | } |
205 | 101k | } |
206 | | |
207 | | } |
208 | | |
209 | | void write_unencrypted_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& output, |
210 | | uint8_t record_type, |
211 | | Protocol_Version version, |
212 | | uint64_t record_sequence, |
213 | | const uint8_t* message, |
214 | | size_t message_len) |
215 | 99.1k | { |
216 | 99.1k | if(record_type == APPLICATION_DATA) |
217 | 0 | throw Internal_Error("Writing an unencrypted TLS application data record"); |
218 | 99.1k | write_record_header(output, record_type, version, record_sequence); |
219 | 99.1k | append_u16_len(output, message_len); |
220 | 99.1k | output.insert(output.end(), message, message + message_len); |
221 | 99.1k | } |
222 | | |
223 | | void write_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& output, |
224 | | uint8_t record_type, |
225 | | Protocol_Version version, |
226 | | uint64_t record_sequence, |
227 | | const uint8_t* message, |
228 | | size_t message_len, |
229 | | Connection_Cipher_State& cs, |
230 | | RandomNumberGenerator& rng) |
231 | 2.53k | { |
232 | 2.53k | write_record_header(output, record_type, version, record_sequence); |
233 | | |
234 | 2.53k | AEAD_Mode& aead = cs.aead(); |
235 | 2.53k | std::vector<uint8_t> aad = cs.format_ad(record_sequence, record_type, version, static_cast<uint16_t>(message_len)); |
236 | | |
237 | 2.53k | const size_t ctext_size = aead.output_length(message_len); |
238 | | |
239 | 2.53k | const size_t rec_size = ctext_size + cs.nonce_bytes_from_record(); |
240 | | |
241 | 2.53k | aead.set_ad(aad); |
242 | | |
243 | 2.53k | const std::vector<uint8_t> nonce = cs.aead_nonce(record_sequence, rng); |
244 | | |
245 | 2.53k | append_u16_len(output, rec_size); |
246 | | |
247 | 2.53k | if(cs.nonce_bytes_from_record() > 0) |
248 | 1.93k | { |
249 | 1.93k | if(cs.nonce_format() == Nonce_Format::CBC_MODE) |
250 | 1.15k | output += nonce; |
251 | 778 | else |
252 | 778 | output += std::make_pair(&nonce[cs.nonce_bytes_from_handshake()], cs.nonce_bytes_from_record()); |
253 | 1.93k | } |
254 | | |
255 | 2.53k | const size_t header_size = output.size(); |
256 | 2.53k | output += std::make_pair(message, message_len); |
257 | | |
258 | 2.53k | aead.start(nonce); |
259 | 2.53k | aead.finish(output, header_size); |
260 | | |
261 | 2.53k | BOTAN_ASSERT(output.size() < MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE, |
262 | 2.53k | "Produced ciphertext larger than protocol allows"); |
263 | 2.53k | } |
264 | | |
265 | | namespace { |
266 | | |
267 | | size_t fill_buffer_to(secure_vector<uint8_t>& readbuf, |
268 | | const uint8_t*& input, |
269 | | size_t& input_size, |
270 | | size_t& input_consumed, |
271 | | size_t desired) |
272 | 279k | { |
273 | 279k | if(readbuf.size() >= desired) |
274 | 446 | return 0; // already have it |
275 | | |
276 | 279k | const size_t taken = std::min(input_size, desired - readbuf.size()); |
277 | | |
278 | 279k | readbuf.insert(readbuf.end(), input, input + taken); |
279 | 279k | input_consumed += taken; |
280 | 279k | input_size -= taken; |
281 | 279k | input += taken; |
282 | | |
283 | 279k | return (desired - readbuf.size()); // how many bytes do we still need? |
284 | 279k | } |
285 | | |
286 | | void decrypt_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& output, |
287 | | uint8_t record_contents[], size_t record_len, |
288 | | uint64_t record_sequence, |
289 | | Protocol_Version record_version, |
290 | | Record_Type record_type, |
291 | | Connection_Cipher_State& cs) |
292 | 897 | { |
293 | 897 | AEAD_Mode& aead = cs.aead(); |
294 | | |
295 | 897 | const std::vector<uint8_t> nonce = cs.aead_nonce(record_contents, record_len, record_sequence); |
296 | 897 | const uint8_t* msg = &record_contents[cs.nonce_bytes_from_record()]; |
297 | 897 | const size_t msg_length = record_len - cs.nonce_bytes_from_record(); |
298 | | |
299 | | /* |
300 | | * This early rejection is based just on public information (length of the |
301 | | * encrypted packet) and so does not leak any information. We used to use |
302 | | * decode_error here which really is more appropriate, but that confuses some |
303 | | * tools which are attempting automated detection of padding oracles, |
304 | | * including older versions of TLS-Attacker. |
305 | | */ |
306 | 897 | if(msg_length < aead.minimum_final_size()) |
307 | 22 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BAD_RECORD_MAC, "AEAD packet is shorter than the tag"); |
308 | | |
309 | 875 | const size_t ptext_size = aead.output_length(msg_length); |
310 | | |
311 | 875 | aead.set_associated_data_vec( |
312 | 875 | cs.format_ad(record_sequence, |
313 | 875 | static_cast<uint8_t>(record_type), |
314 | 875 | record_version, |
315 | 875 | static_cast<uint16_t>(ptext_size)) |
316 | 875 | ); |
317 | | |
318 | 875 | aead.start(nonce); |
319 | | |
320 | 875 | output.assign(msg, msg + msg_length); |
321 | 875 | aead.finish(output, 0); |
322 | 875 | } |
323 | | |
324 | | Record_Header read_tls_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& readbuf, |
325 | | const uint8_t input[], |
326 | | size_t input_len, |
327 | | size_t& consumed, |
328 | | secure_vector<uint8_t>& recbuf, |
329 | | Connection_Sequence_Numbers* sequence_numbers, |
330 | | get_cipherstate_fn get_cipherstate) |
331 | 139k | { |
332 | 139k | if(readbuf.size() < TLS_HEADER_SIZE) // header incomplete? |
333 | 139k | { |
334 | 139k | if(size_t needed = fill_buffer_to(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, TLS_HEADER_SIZE)) |
335 | 723 | { |
336 | 723 | return Record_Header(needed); |
337 | 723 | } |
338 | | |
339 | 138k | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(readbuf.size(), TLS_HEADER_SIZE, "Have an entire header"); |
340 | 138k | } |
341 | | |
342 | 138k | const Protocol_Version version(readbuf[1], readbuf[2]); |
343 | | |
344 | 138k | if(version.is_datagram_protocol()) |
345 | 81 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
346 | 81 | "Expected TLS but got a record with DTLS version"); |
347 | | |
348 | 138k | const size_t record_size = make_uint16(readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE-2], |
349 | 138k | readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE-1]); |
350 | | |
351 | 138k | if(record_size > MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE) |
352 | 331 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::RECORD_OVERFLOW, |
353 | 331 | "Received a record that exceeds maximum size"); |
354 | | |
355 | 138k | if(record_size == 0) |
356 | 107 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::DECODE_ERROR, |
357 | 107 | "Received a completely empty record"); |
358 | | |
359 | 138k | if(size_t needed = fill_buffer_to(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, TLS_HEADER_SIZE + record_size)) |
360 | 446 | { |
361 | 446 | return Record_Header(needed); |
362 | 446 | } |
363 | | |
364 | 137k | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<size_t>(TLS_HEADER_SIZE) + record_size, |
365 | 137k | readbuf.size(), |
366 | 137k | "Have the full record"); |
367 | | |
368 | 137k | const Record_Type type = static_cast<Record_Type>(readbuf[0]); |
369 | | |
370 | 137k | uint16_t epoch = 0; |
371 | | |
372 | 137k | uint64_t sequence = 0; |
373 | 137k | if(sequence_numbers) |
374 | 130k | { |
375 | 130k | sequence = sequence_numbers->next_read_sequence(); |
376 | 130k | epoch = sequence_numbers->current_read_epoch(); |
377 | 130k | } |
378 | 6.65k | else |
379 | 6.65k | { |
380 | | // server initial handshake case |
381 | 6.65k | epoch = 0; |
382 | 6.65k | } |
383 | | |
384 | 137k | if(epoch == 0) // Unencrypted initial handshake |
385 | 136k | { |
386 | 136k | recbuf.assign(readbuf.begin() + TLS_HEADER_SIZE, readbuf.begin() + TLS_HEADER_SIZE + record_size); |
387 | 136k | readbuf.clear(); |
388 | 136k | return Record_Header(sequence, version, type); |
389 | 136k | } |
390 | | |
391 | | // Otherwise, decrypt, check MAC, return plaintext |
392 | 897 | auto cs = get_cipherstate(epoch); |
393 | | |
394 | 897 | BOTAN_ASSERT(cs, "Have cipherstate for this epoch"); |
395 | | |
396 | 897 | decrypt_record(recbuf, |
397 | 897 | &readbuf[TLS_HEADER_SIZE], |
398 | 897 | record_size, |
399 | 897 | sequence, |
400 | 897 | version, |
401 | 897 | type, |
402 | 897 | *cs); |
403 | | |
404 | 897 | if(sequence_numbers) |
405 | 0 | sequence_numbers->read_accept(sequence); |
406 | | |
407 | 897 | readbuf.clear(); |
408 | 897 | return Record_Header(sequence, version, type); |
409 | 897 | } |
410 | | |
411 | | Record_Header read_dtls_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& readbuf, |
412 | | const uint8_t input[], |
413 | | size_t input_len, |
414 | | size_t& consumed, |
415 | | secure_vector<uint8_t>& recbuf, |
416 | | Connection_Sequence_Numbers* sequence_numbers, |
417 | | get_cipherstate_fn get_cipherstate, |
418 | | bool allow_epoch0_restart) |
419 | 1.08k | { |
420 | 1.08k | if(readbuf.size() < DTLS_HEADER_SIZE) // header incomplete? |
421 | 1.08k | { |
422 | 1.08k | if(fill_buffer_to(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, DTLS_HEADER_SIZE)) |
423 | 31 | { |
424 | 31 | readbuf.clear(); |
425 | 31 | return Record_Header(0); |
426 | 31 | } |
427 | | |
428 | 1.05k | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(readbuf.size(), DTLS_HEADER_SIZE, "Have an entire header"); |
429 | 1.05k | } |
430 | | |
431 | 1.05k | const Protocol_Version version(readbuf[1], readbuf[2]); |
432 | | |
433 | 1.05k | if(version.is_datagram_protocol() == false) |
434 | 2 | { |
435 | 2 | readbuf.clear(); |
436 | 2 | return Record_Header(0); |
437 | 2 | } |
438 | | |
439 | 1.05k | const size_t record_size = make_uint16(readbuf[DTLS_HEADER_SIZE-2], |
440 | 1.05k | readbuf[DTLS_HEADER_SIZE-1]); |
441 | | |
442 | 1.05k | if(record_size > MAX_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE) |
443 | 3 | { |
444 | | // Too large to be valid, ignore it |
445 | 3 | readbuf.clear(); |
446 | 3 | return Record_Header(0); |
447 | 3 | } |
448 | | |
449 | 1.05k | if(fill_buffer_to(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, DTLS_HEADER_SIZE + record_size)) |
450 | 20 | { |
451 | | // Truncated packet? |
452 | 20 | readbuf.clear(); |
453 | 20 | return Record_Header(0); |
454 | 20 | } |
455 | | |
456 | 1.03k | BOTAN_ASSERT_EQUAL(static_cast<size_t>(DTLS_HEADER_SIZE) + record_size, readbuf.size(), |
457 | 1.03k | "Have the full record"); |
458 | | |
459 | 1.03k | const Record_Type type = static_cast<Record_Type>(readbuf[0]); |
460 | | |
461 | 1.03k | const uint64_t sequence = load_be<uint64_t>(&readbuf[3], 0); |
462 | 1.03k | const uint16_t epoch = (sequence >> 48); |
463 | | |
464 | 1.03k | const bool already_seen = sequence_numbers && sequence_numbers->already_seen(sequence); |
465 | | |
466 | 1.03k | if(already_seen && !(epoch == 0 && allow_epoch0_restart)) |
467 | 42 | { |
468 | 42 | readbuf.clear(); |
469 | 42 | return Record_Header(0); |
470 | 42 | } |
471 | | |
472 | 991 | if(epoch == 0) // Unencrypted initial handshake |
473 | 916 | { |
474 | 916 | recbuf.assign(readbuf.begin() + DTLS_HEADER_SIZE, readbuf.begin() + DTLS_HEADER_SIZE + record_size); |
475 | 916 | readbuf.clear(); |
476 | 916 | if(sequence_numbers) |
477 | 294 | sequence_numbers->read_accept(sequence); |
478 | 916 | return Record_Header(sequence, version, type); |
479 | 916 | } |
480 | | |
481 | 75 | try |
482 | 75 | { |
483 | | // Otherwise, decrypt, check MAC, return plaintext |
484 | 75 | auto cs = get_cipherstate(epoch); |
485 | | |
486 | 75 | BOTAN_ASSERT(cs, "Have cipherstate for this epoch"); |
487 | | |
488 | 75 | decrypt_record(recbuf, |
489 | 75 | &readbuf[DTLS_HEADER_SIZE], |
490 | 75 | record_size, |
491 | 75 | sequence, |
492 | 75 | version, |
493 | 75 | type, |
494 | 75 | *cs); |
495 | 75 | } |
496 | 75 | catch(std::exception&) |
497 | 75 | { |
498 | 75 | readbuf.clear(); |
499 | 75 | return Record_Header(0); |
500 | 75 | } |
501 | | |
502 | 0 | if(sequence_numbers) |
503 | 0 | sequence_numbers->read_accept(sequence); |
504 | |
|
505 | 0 | readbuf.clear(); |
506 | 0 | return Record_Header(sequence, version, type); |
507 | 0 | } |
508 | | |
509 | | } |
510 | | |
511 | | Record_Header read_record(bool is_datagram, |
512 | | secure_vector<uint8_t>& readbuf, |
513 | | const uint8_t input[], |
514 | | size_t input_len, |
515 | | size_t& consumed, |
516 | | secure_vector<uint8_t>& recbuf, |
517 | | Connection_Sequence_Numbers* sequence_numbers, |
518 | | get_cipherstate_fn get_cipherstate, |
519 | | bool allow_epoch0_restart) |
520 | 140k | { |
521 | 140k | if(is_datagram) |
522 | 1.08k | return read_dtls_record(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, |
523 | 1.08k | recbuf, sequence_numbers, get_cipherstate, allow_epoch0_restart); |
524 | 139k | else |
525 | 139k | return read_tls_record(readbuf, input, input_len, consumed, |
526 | 139k | recbuf, sequence_numbers, get_cipherstate); |
527 | 140k | } |
528 | | |
529 | | } |
530 | | |
531 | | } |