/src/botan/src/lib/tls/tls_callbacks.cpp
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * TLS Callbacks |
3 | | * (C) 2016 Jack Lloyd |
4 | | * 2017 Harry Reimann, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity |
5 | | * |
6 | | * Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt) |
7 | | */ |
8 | | |
9 | | #include <botan/tls_callbacks.h> |
10 | | #include <botan/tls_policy.h> |
11 | | #include <botan/tls_algos.h> |
12 | | #include <botan/x509path.h> |
13 | | #include <botan/ocsp.h> |
14 | | #include <botan/dh.h> |
15 | | #include <botan/ecdh.h> |
16 | | #include <botan/tls_exceptn.h> |
17 | | #include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h> |
18 | | |
19 | | #if defined(BOTAN_HAS_CURVE_25519) |
20 | | #include <botan/curve25519.h> |
21 | | #endif |
22 | | |
23 | | namespace Botan { |
24 | | |
25 | | void TLS::Callbacks::tls_inspect_handshake_msg(const Handshake_Message& /*unused*/) |
26 | 96.3k | { |
27 | | // default is no op |
28 | 96.3k | } |
29 | | |
30 | | std::string TLS::Callbacks::tls_server_choose_app_protocol(const std::vector<std::string>& /*unused*/) |
31 | 0 | { |
32 | 0 | return ""; |
33 | 0 | } |
34 | | |
35 | | std::string TLS::Callbacks::tls_peer_network_identity() |
36 | 1.17k | { |
37 | 1.17k | return ""; |
38 | 1.17k | } |
39 | | |
40 | | std::chrono::system_clock::time_point TLS::Callbacks::tls_current_timestamp() |
41 | 41.3k | { |
42 | 41.3k | return std::chrono::system_clock::now(); |
43 | 41.3k | } |
44 | | |
45 | | void TLS::Callbacks::tls_modify_extensions(Extensions& /*unused*/, Connection_Side /*unused*/) |
46 | 21.2k | { |
47 | 21.2k | } |
48 | | |
49 | | void TLS::Callbacks::tls_examine_extensions(const Extensions& /*unused*/, Connection_Side /*unused*/) |
50 | 19.9k | { |
51 | 19.9k | } |
52 | | |
53 | | std::string TLS::Callbacks::tls_decode_group_param(Group_Params group_param) |
54 | 18.2k | { |
55 | 18.2k | return group_param_to_string(group_param); |
56 | 18.2k | } |
57 | | |
58 | | void TLS::Callbacks::tls_verify_cert_chain( |
59 | | const std::vector<X509_Certificate>& cert_chain, |
60 | | const std::vector<std::optional<OCSP::Response>>& ocsp_responses, |
61 | | const std::vector<Certificate_Store*>& trusted_roots, |
62 | | Usage_Type usage, |
63 | | const std::string& hostname, |
64 | | const TLS::Policy& policy) |
65 | 0 | { |
66 | 0 | if(cert_chain.empty()) |
67 | 0 | throw Invalid_Argument("Certificate chain was empty"); |
68 | | |
69 | 0 | Path_Validation_Restrictions restrictions(policy.require_cert_revocation_info(), |
70 | 0 | policy.minimum_signature_strength()); |
71 | |
|
72 | 0 | Path_Validation_Result result = |
73 | 0 | x509_path_validate(cert_chain, |
74 | 0 | restrictions, |
75 | 0 | trusted_roots, |
76 | 0 | (usage == Usage_Type::TLS_SERVER_AUTH ? hostname : ""), |
77 | 0 | usage, |
78 | 0 | tls_current_timestamp(), |
79 | 0 | tls_verify_cert_chain_ocsp_timeout(), |
80 | 0 | ocsp_responses); |
81 | |
|
82 | 0 | if(!result.successful_validation()) |
83 | 0 | { |
84 | 0 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BAD_CERTIFICATE, |
85 | 0 | "Certificate validation failure: " + result.result_string()); |
86 | 0 | } |
87 | 0 | } |
88 | | |
89 | | std::optional<OCSP::Response> TLS::Callbacks::tls_parse_ocsp_response(const std::vector<uint8_t>& raw_response) |
90 | 0 | { |
91 | 0 | try |
92 | 0 | { |
93 | 0 | return OCSP::Response(raw_response); |
94 | 0 | } |
95 | 0 | catch(const Decoding_Error&) |
96 | 0 | { |
97 | | // ignore parsing errors and just ignore the broken OCSP response |
98 | 0 | return std::nullopt; |
99 | 0 | } |
100 | 0 | } |
101 | | |
102 | | std::vector<uint8_t> TLS::Callbacks::tls_sign_message( |
103 | | const Private_Key& key, |
104 | | RandomNumberGenerator& rng, |
105 | | const std::string& emsa, |
106 | | Signature_Format format, |
107 | | const std::vector<uint8_t>& msg) |
108 | 0 | { |
109 | 0 | PK_Signer signer(key, rng, emsa, format); |
110 | |
|
111 | 0 | return signer.sign_message(msg, rng); |
112 | 0 | } |
113 | | |
114 | | bool TLS::Callbacks::tls_verify_message( |
115 | | const Public_Key& key, |
116 | | const std::string& emsa, |
117 | | Signature_Format format, |
118 | | const std::vector<uint8_t>& msg, |
119 | | const std::vector<uint8_t>& sig) |
120 | 0 | { |
121 | 0 | PK_Verifier verifier(key, emsa, format); |
122 | |
|
123 | 0 | return verifier.verify_message(msg, sig); |
124 | 0 | } |
125 | | |
126 | | std::pair<secure_vector<uint8_t>, std::vector<uint8_t>> TLS::Callbacks::tls_dh_agree( |
127 | | const std::vector<uint8_t>& modulus, |
128 | | const std::vector<uint8_t>& generator, |
129 | | const std::vector<uint8_t>& peer_public_value, |
130 | | const Policy& policy, |
131 | | RandomNumberGenerator& rng) |
132 | 0 | { |
133 | 0 | BigInt p = BigInt::decode(modulus); |
134 | 0 | BigInt g = BigInt::decode(generator); |
135 | 0 | BigInt Y = BigInt::decode(peer_public_value); |
136 | | |
137 | | /* |
138 | | * A basic check for key validity. As we do not know q here we |
139 | | * cannot check that Y is in the right subgroup. However since |
140 | | * our key is ephemeral there does not seem to be any |
141 | | * advantage to bogus keys anyway. |
142 | | */ |
143 | 0 | if(Y <= 1 || Y >= p - 1) |
144 | 0 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
145 | 0 | "Server sent bad DH key for DHE exchange"); |
146 | | |
147 | 0 | DL_Group group(p, g); |
148 | |
|
149 | 0 | if(!group.verify_group(rng, false)) |
150 | 0 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, |
151 | 0 | "DH group validation failed"); |
152 | | |
153 | 0 | DH_PublicKey peer_key(group, Y); |
154 | |
|
155 | 0 | policy.check_peer_key_acceptable(peer_key); |
156 | |
|
157 | 0 | DH_PrivateKey priv_key(rng, group); |
158 | 0 | PK_Key_Agreement ka(priv_key, rng, "Raw"); |
159 | 0 | secure_vector<uint8_t> dh_secret = CT::strip_leading_zeros( |
160 | 0 | ka.derive_key(0, peer_key.public_value()).bits_of()); |
161 | |
|
162 | 0 | return std::make_pair(dh_secret, priv_key.public_value()); |
163 | 0 | } |
164 | | |
165 | | std::pair<secure_vector<uint8_t>, std::vector<uint8_t>> TLS::Callbacks::tls_ecdh_agree( |
166 | | const std::string& curve_name, |
167 | | const std::vector<uint8_t>& peer_public_value, |
168 | | const Policy& policy, |
169 | | RandomNumberGenerator& rng, |
170 | | bool compressed) |
171 | 0 | { |
172 | 0 | secure_vector<uint8_t> ecdh_secret; |
173 | 0 | std::vector<uint8_t> our_public_value; |
174 | |
|
175 | 0 | if(curve_name == "x25519") |
176 | 0 | { |
177 | 0 | #if defined(BOTAN_HAS_CURVE_25519) |
178 | 0 | if(peer_public_value.size() != 32) |
179 | 0 | { |
180 | 0 | throw TLS_Exception(Alert::HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, "Invalid X25519 key size"); |
181 | 0 | } |
182 | | |
183 | 0 | Curve25519_PublicKey peer_key(peer_public_value); |
184 | 0 | policy.check_peer_key_acceptable(peer_key); |
185 | 0 | Curve25519_PrivateKey priv_key(rng); |
186 | 0 | PK_Key_Agreement ka(priv_key, rng, "Raw"); |
187 | 0 | ecdh_secret = ka.derive_key(0, peer_key.public_value()).bits_of(); |
188 | | |
189 | | // X25519 is always compressed but sent as "uncompressed" in TLS |
190 | 0 | our_public_value = priv_key.public_value(); |
191 | | #else |
192 | | throw Internal_Error("Negotiated X25519 somehow, but it is disabled"); |
193 | | #endif |
194 | 0 | } |
195 | 0 | else |
196 | 0 | { |
197 | 0 | EC_Group group(OID::from_string(curve_name)); |
198 | 0 | ECDH_PublicKey peer_key(group, group.OS2ECP(peer_public_value)); |
199 | 0 | policy.check_peer_key_acceptable(peer_key); |
200 | 0 | ECDH_PrivateKey priv_key(rng, group); |
201 | 0 | PK_Key_Agreement ka(priv_key, rng, "Raw"); |
202 | 0 | ecdh_secret = ka.derive_key(0, peer_key.public_value()).bits_of(); |
203 | 0 | our_public_value = priv_key.public_value(compressed ? PointGFp::COMPRESSED : PointGFp::UNCOMPRESSED); |
204 | 0 | } |
205 | | |
206 | 0 | return std::make_pair(ecdh_secret, our_public_value); |
207 | 0 | } |
208 | | |
209 | | } |