Coverage Report

Created: 2023-01-25 06:35

/src/botan/src/lib/utils/ct_utils.cpp
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Source (jump to first uncovered line)
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/*
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* (C) 2018,2021 Jack Lloyd
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*
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* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
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*/
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#include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h>
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namespace Botan::CT {
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secure_vector<uint8_t> copy_output(CT::Mask<uint8_t> bad_input_u8,
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                                   const uint8_t input[],
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                                   size_t input_length,
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                                   size_t offset)
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   {
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   /*
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   * We do not poison the input here because if we did we would have
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   * to unpoison it at exit. We assume instead that callers have
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   * already poisoned the input and will unpoison it at their own
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   * time.
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   */
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   CT::poison(&offset, sizeof(size_t));
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   secure_vector<uint8_t> output(input_length);
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   auto bad_input = CT::Mask<size_t>::expand(bad_input_u8);
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   /*
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   * If the offset is greater than input_length then the arguments are
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   * invalid. Ideally we would through an exception but that leaks
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   * information about the offset. Instead treat it as if the input
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   * was invalid.
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   */
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   bad_input |= CT::Mask<size_t>::is_gt(offset, input_length);
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   /*
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   * If the input is invalid, then set offset == input_length as a result
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   * at the end we will set output_bytes == 0 causing the final result to
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   * be an empty vector.
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   */
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   offset = bad_input.select(input_length, offset);
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   /*
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   Move the desired output bytes to the front using a slow (O^n)
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   but constant time loop that does not leak the value of the offset
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   */
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   for(size_t i = 0; i != input_length; ++i)
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      {
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      /*
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      * If bad_input was set then we modified offset to equal the input_length.
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      * In that case, this_loop will be greater than input_length, and so is_eq
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      * mask will always be false. As a result none of the input values will be
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      * written to output.
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      *
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      * This is ignoring the possibility of integer overflow of offset + i. But
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      * for this to happen the input would have to consume nearly the entire
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      * address space, and we just allocated an output buffer of equal size.
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      */
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      const size_t this_loop = offset + i;
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      /*
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      start index from i rather than 0 since we know j must be >= i + offset
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      to have any effect, and starting from i does not reveal information
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      */
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1.20G
      for(size_t j = i; j != input_length; ++j)
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1.20G
         {
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         const uint8_t b = input[j];
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         const auto is_eq = CT::Mask<size_t>::is_equal(j, this_loop);
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         output[i] |= is_eq.if_set_return(b);
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         }
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      }
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   const size_t output_bytes = input_length - offset;
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   CT::unpoison(output.data(), output.size());
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   CT::unpoison(output_bytes);
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   /*
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   This is potentially not const time, depending on how std::vector is
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   implemented. But since we are always reducing length, it should
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   just amount to setting the member var holding the length.
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   */
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   output.resize(output_bytes);
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   return output;
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   }
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secure_vector<uint8_t> strip_leading_zeros(const uint8_t in[], size_t length)
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   {
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   size_t leading_zeros = 0;
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   auto only_zeros = Mask<uint8_t>::set();
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   for(size_t i = 0; i != length; ++i)
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      {
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      only_zeros &= CT::Mask<uint8_t>::is_zero(in[i]);
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      leading_zeros += only_zeros.if_set_return(1);
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      }
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   return copy_output(CT::Mask<uint8_t>::cleared(), in, length, leading_zeros);
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   }
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}