/* Copyright 2017 The ChromiumOS Authors

 * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be

 * found in the LICENSE file.

 */

#include "system.h"

#include <errno.h>

#include <fcntl.h>

#include <grp.h>

#include <net/if.h>

#include <pwd.h>

#include <stdbool.h>

#include <stdio.h>

#include <string.h>

#include <sys/ioctl.h>

#include <sys/prctl.h>

#include <sys/socket.h>

#include <sys/stat.h>

#include <sys/statvfs.h>

#include <unistd.h>

#include <linux/securebits.h>

#include "syscall_wrapper.h"

#include "util.h"

/*

 * SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE was added in kernel 4.3, so fill in the

 * definition if the securebits header doesn't provide it.

 */

#ifndef SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE

#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE (issecure_mask(6))

#endif

#ifndef SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED

#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED (issecure_mask(7))

#endif

/*

 * SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE was added in kernel 6.14, so fill in the

 * definition if the securebits header doesn't provide it.

 */

#ifndef SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE

#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE (issecure_mask(8))

#endif

#ifndef SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED

#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED (issecure_mask(9))

#endif

/*

 * SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE was added in kernel 6.14, so fill in the

 * definition if the securebits header doesn't provide it.

 */

#ifndef SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE

#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE (issecure_mask(10))

#endif

#ifndef SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED

#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED (issecure_mask(11))

#endif

/*

 * Assert the value of SECURE_ALL_BITS at compile-time to detect a change in

 * the set of secure bits coming from the kernel headers.

 * Kernel 6.14 introduced new secure bits that need to be removed when

 * running on older kernels. An older kernel can be detected when the

 * prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, ...) fails with errno set to EPERM.

 * When this is detected, remove the new bits and try the prctl call again.

 */

#if defined(__ANDROID__)

_Static_assert(SECURE_ALL_BITS == 0x555, "SECURE_ALL_BITS == 0x555.");

#endif

#define SECURE_BITS_6_14                                                       \

  (SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE | SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE)

#define SECURE_LOCK_BITS_6_14                                                  \

  (SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED | SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED)

/* Used by lookup_(user|group) functions. */

#define MAX_PWENT_SZ (1 << 20)

#define MAX_GRENT_SZ (1 << 20)

int secure_noroot_set_and_locked(uint64_t mask)

{

  return (mask & (SECBIT_NOROOT | SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED)) ==

         (SECBIT_NOROOT | SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED);

}

int lock_securebits(uint64_t skip_mask, bool require_keep_caps)

{

  /* The general idea is to set all bits, subject to exceptions below. */

  unsigned long securebits = SECURE_ALL_BITS | SECURE_ALL_LOCKS;

  /*

   * SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS is special in that it is automatically cleared on

   * execve(2). This implies that attempts to set SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (as is

   * the default) in processes that have it locked already (such as nested

   * minijail usage) would fail. Thus, unless the caller requires it,

   * allow it to remain off if it is already locked.

   */

  if (!require_keep_caps) {

    int current_securebits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);

    if (current_securebits < 0) {

      pwarn("prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) failed");

      return -1;

    }

    if ((current_securebits & SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED) != 0 &&

        (current_securebits & SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS) == 0) {

      securebits &= ~SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS;

    }

  }

  /*

   * Ambient capabilities can only be raised if they're already present

   * in the permitted *and* inheritable set. Therefore, we don't really

   * need to lock the NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit, since we are already

   * configuring the permitted and inheritable set.

   */

  securebits &=

      ~(SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE | SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED);

  /* Don't set any bits that the user requested not to be touched. */

  securebits &= ~skip_mask;

  if (!securebits) {

    warn("not locking any securebits");

    return 0;

  }

  int securebits_ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, securebits);

  if (securebits_ret < 0) {

    if (errno == EPERM &&

        (securebits & (SECURE_BITS_6_14 | SECURE_LOCK_BITS_6_14)) !=

      0) {

      /* Possibly running on kernel < 6.14. */

      securebits &=

          ~(SECURE_BITS_6_14 | SECURE_LOCK_BITS_6_14);

      securebits_ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, securebits);

    }

    if (securebits_ret < 0) {

      pwarn("prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS) failed");

      return -1;

    }

  }

  return 0;

}

int write_proc_file(pid_t pid, const char *content, const char *basename)

{

  attribute_cleanup_fd int fd = -1;

  int ret;

  size_t sz, len;

  ssize_t written;

  char filename[32];

  sz = sizeof(filename);

  ret = snprintf(filename, sz, "/proc/%d/%s", pid, basename);

  if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sz) {

    warn("failed to generate %s filename", basename);

    return -1;

  }

  fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);

  if (fd < 0) {

    pwarn("failed to open '%s'", filename);

    return -errno;

  }

  len = strlen(content);

  written = write(fd, content, len);

  if (written < 0) {

    pwarn("failed to write '%s'", filename);

    return -errno;

  }

  if ((size_t)written < len) {

    warn("failed to write %zu bytes to '%s'", len, filename);

    return -1;

  }

  return 0;

}

/*

 * We specifically do not use cap_valid() as that only tells us the last

 * valid cap we were *compiled* against (i.e. what the version of kernel

 * headers says). If we run on a different kernel version, then it's not

 * uncommon for that to be less (if an older kernel) or more (if a newer

 * kernel).

 * Normally, we suck up the answer via /proc. On Android, not all processes are

 * guaranteed to be able to access '/proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap' so we

 * programmatically find the value by calling prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ).

 */

unsigned int get_last_valid_cap(void)

{

  unsigned int last_valid_cap = 0;

  if (is_android()) {

    for (; prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, last_valid_cap, 0, 0, 0) >= 0;

         ++last_valid_cap)

      ;

    /* |last_valid_cap| will be the first failing value. */

    if (last_valid_cap > 0) {

      last_valid_cap--;

    }

  } else {

    static const char cap_file[] = "/proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap";

    FILE *fp = fopen(cap_file, "re");

    if (!fp)

      pdie("fopen(%s)", cap_file);

    if (fscanf(fp, "%u", &last_valid_cap) != 1)

      pdie("fscanf(%s)", cap_file);

    fclose(fp);

  }

  /* Caps are bitfields stored in 64-bit int. */

  if (last_valid_cap > 64)

    pdie("unable to detect last valid cap: %u > 64",

         last_valid_cap);

  return last_valid_cap;

}

int cap_ambient_supported(void)

{

  return prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, CAP_CHOWN, 0, 0) >=

         0;

}

int config_net_loopback(void)

{

  const char ifname[] = "lo";

  attribute_cleanup_fd int sock = -1;

  struct ifreq ifr;

  /* Make sure people don't try to add really long names. */

  _Static_assert(sizeof(ifname) <= IFNAMSIZ, "interface name too long");

  sock = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);

  if (sock < 0) {

    pwarn("socket(AF_LOCAL) failed");

    return -1;

  }

  /*

   * Do the equiv of `ip link set up lo`.  The kernel will assign

   * IPv4 (127.0.0.1) & IPv6 (::1) addresses automatically!

   */

  strcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname);

  if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) < 0) {

    pwarn("ioctl(SIOCGIFFLAGS) failed");

    return -1;

  }

  /* The kernel preserves ifr.ifr_name for use. */

  ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP | IFF_RUNNING;

  if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) < 0) {

    pwarn("ioctl(SIOCSIFFLAGS) failed");

    return -1;

  }

  return 0;

}

int write_pid_to_path(pid_t pid, const char *path)

{

  FILE *fp = fopen(path, "we");

  if (!fp) {

    pwarn("failed to open '%s'", path);

    return -errno;

  }

  if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", (int)pid) < 0) {

    /* fprintf(3) does not set errno on failure. */

    warn("fprintf(%s) failed", path);

    fclose(fp);

    return -1;

  }

  if (fclose(fp)) {

    pwarn("fclose(%s) failed", path);

    return -errno;

  }

  return 0;

}

/*

 * Create the |path| directory and its parents (if need be) with |mode|.

 * If not |isdir|, then |path| is actually a file, so the last component

 * will not be created.

 */

int mkdir_p(const char *path, mode_t mode, bool isdir)

{

  int rc;

  char *dir = strdup(path);

  if (!dir) {

    rc = errno;

    pwarn("strdup(%s) failed", path);

    return -rc;

  }

  /* Starting from the root, work our way out to the end. */

  char *p = strchr(dir + 1, '/');

  while (p) {

    *p = '\0';

    if (mkdir(dir, mode) && errno != EEXIST) {

      rc = errno;

      pwarn("mkdir(%s, 0%o) failed", dir, mode);

      free(dir);

      return -rc;

    }

    *p = '/';

    p = strchr(p + 1, '/');

  }

  /*

   * Create the last directory.  We still check EEXIST here in case

   * of trailing slashes.

   */

  free(dir);

  if (isdir && mkdir(path, mode) && errno != EEXIST) {

    rc = errno;

    pwarn("mkdir(%s, 0%o) failed", path, mode);

    return -rc;

  }

  return 0;

}

/*

 * get_mount_flags: Obtain the mount flags of the mount where |source| lives.

 */

int get_mount_flags(const char *source, unsigned long *mnt_flags)

{

  if (mnt_flags) {

    struct statvfs stvfs_buf;

    int rc = statvfs(source, &stvfs_buf);

    if (rc) {

      rc = errno;

      pwarn("failed to look up mount flags: source=%s",

            source);

      return -rc;

    }

    *mnt_flags = stvfs_buf.f_flag;

  }

  return 0;

}

/*

 * setup_mount_destination: Ensures the mount target exists.

 * Creates it if needed and possible.

 */

int setup_mount_destination(const char *source, const char *dest, uid_t uid,

          uid_t gid, bool bind)

{

  int rc;

  struct stat st_buf;

  bool domkdir;

  rc = stat(dest, &st_buf);

  if (rc == 0) /* destination exists */

    return 0;

  /*

   * Try to create the destination.

   * Either make a directory or touch a file depending on the source type.

   *

   * If the source isn't an absolute path, assume it is a filesystem type

   * such as "tmpfs" and create a directory to mount it on.  The dest will

   * be something like "none" or "proc" which we shouldn't be checking.

   */

  if (source[0] == '/') {

    /* The source is an absolute path -- it better exist! */

    rc = stat(source, &st_buf);

    if (rc) {

      rc = errno;

      pwarn("stat(%s) failed", source);

      return -rc;

    }

    /*

     * If bind mounting, we only create a directory if the source

     * is a directory, else we always bind mount it as a file to

     * support device nodes, sockets, etc...

     *

     * For all other mounts, we assume a block/char source is

     * going to want a directory to mount to.  If the source is

     * something else (e.g. a fifo or socket), this probably will

     * not do the right thing, but we'll fail later on when we try

     * to mount(), so shouldn't be a big deal.

     */

    domkdir = S_ISDIR(st_buf.st_mode) ||

        (!bind && (S_ISBLK(st_buf.st_mode) ||

             S_ISCHR(st_buf.st_mode)));

  } else {

    /* The source is a relative path -- assume it's a pseudo fs. */

    /* Disallow relative bind mounts. */

    if (bind) {

      warn("relative bind-mounts are not allowed: source=%s",

           source);

      return -EINVAL;

    }

    domkdir = true;

  }

  /*

   * Now that we know what we want to do, do it!

   * We always create the intermediate dirs and the final path with 0755

   * perms and root/root ownership.  This shouldn't be a problem because

   * the actual mount will set those perms/ownership on the mount point

   * which is all people should need to access it.

   */

  rc = mkdir_p(dest, 0755, domkdir);

  if (rc)

    return rc;

  if (!domkdir) {

    attribute_cleanup_fd int fd =

        open(dest, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_CLOEXEC, 0700);

    if (fd < 0) {

      rc = errno;

      pwarn("open(%s) failed", dest);

      return -rc;

    }

  }

  if (chown(dest, uid, gid)) {

    rc = errno;

    pwarn("chown(%s, %u, %u) failed", dest, uid, gid);

    return -rc;

  }

  return 0;

}

/*

 * lookup_user: Gets the uid/gid for the given username.

 */

int lookup_user(const char *user, uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid)

{

  char *buf = NULL;

  struct passwd pw;

  struct passwd *ppw = NULL;

  /*

   * sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX), under glibc, is documented to return

   * a suggested starting size for the buffer, so let's try getting this

   * size first, and fallback to a default othersise.

   */

  ssize_t sz = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX);

  if (sz == -1)

    sz = 65536; /* your guess is as good as mine... */

  do {

    buf = malloc(sz);

    if (!buf)

      return -ENOMEM;

    int err = getpwnam_r(user, &pw, buf, sz, &ppw);

    /*

     * We're safe to free the buffer here. The strings inside |pw|

     * point inside |buf|, but we don't use any of them; this leaves

     * the pointers dangling but it's safe.

     * |ppw| points at |pw| if getpwnam_r(3) succeeded.

     */

    free(buf);

    if (err == ERANGE) {

      /* |buf| was too small, retry with a bigger one. */

      sz <<= 1;

    } else if (err != 0) {

      /* We got an error not related to the size of |buf|. */

      return -err;

    } else if (!ppw) {

      /* Not found. */

      return -ENOENT;

    } else {

      *uid = ppw->pw_uid;

      *gid = ppw->pw_gid;

      return 0;

    }

  } while (sz <= MAX_PWENT_SZ);

  /* A buffer of size MAX_PWENT_SZ is still too small, return an error. */

  return -ERANGE;

}

/*

 * lookup_group: Gets the gid for the given group name.

 */

int lookup_group(const char *group, gid_t *gid)

{

  char *buf = NULL;

  struct group gr;

  struct group *pgr = NULL;

  /*

   * sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX), under glibc, is documented to return

   * a suggested starting size for the buffer, so let's try getting this

   * size first, and fallback to a default otherwise.

   */

  ssize_t sz = sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX);

  if (sz == -1)

    sz = 65536; /* and mine is as good as yours, really */

  do {

    buf = malloc(sz);

    if (!buf)

      return -ENOMEM;

    int err = getgrnam_r(group, &gr, buf, sz, &pgr);

    /*

     * We're safe to free the buffer here. The strings inside |gr|

     * point inside |buf|, but we don't use any of them; this leaves

     * the pointers dangling but it's safe.

     * |pgr| points at |gr| if getgrnam_r(3) succeeded.

     */

    free(buf);

    if (err == ERANGE) {

      /* |buf| was too small, retry with a bigger one. */

      sz <<= 1;

    } else if (err != 0) {

      /* We got an error not related to the size of |buf|. */

      return -err;

    } else if (!pgr) {

      /* Not found. */

      return -ENOENT;

    } else {

      *gid = pgr->gr_gid;

      return 0;

    }

  } while (sz <= MAX_GRENT_SZ);

  /* A buffer of size MAX_GRENT_SZ is still too small, return an error. */

  return -ERANGE;

}

static bool seccomp_action_is_available(const char *wanted)

{

  if (is_android()) {

    /*

     * Accessing |actions_avail| is generating SELinux denials, so

     * skip for now.

     * TODO(crbug.com/978022, jorgelo): Remove once the denial is

     * fixed.

     */

    return false;

  }

  static const char actions_avail_path[] =

      "/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail";

  attribute_cleanup_fp FILE *f = fopen(actions_avail_path, "re");

  if (!f) {

    pwarn("fopen(%s) failed", actions_avail_path);

    return false;

  }

  attribute_cleanup_str char *actions_avail = NULL;

  size_t buf_size = 0;

  if (getline(&actions_avail, &buf_size, f) < 0) {

    pwarn("getline() failed");

    return false;

  }

  /*

   * This is just substring search, which means that partial matches will

   * match too (e.g. "action" would match "longaction"). There are no

   * seccomp actions which include other actions though, so we're good for

   * now. Eventually we might want to split the string by spaces.

   */

  return strstr(actions_avail, wanted) != NULL;

}

int seccomp_ret_log_available(void)

{

  static int ret_log_available = -1;

  if (ret_log_available == -1)

    ret_log_available = seccomp_action_is_available("log");

  return ret_log_available;

}

int seccomp_ret_kill_process_available(void)

{

  static int ret_kill_process_available = -1;

  if (ret_kill_process_available == -1)

    ret_kill_process_available =

        seccomp_action_is_available("kill_process");

  return ret_kill_process_available;

}

bool sys_set_no_new_privs(void)

{

  /*

   * Set no_new_privs. See </kernel/seccomp.c> and </kernel/sys.c>

   * in the kernel source tree for an explanation of the parameters.

   */

  if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == 0) {

    return true;

  } else {

    pwarn("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) failed");

    return false;

  }

}

bool seccomp_filter_flags_available(unsigned int flags)

{

  return sys_seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, NULL) != -1 ||

         errno != EINVAL;

}

bool is_canonical_path(const char *path)

{

  attribute_cleanup_str char *rp = realpath(path, NULL);

  if (!rp) {

    pwarn("realpath(%s) failed", path);

    return false;

  }

  if (streq(path, rp)) {

    return true;

  }

  size_t path_len = strlen(path);

  size_t rp_len = strlen(rp);

  /* If |path| has a single trailing slash, that's OK. */

  return path_len == rp_len + 1 && strncmp(path, rp, rp_len) == 0 &&

         path[path_len - 1] == '/';

}