/src/boringssl/crypto/stack/stack.c

Source (jump to first uncovered line)
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 *
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 *
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */

#include <openssl/stack.h>

#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>

#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>

#include "../internal.h"


struct stack_st {
  // num contains the number of valid pointers in |data|.
  size_t num;
  void **data;
  // sorted is non-zero if the values pointed to by |data| are in ascending
  // order, based on |comp|.
  int sorted;
  // num_alloc contains the number of pointers allocated in the buffer pointed
  // to by |data|, which may be larger than |num|.
  size_t num_alloc;
  // comp is an optional comparison function.
  OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func comp;
};

// kMinSize is the number of pointers that will be initially allocated in a new
// stack.
static const size_t kMinSize = 4;

OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new(OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func comp) {
  OPENSSL_STACK *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OPENSSL_STACK));
  if (ret == NULL) {
    return NULL;
  }

  ret->data = OPENSSL_calloc(kMinSize, sizeof(void *));
  if (ret->data == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  ret->comp = comp;
  ret->num_alloc = kMinSize;

  return ret;

err:
  OPENSSL_free(ret);
  return NULL;
}

OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new_null(void) { return OPENSSL_sk_new(NULL); }

size_t OPENSSL_sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return 0;
  }
  return sk->num;
}

void OPENSSL_sk_zero(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
  if (sk == NULL || sk->num == 0) {
    return;
  }
  OPENSSL_memset(sk->data, 0, sizeof(void*) * sk->num);
  sk->num = 0;
  sk->sorted = 0;
}

void *OPENSSL_sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t i) {
  if (!sk || i >= sk->num) {
    return NULL;
  }
  return sk->data[i];
}

void *OPENSSL_sk_set(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t i, void *value) {
  if (!sk || i >= sk->num) {
    return NULL;
  }
  return sk->data[i] = value;
}

void OPENSSL_sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return;
  }
  OPENSSL_free(sk->data);
  OPENSSL_free(sk);
}

void OPENSSL_sk_pop_free_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
                            OPENSSL_sk_call_free_func call_free_func,
                            OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return;
  }

  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
    if (sk->data[i] != NULL) {
      call_free_func(free_func, sk->data[i]);
    }
  }
  OPENSSL_sk_free(sk);
}

// Historically, |sk_pop_free| called the function as |OPENSSL_sk_free_func|
// directly. This is undefined in C. Some callers called |sk_pop_free| directly,
// so we must maintain a compatibility version for now.
static void call_free_func_legacy(OPENSSL_sk_free_func func, void *ptr) {
  func(ptr);
}

void sk_pop_free(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
  OPENSSL_sk_pop_free_ex(sk, call_free_func_legacy, free_func);
}

size_t OPENSSL_sk_insert(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, void *p, size_t where) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return 0;
  }

  if (sk->num >= INT_MAX) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
    return 0;
  }

  if (sk->num_alloc <= sk->num + 1) {
    // Attempt to double the size of the array.
    size_t new_alloc = sk->num_alloc << 1;
    size_t alloc_size = new_alloc * sizeof(void *);
    void **data;

    // If the doubling overflowed, try to increment.
    if (new_alloc < sk->num_alloc || alloc_size / sizeof(void *) != new_alloc) {
      new_alloc = sk->num_alloc + 1;
      alloc_size = new_alloc * sizeof(void *);
    }

    // If the increment also overflowed, fail.
    if (new_alloc < sk->num_alloc || alloc_size / sizeof(void *) != new_alloc) {
      return 0;
    }

    data = OPENSSL_realloc(sk->data, alloc_size);
    if (data == NULL) {
      return 0;
    }

    sk->data = data;
    sk->num_alloc = new_alloc;
  }

  if (where >= sk->num) {
    sk->data[sk->num] = p;
  } else {
    OPENSSL_memmove(&sk->data[where + 1], &sk->data[where],
                    sizeof(void *) * (sk->num - where));
    sk->data[where] = p;
  }

  sk->num++;
  sk->sorted = 0;

  return sk->num;
}

void *OPENSSL_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t where) {
  void *ret;

  if (!sk || where >= sk->num) {
    return NULL;
  }

  ret = sk->data[where];

  if (where != sk->num - 1) {
    OPENSSL_memmove(&sk->data[where], &sk->data[where + 1],
                    sizeof(void *) * (sk->num - where - 1));
  }

  sk->num--;
  return ret;
}

void *OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, const void *p) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return NULL;
  }

  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
    if (sk->data[i] == p) {
      return OPENSSL_sk_delete(sk, i);
    }
  }

  return NULL;
}

void OPENSSL_sk_delete_if(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
                          OPENSSL_sk_call_delete_if_func call_func,
                          OPENSSL_sk_delete_if_func func, void *data) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return;
  }

  size_t new_num = 0;
  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
    if (!call_func(func, sk->data[i], data)) {
      sk->data[new_num] = sk->data[i];
      new_num++;
    }
  }
  sk->num = new_num;
}

int OPENSSL_sk_find(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t *out_index, const void *p,
                    OPENSSL_sk_call_cmp_func call_cmp_func) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return 0;
  }

  if (sk->comp == NULL) {
    // Use pointer equality when no comparison function has been set.
    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
      if (sk->data[i] == p) {
        if (out_index) {
          *out_index = i;
        }
        return 1;
      }
    }
    return 0;
  }

  if (p == NULL) {
    return 0;
  }

  if (!OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(sk)) {
    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
      if (call_cmp_func(sk->comp, p, sk->data[i]) == 0) {
        if (out_index) {
          *out_index = i;
        }
        return 1;
      }
    }
    return 0;
  }

  // The stack is sorted, so binary search to find the element.
  //
  // |lo| and |hi| maintain a half-open interval of where the answer may be. All
  // indices such that |lo <= idx < hi| are candidates.
  size_t lo = 0, hi = sk->num;
  while (lo < hi) {
    // Bias |mid| towards |lo|. See the |r == 0| case below.
    size_t mid = lo + (hi - lo - 1) / 2;
    assert(lo <= mid && mid < hi);
    int r = call_cmp_func(sk->comp, p, sk->data[mid]);
    if (r > 0) {
      lo = mid + 1;  // |mid| is too low.
    } else if (r < 0) {
      hi = mid;  // |mid| is too high.
    } else {
      // |mid| matches. However, this function returns the earliest match, so we
      // can only return if the range has size one.
      if (hi - lo == 1) {
        if (out_index != NULL) {
          *out_index = mid;
        }
        return 1;
      }
      // The sample is biased towards |lo|. |mid| can only be |hi - 1| if
      // |hi - lo| was one, so this makes forward progress.
      assert(mid + 1 < hi);
      hi = mid + 1;
    }
  }

  assert(lo == hi);
  return 0;  // Not found.
}

void *OPENSSL_sk_shift(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return NULL;
  }
  if (sk->num == 0) {
    return NULL;
  }
  return OPENSSL_sk_delete(sk, 0);
}

size_t OPENSSL_sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, void *p) {
  return OPENSSL_sk_insert(sk, p, sk->num);
}

void *OPENSSL_sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return NULL;
  }
  if (sk->num == 0) {
    return NULL;
  }
  return OPENSSL_sk_delete(sk, sk->num - 1);
}

OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_dup(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
  if (sk == NULL) {
    return NULL;
  }

  OPENSSL_STACK *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OPENSSL_STACK));
  if (ret == NULL) {
    return NULL;
  }

  ret->data = OPENSSL_memdup(sk->data, sizeof(void *) * sk->num_alloc);
  if (ret->data == NULL) {
    goto err;
  }

  ret->num = sk->num;
  ret->sorted = sk->sorted;
  ret->num_alloc = sk->num_alloc;
  ret->comp = sk->comp;
  return ret;

err:
  OPENSSL_sk_free(ret);
  return NULL;
}

static size_t parent_idx(size_t idx) {
  assert(idx > 0);
  return (idx - 1) / 2;
}

static size_t left_idx(size_t idx) {
  // The largest possible index is |PTRDIFF_MAX|, not |SIZE_MAX|. If
  // |ptrdiff_t|, a signed type, is the same size as |size_t|, this cannot
  // overflow.
  assert(idx <= PTRDIFF_MAX);
  static_assert(PTRDIFF_MAX <= (SIZE_MAX - 1) / 2, "2 * idx + 1 may oveflow");
  return 2 * idx + 1;
}

// down_heap fixes the subtree rooted at |i|. |i|'s children must each satisfy
// the heap property. Only the first |num| elements of |sk| are considered.
static void down_heap(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_call_cmp_func call_cmp_func,
                      size_t i, size_t num) {
  assert(i < num && num <= sk->num);
  for (;;) {
    size_t left = left_idx(i);
    if (left >= num) {
      break;  // No left child.
    }

    // Swap |i| with the largest of its children.
    size_t next = i;
    if (call_cmp_func(sk->comp, sk->data[next], sk->data[left]) < 0) {
      next = left;
    }
    size_t right = left + 1;  // Cannot overflow because |left < num|.
    if (right < num &&
        call_cmp_func(sk->comp, sk->data[next], sk->data[right]) < 0) {
      next = right;
    }

    if (i == next) {
      break;  // |i| is already larger than its children.
    }

    void *tmp = sk->data[i];
    sk->data[i] = sk->data[next];
    sk->data[next] = tmp;
    i = next;
  }
}

void OPENSSL_sk_sort(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
                     OPENSSL_sk_call_cmp_func call_cmp_func) {
  if (sk == NULL || sk->comp == NULL || sk->sorted) {
    return;
  }

  if (sk->num >= 2) {
    // |qsort| lacks a context parameter in the comparison function for us to
    // pass in |call_cmp_func| and |sk->comp|. While we could cast |sk->comp| to
    // the expected type, it is undefined behavior in C can trip sanitizers.
    // |qsort_r| and |qsort_s| avoid this, but using them is impractical. See
    // https://stackoverflow.com/a/39561369
    //
    // Use our own heap sort instead. This is not performance-sensitive, so we
    // optimize for simplicity and size. First, build a max-heap in place.
    for (size_t i = parent_idx(sk->num - 1); i < sk->num; i--) {
      down_heap(sk, call_cmp_func, i, sk->num);
    }

    // Iteratively remove the maximum element to populate the result in reverse.
    for (size_t i = sk->num - 1; i > 0; i--) {
      void *tmp = sk->data[0];
      sk->data[0] = sk->data[i];
      sk->data[i] = tmp;
      down_heap(sk, call_cmp_func, 0, i);
    }
  }
  sk->sorted = 1;
}

int OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
  if (!sk) {
    return 1;
  }
  // Zero- and one-element lists are always sorted.
  return sk->sorted || (sk->comp != NULL && sk->num < 2);
}

OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
                                            OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func comp) {
  OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func old = sk->comp;

  if (sk->comp != comp) {
    sk->sorted = 0;
  }
  sk->comp = comp;

  return old;
}

OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
                                    OPENSSL_sk_call_copy_func call_copy_func,
                                    OPENSSL_sk_copy_func copy_func,
                                    OPENSSL_sk_call_free_func call_free_func,
                                    OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
  OPENSSL_STACK *ret = OPENSSL_sk_dup(sk);
  if (ret == NULL) {
    return NULL;
  }

  for (size_t i = 0; i < ret->num; i++) {
    if (ret->data[i] == NULL) {
      continue;
    }
    ret->data[i] = call_copy_func(copy_func, ret->data[i]);
    if (ret->data[i] == NULL) {
      for (size_t j = 0; j < i; j++) {
        if (ret->data[j] != NULL) {
          call_free_func(free_func, ret->data[j]);
        }
      }
      OPENSSL_sk_free(ret);
      return NULL;
    }
  }

  return ret;
}

OPENSSL_STACK *sk_new_null(void) { return OPENSSL_sk_new_null(); }

size_t sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { return OPENSSL_sk_num(sk); }

void *sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t i) {
  return OPENSSL_sk_value(sk, i);
}

void sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { OPENSSL_sk_free(sk); }

size_t sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, void *p) { return OPENSSL_sk_push(sk, p); }

void *sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { return OPENSSL_sk_pop(sk); }

void sk_pop_free_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_call_free_func call_free_func,
                    OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
  OPENSSL_sk_pop_free_ex(sk, call_free_func, free_func);
}

Coverage Report

Created: 2024-11-21 07:03

Line	Count	Source (jump to first uncovered line)
1		/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
2		* All rights reserved.
3		*
4		* This package is an SSL implementation written
5		* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6		* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
7		*
8		* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9		* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10		* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11		* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12		* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13		* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
14		*
15		* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16		* the code are not to be removed.
17		* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18		* as the author of the parts of the library used.
19		* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20		* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
21		*
22		* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23		* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
24		* are met:
25		* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26		* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27		* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28		* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29		* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30		* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31		* must display the following acknowledgement:
32		* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33		* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34		* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35		* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36		* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37		* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38		* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
39		*
40		* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41		* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42		* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43		* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44		* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45		* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46		* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47		* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48		* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49		* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
50		* SUCH DAMAGE.
51		*
52		* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53		* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54		* copied and put under another distribution licence
55		* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
56
57		#include <openssl/stack.h>
58
59		#include <assert.h>
60		#include <limits.h>
61
62		#include <openssl/err.h>
63		#include <openssl/mem.h>
64
65		#include "../internal.h"
66
67
68		struct stack_st {
69		// num contains the number of valid pointers in \|data\|.
70		size_t num;
71		void **data;
72		// sorted is non-zero if the values pointed to by \|data\| are in ascending
73		// order, based on \|comp\|.
74		int sorted;
75		// num_alloc contains the number of pointers allocated in the buffer pointed
76		// to by \|data\|, which may be larger than \|num\|.
77		size_t num_alloc;
78		// comp is an optional comparison function.
79		OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func comp;
80		};
81
82		// kMinSize is the number of pointers that will be initially allocated in a new
83		// stack.
84		static const size_t kMinSize = 4;
85
86	1.39k	OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new(OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func comp) {
87	1.39k	OPENSSL_STACK *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OPENSSL_STACK));
88	1.39k	if (ret == NULL) {
89	0	return NULL;
90	0	}
91
92	1.39k	ret->data = OPENSSL_calloc(kMinSize, sizeof(void *));
93	1.39k	if (ret->data == NULL) {
94	0	goto err;
95	0	}
96
97	1.39k	ret->comp = comp;
98	1.39k	ret->num_alloc = kMinSize;
99
100	1.39k	return ret;
101
102	0	err:
103	0	OPENSSL_free(ret);
104	0	return NULL;
105	1.39k	}
106
107	2.42k	OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new_null(void) { return OPENSSL_sk_new(NULL); }
108
109	6.96M	size_t OPENSSL_sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
110	6.96M	if (sk == NULL) {
111	0	return 0;
112	0	}
113	6.96M	return sk->num;
114	6.96M	}
115
116	0	void OPENSSL_sk_zero(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
117	0	if (sk == NULL \|\| sk->num == 0) {
118	0	return;
119	0	}
120	0	OPENSSL_memset(sk->data, 0, sizeof(void) sk->num);
121	0	sk->num = 0;
122	0	sk->sorted = 0;
123	0	}
124
125	6.96M	void OPENSSL_sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK sk, size_t i) {
126	6.96M	if (!sk \|\| i >= sk->num) {
127	0	return NULL;
128	0	}
129	6.96M	return sk->data[i];
130	6.96M	}
131
132	0	void OPENSSL_sk_set(OPENSSL_STACK sk, size_t i, void *value) {
133	0	if (!sk \|\| i >= sk->num) {
134	0	return NULL;
135	0	}
136	0	return sk->data[i] = value;
137	0	}
138
139	18.0k	void OPENSSL_sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
140	18.0k	if (sk == NULL) {
141	8.47k	return;
142	8.47k	}
143	9.53k	OPENSSL_free(sk->data);
144	9.53k	OPENSSL_free(sk);
145	9.53k	}
146
147		void OPENSSL_sk_pop_free_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
148		OPENSSL_sk_call_free_func call_free_func,
149	3.12k	OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
150	3.12k	if (sk == NULL) {
151	1.73k	return;
152	1.73k	}
153
154	13.5k	for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
155	12.1k	if (sk->data[i] != NULL) {
156	12.1k	call_free_func(free_func, sk->data[i]);
157	12.1k	}
158	12.1k	}
159	1.39k	OPENSSL_sk_free(sk);
160	1.39k	}
161
162		// Historically, \|sk_pop_free\| called the function as \|OPENSSL_sk_free_func\|
163		// directly. This is undefined in C. Some callers called \|sk_pop_free\| directly,
164		// so we must maintain a compatibility version for now.
165	0	static void call_free_func_legacy(OPENSSL_sk_free_func func, void *ptr) {
166	0	func(ptr);
167	0	}
168
169	0	void sk_pop_free(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
170	0	OPENSSL_sk_pop_free_ex(sk, call_free_func_legacy, free_func);
171	0	}
172
173	12.1k	size_t OPENSSL_sk_insert(OPENSSL_STACK sk, void p, size_t where) {
174	12.1k	if (sk == NULL) {
175	0	return 0;
176	0	}
177
178	12.1k	if (sk->num >= INT_MAX) {
179	0	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
180	0	return 0;
181	0	}
182
183	12.1k	if (sk->num_alloc <= sk->num + 1) {
184		// Attempt to double the size of the array.
185	1.83k	size_t new_alloc = sk->num_alloc << 1;
186	1.83k	size_t alloc_size = new_alloc * sizeof(void *);
187	1.83k	void **data;
188
189		// If the doubling overflowed, try to increment.
190	1.83k	if (new_alloc < sk->num_alloc \|\| alloc_size / sizeof(void *) != new_alloc) {
191	0	new_alloc = sk->num_alloc + 1;
192	0	alloc_size = new_alloc * sizeof(void *);
193	0	}
194
195		// If the increment also overflowed, fail.
196	1.83k	if (new_alloc < sk->num_alloc \|\| alloc_size / sizeof(void *) != new_alloc) {
197	0	return 0;
198	0	}
199
200	1.83k	data = OPENSSL_realloc(sk->data, alloc_size);
201	1.83k	if (data == NULL) {
202	0	return 0;
203	0	}
204
205	1.83k	sk->data = data;
206	1.83k	sk->num_alloc = new_alloc;
207	1.83k	}
208
209	12.1k	if (where >= sk->num) {
210	12.1k	sk->data[sk->num] = p;
211	12.1k	} else {
212	0	OPENSSL_memmove(&sk->data[where + 1], &sk->data[where],
213	0	sizeof(void ) (sk->num - where));
214	0	sk->data[where] = p;
215	0	}
216
217	12.1k	sk->num++;
218	12.1k	sk->sorted = 0;
219
220	12.1k	return sk->num;
221	12.1k	}
222
223		void OPENSSL_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STACK sk, size_t where) {
224		void *ret;
225
226		if (!sk \|\| where >= sk->num) {
227		return NULL;
228		}
229
230		ret = sk->data[where];
231
232		if (where != sk->num - 1) {
233		OPENSSL_memmove(&sk->data[where], &sk->data[where + 1],
234		sizeof(void ) (sk->num - where - 1));
235		}
236
237		sk->num--;
238		return ret;
239		}
240
241	0	void OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr(OPENSSL_STACK sk, const void *p) {
242	0	if (sk == NULL) {
243	0	return NULL;
244	0	}
245
246	0	for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
247	0	if (sk->data[i] == p) {
248	0	return OPENSSL_sk_delete(sk, i);
249	0	}
250	0	}
251
252	0	return NULL;
253	0	}
254
255		void OPENSSL_sk_delete_if(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
256		OPENSSL_sk_call_delete_if_func call_func,
257	0	OPENSSL_sk_delete_if_func func, void *data) {
258	0	if (sk == NULL) {
259	0	return;
260	0	}
261
262	0	size_t new_num = 0;
263	0	for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
264	0	if (!call_func(func, sk->data[i], data)) {
265	0	sk->data[new_num] = sk->data[i];
266	0	new_num++;
267	0	}
268	0	}
269	0	sk->num = new_num;
270	0	}
271
272		int OPENSSL_sk_find(const OPENSSL_STACK sk, size_t out_index, const void *p,
273	0	OPENSSL_sk_call_cmp_func call_cmp_func) {
274	0	if (sk == NULL) {
275	0	return 0;
276	0	}
277
278	0	if (sk->comp == NULL) {
279		// Use pointer equality when no comparison function has been set.
280	0	for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
281	0	if (sk->data[i] == p) {
282	0	if (out_index) {
283	0	*out_index = i;
284	0	}
285	0	return 1;
286	0	}
287	0	}
288	0	return 0;
289	0	}
290
291	0	if (p == NULL) {
292	0	return 0;
293	0	}
294
295	0	if (!OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(sk)) {
296	0	for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
297	0	if (call_cmp_func(sk->comp, p, sk->data[i]) == 0) {
298	0	if (out_index) {
299	0	*out_index = i;
300	0	}
301	0	return 1;
302	0	}
303	0	}
304	0	return 0;
305	0	}
306
307		// The stack is sorted, so binary search to find the element.
308		//
309		// \|lo\| and \|hi\| maintain a half-open interval of where the answer may be. All
310		// indices such that \|lo <= idx < hi\| are candidates.
311	0	size_t lo = 0, hi = sk->num;
312	0	while (lo < hi) {
313		// Bias \|mid\| towards \|lo\|. See the \|r == 0\| case below.
314	0	size_t mid = lo + (hi - lo - 1) / 2;
315	0	assert(lo <= mid && mid < hi);
316	0	int r = call_cmp_func(sk->comp, p, sk->data[mid]);
317	0	if (r > 0) {
318	0	lo = mid + 1; // \|mid\| is too low.
319	0	} else if (r < 0) {
320	0	hi = mid; // \|mid\| is too high.
321	0	} else {
322		// \|mid\| matches. However, this function returns the earliest match, so we
323		// can only return if the range has size one.
324	0	if (hi - lo == 1) {
325	0	if (out_index != NULL) {
326	0	*out_index = mid;
327	0	}
328	0	return 1;
329	0	}
330		// The sample is biased towards \|lo\|. \|mid\| can only be \|hi - 1\| if
331		// \|hi - lo\| was one, so this makes forward progress.
332	0	assert(mid + 1 < hi);
333	0	hi = mid + 1;
334	0	}
335	0	}
336
337	0	assert(lo == hi);
338	0	return 0; // Not found.
339	0	}
340
341	0	void OPENSSL_sk_shift(OPENSSL_STACK sk) {
342	0	if (sk == NULL) {
343	0	return NULL;
344	0	}
345	0	if (sk->num == 0) {
346	0	return NULL;
347	0	}
348	0	return OPENSSL_sk_delete(sk, 0);
349	0	}
350
351	12.1k	size_t OPENSSL_sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK sk, void p) {
352	12.1k	return OPENSSL_sk_insert(sk, p, sk->num);
353	12.1k	}
354
355	0	void OPENSSL_sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK sk) {
356	0	if (sk == NULL) {
357	0	return NULL;
358	0	}
359	0	if (sk->num == 0) {
360	0	return NULL;
361	0	}
362	0	return OPENSSL_sk_delete(sk, sk->num - 1);
363	0	}
364
365	0	OPENSSL_STACK OPENSSL_sk_dup(const OPENSSL_STACK sk) {
366	0	if (sk == NULL) {
367	0	return NULL;
368	0	}
369
370	0	OPENSSL_STACK *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OPENSSL_STACK));
371	0	if (ret == NULL) {
372	0	return NULL;
373	0	}
374
375	0	ret->data = OPENSSL_memdup(sk->data, sizeof(void ) sk->num_alloc);
376	0	if (ret->data == NULL) {
377	0	goto err;
378	0	}
379
380	0	ret->num = sk->num;
381	0	ret->sorted = sk->sorted;
382	0	ret->num_alloc = sk->num_alloc;
383	0	ret->comp = sk->comp;
384	0	return ret;
385
386	0	err:
387	0	OPENSSL_sk_free(ret);
388	0	return NULL;
389	0	}
390
391	0	static size_t parent_idx(size_t idx) {
392	0	assert(idx > 0);
393	0	return (idx - 1) / 2;
394	0	}
395
396	0	static size_t left_idx(size_t idx) {
397		// The largest possible index is \|PTRDIFF_MAX\|, not \|SIZE_MAX\|. If
398		// \|ptrdiff_t\|, a signed type, is the same size as \|size_t\|, this cannot
399		// overflow.
400	0	assert(idx <= PTRDIFF_MAX);
401	0	static_assert(PTRDIFF_MAX <= (SIZE_MAX - 1) / 2, "2 * idx + 1 may oveflow");
402	0	return 2 * idx + 1;
403	0	}
404
405		// down_heap fixes the subtree rooted at \|i\|. \|i\|'s children must each satisfy
406		// the heap property. Only the first \|num\| elements of \|sk\| are considered.
407		static void down_heap(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_call_cmp_func call_cmp_func,
408	0	size_t i, size_t num) {
409	0	assert(i < num && num <= sk->num);
410	0	for (;;) {
411	0	size_t left = left_idx(i);
412	0	if (left >= num) {
413	0	break; // No left child.
414	0	}
415
416		// Swap \|i\| with the largest of its children.
417	0	size_t next = i;
418	0	if (call_cmp_func(sk->comp, sk->data[next], sk->data[left]) < 0) {
419	0	next = left;
420	0	}
421	0	size_t right = left + 1; // Cannot overflow because \|left < num\|.
422	0	if (right < num &&
423	0	call_cmp_func(sk->comp, sk->data[next], sk->data[right]) < 0) {
424	0	next = right;
425	0	}
426
427	0	if (i == next) {
428	0	break; // \|i\| is already larger than its children.
429	0	}
430
431	0	void *tmp = sk->data[i];
432	0	sk->data[i] = sk->data[next];
433	0	sk->data[next] = tmp;
434	0	i = next;
435	0	}
436	0	}
437
438		void OPENSSL_sk_sort(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
439	0	OPENSSL_sk_call_cmp_func call_cmp_func) {
440	0	if (sk == NULL \|\| sk->comp == NULL \|\| sk->sorted) {
441	0	return;
442	0	}
443
444	0	if (sk->num >= 2) {
445		// \|qsort\| lacks a context parameter in the comparison function for us to
446		// pass in \|call_cmp_func\| and \|sk->comp\|. While we could cast \|sk->comp\| to
447		// the expected type, it is undefined behavior in C can trip sanitizers.
448		// \|qsort_r\| and \|qsort_s\| avoid this, but using them is impractical. See
449		// https://stackoverflow.com/a/39561369
450		//
451		// Use our own heap sort instead. This is not performance-sensitive, so we
452		// optimize for simplicity and size. First, build a max-heap in place.
453	0	for (size_t i = parent_idx(sk->num - 1); i < sk->num; i--) {
454	0	down_heap(sk, call_cmp_func, i, sk->num);
455	0	}
456
457		// Iteratively remove the maximum element to populate the result in reverse.
458	0	for (size_t i = sk->num - 1; i > 0; i--) {
459	0	void *tmp = sk->data[0];
460	0	sk->data[0] = sk->data[i];
461	0	sk->data[i] = tmp;
462	0	down_heap(sk, call_cmp_func, 0, i);
463	0	}
464	0	}
465	0	sk->sorted = 1;
466	0	}
467
468	0	int OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
469	0	if (!sk) {
470	0	return 1;
471	0	}
472		// Zero- and one-element lists are always sorted.
473	0	return sk->sorted \|\| (sk->comp != NULL && sk->num < 2);
474	0	}
475
476		OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
477	0	OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func comp) {
478	0	OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func old = sk->comp;
479
480	0	if (sk->comp != comp) {
481	0	sk->sorted = 0;
482	0	}
483	0	sk->comp = comp;
484
485	0	return old;
486	0	}
487
488		OPENSSL_STACK OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy(const OPENSSL_STACK sk,
489		OPENSSL_sk_call_copy_func call_copy_func,
490		OPENSSL_sk_copy_func copy_func,
491		OPENSSL_sk_call_free_func call_free_func,
492		OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
493		OPENSSL_STACK *ret = OPENSSL_sk_dup(sk);
494		if (ret == NULL) {
495		return NULL;
496		}
497
498		for (size_t i = 0; i < ret->num; i++) {
499		if (ret->data[i] == NULL) {
500		continue;
501		}
502		ret->data[i] = call_copy_func(copy_func, ret->data[i]);
503		if (ret->data[i] == NULL) {
504		for (size_t j = 0; j < i; j++) {
505		if (ret->data[j] != NULL) {
506		call_free_func(free_func, ret->data[j]);
507		}
508		}
509		OPENSSL_sk_free(ret);
510		return NULL;
511		}
512		}
513
514		return ret;
515		}
516
517	0	OPENSSL_STACK *sk_new_null(void) { return OPENSSL_sk_new_null(); }
518
519	0	size_t sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { return OPENSSL_sk_num(sk); }
520
521	0	void sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK sk, size_t i) {
522	0	return OPENSSL_sk_value(sk, i);
523	0	}
524
525	0	void sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { OPENSSL_sk_free(sk); }
526
527	0	size_t sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK sk, void p) { return OPENSSL_sk_push(sk, p); }
528
529	0	void sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK sk) { return OPENSSL_sk_pop(sk); }
530
531		void sk_pop_free_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_call_free_func call_free_func,
532	0	OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
533	0	OPENSSL_sk_pop_free_ex(sk, call_free_func, free_func);
534	0	}