Coverage Report

Created: 2024-11-21 07:03

/src/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
Line
Count
Source (jump to first uncovered line)
1
/*
2
 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3
 *
4
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
5
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
6
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8
 */
9
10
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
11
12
#include <stdio.h>
13
#include <time.h>
14
#include <errno.h>
15
#include <limits.h>
16
17
#include "crypto/ctype.h"
18
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
19
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
20
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
21
#include <openssl/evp.h>
22
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
23
#include <openssl/x509.h>
24
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
25
#include <openssl/objects.h>
26
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
27
#include "internal/dane.h"
28
#include "crypto/x509.h"
29
#include "x509_local.h"
30
31
/* CRL score values */
32
33
0
#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
34
0
#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
35
0
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040 /* CRL times valid */
36
0
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
37
#define CRL_SCORE_VALID /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ \
38
0
    (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
39
0
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
40
0
#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
41
0
#define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
42
0
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
43
44
static int x509_verify_x509(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
45
static int x509_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
46
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
47
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
48
static int verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
49
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
50
static int dane_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
51
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
52
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
53
static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
54
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
55
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
56
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
57
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
58
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
59
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
60
static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
61
static int check_cert_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
62
static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
63
static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
64
static int check_curve(X509 *cert);
65
66
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
67
                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
68
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
69
                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
70
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
71
                         int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
72
                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
73
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
74
                           int *pcrl_score);
75
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
76
                           unsigned int *preasons);
77
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
78
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
79
                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
80
                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
81
82
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
83
84
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
85
0
{
86
0
    return ok;
87
0
}
88
89
/*-
90
 * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error.
91
 * This actually verifies self-signedness only if requested.
92
 * It calls ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions()
93
 * to match issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
94
 * present authority key identifier to match the subject key identifier, etc.
95
 */
96
int X509_self_signed(X509 *cert, int verify_signature)
97
0
{
98
0
    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
99
100
0
    if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert)) == NULL) { /* handles cert == NULL */
101
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
102
0
        return -1;
103
0
    }
104
0
    if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert))
105
0
        return -1;
106
0
    if ((cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) == 0)
107
0
        return 0;
108
0
    if (!verify_signature)
109
0
        return 1;
110
0
    return X509_verify(cert, pkey);
111
0
}
112
113
/*
114
 * Given a certificate, try and find an exact match in the store.
115
 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on not found, -1 on internal error.
116
 */
117
static int lookup_cert_match(X509 **result, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
118
0
{
119
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
120
0
    X509 *xtmp = NULL;
121
0
    int i, ret;
122
123
0
    *result = NULL;
124
    /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
125
0
    ERR_set_mark();
126
0
    certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
127
0
    ERR_pop_to_mark();
128
0
    if (certs == NULL)
129
0
        return -1;
130
131
    /* Look for exact match */
132
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
133
0
        xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
134
0
        if (X509_cmp(xtmp, x) == 0)
135
0
            break;
136
0
        xtmp = NULL;
137
0
    }
138
0
    ret = xtmp != NULL;
139
0
    if (ret) {
140
0
        if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp))
141
0
            ret = -1;
142
0
        else
143
0
            *result = xtmp;
144
0
    }
145
0
    OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(certs);
146
0
    return ret;
147
0
}
148
149
/*-
150
 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
151
 * The error code is set to |err| if |err| is not X509_V_OK, else
152
 * |ctx->error| is left unchanged (under the assumption it is set elsewhere).
153
 * The error depth is |depth| if >= 0, else it defaults to |ctx->error_depth|.
154
 * The error cert is |x| if not NULL, else the cert in |ctx->chain| at |depth|.
155
 *
156
 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
157
 */
158
static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
159
0
{
160
0
    if (depth < 0)
161
0
        depth = ctx->error_depth;
162
0
    else
163
0
        ctx->error_depth = depth;
164
0
    ctx->current_cert = x != NULL ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
165
0
    if (err != X509_V_OK)
166
0
        ctx->error = err;
167
0
    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
168
0
}
169
170
#define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \
171
0
    if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \
172
0
        return 0
173
174
/*-
175
 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant.  Here, the
176
 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
177
 * number.
178
 *
179
 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
180
 */
181
static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
182
0
{
183
0
    ctx->error = err;
184
0
    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
185
0
}
186
187
/* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */
188
static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
189
0
{
190
0
    int i;
191
0
    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
192
193
0
    if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
194
0
        return 1;
195
196
0
    for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
197
0
        X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
198
199
        /*
200
         * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
201
         * check the security of issuer keys.
202
         */
203
0
        CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0 && !check_cert_key_level(ctx, cert),
204
0
                   ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
205
        /*
206
         * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
207
         * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
208
         */
209
0
        CB_FAIL_IF(i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert),
210
0
                   ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
211
0
    }
212
0
    return 1;
213
0
}
214
215
/*-
216
 * Returns -1 on internal error.
217
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
218
 */
219
static int verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
220
0
{
221
    /* Not much to verify on a RPK */
222
0
    if (ctx->verify != NULL)
223
0
        return ctx->verify(ctx);
224
225
0
    return !!ctx->verify_cb(ctx->error == X509_V_OK, ctx);
226
0
}
227
228
229
/*-
230
 * Returns -1 on internal error.
231
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
232
 */
233
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
234
0
{
235
0
    int err;
236
0
    int ok;
237
238
0
    if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) <= 0
239
0
        || (ok = check_extensions(ctx)) <= 0
240
0
        || (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) <= 0
241
0
        || (ok = check_id(ctx)) <= 0
242
0
        || (ok = X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain) ? 1 : -1) <= 0
243
0
        || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) <= 0)
244
0
        return ok;
245
246
0
    err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
247
0
                                  ctx->param->flags);
248
0
    CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err);
249
250
    /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
251
0
    ok = ctx->verify != NULL ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
252
0
    if (ok <= 0)
253
0
        return ok;
254
255
0
    if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) <= 0)
256
0
        return ok;
257
258
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
259
    /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
260
0
    if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) <= 0)
261
0
        return ok;
262
0
    if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) <= 0)
263
0
        return ok;
264
0
#endif
265
266
    /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
267
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) != 0)
268
0
        ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
269
0
    return ok;
270
0
}
271
272
int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
273
0
{
274
0
    if (ctx == NULL) {
275
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
276
0
        return -1;
277
0
    }
278
0
    if (ctx->rpk != NULL)
279
0
        return x509_verify_rpk(ctx);
280
0
    if (ctx->cert == NULL && sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted) >= 1)
281
0
        ctx->cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, 0);
282
0
    return x509_verify_x509(ctx);
283
0
}
284
285
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
286
0
{
287
0
    if (ctx == NULL) {
288
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
289
0
        return -1;
290
0
    }
291
0
    return (ctx->rpk != NULL) ? x509_verify_rpk(ctx) : x509_verify_x509(ctx);
292
0
}
293
294
/*-
295
 * Returns -1 on internal error.
296
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
297
 */
298
static int x509_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
299
0
{
300
0
    int ret;
301
302
    /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
303
0
    if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->rpk)
304
0
        && verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
305
0
        return 0;
306
307
    /* Barring any data to verify the RPK, simply report it as untrusted */
308
0
    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_RPK_UNTRUSTED;
309
310
0
    ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx->dane) ? dane_verify_rpk(ctx) : verify_rpk(ctx);
311
312
    /*
313
     * Safety-net.  If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
314
     * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
315
     * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
316
     */
317
0
    if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
318
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
319
0
    return ret;
320
0
}
321
322
/*-
323
 * Returns -1 on internal error.
324
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
325
 */
326
static int x509_verify_x509(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
327
0
{
328
0
    int ret;
329
330
0
    if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
331
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
332
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
333
0
        return -1;
334
0
    }
335
336
0
    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
337
        /*
338
         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
339
         * cannot do another one.
340
         */
341
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
342
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
343
0
        return -1;
344
0
    }
345
346
0
    if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, ctx->cert, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
347
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
348
0
        return -1;
349
0
    }
350
0
    ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
351
352
    /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
353
0
    CB_FAIL_IF(!check_cert_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert),
354
0
               ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
355
356
0
    ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx->dane) ? dane_verify(ctx) : verify_chain(ctx);
357
358
    /*
359
     * Safety-net.  If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
360
     * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
361
     * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
362
     */
363
0
    if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
364
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
365
0
    return ret;
366
0
}
367
368
static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert)
369
0
{
370
0
    int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk);
371
372
0
    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
373
0
        if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
374
0
            return 1;
375
0
    return 0;
376
0
}
377
378
/*-
379
 * Find in |sk| an issuer cert of cert |x| accepted by |ctx->check_issued|.
380
 * If no_dup, the issuer must not yet be in |ctx->chain|, yet allowing the
381
 *     exception that |x| is self-issued and |ctx->chain| has just one element.
382
 * Prefer the first match with suitable validity period or latest expiration.
383
 */
384
static X509 *get0_best_issuer_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trusted,
385
                                 int no_dup, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
386
0
{
387
0
    int i;
388
0
    X509 *candidate, *issuer = NULL;
389
390
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
391
0
        candidate = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
392
0
        if (no_dup
393
0
            && !((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
394
0
                && sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, candidate))
395
0
            continue;
396
0
        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, candidate)) {
397
0
            if (!trusted) { /* do not check key usage for trust anchors */
398
0
                if (ossl_x509_signing_allowed(candidate, x) != X509_V_OK)
399
0
                    continue;
400
0
            }
401
0
            if (ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx, candidate, -1))
402
0
                return candidate;
403
            /*
404
             * Leave in *issuer the first match that has the latest expiration
405
             * date so we return nearest match if no certificate time is OK.
406
             */
407
0
            if (issuer == NULL
408
0
                    || ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(candidate),
409
0
                                         X509_get0_notAfter(issuer)) > 0)
410
0
                issuer = candidate;
411
0
        }
412
0
    }
413
0
    return issuer;
414
0
}
415
416
/*-
417
 * Try to get issuer cert from |ctx->store| accepted by |ctx->check_issued|.
418
 *
419
 * Return values are:
420
 *  1 lookup successful.
421
 *  0 certificate not found.
422
 * -1 some other error.
423
 */
424
int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
425
0
{
426
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(ctx, X509_get_issuer_name(x));
427
0
    int ret = 0;
428
429
0
    if (certs == NULL)
430
0
        return -1;
431
0
    *issuer = get0_best_issuer_sk(ctx, 1 /* trusted */, 0, certs, x);
432
0
    if (*issuer != NULL)
433
0
        ret = X509_up_ref(*issuer) ? 1 : -1;
434
0
    OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(certs);
435
0
    return ret;
436
0
}
437
438
/* Check that the given certificate |x| is issued by the certificate |issuer| */
439
static int check_issued(ossl_unused X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
440
0
{
441
0
    int err = ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer, x);
442
443
0
    if (err == X509_V_OK)
444
0
        return 1;
445
    /*
446
     * SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH just means 'x' is clearly not issued by 'issuer'.
447
     * Every other error code likely indicates a real error.
448
     */
449
0
    return 0;
450
0
}
451
452
/*-
453
 * Alternative get_issuer method: look up from a STACK_OF(X509) in other_ctx.
454
 * Returns -1 on internal error.
455
 */
456
static int get1_best_issuer_other_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
457
0
{
458
0
    *issuer = get0_best_issuer_sk(ctx, 1 /* trusted */, 1 /* no_dup */,
459
0
                                  ctx->other_ctx, x);
460
0
    if (*issuer == NULL)
461
0
        return 0;
462
0
    return X509_up_ref(*issuer) ? 1 : -1;
463
0
}
464
465
/*-
466
 * Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx.
467
 * Returns NULL on internal/fatal error, empty stack if not found.
468
 */
469
static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const X509_NAME *nm)
470
0
{
471
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *sk = sk_X509_new_null();
472
0
    X509 *x;
473
0
    int i;
474
475
0
    if (sk == NULL)
476
0
        return NULL;
477
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
478
0
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
479
0
        if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
480
0
            if (!X509_add_cert(sk, x, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
481
0
                OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk);
482
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
483
0
                return NULL;
484
0
            }
485
0
        }
486
0
    }
487
0
    return sk;
488
0
}
489
490
/*
491
 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose.  For trusted certificates explicit local
492
 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
493
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
494
 */
495
static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
496
                         int must_be_ca)
497
0
{
498
0
    int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
499
500
    /*
501
     * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
502
     * settings trump the purpose constraints.
503
     *
504
     * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
505
     * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
506
     * ctx->param->purpose!
507
     *
508
     * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
509
     * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
510
     * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose.  It is however
511
     * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
512
     * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
513
     *
514
     * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
515
     * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
516
     * also set.
517
     */
518
0
    if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
519
0
        tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
520
521
0
    switch (tr_ok) {
522
0
    case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
523
0
        return 1;
524
0
    case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
525
0
        break;
526
0
    default: /* can only be X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED */
527
0
        switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
528
0
        case 1:
529
0
            return 1;
530
0
        case 0:
531
0
            break;
532
0
        default:
533
0
            if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
534
0
                return 1;
535
0
        }
536
0
        break;
537
0
    }
538
539
0
    return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
540
0
}
541
542
/*-
543
 * Check extensions of a cert chain for consistency with the supplied purpose.
544
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
545
 */
546
static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
547
0
{
548
0
    int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
549
0
    X509 *x;
550
0
    int ret, proxy_path_length = 0;
551
0
    int purpose, allow_proxy_certs, num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
552
553
    /*-
554
     *  must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
555
     * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
556
     *     use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
557
     * 0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
558
     *     used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
559
     * 1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
560
     *     all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
561
     */
562
0
    must_be_ca = -1;
563
564
    /* CRL path validation */
565
0
    if (ctx->parent != NULL) {
566
0
        allow_proxy_certs = 0;
567
0
        purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
568
0
    } else {
569
0
        allow_proxy_certs =
570
0
            (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS) != 0;
571
0
        purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
572
0
    }
573
574
0
    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
575
0
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
576
0
        CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0
577
0
                       && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0,
578
0
                   ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION);
579
0
        CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0,
580
0
                   ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED);
581
0
        ret = X509_check_ca(x);
582
0
        switch (must_be_ca) {
583
0
        case -1:
584
0
            CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0
585
0
                           && ret != 1 && ret != 0,
586
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
587
0
            break;
588
0
        case 0:
589
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(ret != 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA);
590
0
            break;
591
0
        default:
592
            /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
593
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0
594
0
                       || ((i + 1 < num
595
0
                            || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0)
596
0
                           && ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
597
0
            break;
598
0
        }
599
0
        if (num > 1) {
600
            /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
601
0
            ret = check_curve(x);
602
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(ret < 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED);
603
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS);
604
0
        }
605
        /*
606
         * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested
607
         * and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs
608
         * because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2.
609
         */
610
0
        if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0
611
0
            && num > 1) { /*
612
                           * this should imply
613
                           * !(i == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
614
                           *          && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0)
615
                           */
616
            /* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */
617
0
            if (x->ex_pathlen != -1) {
618
0
                CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0,
619
0
                           ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA);
620
0
                CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) == 0, ctx,
621
0
                           x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN);
622
0
            }
623
0
            CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
624
0
                           && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0
625
0
                           && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0,
626
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL);
627
            /* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
628
0
            if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) {
629
0
                CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0,
630
0
                           ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE);
631
0
            } else {
632
0
                CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0, ctx, x, i,
633
0
                           X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA);
634
0
            }
635
            /* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */
636
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0,
637
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY);
638
            /* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */
639
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
640
0
                        || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0
641
0
                        || x->altname == NULL)
642
0
                       && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0,
643
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY);
644
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0
645
0
                           && x->altname != NULL
646
0
                           && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0,
647
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL);
648
            /* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */
649
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(x->altname != NULL
650
0
                           && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0,
651
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME);
652
            /* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */
653
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x->sig_alg, &x->cert_info.signature) != 0,
654
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY);
655
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(x->akid != NULL
656
0
                           && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0,
657
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL);
658
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(x->skid != NULL
659
0
                           && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0,
660
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL);
661
0
            if (X509_get_version(x) >= X509_VERSION_3) {
662
                /* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */
663
0
                CB_FAIL_IF(i + 1 < num /*
664
                                        * this means not last cert in chain,
665
                                        * taken as "generated by conforming CAs"
666
                                        */
667
0
                           && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL), ctx,
668
0
                           x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER);
669
                /* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */
670
0
                CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 && x->skid == NULL,
671
0
                           ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER);
672
0
            } else {
673
0
                CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x)) > 0,
674
0
                           ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3);
675
0
            }
676
0
        }
677
678
        /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
679
0
        if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
680
0
            return 0;
681
        /* Check path length */
682
0
        CB_FAIL_IF(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1
683
0
                       && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length,
684
0
                   ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
685
        /* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */
686
0
        if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
687
0
            plen++;
688
        /*
689
         * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
690
         * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate.  If not,
691
         * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
692
         */
693
0
        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
694
            /*
695
             * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
696
             * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
697
             * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
698
             * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
699
             *
700
             * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
701
             * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
702
             * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
703
             * increment proxy_path_length.
704
             */
705
0
            if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
706
0
                CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen,
707
0
                           ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
708
0
                proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
709
0
            }
710
0
            proxy_path_length++;
711
0
            must_be_ca = 0;
712
0
        } else {
713
0
            must_be_ca = 1;
714
0
        }
715
0
    }
716
0
    return 1;
717
0
}
718
719
static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype)
720
0
{
721
0
    int i;
722
0
    int ret = 0;
723
0
    GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
724
725
0
    if (gs == NULL)
726
0
        return 0;
727
728
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) {
729
0
        GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i);
730
731
0
        if (g->type == gtype) {
732
0
            ret = 1;
733
0
            break;
734
0
        }
735
0
    }
736
0
    GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs);
737
0
    return ret;
738
0
}
739
740
/*-
741
 * Returns -1 on internal error.
742
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
743
 */
744
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
745
0
{
746
0
    int i;
747
748
    /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
749
0
    for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
750
0
        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
751
0
        int j;
752
753
        /* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */
754
0
        if (i != 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0)
755
0
            continue;
756
757
        /*
758
         * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
759
         * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
760
         * added.
761
         * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
762
         */
763
0
        if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) {
764
0
            X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
765
0
            X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
766
0
            X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
767
0
            int last_nid = 0;
768
0
            int err = X509_V_OK;
769
0
            int last_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
770
771
            /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
772
0
            if (last_loc < 1) {
773
0
                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
774
0
                goto proxy_name_done;
775
0
            }
776
777
            /*
778
             * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
779
             * there is in issuer.
780
             */
781
0
            if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
782
0
                != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
783
0
                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
784
0
                goto proxy_name_done;
785
0
            }
786
787
            /*
788
             * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
789
             * multi-valued RDN
790
             */
791
0
            if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc))
792
0
                == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
793
0
                                                           last_loc - 1))) {
794
0
                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
795
0
                goto proxy_name_done;
796
0
            }
797
798
            /*
799
             * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
800
             * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
801
             */
802
0
            tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
803
0
            if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
804
0
                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
805
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
806
0
                return -1;
807
0
            }
808
809
0
            tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc);
810
0
            last_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
811
812
0
            if (last_nid != NID_commonName
813
0
                || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
814
0
                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
815
0
            }
816
817
0
            X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
818
0
            X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
819
820
0
        proxy_name_done:
821
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, x, i, err);
822
0
        }
823
824
        /*
825
         * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
826
         * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
827
         * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
828
         * to be obeyed.
829
         */
830
0
        for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
831
0
            NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
832
833
0
            if (nc) {
834
0
                int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
835
0
                int ret = 1;
836
837
                /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
838
0
                if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0
839
0
                    && (ctx->param->hostflags
840
0
                        & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0
841
0
                    && ((ctx->param->hostflags
842
0
                         & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0
843
0
                        || (ret = has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS)) == 0))
844
0
                    rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
845
0
                if (ret < 0)
846
0
                    return ret;
847
848
0
                switch (rv) {
849
0
                case X509_V_OK:
850
0
                    break;
851
0
                case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
852
0
                    return -1;
853
0
                default:
854
0
                    CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, x, i, rv);
855
0
                    break;
856
0
                }
857
0
            }
858
0
        }
859
0
    }
860
0
    return 1;
861
0
}
862
863
static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
864
0
{
865
0
    return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
866
0
}
867
868
static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
869
0
{
870
0
    int i;
871
0
    int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
872
0
    char *name;
873
874
0
    if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
875
0
        OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
876
0
        vpm->peername = NULL;
877
0
    }
878
0
    for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
879
0
        name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
880
0
        if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
881
0
            return 1;
882
0
    }
883
0
    return n == 0;
884
0
}
885
886
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
887
0
{
888
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
889
0
    X509 *x = ctx->cert;
890
891
0
    if (vpm->hosts != NULL && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
892
0
        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
893
0
            return 0;
894
0
    }
895
0
    if (vpm->email != NULL
896
0
            && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
897
0
        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
898
0
            return 0;
899
0
    }
900
0
    if (vpm->ip != NULL && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
901
0
        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
902
0
            return 0;
903
0
    }
904
0
    return 1;
905
0
}
906
907
/* Returns -1 on internal error */
908
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
909
0
{
910
0
    int i, res;
911
0
    X509 *x = NULL;
912
0
    X509 *mx;
913
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
914
0
    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
915
0
    int trust;
916
917
    /*
918
     * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
919
     * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
920
     */
921
0
    if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
922
0
        trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted);
923
0
        if (trust != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED)
924
0
            return trust;
925
0
    }
926
927
    /*
928
     * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
929
     * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
930
     * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
931
     * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
932
     */
933
0
    for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
934
0
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
935
0
        trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
936
        /* If explicitly trusted (so not neutral nor rejected) return trusted */
937
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
938
0
            goto trusted;
939
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
940
0
            goto rejected;
941
0
    }
942
943
    /*
944
     * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
945
     * the chain is PKIX trusted.
946
     */
947
0
    if (num_untrusted < num) {
948
0
        if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0)
949
0
            goto trusted;
950
0
        return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
951
0
    }
952
953
0
    if (num_untrusted == num
954
0
            && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0) {
955
        /*
956
         * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
957
         * for a direct trust store match.
958
         */
959
0
        i = 0;
960
0
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
961
0
        res = lookup_cert_match(&mx, ctx, x);
962
0
        if (res < 0)
963
0
            return res;
964
0
        if (res == 0)
965
0
            return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
966
967
        /*
968
         * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings.  If none are set,
969
         * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
970
         */
971
0
        trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
972
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
973
0
            X509_free(mx);
974
0
            goto rejected;
975
0
        }
976
977
        /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
978
0
        (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
979
0
        X509_free(x);
980
0
        ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
981
0
        goto trusted;
982
0
    }
983
984
    /*
985
     * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
986
     * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
987
     */
988
0
    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
989
990
0
 rejected:
991
0
    return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED) == 0
992
0
        ? X509_TRUST_REJECTED : X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
993
994
0
 trusted:
995
0
    if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
996
0
        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
997
0
    if (dane->pdpth < 0)
998
0
        dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
999
    /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
1000
0
    if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
1001
0
        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
1002
0
    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
1003
0
}
1004
1005
/* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */
1006
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1007
0
{
1008
0
    int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
1009
1010
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) == 0)
1011
0
        return 1;
1012
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) != 0) {
1013
0
        last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1014
0
    } else {
1015
        /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
1016
0
        if (ctx->parent != NULL)
1017
0
            return 1;
1018
0
        last = 0;
1019
0
    }
1020
0
    for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
1021
0
        ctx->error_depth = i;
1022
0
        ok = check_cert(ctx);
1023
0
        if (!ok)
1024
0
            return ok;
1025
0
    }
1026
0
    return 1;
1027
0
}
1028
1029
/* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */
1030
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1031
0
{
1032
0
    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1033
0
    int ok = 0;
1034
0
    int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1035
0
    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
1036
1037
0
    ctx->current_cert = x;
1038
0
    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
1039
0
    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
1040
0
    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
1041
1042
0
    if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0)
1043
0
        return 1;
1044
1045
0
    while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
1046
0
        unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1047
1048
        /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
1049
0
        if (ctx->get_crl != NULL)
1050
0
            ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
1051
0
        else
1052
0
            ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
1053
        /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */
1054
0
        if (!ok) {
1055
0
            ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
1056
0
            goto done;
1057
0
        }
1058
0
        ctx->current_crl = crl;
1059
0
        ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
1060
0
        if (!ok)
1061
0
            goto done;
1062
1063
0
        if (dcrl != NULL) {
1064
0
            ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
1065
0
            if (!ok)
1066
0
                goto done;
1067
0
            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
1068
0
            if (!ok)
1069
0
                goto done;
1070
0
        } else {
1071
0
            ok = 1;
1072
0
        }
1073
1074
        /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
1075
0
        if (ok != 2) {
1076
0
            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
1077
0
            if (!ok)
1078
0
                goto done;
1079
0
        }
1080
1081
0
        X509_CRL_free(crl);
1082
0
        X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1083
0
        crl = NULL;
1084
0
        dcrl = NULL;
1085
        /*
1086
         * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
1087
         * so exit loop.
1088
         */
1089
0
        if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
1090
0
            ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
1091
0
            goto done;
1092
0
        }
1093
0
    }
1094
0
 done:
1095
0
    X509_CRL_free(crl);
1096
0
    X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1097
1098
0
    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1099
0
    return ok;
1100
0
}
1101
1102
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1103
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1104
0
{
1105
0
    time_t *ptime;
1106
0
    int i;
1107
1108
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
1109
0
        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1110
0
    else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
1111
0
        return 1;
1112
0
    else
1113
0
        ptime = NULL;
1114
0
    if (notify)
1115
0
        ctx->current_crl = crl;
1116
1117
0
    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1118
0
    if (i == 0) {
1119
0
        if (!notify)
1120
0
            return 0;
1121
0
        if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
1122
0
            return 0;
1123
0
    }
1124
1125
0
    if (i > 0) {
1126
0
        if (!notify)
1127
0
            return 0;
1128
0
        if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
1129
0
            return 0;
1130
0
    }
1131
1132
0
    if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1133
0
        i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1134
1135
0
        if (i == 0) {
1136
0
            if (!notify)
1137
0
                return 0;
1138
0
            if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
1139
0
                return 0;
1140
0
        }
1141
        /* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */
1142
0
        if (i < 0 && (ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA) == 0) {
1143
0
            if (!notify || !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
1144
0
                return 0;
1145
0
        }
1146
0
    }
1147
1148
0
    if (notify)
1149
0
        ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1150
1151
0
    return 1;
1152
0
}
1153
1154
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1155
                      X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1156
                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1157
0
{
1158
0
    int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1159
0
    unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1160
0
    X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1161
0
    X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1162
0
    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1163
1164
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1165
0
        crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1166
0
        reasons = *preasons;
1167
0
        crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1168
0
        if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1169
0
            continue;
1170
        /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1171
0
        if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1172
0
            int day, sec;
1173
1174
0
            if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1175
0
                               X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1176
0
                continue;
1177
            /*
1178
             * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1179
             * and |sec|.
1180
             */
1181
0
            if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1182
0
                continue;
1183
0
        }
1184
0
        best_crl = crl;
1185
0
        best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1186
0
        best_score = crl_score;
1187
0
        best_reasons = reasons;
1188
0
    }
1189
1190
0
    if (best_crl != NULL) {
1191
0
        X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1192
0
        *pcrl = best_crl;
1193
0
        *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1194
0
        *pscore = best_score;
1195
0
        *preasons = best_reasons;
1196
0
        X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1197
0
        X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1198
0
        *pdcrl = NULL;
1199
0
        get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1200
0
    }
1201
1202
0
    if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1203
0
        return 1;
1204
1205
0
    return 0;
1206
0
}
1207
1208
/*
1209
 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1210
 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1211
 */
1212
static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1213
0
{
1214
0
    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta = NULL, *extb = NULL;
1215
0
    int i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1216
1217
0
    if (i >= 0) {
1218
        /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1219
0
        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1220
0
            return 0;
1221
0
        exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1222
0
    }
1223
1224
0
    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1225
0
    if (i >= 0) {
1226
0
        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1227
0
            return 0;
1228
0
        extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1229
0
    }
1230
1231
0
    if (exta == NULL && extb == NULL)
1232
0
        return 1;
1233
1234
0
    if (exta == NULL || extb == NULL)
1235
0
        return 0;
1236
1237
0
    return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb) == 0;
1238
0
}
1239
1240
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1241
static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1242
0
{
1243
    /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1244
0
    if (delta->base_crl_number == NULL)
1245
0
        return 0;
1246
    /* Base must have a CRL number */
1247
0
    if (base->crl_number == NULL)
1248
0
        return 0;
1249
    /* Issuer names must match */
1250
0
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1251
0
                      X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)) != 0)
1252
0
        return 0;
1253
    /* AKID and IDP must match */
1254
0
    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1255
0
        return 0;
1256
0
    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1257
0
        return 0;
1258
    /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1259
0
    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1260
0
        return 0;
1261
    /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1262
0
    return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0;
1263
0
}
1264
1265
/*
1266
 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1267
 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1268
 */
1269
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1270
                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1271
0
{
1272
0
    X509_CRL *delta;
1273
0
    int i;
1274
1275
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS) == 0)
1276
0
        return;
1277
0
    if (((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST) == 0)
1278
0
        return;
1279
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1280
0
        delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1281
0
        if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1282
0
            if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1283
0
                *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1284
0
            X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1285
0
            *dcrl = delta;
1286
0
            return;
1287
0
        }
1288
0
    }
1289
0
    *dcrl = NULL;
1290
0
}
1291
1292
/*
1293
 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1294
 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1295
 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1296
 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1297
 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1298
 */
1299
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1300
                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1301
0
{
1302
0
    int crl_score = 0;
1303
0
    unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1304
1305
    /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1306
1307
    /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1308
0
    if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0)
1309
0
        return 0;
1310
    /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1311
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0) {
1312
0
        if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1313
0
            return 0;
1314
0
    } else if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) != 0) {
1315
        /* If no new reasons reject */
1316
0
        if ((crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0)
1317
0
            return 0;
1318
0
    }
1319
    /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1320
0
    else if (crl->base_crl_number != NULL)
1321
0
        return 0;
1322
    /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1323
0
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)) != 0) {
1324
0
        if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT) == 0)
1325
0
            return 0;
1326
0
    } else {
1327
0
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1328
0
    }
1329
1330
0
    if ((crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) == 0)
1331
0
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1332
1333
    /* Check expiration */
1334
0
    if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1335
0
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1336
1337
    /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1338
0
    crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1339
1340
    /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1341
0
    if ((crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID) == 0)
1342
0
        return 0;
1343
1344
    /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1345
0
    if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1346
        /* If no new reasons reject */
1347
0
        if ((crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0)
1348
0
            return 0;
1349
0
        tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1350
0
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1351
0
    }
1352
1353
0
    *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1354
1355
0
    return crl_score;
1356
1357
0
}
1358
1359
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1360
                           X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1361
0
{
1362
0
    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1363
0
    const X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1364
0
    int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1365
0
    int i;
1366
1367
0
    if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1368
0
        cidx++;
1369
1370
0
    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1371
1372
0
    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1373
0
        if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1374
0
            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1375
0
            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1376
0
            return;
1377
0
        }
1378
0
    }
1379
1380
0
    for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1381
0
        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1382
0
        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1383
0
            continue;
1384
0
        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1385
0
            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1386
0
            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1387
0
            return;
1388
0
        }
1389
0
    }
1390
1391
    /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1392
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0)
1393
0
        return;
1394
1395
    /*
1396
     * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1397
     * untrusted certificates.
1398
     */
1399
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1400
0
        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1401
0
        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm) != 0)
1402
0
            continue;
1403
0
        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1404
0
            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1405
0
            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1406
0
            return;
1407
0
        }
1408
0
    }
1409
0
}
1410
1411
/*
1412
 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1413
 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1414
 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1415
 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1416
 */
1417
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1418
0
{
1419
0
    X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx = {0};
1420
0
    int ret;
1421
1422
    /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1423
0
    if (ctx->parent != NULL)
1424
0
        return 0;
1425
0
    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->store, x, ctx->untrusted))
1426
0
        return -1;
1427
1428
0
    crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1429
    /* Copy verify params across */
1430
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1431
1432
0
    crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1433
0
    crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1434
1435
    /* Verify CRL issuer */
1436
0
    ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1437
0
    if (ret <= 0)
1438
0
        goto err;
1439
1440
    /* Check chain is acceptable */
1441
0
    ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1442
0
 err:
1443
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1444
0
    return ret;
1445
0
}
1446
1447
/*
1448
 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1449
 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1450
 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorized to do so. RFC5280 is more
1451
 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1452
 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1453
 * RFC5280 version
1454
 */
1455
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1456
                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1457
                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1458
0
{
1459
0
    X509 *cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1460
0
    X509 *crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1461
1462
0
    return X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta) == 0;
1463
0
}
1464
1465
/*-
1466
 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1467
 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1468
 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1469
 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1470
 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1471
 */
1472
static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1473
0
{
1474
0
    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1475
0
    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1476
0
    GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1477
0
    int i, j;
1478
1479
0
    if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
1480
0
        return 1;
1481
0
    if (a->type == 1) {
1482
0
        if (a->dpname == NULL)
1483
0
            return 0;
1484
        /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1485
0
        if (b->type == 1) {
1486
0
            if (b->dpname == NULL)
1487
0
                return 0;
1488
0
            return X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname) == 0;
1489
0
        }
1490
        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1491
0
        nm = a->dpname;
1492
0
        gens = b->name.fullname;
1493
0
    } else if (b->type == 1) {
1494
0
        if (b->dpname == NULL)
1495
0
            return 0;
1496
        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1497
0
        gens = a->name.fullname;
1498
0
        nm = b->dpname;
1499
0
    }
1500
1501
    /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1502
0
    if (nm != NULL) {
1503
0
        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1504
0
            gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1505
0
            if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1506
0
                continue;
1507
0
            if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName) == 0)
1508
0
                return 1;
1509
0
        }
1510
0
        return 0;
1511
0
    }
1512
1513
    /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1514
1515
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1516
0
        gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1517
0
        for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1518
0
            genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1519
0
            if (GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb) == 0)
1520
0
                return 1;
1521
0
        }
1522
0
    }
1523
1524
0
    return 0;
1525
1526
0
}
1527
1528
static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1529
0
{
1530
0
    int i;
1531
0
    const X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1532
1533
    /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1534
0
    if (dp->CRLissuer == NULL)
1535
0
        return (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0;
1536
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1537
0
        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1538
1539
0
        if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1540
0
            continue;
1541
0
        if (X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm) == 0)
1542
0
            return 1;
1543
0
    }
1544
0
    return 0;
1545
0
}
1546
1547
/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1548
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1549
                           unsigned int *preasons)
1550
0
{
1551
0
    int i;
1552
1553
0
    if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) != 0)
1554
0
        return 0;
1555
0
    if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) {
1556
0
        if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) != 0)
1557
0
            return 0;
1558
0
    } else {
1559
0
        if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) != 0)
1560
0
            return 0;
1561
0
    }
1562
0
    *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1563
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1564
0
        DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1565
1566
0
        if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1567
0
            if (crl->idp == NULL
1568
0
                    || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1569
0
                *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1570
0
                return 1;
1571
0
            }
1572
0
        }
1573
0
    }
1574
0
    return (crl->idp == NULL || crl->idp->distpoint == NULL)
1575
0
            && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0;
1576
0
}
1577
1578
/*
1579
 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1580
 * to find a delta CRL too
1581
 */
1582
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1583
                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1584
0
{
1585
0
    int ok;
1586
0
    X509 *issuer = NULL;
1587
0
    int crl_score = 0;
1588
0
    unsigned int reasons;
1589
0
    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1590
0
    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1591
0
    const X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1592
1593
0
    reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1594
0
    ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1595
0
                    &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1596
0
    if (ok)
1597
0
        goto done;
1598
1599
    /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1600
0
    skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1601
1602
    /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1603
0
    if (skcrl == NULL && crl != NULL)
1604
0
        goto done;
1605
1606
0
    get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1607
1608
0
    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1609
1610
0
 done:
1611
    /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1612
0
    if (crl != NULL) {
1613
0
        ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1614
0
        ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1615
0
        ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1616
0
        *pcrl = crl;
1617
0
        *pdcrl = dcrl;
1618
0
        return 1;
1619
0
    }
1620
0
    return 0;
1621
0
}
1622
1623
/* Check CRL validity */
1624
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1625
0
{
1626
0
    X509 *issuer = NULL;
1627
0
    EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1628
0
    int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1629
0
    int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1630
1631
    /* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1632
0
    if (ctx->current_issuer != NULL) {
1633
0
        issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1634
    /*
1635
     * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1636
     * certificate in chain.
1637
     */
1638
0
    } else if (cnum < chnum) {
1639
0
        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1640
0
    } else {
1641
0
        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1642
0
        if (!ossl_assert(issuer != NULL))
1643
0
            return 0;
1644
        /* If not self-issued, can't check signature */
1645
0
        if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1646
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1647
0
            return 0;
1648
0
    }
1649
1650
0
    if (issuer == NULL)
1651
0
        return 1;
1652
1653
    /*
1654
     * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1655
     */
1656
0
    if (crl->base_crl_number == NULL) {
1657
        /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1658
0
        if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 &&
1659
0
            (issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) == 0 &&
1660
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1661
0
            return 0;
1662
1663
0
        if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) == 0 &&
1664
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1665
0
            return 0;
1666
1667
0
        if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) == 0 &&
1668
0
            check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1669
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1670
0
            return 0;
1671
1672
0
        if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0 &&
1673
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1674
0
            return 0;
1675
0
    }
1676
1677
0
    if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) == 0 &&
1678
0
        !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1679
0
        return 0;
1680
1681
    /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1682
0
    ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
1683
0
    if (ikey == NULL &&
1684
0
        !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1685
0
        return 0;
1686
1687
0
    if (ikey != NULL) {
1688
0
        int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1689
1690
0
        if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1691
0
            return 0;
1692
        /* Verify CRL signature */
1693
0
        if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1694
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1695
0
            return 0;
1696
0
    }
1697
0
    return 1;
1698
0
}
1699
1700
/* Check certificate against CRL */
1701
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1702
0
{
1703
0
    X509_REVOKED *rev;
1704
1705
    /*
1706
     * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1707
     * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1708
     * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1709
     * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1710
     */
1711
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0
1712
0
        && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
1713
0
        !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1714
0
        return 0;
1715
    /*
1716
     * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL.  If found, make sure
1717
     * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1718
     */
1719
0
    if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1720
0
        if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1721
0
            return 2;
1722
0
        if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
1723
0
            return 0;
1724
0
    }
1725
1726
0
    return 1;
1727
0
}
1728
1729
/* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */
1730
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1731
0
{
1732
0
    int ret;
1733
1734
0
    if (ctx->parent)
1735
0
        return 1;
1736
    /*
1737
     * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1738
     * certificate!  In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1739
     * certificate as a top-most element.  This comports well with RFC5280
1740
     * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1741
     * chain to be verified.  In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1742
     * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1743
     * element.  We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1744
     * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1745
     * X509_policy_check() call.
1746
     */
1747
0
    if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1748
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1749
0
        goto memerr;
1750
0
    }
1751
0
    ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1752
0
                            ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1753
0
    if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1754
0
        (void)sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1755
1756
0
    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
1757
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1758
0
        goto memerr;
1759
0
    }
1760
    /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1761
0
    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
1762
0
        int i, cbcalled = 0;
1763
1764
        /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1765
0
        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1766
0
            X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1767
1768
0
            if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0)
1769
0
                cbcalled = 1;
1770
0
            CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
1771
0
                       ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
1772
0
        }
1773
0
        if (!cbcalled) {
1774
            /* Should not be able to get here */
1775
0
            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1776
0
            return 0;
1777
0
        }
1778
        /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
1779
0
        return 1;
1780
0
    }
1781
0
    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
1782
0
        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1783
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1784
0
        return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1785
0
    }
1786
0
    if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1787
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1788
0
        return 0;
1789
0
    }
1790
1791
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) != 0) {
1792
0
        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1793
        /*
1794
         * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1795
         * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1796
         * remain in an error state.  Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1797
         * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1798
         */
1799
0
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1800
0
            return 0;
1801
0
    }
1802
1803
0
    return 1;
1804
1805
0
 memerr:
1806
0
    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1807
0
    return -1;
1808
0
}
1809
1810
/*-
1811
 * Check certificate validity times.
1812
 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1813
 * the validation status.
1814
 *
1815
 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1816
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
1817
 */
1818
int ossl_x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1819
0
{
1820
0
    time_t *ptime;
1821
0
    int i;
1822
1823
0
    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
1824
0
        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1825
0
    else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
1826
0
        return 1;
1827
0
    else
1828
0
        ptime = NULL;
1829
1830
0
    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
1831
0
    if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1832
0
        return 0;
1833
0
    CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD);
1834
0
    CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID);
1835
1836
0
    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
1837
0
    if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1838
0
        return 0;
1839
0
    CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD);
1840
0
    CB_FAIL_IF(i < 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED);
1841
0
    return 1;
1842
0
}
1843
1844
/*
1845
 * Verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain.
1846
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
1847
 */
1848
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1849
0
{
1850
0
    int n;
1851
0
    X509 *xi;
1852
0
    X509 *xs;
1853
1854
    /* For RPK: just do the verify callback */
1855
0
    if (ctx->rpk != NULL) {
1856
0
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(ctx->error == X509_V_OK, ctx))
1857
0
            return 0;
1858
0
        return 1;
1859
0
    }
1860
0
    n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1861
0
    xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1862
0
    xs = xi;
1863
1864
0
    ctx->error_depth = n;
1865
0
    if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1866
        /*
1867
         * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures,
1868
         * on the top certificate we check only the timestamps.
1869
         * We report the issuer as NULL because all we have is a bare key.
1870
         */
1871
0
        xi = NULL;
1872
0
    } else if (ossl_x509_likely_issued(xi, xi) != X509_V_OK
1873
               /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */
1874
0
               && ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) == 0)) {
1875
0
        if (n > 0) {
1876
0
            n--;
1877
0
            ctx->error_depth = n;
1878
0
            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1879
0
        } else {
1880
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, 0,
1881
0
                       X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
1882
0
        }
1883
        /*
1884
         * The below code will certainly not do a
1885
         * self-signature check on xi because it is not self-issued.
1886
         */
1887
0
    }
1888
1889
    /*
1890
     * Do not clear error (by ctx->error = X509_V_OK), it must be "sticky",
1891
     * only the user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1892
     */
1893
0
    while (n >= 0) {
1894
        /*-
1895
         * For each iteration of this loop:
1896
         * n is the subject depth
1897
         * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
1898
         * xi is NULL for DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures
1899
         *       else the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
1900
         * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
1901
         */
1902
        /*
1903
         * Do signature check for self-signed certificates only if explicitly
1904
         * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
1905
         */
1906
0
        if (xi != NULL
1907
0
            && (xs != xi
1908
0
                || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE) != 0
1909
0
                    && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0))) {
1910
0
            EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1911
            /*
1912
             * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
1913
             * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer
1914
             * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject).
1915
             */
1916
0
            int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1);
1917
            /*
1918
             * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4
1919
             * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
1920
             * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
1921
             * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
1922
             * we must not verify a certificate signature if the key usage of
1923
             * the CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
1924
             * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
1925
             * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
1926
             * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
1927
             * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus
1928
             * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
1929
             */
1930
0
            int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
1931
0
                ? X509_V_OK : ossl_x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs);
1932
1933
0
            CB_FAIL_IF(ret != X509_V_OK, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret);
1934
0
            if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1935
0
                CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, issuer_depth,
1936
0
                           X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY);
1937
0
            } else {
1938
0
                CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0,
1939
0
                           ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
1940
0
            }
1941
0
        }
1942
1943
        /* In addition to RFC 5280 requirements do also for trust anchor cert */
1944
        /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1945
0
        if (!ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1946
0
            return 0;
1947
1948
        /*
1949
         * Signal success at this depth.  However, the previous error (if any)
1950
         * is retained.
1951
         */
1952
0
        ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1953
0
        ctx->current_cert = xs;
1954
0
        ctx->error_depth = n;
1955
0
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1956
0
            return 0;
1957
1958
0
        if (--n >= 0) {
1959
0
            xi = xs;
1960
0
            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1961
0
        }
1962
0
    }
1963
0
    return 1;
1964
0
}
1965
1966
int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1967
0
{
1968
0
    return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1969
0
}
1970
1971
/* returns 0 on error, otherwise 1 if ctm > cmp_time, else -1 */
1972
int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1973
0
{
1974
0
    static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1975
0
    static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1976
0
    ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1977
0
    int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1978
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
1979
    const char upper_z = 0x5A;
1980
#else
1981
0
    const char upper_z = 'Z';
1982
0
#endif
1983
1984
    /*-
1985
     * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1986
     * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1987
     * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1988
     * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1989
     *
1990
     * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1991
     * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1992
     *  validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1993
     *  dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1994
     */
1995
0
    switch (ctm->type) {
1996
0
    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1997
0
        if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
1998
0
            return 0;
1999
0
        break;
2000
0
    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
2001
0
        if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
2002
0
            return 0;
2003
0
        break;
2004
0
    default:
2005
0
        return 0;
2006
0
    }
2007
2008
    /**
2009
     * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
2010
     * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
2011
     * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
2012
     */
2013
0
    for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
2014
0
        if (!ossl_ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
2015
0
            return 0;
2016
0
    }
2017
0
    if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z)
2018
0
        return 0;
2019
2020
    /*
2021
     * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
2022
     * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
2023
     * so we go through ASN.1
2024
     */
2025
0
    asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
2026
0
    if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
2027
0
        goto err;
2028
0
    if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time) == 0)
2029
0
        goto err;
2030
2031
    /*
2032
     * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
2033
     * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
2034
     */
2035
0
    ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
2036
2037
0
 err:
2038
0
    ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
2039
0
    return ret;
2040
0
}
2041
2042
/*
2043
 * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range,
2044
 * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start
2045
 */
2046
int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm,
2047
                       const ASN1_TIME *start, const ASN1_TIME *end)
2048
0
{
2049
0
    time_t ref_time;
2050
0
    time_t *time = NULL;
2051
0
    unsigned long flags = vpm == NULL ? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm);
2052
2053
0
    if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) {
2054
0
        ref_time = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm);
2055
0
        time = &ref_time;
2056
0
    } else if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) {
2057
0
        return 0; /* this means ok */
2058
0
    } /* else reference time is the current time */
2059
2060
0
    if (end != NULL && X509_cmp_time(end, time) < 0)
2061
0
        return 1;
2062
0
    if (start != NULL && X509_cmp_time(start, time) > 0)
2063
0
        return -1;
2064
0
    return 0;
2065
0
}
2066
2067
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
2068
0
{
2069
0
    return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
2070
0
}
2071
2072
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2073
0
{
2074
0
    return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
2075
0
}
2076
2077
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
2078
                            int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2079
0
{
2080
0
    time_t t;
2081
2082
0
    if (in_tm)
2083
0
        t = *in_tm;
2084
0
    else
2085
0
        time(&t);
2086
2087
0
    if (s != NULL && (s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING) == 0) {
2088
0
        if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
2089
0
            return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2090
0
        if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
2091
0
            return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2092
0
    }
2093
0
    return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2094
0
}
2095
2096
/* Copy any missing public key parameters up the chain towards pkey */
2097
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2098
0
{
2099
0
    EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
2100
0
    int i, j;
2101
2102
0
    if (pkey != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
2103
0
        return 1;
2104
2105
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2106
0
        ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
2107
0
        if (ktmp == NULL) {
2108
0
            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
2109
0
            return 0;
2110
0
        }
2111
0
        if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
2112
0
            break;
2113
0
        ktmp = NULL;
2114
0
    }
2115
0
    if (ktmp == NULL) {
2116
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2117
0
        return 0;
2118
0
    }
2119
2120
    /* first, populate the other certs */
2121
0
    for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
2122
0
        ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
2123
0
        if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp))
2124
0
            return 0;
2125
0
    }
2126
2127
0
    if (pkey != NULL)
2128
0
        return EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
2129
0
    return 1;
2130
0
}
2131
2132
/*
2133
 * Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs.
2134
 * Sadly, returns NULL also on internal error.
2135
 */
2136
X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2137
                        EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2138
0
{
2139
0
    X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2140
0
    int i;
2141
0
    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2142
2143
    /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2144
0
    if (base->base_crl_number != NULL || newer->base_crl_number != NULL) {
2145
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2146
0
        return NULL;
2147
0
    }
2148
    /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2149
0
    if (base->crl_number == NULL || newer->crl_number == NULL) {
2150
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2151
0
        return NULL;
2152
0
    }
2153
    /* Issuer names must match */
2154
0
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
2155
0
                      X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)) != 0) {
2156
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2157
0
        return NULL;
2158
0
    }
2159
    /* AKID and IDP must match */
2160
0
    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2161
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2162
0
        return NULL;
2163
0
    }
2164
0
    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2165
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2166
0
        return NULL;
2167
0
    }
2168
    /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2169
0
    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2170
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2171
0
        return NULL;
2172
0
    }
2173
    /* CRLs must verify */
2174
0
    if (skey != NULL && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2175
0
                         X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2176
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2177
0
        return NULL;
2178
0
    }
2179
    /* Create new CRL */
2180
0
    crl = X509_CRL_new_ex(base->libctx, base->propq);
2181
0
    if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2)) {
2182
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
2183
0
        goto err;
2184
0
    }
2185
    /* Set issuer name */
2186
0
    if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2187
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
2188
0
        goto err;
2189
0
    }
2190
2191
0
    if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) {
2192
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
2193
0
        goto err;
2194
0
    }
2195
0
    if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) {
2196
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
2197
0
        goto err;
2198
0
    }
2199
2200
    /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2201
0
    if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) {
2202
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
2203
0
        goto err;
2204
0
    }
2205
2206
    /*
2207
     * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2208
     * number to correct value too.
2209
     */
2210
0
    for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2211
0
        X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2212
2213
0
        if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) {
2214
0
            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
2215
0
            goto err;
2216
0
        }
2217
0
    }
2218
2219
    /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2220
0
    revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2221
2222
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2223
0
        X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2224
2225
0
        rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2226
        /*
2227
         * Add only if not also in base.
2228
         * Need something cleverer here for some more complex CRLs covering
2229
         * multiple CAs.
2230
         */
2231
0
        if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
2232
0
            rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2233
0
            if (rvtmp == NULL) {
2234
0
                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2235
0
                goto err;
2236
0
            }
2237
0
            if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2238
0
                X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2239
0
                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
2240
0
                goto err;
2241
0
            }
2242
0
        }
2243
0
    }
2244
2245
0
    if (skey != NULL && md != NULL && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) {
2246
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
2247
0
        goto err;
2248
0
    }
2249
2250
0
    return crl;
2251
2252
0
 err:
2253
0
    X509_CRL_free(crl);
2254
0
    return NULL;
2255
0
}
2256
2257
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2258
0
{
2259
0
    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2260
0
}
2261
2262
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2263
0
{
2264
0
    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2265
0
}
2266
2267
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2268
0
{
2269
0
    return ctx->error;
2270
0
}
2271
2272
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2273
0
{
2274
0
    ctx->error = err;
2275
0
}
2276
2277
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2278
0
{
2279
0
    return ctx->error_depth;
2280
0
}
2281
2282
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2283
0
{
2284
0
    ctx->error_depth = depth;
2285
0
}
2286
2287
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2288
0
{
2289
0
    return ctx->current_cert;
2290
0
}
2291
2292
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2293
0
{
2294
0
    ctx->current_cert = x;
2295
0
}
2296
2297
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2298
0
{
2299
0
    return ctx->chain;
2300
0
}
2301
2302
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2303
0
{
2304
0
    if (ctx->chain == NULL)
2305
0
        return NULL;
2306
0
    return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2307
0
}
2308
2309
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2310
0
{
2311
0
    return ctx->current_issuer;
2312
0
}
2313
2314
X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2315
0
{
2316
0
    return ctx->current_crl;
2317
0
}
2318
2319
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2320
0
{
2321
0
    return ctx->parent;
2322
0
}
2323
2324
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2325
0
{
2326
0
    ctx->cert = x;
2327
0
}
2328
2329
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *rpk)
2330
0
{
2331
0
    ctx->rpk = rpk;
2332
0
}
2333
2334
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2335
0
{
2336
0
    ctx->crls = sk;
2337
0
}
2338
2339
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2340
0
{
2341
    /*
2342
     * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2343
     * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all?  Or should the trust
2344
     * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2345
     */
2346
0
    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2347
0
}
2348
2349
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2350
0
{
2351
    /*
2352
     * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2353
     * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2354
     */
2355
0
    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2356
0
}
2357
2358
/*
2359
 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2360
 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2361
 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2362
 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2363
 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2364
 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2365
 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2366
 * client/server.
2367
 */
2368
int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2369
                                   int purpose, int trust)
2370
0
{
2371
0
    int idx;
2372
2373
    /* If purpose not set use default */
2374
0
    if (purpose == 0)
2375
0
        purpose = def_purpose;
2376
    /*
2377
     * If purpose is set but we don't have a default then set the default to
2378
     * the current purpose
2379
     */
2380
0
    else if (def_purpose == 0)
2381
0
        def_purpose = purpose;
2382
    /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2383
0
    if (purpose != 0) {
2384
0
        X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2385
2386
0
        idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2387
0
        if (idx == -1) {
2388
0
            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2389
0
            return 0;
2390
0
        }
2391
0
        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2392
0
        if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2393
0
            idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2394
0
            if (idx == -1) {
2395
0
                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2396
0
                return 0;
2397
0
            }
2398
0
            ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2399
0
        }
2400
        /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2401
0
        if (trust == 0)
2402
0
            trust = ptmp->trust;
2403
0
    }
2404
0
    if (trust != 0) {
2405
0
        idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2406
0
        if (idx == -1) {
2407
0
            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2408
0
            return 0;
2409
0
        }
2410
0
    }
2411
2412
0
    if (ctx->param->purpose == 0 && purpose != 0)
2413
0
        ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2414
0
    if (ctx->param->trust == 0 && trust != 0)
2415
0
        ctx->param->trust = trust;
2416
0
    return 1;
2417
0
}
2418
2419
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
2420
0
{
2421
0
    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2422
2423
0
    if (ctx == NULL)
2424
0
        return NULL;
2425
2426
0
    ctx->libctx = libctx;
2427
0
    if (propq != NULL) {
2428
0
        ctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq);
2429
0
        if (ctx->propq == NULL) {
2430
0
            OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2431
0
            return NULL;
2432
0
        }
2433
0
    }
2434
2435
0
    return ctx;
2436
0
}
2437
2438
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2439
0
{
2440
0
    return X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(NULL, NULL);
2441
0
}
2442
2443
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2444
0
{
2445
0
    if (ctx == NULL)
2446
0
        return;
2447
2448
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2449
2450
    /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */
2451
0
    OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq);
2452
0
    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2453
0
}
2454
2455
2456
int X509_STORE_CTX_init_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, EVP_PKEY *rpk)
2457
0
{
2458
0
    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, NULL, NULL))
2459
0
        return 0;
2460
0
    ctx->rpk = rpk;
2461
0
    return 1;
2462
0
}
2463
2464
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2465
                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2466
0
{
2467
0
    if (ctx == NULL) {
2468
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
2469
0
        return 0;
2470
0
    }
2471
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2472
2473
0
    ctx->store = store;
2474
0
    ctx->cert = x509;
2475
0
    ctx->untrusted = chain;
2476
0
    ctx->crls = NULL;
2477
0
    ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
2478
0
    ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2479
0
    ctx->valid = 0;
2480
0
    ctx->chain = NULL;
2481
0
    ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
2482
0
    ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2483
0
    ctx->error_depth = 0;
2484
0
    ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2485
0
    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2486
0
    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2487
0
    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2488
0
    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2489
0
    ctx->tree = NULL;
2490
0
    ctx->parent = NULL;
2491
0
    ctx->dane = NULL;
2492
0
    ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
2493
0
    ctx->rpk = NULL;
2494
    /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2495
0
    memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2496
2497
    /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2498
0
    if (store != NULL)
2499
0
        ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2500
0
    else
2501
0
        ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2502
2503
0
    if (store != NULL && store->check_issued != NULL)
2504
0
        ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2505
0
    else
2506
0
        ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2507
2508
0
    if (store != NULL && store->get_issuer != NULL)
2509
0
        ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2510
0
    else
2511
0
        ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2512
2513
0
    if (store != NULL && store->verify_cb != NULL)
2514
0
        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2515
0
    else
2516
0
        ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2517
2518
0
    if (store != NULL && store->verify != NULL)
2519
0
        ctx->verify = store->verify;
2520
0
    else
2521
0
        ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2522
2523
0
    if (store != NULL && store->check_revocation != NULL)
2524
0
        ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2525
0
    else
2526
0
        ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2527
2528
0
    if (store != NULL && store->get_crl != NULL)
2529
0
        ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2530
0
    else
2531
0
        ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2532
2533
0
    if (store != NULL && store->check_crl != NULL)
2534
0
        ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2535
0
    else
2536
0
        ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2537
2538
0
    if (store != NULL && store->cert_crl != NULL)
2539
0
        ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2540
0
    else
2541
0
        ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2542
2543
0
    if (store != NULL && store->check_policy != NULL)
2544
0
        ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
2545
0
    else
2546
0
        ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2547
2548
0
    if (store != NULL && store->lookup_certs != NULL)
2549
0
        ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2550
0
    else
2551
0
        ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
2552
2553
0
    if (store != NULL && store->lookup_crls != NULL)
2554
0
        ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2555
0
    else
2556
0
        ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
2557
2558
0
    ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2559
0
    if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2560
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2561
0
        goto err;
2562
0
    }
2563
2564
    /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */
2565
0
    if (store == NULL)
2566
0
        ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2567
0
    else if (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) == 0)
2568
0
        goto err;
2569
2570
0
    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, "default"))
2571
0
        goto err;
2572
2573
    /*
2574
     * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2575
     * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2576
     */
2577
0
    if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2578
0
        int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2579
0
        X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2580
2581
0
        if (xp != NULL)
2582
0
            ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2583
0
    }
2584
2585
0
    if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2586
0
                           &ctx->ex_data))
2587
0
        return 1;
2588
0
    ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2589
2590
0
 err:
2591
    /*
2592
     * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2593
     * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2594
     */
2595
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2596
0
    return 0;
2597
0
}
2598
2599
/*
2600
 * Set alternative get_issuer method: just from a STACK of trusted certificates.
2601
 * This avoids the complexity of X509_STORE where it is not needed.
2602
 */
2603
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2604
0
{
2605
0
    ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2606
0
    ctx->get_issuer = get1_best_issuer_other_sk;
2607
0
    ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2608
0
}
2609
2610
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2611
0
{
2612
    /*
2613
     * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2614
     * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2615
     * calls cleanup() for the same object twice!  Thus we must zero the
2616
     * pointers below after they're freed!
2617
     */
2618
    /* Seems to always be NULL in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2619
0
    if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2620
0
        ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2621
0
        ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2622
0
    }
2623
0
    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2624
0
        if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2625
0
            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2626
0
        ctx->param = NULL;
2627
0
    }
2628
0
    X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2629
0
    ctx->tree = NULL;
2630
0
    OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(ctx->chain);
2631
0
    ctx->chain = NULL;
2632
0
    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2633
0
    memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2634
0
}
2635
2636
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2637
0
{
2638
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2639
0
}
2640
2641
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2642
0
{
2643
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2644
0
}
2645
2646
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2647
                             time_t t)
2648
0
{
2649
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2650
0
}
2651
2652
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_reasons(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2653
                                        unsigned int current_reasons)
2654
0
{
2655
0
   ctx->current_reasons = current_reasons;
2656
0
}
2657
2658
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2659
0
{
2660
0
    return ctx->cert;
2661
0
}
2662
2663
EVP_PKEY *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_rpk(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2664
0
{
2665
0
    return ctx->rpk;
2666
0
}
2667
2668
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2669
0
{
2670
0
    return ctx->untrusted;
2671
0
}
2672
2673
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2674
0
{
2675
0
    ctx->untrusted = sk;
2676
0
}
2677
2678
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2679
0
{
2680
0
    OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(ctx->chain);
2681
0
    ctx->chain = sk;
2682
0
}
2683
2684
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2685
                                  X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
2686
0
{
2687
0
    ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2688
0
}
2689
2690
X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2691
0
{
2692
0
    return ctx->verify_cb;
2693
0
}
2694
2695
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2696
                               X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
2697
0
{
2698
0
    ctx->verify = verify;
2699
0
}
2700
2701
X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2702
0
{
2703
0
    return ctx->verify;
2704
0
}
2705
2706
X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
2707
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2708
0
{
2709
0
    return ctx->get_issuer;
2710
0
}
2711
2712
X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
2713
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2714
0
{
2715
0
    return ctx->check_issued;
2716
0
}
2717
2718
X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
2719
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2720
0
{
2721
0
    return ctx->check_revocation;
2722
0
}
2723
2724
X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2725
0
{
2726
0
    return ctx->get_crl;
2727
0
}
2728
2729
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2730
                                X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn get_crl)
2731
0
{
2732
0
   ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
2733
0
}
2734
2735
X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
2736
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2737
0
{
2738
0
    return ctx->check_crl;
2739
0
}
2740
2741
X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
2742
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2743
0
{
2744
0
    return ctx->cert_crl;
2745
0
}
2746
2747
X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
2748
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2749
0
{
2750
0
    return ctx->check_policy;
2751
0
}
2752
2753
X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
2754
X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2755
0
{
2756
0
    return ctx->lookup_certs;
2757
0
}
2758
2759
X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
2760
X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2761
0
{
2762
0
    return ctx->lookup_crls;
2763
0
}
2764
2765
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2766
0
{
2767
0
    return ctx->cleanup;
2768
0
}
2769
2770
X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2771
0
{
2772
0
    return ctx->tree;
2773
0
}
2774
2775
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2776
0
{
2777
0
    return ctx->explicit_policy;
2778
0
}
2779
2780
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2781
0
{
2782
0
    return ctx->num_untrusted;
2783
0
}
2784
2785
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2786
0
{
2787
0
    const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2788
2789
0
    param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2790
0
    if (param == NULL) {
2791
0
        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID, "name=%s", name);
2792
0
        return 0;
2793
0
    }
2794
0
    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2795
0
}
2796
2797
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2798
0
{
2799
0
    return ctx->param;
2800
0
}
2801
2802
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2803
0
{
2804
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2805
0
    ctx->param = param;
2806
0
}
2807
2808
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
2809
0
{
2810
0
    ctx->dane = dane;
2811
0
}
2812
2813
static unsigned char *dane_i2d(X509 *cert, uint8_t selector,
2814
                               unsigned int *i2dlen)
2815
0
{
2816
0
    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2817
0
    int len;
2818
2819
    /*
2820
     * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2821
     */
2822
0
    switch (selector) {
2823
0
    case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2824
0
        len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2825
0
        break;
2826
0
    case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2827
0
        len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2828
0
        break;
2829
0
    default:
2830
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2831
0
        return NULL;
2832
0
    }
2833
2834
0
    if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2835
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2836
0
        return NULL;
2837
0
    }
2838
2839
0
    *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2840
0
    return buf;
2841
0
}
2842
2843
0
#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2844
2845
/* Returns -1 on internal error */
2846
static int dane_match_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2847
0
{
2848
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2849
0
    unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2850
0
    unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2851
0
    unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2852
0
    unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2853
0
    unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2854
0
    unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2855
0
    unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2856
0
    unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2857
0
    unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2858
0
    int i;
2859
0
    int recnum;
2860
0
    int matched = 0;
2861
0
    danetls_record *t = NULL;
2862
0
    uint32_t mask;
2863
2864
0
    mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2865
2866
    /* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */
2867
0
    if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2868
0
        mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2869
2870
    /*
2871
     * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2872
     * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2873
     * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2874
     */
2875
0
    if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2876
0
        mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2877
2878
    /*-
2879
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2880
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2881
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2882
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2883
     *
2884
     * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2885
     * and no expiration or hostname checks.  We also process digests with
2886
     * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2887
     * is always processed (last).  If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2888
     *
2889
     * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2890
     * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2891
     * priorities.  See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2892
     *
2893
     * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2894
     * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2895
     * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2896
     * usages, that's OK.  Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2897
     * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2898
     * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2899
     * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2900
     *
2901
     * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2902
     * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2903
     * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2904
     * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2905
     */
2906
0
    recnum = (dane->umask & mask) != 0 ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2907
0
    for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2908
0
        t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2909
0
        if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2910
0
            continue;
2911
0
        if (t->usage != usage) {
2912
0
            usage = t->usage;
2913
2914
            /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2915
0
            mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2916
0
            ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2917
0
        }
2918
0
        if (t->selector != selector) {
2919
0
            selector = t->selector;
2920
2921
            /* Update per-selector state */
2922
0
            OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2923
0
            i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2924
0
            if (i2dbuf == NULL)
2925
0
                return -1;
2926
2927
            /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2928
0
            mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2929
0
            ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2930
0
        } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2931
            /*-
2932
             * Digest agility:
2933
             *
2934
             *     <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2935
             *
2936
             * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2937
             * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2938
             * other than "Full".
2939
             */
2940
0
            if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2941
0
                continue;
2942
0
        }
2943
2944
        /*
2945
         * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2946
         * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2947
         */
2948
0
        if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2949
0
            const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2950
2951
0
            cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
2952
0
            cmplen = i2dlen;
2953
2954
0
            if (md != NULL) {
2955
0
                cmpbuf = mdbuf;
2956
0
                if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2957
0
                    matched = -1;
2958
0
                    break;
2959
0
                }
2960
0
            }
2961
0
        }
2962
2963
        /*
2964
         * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match.  Any
2965
         * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2966
         * full chain.
2967
         */
2968
0
        if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2969
0
            memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2970
0
            if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2971
0
                matched = 1;
2972
0
            if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2973
0
                dane->mdpth = depth;
2974
0
                dane->mtlsa = t;
2975
0
                OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2976
0
                dane->mcert = cert;
2977
0
                X509_up_ref(cert);
2978
0
            }
2979
0
            break;
2980
0
        }
2981
0
    }
2982
2983
    /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2984
0
    OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2985
0
    return matched;
2986
0
}
2987
2988
/* Returns -1 on internal error */
2989
static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2990
0
{
2991
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2992
0
    int matched = 0;
2993
0
    X509 *cert;
2994
2995
0
    if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2996
0
        return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2997
2998
    /*
2999
     * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
3000
     * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
3001
     * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
3002
     */
3003
0
    cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
3004
0
    if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match_cert(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
3005
0
        return matched;
3006
0
    if (matched > 0) {
3007
0
        ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
3008
0
        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
3009
0
    }
3010
3011
0
    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
3012
0
}
3013
3014
static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
3015
0
{
3016
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
3017
0
    danetls_record *t;
3018
0
    int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
3019
0
    X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
3020
0
    int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
3021
0
    int i;
3022
3023
0
    for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
3024
0
        t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
3025
0
        if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
3026
0
            t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
3027
0
            t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
3028
0
            X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
3029
0
            continue;
3030
3031
        /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
3032
0
        X509_free(dane->mcert);
3033
0
        dane->mcert = NULL;
3034
3035
        /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
3036
0
        ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
3037
0
        dane->mdpth = num - 1;
3038
0
        dane->mtlsa = t;
3039
3040
        /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
3041
0
        num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3042
0
        for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
3043
0
            X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
3044
3045
0
        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
3046
0
    }
3047
3048
0
    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
3049
0
}
3050
3051
/*
3052
 * Only DANE-EE and SPKI are supported
3053
 * Returns -1 on internal error
3054
 */
3055
static int dane_match_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *rpk)
3056
0
{
3057
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
3058
0
    danetls_record *t = NULL;
3059
0
    int mtype = DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL;
3060
0
    unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
3061
0
    unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
3062
0
    unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3063
0
    unsigned char *cmpbuf;
3064
0
    unsigned int cmplen = 0;
3065
0
    int len;
3066
0
    int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
3067
0
    int i;
3068
0
    int matched = 0;
3069
3070
    /* Calculate ASN.1 DER of RPK */
3071
0
    if ((len = i2d_PUBKEY(rpk, &i2dbuf)) <= 0)
3072
0
        return -1;
3073
0
    cmplen = i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
3074
0
    cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
3075
3076
0
    for (i = 0; i < recnum; i++) {
3077
0
        t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
3078
0
        if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE || t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI)
3079
0
            continue;
3080
3081
        /* Calculate hash - keep only one around */
3082
0
        if (t->mtype != mtype) {
3083
0
            const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
3084
3085
0
            cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
3086
0
            cmplen = i2dlen;
3087
3088
0
            if (md != NULL) {
3089
0
                cmpbuf = mdbuf;
3090
0
                if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
3091
0
                    matched = -1;
3092
0
                    break;
3093
0
                }
3094
0
            }
3095
0
        }
3096
0
        if (cmplen == t->dlen && memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
3097
0
            matched = 1;
3098
0
            dane->mdpth = 0;
3099
0
            dane->mtlsa = t;
3100
0
            break;
3101
0
        }
3102
0
    }
3103
0
    OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
3104
0
    return matched;
3105
0
}
3106
3107
static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
3108
0
{
3109
    /* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */
3110
0
    X509_free(dane->mcert);
3111
0
    dane->mcert = NULL;
3112
0
    dane->mtlsa = NULL;
3113
0
    dane->mdpth = -1;
3114
0
    dane->pdpth = -1;
3115
0
}
3116
3117
/* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */
3118
static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3119
0
{
3120
0
    int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
3121
3122
0
    CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, cert, 0, err);
3123
0
    return 1;
3124
0
}
3125
3126
/* Returns -1 on internal error */
3127
static int dane_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
3128
0
{
3129
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
3130
0
    int matched;
3131
3132
0
    dane_reset(dane);
3133
3134
    /*
3135
     * Look for a DANE record for RPK
3136
     * If error, return -1
3137
     * If found, call ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)
3138
     * If not found call ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)
3139
     */
3140
0
    matched = dane_match_rpk(ctx, ctx->rpk);
3141
0
    ctx->error_depth = 0;
3142
3143
0
    if (matched < 0) {
3144
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3145
0
        return -1;
3146
0
    }
3147
3148
0
    if (matched > 0)
3149
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
3150
0
    else
3151
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH;
3152
3153
0
    return verify_rpk(ctx);
3154
0
}
3155
3156
/* Returns -1 on internal error */
3157
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
3158
0
{
3159
0
    X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
3160
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
3161
0
    int matched;
3162
0
    int done;
3163
3164
0
    dane_reset(dane);
3165
3166
    /*-
3167
     * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
3168
     * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done.  If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
3169
     * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
3170
     * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust anchor.
3171
     * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
3172
     * if:
3173
     *   + matched < 0, internal error.
3174
     *   + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
3175
     *   + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
3176
     *     DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
3177
     */
3178
0
    matched = dane_match_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
3179
0
    done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
3180
3181
0
    if (done && !X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain))
3182
0
        return -1;
3183
3184
0
    if (matched > 0) {
3185
        /* Callback invoked as needed */
3186
0
        if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
3187
0
            return 0;
3188
        /* Callback invoked as needed */
3189
0
        if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
3190
0
            !check_id(ctx))
3191
0
            return 0;
3192
        /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
3193
0
        ctx->error_depth = 0;
3194
0
        ctx->current_cert = cert;
3195
0
        return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
3196
0
    }
3197
3198
0
    if (matched < 0) {
3199
0
        ctx->error_depth = 0;
3200
0
        ctx->current_cert = cert;
3201
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3202
0
        return -1;
3203
0
    }
3204
3205
0
    if (done) {
3206
        /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
3207
0
        if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
3208
0
            return 0;
3209
0
        return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3210
0
    }
3211
3212
    /*
3213
     * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2.  TLSA record matching of depth > 0
3214
     * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
3215
     */
3216
0
    return verify_chain(ctx);
3217
0
}
3218
3219
/*
3220
 * Get trusted issuer, without duplicate suppression
3221
 * Returns -1 on internal error.
3222
 */
3223
static int get1_trusted_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3224
0
{
3225
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
3226
0
    int ok;
3227
3228
0
    ctx->chain = NULL;
3229
0
    ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
3230
0
    ctx->chain = saved_chain;
3231
3232
0
    return ok;
3233
0
}
3234
3235
/*-
3236
 * Returns -1 on internal error.
3237
 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
3238
 */
3239
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
3240
0
{
3241
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
3242
0
    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3243
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *sk_untrusted = NULL;
3244
0
    unsigned int search;
3245
0
    int may_trusted = 0;
3246
0
    int may_alternate = 0;
3247
0
    int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
3248
0
    int alt_untrusted = 0;
3249
0
    int max_depth;
3250
0
    int ok = 0;
3251
0
    int i;
3252
3253
    /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
3254
0
    if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num))
3255
0
        goto int_err;
3256
3257
0
#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
3258
0
#define S_DOTRUSTED   (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
3259
0
#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
3260
    /*
3261
     * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled,
3262
     * which is the default.
3263
     * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
3264
     * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first.  If not trusted-first,
3265
     * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
3266
     * if no luck with untrusted first.
3267
     */
3268
0
    search = ctx->untrusted != NULL ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
3269
0
    if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
3270
0
        if (search == 0 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) != 0)
3271
0
            search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3272
0
        else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
3273
0
            may_alternate = 1;
3274
0
        may_trusted = 1;
3275
0
    }
3276
3277
    /* Initialize empty untrusted stack. */
3278
0
    if ((sk_untrusted = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3279
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3280
0
        goto memerr;
3281
0
    }
3282
3283
    /*
3284
     * If we got any "Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, *prepend* them
3285
     * to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack.
3286
     */
3287
0
    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL
3288
0
        && !X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted, dane->certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT)) {
3289
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
3290
0
        goto memerr;
3291
0
    }
3292
3293
    /*
3294
     * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
3295
     * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so we can make
3296
     * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
3297
     */
3298
0
    if (!X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted, ctx->untrusted, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT)) {
3299
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
3300
0
        goto memerr;
3301
0
    }
3302
3303
    /*
3304
     * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
3305
     * might be reasonable.
3306
     */
3307
0
    if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX / 2)
3308
0
        ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX / 2;
3309
3310
    /*
3311
     * Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
3312
     * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
3313
     * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
3314
     */
3315
0
    max_depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
3316
3317
0
    while (search != 0) {
3318
0
        X509 *curr, *issuer = NULL;
3319
3320
0
        num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3321
0
        ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
3322
        /*
3323
         * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
3324
         * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled.  When we
3325
         * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
3326
         * we've not found a trust anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
3327
         *
3328
         * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
3329
         * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
3330
         * not ultimately-trusted issuer.  For example, with verify_depth = 0,
3331
         * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
3332
         * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor.  No attempt will be
3333
         * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
3334
         * would be a-priori too long.
3335
         */
3336
0
        if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
3337
0
            i = num;
3338
0
            if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
3339
                /*
3340
                 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
3341
                 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
3342
                 * has an untrusted issuer.  We use the alt_untrusted variable
3343
                 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match.  It
3344
                 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
3345
                 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
3346
                 * untrusted certificates.  While we're searching for such a
3347
                 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
3348
                 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3349
                 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3350
                 *
3351
                 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3352
                 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3353
                 */
3354
0
                i = alt_untrusted;
3355
0
            }
3356
0
            curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
3357
3358
            /* Note: get1_trusted_issuer() must be used even if self-signed. */
3359
0
            ok = num > max_depth ? 0 : get1_trusted_issuer(&issuer, ctx, curr);
3360
3361
0
            if (ok < 0) {
3362
0
                trust = -1;
3363
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
3364
0
                break;
3365
0
            }
3366
3367
0
            if (ok > 0) {
3368
0
                int self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0);
3369
3370
0
                if (self_signed < 0) {
3371
0
                    X509_free(issuer);
3372
0
                    goto int_err;
3373
0
                }
3374
                /*
3375
                 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3376
                 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry.  We might now
3377
                 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store.  Note
3378
                 * that despite the current trust store match we might still
3379
                 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust anchor, in which
3380
                 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3381
                 * again.  Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3382
                 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3383
                 *
3384
                 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3385
                 * anchor, reset DANE trust.  We might find a suitable trusted
3386
                 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3387
                 */
3388
0
                if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
3389
0
                    if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && !self_signed)) {
3390
0
                        X509_free(issuer);
3391
0
                        goto int_err;
3392
0
                    }
3393
0
                    search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
3394
0
                    for (; num > i; --num)
3395
0
                        X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
3396
0
                    ctx->num_untrusted = num;
3397
3398
0
                    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3399
0
                        dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
3400
0
                        dane->mdpth = -1;
3401
0
                        X509_free(dane->mcert);
3402
0
                        dane->mcert = NULL;
3403
0
                    }
3404
0
                    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3405
0
                        dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
3406
0
                        dane->pdpth = -1;
3407
0
                }
3408
3409
0
                if (!self_signed) { /* untrusted not self-signed certificate */
3410
                    /* Grow the chain by trusted issuer */
3411
0
                    if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, issuer)) {
3412
0
                        X509_free(issuer);
3413
0
                        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3414
0
                        goto memerr;
3415
0
                    }
3416
0
                    if ((self_signed = X509_self_signed(issuer, 0)) < 0)
3417
0
                        goto int_err;
3418
0
                } else {
3419
                    /*
3420
                     * We have a self-signed untrusted cert that has the same
3421
                     * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3422
                     * a trust anchor.  We must have an exact match to avoid
3423
                     * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3424
                     */
3425
0
                    if (X509_cmp(curr, issuer) != 0) {
3426
                        /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3427
0
                        X509_free(issuer);
3428
0
                        ok = 0;
3429
0
                    } else { /* curr "==" issuer */
3430
                        /*
3431
                         * Replace self-signed untrusted certificate
3432
                         * by its trusted matching issuer.
3433
                         */
3434
0
                        X509_free(curr);
3435
0
                        ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
3436
0
                        (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, issuer);
3437
0
                    }
3438
0
                }
3439
3440
                /*
3441
                 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, re-check
3442
                 * trust.  If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3443
                 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3444
                 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3445
                 *
3446
                 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3447
                 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3448
                 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3449
                 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store.  In particular, the
3450
                 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3451
                 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3452
                 */
3453
0
                if (ok) {
3454
0
                    if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num))
3455
0
                        goto int_err;
3456
0
                    search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3457
0
                    trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3458
0
                    if (trust != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED)
3459
0
                        break;
3460
0
                    if (!self_signed)
3461
0
                        continue;
3462
0
                }
3463
0
            }
3464
3465
            /*
3466
             * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3467
             * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3468
             * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3469
             * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3470
             */
3471
0
            if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
3472
                /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3473
0
                if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
3474
0
                    continue;
3475
                /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3476
0
                if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
3477
0
                    ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
3478
0
                    break;
3479
                /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3480
0
                search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
3481
0
                alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
3482
0
            }
3483
0
        }
3484
3485
        /*
3486
         * Try to extend chain with peer-provided untrusted certificate
3487
         */
3488
0
        if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
3489
0
            num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3490
0
            if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted))
3491
0
                goto int_err;
3492
0
            curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
3493
0
            issuer = (X509_self_signed(curr, 0) > 0 || num > max_depth) ?
3494
0
                NULL : get0_best_issuer_sk(ctx, 0, 1, sk_untrusted, curr);
3495
0
            if (issuer == NULL) {
3496
                /*
3497
                 * Once we have reached a self-signed cert or num > max_depth
3498
                 * or can't find an issuer in the untrusted list we stop looking
3499
                 * there and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3500
                 */
3501
0
                search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3502
0
                if (may_trusted)
3503
0
                    search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3504
0
                continue;
3505
0
            }
3506
3507
            /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3508
0
            (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sk_untrusted, issuer);
3509
3510
            /* Grow the chain by untrusted issuer */
3511
0
            if (!X509_add_cert(ctx->chain, issuer, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF))
3512
0
                goto int_err;
3513
3514
0
            ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3515
3516
            /* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */
3517
0
            trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1);
3518
0
            if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED || trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
3519
0
                break;
3520
0
        }
3521
0
    }
3522
0
    sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted);
3523
3524
0
    if (trust < 0) /* internal error */
3525
0
        return trust;
3526
3527
    /*
3528
     * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3529
     * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3530
     */
3531
0
    num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3532
0
    if (num <= max_depth) {
3533
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3534
0
            trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
3535
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3536
0
            trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3537
0
    }
3538
3539
0
    switch (trust) {
3540
0
    case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3541
0
        return 1;
3542
0
    case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3543
        /* Callback already issued */
3544
0
        return 0;
3545
0
    case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3546
0
    default:
3547
0
        switch (ctx->error) {
3548
0
        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
3549
0
        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
3550
0
        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
3551
0
        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
3552
0
            return 0; /* Callback already done by ossl_x509_check_cert_time() */
3553
0
        default: /* A preliminary error has become final */
3554
0
            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, ctx->error);
3555
0
        case X509_V_OK:
3556
0
            break;
3557
0
        }
3558
0
        CB_FAIL_IF(num > max_depth,
3559
0
                   ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3560
0
        CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)
3561
0
                       && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0),
3562
0
                   ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3563
0
        if (X509_self_signed(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1), 0) > 0)
3564
0
            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1,
3565
0
                                  num == 1
3566
0
                                  ? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
3567
0
                                  : X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3568
0
        return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1,
3569
0
                              ctx->num_untrusted < num
3570
0
                              ? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
3571
0
                              : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
3572
0
    }
3573
3574
0
 int_err:
3575
0
    ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3576
0
    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3577
0
    sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted);
3578
0
    return -1;
3579
3580
0
 memerr:
3581
0
    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3582
0
    sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted);
3583
0
    return -1;
3584
0
}
3585
3586
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_build_chain(X509 *target, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
3587
                                 X509_STORE *store, int with_self_signed,
3588
                                 OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
3589
0
{
3590
0
    int finish_chain = store != NULL;
3591
0
    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
3592
0
    int flags = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF;
3593
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *result = NULL;
3594
3595
0
    if (target == NULL) {
3596
0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
3597
0
        return NULL;
3598
0
    }
3599
3600
0
    if ((ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(libctx, propq)) == NULL)
3601
0
        return NULL;
3602
0
    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, target, finish_chain ? certs : NULL))
3603
0
        goto err;
3604
0
    if (!finish_chain)
3605
0
        X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, certs);
3606
0
    if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, target, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
3607
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3608
0
        goto err;
3609
0
    }
3610
0
    ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
3611
3612
0
    if (!build_chain(ctx) && finish_chain)
3613
0
        goto err;
3614
3615
    /* result list to store the up_ref'ed certificates */
3616
0
    if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) > 1 && !with_self_signed)
3617
0
        flags |= X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS;
3618
0
    if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&result, ctx->chain, flags)) {
3619
0
        sk_X509_free(result);
3620
0
        result = NULL;
3621
0
    }
3622
3623
0
 err:
3624
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
3625
0
    return result;
3626
0
}
3627
3628
/*
3629
 * note that there's a corresponding minbits_table in ssl/ssl_cert.c
3630
 * in ssl_get_security_level_bits that's used for selection of DH parameters
3631
 */
3632
static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3633
static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3634
3635
/*-
3636
 * Check whether the given public key meets the security level of `ctx`.
3637
 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3638
 */
3639
static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3640
0
{
3641
0
    int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3642
3643
    /*
3644
     * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
3645
     * key type.  Some engines support key types not understood outside the
3646
     * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
3647
     * floor.
3648
     */
3649
0
    if (level <= 0)
3650
0
        return 1;
3651
3652
    /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3653
0
    if (pkey == NULL)
3654
0
        return 0;
3655
3656
0
    if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3657
0
        level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3658
3659
0
    return EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3660
0
}
3661
3662
/*-
3663
 * Check whether the public key of `cert` meets the security level of `ctx`.
3664
 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3665
 */
3666
static int check_cert_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3667
0
{
3668
0
    return check_key_level(ctx, X509_get0_pubkey(cert));
3669
0
}
3670
3671
/*-
3672
 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
3673
 * for an elliptic curve.
3674
 *
3675
 * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors.
3676
 */
3677
static int check_curve(X509 *cert)
3678
0
{
3679
0
    EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3680
0
    int ret, val;
3681
3682
    /* Unsupported or malformed key */
3683
0
    if (pkey == NULL)
3684
0
        return -1;
3685
0
    if (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
3686
0
        return 1;
3687
3688
0
    ret =
3689
0
        EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(pkey,
3690
0
                               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_DECODED_FROM_EXPLICIT_PARAMS,
3691
0
                               &val);
3692
0
    return ret == 1 ? !val : -1;
3693
0
}
3694
3695
/*-
3696
 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3697
 * level of ``ctx``.  Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3698
 * self-signed or otherwise).
3699
 *
3700
 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3701
 */
3702
static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3703
0
{
3704
0
    int secbits = -1;
3705
0
    int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3706
3707
0
    if (level <= 0)
3708
0
        return 1;
3709
0
    if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3710
0
        level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3711
3712
0
    if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
3713
0
        return 0;
3714
3715
0
    return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3716
0
}