/*

 * Copyright 2018-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

 * Copyright (c) 2018-2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates.  All rights reserved.

 *

 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use

 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at

 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html

 */

#include <openssl/err.h>

#include <openssl/bn.h>

#include "crypto/bn.h"

#include "rsa_local.h"

/*

 * Part of the RSA keypair test.

 * Check the Chinese Remainder Theorem components are valid.

 *

 * See SP800-5bBr1

 *   6.4.1.2.3: rsakpv1-crt Step 7

 *   6.4.1.3.3: rsakpv2-crt Step 7

 */

int ossl_rsa_check_crt_components(const RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    int ret = 0;

    BIGNUM *r = NULL, *p1 = NULL, *q1 = NULL;

    /* check if only some of the crt components are set */

    if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL || rsa->dmq1 == NULL || rsa->iqmp == NULL) {

        if (rsa->dmp1 != NULL || rsa->dmq1 != NULL || rsa->iqmp != NULL)

            return 0;

        return 1; /* return ok if all components are NULL */

    }

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    if (q1 != NULL) {

        BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        BN_set_flags(p1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        BN_set_flags(q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        ret = 1;

    } else {

        ret = 0;

    }

    ret = ret

          /* p1 = p -1 */

          && (BN_copy(p1, rsa->p) != NULL)

          && BN_sub_word(p1, 1)

          /* q1 = q - 1 */

          && (BN_copy(q1, rsa->q) != NULL)

          && BN_sub_word(q1, 1)

          /* (a) 1 < dP < (p – 1). */

          && (BN_cmp(rsa->dmp1, BN_value_one()) > 0)

          && (BN_cmp(rsa->dmp1, p1) < 0)

          /* (b) 1 < dQ < (q - 1). */

          && (BN_cmp(rsa->dmq1, BN_value_one()) > 0)

          && (BN_cmp(rsa->dmq1, q1) < 0)

          /* (c) 1 < qInv < p */

          && (BN_cmp(rsa->iqmp, BN_value_one()) > 0)

          && (BN_cmp(rsa->iqmp, rsa->p) < 0)

          /* (d) 1 = (dP . e) mod (p - 1)*/

          && BN_mod_mul(r, rsa->dmp1, rsa->e, p1, ctx)

          && BN_is_one(r)

          /* (e) 1 = (dQ . e) mod (q - 1) */

          && BN_mod_mul(r, rsa->dmq1, rsa->e, q1, ctx)

          && BN_is_one(r)

          /* (f) 1 = (qInv . q) mod p */

          && BN_mod_mul(r, rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx)

          && BN_is_one(r);

    BN_clear(r);

    BN_clear(p1);

    BN_clear(q1);

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);

    return ret;

}

/*

 * Part of the RSA keypair test.

 * Check that (√2)(2^(nbits/2 - 1) <= p <= 2^(nbits/2) - 1

 *

 * See SP800-5bBr1 6.4.1.2.1 Part 5 (c) & (g) - used for both p and q.

 *

 * (√2)(2^(nbits/2 - 1) = (√2/2)(2^(nbits/2))

 */

int ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor_range(const BIGNUM *p, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    int ret = 0;

    BIGNUM *low;

    int shift;

    nbits >>= 1;

    shift = nbits - BN_num_bits(&ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2);

    /* Upper bound check */

    if (BN_num_bits(p) != nbits)

        return 0;

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    low = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    if (low == NULL)

        goto err;

    /* set low = (√2)(2^(nbits/2 - 1) */

    if (!BN_copy(low, &ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2))

        goto err;

    if (shift >= 0) {

        /*

         * We don't have all the bits. ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2 contains a rounded up

         * value, so there is a very low probability that we'll reject a valid

         * value.

         */

        if (!BN_lshift(low, low, shift))

            goto err;

    } else if (!BN_rshift(low, low, -shift)) {

        goto err;

    }

    if (BN_cmp(p, low) <= 0)

        goto err;

    ret = 1;

err:

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);

    return ret;

}

/*

 * Part of the RSA keypair test.

 * Check the prime factor (for either p or q)

 * i.e: p is prime AND GCD(p - 1, e) = 1

 *

 * See SP800-56Br1 6.4.1.2.3 Step 5 (a to d) & (e to h).

 */

int ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *e, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    int ret = 0;

    BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *gcd = NULL;

    /* (Steps 5 a-b) prime test */

    if (BN_check_prime(p, ctx, NULL) != 1

            /* (Step 5c) (√2)(2^(nbits/2 - 1) <= p <= 2^(nbits/2 - 1) */

            || ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor_range(p, nbits, ctx) != 1)

        return 0;

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    if (gcd != NULL) {

        BN_set_flags(p1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        BN_set_flags(gcd, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        ret = 1;

    } else {

        ret = 0;

    }

    ret = ret

          /* (Step 5d) GCD(p-1, e) = 1 */

          && (BN_copy(p1, p) != NULL)

          && BN_sub_word(p1, 1)

          && BN_gcd(gcd, p1, e, ctx)

          && BN_is_one(gcd);

    BN_clear(p1);

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);

    return ret;

}

/*

 * See SP800-56Br1 6.4.1.2.3 Part 6(a-b) Check the private exponent d

 * satisfies:

 *     (Step 6a) 2^(nBit/2) < d < LCM(p–1, q–1).

 *     (Step 6b) 1 = (d*e) mod LCM(p–1, q–1)

 */

int ossl_rsa_check_private_exponent(const RSA *rsa, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    int ret;

    BIGNUM *r, *p1, *q1, *lcm, *p1q1, *gcd;

    /* (Step 6a) 2^(nbits/2) < d */

    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->d) <= (nbits >> 1))

        return 0;

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    lcm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    p1q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    if (gcd != NULL) {

        BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        BN_set_flags(p1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        BN_set_flags(q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        BN_set_flags(lcm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        BN_set_flags(p1q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        BN_set_flags(gcd, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        ret = 1;

    } else {

        ret = 0;

    }

    ret = (ret

          /* LCM(p - 1, q - 1) */

          && (ossl_rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1,

                               p1q1) == 1)

          /* (Step 6a) d < LCM(p - 1, q - 1) */

          && (BN_cmp(rsa->d, lcm) < 0)

          /* (Step 6b) 1 = (e . d) mod LCM(p - 1, q - 1) */

          && BN_mod_mul(r, rsa->e, rsa->d, lcm, ctx)

          && BN_is_one(r));

    BN_clear(r);

    BN_clear(p1);

    BN_clear(q1);

    BN_clear(lcm);

    BN_clear(gcd);

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);

    return ret;

}

/*

 * Check exponent is odd.

 * For FIPS also check the bit length is in the range [17..256]

 */

int ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(const BIGNUM *e)

{

#ifdef FIPS_MODULE

    int bitlen;

    bitlen = BN_num_bits(e);

    return (BN_is_odd(e) && bitlen > 16 && bitlen < 257);

#else

    /* Allow small exponents larger than 1 for legacy purposes */

    return BN_is_odd(e) && BN_cmp(e, BN_value_one()) > 0;

#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */

}

/*

 * SP800-56Br1 6.4.1.2.1 (Step 5i): |p - q| > 2^(nbits/2 - 100)

 * i.e- numbits(p-q-1) > (nbits/2 -100)

 */

int ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(BIGNUM *diff, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,

                           int nbits)

{

    int bitlen = (nbits >> 1) - 100;

    if (!BN_sub(diff, p, q))

        return -1;

    BN_set_negative(diff, 0);

    if (BN_is_zero(diff))

        return 0;

    if (!BN_sub_word(diff, 1))

        return -1;

    return (BN_num_bits(diff) > bitlen);

}

/*

 * return LCM(p-1, q-1)

 *

 * Caller should ensure that lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1 are flagged with

 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.

 */

int ossl_rsa_get_lcm(BN_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,

                     BIGNUM *lcm, BIGNUM *gcd, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *q1,

                     BIGNUM *p1q1)

{

    return BN_sub(p1, p, BN_value_one())    /* p-1 */

           && BN_sub(q1, q, BN_value_one()) /* q-1 */

           && BN_mul(p1q1, p1, q1, ctx)     /* (p-1)(q-1) */

           && BN_gcd(gcd, p1, q1, ctx)

           && BN_div(lcm, NULL, p1q1, gcd, ctx); /* LCM((p-1, q-1)) */

}

/*

 * SP800-56Br1 6.4.2.2 Partial Public Key Validation for RSA refers to

 * SP800-89 5.3.3 (Explicit) Partial Public Key Validation for RSA

 * caveat is that the modulus must be as specified in SP800-56Br1

 */

int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)

{

    int ret = 0, status;

    int nbits;

    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

    BIGNUM *gcd = NULL;

    if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL)

        return 0;

    nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);

    if (nbits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);

        return 0;

    }

#ifdef FIPS_MODULE

    /*

     * (Step a): modulus must be 2048 or 3072 (caveat from SP800-56Br1)

     * NOTE: changed to allow keys >= 2048

     */

    if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, -1)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);

        return 0;

    }

#endif

    if (!BN_is_odd(rsa->n)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);

        return 0;

    }

    /* (Steps b-c): 2^16 < e < 2^256, n and e must be odd */

    if (!ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);

        return 0;

    }

    ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);

    gcd = BN_new();

    if (ctx == NULL || gcd == NULL)

        goto err;

    /* (Steps d-f):

     * The modulus is composite, but not a power of a prime.

     * The modulus has no factors smaller than 752.

     */

    if (!BN_gcd(gcd, rsa->n, ossl_bn_get0_small_factors(), ctx)

        || !BN_is_one(gcd)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);

        goto err;

    }

    /* Highest number of MR rounds from FIPS 186-5 Section B.3 Table B.1 */

    ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 5, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);

#ifdef FIPS_MODULE

    if (ret != 1 || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME) {

#else

    if (ret != 1 || (status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME

                     && (nbits >= RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS

                         || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_WITH_FACTOR))) {

#endif

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);

        ret = 0;

        goto err;

    }

    ret = 1;

err:

    BN_free(gcd);

    BN_CTX_free(ctx);

    return ret;

}

/*

 * Perform validation of the RSA private key to check that 0 < D < N.

 */

int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_private(const RSA *rsa)

{

    if (rsa->d == NULL || rsa->n == NULL)

        return 0;

    return BN_cmp(rsa->d, BN_value_one()) >= 0 && BN_cmp(rsa->d, rsa->n) < 0;

}

/*

 * RSA key pair validation.

 *

 * SP800-56Br1.

 *    6.4.1.2 "RSAKPV1 Family: RSA Key - Pair Validation with a Fixed Exponent"

 *    6.4.1.3 "RSAKPV2 Family: RSA Key - Pair Validation with a Random Exponent"

 *

 * It uses:

 *     6.4.1.2.3 "rsakpv1 - crt"

 *     6.4.1.3.3 "rsakpv2 - crt"

 */

int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed,

                                     int strength, int nbits)

{

    int ret = 0;

    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

    BIGNUM *r = NULL;

    if (rsa->p == NULL

            || rsa->q == NULL

            || rsa->e == NULL

            || rsa->d == NULL

            || rsa->n == NULL) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST);

        return 0;

    }

    /* (Step 1): Check Ranges */

    if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, strength))

        return 0;

    /* If the exponent is known */

    if (efixed != NULL) {

        /* (2): Check fixed exponent matches public exponent. */

        if (BN_cmp(efixed, rsa->e) != 0) {

            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST);

            return 0;

        }

    }

    /* (Step 1.c): e is odd integer 65537 <= e < 2^256 */

    if (!ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) {

        /* exponent out of range */

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);

        return 0;

    }

    /* (Step 3.b): check the modulus */

    if (nbits != BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);

        return 0;

    }

    /* (Step 3.c): check that the modulus length is a positive even integer */

    if (nbits <= 0 || (nbits & 0x1)) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);

        return 0;

    }

    ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);

    if (ctx == NULL)

        return 0;

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    if (r == NULL || !BN_mul(r, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))

        goto err;

    /* (Step 4.c): Check n = pq */

    if (BN_cmp(rsa->n, r) != 0) {

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST);

        goto err;

    }

    /* (Step 5): check prime factors p & q */

    ret = ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->p, rsa->e, nbits, ctx)

          && ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->q, rsa->e, nbits, ctx)

          && (ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(r, rsa->p, rsa->q, nbits) > 0)

          /* (Step 6): Check the private exponent d */

          && ossl_rsa_check_private_exponent(rsa, nbits, ctx)

          /* 6.4.1.2.3 (Step 7): Check the CRT components */

          && ossl_rsa_check_crt_components(rsa, ctx);

    if (ret != 1)

        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);

err:

    BN_clear(r);

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);

    BN_CTX_free(ctx);

    return ret;

}