Coverage Report

Created: 2025-06-13 06:36

/src/openssl/providers/implementations/kem/ml_kem_kem.c
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Source (jump to first uncovered line)
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/*
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 * Copyright 2024-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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 *
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 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
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 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
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 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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 */
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/params.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/proverr.h>
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#include "crypto/ml_kem.h"
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#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
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#include "prov/implementations.h"
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#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
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#include "prov/providercommon.h"
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static OSSL_FUNC_kem_newctx_fn ml_kem_newctx;
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static OSSL_FUNC_kem_freectx_fn ml_kem_freectx;
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static OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate_init_fn ml_kem_encapsulate_init;
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static OSSL_FUNC_kem_encapsulate_fn ml_kem_encapsulate;
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static OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate_init_fn ml_kem_decapsulate_init;
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static OSSL_FUNC_kem_decapsulate_fn ml_kem_decapsulate;
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static OSSL_FUNC_kem_set_ctx_params_fn ml_kem_set_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_FUNC_kem_settable_ctx_params_fn ml_kem_settable_ctx_params;
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typedef struct {
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    ML_KEM_KEY *key;
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    uint8_t entropy_buf[ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES];
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    uint8_t *entropy;
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    int op;
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} PROV_ML_KEM_CTX;
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static void *ml_kem_newctx(void *provctx)
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0
{
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0
    PROV_ML_KEM_CTX *ctx;
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0
    if ((ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
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0
        return NULL;
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0
    ctx->key = NULL;
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0
    ctx->entropy = NULL;
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0
    ctx->op = 0;
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0
    return ctx;
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0
}
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static void ml_kem_freectx(void *vctx)
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0
{
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0
    PROV_ML_KEM_CTX *ctx = vctx;
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0
    if (ctx->entropy != NULL)
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0
        OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->entropy, ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES);
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0
    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
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0
}
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static int ml_kem_init(void *vctx, int op, void *key,
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                       const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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0
{
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0
    PROV_ML_KEM_CTX *ctx = vctx;
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0
    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
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0
        return 0;
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0
    ctx->key = key;
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0
    ctx->op = op;
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0
    return ml_kem_set_ctx_params(vctx, params);
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0
}
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static int ml_kem_encapsulate_init(void *vctx, void *vkey,
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                                   const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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0
{
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0
    ML_KEM_KEY *key = vkey;
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0
    if (!ossl_ml_kem_have_pubkey(key)) {
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0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
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0
        return 0;
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0
    }
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0
    return ml_kem_init(vctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE, key, params);
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0
}
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static int ml_kem_decapsulate_init(void *vctx, void *vkey,
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                                   const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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0
{
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0
    ML_KEM_KEY *key = vkey;
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0
    if (!ossl_ml_kem_have_prvkey(key)) {
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0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
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0
        return 0;
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0
    }
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0
    return ml_kem_init(vctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE, key, params);
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0
}
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static int ml_kem_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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0
{
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0
    PROV_ML_KEM_CTX *ctx = vctx;
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0
    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
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0
    if (ctx == NULL)
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0
        return 0;
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0
    if (ctx->op == EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE && ctx->entropy != NULL) {
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        /* Decapsulation is deterministic */
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0
        OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->entropy, ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES);
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0
        ctx->entropy = NULL;
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0
    }
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0
    if (ossl_param_is_empty(params))
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0
        return 1;
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    /* Encapsulation ephemeral input key material "ikmE" */
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0
    if (ctx->op == EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE
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0
        && (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KEM_PARAM_IKME)) != NULL) {
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0
        size_t len = ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES;
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0
        ctx->entropy = ctx->entropy_buf;
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0
        if (OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->entropy,
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0
                                        len, &len)
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            && len == ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES)
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0
            return 1;
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        /* Possibly, but much less likely wrong type */
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0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH);
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0
        ctx->entropy = NULL;
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0
        return 0;
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0
    }
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    return 1;
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0
}
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static const OSSL_PARAM *ml_kem_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx,
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                                                    ossl_unused void *provctx)
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0
{
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0
    static const OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
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0
        OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KEM_PARAM_IKME, NULL, 0),
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0
        OSSL_PARAM_END
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0
    };
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0
    return params;
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0
}
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static int ml_kem_encapsulate(void *vctx, unsigned char *ctext, size_t *clen,
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                              unsigned char *shsec, size_t *slen)
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0
{
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0
    PROV_ML_KEM_CTX *ctx = vctx;
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0
    ML_KEM_KEY *key = ctx->key;
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0
    const ML_KEM_VINFO *v;
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0
    size_t encap_clen;
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0
    size_t encap_slen;
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0
    int ret = 0;
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0
    if (!ossl_ml_kem_have_pubkey(key)) {
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0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
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0
        goto end;
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0
    }
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0
    v = ossl_ml_kem_key_vinfo(key);
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0
    encap_clen = v->ctext_bytes;
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0
    encap_slen = ML_KEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES;
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0
    if (ctext == NULL) {
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0
        if (clen == NULL && slen == NULL)
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0
            return 0;
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0
        if (clen != NULL)
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0
            *clen = encap_clen;
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0
        if (slen != NULL)
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0
            *slen = encap_slen;
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0
        return 1;
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0
    }
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0
    if (shsec == NULL) {
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0
        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
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0
                       "NULL shared-secret buffer");
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0
        goto end;
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0
    }
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0
    if (clen == NULL) {
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0
        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NULL_LENGTH_POINTER,
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0
                       "null ciphertext input/output length pointer");
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0
        goto end;
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0
    } else if (*clen < encap_clen) {
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0
        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
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0
                       "ciphertext buffer too small");
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0
        goto end;
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0
    } else {
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0
        *clen = encap_clen;
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0
    }
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0
    if (slen == NULL) {
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0
        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NULL_LENGTH_POINTER,
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0
                       "null shared secret input/output length pointer");
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0
        goto end;
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0
    } else if (*slen < encap_slen) {
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0
        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
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0
                       "shared-secret buffer too small");
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0
        goto end;
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0
    } else {
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0
        *slen = encap_slen;
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0
    }
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0
    if (ctx->entropy != NULL)
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0
        ret = ossl_ml_kem_encap_seed(ctext, encap_clen, shsec, encap_slen,
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0
                                     ctx->entropy, ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES, key);
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0
    else
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0
        ret = ossl_ml_kem_encap_rand(ctext, encap_clen, shsec, encap_slen, key);
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0
 end:
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    /*
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     * One shot entropy, each encapsulate call must either provide a new
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     * "ikmE", or else will use a random value.  If a caller sets an explicit
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     * ikmE once for testing, and later performs multiple encapsulations
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     * without again calling encapsulate_init(), these should not share the
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     * original entropy.
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     */
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0
    if (ctx->entropy != NULL) {
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0
        OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->entropy, ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES);
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0
        ctx->entropy = NULL;
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0
    }
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0
    return ret;
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0
}
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static int ml_kem_decapsulate(void *vctx, uint8_t *shsec, size_t *slen,
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                              const uint8_t *ctext, size_t clen)
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0
{
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0
    PROV_ML_KEM_CTX *ctx = vctx;
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0
    ML_KEM_KEY *key = ctx->key;
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0
    size_t decap_slen = ML_KEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES;
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231
0
    if (!ossl_ml_kem_have_prvkey(key)) {
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0
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
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0
        return 0;
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0
    }
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236
0
    if (shsec == NULL) {
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0
        if (slen == NULL)
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0
            return 0;
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0
        *slen = ML_KEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES;
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0
        return 1;
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0
    }
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    /* For now tolerate newly-deprecated NULL length pointers. */
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0
    if (slen == NULL) {
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0
        slen = &decap_slen;
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0
    } else if (*slen < decap_slen) {
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0
        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
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0
                       "shared-secret buffer too small");
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0
        return 0;
250
0
    } else {
251
0
        *slen = decap_slen;
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0
    }
253
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    /* ML-KEM decap handles incorrect ciphertext lengths internally */
255
0
    return ossl_ml_kem_decap(shsec, decap_slen, ctext, clen, key);
256
0
}
257
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const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_ml_kem_asym_kem_functions[] = {
259
    { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_NEWCTX, (OSSL_FUNC) ml_kem_newctx },
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    { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_ENCAPSULATE_INIT, (OSSL_FUNC) ml_kem_encapsulate_init },
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    { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_ENCAPSULATE, (OSSL_FUNC) ml_kem_encapsulate },
262
    { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_DECAPSULATE_INIT, (OSSL_FUNC) ml_kem_decapsulate_init },
263
    { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_DECAPSULATE, (OSSL_FUNC) ml_kem_decapsulate },
264
    { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_FREECTX, (OSSL_FUNC) ml_kem_freectx },
265
    { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (OSSL_FUNC) ml_kem_set_ctx_params },
266
    { OSSL_FUNC_KEM_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, (OSSL_FUNC) ml_kem_settable_ctx_params },
267
    OSSL_DISPATCH_END
268
};