/src/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | /* |
11 | | * DH low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
12 | | * internal use. |
13 | | */ |
14 | | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
15 | | |
16 | | #include <stdio.h> |
17 | | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
18 | | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
19 | | #include "dh_local.h" |
20 | | #include "crypto/dh.h" |
21 | | |
22 | | /*- |
23 | | * Check that p and g are suitable enough |
24 | | * |
25 | | * p is odd |
26 | | * 1 < g < p - 1 |
27 | | */ |
28 | | int DH_check_params_ex(const DH *dh) |
29 | 0 | { |
30 | 0 | int errflags = 0; |
31 | |
|
32 | 0 | if (!DH_check_params(dh, &errflags)) |
33 | 0 | return 0; |
34 | | |
35 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) != 0) |
36 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME); |
37 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) != 0) |
38 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR); |
39 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL) != 0) |
40 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL); |
41 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE) != 0) |
42 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
43 | |
|
44 | 0 | return errflags == 0; |
45 | 0 | } |
46 | | |
47 | | #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
48 | | int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret) |
49 | | { |
50 | | int nid; |
51 | | |
52 | | *ret = 0; |
53 | | /* |
54 | | * SP800-56A R3 Section 5.5.2 Assurances of Domain Parameter Validity |
55 | | * (1a) The domain parameters correspond to any approved safe prime group. |
56 | | */ |
57 | | nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh); |
58 | | if (nid != NID_undef) |
59 | | return 1; |
60 | | /* |
61 | | * OR |
62 | | * (2b) FFC domain params conform to FIPS-186-4 explicit domain param |
63 | | * validity tests. |
64 | | */ |
65 | | return ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params, |
66 | | FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, ret, NULL); |
67 | | } |
68 | | #else |
69 | | int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret) |
70 | 0 | { |
71 | 0 | int ok = 0; |
72 | 0 | BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; |
73 | 0 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
74 | |
|
75 | 0 | *ret = 0; |
76 | 0 | ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx); |
77 | 0 | if (ctx == NULL) |
78 | 0 | goto err; |
79 | 0 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
80 | 0 | tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
81 | 0 | if (tmp == NULL) |
82 | 0 | goto err; |
83 | | |
84 | 0 | if (!BN_is_odd(dh->params.p)) |
85 | 0 | *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME; |
86 | 0 | if (BN_is_negative(dh->params.g) |
87 | 0 | || BN_is_zero(dh->params.g) |
88 | 0 | || BN_is_one(dh->params.g)) |
89 | 0 | *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; |
90 | 0 | if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->params.p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1)) |
91 | 0 | goto err; |
92 | 0 | if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, tmp) >= 0) |
93 | 0 | *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; |
94 | 0 | if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) |
95 | 0 | *ret |= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL; |
96 | 0 | if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) |
97 | 0 | *ret |= DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE; |
98 | |
|
99 | 0 | ok = 1; |
100 | 0 | err: |
101 | 0 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
102 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
103 | 0 | return ok; |
104 | 0 | } |
105 | | #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ |
106 | | |
107 | | /*- |
108 | | * Check that p is a safe prime and |
109 | | * g is a suitable generator. |
110 | | */ |
111 | | int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh) |
112 | 0 | { |
113 | 0 | int errflags = 0; |
114 | |
|
115 | 0 | if (!DH_check(dh, &errflags)) |
116 | 0 | return 0; |
117 | | |
118 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) != 0) |
119 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR); |
120 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME) != 0) |
121 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME); |
122 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE) != 0) |
123 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE); |
124 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE) != 0) |
125 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE); |
126 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR) != 0) |
127 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR); |
128 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) != 0) |
129 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME); |
130 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) != 0) |
131 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME); |
132 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL) != 0) |
133 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL); |
134 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE) != 0) |
135 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
136 | |
|
137 | 0 | return errflags == 0; |
138 | 0 | } |
139 | | |
140 | | /* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */ |
141 | | int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) |
142 | 0 | { |
143 | | #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
144 | | return DH_check_params(dh, ret); |
145 | | #else |
146 | 0 | int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0; |
147 | 0 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
148 | 0 | BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL; |
149 | 0 | int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh); |
150 | |
|
151 | 0 | *ret = 0; |
152 | 0 | if (nid != NID_undef) |
153 | 0 | return 1; |
154 | | |
155 | | /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */ |
156 | 0 | if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
157 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
158 | 0 | *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME; |
159 | 0 | return 0; |
160 | 0 | } |
161 | | |
162 | 0 | if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret)) |
163 | 0 | return 0; |
164 | | |
165 | 0 | ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx); |
166 | 0 | if (ctx == NULL) |
167 | 0 | goto err; |
168 | 0 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
169 | 0 | t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
170 | 0 | t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
171 | 0 | if (t2 == NULL) |
172 | 0 | goto err; |
173 | | |
174 | 0 | if (dh->params.q != NULL) { |
175 | 0 | if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0) |
176 | 0 | q_good = 1; |
177 | 0 | else |
178 | 0 | *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE; |
179 | 0 | } |
180 | |
|
181 | 0 | if (q_good) { |
182 | 0 | if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) |
183 | 0 | *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; |
184 | 0 | else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0) |
185 | 0 | *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; |
186 | 0 | else { |
187 | | /* Check g^q == 1 mod p */ |
188 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_exp(t1, dh->params.g, dh->params.q, dh->params.p, ctx)) |
189 | 0 | goto err; |
190 | 0 | if (!BN_is_one(t1)) |
191 | 0 | *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; |
192 | 0 | } |
193 | 0 | r = BN_check_prime(dh->params.q, ctx, NULL); |
194 | 0 | if (r < 0) |
195 | 0 | goto err; |
196 | 0 | if (!r) |
197 | 0 | *ret |= DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME; |
198 | | /* Check p == 1 mod q i.e. q divides p - 1 */ |
199 | 0 | if (!BN_div(t1, t2, dh->params.p, dh->params.q, ctx)) |
200 | 0 | goto err; |
201 | 0 | if (!BN_is_one(t2)) |
202 | 0 | *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE; |
203 | 0 | if (dh->params.j != NULL |
204 | 0 | && BN_cmp(dh->params.j, t1)) |
205 | 0 | *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE; |
206 | 0 | } |
207 | | |
208 | 0 | r = BN_check_prime(dh->params.p, ctx, NULL); |
209 | 0 | if (r < 0) |
210 | 0 | goto err; |
211 | 0 | if (!r) |
212 | 0 | *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME; |
213 | 0 | else if (dh->params.q == NULL) { |
214 | 0 | if (!BN_rshift1(t1, dh->params.p)) |
215 | 0 | goto err; |
216 | 0 | r = BN_check_prime(t1, ctx, NULL); |
217 | 0 | if (r < 0) |
218 | 0 | goto err; |
219 | 0 | if (!r) |
220 | 0 | *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME; |
221 | 0 | } |
222 | 0 | ok = 1; |
223 | 0 | err: |
224 | 0 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
225 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
226 | 0 | return ok; |
227 | 0 | #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ |
228 | 0 | } |
229 | | |
230 | | int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key) |
231 | 0 | { |
232 | 0 | int errflags = 0; |
233 | |
|
234 | 0 | if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &errflags)) |
235 | 0 | return 0; |
236 | | |
237 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL) != 0) |
238 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL); |
239 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE) != 0) |
240 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE); |
241 | 0 | if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID) != 0) |
242 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID); |
243 | |
|
244 | 0 | return errflags == 0; |
245 | 0 | } |
246 | | |
247 | | /* |
248 | | * See SP800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.1 : FFC Full public key validation. |
249 | | */ |
250 | | int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret) |
251 | 0 | { |
252 | | /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */ |
253 | 0 | if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { |
254 | 0 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); |
255 | 0 | *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID; |
256 | 0 | return 0; |
257 | 0 | } |
258 | | |
259 | 0 | if (dh->params.q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) < 0) { |
260 | 0 | *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID; |
261 | 0 | return 1; |
262 | 0 | } |
263 | | |
264 | 0 | return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret); |
265 | 0 | } |
266 | | |
267 | | /* |
268 | | * See SP800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.1 : FFC Partial public key validation. |
269 | | * To only be used with ephemeral FFC public keys generated using the approved |
270 | | * safe-prime groups. |
271 | | */ |
272 | | int ossl_dh_check_pub_key_partial(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret) |
273 | 0 | { |
274 | 0 | return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key_partial(&dh->params, pub_key, ret) |
275 | 0 | && *ret == 0; |
276 | 0 | } |
277 | | |
278 | | int ossl_dh_check_priv_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *priv_key, int *ret) |
279 | 0 | { |
280 | 0 | int ok = 0; |
281 | 0 | BIGNUM *two_powN = NULL, *upper; |
282 | |
|
283 | 0 | *ret = 0; |
284 | 0 | two_powN = BN_new(); |
285 | 0 | if (two_powN == NULL) |
286 | 0 | return 0; |
287 | | |
288 | 0 | if (dh->params.q != NULL) { |
289 | 0 | upper = dh->params.q; |
290 | 0 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
291 | 0 | } else if (dh->params.p != NULL) { |
292 | | /* |
293 | | * We do not have q so we just check the key is within some |
294 | | * reasonable range, or the number of bits is equal to dh->length. |
295 | | */ |
296 | 0 | int length = dh->length; |
297 | |
|
298 | 0 | if (length == 0) { |
299 | 0 | length = BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) - 1; |
300 | 0 | if (BN_num_bits(priv_key) <= length |
301 | 0 | && BN_num_bits(priv_key) > 1) |
302 | 0 | ok = 1; |
303 | 0 | } else if (BN_num_bits(priv_key) == length) { |
304 | 0 | ok = 1; |
305 | 0 | } |
306 | 0 | goto end; |
307 | 0 | #endif |
308 | 0 | } else { |
309 | 0 | goto end; |
310 | 0 | } |
311 | | |
312 | | /* Is it from an approved Safe prime group ?*/ |
313 | 0 | if (DH_get_nid((DH *)dh) != NID_undef && dh->length != 0) { |
314 | 0 | if (!BN_lshift(two_powN, BN_value_one(), dh->length)) |
315 | 0 | goto end; |
316 | 0 | if (BN_cmp(two_powN, dh->params.q) < 0) |
317 | 0 | upper = two_powN; |
318 | 0 | } |
319 | 0 | if (!ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(upper, priv_key, ret)) |
320 | 0 | goto end; |
321 | | |
322 | 0 | ok = 1; |
323 | 0 | end: |
324 | 0 | BN_free(two_powN); |
325 | 0 | return ok; |
326 | 0 | } |
327 | | |
328 | | /* |
329 | | * FFC pairwise check from SP800-56A R3. |
330 | | * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency |
331 | | */ |
332 | | int ossl_dh_check_pairwise(const DH *dh) |
333 | 0 | { |
334 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
335 | 0 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
336 | 0 | BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL; |
337 | |
|
338 | 0 | if (dh->params.p == NULL |
339 | 0 | || dh->params.g == NULL |
340 | 0 | || dh->priv_key == NULL |
341 | 0 | || dh->pub_key == NULL) |
342 | 0 | return 0; |
343 | | |
344 | 0 | ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx); |
345 | 0 | if (ctx == NULL) |
346 | 0 | goto err; |
347 | 0 | pub_key = BN_new(); |
348 | 0 | if (pub_key == NULL) |
349 | 0 | goto err; |
350 | | |
351 | | /* recalculate the public key = (g ^ priv) mod p */ |
352 | 0 | if (!ossl_dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, dh->priv_key, pub_key)) |
353 | 0 | goto err; |
354 | | /* check it matches the existing public_key */ |
355 | 0 | ret = BN_cmp(pub_key, dh->pub_key) == 0; |
356 | 0 | err: |
357 | 0 | BN_free(pub_key); |
358 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
359 | 0 | return ret; |
360 | 0 | } |