/*

 * Copyright 2017-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

 * Copyright 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc.

 *

 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use

 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at

 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html

 *

 * Originally written by Mike Hamburg

 */

#include <string.h>

#include <openssl/crypto.h>

#include <openssl/evp.h>

#include "crypto/ecx.h"

#include "curve448_local.h"

#include "word.h"

#include "ed448.h"

#include "internal/numbers.h"

#define COFACTOR 4

static c448_error_t oneshot_hash(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,

    const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen,

    const char *propq)

{

    EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();

    EVP_MD *shake256 = NULL;

    c448_error_t ret = C448_FAILURE;

    if (hashctx == NULL)

        return C448_FAILURE;

    shake256 = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "SHAKE256", propq);

    if (shake256 == NULL)

        goto err;

    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hashctx, shake256, NULL)

        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, in, inlen)

        || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, out, outlen))

        goto err;

    ret = C448_SUCCESS;

err:

    EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);

    EVP_MD_free(shake256);

    return ret;

}

static void clamp(uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES])

{

    secret_scalar_ser[0] &= -COFACTOR;

    secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 1] = 0;

    secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 2] |= 0x80;

}

static c448_error_t hash_init_with_dom(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx,

    uint8_t prehashed,

    uint8_t for_prehash,

    const uint8_t *context,

    size_t context_len,

    const char *propq)

{

    /* ASCII: "SigEd448", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */

    static const char dom_s[] = "\x53\x69\x67\x45\x64\x34\x34\x38";

    uint8_t dom[2];

    EVP_MD *shake256 = NULL;

    if (context_len > UINT8_MAX)

        return C448_FAILURE;

    dom[0] = (uint8_t)(2 - (prehashed == 0 ? 1 : 0)

        - (for_prehash == 0 ? 1 : 0));

    dom[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;

    shake256 = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "SHAKE256", propq);

    if (shake256 == NULL)

        return C448_FAILURE;

    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(hashctx, shake256, NULL)

        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, dom_s, sizeof(dom_s) - 1)

        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, dom, sizeof(dom))

        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, context, context_len)) {

        EVP_MD_free(shake256);

        return C448_FAILURE;

    }

    EVP_MD_free(shake256);

    return C448_SUCCESS;

}

/*

 * EdDSA key generation.  This function uses a different (non-Decaf) encoding.

 *

 * pubkey (out): The public key.

 * privkey (in): The private key.

 * propq (in): The property query used to fetch SHAKE256.

 */

static c448_error_t

c448_ed448_derive_public_key(

    OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,

    uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],

    const uint8_t privkey[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES],

    const char *propq)

{

    /* only this much used for keygen */

    uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];

    curve448_scalar_t secret_scalar;

    unsigned int c;

    curve448_point_t p;

    if (!oneshot_hash(ctx, secret_scalar_ser, sizeof(secret_scalar_ser),

            privkey,

            EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES,

            propq))

        return C448_FAILURE;

    clamp(secret_scalar_ser);

    ossl_curve448_scalar_decode_long(secret_scalar, secret_scalar_ser,

        sizeof(secret_scalar_ser));

    /*

     * Since we are going to mul_by_cofactor during encoding, divide by it

     * here. However, the EdDSA base point is not the same as the decaf base

     * point if the sigma isogeny is in use: the EdDSA base point is on

     * Etwist_d/(1-d) and the decaf base point is on Etwist_d, and when

     * converted it effectively picks up a factor of 2 from the isogenies.  So

     * we might start at 2 instead of 1.

     */

    for (c = 1; c < C448_EDDSA_ENCODE_RATIO; c <<= 1)

        ossl_curve448_scalar_halve(secret_scalar, secret_scalar);

    ossl_curve448_precomputed_scalarmul(p, ossl_curve448_precomputed_base,

        secret_scalar);

    ossl_curve448_point_mul_by_ratio_and_encode_like_eddsa(pubkey, p);

    /* Cleanup */

    ossl_curve448_scalar_destroy(secret_scalar);

    ossl_curve448_point_destroy(p);

    OPENSSL_cleanse(secret_scalar_ser, sizeof(secret_scalar_ser));

    return C448_SUCCESS;

}

/*

 * EdDSA signing.

 *

 * signature (out): The signature.

 * privkey (in): The private key.

 * pubkey (in):  The public key.

 * message (in):  The message to sign.

 * message_len (in):  The length of the message.

 * prehashed (in):  Nonzero if the message is actually the hash of something

 *                  you want to sign.

 * context (in):  A "context" for this signature of up to 255 bytes.

 * context_len (in):  Length of the context.

 * propq (in):  The property query used to fetch SHAKE256.

 *

 * For Ed25519, it is unsafe to use the same key for both prehashed and

 * non-prehashed messages, at least without some very careful protocol-level

 * disambiguation.  For Ed448 it is safe.

 */

static c448_error_t

c448_ed448_sign(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,

    uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],

    const uint8_t privkey[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES],

    const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],

    const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,

    uint8_t prehashed, const uint8_t *context,

    size_t context_len, const char *propq)

{

    curve448_scalar_t secret_scalar;

    EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();

    c448_error_t ret = C448_FAILURE;

    curve448_scalar_t nonce_scalar;

    uint8_t nonce_point[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] = { 0 };

    unsigned int c;

    curve448_scalar_t challenge_scalar;

    if (hashctx == NULL)

        return C448_FAILURE;

    {

        /*

         * Schedule the secret key, First EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES is serialized

         * secret scalar,next EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES bytes is the seed.

         */

        uint8_t expanded[EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES * 2];

        if (!oneshot_hash(ctx, expanded, sizeof(expanded), privkey,

                EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES, propq))

            goto err;

        clamp(expanded);

        ossl_curve448_scalar_decode_long(secret_scalar, expanded,

            EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);

        /* Hash to create the nonce */

        if (!hash_init_with_dom(ctx, hashctx, prehashed, 0, context,

                context_len, propq)

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx,

                expanded + EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES,

                EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES)

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)) {

            OPENSSL_cleanse(expanded, sizeof(expanded));

            goto err;

        }

        OPENSSL_cleanse(expanded, sizeof(expanded));

    }

    /* Decode the nonce */

    {

        uint8_t nonce[2 * EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];

        if (!EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, nonce, sizeof(nonce)))

            goto err;

        ossl_curve448_scalar_decode_long(nonce_scalar, nonce, sizeof(nonce));

        OPENSSL_cleanse(nonce, sizeof(nonce));

    }

    {

        /* Scalarmul to create the nonce-point */

        curve448_scalar_t nonce_scalar_2;

        curve448_point_t p;

        ossl_curve448_scalar_halve(nonce_scalar_2, nonce_scalar);

        for (c = 2; c < C448_EDDSA_ENCODE_RATIO; c <<= 1)

            ossl_curve448_scalar_halve(nonce_scalar_2, nonce_scalar_2);

        ossl_curve448_precomputed_scalarmul(p, ossl_curve448_precomputed_base,

            nonce_scalar_2);

        ossl_curve448_point_mul_by_ratio_and_encode_like_eddsa(nonce_point, p);

        ossl_curve448_point_destroy(p);

        ossl_curve448_scalar_destroy(nonce_scalar_2);

    }

    {

        uint8_t challenge[2 * EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];

        /* Compute the challenge */

        if (!hash_init_with_dom(ctx, hashctx, prehashed, 0, context, context_len,

                propq)

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, nonce_point, sizeof(nonce_point))

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, pubkey, EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)

            || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge)))

            goto err;

        ossl_curve448_scalar_decode_long(challenge_scalar, challenge,

            sizeof(challenge));

        OPENSSL_cleanse(challenge, sizeof(challenge));

    }

    ossl_curve448_scalar_mul(challenge_scalar, challenge_scalar, secret_scalar);

    ossl_curve448_scalar_add(challenge_scalar, challenge_scalar, nonce_scalar);

    OPENSSL_cleanse(signature, EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES);

    memcpy(signature, nonce_point, sizeof(nonce_point));

    ossl_curve448_scalar_encode(&signature[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],

        challenge_scalar);

    ossl_curve448_scalar_destroy(secret_scalar);

    ossl_curve448_scalar_destroy(nonce_scalar);

    ossl_curve448_scalar_destroy(challenge_scalar);

    ret = C448_SUCCESS;

err:

    EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);

    return ret;

}

static c448_error_t

c448_ed448_pubkey_verify(const uint8_t *pub, size_t pub_len)

{

    curve448_point_t pk_point;

    if (pub_len != EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)

        return C448_FAILURE;

    return ossl_curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio(pk_point, pub);

}

/*

 * EdDSA signature verification.

 *

 * Uses the standard (i.e. less-strict) verification formula.

 *

 * signature (in): The signature.

 * pubkey (in): The public key.

 * message (in): The message to verify.

 * message_len (in): The length of the message.

 * prehashed (in): Nonzero if the message is actually the hash of something you

 *                 want to verify.

 * context (in): A "context" for this signature of up to 255 bytes.

 * context_len (in): Length of the context.

 * propq (in): The property query used to fetch SHAKE256.

 *

 * For Ed25519, it is unsafe to use the same key for both prehashed and

 * non-prehashed messages, at least without some very careful protocol-level

 * disambiguation.  For Ed448 it is safe.

 */

static c448_error_t

c448_ed448_verify(

    OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,

    const uint8_t signature[EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES],

    const uint8_t pubkey[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],

    const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,

    uint8_t prehashed, const uint8_t *context,

    uint8_t context_len, const char *propq)

{

    curve448_point_t pk_point, r_point;

    c448_error_t error;

    curve448_scalar_t challenge_scalar;

    curve448_scalar_t response_scalar;

    /* Order in little endian format */

    static const uint8_t order[] = {

        0xF3, 0x44, 0x58, 0xAB, 0x92, 0xC2, 0x78, 0x23, 0x55, 0x8F, 0xC5, 0x8D,

        0x72, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x21, 0x90, 0x36, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x4E, 0xC4,

        0xE9, 0x23, 0xCA, 0x7C, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,

        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,

        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x3F, 0x00

    };

    int i;

    /*

     * Check that s (second 57 bytes of the sig) is less than the order. Both

     * s and the order are in little-endian format. This can be done in

     * variable time, since if this is not the case the signature if publicly

     * invalid.

     */

    for (i = EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES - 1; i >= 0; i--) {

        if (signature[i + EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] > order[i])

            return C448_FAILURE;

        if (signature[i + EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] < order[i])

            break;

    }

    if (i < 0)

        return C448_FAILURE;

    error = ossl_curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio(pk_point, pubkey);

    if (C448_SUCCESS != error)

        return error;

    error = ossl_curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio(r_point, signature);

    if (C448_SUCCESS != error)

        return error;

    {

        /* Compute the challenge */

        EVP_MD_CTX *hashctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();

        uint8_t challenge[2 * EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES];

        if (hashctx == NULL

            || !hash_init_with_dom(ctx, hashctx, prehashed, 0, context,

                context_len, propq)

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, signature, EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, pubkey, EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES)

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(hashctx, message, message_len)

            || !EVP_DigestFinalXOF(hashctx, challenge, sizeof(challenge))) {

            EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);

            return C448_FAILURE;

        }

        EVP_MD_CTX_free(hashctx);

        ossl_curve448_scalar_decode_long(challenge_scalar, challenge,

            sizeof(challenge));

        OPENSSL_cleanse(challenge, sizeof(challenge));

    }

    ossl_curve448_scalar_sub(challenge_scalar, ossl_curve448_scalar_zero,

        challenge_scalar);

    ossl_curve448_scalar_decode_long(response_scalar,

        &signature[EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],

        EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES);

    /* pk_point = -c(x(P)) + (cx + k)G = kG */

    ossl_curve448_base_double_scalarmul_non_secret(pk_point,

        response_scalar,

        pk_point, challenge_scalar);

    return c448_succeed_if(ossl_curve448_point_eq(pk_point, r_point));

}

int ossl_ed448_sign(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out_sig,

    const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,

    const uint8_t public_key[57], const uint8_t private_key[57],

    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,

    const uint8_t phflag, const char *propq)

{

    return c448_ed448_sign(ctx, out_sig, private_key, public_key, message,

               message_len, phflag, context, context_len,

               propq)

        == C448_SUCCESS;

}

/*

 * This function should not be necessary since ossl_ed448_verify() already

 * does this check internally.

 * For some reason the FIPS ACVP requires a EDDSA KeyVer test.

 */

int ossl_ed448_pubkey_verify(const uint8_t *pub, size_t pub_len)

{

    return c448_ed448_pubkey_verify(pub, pub_len);

}

int ossl_ed448_verify(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,

    const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,

    const uint8_t signature[114], const uint8_t public_key[57],

    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,

    const uint8_t phflag, const char *propq)

{

    return c448_ed448_verify(ctx, signature, public_key, message,

               message_len, phflag, context, (uint8_t)context_len,

               propq)

        == C448_SUCCESS;

}

int ossl_ed448_public_from_private(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, uint8_t out_public_key[57],

    const uint8_t private_key[57], const char *propq)

{

    return c448_ed448_derive_public_key(ctx, out_public_key, private_key,

               propq)

        == C448_SUCCESS;

}