Coverage Report

Created: 2022-11-30 06:20

/src/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
Line
Count
Source (jump to first uncovered line)
1
/* crypto/cms/cms_kari.c */
2
/*
3
 * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
4
 * project.
5
 */
6
/* ====================================================================
7
 * Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
8
 *
9
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11
 * are met:
12
 *
13
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15
 *
16
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
19
 *    distribution.
20
 *
21
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
23
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
25
 *
26
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29
 *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
30
 *
31
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34
 *
35
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36
 *    acknowledgment:
37
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
39
 *
40
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52
 * ====================================================================
53
 */
54
55
#include "cryptlib.h"
56
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
57
#include <openssl/pem.h>
58
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
59
#include <openssl/err.h>
60
#include <openssl/cms.h>
61
#include <openssl/rand.h>
62
#include <openssl/aes.h>
63
#include "cms_lcl.h"
64
#include "asn1_locl.h"
65
66
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
67
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
68
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
69
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier)
70
71
/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
72
73
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
74
                                    X509_ALGOR **palg,
75
                                    ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
76
0
{
77
0
    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
78
0
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
79
0
               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
80
0
        return 0;
81
0
    }
82
0
    if (palg)
83
0
        *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
84
0
    if (pukm)
85
0
        *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
86
0
    return 1;
87
0
}
88
89
/* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
90
91
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
92
*CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
93
0
{
94
0
    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
95
0
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
96
0
               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
97
0
        return NULL;
98
0
    }
99
0
    return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
100
0
}
101
102
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
103
                                        X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
104
                                        ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
105
                                        ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
106
                                        X509_NAME **issuer,
107
                                        ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
108
0
{
109
0
    CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
110
0
    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
111
0
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
112
0
               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
113
0
        return 0;
114
0
    }
115
0
    oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
116
0
    if (issuer)
117
0
        *issuer = NULL;
118
0
    if (sno)
119
0
        *sno = NULL;
120
0
    if (keyid)
121
0
        *keyid = NULL;
122
0
    if (pubalg)
123
0
        *pubalg = NULL;
124
0
    if (pubkey)
125
0
        *pubkey = NULL;
126
0
    if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
127
0
        if (issuer)
128
0
            *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
129
0
        if (sno)
130
0
            *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
131
0
    } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
132
0
        if (keyid)
133
0
            *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
134
0
    } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
135
0
        if (pubalg)
136
0
            *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
137
0
        if (pubkey)
138
0
            *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
139
0
    } else
140
0
        return 0;
141
0
    return 1;
142
0
}
143
144
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
145
0
{
146
0
    CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
147
0
    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
148
0
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
149
0
               CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
150
0
        return -2;
151
0
    }
152
0
    oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
153
0
    if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
154
0
        return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
155
0
    else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
156
0
        return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
157
0
    return -1;
158
0
}
159
160
int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
161
                                      ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
162
                                      ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
163
                                      CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
164
                                      X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
165
0
{
166
0
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
167
0
    if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
168
0
        if (issuer)
169
0
            *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
170
0
        if (sno)
171
0
            *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
172
0
        if (keyid)
173
0
            *keyid = NULL;
174
0
        if (tm)
175
0
            *tm = NULL;
176
0
        if (other)
177
0
            *other = NULL;
178
0
    } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
179
0
        if (keyid)
180
0
            *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
181
0
        if (tm)
182
0
            *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
183
0
        if (other)
184
0
            *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
185
0
        if (issuer)
186
0
            *issuer = NULL;
187
0
        if (sno)
188
0
            *sno = NULL;
189
0
    } else
190
0
        return 0;
191
0
    return 1;
192
0
}
193
194
int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
195
                                       X509 *cert)
196
0
{
197
0
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
198
0
    if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
199
0
        return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
200
0
    else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
201
0
        return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
202
0
    else
203
0
        return -1;
204
0
}
205
206
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
207
0
{
208
0
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
209
0
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
210
0
    if (kari->pctx) {
211
0
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
212
0
        kari->pctx = NULL;
213
0
    }
214
0
    if (!pk)
215
0
        return 1;
216
0
    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
217
0
    if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx))
218
0
        goto err;
219
0
    kari->pctx = pctx;
220
0
    return 1;
221
0
 err:
222
0
    if (pctx)
223
0
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
224
0
    return 0;
225
0
}
226
227
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
228
0
{
229
0
    if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
230
0
        return &ri->d.kari->ctx;
231
0
    return NULL;
232
0
}
233
234
/*
235
 * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
236
 * or the encrypted CEK.
237
 */
238
239
static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
240
                          const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
241
                          CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
242
0
{
243
    /* Key encryption key */
244
0
    unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
245
0
    size_t keklen;
246
0
    int rv = 0;
247
0
    unsigned char *out = NULL;
248
0
    int outlen;
249
0
    keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&kari->ctx);
250
0
    if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
251
0
        return 0;
252
    /* Derive KEK */
253
0
    if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
254
0
        goto err;
255
    /* Set KEK in context */
256
0
    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
257
0
        goto err;
258
    /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
259
0
    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
260
0
        goto err;
261
0
    out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
262
0
    if (!out)
263
0
        goto err;
264
0
    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
265
0
        goto err;
266
0
    *pout = out;
267
0
    *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
268
0
    rv = 1;
269
270
0
 err:
271
0
    OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
272
0
    if (!rv && out)
273
0
        OPENSSL_free(out);
274
0
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kari->ctx);
275
0
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
276
0
    kari->pctx = NULL;
277
0
    return rv;
278
0
}
279
280
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
281
                                   CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
282
                                   CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
283
0
{
284
0
    int rv = 0;
285
0
    unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
286
0
    size_t enckeylen;
287
0
    size_t ceklen;
288
0
    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
289
0
    enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
290
0
    enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
291
    /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
292
0
    if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
293
0
        goto err;
294
    /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
295
0
    if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
296
0
        goto err;
297
0
    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
298
0
    if (ec->key) {
299
0
        OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
300
0
        OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
301
0
    }
302
0
    ec->key = cek;
303
0
    ec->keylen = ceklen;
304
0
    cek = NULL;
305
0
    rv = 1;
306
0
 err:
307
0
    if (cek)
308
0
        OPENSSL_free(cek);
309
0
    return rv;
310
0
}
311
312
/* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
313
static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
314
                                         EVP_PKEY *pk)
315
0
{
316
0
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
317
0
    EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
318
0
    int rv = 0;
319
0
    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
320
0
    if (!pctx)
321
0
        goto err;
322
0
    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
323
0
        goto err;
324
0
    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
325
0
        goto err;
326
0
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
327
0
    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
328
0
    if (!pctx)
329
0
        goto err;
330
0
    if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
331
0
        goto err;
332
0
    kari->pctx = pctx;
333
0
    rv = 1;
334
0
 err:
335
0
    if (!rv && pctx)
336
0
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
337
0
    if (ekey)
338
0
        EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
339
0
    return rv;
340
0
}
341
342
/* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */
343
344
int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
345
                                EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
346
0
{
347
0
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
348
0
    CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
349
350
0
    ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
351
0
    if (!ri->d.kari)
352
0
        return 0;
353
0
    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
354
355
0
    kari = ri->d.kari;
356
0
    kari->version = 3;
357
358
0
    rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
359
0
    if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
360
0
        M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
361
0
        return 0;
362
0
    }
363
364
0
    if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
365
0
        rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
366
0
        rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
367
0
        if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
368
0
            return 0;
369
0
        if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
370
0
            return 0;
371
0
    } else {
372
0
        rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
373
0
        if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
374
0
            return 0;
375
0
    }
376
377
    /* Create ephemeral key */
378
0
    if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
379
0
        return 0;
380
381
0
    CRYPTO_add(&pk->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
382
0
    rek->pkey = pk;
383
0
    return 1;
384
0
}
385
386
static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
387
                         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
388
0
{
389
0
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = &kari->ctx;
390
0
    const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
391
0
    int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
392
    /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
393
0
    kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
394
395
0
    if (kekcipher) {
396
0
        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
397
0
            return 0;
398
0
        return 1;
399
0
    }
400
    /*
401
     * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
402
     * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
403
     */
404
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
405
0
    if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
406
0
        kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
407
0
    else
408
0
#endif
409
0
    if (keylen <= 16)
410
0
        kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
411
0
    else if (keylen <= 24)
412
0
        kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
413
0
    else
414
0
        kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
415
0
    return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
416
0
}
417
418
/* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
419
420
int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
421
                                   CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
422
0
{
423
0
    CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
424
0
    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
425
0
    CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
426
0
    STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
427
0
    int i;
428
429
0
    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
430
0
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
431
0
        return 0;
432
0
    }
433
0
    kari = ri->d.kari;
434
0
    reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
435
0
    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
436
    /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
437
0
    if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
438
0
        return 0;
439
    /*
440
     * If no orignator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
441
     * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
442
     */
443
0
    if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
444
0
        CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
445
0
        oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
446
0
        oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
447
0
        if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
448
0
            return 0;
449
0
    }
450
    /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
451
0
    if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
452
0
        return 0;
453
    /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
454
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
455
0
        unsigned char *enckey;
456
0
        size_t enckeylen;
457
0
        rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
458
0
        if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
459
0
            return 0;
460
0
        if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
461
0
                            kari, 1))
462
0
            return 0;
463
0
        ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
464
0
    }
465
466
0
    return 1;
467
468
0
}