/src/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
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1 | | /* crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c */ |
2 | | /* |
3 | | * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project |
4 | | */ |
5 | | /* ==================================================================== |
6 | | * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
7 | | * |
8 | | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
9 | | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
10 | | * are met: |
11 | | * |
12 | | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
13 | | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
14 | | * |
15 | | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
16 | | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
17 | | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
18 | | * distribution. |
19 | | * |
20 | | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
21 | | * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
22 | | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
23 | | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
24 | | * |
25 | | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
26 | | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
27 | | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
28 | | * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. |
29 | | * |
30 | | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
31 | | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
32 | | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
33 | | * |
34 | | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
35 | | * acknowledgment: |
36 | | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
37 | | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
38 | | * |
39 | | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
40 | | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
41 | | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
42 | | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
43 | | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
44 | | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
45 | | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
46 | | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
47 | | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
48 | | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
49 | | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
50 | | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
51 | | * ==================================================================== |
52 | | * |
53 | | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
54 | | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
55 | | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
56 | | * |
57 | | */ |
58 | | |
59 | | #include "ecs_locl.h" |
60 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
61 | | #include <openssl/obj_mac.h> |
62 | | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
63 | | |
64 | | static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, |
65 | | const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, |
66 | | EC_KEY *eckey); |
67 | | static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, |
68 | | BIGNUM **rp); |
69 | | static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, |
70 | | const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey); |
71 | | |
72 | | static ECDSA_METHOD openssl_ecdsa_meth = { |
73 | | "OpenSSL ECDSA method", |
74 | | ecdsa_do_sign, |
75 | | ecdsa_sign_setup, |
76 | | ecdsa_do_verify, |
77 | | #if 0 |
78 | | NULL, /* init */ |
79 | | NULL, /* finish */ |
80 | | #endif |
81 | | 0, /* flags */ |
82 | | NULL /* app_data */ |
83 | | }; |
84 | | |
85 | | const ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_OpenSSL(void) |
86 | 0 | { |
87 | 0 | return &openssl_ecdsa_meth; |
88 | 0 | } |
89 | | |
90 | | static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, |
91 | | BIGNUM **rp) |
92 | 0 | { |
93 | 0 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
94 | 0 | BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL; |
95 | 0 | EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL; |
96 | 0 | const EC_GROUP *group; |
97 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
98 | 0 | int order_bits; |
99 | |
|
100 | 0 | if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) { |
101 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
102 | 0 | return 0; |
103 | 0 | } |
104 | | |
105 | 0 | if (ctx_in == NULL) { |
106 | 0 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { |
107 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
108 | 0 | return 0; |
109 | 0 | } |
110 | 0 | } else |
111 | 0 | ctx = ctx_in; |
112 | | |
113 | 0 | k = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */ |
114 | 0 | r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */ |
115 | 0 | order = BN_new(); |
116 | 0 | X = BN_new(); |
117 | 0 | if (!k || !r || !order || !X) { |
118 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
119 | 0 | goto err; |
120 | 0 | } |
121 | 0 | if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { |
122 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
123 | 0 | goto err; |
124 | 0 | } |
125 | 0 | if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { |
126 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
127 | 0 | goto err; |
128 | 0 | } |
129 | | |
130 | | /* Preallocate space */ |
131 | 0 | order_bits = BN_num_bits(order); |
132 | 0 | if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) |
133 | 0 | || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) |
134 | 0 | || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits)) |
135 | 0 | goto err; |
136 | | |
137 | 0 | do { |
138 | | /* get random k */ |
139 | 0 | do |
140 | 0 | if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) { |
141 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, |
142 | 0 | ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED); |
143 | 0 | goto err; |
144 | 0 | } |
145 | 0 | while (BN_is_zero(k)) ; |
146 | | |
147 | | /* |
148 | | * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we |
149 | | * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length. |
150 | | * |
151 | | * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a |
152 | | * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is |
153 | | * one bit longer than the order. This guarantees the code |
154 | | * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere. |
155 | | * |
156 | | * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic |
157 | | * conditional copy. |
158 | | */ |
159 | 0 | if (!BN_add(r, k, order) |
160 | 0 | || !BN_add(X, r, order) |
161 | 0 | || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X)) |
162 | 0 | goto err; |
163 | | |
164 | | /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ |
165 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { |
166 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
167 | 0 | goto err; |
168 | 0 | } |
169 | 0 | if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == |
170 | 0 | NID_X9_62_prime_field) { |
171 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp |
172 | 0 | (group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) { |
173 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
174 | 0 | goto err; |
175 | 0 | } |
176 | 0 | } |
177 | 0 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M |
178 | 0 | else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ |
179 | |
|
180 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, |
181 | 0 | tmp_point, X, NULL, |
182 | 0 | ctx)) { |
183 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
184 | 0 | goto err; |
185 | 0 | } |
186 | 0 | } |
187 | 0 | #endif |
188 | 0 | if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) { |
189 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
190 | 0 | goto err; |
191 | 0 | } |
192 | 0 | } |
193 | 0 | while (BN_is_zero(r)); |
194 | | |
195 | | /* compute the inverse of k */ |
196 | 0 | if (EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group) != NULL) { |
197 | | /* |
198 | | * We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact |
199 | | * order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead. |
200 | | */ |
201 | 0 | if (!BN_set_word(X, 2)) { |
202 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
203 | 0 | goto err; |
204 | 0 | } |
205 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_sub(X, order, X, order, ctx)) { |
206 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
207 | 0 | goto err; |
208 | 0 | } |
209 | 0 | BN_set_flags(X, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
210 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime |
211 | 0 | (k, k, X, order, ctx, EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group))) { |
212 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
213 | 0 | goto err; |
214 | 0 | } |
215 | 0 | } else { |
216 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) { |
217 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
218 | 0 | goto err; |
219 | 0 | } |
220 | 0 | } |
221 | | |
222 | | /* clear old values if necessary */ |
223 | 0 | if (*rp != NULL) |
224 | 0 | BN_clear_free(*rp); |
225 | 0 | if (*kinvp != NULL) |
226 | 0 | BN_clear_free(*kinvp); |
227 | | /* save the pre-computed values */ |
228 | 0 | *rp = r; |
229 | 0 | *kinvp = k; |
230 | 0 | ret = 1; |
231 | 0 | err: |
232 | 0 | if (!ret) { |
233 | 0 | if (k != NULL) |
234 | 0 | BN_clear_free(k); |
235 | 0 | if (r != NULL) |
236 | 0 | BN_clear_free(r); |
237 | 0 | } |
238 | 0 | if (ctx_in == NULL) |
239 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
240 | 0 | if (order != NULL) |
241 | 0 | BN_free(order); |
242 | 0 | if (tmp_point != NULL) |
243 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(tmp_point); |
244 | 0 | if (X) |
245 | 0 | BN_clear_free(X); |
246 | 0 | return (ret); |
247 | 0 | } |
248 | | |
249 | | static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, |
250 | | const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, |
251 | | EC_KEY *eckey) |
252 | 0 | { |
253 | 0 | int ok = 0, i; |
254 | 0 | BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL; |
255 | 0 | const BIGNUM *ckinv; |
256 | 0 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
257 | 0 | const EC_GROUP *group; |
258 | 0 | ECDSA_SIG *ret; |
259 | 0 | ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa; |
260 | 0 | const BIGNUM *priv_key; |
261 | |
|
262 | 0 | ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey); |
263 | 0 | group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); |
264 | 0 | priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey); |
265 | |
|
266 | 0 | if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL || ecdsa == NULL) { |
267 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
268 | 0 | return NULL; |
269 | 0 | } |
270 | | |
271 | 0 | ret = ECDSA_SIG_new(); |
272 | 0 | if (!ret) { |
273 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
274 | 0 | return NULL; |
275 | 0 | } |
276 | 0 | s = ret->s; |
277 | |
|
278 | 0 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL || |
279 | 0 | (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) { |
280 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
281 | 0 | goto err; |
282 | 0 | } |
283 | | |
284 | 0 | if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { |
285 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
286 | 0 | goto err; |
287 | 0 | } |
288 | 0 | i = BN_num_bits(order); |
289 | | /* |
290 | | * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. |
291 | | */ |
292 | 0 | if (8 * dgst_len > i) |
293 | 0 | dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8; |
294 | 0 | if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { |
295 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
296 | 0 | goto err; |
297 | 0 | } |
298 | | /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ |
299 | 0 | if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { |
300 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
301 | 0 | goto err; |
302 | 0 | } |
303 | 0 | do { |
304 | 0 | if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) { |
305 | 0 | if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r)) { |
306 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); |
307 | 0 | goto err; |
308 | 0 | } |
309 | 0 | ckinv = kinv; |
310 | 0 | } else { |
311 | 0 | ckinv = in_kinv; |
312 | 0 | if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) { |
313 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
314 | 0 | goto err; |
315 | 0 | } |
316 | 0 | } |
317 | | |
318 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) { |
319 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
320 | 0 | goto err; |
321 | 0 | } |
322 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) { |
323 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
324 | 0 | goto err; |
325 | 0 | } |
326 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) { |
327 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
328 | 0 | goto err; |
329 | 0 | } |
330 | 0 | if (BN_is_zero(s)) { |
331 | | /* |
332 | | * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to |
333 | | * generate new kinv and r values |
334 | | */ |
335 | 0 | if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) { |
336 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, |
337 | 0 | ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES); |
338 | 0 | goto err; |
339 | 0 | } |
340 | 0 | } else |
341 | | /* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */ |
342 | 0 | break; |
343 | 0 | } |
344 | 0 | while (1); |
345 | | |
346 | 0 | ok = 1; |
347 | 0 | err: |
348 | 0 | if (!ok) { |
349 | 0 | ECDSA_SIG_free(ret); |
350 | 0 | ret = NULL; |
351 | 0 | } |
352 | 0 | if (ctx) |
353 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
354 | 0 | if (m) |
355 | 0 | BN_clear_free(m); |
356 | 0 | if (tmp) |
357 | 0 | BN_clear_free(tmp); |
358 | 0 | if (order) |
359 | 0 | BN_free(order); |
360 | 0 | if (kinv) |
361 | 0 | BN_clear_free(kinv); |
362 | 0 | return ret; |
363 | 0 | } |
364 | | |
365 | | static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, |
366 | | const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) |
367 | 0 | { |
368 | 0 | int ret = -1, i; |
369 | 0 | BN_CTX *ctx; |
370 | 0 | BIGNUM *order, *u1, *u2, *m, *X; |
371 | 0 | EC_POINT *point = NULL; |
372 | 0 | const EC_GROUP *group; |
373 | 0 | const EC_POINT *pub_key; |
374 | | |
375 | | /* check input values */ |
376 | 0 | if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL || |
377 | 0 | (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) { |
378 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); |
379 | 0 | return -1; |
380 | 0 | } |
381 | | |
382 | 0 | ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
383 | 0 | if (!ctx) { |
384 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
385 | 0 | return -1; |
386 | 0 | } |
387 | 0 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
388 | 0 | order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
389 | 0 | u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
390 | 0 | u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
391 | 0 | m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
392 | 0 | X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
393 | 0 | if (!X) { |
394 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
395 | 0 | goto err; |
396 | 0 | } |
397 | | |
398 | 0 | if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { |
399 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
400 | 0 | goto err; |
401 | 0 | } |
402 | | |
403 | 0 | if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || |
404 | 0 | BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) || |
405 | 0 | BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) { |
406 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
407 | 0 | ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */ |
408 | 0 | goto err; |
409 | 0 | } |
410 | | /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */ |
411 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) { |
412 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
413 | 0 | goto err; |
414 | 0 | } |
415 | | /* digest -> m */ |
416 | 0 | i = BN_num_bits(order); |
417 | | /* |
418 | | * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. |
419 | | */ |
420 | 0 | if (8 * dgst_len > i) |
421 | 0 | dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8; |
422 | 0 | if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { |
423 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
424 | 0 | goto err; |
425 | 0 | } |
426 | | /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ |
427 | 0 | if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { |
428 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
429 | 0 | goto err; |
430 | 0 | } |
431 | | /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */ |
432 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) { |
433 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
434 | 0 | goto err; |
435 | 0 | } |
436 | | /* u2 = r * w mod q */ |
437 | 0 | if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) { |
438 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
439 | 0 | goto err; |
440 | 0 | } |
441 | | |
442 | 0 | if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { |
443 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
444 | 0 | goto err; |
445 | 0 | } |
446 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) { |
447 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
448 | 0 | goto err; |
449 | 0 | } |
450 | 0 | if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == |
451 | 0 | NID_X9_62_prime_field) { |
452 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { |
453 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
454 | 0 | goto err; |
455 | 0 | } |
456 | 0 | } |
457 | 0 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M |
458 | 0 | else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ |
459 | |
|
460 | 0 | if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { |
461 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
462 | 0 | goto err; |
463 | 0 | } |
464 | 0 | } |
465 | 0 | #endif |
466 | 0 | if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) { |
467 | 0 | ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
468 | 0 | goto err; |
469 | 0 | } |
470 | | /* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */ |
471 | 0 | ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0); |
472 | 0 | err: |
473 | 0 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
474 | 0 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
475 | 0 | if (point) |
476 | 0 | EC_POINT_free(point); |
477 | 0 | return ret; |
478 | 0 | } |