/* p12_kiss.c */

/*

 * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project

 * 1999.

 */

/* ====================================================================

 * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.

 *

 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

 * are met:

 *

 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

 *

 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in

 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the

 *    distribution.

 *

 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this

 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:

 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"

 *

 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to

 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without

 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact

 *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.

 *

 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"

 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written

 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.

 *

 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following

 *    acknowledgment:

 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"

 *

 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY

 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR

 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR

 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,

 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT

 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;

 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,

 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)

 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED

 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

 * ====================================================================

 *

 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young

 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim

 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

 *

 */

#include <stdio.h>

#include "cryptlib.h"

#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>

/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */

static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,

                      EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);

static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,

                      int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);

static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,

                     EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);

/*

 * Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert and

 * other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL, or it

 * should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be passed

 * unitialised.

 */

int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,

                 STACK_OF(X509) **ca)

{

    STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL;

    X509 *x = NULL;

    if (pkey)

        *pkey = NULL;

    if (cert)

        *cert = NULL;

    /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */

    if (!p12) {

        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,

                  PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);

        return 0;

    }

    /* Check the mac */

    /*

     * If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases to

     * determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that under

     * PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length

     * password are two different things...

     */

    if (!pass || !*pass) {

        if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0))

            pass = NULL;

        else if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0))

            pass = "";

        else {

            PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);

            goto err;

        }

    } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {

        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);

        goto err;

    }

    /* Allocate stack for other certificates */

    ocerts = sk_X509_new_null();

    if (!ocerts) {

        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

        goto err;

    }

    if (!parse_pk12(p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) {

        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);

        goto err;

    }

    while ((x = sk_X509_pop(ocerts))) {

        if (pkey && *pkey && cert && !*cert) {

            ERR_set_mark();

            if (X509_check_private_key(x, *pkey)) {

                *cert = x;

                x = NULL;

            }

            ERR_pop_to_mark();

        }

        if (ca && x) {

            if (!*ca)

                *ca = sk_X509_new_null();

            if (!*ca)

                goto err;

            if (!sk_X509_push(*ca, x))

                goto err;

            x = NULL;

        }

        if (x)

            X509_free(x);

    }

    if (ocerts)

        sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);

    return 1;

 err:

    if (pkey) {

        EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);

        *pkey = NULL;

    }

    if (cert) {

        X509_free(*cert);

        *cert = NULL;

    }

    if (x)

        X509_free(x);

    if (ocerts)

        sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);

    return 0;

}

/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */

static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,

                      EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)

{

    STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;

    STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;

    int i, bagnid;

    PKCS7 *p7;

    if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)))

        return 0;

    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {

        p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);

        bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);

        if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {

            bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);

        } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {

            bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);

        } else

            continue;

        if (!bags) {

            sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);

            return 0;

        }

        if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) {

            sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);

            sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);

            return 0;

        }

        sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);

    }

    sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);

    return 1;

}

static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,

                      int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)

{

    int i;

    for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {

        if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i),

                       pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts))

            return 0;

    }

    return 1;

}

static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,

                     EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)

{

    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;

    X509 *x509;

    ASN1_TYPE *attrib;

    ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;

    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkid = NULL;

    if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName)))

        fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;

    if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)))

        lkid = attrib->value.octet_string;

    switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag)) {

    case NID_keyBag:

        if (!pkey || *pkey)

            return 1;

        if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag)))

            return 0;

        break;

    case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:

        if (!pkey || *pkey)

            return 1;

        if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))

            return 0;

        *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);

        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);

        if (!(*pkey))

            return 0;

        break;

    case NID_certBag:

        if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate)

            return 1;

        if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag)))

            return 0;

        if (lkid && !X509_keyid_set1(x509, lkid->data, lkid->length)) {

            X509_free(x509);

            return 0;

        }

        if (fname) {

            int len, r;

            unsigned char *data;

            len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);

            if (len >= 0) {

                r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);

                OPENSSL_free(data);

                if (!r) {

                    X509_free(x509);

                    return 0;

                }

            }

        }

        if (!sk_X509_push(ocerts, x509)) {

            X509_free(x509);

            return 0;

        }

        break;

    case NID_safeContentsBag:

        return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts);

        break;

    default:

        return 1;

        break;

    }

    return 1;

}