/* crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c */

/*

 * Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,

 * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.

 */

/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */

/*

 * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, <URL:

 * http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z> for problems with the security

 * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new

 * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern,

 * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, <URL:

 * http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>. The new proof has stronger requirements

 * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of

 * one-wayness.  For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion.

 */

#include "constant_time_locl.h"

#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)

# include <stdio.h>

# include "cryptlib.h"

# include <openssl/bn.h>

# include <openssl/rsa.h>

# include <openssl/evp.h>

# include <openssl/rand.h>

# include <openssl/sha.h>

int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

                               const unsigned char *from, int flen,

                               const unsigned char *param, int plen)

{

    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen,

                                           param, plen, NULL, NULL);

}

int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

                                    const unsigned char *from, int flen,

                                    const unsigned char *param, int plen,

                                    const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)

{

    int i, emlen = tlen - 1;

    unsigned char *db, *seed;

    unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

    int mdlen;

    if (md == NULL)

        md = EVP_sha1();

    if (mgf1md == NULL)

        mgf1md = md;

    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);

    if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,

               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);

        return 0;

    }

    if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,

               RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);

        return 0;

    }

    to[0] = 0;

    seed = to + 1;

    db = to + mdlen + 1;

    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL))

        return 0;

    memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1);

    db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;

    memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);

    if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0)

        return 0;

# ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT

    memcpy(seed,

           "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",

           20);

# endif

    dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen);

    if (dbmask == NULL) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

        return 0;

    }

    if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)

        goto err;

    for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++)

        db[i] ^= dbmask[i];

    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)

        goto err;

    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)

        seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];

    OPENSSL_free(dbmask);

    return 1;

 err:

    OPENSSL_free(dbmask);

    return 0;

}

int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,

                                 const unsigned char *param, int plen)

{

    return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num,

                                             param, plen, NULL, NULL);

}

int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,

                                      const unsigned char *from, int flen,

                                      int num, const unsigned char *param,

                                      int plen, const EVP_MD *md,

                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md)

{

    int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;

    unsigned int good, found_one_byte;

    const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;

    /*

     * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =

     * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB

     */

    unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],

        phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

    int mdlen;

    if (md == NULL)

        md = EVP_sha1();

    if (mgf1md == NULL)

        mgf1md = md;

    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);

    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)

        return -1;

    /*

     * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the

     * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by

     * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,

     * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of

     * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.

     * This does not leak any side-channel information.

     */

    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)

        goto decoding_err;

    dblen = num - mdlen - 1;

    db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);

    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);

    if (db == NULL || em == NULL) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

        goto cleanup;

    }

    /*

     * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid

     * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel

     * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed  memory access

     * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.

     *

     * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.

     */

    memset(em, 0, num);

    memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);

    /*

     * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is

     * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA

     * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).

     */

    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);

    maskedseed = em + 1;

    maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;

    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))

        goto cleanup;

    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)

        seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];

    if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md))

        goto cleanup;

    for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)

        db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];

    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL))

        goto cleanup;

    good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen));

    found_one_byte = 0;

    for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) {

        /*

         * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1.

         */

        unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);

        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]);

        one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1,

                                             i, one_index);

        found_one_byte |= equals1;

        good &= (found_one_byte | equals0);

    }

    good &= found_one_byte;

    /*

     * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid,

     * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a

     * concern.

     */

    if (!good)

        goto decoding_err;

    msg_index = one_index + 1;

    mlen = dblen - msg_index;

    if (tlen < mlen) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);

        mlen = -1;

    } else {

        memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);

        goto cleanup;

    }

 decoding_err:

    /*

     * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not

     * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.

     */

    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,

           RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);

 cleanup:

    if (db != NULL) {

        OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen);

        OPENSSL_free(db);

    }

    if (em != NULL) {

        OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);

        OPENSSL_free(em);

    }

    return mlen;

}

int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,

               const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)

{

    long i, outlen = 0;

    unsigned char cnt[4];

    EVP_MD_CTX c;

    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

    int mdlen;

    int rv = -1;

    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);

    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);

    if (mdlen < 0)

        goto err;

    for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) {

        cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);

        cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);

        cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;

        cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);

        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, dgst, NULL)

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen)

            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4))

            goto err;

        if (outlen + mdlen <= len) {

            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL))

                goto err;

            outlen += mdlen;

        } else {

            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL))

                goto err;

            memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);

            outlen = len;

        }

    }

    rv = 0;

 err:

    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);

    return rv;

}

#endif