/src/mozilla-central/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7decode.c
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1 | | /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
2 | | * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
3 | | * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
4 | | |
5 | | /* |
6 | | * PKCS7 decoding, verification. |
7 | | */ |
8 | | |
9 | | #include "p7local.h" |
10 | | |
11 | | #include "cert.h" |
12 | | /* XXX do not want to have to include */ |
13 | | #include "certdb.h" /* certdb.h -- the trust stuff needed by */ |
14 | | /* the add certificate code needs to get */ |
15 | | /* rewritten/abstracted and then this */ |
16 | | /* include should be removed! */ |
17 | | /*#include "cdbhdl.h" */ |
18 | | #include "cryptohi.h" |
19 | | #include "keyhi.h" |
20 | | #include "secasn1.h" |
21 | | #include "secitem.h" |
22 | | #include "secoid.h" |
23 | | #include "pk11func.h" |
24 | | #include "prtime.h" |
25 | | #include "secerr.h" |
26 | | #include "sechash.h" /* for HASH_GetHashObject() */ |
27 | | #include "secder.h" |
28 | | #include "secpkcs5.h" |
29 | | |
30 | | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker { |
31 | | int depth; |
32 | | int digcnt; |
33 | | void **digcxs; |
34 | | const SECHashObject **digobjs; |
35 | | sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj; |
36 | | PRBool saw_contents; |
37 | | }; |
38 | | |
39 | | struct SEC_PKCS7DecoderContextStr { |
40 | | SEC_ASN1DecoderContext *dcx; |
41 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo; |
42 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb; |
43 | | void *cb_arg; |
44 | | SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn; |
45 | | void *pwfn_arg; |
46 | | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker worker; |
47 | | PLArenaPool *tmp_poolp; |
48 | | int error; |
49 | | SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback dkcb; |
50 | | void *dkcb_arg; |
51 | | SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb; |
52 | | }; |
53 | | |
54 | | /* |
55 | | * Handle one worker, decrypting and digesting the data as necessary. |
56 | | * |
57 | | * XXX If/when we support nested contents, this probably needs to be |
58 | | * revised somewhat to get passed the content-info (which unfortunately |
59 | | * can be two different types depending on whether it is encrypted or not) |
60 | | * corresponding to the given worker. |
61 | | */ |
62 | | static void |
63 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
64 | | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker, |
65 | | const unsigned char *data, unsigned long len, |
66 | | PRBool final) |
67 | 0 | { |
68 | 0 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
69 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
70 | 0 | int i; |
71 | 0 |
|
72 | 0 | /* |
73 | 0 | * We should really have data to process, or we should be trying |
74 | 0 | * to finish/flush the last block. (This is an overly paranoid |
75 | 0 | * check since all callers are in this file and simple inspection |
76 | 0 | * proves they do it right. But it could find a bug in future |
77 | 0 | * modifications/development, that is why it is here.) |
78 | 0 | */ |
79 | 0 | PORT_Assert((data != NULL && len) || final); |
80 | 0 |
|
81 | 0 | /* |
82 | 0 | * Decrypt this chunk. |
83 | 0 | * |
84 | 0 | * XXX If we get an error, we do not want to do the digest or callback, |
85 | 0 | * but we want to keep decoding. Or maybe we want to stop decoding |
86 | 0 | * altogether if there is a callback, because obviously we are not |
87 | 0 | * sending the data back and they want to know that. |
88 | 0 | */ |
89 | 0 | if (worker->decryptobj != NULL) { |
90 | 0 | /* XXX the following lengths should all be longs? */ |
91 | 0 | unsigned int inlen; /* length of data being decrypted */ |
92 | 0 | unsigned int outlen; /* length of decrypted data */ |
93 | 0 | unsigned int buflen; /* length available for decrypted data */ |
94 | 0 | SECItem *plain; |
95 | 0 |
|
96 | 0 | inlen = len; |
97 | 0 | buflen = sec_PKCS7DecryptLength(worker->decryptobj, inlen, final); |
98 | 0 | if (buflen == 0) { |
99 | 0 | if (inlen == 0) /* no input and no output */ |
100 | 0 | return; |
101 | 0 | /* |
102 | 0 | * No output is expected, but the input data may be buffered |
103 | 0 | * so we still have to call Decrypt. |
104 | 0 | */ |
105 | 0 | rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt(worker->decryptobj, NULL, NULL, 0, |
106 | 0 | data, inlen, final); |
107 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
108 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
109 | 0 | return; /* XXX indicate error? */ |
110 | 0 | } |
111 | 0 | return; |
112 | 0 | } |
113 | 0 | |
114 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) { |
115 | 0 | buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(buflen); |
116 | 0 | plain = NULL; |
117 | 0 | } else { |
118 | 0 | unsigned long oldlen; |
119 | 0 |
|
120 | 0 | /* |
121 | 0 | * XXX This assumes one level of content only. |
122 | 0 | * See comment above about nested content types. |
123 | 0 | * XXX Also, it should work for signedAndEnvelopedData, too! |
124 | 0 | */ |
125 | 0 | plain = &(p7dcx->cinfo->content.envelopedData->encContentInfo.plainContent); |
126 | 0 |
|
127 | 0 | oldlen = plain->len; |
128 | 0 | if (oldlen == 0) { |
129 | 0 | buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7dcx->cinfo->poolp, |
130 | 0 | buflen); |
131 | 0 | } else { |
132 | 0 | buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaGrow(p7dcx->cinfo->poolp, |
133 | 0 | plain->data, |
134 | 0 | oldlen, oldlen + buflen); |
135 | 0 | if (buf != NULL) |
136 | 0 | buf += oldlen; |
137 | 0 | } |
138 | 0 | plain->data = buf; |
139 | 0 | } |
140 | 0 | if (buf == NULL) { |
141 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; |
142 | 0 | return; /* XXX indicate error? */ |
143 | 0 | } |
144 | 0 | rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt(worker->decryptobj, buf, &outlen, buflen, |
145 | 0 | data, inlen, final); |
146 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
147 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
148 | 0 | return; /* XXX indicate error? */ |
149 | 0 | } |
150 | 0 | if (plain != NULL) { |
151 | 0 | PORT_Assert(final || outlen == buflen); |
152 | 0 | plain->len += outlen; |
153 | 0 | } |
154 | 0 | data = buf; |
155 | 0 | len = outlen; |
156 | 0 | } |
157 | 0 |
|
158 | 0 | /* |
159 | 0 | * Update the running digests. |
160 | 0 | */ |
161 | 0 | if (len) { |
162 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++) { |
163 | 0 | (*worker->digobjs[i]->update)(worker->digcxs[i], data, len); |
164 | 0 | } |
165 | 0 | } |
166 | 0 |
|
167 | 0 | /* |
168 | 0 | * Pass back the contents bytes, and free the temporary buffer. |
169 | 0 | */ |
170 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) { |
171 | 0 | if (len) |
172 | 0 | (*p7dcx->cb)(p7dcx->cb_arg, (const char *)data, len); |
173 | 0 | if (worker->decryptobj != NULL) { |
174 | 0 | PORT_Assert(buf != NULL); |
175 | 0 | PORT_Free(buf); |
176 | 0 | } |
177 | 0 | } |
178 | 0 | } |
179 | | |
180 | | static void |
181 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter(void *arg, const char *data, unsigned long len, |
182 | | int depth, SEC_ASN1EncodingPart data_kind) |
183 | 0 | { |
184 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx; |
185 | 0 | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker; |
186 | 0 |
|
187 | 0 | /* |
188 | 0 | * Since we do not handle any nested contents, the only bytes we |
189 | 0 | * are really interested in are the actual contents bytes (not |
190 | 0 | * the identifier, length, or end-of-contents bytes). If we were |
191 | 0 | * handling nested types we would probably need to do something |
192 | 0 | * smarter based on depth and data_kind. |
193 | 0 | */ |
194 | 0 | if (data_kind != SEC_ASN1_Contents) |
195 | 0 | return; |
196 | 0 | |
197 | 0 | /* |
198 | 0 | * The ASN.1 decoder should not even call us with a length of 0. |
199 | 0 | * Just being paranoid. |
200 | 0 | */ |
201 | 0 | PORT_Assert(len); |
202 | 0 | if (len == 0) |
203 | 0 | return; |
204 | 0 | |
205 | 0 | p7dcx = (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *)arg; |
206 | 0 |
|
207 | 0 | /* |
208 | 0 | * Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain |
209 | 0 | * of workers -- one per each level of content. The following |
210 | 0 | * would start with the first worker and loop over them. |
211 | 0 | */ |
212 | 0 | worker = &(p7dcx->worker); |
213 | 0 |
|
214 | 0 | worker->saw_contents = PR_TRUE; |
215 | 0 |
|
216 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data(p7dcx, worker, |
217 | 0 | (const unsigned char *)data, len, PR_FALSE); |
218 | 0 | } |
219 | | |
220 | | /* |
221 | | * Create digest contexts for each algorithm in "digestalgs". |
222 | | * No algorithms is not an error, we just do not do anything. |
223 | | * An error (like trouble allocating memory), marks the error |
224 | | * in "p7dcx" and returns SECFailure, which means that our caller |
225 | | * should just give up altogether. |
226 | | */ |
227 | | static SECStatus |
228 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int depth, |
229 | | SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs) |
230 | 0 | { |
231 | 0 | int i, digcnt; |
232 | 0 |
|
233 | 0 | if (digestalgs == NULL) |
234 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
235 | 0 | |
236 | 0 | /* |
237 | 0 | * Count the algorithms. |
238 | 0 | */ |
239 | 0 | digcnt = 0; |
240 | 0 | while (digestalgs[digcnt] != NULL) |
241 | 0 | digcnt++; |
242 | 0 |
|
243 | 0 | /* |
244 | 0 | * No algorithms means no work to do. |
245 | 0 | * Just act as if there were no algorithms specified. |
246 | 0 | */ |
247 | 0 | if (digcnt == 0) |
248 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
249 | 0 | |
250 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcxs = (void **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, |
251 | 0 | digcnt * sizeof(void *)); |
252 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digobjs = (const SECHashObject **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, |
253 | 0 | digcnt * sizeof(SECHashObject *)); |
254 | 0 | if (p7dcx->worker.digcxs == NULL || p7dcx->worker.digobjs == NULL) { |
255 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; |
256 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
257 | 0 | } |
258 | 0 | |
259 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.depth = depth; |
260 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcnt = 0; |
261 | 0 |
|
262 | 0 | /* |
263 | 0 | * Create a digest context for each algorithm. |
264 | 0 | */ |
265 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < digcnt; i++) { |
266 | 0 | SECAlgorithmID *algid = digestalgs[i]; |
267 | 0 | SECOidTag oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(algid->algorithm)); |
268 | 0 | const SECHashObject *digobj = HASH_GetHashObjectByOidTag(oidTag); |
269 | 0 | void *digcx; |
270 | 0 |
|
271 | 0 | /* |
272 | 0 | * Skip any algorithm we do not even recognize; obviously, |
273 | 0 | * this could be a problem, but if it is critical then the |
274 | 0 | * result will just be that the signature does not verify. |
275 | 0 | * We do not necessarily want to error out here, because |
276 | 0 | * the particular algorithm may not actually be important, |
277 | 0 | * but we cannot know that until later. |
278 | 0 | */ |
279 | 0 | if (digobj == NULL) { |
280 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcnt--; |
281 | 0 | continue; |
282 | 0 | } |
283 | 0 | |
284 | 0 | digcx = (*digobj->create)(); |
285 | 0 | if (digcx != NULL) { |
286 | 0 | (*digobj->begin)(digcx); |
287 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digobjs[p7dcx->worker.digcnt] = digobj; |
288 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcxs[p7dcx->worker.digcnt] = digcx; |
289 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcnt++; |
290 | 0 | } |
291 | 0 | } |
292 | 0 |
|
293 | 0 | if (p7dcx->worker.digcnt != 0) |
294 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx, |
295 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter, |
296 | 0 | p7dcx, |
297 | 0 | (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL)); |
298 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
299 | 0 | } |
300 | | |
301 | | /* |
302 | | * Close out all of the digest contexts, storing the results in "digestsp". |
303 | | */ |
304 | | static SECStatus |
305 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
306 | | PLArenaPool *poolp, |
307 | | SECItem ***digestsp) |
308 | 0 | { |
309 | 0 | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker; |
310 | 0 | const SECHashObject *digobj; |
311 | 0 | void *digcx; |
312 | 0 | SECItem **digests, *digest; |
313 | 0 | int i; |
314 | 0 | void *mark; |
315 | 0 |
|
316 | 0 | /* |
317 | 0 | * XXX Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain |
318 | 0 | * of workers -- one per each level of content. The following |
319 | 0 | * would want to find the last worker in the chain. |
320 | 0 | */ |
321 | 0 | worker = &(p7dcx->worker); |
322 | 0 |
|
323 | 0 | /* |
324 | 0 | * If no digests, then we have nothing to do. |
325 | 0 | */ |
326 | 0 | if (worker->digcnt == 0) |
327 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
328 | 0 | |
329 | 0 | /* |
330 | 0 | * No matter what happens after this, we want to stop filtering. |
331 | 0 | * XXX If we handle nested contents, we only want to stop filtering |
332 | 0 | * if we are finishing off the *last* worker. |
333 | 0 | */ |
334 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
335 | 0 |
|
336 | 0 | /* |
337 | 0 | * If we ended up with no contents, just destroy each |
338 | 0 | * digest context -- they are meaningless and potentially |
339 | 0 | * confusing, because their presence would imply some content |
340 | 0 | * was digested. |
341 | 0 | */ |
342 | 0 | if (!worker->saw_contents) { |
343 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++) { |
344 | 0 | digcx = worker->digcxs[i]; |
345 | 0 | digobj = worker->digobjs[i]; |
346 | 0 | (*digobj->destroy)(digcx, PR_TRUE); |
347 | 0 | } |
348 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
349 | 0 | } |
350 | 0 |
|
351 | 0 | mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp); |
352 | 0 |
|
353 | 0 | /* |
354 | 0 | * Close out each digest context, saving digest away. |
355 | 0 | */ |
356 | 0 | digests = |
357 | 0 | (SECItem **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, (worker->digcnt + 1) * sizeof(SECItem *)); |
358 | 0 | digest = (SECItem *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, worker->digcnt * sizeof(SECItem)); |
359 | 0 | if (digests == NULL || digest == NULL) { |
360 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
361 | 0 | PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark); |
362 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
363 | 0 | } |
364 | 0 |
|
365 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++, digest++) { |
366 | 0 | digcx = worker->digcxs[i]; |
367 | 0 | digobj = worker->digobjs[i]; |
368 | 0 |
|
369 | 0 | digest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, digobj->length); |
370 | 0 | if (digest->data == NULL) { |
371 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
372 | 0 | PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark); |
373 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
374 | 0 | } |
375 | 0 |
|
376 | 0 | digest->len = digobj->length; |
377 | 0 | (*digobj->end)(digcx, digest->data, &(digest->len), digest->len); |
378 | 0 | (*digobj->destroy)(digcx, PR_TRUE); |
379 | 0 |
|
380 | 0 | digests[i] = digest; |
381 | 0 | } |
382 | 0 | digests[i] = NULL; |
383 | 0 | *digestsp = digests; |
384 | 0 |
|
385 | 0 | PORT_ArenaUnmark(poolp, mark); |
386 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
387 | 0 | } |
388 | | |
389 | | /* |
390 | | * XXX Need comment explaining following helper function (which is used |
391 | | * by sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt). |
392 | | */ |
393 | | |
394 | | static PK11SymKey * |
395 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_get_recipient_key(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
396 | | SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos, |
397 | | SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo) |
398 | 0 | { |
399 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *ri; |
400 | 0 | CERTCertificate *cert = NULL; |
401 | 0 | SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey = NULL; |
402 | 0 | PK11SymKey *bulkkey = NULL; |
403 | 0 | SECOidTag keyalgtag, bulkalgtag, encalgtag; |
404 | 0 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; |
405 | 0 |
|
406 | 0 | if (recipientinfos == NULL || recipientinfos[0] == NULL) { |
407 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT; |
408 | 0 | goto no_key_found; |
409 | 0 | } |
410 | 0 | |
411 | 0 | cert = PK11_FindCertAndKeyByRecipientList(&slot, recipientinfos, &ri, |
412 | 0 | &privkey, p7dcx->pwfn_arg); |
413 | 0 | if (cert == NULL) { |
414 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT; |
415 | 0 | goto no_key_found; |
416 | 0 | } |
417 | 0 | |
418 | 0 | ri->cert = cert; /* so we can find it later */ |
419 | 0 | PORT_Assert(privkey != NULL); |
420 | 0 |
|
421 | 0 | keyalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm)); |
422 | 0 | encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->keyEncAlg)); |
423 | 0 | if (keyalgtag != encalgtag) { |
424 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_KEYALG_MISMATCH; |
425 | 0 | goto no_key_found; |
426 | 0 | } |
427 | 0 | bulkalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg)); |
428 | 0 |
|
429 | 0 | switch (encalgtag) { |
430 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
431 | 0 | bulkkey = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(privkey, &ri->encKey, |
432 | 0 | PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(bulkalgtag), |
433 | 0 | CKA_DECRYPT, 0); |
434 | 0 | if (bulkkey == NULL) { |
435 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
436 | 0 | PORT_SetError(0); |
437 | 0 | goto no_key_found; |
438 | 0 | } |
439 | 0 | break; |
440 | 0 | default: |
441 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG; |
442 | 0 | break; |
443 | 0 | } |
444 | 0 | |
445 | 0 | no_key_found: |
446 | 0 | if (privkey != NULL) |
447 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey); |
448 | 0 | if (slot != NULL) |
449 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
450 | 0 |
|
451 | 0 | return bulkkey; |
452 | 0 | } |
453 | | |
454 | | /* |
455 | | * XXX The following comment is old -- the function used to only handle |
456 | | * EnvelopedData or SignedAndEnvelopedData but now handles EncryptedData |
457 | | * as well (and it had all of the code of the helper function above |
458 | | * built into it), though the comment was left as is. Fix it... |
459 | | * |
460 | | * We are just about to decode the content of an EnvelopedData. |
461 | | * Set up a decryption context so we can decrypt as we go. |
462 | | * Presumably we are one of the recipients listed in "recipientinfos". |
463 | | * (XXX And if we are not, or if we have trouble, what should we do? |
464 | | * It would be nice to let the decoding still work. Maybe it should |
465 | | * be an error if there is a content callback, but not an error otherwise?) |
466 | | * The encryption key and related information can be found in "enccinfo". |
467 | | */ |
468 | | static SECStatus |
469 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int depth, |
470 | | SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos, |
471 | | SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo, |
472 | | PK11SymKey **copy_key_for_signature) |
473 | 0 | { |
474 | 0 | PK11SymKey *bulkkey = NULL; |
475 | 0 | sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj; |
476 | 0 |
|
477 | 0 | /* |
478 | 0 | * If a callback is supplied to retrieve the encryption key, |
479 | 0 | * for instance, for Encrypted Content infos, then retrieve |
480 | 0 | * the bulkkey from the callback. Otherwise, assume that |
481 | 0 | * we are processing Enveloped or SignedAndEnveloped data |
482 | 0 | * content infos. |
483 | 0 | * |
484 | 0 | * XXX Put an assert here? |
485 | 0 | */ |
486 | 0 | if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(p7dcx->cinfo) == SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA) { |
487 | 0 | if (p7dcx->dkcb != NULL) { |
488 | 0 | bulkkey = (*p7dcx->dkcb)(p7dcx->dkcb_arg, |
489 | 0 | &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg)); |
490 | 0 | } |
491 | 0 | enccinfo->keysize = 0; |
492 | 0 | } else { |
493 | 0 | bulkkey = sec_pkcs7_decoder_get_recipient_key(p7dcx, recipientinfos, |
494 | 0 | enccinfo); |
495 | 0 | if (bulkkey == NULL) |
496 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
497 | 0 | enccinfo->keysize = PK11_GetKeyStrength(bulkkey, |
498 | 0 | &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg)); |
499 | 0 | } |
500 | 0 |
|
501 | 0 | /* |
502 | 0 | * XXX I think following should set error in p7dcx and clear set error |
503 | 0 | * (as used to be done here, or as is done in get_receipient_key above. |
504 | 0 | */ |
505 | 0 | if (bulkkey == NULL) { |
506 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
507 | 0 | } |
508 | 0 | |
509 | 0 | /* |
510 | 0 | * We want to make sure decryption is allowed. This is done via |
511 | 0 | * a callback specified in SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(). |
512 | 0 | */ |
513 | 0 | if (p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb) { |
514 | 0 | if ((*p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb)(&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg), |
515 | 0 | bulkkey) == PR_FALSE) { |
516 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_DECRYPTION_DISALLOWED; |
517 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
518 | 0 | } |
519 | 0 | } else { |
520 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_DECRYPTION_DISALLOWED; |
521 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
522 | 0 | } |
523 | 0 | |
524 | 0 | /* |
525 | 0 | * When decrypting a signedAndEnvelopedData, the signature also has |
526 | 0 | * to be decrypted with the bulk encryption key; to avoid having to |
527 | 0 | * get it all over again later (and do another potentially expensive |
528 | 0 | * RSA operation), copy it for later signature verification to use. |
529 | 0 | */ |
530 | 0 | if (copy_key_for_signature != NULL) |
531 | 0 | *copy_key_for_signature = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(bulkkey); |
532 | 0 |
|
533 | 0 | /* |
534 | 0 | * Now we have the bulk encryption key (in bulkkey) and the |
535 | 0 | * the algorithm (in enccinfo->contentEncAlg). Using those, |
536 | 0 | * create a decryption context. |
537 | 0 | */ |
538 | 0 | decryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject(bulkkey, |
539 | 0 | &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg)); |
540 | 0 |
|
541 | 0 | /* |
542 | 0 | * We are done with (this) bulkkey now. |
543 | 0 | */ |
544 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(bulkkey); |
545 | 0 |
|
546 | 0 | if (decryptobj == NULL) { |
547 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
548 | 0 | PORT_SetError(0); |
549 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
550 | 0 | } |
551 | 0 |
|
552 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx, |
553 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter, |
554 | 0 | p7dcx, |
555 | 0 | (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL)); |
556 | 0 |
|
557 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.depth = depth; |
558 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.decryptobj = decryptobj; |
559 | 0 |
|
560 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
561 | 0 | |
562 | 0 | no_decryption: |
563 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(bulkkey); |
564 | 0 | /* |
565 | 0 | * For some reason (error set already, if appropriate), we cannot |
566 | 0 | * decrypt the content. I am not sure what exactly is the right |
567 | 0 | * thing to do here; in some cases we want to just stop, and in |
568 | 0 | * others we want to let the decoding finish even though we cannot |
569 | 0 | * decrypt the content. My current thinking is that if the caller |
570 | 0 | * set up a content callback, then they are really interested in |
571 | 0 | * getting (decrypted) content, and if they cannot they will want |
572 | 0 | * to know about it. However, if no callback was specified, then |
573 | 0 | * maybe it is not important that the decryption failed. |
574 | 0 | */ |
575 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) |
576 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
577 | 0 | else |
578 | 0 | return SECSuccess; /* Let the decoding continue. */ |
579 | 0 | } |
580 | | |
581 | | static SECStatus |
582 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
583 | | PLArenaPool *poolp, |
584 | | SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo) |
585 | 0 | { |
586 | 0 | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker; |
587 | 0 |
|
588 | 0 | /* |
589 | 0 | * XXX Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain |
590 | 0 | * of workers -- one per each level of content. The following |
591 | 0 | * would want to find the last worker in the chain. |
592 | 0 | */ |
593 | 0 | worker = &(p7dcx->worker); |
594 | 0 |
|
595 | 0 | /* |
596 | 0 | * If no decryption context, then we have nothing to do. |
597 | 0 | */ |
598 | 0 | if (worker->decryptobj == NULL) |
599 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
600 | 0 | |
601 | 0 | /* |
602 | 0 | * No matter what happens after this, we want to stop filtering. |
603 | 0 | * XXX If we handle nested contents, we only want to stop filtering |
604 | 0 | * if we are finishing off the *last* worker. |
605 | 0 | */ |
606 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
607 | 0 |
|
608 | 0 | /* |
609 | 0 | * Handle the last block. |
610 | 0 | */ |
611 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data(p7dcx, worker, NULL, 0, PR_TRUE); |
612 | 0 |
|
613 | 0 | /* |
614 | 0 | * All done, destroy it. |
615 | 0 | */ |
616 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(worker->decryptobj); |
617 | 0 | worker->decryptobj = NULL; |
618 | 0 |
|
619 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
620 | 0 | } |
621 | | |
622 | | static void |
623 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_notify(void *arg, PRBool before, void *dest, int depth) |
624 | 0 | { |
625 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx; |
626 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo; |
627 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sigd; |
628 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envd; |
629 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saed; |
630 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encd; |
631 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DigestedData *digd; |
632 | 0 | PRBool after; |
633 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
634 | 0 |
|
635 | 0 | /* |
636 | 0 | * Just to make the code easier to read, create an "after" variable |
637 | 0 | * that is equivalent to "not before". |
638 | 0 | * (This used to be just the statement "after = !before", but that |
639 | 0 | * causes a warning on the mac; to avoid that, we do it the long way.) |
640 | 0 | */ |
641 | 0 | if (before) |
642 | 0 | after = PR_FALSE; |
643 | 0 | else |
644 | 0 | after = PR_TRUE; |
645 | 0 |
|
646 | 0 | p7dcx = (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *)arg; |
647 | 0 | if (!p7dcx) { |
648 | 0 | return; |
649 | 0 | } |
650 | 0 | |
651 | 0 | cinfo = p7dcx->cinfo; |
652 | 0 |
|
653 | 0 | if (!cinfo) { |
654 | 0 | return; |
655 | 0 | } |
656 | 0 | |
657 | 0 | if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == NULL) { |
658 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(cinfo->contentType)) |
659 | 0 | cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOID(&(cinfo->contentType)); |
660 | 0 | return; |
661 | 0 | } |
662 | 0 |
|
663 | 0 | switch (cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset) { |
664 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: |
665 | 0 | sigd = cinfo->content.signedData; |
666 | 0 | if (sigd == NULL) |
667 | 0 | break; |
668 | 0 | |
669 | 0 | if (sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) { |
670 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.contentType)) |
671 | 0 | sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag = |
672 | 0 | SECOID_FindOID(&(sigd->contentInfo.contentType)); |
673 | 0 | break; |
674 | 0 | } |
675 | 0 |
|
676 | 0 | /* |
677 | 0 | * We only set up a filtering digest if the content is |
678 | 0 | * plain DATA; anything else needs more work because a |
679 | 0 | * second pass is required to produce a DER encoding from |
680 | 0 | * an input that can be BER encoded. (This is a requirement |
681 | 0 | * of PKCS7 that is unfortunate, but there you have it.) |
682 | 0 | * |
683 | 0 | * XXX Also, since we stop here if this is not DATA, the |
684 | 0 | * inner content is not getting processed at all. Someday |
685 | 0 | * we may want to fix that. |
686 | 0 | */ |
687 | 0 | if (sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag->offset != SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA) { |
688 | 0 | /* XXX Set an error in p7dcx->error */ |
689 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
690 | 0 | break; |
691 | 0 | } |
692 | 0 |
|
693 | 0 | /* |
694 | 0 | * Just before the content, we want to set up a digest context |
695 | 0 | * for each digest algorithm listed, and start a filter which |
696 | 0 | * will run all of the contents bytes through that digest. |
697 | 0 | */ |
698 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content)) { |
699 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests(p7dcx, depth, |
700 | 0 | sigd->digestAlgorithms); |
701 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
702 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
703 | 0 |
|
704 | 0 | break; |
705 | 0 | } |
706 | 0 |
|
707 | 0 | /* |
708 | 0 | * XXX To handle nested types, here is where we would want |
709 | 0 | * to check for inner boundaries that need handling. |
710 | 0 | */ |
711 | 0 |
|
712 | 0 | /* |
713 | 0 | * Are we done? |
714 | 0 | */ |
715 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content)) { |
716 | 0 | /* |
717 | 0 | * Close out the digest contexts. We ignore any error |
718 | 0 | * because we are stopping anyway; the error status left |
719 | 0 | * behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions. |
720 | 0 | */ |
721 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
722 | 0 | &(sigd->digests)); |
723 | 0 |
|
724 | 0 | /* |
725 | 0 | * XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove |
726 | 0 | * the worker from the chain (and free it). |
727 | 0 | */ |
728 | 0 |
|
729 | 0 | /* |
730 | 0 | * Stop notify. |
731 | 0 | */ |
732 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
733 | 0 | } |
734 | 0 | break; |
735 | 0 |
|
736 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
737 | 0 | envd = cinfo->content.envelopedData; |
738 | 0 | if (envd == NULL) |
739 | 0 | break; |
740 | 0 | |
741 | 0 | if (envd->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) { |
742 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.contentType)) |
743 | 0 | envd->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag = |
744 | 0 | SECOID_FindOID(&(envd->encContentInfo.contentType)); |
745 | 0 | break; |
746 | 0 | } |
747 | 0 |
|
748 | 0 | /* |
749 | 0 | * Just before the content, we want to set up a decryption |
750 | 0 | * context, and start a filter which will run all of the |
751 | 0 | * contents bytes through it to determine the plain content. |
752 | 0 | */ |
753 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
754 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(p7dcx, depth, |
755 | 0 | envd->recipientInfos, |
756 | 0 | &(envd->encContentInfo), |
757 | 0 | NULL); |
758 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
759 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
760 | 0 |
|
761 | 0 | break; |
762 | 0 | } |
763 | 0 |
|
764 | 0 | /* |
765 | 0 | * Are we done? |
766 | 0 | */ |
767 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
768 | 0 | /* |
769 | 0 | * Close out the decryption context. We ignore any error |
770 | 0 | * because we are stopping anyway; the error status left |
771 | 0 | * behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions. |
772 | 0 | */ |
773 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
774 | 0 | &(envd->encContentInfo)); |
775 | 0 |
|
776 | 0 | /* |
777 | 0 | * XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove |
778 | 0 | * the worker from the chain (and free it). |
779 | 0 | */ |
780 | 0 |
|
781 | 0 | /* |
782 | 0 | * Stop notify. |
783 | 0 | */ |
784 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
785 | 0 | } |
786 | 0 | break; |
787 | 0 |
|
788 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
789 | 0 | saed = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData; |
790 | 0 | if (saed == NULL) |
791 | 0 | break; |
792 | 0 | |
793 | 0 | if (saed->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) { |
794 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.contentType)) |
795 | 0 | saed->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag = |
796 | 0 | SECOID_FindOID(&(saed->encContentInfo.contentType)); |
797 | 0 | break; |
798 | 0 | } |
799 | 0 |
|
800 | 0 | /* |
801 | 0 | * Just before the content, we want to set up a decryption |
802 | 0 | * context *and* digest contexts, and start a filter which |
803 | 0 | * will run all of the contents bytes through both. |
804 | 0 | */ |
805 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
806 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(p7dcx, depth, |
807 | 0 | saed->recipientInfos, |
808 | 0 | &(saed->encContentInfo), |
809 | 0 | &(saed->sigKey)); |
810 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess) |
811 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests(p7dcx, depth, |
812 | 0 | saed->digestAlgorithms); |
813 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
814 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
815 | 0 |
|
816 | 0 | break; |
817 | 0 | } |
818 | 0 |
|
819 | 0 | /* |
820 | 0 | * Are we done? |
821 | 0 | */ |
822 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
823 | 0 | /* |
824 | 0 | * Close out the decryption and digests contexts. |
825 | 0 | * We ignore any errors because we are stopping anyway; |
826 | 0 | * the error status left behind in p7dcx will be seen by |
827 | 0 | * outer functions. |
828 | 0 | * |
829 | 0 | * Note that the decrypt stuff must be called first; |
830 | 0 | * it may have a last buffer to do which in turn has |
831 | 0 | * to be added to the digest. |
832 | 0 | */ |
833 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
834 | 0 | &(saed->encContentInfo)); |
835 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
836 | 0 | &(saed->digests)); |
837 | 0 |
|
838 | 0 | /* |
839 | 0 | * XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove |
840 | 0 | * the worker from the chain (and free it). |
841 | 0 | */ |
842 | 0 |
|
843 | 0 | /* |
844 | 0 | * Stop notify. |
845 | 0 | */ |
846 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
847 | 0 | } |
848 | 0 | break; |
849 | 0 |
|
850 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
851 | 0 | digd = cinfo->content.digestedData; |
852 | 0 |
|
853 | 0 | /* |
854 | 0 | * XXX Want to do the digest or not? Maybe future enhancement... |
855 | 0 | */ |
856 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content.data)) { |
857 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx, sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter, |
858 | 0 | p7dcx, |
859 | 0 | (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL)); |
860 | 0 | break; |
861 | 0 | } |
862 | 0 |
|
863 | 0 | /* |
864 | 0 | * Are we done? |
865 | 0 | */ |
866 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content.data)) { |
867 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
868 | 0 | } |
869 | 0 | break; |
870 | 0 |
|
871 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
872 | 0 | encd = cinfo->content.encryptedData; |
873 | 0 |
|
874 | 0 | if (!encd) { |
875 | 0 | break; |
876 | 0 | } |
877 | 0 | |
878 | 0 | /* |
879 | 0 | * XXX If the decryption key callback is set, we want to start |
880 | 0 | * the decryption. If the callback is not set, we will treat the |
881 | 0 | * content as plain data, since we do not have the key. |
882 | 0 | * |
883 | 0 | * Is this the proper thing to do? |
884 | 0 | */ |
885 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
886 | 0 | /* |
887 | 0 | * Start the encryption process if the decryption key callback |
888 | 0 | * is present. Otherwise, treat the content like plain data. |
889 | 0 | */ |
890 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
891 | 0 | if (p7dcx->dkcb != NULL) { |
892 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(p7dcx, depth, NULL, |
893 | 0 | &(encd->encContentInfo), |
894 | 0 | NULL); |
895 | 0 | } |
896 | 0 |
|
897 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
898 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
899 | 0 |
|
900 | 0 | break; |
901 | 0 | } |
902 | 0 |
|
903 | 0 | /* |
904 | 0 | * Are we done? |
905 | 0 | */ |
906 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
907 | 0 | /* |
908 | 0 | * Close out the decryption context. We ignore any error |
909 | 0 | * because we are stopping anyway; the error status left |
910 | 0 | * behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions. |
911 | 0 | */ |
912 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
913 | 0 | &(encd->encContentInfo)); |
914 | 0 |
|
915 | 0 | /* |
916 | 0 | * Stop notify. |
917 | 0 | */ |
918 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
919 | 0 | } |
920 | 0 | break; |
921 | 0 |
|
922 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
923 | 0 | /* |
924 | 0 | * If a output callback has been specified, we want to set the filter |
925 | 0 | * to call the callback. This is taken care of in |
926 | 0 | * sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt() or |
927 | 0 | * sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests() for the other content types. |
928 | 0 | */ |
929 | 0 |
|
930 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(cinfo->content.data)) { |
931 | 0 |
|
932 | 0 | /* |
933 | 0 | * Set the filter proc up. |
934 | 0 | */ |
935 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx, |
936 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter, |
937 | 0 | p7dcx, |
938 | 0 | (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL)); |
939 | 0 | break; |
940 | 0 | } |
941 | 0 |
|
942 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(cinfo->content.data)) { |
943 | 0 | /* |
944 | 0 | * Time to clean up after ourself, stop the Notify and Filter |
945 | 0 | * procedures. |
946 | 0 | */ |
947 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
948 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
949 | 0 | } |
950 | 0 | break; |
951 | 0 |
|
952 | 0 | default: |
953 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
954 | 0 | break; |
955 | 0 | } |
956 | 0 | } |
957 | | |
958 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext * |
959 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb, void *cb_arg, |
960 | | SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg, |
961 | | SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb, |
962 | | void *decrypt_key_cb_arg, |
963 | | SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb) |
964 | 0 | { |
965 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx; |
966 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderContext *dcx; |
967 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo; |
968 | 0 | PLArenaPool *poolp; |
969 | 0 |
|
970 | 0 | poolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); /* XXX what is right value? */ |
971 | 0 | if (poolp == NULL) |
972 | 0 | return NULL; |
973 | 0 | |
974 | 0 | cinfo = (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(*cinfo)); |
975 | 0 | if (cinfo == NULL) { |
976 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE); |
977 | 0 | return NULL; |
978 | 0 | } |
979 | 0 |
|
980 | 0 | cinfo->poolp = poolp; |
981 | 0 | cinfo->pwfn = pwfn; |
982 | 0 | cinfo->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg; |
983 | 0 | cinfo->created = PR_FALSE; |
984 | 0 | cinfo->refCount = 1; |
985 | 0 |
|
986 | 0 | p7dcx = |
987 | 0 | (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext)); |
988 | 0 | if (p7dcx == NULL) { |
989 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE); |
990 | 0 | return NULL; |
991 | 0 | } |
992 | 0 |
|
993 | 0 | p7dcx->tmp_poolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); /* XXX what is right value? */ |
994 | 0 | if (p7dcx->tmp_poolp == NULL) { |
995 | 0 | PORT_Free(p7dcx); |
996 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE); |
997 | 0 | return NULL; |
998 | 0 | } |
999 | 0 |
|
1000 | 0 | dcx = SEC_ASN1DecoderStart(poolp, cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate); |
1001 | 0 | if (dcx == NULL) { |
1002 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, PR_FALSE); |
1003 | 0 | PORT_Free(p7dcx); |
1004 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE); |
1005 | 0 | return NULL; |
1006 | 0 | } |
1007 | 0 |
|
1008 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetNotifyProc(dcx, sec_pkcs7_decoder_notify, p7dcx); |
1009 | 0 |
|
1010 | 0 | p7dcx->dcx = dcx; |
1011 | 0 | p7dcx->cinfo = cinfo; |
1012 | 0 | p7dcx->cb = cb; |
1013 | 0 | p7dcx->cb_arg = cb_arg; |
1014 | 0 | p7dcx->pwfn = pwfn; |
1015 | 0 | p7dcx->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg; |
1016 | 0 | p7dcx->dkcb = decrypt_key_cb; |
1017 | 0 | p7dcx->dkcb_arg = decrypt_key_cb_arg; |
1018 | 0 | p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb = decrypt_allowed_cb; |
1019 | 0 |
|
1020 | 0 | return p7dcx; |
1021 | 0 | } |
1022 | | |
1023 | | /* |
1024 | | * Do the next chunk of PKCS7 decoding. If there is a problem, set |
1025 | | * an error and return a failure status. Note that in the case of |
1026 | | * an error, this routine is still prepared to be called again and |
1027 | | * again in case that is the easiest route for our caller to take. |
1028 | | * We simply detect it and do not do anything except keep setting |
1029 | | * that error in case our caller has not noticed it yet... |
1030 | | */ |
1031 | | SECStatus |
1032 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
1033 | | const char *buf, unsigned long len) |
1034 | 0 | { |
1035 | 0 | if (!p7dcx) { |
1036 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
1037 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1038 | 0 | } |
1039 | 0 |
|
1040 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cinfo != NULL && p7dcx->dcx != NULL) { |
1041 | 0 | PORT_Assert(p7dcx->error == 0); |
1042 | 0 | if (p7dcx->error == 0) { |
1043 | 0 | if (SEC_ASN1DecoderUpdate(p7dcx->dcx, buf, len) != SECSuccess) { |
1044 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
1045 | 0 | PORT_Assert(p7dcx->error); |
1046 | 0 | if (p7dcx->error == 0) |
1047 | 0 | p7dcx->error = -1; |
1048 | 0 | } |
1049 | 0 | } |
1050 | 0 | } |
1051 | 0 |
|
1052 | 0 | if (p7dcx->error) { |
1053 | 0 | if (p7dcx->dcx != NULL) { |
1054 | 0 | (void)SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish(p7dcx->dcx); |
1055 | 0 | p7dcx->dcx = NULL; |
1056 | 0 | } |
1057 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cinfo != NULL) { |
1058 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(p7dcx->cinfo); |
1059 | 0 | p7dcx->cinfo = NULL; |
1060 | 0 | } |
1061 | 0 | PORT_SetError(p7dcx->error); |
1062 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1063 | 0 | } |
1064 | 0 |
|
1065 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
1066 | 0 | } |
1067 | | |
1068 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo * |
1069 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx) |
1070 | 0 | { |
1071 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo; |
1072 | 0 |
|
1073 | 0 | cinfo = p7dcx->cinfo; |
1074 | 0 | if (p7dcx->dcx != NULL) { |
1075 | 0 | if (SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish(p7dcx->dcx) != SECSuccess) { |
1076 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo); |
1077 | 0 | cinfo = NULL; |
1078 | 0 | } |
1079 | 0 | } |
1080 | 0 | /* free any NSS data structures */ |
1081 | 0 | if (p7dcx->worker.decryptobj) { |
1082 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(p7dcx->worker.decryptobj); |
1083 | 0 | } |
1084 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, PR_FALSE); |
1085 | 0 | PORT_Free(p7dcx); |
1086 | 0 | return cinfo; |
1087 | 0 | } |
1088 | | |
1089 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo * |
1090 | | SEC_PKCS7DecodeItem(SECItem *p7item, |
1091 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb, void *cb_arg, |
1092 | | SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg, |
1093 | | SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb, |
1094 | | void *decrypt_key_cb_arg, |
1095 | | SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb) |
1096 | 0 | { |
1097 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx; |
1098 | 0 |
|
1099 | 0 | p7dcx = SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(cb, cb_arg, pwfn, pwfn_arg, decrypt_key_cb, |
1100 | 0 | decrypt_key_cb_arg, decrypt_allowed_cb); |
1101 | 0 | if (!p7dcx) { |
1102 | 0 | /* error code is set */ |
1103 | 0 | return NULL; |
1104 | 0 | } |
1105 | 0 | (void)SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate(p7dcx, (char *)p7item->data, p7item->len); |
1106 | 0 | return SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish(p7dcx); |
1107 | 0 | } |
1108 | | |
1109 | | /* |
1110 | | * Abort the ASN.1 stream. Used by pkcs 12 |
1111 | | */ |
1112 | | void |
1113 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderAbort(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int error) |
1114 | 0 | { |
1115 | 0 | PORT_Assert(p7dcx); |
1116 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderAbort(p7dcx->dcx, error); |
1117 | 0 | } |
1118 | | |
1119 | | /* |
1120 | | * If the thing contains any certs or crls return true; false otherwise. |
1121 | | */ |
1122 | | PRBool |
1123 | | SEC_PKCS7ContainsCertsOrCrls(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1124 | 0 | { |
1125 | 0 | SECOidTag kind; |
1126 | 0 | SECItem **certs; |
1127 | 0 | CERTSignedCrl **crls; |
1128 | 0 |
|
1129 | 0 | kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo); |
1130 | 0 | switch (kind) { |
1131 | 0 | default: |
1132 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1133 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1134 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1135 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1136 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1137 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: |
1138 | 0 | certs = cinfo->content.signedData->rawCerts; |
1139 | 0 | crls = cinfo->content.signedData->crls; |
1140 | 0 | break; |
1141 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1142 | 0 | certs = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->rawCerts; |
1143 | 0 | crls = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->crls; |
1144 | 0 | break; |
1145 | 0 | } |
1146 | 0 | |
1147 | 0 | /* |
1148 | 0 | * I know this could be collapsed, but I was in a mood to be explicit. |
1149 | 0 | */ |
1150 | 0 | if (certs != NULL && certs[0] != NULL) |
1151 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1152 | 0 | else if (crls != NULL && crls[0] != NULL) |
1153 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1154 | 0 | else |
1155 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1156 | 0 | } |
1157 | | |
1158 | | /* return the content length...could use GetContent, however we |
1159 | | * need the encrypted content length |
1160 | | */ |
1161 | | PRBool |
1162 | | SEC_PKCS7IsContentEmpty(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, unsigned int minLen) |
1163 | 0 | { |
1164 | 0 | SECItem *item = NULL; |
1165 | 0 |
|
1166 | 0 | if (cinfo == NULL) { |
1167 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1168 | 0 | } |
1169 | 0 |
|
1170 | 0 | switch (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo)) { |
1171 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1172 | 0 | item = cinfo->content.data; |
1173 | 0 | break; |
1174 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1175 | 0 | item = &cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent; |
1176 | 0 | break; |
1177 | 0 | default: |
1178 | 0 | /* add other types */ |
1179 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1180 | 0 | } |
1181 | 0 | |
1182 | 0 | if (!item) { |
1183 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1184 | 0 | } else if (item->len <= minLen) { |
1185 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1186 | 0 | } |
1187 | 0 |
|
1188 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1189 | 0 | } |
1190 | | |
1191 | | PRBool |
1192 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentIsEncrypted(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1193 | 0 | { |
1194 | 0 | SECOidTag kind; |
1195 | 0 |
|
1196 | 0 | kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo); |
1197 | 0 | switch (kind) { |
1198 | 0 | default: |
1199 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1200 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1201 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: |
1202 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1203 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1204 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1205 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1206 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1207 | 0 | } |
1208 | 0 | } |
1209 | | |
1210 | | /* |
1211 | | * If the PKCS7 content has a signature (not just *could* have a signature) |
1212 | | * return true; false otherwise. This can/should be called before calling |
1213 | | * VerifySignature, which will always indicate failure if no signature is |
1214 | | * present, but that does not mean there even was a signature! |
1215 | | * Note that the content itself can be empty (detached content was sent |
1216 | | * another way); it is the presence of the signature that matters. |
1217 | | */ |
1218 | | PRBool |
1219 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1220 | 0 | { |
1221 | 0 | SECOidTag kind; |
1222 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos; |
1223 | 0 |
|
1224 | 0 | kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo); |
1225 | 0 | switch (kind) { |
1226 | 0 | default: |
1227 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1228 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1229 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1230 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1231 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1232 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: |
1233 | 0 | signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos; |
1234 | 0 | break; |
1235 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1236 | 0 | signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->signerInfos; |
1237 | 0 | break; |
1238 | 0 | } |
1239 | 0 | |
1240 | 0 | /* |
1241 | 0 | * I know this could be collapsed; but I kind of think it will get |
1242 | 0 | * more complicated before I am finished, so... |
1243 | 0 | */ |
1244 | 0 | if (signerinfos != NULL && signerinfos[0] != NULL) |
1245 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1246 | 0 | else |
1247 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1248 | 0 | } |
1249 | | |
1250 | | /* |
1251 | | * sec_pkcs7_verify_signature |
1252 | | * |
1253 | | * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature is good. |
1254 | | * The digest was either calculated earlier (and is stored in the |
1255 | | * contentInfo itself) or is passed in via "detached_digest". |
1256 | | * |
1257 | | * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted |
1258 | | * for the purpose specified by "certusage" at |
1259 | | * - "*atTime" if "atTime" is not null, or |
1260 | | * - the signing time if the signing time is available in "cinfo", or |
1261 | | * - the current time (as returned by PR_Now). |
1262 | | * |
1263 | | * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found |
1264 | | * into our local database. |
1265 | | * |
1266 | | * XXX Each place which returns PR_FALSE should be sure to have a good |
1267 | | * error set for inspection by the caller. Alternatively, we could create |
1268 | | * an enumeration of success and each type of failure and return that |
1269 | | * instead of a boolean. For now, the default in a bad situation is to |
1270 | | * set the error to SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE. But this should be |
1271 | | * reviewed; better (more specific) errors should be possible (to distinguish |
1272 | | * a signature failure from a badly-formed pkcs7 signedData, for example). |
1273 | | * Some of the errors should probably just be SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE, |
1274 | | * but that has a less helpful error string associated with it right now; |
1275 | | * if/when that changes, review and change these as needed. |
1276 | | * |
1277 | | * XXX This is broken wrt signedAndEnvelopedData. In that case, the |
1278 | | * message digest is doubly encrypted -- first encrypted with the signer |
1279 | | * private key but then again encrypted with the bulk encryption key used |
1280 | | * to encrypt the content. So before we can pass the digest to VerifyDigest, |
1281 | | * we need to decrypt it with the bulk encryption key. Also, in this case, |
1282 | | * there should be NO authenticatedAttributes (signerinfo->authAttr should |
1283 | | * be NULL). |
1284 | | */ |
1285 | | static PRBool |
1286 | | sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, |
1287 | | SECCertUsage certusage, |
1288 | | const SECItem *detached_digest, |
1289 | | HASH_HashType digest_type, |
1290 | | PRBool keepcerts, |
1291 | | const PRTime *atTime) |
1292 | 0 | { |
1293 | 0 | SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs, *bulkid; |
1294 | 0 | const SECItem *digest; |
1295 | 0 | SECItem **digests; |
1296 | 0 | SECItem **rawcerts; |
1297 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos, *signerinfo; |
1298 | 0 | CERTCertificate *cert, **certs; |
1299 | 0 | PRBool goodsig; |
1300 | 0 | CERTCertDBHandle *certdb, *defaultdb; |
1301 | 0 | SECOidTag encTag, digestTag; |
1302 | 0 | HASH_HashType found_type; |
1303 | 0 | int i, certcount; |
1304 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *publickey; |
1305 | 0 | SECItem *content_type; |
1306 | 0 | PK11SymKey *sigkey; |
1307 | 0 | SECItem *encoded_stime; |
1308 | 0 | PRTime stime; |
1309 | 0 | PRTime verificationTime; |
1310 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
1311 | 0 |
|
1312 | 0 | /* |
1313 | 0 | * Everything needed in order to "goto done" safely. |
1314 | 0 | */ |
1315 | 0 | goodsig = PR_FALSE; |
1316 | 0 | certcount = 0; |
1317 | 0 | cert = NULL; |
1318 | 0 | certs = NULL; |
1319 | 0 | certdb = NULL; |
1320 | 0 | defaultdb = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(); |
1321 | 0 | publickey = NULL; |
1322 | 0 |
|
1323 | 0 | if (!SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned(cinfo)) { |
1324 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1325 | 0 | goto done; |
1326 | 0 | } |
1327 | 0 |
|
1328 | 0 | PORT_Assert(cinfo->contentTypeTag != NULL); |
1329 | 0 |
|
1330 | 0 | switch (cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset) { |
1331 | 0 | default: |
1332 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1333 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1334 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1335 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1336 | 0 | /* Could only get here if SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned is broken. */ |
1337 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
1338 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: { |
1339 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp; |
1340 | 0 |
|
1341 | 0 | sdp = cinfo->content.signedData; |
1342 | 0 | digestalgs = sdp->digestAlgorithms; |
1343 | 0 | digests = sdp->digests; |
1344 | 0 | rawcerts = sdp->rawCerts; |
1345 | 0 | signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos; |
1346 | 0 | content_type = &(sdp->contentInfo.contentType); |
1347 | 0 | sigkey = NULL; |
1348 | 0 | bulkid = NULL; |
1349 | 0 | } break; |
1350 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: { |
1351 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp; |
1352 | 0 |
|
1353 | 0 | saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData; |
1354 | 0 | digestalgs = saedp->digestAlgorithms; |
1355 | 0 | digests = saedp->digests; |
1356 | 0 | rawcerts = saedp->rawCerts; |
1357 | 0 | signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos; |
1358 | 0 | content_type = &(saedp->encContentInfo.contentType); |
1359 | 0 | sigkey = saedp->sigKey; |
1360 | 0 | bulkid = &(saedp->encContentInfo.contentEncAlg); |
1361 | 0 | } break; |
1362 | 0 | } |
1363 | 0 | |
1364 | 0 | if ((signerinfos == NULL) || (signerinfos[0] == NULL)) { |
1365 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1366 | 0 | goto done; |
1367 | 0 | } |
1368 | 0 |
|
1369 | 0 | /* |
1370 | 0 | * XXX Need to handle multiple signatures; checking them is easy, |
1371 | 0 | * but what should be the semantics here (like, return value)? |
1372 | 0 | */ |
1373 | 0 | if (signerinfos[1] != NULL) { |
1374 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1375 | 0 | goto done; |
1376 | 0 | } |
1377 | 0 |
|
1378 | 0 | signerinfo = signerinfos[0]; |
1379 | 0 |
|
1380 | 0 | /* |
1381 | 0 | * XXX I would like to just pass the issuerAndSN, along with the rawcerts |
1382 | 0 | * and crls, to some function that did all of this certificate stuff |
1383 | 0 | * (open/close the database if necessary, verifying the certs, etc.) |
1384 | 0 | * and gave me back a cert pointer if all was good. |
1385 | 0 | */ |
1386 | 0 | certdb = defaultdb; |
1387 | 0 | if (certdb == NULL) { |
1388 | 0 | goto done; |
1389 | 0 | } |
1390 | 0 | |
1391 | 0 | certcount = 0; |
1392 | 0 | if (rawcerts != NULL) { |
1393 | 0 | for (; rawcerts[certcount] != NULL; certcount++) { |
1394 | 0 | /* just counting */ |
1395 | 0 | } |
1396 | 0 | } |
1397 | 0 |
|
1398 | 0 | /* |
1399 | 0 | * Note that the result of this is that each cert in "certs" |
1400 | 0 | * needs to be destroyed. |
1401 | 0 | */ |
1402 | 0 | rv = CERT_ImportCerts(certdb, certusage, certcount, rawcerts, &certs, |
1403 | 0 | keepcerts, PR_FALSE, NULL); |
1404 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1405 | 0 | goto done; |
1406 | 0 | } |
1407 | 0 | |
1408 | 0 | /* |
1409 | 0 | * This cert will also need to be freed, but since we save it |
1410 | 0 | * in signerinfo for later, we do not want to destroy it when |
1411 | 0 | * we leave this function -- we let the clean-up of the entire |
1412 | 0 | * cinfo structure later do the destroy of this cert. |
1413 | 0 | */ |
1414 | 0 | cert = CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN(certdb, signerinfo->issuerAndSN); |
1415 | 0 | if (cert == NULL) { |
1416 | 0 | goto done; |
1417 | 0 | } |
1418 | 0 | |
1419 | 0 | signerinfo->cert = cert; |
1420 | 0 |
|
1421 | 0 | /* |
1422 | 0 | * Get and convert the signing time; if available, it will be used |
1423 | 0 | * both on the cert verification and for importing the sender |
1424 | 0 | * email profile. |
1425 | 0 | */ |
1426 | 0 | encoded_stime = SEC_PKCS7GetSigningTime(cinfo); |
1427 | 0 | if (encoded_stime != NULL) { |
1428 | 0 | if (DER_DecodeTimeChoice(&stime, encoded_stime) != SECSuccess) |
1429 | 0 | encoded_stime = NULL; /* conversion failed, so pretend none */ |
1430 | 0 | } |
1431 | 0 |
|
1432 | 0 | /* |
1433 | 0 | * XXX This uses the signing time, if available. Additionally, we |
1434 | 0 | * might want to, if there is no signing time, get the message time |
1435 | 0 | * from the mail header itself, and use that. That would require |
1436 | 0 | * a change to our interface though, and for S/MIME callers to pass |
1437 | 0 | * in a time (and for non-S/MIME callers to pass in nothing, or |
1438 | 0 | * maybe make them pass in the current time, always?). |
1439 | 0 | */ |
1440 | 0 | if (atTime) { |
1441 | 0 | verificationTime = *atTime; |
1442 | 0 | } else if (encoded_stime != NULL) { |
1443 | 0 | verificationTime = stime; |
1444 | 0 | } else { |
1445 | 0 | verificationTime = PR_Now(); |
1446 | 0 | } |
1447 | 0 | if (CERT_VerifyCert(certdb, cert, PR_TRUE, certusage, verificationTime, |
1448 | 0 | cinfo->pwfn_arg, NULL) != SECSuccess) { |
1449 | 0 | /* |
1450 | 0 | * XXX Give the user an option to check the signature anyway? |
1451 | 0 | * If we want to do this, need to give a way to leave and display |
1452 | 0 | * some dialog and get the answer and come back through (or do |
1453 | 0 | * the rest of what we do below elsewhere, maybe by putting it |
1454 | 0 | * in a function that we call below and could call from a dialog |
1455 | 0 | * finish handler). |
1456 | 0 | */ |
1457 | 0 | goto savecert; |
1458 | 0 | } |
1459 | 0 | |
1460 | 0 | publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); |
1461 | 0 | if (publickey == NULL) |
1462 | 0 | goto done; |
1463 | 0 | |
1464 | 0 | /* |
1465 | 0 | * XXX No! If digests is empty, see if we can create it now by |
1466 | 0 | * digesting the contents. This is necessary if we want to allow |
1467 | 0 | * somebody to do a simple decode (without filtering, etc.) and |
1468 | 0 | * then later call us here to do the verification. |
1469 | 0 | * OR, we can just specify that the interface to this routine |
1470 | 0 | * *requires* that the digest(s) be done before calling and either |
1471 | 0 | * stashed in the struct itself or passed in explicitly (as would |
1472 | 0 | * be done for detached contents). |
1473 | 0 | */ |
1474 | 0 | if ((digests == NULL || digests[0] == NULL) && (detached_digest == NULL || detached_digest->data == NULL)) |
1475 | 0 | goto done; |
1476 | 0 | |
1477 | 0 | /* |
1478 | 0 | * Find and confirm digest algorithm. |
1479 | 0 | */ |
1480 | 0 | digestTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(signerinfo->digestAlg.algorithm)); |
1481 | 0 |
|
1482 | 0 | /* make sure we understand the digest type first */ |
1483 | 0 | found_type = HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(digestTag); |
1484 | 0 | if ((digestTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) || (found_type == HASH_AlgNULL)) { |
1485 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1486 | 0 | goto done; |
1487 | 0 | } |
1488 | 0 |
|
1489 | 0 | if (detached_digest != NULL) { |
1490 | 0 | unsigned int hashLen = HASH_ResultLen(found_type); |
1491 | 0 |
|
1492 | 0 | if (digest_type != found_type || |
1493 | 0 | detached_digest->len != hashLen) { |
1494 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1495 | 0 | goto done; |
1496 | 0 | } |
1497 | 0 | digest = detached_digest; |
1498 | 0 | } else { |
1499 | 0 | PORT_Assert(digestalgs != NULL && digestalgs[0] != NULL); |
1500 | 0 | if (digestalgs == NULL || digestalgs[0] == NULL) { |
1501 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1502 | 0 | goto done; |
1503 | 0 | } |
1504 | 0 |
|
1505 | 0 | /* |
1506 | 0 | * pick digest matching signerinfo->digestAlg from digests |
1507 | 0 | */ |
1508 | 0 | for (i = 0; digestalgs[i] != NULL; i++) { |
1509 | 0 | if (SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(digestalgs[i]->algorithm)) == digestTag) |
1510 | 0 | break; |
1511 | 0 | } |
1512 | 0 | if (digestalgs[i] == NULL) { |
1513 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1514 | 0 | goto done; |
1515 | 0 | } |
1516 | 0 |
|
1517 | 0 | digest = digests[i]; |
1518 | 0 | } |
1519 | 0 |
|
1520 | 0 | encTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(signerinfo->digestEncAlg.algorithm)); |
1521 | 0 | if (encTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) { |
1522 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1523 | 0 | goto done; |
1524 | 0 | } |
1525 | 0 |
|
1526 | 0 | if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) { |
1527 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr; |
1528 | 0 | SECItem *value; |
1529 | 0 | SECItem encoded_attrs; |
1530 | 0 |
|
1531 | 0 | /* |
1532 | 0 | * We have a sigkey only for signedAndEnvelopedData, which is |
1533 | 0 | * not supposed to have any authenticated attributes. |
1534 | 0 | */ |
1535 | 0 | if (sigkey != NULL) { |
1536 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1537 | 0 | goto done; |
1538 | 0 | } |
1539 | 0 |
|
1540 | 0 | /* |
1541 | 0 | * PKCS #7 says that if there are any authenticated attributes, |
1542 | 0 | * then there must be one for content type which matches the |
1543 | 0 | * content type of the content being signed, and there must |
1544 | 0 | * be one for message digest which matches our message digest. |
1545 | 0 | * So check these things first. |
1546 | 0 | * XXX Might be nice to have a compare-attribute-value function |
1547 | 0 | * which could collapse the following nicely. |
1548 | 0 | */ |
1549 | 0 | attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr, |
1550 | 0 | SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE, PR_TRUE); |
1551 | 0 | value = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr); |
1552 | 0 | if (value == NULL || value->len != content_type->len) { |
1553 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1554 | 0 | goto done; |
1555 | 0 | } |
1556 | 0 | if (PORT_Memcmp(value->data, content_type->data, value->len) != 0) { |
1557 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1558 | 0 | goto done; |
1559 | 0 | } |
1560 | 0 |
|
1561 | 0 | attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr, |
1562 | 0 | SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST, PR_TRUE); |
1563 | 0 | value = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr); |
1564 | 0 | if (value == NULL || value->len != digest->len) { |
1565 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1566 | 0 | goto done; |
1567 | 0 | } |
1568 | 0 | if (PORT_Memcmp(value->data, digest->data, value->len) != 0) { |
1569 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1570 | 0 | goto done; |
1571 | 0 | } |
1572 | 0 |
|
1573 | 0 | /* |
1574 | 0 | * Okay, we met the constraints of the basic attributes. |
1575 | 0 | * Now check the signature, which is based on a digest of |
1576 | 0 | * the DER-encoded authenticated attributes. So, first we |
1577 | 0 | * encode and then we digest/verify. |
1578 | 0 | */ |
1579 | 0 | encoded_attrs.data = NULL; |
1580 | 0 | encoded_attrs.len = 0; |
1581 | 0 | if (sec_PKCS7EncodeAttributes(NULL, &encoded_attrs, |
1582 | 0 | &(signerinfo->authAttr)) == NULL) |
1583 | 0 | goto done; |
1584 | 0 | |
1585 | 0 | if (encoded_attrs.data == NULL || encoded_attrs.len == 0) { |
1586 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1587 | 0 | goto done; |
1588 | 0 | } |
1589 | 0 |
|
1590 | 0 | goodsig = (PRBool)(VFY_VerifyDataDirect(encoded_attrs.data, |
1591 | 0 | encoded_attrs.len, |
1592 | 0 | publickey, &(signerinfo->encDigest), |
1593 | 0 | encTag, digestTag, NULL, |
1594 | 0 | cinfo->pwfn_arg) == SECSuccess); |
1595 | 0 | PORT_Free(encoded_attrs.data); |
1596 | 0 | } else { |
1597 | 0 | SECItem *sig; |
1598 | 0 | SECItem holder; |
1599 | 0 |
|
1600 | 0 | /* |
1601 | 0 | * No authenticated attributes. |
1602 | 0 | * The signature is based on the plain message digest. |
1603 | 0 | */ |
1604 | 0 |
|
1605 | 0 | sig = &(signerinfo->encDigest); |
1606 | 0 | if (sig->len == 0) { /* bad signature */ |
1607 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1608 | 0 | goto done; |
1609 | 0 | } |
1610 | 0 |
|
1611 | 0 | if (sigkey != NULL) { |
1612 | 0 | sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj; |
1613 | 0 | unsigned int buflen; |
1614 | 0 |
|
1615 | 0 | /* |
1616 | 0 | * For signedAndEnvelopedData, we first must decrypt the encrypted |
1617 | 0 | * digest with the bulk encryption key. The result is the normal |
1618 | 0 | * encrypted digest (aka the signature). |
1619 | 0 | */ |
1620 | 0 | decryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject(sigkey, bulkid); |
1621 | 0 | if (decryptobj == NULL) |
1622 | 0 | goto done; |
1623 | 0 | |
1624 | 0 | buflen = sec_PKCS7DecryptLength(decryptobj, sig->len, PR_TRUE); |
1625 | 0 | PORT_Assert(buflen); |
1626 | 0 | if (buflen == 0) { /* something is wrong */ |
1627 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(decryptobj); |
1628 | 0 | goto done; |
1629 | 0 | } |
1630 | 0 | |
1631 | 0 | holder.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(buflen); |
1632 | 0 | if (holder.data == NULL) { |
1633 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(decryptobj); |
1634 | 0 | goto done; |
1635 | 0 | } |
1636 | 0 | |
1637 | 0 | rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt(decryptobj, holder.data, &holder.len, buflen, |
1638 | 0 | sig->data, sig->len, PR_TRUE); |
1639 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(decryptobj); |
1640 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1641 | 0 | goto done; |
1642 | 0 | } |
1643 | 0 | |
1644 | 0 | sig = &holder; |
1645 | 0 | } |
1646 | 0 |
|
1647 | 0 | goodsig = (PRBool)(VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(digest, publickey, sig, |
1648 | 0 | encTag, digestTag, cinfo->pwfn_arg) == SECSuccess); |
1649 | 0 |
|
1650 | 0 | if (sigkey != NULL) { |
1651 | 0 | PORT_Assert(sig == &holder); |
1652 | 0 | PORT_ZFree(holder.data, holder.len); |
1653 | 0 | } |
1654 | 0 | } |
1655 | 0 |
|
1656 | 0 | if (!goodsig) { |
1657 | 0 | /* |
1658 | 0 | * XXX Change the generic error into our specific one, because |
1659 | 0 | * in that case we get a better explanation out of the Security |
1660 | 0 | * Advisor. This is really a bug in our error strings (the |
1661 | 0 | * "generic" error has a lousy/wrong message associated with it |
1662 | 0 | * which assumes the signature verification was done for the |
1663 | 0 | * purposes of checking the issuer signature on a certificate) |
1664 | 0 | * but this is at least an easy workaround and/or in the |
1665 | 0 | * Security Advisor, which specifically checks for the error |
1666 | 0 | * SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE and gives more explanation |
1667 | 0 | * in that case but does not similarly check for |
1668 | 0 | * SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE. It probably should, but then would |
1669 | 0 | * probably say the wrong thing in the case that it *was* the |
1670 | 0 | * certificate signature check that failed during the cert |
1671 | 0 | * verification done above. Our error handling is really a mess. |
1672 | 0 | */ |
1673 | 0 | if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) |
1674 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1675 | 0 | } |
1676 | 0 |
|
1677 | 0 | savecert: |
1678 | 0 | /* |
1679 | 0 | * Only save the smime profile if we are checking an email message and |
1680 | 0 | * the cert has an email address in it. |
1681 | 0 | */ |
1682 | 0 | if (cert->emailAddr && cert->emailAddr[0] && |
1683 | 0 | ((certusage == certUsageEmailSigner) || |
1684 | 0 | (certusage == certUsageEmailRecipient))) { |
1685 | 0 | SECItem *profile = NULL; |
1686 | 0 | int save_error; |
1687 | 0 |
|
1688 | 0 | /* |
1689 | 0 | * Remember the current error set because we do not care about |
1690 | 0 | * anything set by the functions we are about to call. |
1691 | 0 | */ |
1692 | 0 | save_error = PORT_GetError(); |
1693 | 0 |
|
1694 | 0 | if (goodsig && (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL)) { |
1695 | 0 | /* |
1696 | 0 | * If the signature is good, then we can save the S/MIME profile, |
1697 | 0 | * if we have one. |
1698 | 0 | */ |
1699 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr; |
1700 | 0 |
|
1701 | 0 | attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr, |
1702 | 0 | SEC_OID_PKCS9_SMIME_CAPABILITIES, |
1703 | 0 | PR_TRUE); |
1704 | 0 | profile = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr); |
1705 | 0 | } |
1706 | 0 |
|
1707 | 0 | rv = CERT_SaveSMimeProfile(cert, profile, encoded_stime); |
1708 | 0 |
|
1709 | 0 | /* |
1710 | 0 | * Restore the saved error in case the calls above set a new |
1711 | 0 | * one that we do not actually care about. |
1712 | 0 | */ |
1713 | 0 | PORT_SetError(save_error); |
1714 | 0 |
|
1715 | 0 | /* |
1716 | 0 | * XXX Failure is not indicated anywhere -- the signature |
1717 | 0 | * verification itself is unaffected by whether or not the |
1718 | 0 | * profile was successfully saved. |
1719 | 0 | */ |
1720 | 0 | } |
1721 | 0 |
|
1722 | 0 | done: |
1723 | 0 |
|
1724 | 0 | /* |
1725 | 0 | * See comment above about why we do not want to destroy cert |
1726 | 0 | * itself here. |
1727 | 0 | */ |
1728 | 0 |
|
1729 | 0 | if (certs != NULL) |
1730 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertArray(certs, certcount); |
1731 | 0 |
|
1732 | 0 | if (publickey != NULL) |
1733 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey); |
1734 | 0 |
|
1735 | 0 | return goodsig; |
1736 | 0 | } |
1737 | | |
1738 | | /* |
1739 | | * SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature |
1740 | | * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature is good. |
1741 | | * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted |
1742 | | * for the purpose specified by "certusage". |
1743 | | * |
1744 | | * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found |
1745 | | * into our local database. |
1746 | | */ |
1747 | | PRBool |
1748 | | SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, |
1749 | | SECCertUsage certusage, |
1750 | | PRBool keepcerts) |
1751 | 0 | { |
1752 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certusage, |
1753 | 0 | NULL, HASH_AlgNULL, keepcerts, NULL); |
1754 | 0 | } |
1755 | | |
1756 | | /* |
1757 | | * SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature |
1758 | | * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature matches |
1759 | | * a passed-in digest (calculated, supposedly, from detached contents). |
1760 | | * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted |
1761 | | * for the purpose specified by "certusage". |
1762 | | * |
1763 | | * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found |
1764 | | * into our local database. |
1765 | | */ |
1766 | | PRBool |
1767 | | SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, |
1768 | | SECCertUsage certusage, |
1769 | | const SECItem *detached_digest, |
1770 | | HASH_HashType digest_type, |
1771 | | PRBool keepcerts) |
1772 | 0 | { |
1773 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certusage, |
1774 | 0 | detached_digest, digest_type, |
1775 | 0 | keepcerts, NULL); |
1776 | 0 | } |
1777 | | |
1778 | | /* |
1779 | | * SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignatureAtTime |
1780 | | * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature matches |
1781 | | * a passed-in digest (calculated, supposedly, from detached contents). |
1782 | | * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted |
1783 | | * for the purpose specified by "certusage" at time "atTime". |
1784 | | * |
1785 | | * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found |
1786 | | * into our local database. |
1787 | | */ |
1788 | | PRBool |
1789 | | SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignatureAtTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, |
1790 | | SECCertUsage certusage, |
1791 | | const SECItem *detached_digest, |
1792 | | HASH_HashType digest_type, |
1793 | | PRBool keepcerts, |
1794 | | PRTime atTime) |
1795 | 0 | { |
1796 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certusage, |
1797 | 0 | detached_digest, digest_type, |
1798 | 0 | keepcerts, &atTime); |
1799 | 0 | } |
1800 | | |
1801 | | /* |
1802 | | * Return the asked-for portion of the name of the signer of a PKCS7 |
1803 | | * signed object. |
1804 | | * |
1805 | | * Returns a pointer to allocated memory, which must be freed. |
1806 | | * A NULL return value is an error. |
1807 | | */ |
1808 | | |
1809 | 0 | #define sec_common_name 1 |
1810 | 0 | #define sec_email_address 2 |
1811 | | |
1812 | | static char * |
1813 | | sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, int selector) |
1814 | 0 | { |
1815 | 0 | SECOidTag kind; |
1816 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos; |
1817 | 0 | CERTCertificate *signercert; |
1818 | 0 | char *container; |
1819 | 0 |
|
1820 | 0 | kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo); |
1821 | 0 | switch (kind) { |
1822 | 0 | default: |
1823 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1824 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1825 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1826 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1827 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
1828 | 0 | return NULL; |
1829 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: { |
1830 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp; |
1831 | 0 |
|
1832 | 0 | sdp = cinfo->content.signedData; |
1833 | 0 | signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos; |
1834 | 0 | } break; |
1835 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: { |
1836 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp; |
1837 | 0 |
|
1838 | 0 | saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData; |
1839 | 0 | signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos; |
1840 | 0 | } break; |
1841 | 0 | } |
1842 | 0 | |
1843 | 0 | if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL) |
1844 | 0 | return NULL; |
1845 | 0 | |
1846 | 0 | signercert = signerinfos[0]->cert; |
1847 | 0 |
|
1848 | 0 | /* |
1849 | 0 | * No cert there; see if we can find one by calling verify ourselves. |
1850 | 0 | */ |
1851 | 0 | if (signercert == NULL) { |
1852 | 0 | /* |
1853 | 0 | * The cert usage does not matter in this case, because we do not |
1854 | 0 | * actually care about the verification itself, but we have to pick |
1855 | 0 | * some valid usage to pass in. |
1856 | 0 | */ |
1857 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certUsageEmailSigner, |
1858 | 0 | NULL, HASH_AlgNULL, PR_FALSE, NULL); |
1859 | 0 | signercert = signerinfos[0]->cert; |
1860 | 0 | if (signercert == NULL) |
1861 | 0 | return NULL; |
1862 | 0 | } |
1863 | 0 | |
1864 | 0 | switch (selector) { |
1865 | 0 | case sec_common_name: |
1866 | 0 | container = CERT_GetCommonName(&signercert->subject); |
1867 | 0 | break; |
1868 | 0 | case sec_email_address: |
1869 | 0 | if (signercert->emailAddr && signercert->emailAddr[0]) { |
1870 | 0 | container = PORT_Strdup(signercert->emailAddr); |
1871 | 0 | } else { |
1872 | 0 | container = NULL; |
1873 | 0 | } |
1874 | 0 | break; |
1875 | 0 | default: |
1876 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
1877 | 0 | container = NULL; |
1878 | 0 | break; |
1879 | 0 | } |
1880 | 0 |
|
1881 | 0 | return container; |
1882 | 0 | } |
1883 | | |
1884 | | char * |
1885 | | SEC_PKCS7GetSignerCommonName(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1886 | 0 | { |
1887 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(cinfo, sec_common_name); |
1888 | 0 | } |
1889 | | |
1890 | | char * |
1891 | | SEC_PKCS7GetSignerEmailAddress(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1892 | 0 | { |
1893 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(cinfo, sec_email_address); |
1894 | 0 | } |
1895 | | |
1896 | | /* |
1897 | | * Return the signing time, in UTCTime format, of a PKCS7 contentInfo. |
1898 | | */ |
1899 | | SECItem * |
1900 | | SEC_PKCS7GetSigningTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1901 | 0 | { |
1902 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos; |
1903 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr; |
1904 | 0 |
|
1905 | 0 | if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA) |
1906 | 0 | return NULL; |
1907 | 0 | |
1908 | 0 | signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos; |
1909 | 0 |
|
1910 | 0 | /* |
1911 | 0 | * No signature, or more than one, means no deal. |
1912 | 0 | */ |
1913 | 0 | if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL || signerinfos[1] != NULL) |
1914 | 0 | return NULL; |
1915 | 0 | |
1916 | 0 | attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfos[0]->authAttr, |
1917 | 0 | SEC_OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME, PR_TRUE); |
1918 | 0 | return sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr); |
1919 | 0 | } |