Coverage Report

Created: 2026-08-14 07:17

next uncovered line (L), next uncovered region (R), next uncovered branch (B)
/src/freeradius-server/src/fuzzer/fuzzer_cf.c
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Source
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/*
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 *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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 *   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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 *   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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 *   (at your option) any later version.
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 *
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 *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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 *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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 *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
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 *   GNU General Public License for more details.
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 *
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 *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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 *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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 *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
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 */
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/**
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 * $Id: e74e4bb7eb1f5d1997db8032c515663fbc37e1e4 $
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 *
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 * @file src/bin/fuzzer_cf.c
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 * @brief Functions to fuzz the FreeRADIUS config-file parser
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 *
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 * Targets cf_file_read() and the section/pair tokenisers it drives
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 * (cf_file.c, cf_util.c, cf_parse.c). The full configuration grammar -
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 * sections, pairs, quoting, line continuation, $INCLUDE / $-INCLUDE
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 * resolution, operators, and xlat expansions - is exercised through
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 * this single entry point.
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 *
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 * The harness writes each fuzzer input to a per-process file under the
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 * system temporary directory because cf_file_read() is path-based and
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 * resolves $INCLUDE relative to the directory of the file being parsed.
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 * A pid-suffixed name keeps the harness safe under libFuzzer's -jobs=N.
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 */
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RCSID("$Id: e74e4bb7eb1f5d1997db8032c515663fbc37e1e4 $")
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#include <freeradius-devel/build.h>
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#include <freeradius-devel/server/cf_file.h>
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#include <freeradius-devel/server/cf_util.h>
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#include <freeradius-devel/server/main_config.h>
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#include <freeradius-devel/util/strerror.h>
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extern char const  *__lsan_default_suppressions(void);
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int LLVMFuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv);
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int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len);
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int LLVMFuzzerInitialize(UNUSED int *argc, UNUSED char ***argv)
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{
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  /*
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   *  Don't put output anywhere.  Otherwise we will have reams of log messages.
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   */
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  default_log.dst = L_DST_NULL;
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  default_log.fd = -1;
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  default_log.print_level = true;
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  default_log.suppress_secrets = true;
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  return 0;
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}
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int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size)
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{
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  main_config_t *config;
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  size_t    depth = 0, max_depth = 0;
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  /*
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   *  cap input size: the parser is line-oriented and a
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   *  pathological input can cost a great deal of time without
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   *  exposing new states.
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   */
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  if (size > 16 * 1024) return 0;
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  /*
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   *  Pre-filter on brace nesting depth. The config parser
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   *  recurses via C function calls on '{'-introduced
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   *  sub-sections (parse_subrequest, parse_foreach,
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   *  parse_switch, etc., and cf_section_pass2 walking the
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   *  section tree). libFuzzer trivially discovers inputs of
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   *  the form "{{{{ ... }}}}" that exhaust the C stack without
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   *  revealing any new parser states. Real configs nest fewer
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   *  than ten levels deep; the cap is set generously here so
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   *  that any legitimate nesting still reaches the parser.
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   *
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   *  Quoting is intentionally ignored: a conservative count
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   *  can only over-reject, never under-reject, and the cost of
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   *  dropping a few well-formed inputs with '{' embedded in
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   *  strings is negligible compared with the cost of burning
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   *  every fuzz cycle on the same recursion failure.
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   */
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536k
  for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
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    if (!data[i]) {
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      size = i;
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      break;
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    }
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536k
    if (data[i] == '{') {
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25.0k
      depth++;
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25.0k
      if (depth > max_depth) max_depth = depth;
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511k
    } else if ((data[i] == '}') && (depth > 0)) {
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3.81k
      depth--;
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3.81k
    }
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536k
  }
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  if (max_depth > 64) return 0;
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  config = main_config_alloc(NULL);
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  if (!config) return 0;
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  config->root_cs = cf_section_alloc(config, NULL, "main", NULL);
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  if (!config->root_cs) {
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0
    talloc_free(config);
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0
    return 0;
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0
  }
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  cf_section_set_unlang(config->root_cs);
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  (void) cf_file_read_buffer(config->root_cs, (char const *) data, size, "/");
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  talloc_free(config);
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  /*
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   *  Clear error messages from the run, keeping malloc/free
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   *  balanced so the fuzzer's leak heuristics do not fire.
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   */
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  fr_strerror_clear();
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  return 0;
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}