Coverage Report

Created: 2026-06-08 06:48

next uncovered line (L), next uncovered region (R), next uncovered branch (B)
/src/nettle/ccm.c
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Count
Source
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/* ccm.c
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   Counter with CBC-MAC mode, specified by NIST,
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   http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf
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   Copyright (C) 2014 Exegin Technologies Limited
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   Copyright (C) 2014 Owen Kirby
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   This file is part of GNU Nettle.
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   GNU Nettle is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
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   modify it under the terms of either:
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     * the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free
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       Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your
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       option) any later version.
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   or
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     * the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
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       Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
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       option) any later version.
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   or both in parallel, as here.
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   GNU Nettle is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
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   General Public License for more details.
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   You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License and
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   the GNU Lesser General Public License along with this program.  If
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   not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
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*/
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#if HAVE_CONFIG_H
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# include "config.h"
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#endif
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40
#include <assert.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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44
#include "ccm.h"
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#include "ctr.h"
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47
#include "memops.h"
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#include "nettle-internal.h"
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#include "macros.h"
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51
/*
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 * The format of the CCM IV (for both CTR and CBC-MAC) is: flags | nonce | count
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 *  flags = 1 octet
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 *  nonce = N octets
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 *  count >= 1 octet
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 *
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 * such that:
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 *  sizeof(flags) + sizeof(nonce) + sizeof(count) == 1 block
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 */
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13.7k
#define CCM_FLAG_L          0x07
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4.59k
#define CCM_FLAG_M          0x38
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4.59k
#define CCM_FLAG_ADATA      0x40
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#define CCM_FLAG_RESERVED   0x80
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4.59k
#define CCM_FLAG_GET_L(_x_) (((_x_) & CCM_FLAG_L) + 1)
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9.19k
#define CCM_FLAG_SET_L(_x_) (((_x_) - 1) & CCM_FLAG_L)
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4.59k
#define CCM_FLAG_SET_M(_x_) ((((_x_) - 2) << 2) & CCM_FLAG_M)
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13.7k
#define CCM_OFFSET_FLAGS    0
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45.9k
#define CCM_OFFSET_NONCE    1
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#define CCM_L_SIZE(_nlen_)  (CCM_BLOCK_SIZE - CCM_OFFSET_NONCE - (_nlen_))
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/*
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 * The data input to the CBC-MAC: L(a) | adata | padding | plaintext | padding
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 *
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 * blength is the length of data that has been added to the CBC-MAC modulus the
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 * cipher block size. If the value of blength is non-zero then some data has
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 * been XOR'ed into the CBC-MAC, and we will need to pad the block (XOR with 0),
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 * and iterate the cipher one more time.
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 *
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 * The end of adata is detected implicitly by the first call to the encrypt()
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 * and decrypt() functions, and will call ccm_pad() to insert the padding if
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 * necessary. Because of the underlying CTR encryption, the encrypt() and
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 * decrypt() functions must be called with a multiple of the block size and
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 * therefore blength should be zero on all but the first call.
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 *
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 * Likewise, the end of the plaintext is implicitly determined by the first call
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 * to the digest() function, which will pad if the final CTR encryption was not
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 * a multiple of the block size.
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 */
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static void
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ccm_pad(struct ccm_ctx *ctx, const void *cipher, nettle_cipher_func *f)
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9.19k
{
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9.19k
    if (ctx->blength) f(cipher, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE, ctx->tag.b, ctx->tag.b);
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9.19k
    ctx->blength = 0;
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9.19k
}
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static void
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ccm_build_iv(uint8_t *iv, size_t noncelen, const uint8_t *nonce,
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       uint8_t flags, size_t count)
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9.19k
{
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9.19k
  unsigned int i;
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  /* Sanity check the nonce length. */
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9.19k
  assert(noncelen >= CCM_MIN_NONCE_SIZE);
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9.19k
  assert(noncelen <= CCM_MAX_NONCE_SIZE);
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  /* Generate the IV */
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9.19k
  iv[CCM_OFFSET_FLAGS] = flags | CCM_FLAG_SET_L(CCM_L_SIZE(noncelen));
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9.19k
  memcpy(&iv[CCM_OFFSET_NONCE], nonce, noncelen);
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36.7k
  for (i=(CCM_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); i >= (CCM_OFFSET_NONCE + noncelen); i--) {
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27.5k
    iv[i] = count & 0xff;
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27.5k
    count >>= 8;
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27.5k
  }
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  /* Ensure the count was not truncated. */
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9.19k
  assert(!count);
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9.19k
}
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void
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ccm_set_nonce(struct ccm_ctx *ctx, const void *cipher, nettle_cipher_func *f,
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        size_t length, const uint8_t *nonce,
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        size_t authlen, size_t msglen, size_t taglen)
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4.59k
{
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  /* Generate the IV for the CTR and CBC-MAC */
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4.59k
  ctx->blength = 0;
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4.59k
  ccm_build_iv(ctx->tag.b, length, nonce, CCM_FLAG_SET_M(taglen), msglen);
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4.59k
  ccm_build_iv(ctx->ctr.b, length, nonce, 0, 1);
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  /* If no auth data, encrypt B0 and skip L(a) */
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4.59k
  if (!authlen) {
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0
    f(cipher, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE, ctx->tag.b, ctx->tag.b);
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0
    return;
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0
  }
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  /* Encrypt B0 (with the adata flag), and input L(a) to the CBC-MAC. */
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4.59k
  ctx->tag.b[CCM_OFFSET_FLAGS] |= CCM_FLAG_ADATA;
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4.59k
  f(cipher, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE, ctx->tag.b, ctx->tag.b);
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4.59k
#if SIZEOF_SIZE_T > 4
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4.59k
  if (authlen >= (0x01ULL << 32)) {
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    /* Encode L(a) as 0xff || 0xff || <64-bit integer> */
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0
    ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= 0xff;
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0
    ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= 0xff;
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0
    ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 56) & 0xff;
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0
    ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 48) & 0xff;
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0
    ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 40) & 0xff;
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0
    ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 32) & 0xff;
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0
    ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 24) & 0xff;
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0
    ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 16) & 0xff;
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0
  }
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4.59k
  else
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4.59k
#endif
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4.59k
    if (authlen >= ((0x1ULL << 16) - (0x1ULL << 8))) {
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      /* Encode L(a) as 0xff || 0xfe || <32-bit integer> */
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0
      ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= 0xff;
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0
      ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= 0xfe;
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0
      ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 24) & 0xff;
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0
      ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 16) & 0xff;
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0
    }
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4.59k
  ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 8) & 0xff;
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4.59k
  ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength++] ^= (authlen >> 0) & 0xff;
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4.59k
}
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void
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ccm_update(struct ccm_ctx *ctx, const void *cipher, nettle_cipher_func *f,
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     size_t length, const uint8_t *data)
166
9.19k
{
167
9.19k
  const uint8_t *end = data + length;
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169
  /* If we don't have enough to fill a block, save the data for later. */
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9.19k
  if ((ctx->blength + length) < CCM_BLOCK_SIZE) {
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8.16k
    memxor(&ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength], data, length);
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8.16k
    ctx->blength += length;
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8.16k
    return;
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8.16k
  }
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  /* Process a partially filled block. */
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1.02k
  if (ctx->blength) {
178
0
    memxor(&ctx->tag.b[ctx->blength], data, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE - ctx->blength);
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0
    data += (CCM_BLOCK_SIZE - ctx->blength);
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0
    f(cipher, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE, ctx->tag.b, ctx->tag.b);
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0
  }
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  /* Process full blocks. */
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25.6k
  while ((data + CCM_BLOCK_SIZE) < end) {
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24.6k
    memxor(ctx->tag.b, data, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE);
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24.6k
    f(cipher, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE, ctx->tag.b, ctx->tag.b);
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24.6k
    data += CCM_BLOCK_SIZE;
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24.6k
  } /* while */
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  /* Save leftovers for later. */
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1.02k
  ctx->blength = (end - data);
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1.02k
  if (ctx->blength) memxor(&ctx->tag.b, data, ctx->blength);
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1.02k
}
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/*
196
 * Because of the underlying CTR mode encryption, when called multiple times
197
 * the data in intermediate calls must be provided in multiples of the block
198
 * size.
199
 */
200
void
201
ccm_encrypt(struct ccm_ctx *ctx, const void *cipher, nettle_cipher_func *f,
202
      size_t length, uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src)
203
753
{
204
753
  ccm_pad(ctx, cipher, f);
205
753
  ccm_update(ctx, cipher, f, length, src);
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753
  ctr_crypt(cipher, f, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE, ctx->ctr.b, length, dst, src);
207
753
}
208
209
/*
210
 * Because of the underlying CTR mode decryption, when called multiple times
211
 * the data in intermediate calls must be provided in multiples of the block
212
 * size.
213
 */
214
void
215
ccm_decrypt(struct ccm_ctx *ctx, const void *cipher, nettle_cipher_func *f,
216
      size_t length, uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src)
217
3.84k
{
218
3.84k
  ctr_crypt(cipher, f, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE, ctx->ctr.b, length, dst, src);
219
3.84k
  ccm_pad(ctx, cipher, f);
220
3.84k
  ccm_update(ctx, cipher, f, length, dst);
221
3.84k
}
222
223
void
224
ccm_digest(struct ccm_ctx *ctx, const void *cipher, nettle_cipher_func *f,
225
     size_t length, uint8_t *digest)
226
4.59k
{
227
4.59k
  int i = CCM_BLOCK_SIZE - CCM_FLAG_GET_L(ctx->ctr.b[CCM_OFFSET_FLAGS]);
228
4.59k
  assert(length <= CCM_BLOCK_SIZE);
229
18.3k
  while (i < CCM_BLOCK_SIZE)  ctx->ctr.b[i++] = 0;
230
4.59k
  ccm_pad(ctx, cipher, f);
231
4.59k
  ctr_crypt(cipher, f, CCM_BLOCK_SIZE, ctx->ctr.b, length, digest, ctx->tag.b);
232
4.59k
}
233
234
void
235
ccm_encrypt_message(const void *cipher, nettle_cipher_func *f,
236
        size_t nlength, const uint8_t *nonce,
237
        size_t alength, const uint8_t *adata, size_t tlength,
238
        size_t clength, uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src)
239
753
{
240
753
  struct ccm_ctx ctx;
241
753
  uint8_t *tag = dst + (clength-tlength);
242
753
  assert(clength >= tlength);
243
753
  ccm_set_nonce(&ctx, cipher, f, nlength, nonce, alength, clength-tlength, tlength);
244
753
  ccm_update(&ctx, cipher, f, alength, adata);
245
753
  ccm_encrypt(&ctx, cipher, f, clength-tlength, dst, src);
246
753
  ccm_digest(&ctx, cipher, f, tlength, tag);
247
753
}
248
249
int
250
ccm_decrypt_message(const void *cipher, nettle_cipher_func *f,
251
        size_t nlength, const uint8_t *nonce,
252
        size_t alength, const uint8_t *adata, size_t tlength,
253
        size_t mlength, uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src)
254
3.84k
{
255
3.84k
  struct ccm_ctx ctx;
256
3.84k
  uint8_t tag[CCM_BLOCK_SIZE];
257
3.84k
  ccm_set_nonce(&ctx, cipher, f, nlength, nonce, alength, mlength, tlength);
258
3.84k
  ccm_update(&ctx, cipher, f, alength, adata);
259
3.84k
  ccm_decrypt(&ctx, cipher, f, mlength, dst, src);
260
3.84k
  ccm_digest(&ctx, cipher, f, tlength, tag);
261
3.84k
  return memeql_sec(tag, src + mlength, tlength);
262
3.84k
}