/src/hostap/src/crypto/milenage.c
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1 | | /* |
2 | | * 3GPP AKA - Milenage algorithm (3GPP TS 35.205, .206, .207, .208) |
3 | | * Copyright (c) 2006-2007 <j@w1.fi> |
4 | | * |
5 | | * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. |
6 | | * See README for more details. |
7 | | * |
8 | | * This file implements an example authentication algorithm defined for 3GPP |
9 | | * AKA. This can be used to implement a simple HLR/AuC into hlr_auc_gw to allow |
10 | | * EAP-AKA to be tested properly with real USIM cards. |
11 | | * |
12 | | * This implementations assumes that the r1..r5 and c1..c5 constants defined in |
13 | | * TS 35.206 are used, i.e., r1=64, r2=0, r3=32, r4=64, r5=96, c1=00..00, |
14 | | * c2=00..01, c3=00..02, c4=00..04, c5=00..08. The block cipher is assumed to |
15 | | * be AES (Rijndael). |
16 | | */ |
17 | | |
18 | | #include "includes.h" |
19 | | |
20 | | #include "common.h" |
21 | | #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h" |
22 | | #include "milenage.h" |
23 | | |
24 | | |
25 | | /** |
26 | | * milenage_f1 - Milenage f1 and f1* algorithms |
27 | | * @opc: OPc = 128-bit value derived from OP and K |
28 | | * @k: K = 128-bit subscriber key |
29 | | * @_rand: RAND = 128-bit random challenge |
30 | | * @sqn: SQN = 48-bit sequence number |
31 | | * @amf: AMF = 16-bit authentication management field |
32 | | * @mac_a: Buffer for MAC-A = 64-bit network authentication code, or %NULL |
33 | | * @mac_s: Buffer for MAC-S = 64-bit resync authentication code, or %NULL |
34 | | * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
35 | | */ |
36 | | int milenage_f1(const u8 *opc, const u8 *k, const u8 *_rand, |
37 | | const u8 *sqn, const u8 *amf, u8 *mac_a, u8 *mac_s) |
38 | 0 | { |
39 | 0 | u8 tmp1[16], tmp2[16], tmp3[16]; |
40 | 0 | int i; |
41 | | |
42 | | /* tmp1 = TEMP = E_K(RAND XOR OP_C) */ |
43 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
44 | 0 | tmp1[i] = _rand[i] ^ opc[i]; |
45 | 0 | if (aes_128_encrypt_block(k, tmp1, tmp1)) |
46 | 0 | return -1; |
47 | | |
48 | | /* tmp2 = IN1 = SQN || AMF || SQN || AMF */ |
49 | 0 | os_memcpy(tmp2, sqn, 6); |
50 | 0 | os_memcpy(tmp2 + 6, amf, 2); |
51 | 0 | os_memcpy(tmp2 + 8, tmp2, 8); |
52 | | |
53 | | /* OUT1 = E_K(TEMP XOR rot(IN1 XOR OP_C, r1) XOR c1) XOR OP_C */ |
54 | | |
55 | | /* rotate (tmp2 XOR OP_C) by r1 (= 0x40 = 8 bytes) */ |
56 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
57 | 0 | tmp3[(i + 8) % 16] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i]; |
58 | | /* XOR with TEMP = E_K(RAND XOR OP_C) */ |
59 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
60 | 0 | tmp3[i] ^= tmp1[i]; |
61 | | /* XOR with c1 (= ..00, i.e., NOP) */ |
62 | | |
63 | | /* f1 || f1* = E_K(tmp3) XOR OP_c */ |
64 | 0 | if (aes_128_encrypt_block(k, tmp3, tmp1)) |
65 | 0 | return -1; |
66 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
67 | 0 | tmp1[i] ^= opc[i]; |
68 | 0 | if (mac_a) |
69 | 0 | os_memcpy(mac_a, tmp1, 8); /* f1 */ |
70 | 0 | if (mac_s) |
71 | 0 | os_memcpy(mac_s, tmp1 + 8, 8); /* f1* */ |
72 | 0 | return 0; |
73 | 0 | } |
74 | | |
75 | | |
76 | | /** |
77 | | * milenage_f2345 - Milenage f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* algorithms |
78 | | * @opc: OPc = 128-bit value derived from OP and K |
79 | | * @k: K = 128-bit subscriber key |
80 | | * @_rand: RAND = 128-bit random challenge |
81 | | * @res: Buffer for RES = 64-bit signed response (f2), or %NULL |
82 | | * @ck: Buffer for CK = 128-bit confidentiality key (f3), or %NULL |
83 | | * @ik: Buffer for IK = 128-bit integrity key (f4), or %NULL |
84 | | * @ak: Buffer for AK = 48-bit anonymity key (f5), or %NULL |
85 | | * @akstar: Buffer for AK = 48-bit anonymity key (f5*), or %NULL |
86 | | * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
87 | | */ |
88 | | int milenage_f2345(const u8 *opc, const u8 *k, const u8 *_rand, |
89 | | u8 *res, u8 *ck, u8 *ik, u8 *ak, u8 *akstar) |
90 | 5.10k | { |
91 | 5.10k | u8 tmp1[16], tmp2[16], tmp3[16]; |
92 | 5.10k | int i; |
93 | | |
94 | | /* tmp2 = TEMP = E_K(RAND XOR OP_C) */ |
95 | 86.8k | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
96 | 81.7k | tmp1[i] = _rand[i] ^ opc[i]; |
97 | 5.10k | if (aes_128_encrypt_block(k, tmp1, tmp2)) |
98 | 0 | return -1; |
99 | | |
100 | | /* OUT2 = E_K(rot(TEMP XOR OP_C, r2) XOR c2) XOR OP_C */ |
101 | | /* OUT3 = E_K(rot(TEMP XOR OP_C, r3) XOR c3) XOR OP_C */ |
102 | | /* OUT4 = E_K(rot(TEMP XOR OP_C, r4) XOR c4) XOR OP_C */ |
103 | | /* OUT5 = E_K(rot(TEMP XOR OP_C, r5) XOR c5) XOR OP_C */ |
104 | | |
105 | | /* f2 and f5 */ |
106 | | /* rotate by r2 (= 0, i.e., NOP) */ |
107 | 86.8k | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
108 | 81.7k | tmp1[i] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i]; |
109 | 5.10k | tmp1[15] ^= 1; /* XOR c2 (= ..01) */ |
110 | | /* f5 || f2 = E_K(tmp1) XOR OP_c */ |
111 | 5.10k | if (aes_128_encrypt_block(k, tmp1, tmp3)) |
112 | 0 | return -1; |
113 | 86.8k | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
114 | 81.7k | tmp3[i] ^= opc[i]; |
115 | 5.10k | if (res) |
116 | 5.10k | os_memcpy(res, tmp3 + 8, 8); /* f2 */ |
117 | 5.10k | if (ak) |
118 | 0 | os_memcpy(ak, tmp3, 6); /* f5 */ |
119 | | |
120 | | /* f3 */ |
121 | 5.10k | if (ck) { |
122 | | /* rotate by r3 = 0x20 = 4 bytes */ |
123 | 86.8k | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
124 | 81.7k | tmp1[(i + 12) % 16] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i]; |
125 | 5.10k | tmp1[15] ^= 2; /* XOR c3 (= ..02) */ |
126 | 5.10k | if (aes_128_encrypt_block(k, tmp1, ck)) |
127 | 0 | return -1; |
128 | 86.8k | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
129 | 81.7k | ck[i] ^= opc[i]; |
130 | 5.10k | } |
131 | | |
132 | | /* f4 */ |
133 | 5.10k | if (ik) { |
134 | | /* rotate by r4 = 0x40 = 8 bytes */ |
135 | 86.8k | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
136 | 81.7k | tmp1[(i + 8) % 16] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i]; |
137 | 5.10k | tmp1[15] ^= 4; /* XOR c4 (= ..04) */ |
138 | 5.10k | if (aes_128_encrypt_block(k, tmp1, ik)) |
139 | 0 | return -1; |
140 | 86.8k | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
141 | 81.7k | ik[i] ^= opc[i]; |
142 | 5.10k | } |
143 | | |
144 | | /* f5* */ |
145 | 5.10k | if (akstar) { |
146 | | /* rotate by r5 = 0x60 = 12 bytes */ |
147 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
148 | 0 | tmp1[(i + 4) % 16] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i]; |
149 | 0 | tmp1[15] ^= 8; /* XOR c5 (= ..08) */ |
150 | 0 | if (aes_128_encrypt_block(k, tmp1, tmp1)) |
151 | 0 | return -1; |
152 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) |
153 | 0 | akstar[i] = tmp1[i] ^ opc[i]; |
154 | 0 | } |
155 | | |
156 | 5.10k | return 0; |
157 | 5.10k | } |
158 | | |
159 | | |
160 | | /** |
161 | | * milenage_generate - Generate AKA AUTN,IK,CK,RES |
162 | | * @opc: OPc = 128-bit operator variant algorithm configuration field (encr.) |
163 | | * @amf: AMF = 16-bit authentication management field |
164 | | * @k: K = 128-bit subscriber key |
165 | | * @sqn: SQN = 48-bit sequence number |
166 | | * @_rand: RAND = 128-bit random challenge |
167 | | * @autn: Buffer for AUTN = 128-bit authentication token |
168 | | * @ik: Buffer for IK = 128-bit integrity key (f4), or %NULL |
169 | | * @ck: Buffer for CK = 128-bit confidentiality key (f3), or %NULL |
170 | | * @res: Buffer for RES = 64-bit signed response (f2), or %NULL |
171 | | * @res_len: Max length for res; set to used length or 0 on failure |
172 | | */ |
173 | | void milenage_generate(const u8 *opc, const u8 *amf, const u8 *k, |
174 | | const u8 *sqn, const u8 *_rand, u8 *autn, u8 *ik, |
175 | | u8 *ck, u8 *res, size_t *res_len) |
176 | 0 | { |
177 | 0 | int i; |
178 | 0 | u8 mac_a[8], ak[6]; |
179 | |
|
180 | 0 | if (*res_len < 8) { |
181 | 0 | *res_len = 0; |
182 | 0 | return; |
183 | 0 | } |
184 | 0 | if (milenage_f1(opc, k, _rand, sqn, amf, mac_a, NULL) || |
185 | 0 | milenage_f2345(opc, k, _rand, res, ck, ik, ak, NULL)) { |
186 | 0 | *res_len = 0; |
187 | 0 | return; |
188 | 0 | } |
189 | 0 | *res_len = 8; |
190 | | |
191 | | /* AUTN = (SQN ^ AK) || AMF || MAC */ |
192 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) |
193 | 0 | autn[i] = sqn[i] ^ ak[i]; |
194 | 0 | os_memcpy(autn + 6, amf, 2); |
195 | 0 | os_memcpy(autn + 8, mac_a, 8); |
196 | 0 | } |
197 | | |
198 | | |
199 | | /** |
200 | | * milenage_auts - Milenage AUTS validation |
201 | | * @opc: OPc = 128-bit operator variant algorithm configuration field (encr.) |
202 | | * @k: K = 128-bit subscriber key |
203 | | * @_rand: RAND = 128-bit random challenge |
204 | | * @auts: AUTS = 112-bit authentication token from client |
205 | | * @sqn: Buffer for SQN = 48-bit sequence number |
206 | | * Returns: 0 = success (sqn filled), -1 on failure |
207 | | */ |
208 | | int milenage_auts(const u8 *opc, const u8 *k, const u8 *_rand, const u8 *auts, |
209 | | u8 *sqn) |
210 | 0 | { |
211 | 0 | u8 amf[2] = { 0x00, 0x00 }; /* TS 33.102 v7.0.0, 6.3.3 */ |
212 | 0 | u8 ak[6], mac_s[8]; |
213 | 0 | int i; |
214 | |
|
215 | 0 | if (milenage_f2345(opc, k, _rand, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ak)) |
216 | 0 | return -1; |
217 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) |
218 | 0 | sqn[i] = auts[i] ^ ak[i]; |
219 | 0 | if (milenage_f1(opc, k, _rand, sqn, amf, NULL, mac_s) || |
220 | 0 | os_memcmp_const(mac_s, auts + 6, 8) != 0) |
221 | 0 | return -1; |
222 | 0 | return 0; |
223 | 0 | } |
224 | | |
225 | | |
226 | | /** |
227 | | * gsm_milenage - Generate GSM-Milenage (3GPP TS 55.205) authentication triplet |
228 | | * @opc: OPc = 128-bit operator variant algorithm configuration field (encr.) |
229 | | * @k: K = 128-bit subscriber key |
230 | | * @_rand: RAND = 128-bit random challenge |
231 | | * @sres: Buffer for SRES = 32-bit SRES |
232 | | * @kc: Buffer for Kc = 64-bit Kc |
233 | | * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
234 | | */ |
235 | | int gsm_milenage(const u8 *opc, const u8 *k, const u8 *_rand, u8 *sres, u8 *kc) |
236 | 5.10k | { |
237 | 5.10k | u8 res[8], ck[16], ik[16]; |
238 | 5.10k | int i; |
239 | | |
240 | 5.10k | if (milenage_f2345(opc, k, _rand, res, ck, ik, NULL, NULL)) |
241 | 0 | return -1; |
242 | | |
243 | 45.9k | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) |
244 | 40.8k | kc[i] = ck[i] ^ ck[i + 8] ^ ik[i] ^ ik[i + 8]; |
245 | | |
246 | | #ifdef GSM_MILENAGE_ALT_SRES |
247 | | os_memcpy(sres, res, 4); |
248 | | #else /* GSM_MILENAGE_ALT_SRES */ |
249 | 25.5k | for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) |
250 | 20.4k | sres[i] = res[i] ^ res[i + 4]; |
251 | 5.10k | #endif /* GSM_MILENAGE_ALT_SRES */ |
252 | 5.10k | return 0; |
253 | 5.10k | } |
254 | | |
255 | | |
256 | | /** |
257 | | * milenage_generate - Generate AKA AUTN,IK,CK,RES |
258 | | * @opc: OPc = 128-bit operator variant algorithm configuration field (encr.) |
259 | | * @k: K = 128-bit subscriber key |
260 | | * @sqn: SQN = 48-bit sequence number |
261 | | * @_rand: RAND = 128-bit random challenge |
262 | | * @autn: AUTN = 128-bit authentication token |
263 | | * @ik: Buffer for IK = 128-bit integrity key (f4), or %NULL |
264 | | * @ck: Buffer for CK = 128-bit confidentiality key (f3), or %NULL |
265 | | * @res: Buffer for RES = 64-bit signed response (f2), or %NULL |
266 | | * @res_len: Variable that will be set to RES length |
267 | | * @auts: 112-bit buffer for AUTS |
268 | | * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure, or -2 on synchronization failure |
269 | | */ |
270 | | int milenage_check(const u8 *opc, const u8 *k, const u8 *sqn, const u8 *_rand, |
271 | | const u8 *autn, u8 *ik, u8 *ck, u8 *res, size_t *res_len, |
272 | | u8 *auts) |
273 | 0 | { |
274 | 0 | int i; |
275 | 0 | u8 mac_a[8], ak[6], rx_sqn[6]; |
276 | 0 | const u8 *amf; |
277 | |
|
278 | 0 | wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: AUTN", autn, 16); |
279 | 0 | wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: RAND", _rand, 16); |
280 | |
|
281 | 0 | if (milenage_f2345(opc, k, _rand, res, ck, ik, ak, NULL)) |
282 | 0 | return -1; |
283 | | |
284 | 0 | *res_len = 8; |
285 | 0 | wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: RES", res, *res_len); |
286 | 0 | wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: CK", ck, 16); |
287 | 0 | wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: IK", ik, 16); |
288 | 0 | wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: AK", ak, 6); |
289 | | |
290 | | /* AUTN = (SQN ^ AK) || AMF || MAC */ |
291 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) |
292 | 0 | rx_sqn[i] = autn[i] ^ ak[i]; |
293 | 0 | wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: SQN", rx_sqn, 6); |
294 | |
|
295 | 0 | if (os_memcmp(rx_sqn, sqn, 6) <= 0) { |
296 | 0 | u8 auts_amf[2] = { 0x00, 0x00 }; /* TS 33.102 v7.0.0, 6.3.3 */ |
297 | 0 | if (milenage_f2345(opc, k, _rand, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ak)) |
298 | 0 | return -1; |
299 | 0 | wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: AK*", ak, 6); |
300 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) |
301 | 0 | auts[i] = sqn[i] ^ ak[i]; |
302 | 0 | if (milenage_f1(opc, k, _rand, sqn, auts_amf, NULL, auts + 6)) |
303 | 0 | return -1; |
304 | 0 | wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: AUTS", auts, 14); |
305 | 0 | return -2; |
306 | 0 | } |
307 | | |
308 | 0 | amf = autn + 6; |
309 | 0 | wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: AMF", amf, 2); |
310 | 0 | if (milenage_f1(opc, k, _rand, rx_sqn, amf, mac_a, NULL)) |
311 | 0 | return -1; |
312 | | |
313 | 0 | wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: MAC_A", mac_a, 8); |
314 | |
|
315 | 0 | if (os_memcmp_const(mac_a, autn + 8, 8) != 0) { |
316 | 0 | wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: MAC mismatch"); |
317 | 0 | wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "Milenage: Received MAC_A", |
318 | 0 | autn + 8, 8); |
319 | 0 | return -1; |
320 | 0 | } |
321 | | |
322 | 0 | return 0; |
323 | 0 | } |