/src/irssi/subprojects/openssl-1.1.1l/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
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1 | | /* |
2 | | * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
3 | | * |
4 | | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
7 | | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
8 | | */ |
9 | | |
10 | | #include <string.h> |
11 | | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
12 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
13 | | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
14 | | #include "rand_local.h" |
15 | | #include "internal/thread_once.h" |
16 | | #include "crypto/rand.h" |
17 | | #include "crypto/cryptlib.h" |
18 | | |
19 | | /* |
20 | | * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG |
21 | | * |
22 | | * See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for a general overview. |
23 | | * |
24 | | * The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new |
25 | | * does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has |
26 | | * instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free |
27 | | * lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware |
28 | | * DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is |
29 | | * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.) |
30 | | */ |
31 | | |
32 | | /* |
33 | | * The three shared DRBG instances |
34 | | * |
35 | | * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>. |
36 | | */ |
37 | | |
38 | | /* |
39 | | * The <master> DRBG |
40 | | * |
41 | | * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other |
42 | | * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy |
43 | | * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add(). |
44 | | * |
45 | | * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by |
46 | | * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child |
47 | | * DRBG instances during reseeding. |
48 | | */ |
49 | | static RAND_DRBG *master_drbg; |
50 | | /* |
51 | | * The <public> DRBG |
52 | | * |
53 | | * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes(). |
54 | | * |
55 | | * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread. |
56 | | */ |
57 | | static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg; |
58 | | /* |
59 | | * The <private> DRBG |
60 | | * |
61 | | * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes() |
62 | | * |
63 | | * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread. |
64 | | */ |
65 | | static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg; |
66 | | |
67 | | |
68 | | |
69 | | /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */ |
70 | | static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"; |
71 | | |
72 | | static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; |
73 | | |
74 | | |
75 | | |
76 | | static int rand_drbg_type = RAND_DRBG_TYPE; |
77 | | static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags = RAND_DRBG_FLAGS; |
78 | | |
79 | | static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL; |
80 | | static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL; |
81 | | |
82 | | static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; |
83 | | static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; |
84 | | |
85 | | /* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */ |
86 | | static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags = |
87 | | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF; |
88 | | |
89 | | static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent); |
90 | | |
91 | | static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, |
92 | | int type, |
93 | | unsigned int flags, |
94 | | RAND_DRBG *parent); |
95 | | |
96 | | /* |
97 | | * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|. |
98 | | * |
99 | | * If |type| and |flags| are zero, use the defaults |
100 | | * |
101 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
102 | | */ |
103 | | int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) |
104 | 3 | { |
105 | 3 | int ret = 1; |
106 | | |
107 | 3 | if (type == 0 && flags == 0) { |
108 | 0 | type = rand_drbg_type; |
109 | 0 | flags = rand_drbg_flags; |
110 | 0 | } |
111 | | |
112 | | /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */ |
113 | 3 | if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) { |
114 | 0 | drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); |
115 | 0 | rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); |
116 | 0 | drbg->adin_pool = NULL; |
117 | 0 | } |
118 | | |
119 | 3 | drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED; |
120 | 3 | drbg->flags = flags; |
121 | 3 | drbg->type = type; |
122 | | |
123 | 3 | switch (type) { |
124 | 0 | default: |
125 | 0 | drbg->type = 0; |
126 | 0 | drbg->flags = 0; |
127 | 0 | drbg->meth = NULL; |
128 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); |
129 | 0 | return 0; |
130 | 0 | case 0: |
131 | | /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */ |
132 | 0 | drbg->meth = NULL; |
133 | 0 | return 1; |
134 | 0 | case NID_aes_128_ctr: |
135 | 0 | case NID_aes_192_ctr: |
136 | 3 | case NID_aes_256_ctr: |
137 | 3 | ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg); |
138 | 3 | break; |
139 | 3 | } |
140 | | |
141 | 3 | if (ret == 0) { |
142 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
143 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG); |
144 | 0 | } |
145 | 3 | return ret; |
146 | 3 | } |
147 | | |
148 | | /* |
149 | | * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances. |
150 | | * |
151 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
152 | | */ |
153 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags) |
154 | 0 | { |
155 | 0 | int ret = 1; |
156 | |
|
157 | 0 | switch (type) { |
158 | 0 | default: |
159 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); |
160 | 0 | return 0; |
161 | 0 | case NID_aes_128_ctr: |
162 | 0 | case NID_aes_192_ctr: |
163 | 0 | case NID_aes_256_ctr: |
164 | 0 | break; |
165 | 0 | } |
166 | | |
167 | 0 | if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) { |
168 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS); |
169 | 0 | return 0; |
170 | 0 | } |
171 | | |
172 | 0 | rand_drbg_type = type; |
173 | 0 | rand_drbg_flags = flags; |
174 | |
|
175 | 0 | return ret; |
176 | 0 | } |
177 | | |
178 | | |
179 | | /* |
180 | | * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on |
181 | | * the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled. |
182 | | * The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding. |
183 | | * |
184 | | * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure. |
185 | | */ |
186 | | static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, |
187 | | int type, |
188 | | unsigned int flags, |
189 | | RAND_DRBG *parent) |
190 | 3 | { |
191 | 3 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) |
192 | 3 | : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)); |
193 | | |
194 | 3 | if (drbg == NULL) { |
195 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
196 | 0 | return NULL; |
197 | 0 | } |
198 | | |
199 | 3 | drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg); |
200 | 3 | drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); |
201 | 3 | drbg->parent = parent; |
202 | | |
203 | 3 | if (parent == NULL) { |
204 | 1 | drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy; |
205 | 1 | drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy; |
206 | 1 | #ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE |
207 | 1 | drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce; |
208 | 1 | drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce; |
209 | 1 | #endif |
210 | | |
211 | 1 | drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval; |
212 | 1 | drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval; |
213 | 2 | } else { |
214 | 2 | drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy; |
215 | 2 | drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy; |
216 | | /* |
217 | | * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will |
218 | | * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent. |
219 | | */ |
220 | | |
221 | 2 | drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval; |
222 | 2 | drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval; |
223 | 2 | } |
224 | | |
225 | 3 | if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0) |
226 | 0 | goto err; |
227 | | |
228 | 3 | if (parent != NULL) { |
229 | 2 | rand_drbg_lock(parent); |
230 | 2 | if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) { |
231 | | /* |
232 | | * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C |
233 | | * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source |
234 | | */ |
235 | 0 | rand_drbg_unlock(parent); |
236 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK); |
237 | 0 | goto err; |
238 | 0 | } |
239 | 2 | rand_drbg_unlock(parent); |
240 | 2 | } |
241 | | |
242 | 3 | return drbg; |
243 | | |
244 | 0 | err: |
245 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); |
246 | |
|
247 | 0 | return NULL; |
248 | 3 | } |
249 | | |
250 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) |
251 | 0 | { |
252 | 0 | return rand_drbg_new(0, type, flags, parent); |
253 | 0 | } |
254 | | |
255 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) |
256 | 3 | { |
257 | 3 | return rand_drbg_new(1, type, flags, parent); |
258 | 3 | } |
259 | | |
260 | | /* |
261 | | * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory. |
262 | | */ |
263 | | void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
264 | 3 | { |
265 | 3 | if (drbg == NULL) |
266 | 0 | return; |
267 | | |
268 | 3 | if (drbg->meth != NULL) |
269 | 3 | drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); |
270 | 3 | rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); |
271 | 3 | CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock); |
272 | 3 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data); |
273 | | |
274 | 3 | if (drbg->secure) |
275 | 0 | OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); |
276 | 3 | else |
277 | 3 | OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); |
278 | 3 | } |
279 | | |
280 | | /* |
281 | | * Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and |
282 | | * |perslen| as prediction-resistance input. |
283 | | * |
284 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
285 | | * |
286 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
287 | | */ |
288 | | int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
289 | | const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen) |
290 | 3 | { |
291 | 3 | unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL; |
292 | 3 | size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0; |
293 | 3 | size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength; |
294 | 3 | size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; |
295 | 3 | size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen; |
296 | | |
297 | 3 | if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) { |
298 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, |
299 | 0 | RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG); |
300 | 0 | goto end; |
301 | 0 | } |
302 | | |
303 | 3 | if (drbg->meth == NULL) { |
304 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, |
305 | 0 | RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); |
306 | 0 | goto end; |
307 | 0 | } |
308 | | |
309 | 3 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
310 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, |
311 | 0 | drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE |
312 | 0 | : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED); |
313 | 0 | goto end; |
314 | 0 | } |
315 | | |
316 | 3 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
317 | | |
318 | | /* |
319 | | * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy |
320 | | * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing |
321 | | * the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce. |
322 | | * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL. |
323 | | */ |
324 | 3 | if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { |
325 | 2 | min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2; |
326 | 2 | min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen; |
327 | 2 | max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen; |
328 | 2 | } |
329 | | |
330 | 3 | if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) |
331 | 3 | entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy, |
332 | 3 | min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0); |
333 | 3 | if (entropylen < min_entropylen |
334 | 3 | || entropylen > max_entropylen) { |
335 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); |
336 | 0 | goto end; |
337 | 0 | } |
338 | | |
339 | 3 | if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) { |
340 | 1 | noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2, |
341 | 1 | drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen); |
342 | 1 | if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) { |
343 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE); |
344 | 0 | goto end; |
345 | 0 | } |
346 | 1 | } |
347 | | |
348 | 3 | if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen, |
349 | 3 | nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) { |
350 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG); |
351 | 0 | goto end; |
352 | 0 | } |
353 | | |
354 | 3 | drbg->state = DRBG_READY; |
355 | 3 | drbg->generate_counter = 1; |
356 | 3 | drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); |
357 | 3 | if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation) { |
358 | 3 | if (drbg->parent == NULL) |
359 | 3 | tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter); |
360 | 2 | else |
361 | 3 | tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter, |
362 | 3 | tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)); |
363 | 3 | } |
364 | | |
365 | 3 | end: |
366 | 3 | if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) |
367 | 3 | drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); |
368 | 3 | if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL) |
369 | 1 | drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen); |
370 | 3 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) |
371 | 3 | return 1; |
372 | 0 | return 0; |
373 | 3 | } |
374 | | |
375 | | /* |
376 | | * Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used. |
377 | | * |
378 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
379 | | * |
380 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
381 | | */ |
382 | | int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
383 | 0 | { |
384 | 0 | if (drbg->meth == NULL) { |
385 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
386 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE, |
387 | 0 | RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); |
388 | 0 | return 0; |
389 | 0 | } |
390 | | |
391 | | /* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important |
392 | | * members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their |
393 | | * initial values. |
394 | | */ |
395 | 0 | drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); |
396 | 0 | return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->type, drbg->flags); |
397 | 0 | } |
398 | | |
399 | | /* |
400 | | * Reseed |drbg|, mixing in the specified data |
401 | | * |
402 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
403 | | * |
404 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
405 | | */ |
406 | | int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
407 | | const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen, |
408 | | int prediction_resistance) |
409 | 9 | { |
410 | 9 | unsigned char *entropy = NULL; |
411 | 9 | size_t entropylen = 0; |
412 | | |
413 | 9 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) { |
414 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE); |
415 | 0 | return 0; |
416 | 0 | } |
417 | 9 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
418 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED); |
419 | 0 | return 0; |
420 | 0 | } |
421 | | |
422 | 9 | if (adin == NULL) { |
423 | 0 | adinlen = 0; |
424 | 9 | } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) { |
425 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
426 | 0 | return 0; |
427 | 0 | } |
428 | | |
429 | 9 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
430 | 9 | if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) |
431 | 9 | entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, |
432 | 9 | drbg->min_entropylen, |
433 | 9 | drbg->max_entropylen, |
434 | 9 | prediction_resistance); |
435 | 9 | if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen |
436 | 9 | || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { |
437 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); |
438 | 0 | goto end; |
439 | 0 | } |
440 | | |
441 | 9 | if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen)) |
442 | 0 | goto end; |
443 | | |
444 | 9 | drbg->state = DRBG_READY; |
445 | 9 | drbg->generate_counter = 1; |
446 | 9 | drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); |
447 | 9 | if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation) { |
448 | 9 | if (drbg->parent == NULL) |
449 | 9 | tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter); |
450 | 9 | else |
451 | 9 | tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter, |
452 | 9 | tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)); |
453 | 9 | } |
454 | | |
455 | 9 | end: |
456 | 9 | if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) |
457 | 9 | drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); |
458 | 9 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) |
459 | 9 | return 1; |
460 | 0 | return 0; |
461 | 9 | } |
462 | | |
463 | | /* |
464 | | * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input |
465 | | * |
466 | | * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means, |
467 | | * regardless of its current state. |
468 | | * |
469 | | * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed, |
470 | | * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy. |
471 | | * |
472 | | * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input. |
473 | | * |
474 | | * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input |
475 | | * |
476 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
477 | | * |
478 | | * This function is used internally only. |
479 | | */ |
480 | | int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
481 | | const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy) |
482 | 0 | { |
483 | 0 | int reseeded = 0; |
484 | 0 | const unsigned char *adin = NULL; |
485 | 0 | size_t adinlen = 0; |
486 | |
|
487 | 0 | if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) { |
488 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
489 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
490 | 0 | rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); |
491 | 0 | drbg->seed_pool = NULL; |
492 | 0 | return 0; |
493 | 0 | } |
494 | | |
495 | 0 | if (buffer != NULL) { |
496 | 0 | if (entropy > 0) { |
497 | 0 | if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) { |
498 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, |
499 | 0 | RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
500 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
501 | 0 | return 0; |
502 | 0 | } |
503 | | |
504 | 0 | if (entropy > 8 * len) { |
505 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE); |
506 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
507 | 0 | return 0; |
508 | 0 | } |
509 | | |
510 | | /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */ |
511 | 0 | drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy); |
512 | 0 | if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) |
513 | 0 | return 0; |
514 | 0 | } else { |
515 | 0 | if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) { |
516 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, |
517 | 0 | RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
518 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
519 | 0 | return 0; |
520 | 0 | } |
521 | 0 | adin = buffer; |
522 | 0 | adinlen = len; |
523 | 0 | } |
524 | 0 | } |
525 | | |
526 | | /* repair error state */ |
527 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) |
528 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg); |
529 | | |
530 | | /* repair uninitialized state */ |
531 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
532 | | /* reinstantiate drbg */ |
533 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, |
534 | 0 | (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string, |
535 | 0 | sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1); |
536 | | /* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */ |
537 | 0 | reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY); |
538 | 0 | } |
539 | | |
540 | | /* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */ |
541 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) { |
542 | 0 | if (adin != NULL) { |
543 | | /* |
544 | | * mix in additional input without reseeding |
545 | | * |
546 | | * Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional |
547 | | * data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling |
548 | | * entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy(). |
549 | | * This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A. |
550 | | */ |
551 | 0 | drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0); |
552 | 0 | } else if (reseeded == 0) { |
553 | | /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */ |
554 | 0 | if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0)) { |
555 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); |
556 | 0 | } |
557 | 0 | } |
558 | 0 | } |
559 | |
|
560 | 0 | rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); |
561 | 0 | drbg->seed_pool = NULL; |
562 | |
|
563 | 0 | return drbg->state == DRBG_READY; |
564 | 0 | } |
565 | | |
566 | | /* |
567 | | * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need |
568 | | * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be |
569 | | * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|. |
570 | | * |
571 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
572 | | * |
573 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
574 | | * |
575 | | */ |
576 | | int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, |
577 | | int prediction_resistance, |
578 | | const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) |
579 | 472k | { |
580 | 472k | int fork_id; |
581 | 472k | int reseed_required = 0; |
582 | | |
583 | 472k | if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) { |
584 | | /* try to recover from previous errors */ |
585 | 0 | rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0); |
586 | |
|
587 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) { |
588 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE); |
589 | 0 | return 0; |
590 | 0 | } |
591 | 0 | if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
592 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED); |
593 | 0 | return 0; |
594 | 0 | } |
595 | 0 | } |
596 | | |
597 | 472k | if (outlen > drbg->max_request) { |
598 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG); |
599 | 0 | return 0; |
600 | 0 | } |
601 | 472k | if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) { |
602 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
603 | 0 | return 0; |
604 | 0 | } |
605 | | |
606 | 472k | fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); |
607 | | |
608 | 472k | if (drbg->fork_id != fork_id) { |
609 | 0 | drbg->fork_id = fork_id; |
610 | 0 | reseed_required = 1; |
611 | 0 | } |
612 | | |
613 | 472k | if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) { |
614 | 472k | if (drbg->generate_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval) |
615 | 3 | reseed_required = 1; |
616 | 472k | } |
617 | 472k | if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) { |
618 | 472k | time_t now = time(NULL); |
619 | 472k | if (now < drbg->reseed_time |
620 | 472k | || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval) |
621 | 6 | reseed_required = 1; |
622 | 472k | } |
623 | 472k | if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation && drbg->parent != NULL) { |
624 | 472k | if (drbg->reseed_counter != tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)) |
625 | 0 | reseed_required = 1; |
626 | 472k | } |
627 | | |
628 | 472k | if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) { |
629 | 9 | if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) { |
630 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); |
631 | 0 | return 0; |
632 | 0 | } |
633 | 9 | adin = NULL; |
634 | 9 | adinlen = 0; |
635 | 9 | } |
636 | | |
637 | 472k | if (!drbg->meth->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) { |
638 | 0 | drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; |
639 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR); |
640 | 0 | return 0; |
641 | 0 | } |
642 | | |
643 | 472k | drbg->generate_counter++; |
644 | | |
645 | 472k | return 1; |
646 | 472k | } |
647 | | |
648 | | /* |
649 | | * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will |
650 | | * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes. |
651 | | * |
652 | | * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null. |
653 | | * |
654 | | * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. |
655 | | */ |
656 | | int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) |
657 | 472k | { |
658 | 472k | unsigned char *additional = NULL; |
659 | 472k | size_t additional_len; |
660 | 472k | size_t chunk; |
661 | 472k | size_t ret = 0; |
662 | | |
663 | 472k | if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) { |
664 | 2 | if (drbg->type == 0) |
665 | 0 | goto err; |
666 | 2 | drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen); |
667 | 2 | if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) |
668 | 0 | goto err; |
669 | 2 | } |
670 | | |
671 | 472k | additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, |
672 | 472k | &additional); |
673 | | |
674 | 945k | for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) { |
675 | 472k | chunk = outlen; |
676 | 472k | if (chunk > drbg->max_request) |
677 | 0 | chunk = drbg->max_request; |
678 | 472k | ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, additional, additional_len); |
679 | 472k | if (!ret) |
680 | 0 | goto err; |
681 | 472k | } |
682 | 472k | ret = 1; |
683 | | |
684 | 472k | err: |
685 | 472k | if (additional != NULL) |
686 | 472k | rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional); |
687 | | |
688 | 472k | return ret; |
689 | 472k | } |
690 | | |
691 | | /* |
692 | | * Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce. |
693 | | * |
694 | | * Setting the callbacks is allowed only if the drbg has not been |
695 | | * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail. |
696 | | * |
697 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
698 | | */ |
699 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
700 | | RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy, |
701 | | RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy, |
702 | | RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce, |
703 | | RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce) |
704 | 0 | { |
705 | 0 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) |
706 | 0 | return 0; |
707 | 0 | drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy; |
708 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy; |
709 | 0 | drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce; |
710 | 0 | drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce; |
711 | 0 | return 1; |
712 | 0 | } |
713 | | |
714 | | /* |
715 | | * Set the reseed interval. |
716 | | * |
717 | | * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the number of generate |
718 | | * requests exceeds the given reseed interval. If the reseed interval |
719 | | * is 0, then this feature is disabled. |
720 | | * |
721 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
722 | | */ |
723 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval) |
724 | 0 | { |
725 | 0 | if (interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL) |
726 | 0 | return 0; |
727 | 0 | drbg->reseed_interval = interval; |
728 | 0 | return 1; |
729 | 0 | } |
730 | | |
731 | | /* |
732 | | * Set the reseed time interval. |
733 | | * |
734 | | * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the time elapsed since |
735 | | * the last reseeding exceeds the given reseed time interval. For safety, |
736 | | * a reseeding will also occur if the clock has been reset to a smaller |
737 | | * value. |
738 | | * |
739 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
740 | | */ |
741 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval) |
742 | 0 | { |
743 | 0 | if (interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL) |
744 | 0 | return 0; |
745 | 0 | drbg->reseed_time_interval = interval; |
746 | 0 | return 1; |
747 | 0 | } |
748 | | |
749 | | /* |
750 | | * Set the default values for reseed (time) intervals of new DRBG instances |
751 | | * |
752 | | * The default values can be set independently for master DRBG instances |
753 | | * (without a parent) and slave DRBG instances (with parent). |
754 | | * |
755 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
756 | | */ |
757 | | |
758 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults( |
759 | | unsigned int _master_reseed_interval, |
760 | | unsigned int _slave_reseed_interval, |
761 | | time_t _master_reseed_time_interval, |
762 | | time_t _slave_reseed_time_interval |
763 | | ) |
764 | 0 | { |
765 | 0 | if (_master_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL |
766 | 0 | || _slave_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL) |
767 | 0 | return 0; |
768 | | |
769 | 0 | if (_master_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL |
770 | 0 | || _slave_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL) |
771 | 0 | return 0; |
772 | | |
773 | 0 | master_reseed_interval = _master_reseed_interval; |
774 | 0 | slave_reseed_interval = _slave_reseed_interval; |
775 | |
|
776 | 0 | master_reseed_time_interval = _master_reseed_time_interval; |
777 | 0 | slave_reseed_time_interval = _slave_reseed_time_interval; |
778 | |
|
779 | 0 | return 1; |
780 | 0 | } |
781 | | |
782 | | /* |
783 | | * Locks the given drbg. Locking a drbg which does not have locking |
784 | | * enabled is considered a successful no-op. |
785 | | * |
786 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
787 | | */ |
788 | | int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
789 | 13 | { |
790 | 13 | if (drbg->lock != NULL) |
791 | 13 | return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); |
792 | | |
793 | 0 | return 1; |
794 | 13 | } |
795 | | |
796 | | /* |
797 | | * Unlocks the given drbg. Unlocking a drbg which does not have locking |
798 | | * enabled is considered a successful no-op. |
799 | | * |
800 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
801 | | */ |
802 | | int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
803 | 13 | { |
804 | 13 | if (drbg->lock != NULL) |
805 | 13 | return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); |
806 | | |
807 | 0 | return 1; |
808 | 13 | } |
809 | | |
810 | | /* |
811 | | * Enables locking for the given drbg |
812 | | * |
813 | | * Locking can only be enabled if the random generator |
814 | | * is in the uninitialized state. |
815 | | * |
816 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
817 | | */ |
818 | | int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
819 | 1 | { |
820 | 1 | if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { |
821 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, |
822 | 0 | RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED); |
823 | 0 | return 0; |
824 | 0 | } |
825 | | |
826 | 1 | if (drbg->lock == NULL) { |
827 | 1 | if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent->lock == NULL) { |
828 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, |
829 | 0 | RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED); |
830 | 0 | return 0; |
831 | 0 | } |
832 | | |
833 | 1 | drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); |
834 | 1 | if (drbg->lock == NULL) { |
835 | 0 | RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, |
836 | 0 | RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK); |
837 | 0 | return 0; |
838 | 0 | } |
839 | 1 | } |
840 | | |
841 | 1 | return 1; |
842 | 1 | } |
843 | | |
844 | | /* |
845 | | * Get and set the EXDATA |
846 | | */ |
847 | | int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg) |
848 | 0 | { |
849 | 0 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg); |
850 | 0 | } |
851 | | |
852 | | void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx) |
853 | 0 | { |
854 | 0 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx); |
855 | 0 | } |
856 | | |
857 | | |
858 | | /* |
859 | | * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the |
860 | | * global DRBG. They lock. |
861 | | */ |
862 | | |
863 | | /* |
864 | | * Allocates a new global DRBG on the secure heap (if enabled) and |
865 | | * initializes it with default settings. |
866 | | * |
867 | | * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure. |
868 | | */ |
869 | | static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent) |
870 | 3 | { |
871 | 3 | RAND_DRBG *drbg; |
872 | | |
873 | 3 | drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(rand_drbg_type, rand_drbg_flags, parent); |
874 | 3 | if (drbg == NULL) |
875 | 0 | return NULL; |
876 | | |
877 | | /* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */ |
878 | 3 | if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0) |
879 | 0 | goto err; |
880 | | |
881 | | /* enable reseed propagation */ |
882 | 3 | drbg->enable_reseed_propagation = 1; |
883 | 3 | drbg->reseed_counter = 1; |
884 | | |
885 | | /* |
886 | | * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation. |
887 | | * |
888 | | * The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and |
889 | | * an automatic recovery is attempted. |
890 | | */ |
891 | 3 | (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, |
892 | 3 | (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string, |
893 | 3 | sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1); |
894 | 3 | return drbg; |
895 | | |
896 | 0 | err: |
897 | 0 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); |
898 | 0 | return NULL; |
899 | 3 | } |
900 | | |
901 | | /* |
902 | | * Initialize the global DRBGs on first use. |
903 | | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. |
904 | | */ |
905 | | DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init) |
906 | 1 | { |
907 | | /* |
908 | | * ensure that libcrypto is initialized, otherwise the |
909 | | * DRBG locks are not cleaned up properly |
910 | | */ |
911 | 1 | if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)) |
912 | 0 | return 0; |
913 | | |
914 | 1 | if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&private_drbg, NULL)) |
915 | 0 | return 0; |
916 | | |
917 | 1 | if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&public_drbg, NULL)) |
918 | 0 | goto err1; |
919 | | |
920 | 1 | master_drbg = drbg_setup(NULL); |
921 | 1 | if (master_drbg == NULL) |
922 | 0 | goto err2; |
923 | | |
924 | 1 | return 1; |
925 | | |
926 | 0 | err2: |
927 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg); |
928 | 0 | err1: |
929 | 0 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg); |
930 | 0 | return 0; |
931 | 0 | } |
932 | | |
933 | | /* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */ |
934 | | void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void) |
935 | 2 | { |
936 | 2 | if (master_drbg != NULL) { |
937 | 1 | RAND_DRBG_free(master_drbg); |
938 | 1 | master_drbg = NULL; |
939 | | |
940 | 1 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg); |
941 | 1 | CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg); |
942 | 1 | } |
943 | 2 | } |
944 | | |
945 | | void drbg_delete_thread_state(void) |
946 | 1 | { |
947 | 1 | RAND_DRBG *drbg; |
948 | | |
949 | 1 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg); |
950 | 1 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, NULL); |
951 | 1 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); |
952 | | |
953 | 1 | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg); |
954 | 1 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, NULL); |
955 | 1 | RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); |
956 | 1 | } |
957 | | |
958 | | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */ |
959 | | static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count) |
960 | 202k | { |
961 | 202k | int ret; |
962 | 202k | RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_public(); |
963 | | |
964 | 202k | if (drbg == NULL) |
965 | 0 | return 0; |
966 | | |
967 | 202k | ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, out, count); |
968 | | |
969 | 202k | return ret; |
970 | 202k | } |
971 | | |
972 | | /* |
973 | | * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer |
974 | | * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG |
975 | | * successfully. |
976 | | */ |
977 | | size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg) |
978 | 0 | { |
979 | | /* |
980 | | * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize) |
981 | | * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies |
982 | | * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations |
983 | | * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate(). |
984 | | */ |
985 | 0 | size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength; |
986 | 0 | size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; |
987 | | |
988 | | /* |
989 | | * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a |
990 | | * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate(). |
991 | | */ |
992 | 0 | if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { |
993 | 0 | min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2; |
994 | 0 | min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen; |
995 | 0 | } |
996 | | |
997 | | /* |
998 | | * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes |
999 | | * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because |
1000 | | * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8). |
1001 | | */ |
1002 | 0 | min_entropy >>= 3; |
1003 | | |
1004 | | /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */ |
1005 | 0 | return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen; |
1006 | 0 | } |
1007 | | |
1008 | | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */ |
1009 | | static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) |
1010 | 0 | { |
1011 | 0 | int ret = 0; |
1012 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master(); |
1013 | 0 | size_t buflen; |
1014 | 0 | size_t seedlen; |
1015 | |
|
1016 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) |
1017 | 0 | return 0; |
1018 | | |
1019 | 0 | if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0) |
1020 | 0 | return 0; |
1021 | | |
1022 | 0 | rand_drbg_lock(drbg); |
1023 | 0 | seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg); |
1024 | |
|
1025 | 0 | buflen = (size_t)num; |
1026 | |
|
1027 | 0 | if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) { |
1028 | | #if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) |
1029 | | /* |
1030 | | * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail |
1031 | | * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into |
1032 | | * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a |
1033 | | * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data. |
1034 | | * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF. |
1035 | | */ |
1036 | | unsigned char dummy[1]; |
1037 | | |
1038 | | ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen); |
1039 | | rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); |
1040 | | return ret; |
1041 | | #else |
1042 | | /* |
1043 | | * If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content |
1044 | | * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular |
1045 | | * reseeding. |
1046 | | */ |
1047 | 0 | randomness = 0.0; |
1048 | 0 | #endif |
1049 | 0 | } |
1050 | | |
1051 | |
|
1052 | 0 | if (randomness > (double)seedlen) { |
1053 | | /* |
1054 | | * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a |
1055 | | * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer |
1056 | | * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart() |
1057 | | * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes, |
1058 | | * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the |
1059 | | * security strength. |
1060 | | */ |
1061 | 0 | randomness = (double)seedlen; |
1062 | 0 | } |
1063 | |
|
1064 | 0 | ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness)); |
1065 | 0 | rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); |
1066 | |
|
1067 | 0 | return ret; |
1068 | 0 | } |
1069 | | |
1070 | | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */ |
1071 | | static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num) |
1072 | 0 | { |
1073 | 0 | return drbg_add(buf, num, num); |
1074 | 0 | } |
1075 | | |
1076 | | /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_status() method */ |
1077 | | static int drbg_status(void) |
1078 | 0 | { |
1079 | 0 | int ret; |
1080 | 0 | RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master(); |
1081 | |
|
1082 | 0 | if (drbg == NULL) |
1083 | 0 | return 0; |
1084 | | |
1085 | 0 | rand_drbg_lock(drbg); |
1086 | 0 | ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0; |
1087 | 0 | rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); |
1088 | 0 | return ret; |
1089 | 0 | } |
1090 | | |
1091 | | /* |
1092 | | * Get the master DRBG. |
1093 | | * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure. |
1094 | | * |
1095 | | */ |
1096 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void) |
1097 | 0 | { |
1098 | 0 | if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) |
1099 | 0 | return NULL; |
1100 | | |
1101 | 0 | return master_drbg; |
1102 | 0 | } |
1103 | | |
1104 | | /* |
1105 | | * Get the public DRBG. |
1106 | | * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure. |
1107 | | */ |
1108 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void) |
1109 | 202k | { |
1110 | 202k | RAND_DRBG *drbg; |
1111 | | |
1112 | 202k | if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) |
1113 | 0 | return NULL; |
1114 | | |
1115 | 202k | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg); |
1116 | 202k | if (drbg == NULL) { |
1117 | 1 | if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND)) |
1118 | 0 | return NULL; |
1119 | 1 | drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg); |
1120 | 1 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, drbg); |
1121 | 1 | } |
1122 | 202k | return drbg; |
1123 | 202k | } |
1124 | | |
1125 | | /* |
1126 | | * Get the private DRBG. |
1127 | | * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure. |
1128 | | */ |
1129 | | RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void) |
1130 | 270k | { |
1131 | 270k | RAND_DRBG *drbg; |
1132 | | |
1133 | 270k | if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) |
1134 | 0 | return NULL; |
1135 | | |
1136 | 270k | drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg); |
1137 | 270k | if (drbg == NULL) { |
1138 | 1 | if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND)) |
1139 | 0 | return NULL; |
1140 | 1 | drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg); |
1141 | 1 | CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, drbg); |
1142 | 1 | } |
1143 | 270k | return drbg; |
1144 | 270k | } |
1145 | | |
1146 | | RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { |
1147 | | drbg_seed, |
1148 | | drbg_bytes, |
1149 | | NULL, |
1150 | | drbg_add, |
1151 | | drbg_bytes, |
1152 | | drbg_status |
1153 | | }; |
1154 | | |
1155 | | RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) |
1156 | 270k | { |
1157 | 270k | return &rand_meth; |
1158 | 270k | } |