/src/libressl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
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1 | | /* $OpenBSD: x509_cmp.c,v 1.39 2022/02/24 22:05:06 beck Exp $ */ |
2 | | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
3 | | * All rights reserved. |
4 | | * |
5 | | * This package is an SSL implementation written |
6 | | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
7 | | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
8 | | * |
9 | | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
11 | | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
12 | | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
13 | | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
14 | | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
15 | | * |
16 | | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | | * the code are not to be removed. |
18 | | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
19 | | * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
20 | | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
21 | | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
22 | | * |
23 | | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
25 | | * are met: |
26 | | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
27 | | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
28 | | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
29 | | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
30 | | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
31 | | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
32 | | * must display the following acknowledgement: |
33 | | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
34 | | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
35 | | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
36 | | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
37 | | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
38 | | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
40 | | * |
41 | | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
43 | | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
44 | | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
45 | | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
46 | | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
47 | | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
48 | | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
49 | | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
50 | | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
51 | | * SUCH DAMAGE. |
52 | | * |
53 | | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
55 | | * copied and put under another distribution licence |
56 | | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
57 | | */ |
58 | | |
59 | | #include <ctype.h> |
60 | | #include <stdio.h> |
61 | | #include <string.h> |
62 | | |
63 | | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> |
64 | | |
65 | | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
66 | | #include <openssl/err.h> |
67 | | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
68 | | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
69 | | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
70 | | |
71 | | #include "evp_locl.h" |
72 | | #include "x509_lcl.h" |
73 | | |
74 | | int |
75 | | X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
76 | 0 | { |
77 | 0 | int i; |
78 | 0 | X509_CINF *ai, *bi; |
79 | |
|
80 | 0 | ai = a->cert_info; |
81 | 0 | bi = b->cert_info; |
82 | 0 | i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); |
83 | 0 | if (i) |
84 | 0 | return (i); |
85 | 0 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); |
86 | 0 | } |
87 | | |
88 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
89 | | unsigned long |
90 | | X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) |
91 | 0 | { |
92 | 0 | unsigned long ret = 0; |
93 | 0 | EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
94 | 0 | unsigned char md[16]; |
95 | 0 | char *f; |
96 | |
|
97 | 0 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
98 | 0 | f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); |
99 | 0 | if (f == NULL) |
100 | 0 | goto err; |
101 | 0 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) |
102 | 0 | goto err; |
103 | 0 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) |
104 | 0 | goto err; |
105 | 0 | free(f); |
106 | 0 | f = NULL; |
107 | 0 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, |
108 | 0 | (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, |
109 | 0 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) |
110 | 0 | goto err; |
111 | 0 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) |
112 | 0 | goto err; |
113 | 0 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
114 | 0 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & |
115 | 0 | 0xffffffffL; |
116 | |
|
117 | 0 | err: |
118 | 0 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
119 | 0 | free(f); |
120 | 0 | return (ret); |
121 | 0 | } |
122 | | #endif |
123 | | |
124 | | int |
125 | | X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
126 | 0 | { |
127 | 0 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); |
128 | 0 | } |
129 | | |
130 | | int |
131 | | X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
132 | 0 | { |
133 | 0 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); |
134 | 0 | } |
135 | | |
136 | | int |
137 | | X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
138 | 0 | { |
139 | 0 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); |
140 | 0 | } |
141 | | |
142 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
143 | | int |
144 | | X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
145 | 0 | { |
146 | 0 | return memcmp(a->hash, b->hash, X509_CRL_HASH_LEN); |
147 | 0 | } |
148 | | #endif |
149 | | |
150 | | X509_NAME * |
151 | | X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) |
152 | 0 | { |
153 | 0 | return (a->cert_info->issuer); |
154 | 0 | } |
155 | | |
156 | | unsigned long |
157 | | X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) |
158 | 0 | { |
159 | 0 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
160 | 0 | } |
161 | | |
162 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
163 | | unsigned long |
164 | | X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) |
165 | 0 | { |
166 | 0 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
167 | 0 | } |
168 | | #endif |
169 | | |
170 | | X509_NAME * |
171 | | X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) |
172 | 0 | { |
173 | 0 | return (a->cert_info->subject); |
174 | 0 | } |
175 | | |
176 | | ASN1_INTEGER * |
177 | | X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) |
178 | 0 | { |
179 | 0 | return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); |
180 | 0 | } |
181 | | |
182 | | const ASN1_INTEGER * |
183 | | X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) |
184 | 0 | { |
185 | 0 | return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); |
186 | 0 | } |
187 | | |
188 | | unsigned long |
189 | | X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) |
190 | 0 | { |
191 | 0 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); |
192 | 0 | } |
193 | | |
194 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
195 | | unsigned long |
196 | | X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) |
197 | 0 | { |
198 | 0 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); |
199 | 0 | } |
200 | | #endif |
201 | | |
202 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
203 | | /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for |
204 | | * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally |
205 | | * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in |
206 | | * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may |
207 | | * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring |
208 | | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point |
209 | | * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt |
210 | | * with an evil cast. |
211 | | */ |
212 | | int |
213 | | X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
214 | 0 | { |
215 | | /* ensure hash is valid */ |
216 | 0 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); |
217 | 0 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); |
218 | |
|
219 | 0 | return memcmp(a->hash, b->hash, X509_CERT_HASH_LEN); |
220 | 0 | } |
221 | | #endif |
222 | | |
223 | | int |
224 | | X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
225 | 0 | { |
226 | 0 | int ret; |
227 | | |
228 | | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
229 | 0 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
230 | 0 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); |
231 | 0 | if (ret < 0) |
232 | 0 | return -2; |
233 | 0 | } |
234 | 0 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
235 | 0 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); |
236 | 0 | if (ret < 0) |
237 | 0 | return -2; |
238 | 0 | } |
239 | 0 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
240 | 0 | if (ret) |
241 | 0 | return ret; |
242 | 0 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
243 | 0 | } |
244 | | |
245 | | unsigned long |
246 | | X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) |
247 | 0 | { |
248 | 0 | unsigned long ret = 0; |
249 | 0 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
250 | | |
251 | | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
252 | 0 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); |
253 | 0 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), |
254 | 0 | NULL)) |
255 | 0 | return 0; |
256 | | |
257 | 0 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
258 | 0 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & |
259 | 0 | 0xffffffffL; |
260 | 0 | return (ret); |
261 | 0 | } |
262 | | |
263 | | |
264 | | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
265 | | /* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, |
266 | | * this is reasonably efficient. */ |
267 | | |
268 | | unsigned long |
269 | | X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) |
270 | 0 | { |
271 | 0 | EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
272 | 0 | unsigned long ret = 0; |
273 | 0 | unsigned char md[16]; |
274 | | |
275 | | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
276 | 0 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); |
277 | 0 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
278 | 0 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) && |
279 | 0 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) && |
280 | 0 | EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) |
281 | 0 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | |
282 | 0 | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
283 | 0 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | |
284 | 0 | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & |
285 | 0 | 0xffffffffL; |
286 | 0 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
287 | |
|
288 | 0 | return (ret); |
289 | 0 | } |
290 | | #endif |
291 | | |
292 | | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ |
293 | | X509 * |
294 | | X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
295 | | ASN1_INTEGER *serial) |
296 | 0 | { |
297 | 0 | int i; |
298 | 0 | X509_CINF cinf; |
299 | 0 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL; |
300 | |
|
301 | 0 | if (!sk) |
302 | 0 | return NULL; |
303 | | |
304 | 0 | x.cert_info = &cinf; |
305 | 0 | cinf.serialNumber = serial; |
306 | 0 | cinf.issuer = name; |
307 | |
|
308 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
309 | 0 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
310 | 0 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) |
311 | 0 | return (x509); |
312 | 0 | } |
313 | 0 | return (NULL); |
314 | 0 | } |
315 | | |
316 | | X509 * |
317 | | X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) |
318 | 0 | { |
319 | 0 | X509 *x509; |
320 | 0 | int i; |
321 | |
|
322 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
323 | 0 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
324 | 0 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) |
325 | 0 | return (x509); |
326 | 0 | } |
327 | 0 | return (NULL); |
328 | 0 | } |
329 | | |
330 | | EVP_PKEY * |
331 | | X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
332 | 0 | { |
333 | 0 | if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL) |
334 | 0 | return (NULL); |
335 | 0 | return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); |
336 | 0 | } |
337 | | |
338 | | EVP_PKEY * |
339 | | X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) |
340 | 0 | { |
341 | 0 | if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL) |
342 | 0 | return (NULL); |
343 | 0 | return (X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key)); |
344 | 0 | } |
345 | | |
346 | | ASN1_BIT_STRING * |
347 | | X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) |
348 | 0 | { |
349 | 0 | if (!x) |
350 | 0 | return NULL; |
351 | 0 | return x->cert_info->key->public_key; |
352 | 0 | } |
353 | | |
354 | | int |
355 | | X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) |
356 | 0 | { |
357 | 0 | const EVP_PKEY *xk; |
358 | 0 | int ret; |
359 | |
|
360 | 0 | xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
361 | |
|
362 | 0 | if (xk) |
363 | 0 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); |
364 | 0 | else |
365 | 0 | ret = -2; |
366 | |
|
367 | 0 | switch (ret) { |
368 | 0 | case 1: |
369 | 0 | break; |
370 | 0 | case 0: |
371 | 0 | X509error(X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); |
372 | 0 | break; |
373 | 0 | case -1: |
374 | 0 | X509error(X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); |
375 | 0 | break; |
376 | 0 | case -2: |
377 | 0 | X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); |
378 | 0 | } |
379 | 0 | if (ret > 0) |
380 | 0 | return 1; |
381 | 0 | return 0; |
382 | 0 | } |
383 | | |
384 | | /* |
385 | | * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference |
386 | | * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of |
387 | | * each X509 structure. |
388 | | */ |
389 | | STACK_OF(X509) * |
390 | | X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
391 | 0 | { |
392 | 0 | STACK_OF(X509) *ret; |
393 | 0 | size_t i; |
394 | |
|
395 | 0 | ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); |
396 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) |
397 | 0 | X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); |
398 | |
|
399 | 0 | return ret; |
400 | 0 | } |