Coverage Report

Created: 2022-08-24 06:31

/src/libressl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
Line
Count
Source (jump to first uncovered line)
1
/* $OpenBSD: x509_cmp.c,v 1.39 2022/02/24 22:05:06 beck Exp $ */
2
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3
 * All rights reserved.
4
 *
5
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8
 *
9
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15
 *
16
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17
 * the code are not to be removed.
18
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22
 *
23
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25
 * are met:
26
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
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 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40
 *
41
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52
 *
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 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57
 */
58
59
#include <ctype.h>
60
#include <stdio.h>
61
#include <string.h>
62
63
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
64
65
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
66
#include <openssl/err.h>
67
#include <openssl/objects.h>
68
#include <openssl/x509.h>
69
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
70
71
#include "evp_locl.h"
72
#include "x509_lcl.h"
73
74
int
75
X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
76
0
{
77
0
  int i;
78
0
  X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
79
80
0
  ai = a->cert_info;
81
0
  bi = b->cert_info;
82
0
  i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
83
0
  if (i)
84
0
    return (i);
85
0
  return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
86
0
}
87
88
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
89
unsigned long
90
X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
91
0
{
92
0
  unsigned long ret = 0;
93
0
  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
94
0
  unsigned char md[16];
95
0
  char *f;
96
97
0
  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
98
0
  f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
99
0
  if (f == NULL)
100
0
    goto err;
101
0
  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
102
0
    goto err;
103
0
  if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
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0
    goto err;
105
0
  free(f);
106
0
  f = NULL;
107
0
  if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,
108
0
      (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
109
0
      (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
110
0
    goto err;
111
0
  if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
112
0
    goto err;
113
0
  ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
114
0
      ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
115
0
      0xffffffffL;
116
117
0
err:
118
0
  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
119
0
  free(f);
120
0
  return (ret);
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0
}
122
#endif
123
124
int
125
X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
126
0
{
127
0
  return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
128
0
}
129
130
int
131
X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
132
0
{
133
0
  return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
134
0
}
135
136
int
137
X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
138
0
{
139
0
  return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
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0
}
141
142
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
143
int
144
X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
145
0
{
146
0
  return memcmp(a->hash, b->hash, X509_CRL_HASH_LEN);
147
0
}
148
#endif
149
150
X509_NAME *
151
X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
152
0
{
153
0
  return (a->cert_info->issuer);
154
0
}
155
156
unsigned long
157
X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
158
0
{
159
0
  return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
160
0
}
161
162
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
163
unsigned long
164
X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
165
0
{
166
0
  return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
167
0
}
168
#endif
169
170
X509_NAME *
171
X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
172
0
{
173
0
  return (a->cert_info->subject);
174
0
}
175
176
ASN1_INTEGER *
177
X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
178
0
{
179
0
  return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
180
0
}
181
182
const ASN1_INTEGER *
183
X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
184
0
{
185
0
  return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
186
0
}
187
188
unsigned long
189
X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
190
0
{
191
0
  return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
192
0
}
193
194
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
195
unsigned long
196
X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
197
0
{
198
0
  return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
199
0
}
200
#endif
201
202
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
203
/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
204
 * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
205
 * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
206
 * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
207
 * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
208
 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
209
 * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
210
 * with an evil cast.
211
 */
212
int
213
X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
214
0
{
215
  /* ensure hash is valid */
216
0
  X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
217
0
  X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
218
219
0
  return memcmp(a->hash, b->hash, X509_CERT_HASH_LEN);
220
0
}
221
#endif
222
223
int
224
X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
225
0
{
226
0
  int ret;
227
228
  /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
229
0
  if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
230
0
    ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
231
0
    if (ret < 0)
232
0
      return -2;
233
0
  }
234
0
  if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
235
0
    ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
236
0
    if (ret < 0)
237
0
      return -2;
238
0
  }
239
0
  ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
240
0
  if (ret)
241
0
    return ret;
242
0
  return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
243
0
}
244
245
unsigned long
246
X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
247
0
{
248
0
  unsigned long ret = 0;
249
0
  unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
250
251
  /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
252
0
  i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
253
0
  if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
254
0
      NULL))
255
0
    return 0;
256
257
0
  ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
258
0
      ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
259
0
      0xffffffffL;
260
0
  return (ret);
261
0
}
262
263
264
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
265
/* I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
266
 * this is reasonably efficient. */
267
268
unsigned long
269
X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
270
0
{
271
0
  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
272
0
  unsigned long ret = 0;
273
0
  unsigned char md[16];
274
275
  /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
276
0
  i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
277
0
  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
278
0
  if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) &&
279
0
      EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) &&
280
0
      EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
281
0
    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) |
282
0
        ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
283
0
        ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) |
284
0
        ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
285
0
        0xffffffffL;
286
0
  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
287
288
0
  return (ret);
289
0
}
290
#endif
291
292
/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
293
X509 *
294
X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
295
    ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
296
0
{
297
0
  int i;
298
0
  X509_CINF cinf;
299
0
  X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
300
301
0
  if (!sk)
302
0
    return NULL;
303
304
0
  x.cert_info = &cinf;
305
0
  cinf.serialNumber = serial;
306
0
  cinf.issuer = name;
307
308
0
  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
309
0
    x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
310
0
    if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
311
0
      return (x509);
312
0
  }
313
0
  return (NULL);
314
0
}
315
316
X509 *
317
X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
318
0
{
319
0
  X509 *x509;
320
0
  int i;
321
322
0
  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
323
0
    x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
324
0
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
325
0
      return (x509);
326
0
  }
327
0
  return (NULL);
328
0
}
329
330
EVP_PKEY *
331
X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
332
0
{
333
0
  if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL)
334
0
    return (NULL);
335
0
  return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
336
0
}
337
338
EVP_PKEY *
339
X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
340
0
{
341
0
  if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL)
342
0
    return (NULL);
343
0
  return (X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key));
344
0
}
345
346
ASN1_BIT_STRING *
347
X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
348
0
{
349
0
  if (!x)
350
0
    return NULL;
351
0
  return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
352
0
}
353
354
int
355
X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
356
0
{
357
0
  const EVP_PKEY *xk;
358
0
  int ret;
359
360
0
  xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
361
362
0
  if (xk)
363
0
    ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
364
0
  else
365
0
    ret = -2;
366
367
0
  switch (ret) {
368
0
  case 1:
369
0
    break;
370
0
  case 0:
371
0
    X509error(X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
372
0
    break;
373
0
  case -1:
374
0
    X509error(X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
375
0
    break;
376
0
  case -2:
377
0
    X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
378
0
  }
379
0
  if (ret > 0)
380
0
    return 1;
381
0
  return 0;
382
0
}
383
384
/*
385
 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
386
 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
387
 * each X509 structure.
388
 */
389
STACK_OF(X509) *
390
X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
391
0
{
392
0
  STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
393
0
  size_t i;
394
395
0
  ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
396
0
  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
397
0
    X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
398
399
0
  return ret;
400
0
}