Coverage Report

Created: 2022-08-24 06:30

/src/libressl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
Line
Count
Source (jump to first uncovered line)
1
/* $OpenBSD: dsa_ossl.c,v 1.44 2022/02/24 08:35:45 tb Exp $ */
2
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3
 * All rights reserved.
4
 *
5
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8
 * 
9
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15
 * 
16
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17
 * the code are not to be removed.
18
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22
 * 
23
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25
 * are met:
26
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40
 * 
41
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52
 * 
53
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57
 */
58
59
/* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */
60
61
#include <stdio.h>
62
63
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
64
#include <openssl/bn.h>
65
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
66
#include <openssl/err.h>
67
#include <openssl/sha.h>
68
69
#include "bn_lcl.h"
70
#include "dsa_locl.h"
71
72
static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
73
static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
74
    BIGNUM **rp);
75
static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
76
    DSA *dsa);
77
static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
78
static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
79
80
static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
81
  .name = "OpenSSL DSA method",
82
  .dsa_do_sign = dsa_do_sign,
83
  .dsa_sign_setup = dsa_sign_setup,
84
  .dsa_do_verify = dsa_do_verify,
85
  .init = dsa_init,
86
  .finish = dsa_finish,
87
};
88
89
const DSA_METHOD *
90
DSA_OpenSSL(void)
91
0
{
92
0
  return &openssl_dsa_meth;
93
0
}
94
95
static DSA_SIG *
96
dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
97
0
{
98
0
  BIGNUM b, bm, bxr, binv, m, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
99
0
  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
100
0
  int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
101
0
  DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
102
0
  int noredo = 0;
103
104
0
  BN_init(&b);
105
0
  BN_init(&binv);
106
0
  BN_init(&bm);
107
0
  BN_init(&bxr);
108
0
  BN_init(&m);
109
110
0
  if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
111
0
    reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
112
0
    goto err;
113
0
  }
114
115
0
  s = BN_new();
116
0
  if (s == NULL)
117
0
    goto err;
118
0
  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
119
0
  if (ctx == NULL)
120
0
    goto err;
121
122
  /*
123
   * If the digest length is greater than N (the bit length of q), the
124
   * leftmost N bits of the digest shall be used, see FIPS 186-3, 4.2.
125
   * In this case the digest length is given in bytes.
126
   */
127
0
  if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q))
128
0
    dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
129
0
  if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, &m) == NULL)
130
0
    goto err;
131
132
0
 redo:
133
0
  if (dsa->kinv == NULL || dsa->r == NULL) {
134
0
    if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r))
135
0
      goto err;
136
0
  } else {
137
0
    kinv = dsa->kinv;
138
0
    dsa->kinv = NULL;
139
0
    r = dsa->r;
140
0
    dsa->r = NULL;
141
0
    noredo = 1;
142
0
  }
143
144
  /*
145
   * Compute:
146
   *
147
   *  s = inv(k)(m + xr) mod q
148
   *
149
   * In order to reduce the possibility of a side-channel attack, the
150
   * following is calculated using a blinding value:
151
   *
152
   *  s = inv(b)(bm + bxr)inv(k) mod q
153
   *
154
   * Where b is a random value in the range [1, q).
155
   */
156
0
  if (!bn_rand_interval(&b, BN_value_one(), dsa->q))
157
0
    goto err;
158
0
  if (BN_mod_inverse_ct(&binv, &b, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL)
159
0
    goto err;
160
161
0
  if (!BN_mod_mul(&bxr, &b, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx)) /* bx */
162
0
    goto err;
163
0
  if (!BN_mod_mul(&bxr, &bxr, r, dsa->q, ctx)) /* bxr */
164
0
    goto err;
165
0
  if (!BN_mod_mul(&bm, &b, &m, dsa->q, ctx)) /* bm */
166
0
    goto err;
167
0
  if (!BN_mod_add(s, &bxr, &bm, dsa->q, ctx)) /* s = bm + bxr */
168
0
    goto err;
169
0
  if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) /* s = b(m + xr)k^-1 */
170
0
    goto err;
171
0
  if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, &binv, dsa->q, ctx)) /* s = (m + xr)k^-1 */
172
0
    goto err;
173
174
  /*
175
   * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
176
   * unlikely.
177
   */
178
0
  if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
179
0
    if (noredo) {
180
0
      reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES;
181
0
      goto err;
182
0
    }
183
0
    goto redo;
184
0
  }
185
186
0
  if ((ret = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
187
0
    reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
188
0
    goto err;
189
0
  }
190
0
  ret->r = r;
191
0
  ret->s = s;
192
  
193
0
 err:
194
0
  if (!ret) {
195
0
    DSAerror(reason);
196
0
    BN_free(r);
197
0
    BN_free(s);
198
0
  }
199
0
  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
200
0
  BN_clear_free(&b);
201
0
  BN_clear_free(&bm);
202
0
  BN_clear_free(&bxr);
203
0
  BN_clear_free(&binv);
204
0
  BN_clear_free(&m);
205
0
  BN_clear_free(kinv);
206
207
0
  return ret;
208
0
}
209
210
static int
211
dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
212
0
{
213
0
  BN_CTX *ctx;
214
0
  BIGNUM k, l, m, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
215
0
  int q_bits, ret = 0;
216
217
0
  if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
218
0
    DSAerror(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
219
0
    return 0;
220
0
  }
221
222
0
  BN_init(&k);
223
0
  BN_init(&l);
224
0
  BN_init(&m);
225
226
0
  if (ctx_in == NULL) {
227
0
    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
228
0
      goto err;
229
0
  } else
230
0
    ctx = ctx_in;
231
232
0
  if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
233
0
    goto err;
234
235
  /* Preallocate space */
236
0
  q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
237
0
  if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits) ||
238
0
      !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits) ||
239
0
      !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits))
240
0
    goto err;
241
242
0
  if (!bn_rand_interval(&k, BN_value_one(), dsa->q))
243
0
    goto err;
244
245
0
  BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
246
247
0
  if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
248
0
    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
249
0
        CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx))
250
0
      goto err;
251
0
  }
252
253
  /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
254
255
  /*
256
   * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
257
   * so we compute G^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed
258
   * bit-length.
259
   *
260
   * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
261
   * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
262
   * one bit longer than the modulus.
263
   *
264
   * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
265
   * conditional copy.
266
   */
267
268
0
  if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q) ||
269
0
      !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q) ||
270
0
      !BN_copy(&k, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m))
271
0
    goto err;
272
273
0
  if (dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
274
0
    if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, &k, dsa->p, ctx,
275
0
        dsa->method_mont_p))
276
0
      goto err;
277
0
  } else {
278
0
    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_ct(r, dsa->g, &k, dsa->p, ctx,
279
0
        dsa->method_mont_p))
280
0
      goto err;
281
0
  }
282
283
0
  if (!BN_mod_ct(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
284
0
    goto err;
285
286
  /* Compute  part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
287
0
  if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse_ct(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
288
0
    goto err;
289
290
0
  BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
291
0
  *kinvp = kinv;
292
0
  kinv = NULL;
293
0
  BN_clear_free(*rp);
294
0
  *rp = r;
295
296
0
  ret = 1;
297
298
0
 err:
299
0
  if (!ret) {
300
0
    DSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
301
0
    BN_clear_free(r);
302
0
  }
303
0
  if (ctx_in == NULL)
304
0
    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
305
0
  BN_clear_free(&k);
306
0
  BN_clear_free(&l);
307
0
  BN_clear_free(&m);
308
309
0
  return ret;
310
0
}
311
312
static int
313
dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
314
0
{
315
0
  BN_CTX *ctx;
316
0
  BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
317
0
  BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
318
0
  int qbits;
319
0
  int ret = -1;
320
321
0
  if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
322
0
    DSAerror(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
323
0
    return -1;
324
0
  }
325
326
  /* FIPS 186-3 allows only three different sizes for q. */
327
0
  qbits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
328
0
  if (qbits != 160 && qbits != 224 && qbits != 256) {
329
0
    DSAerror(DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
330
0
    return -1;
331
0
  }
332
0
  if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
333
0
    DSAerror(DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
334
0
    return -1;
335
0
  }
336
337
0
  BN_init(&u1);
338
0
  BN_init(&u2);
339
0
  BN_init(&t1);
340
341
0
  if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
342
0
    goto err;
343
344
0
  if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
345
0
      BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
346
0
    ret = 0;
347
0
    goto err;
348
0
  }
349
0
  if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
350
0
      BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
351
0
    ret = 0;
352
0
    goto err;
353
0
  }
354
355
  /* Calculate w = inv(s) mod q, saving w in u2. */
356
0
  if ((BN_mod_inverse_ct(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
357
0
    goto err;
358
359
  /*
360
   * If the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
361
   * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see FIPS 186-3, 4.2.
362
   */
363
0
  if (dgst_len > (qbits >> 3))
364
0
    dgst_len = (qbits >> 3);
365
366
  /* Save m in u1. */
367
0
  if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, &u1) == NULL)
368
0
    goto err;
369
370
  /* u1 = m * w mod q */
371
0
  if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx))
372
0
    goto err;
373
374
  /* u2 = r * w mod q */
375
0
  if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx))
376
0
    goto err;
377
378
0
  if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
379
0
    mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
380
0
        CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx);
381
0
    if (!mont)
382
0
      goto err;
383
0
  }
384
385
0
  if (dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != NULL) {
386
0
    if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, &t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key,
387
0
        &u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont))
388
0
      goto err;
389
0
  } else {
390
0
    if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2,
391
0
        dsa->p, ctx, mont))
392
0
      goto err;
393
0
  }
394
395
  /* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */
396
  /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
397
0
  if (!BN_mod_ct(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx))
398
0
    goto err;
399
400
  /* v is in u1 - if the signature is correct, it will be equal to r. */
401
0
  ret = BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0;
402
403
0
 err:
404
0
  if (ret < 0)
405
0
    DSAerror(ERR_R_BN_LIB);
406
0
  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
407
0
  BN_free(&u1);
408
0
  BN_free(&u2);
409
0
  BN_free(&t1);
410
411
0
  return ret;
412
0
}
413
414
static int
415
dsa_init(DSA *dsa)
416
0
{
417
0
  dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
418
0
  return 1;
419
0
}
420
421
static int
422
dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
423
0
{
424
0
  BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
425
0
  return 1;
426
0
}
427