/src/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
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1 | | /* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ |
2 | | /* |
3 | | * SSL3 Protocol |
4 | | * |
5 | | * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
6 | | * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
7 | | * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
8 | | |
9 | | /* TODO(ekr): Implement HelloVerifyRequest on server side. OK for now. */ |
10 | | |
11 | | #include "cert.h" |
12 | | #include "ssl.h" |
13 | | #include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ |
14 | | #include "keyhi.h" |
15 | | #include "secder.h" |
16 | | #include "secitem.h" |
17 | | #include "sechash.h" |
18 | | |
19 | | #include "sslimpl.h" |
20 | | #include "sslproto.h" |
21 | | #include "sslerr.h" |
22 | | #include "ssl3ext.h" |
23 | | #include "ssl3exthandle.h" |
24 | | #include "tls13ech.h" |
25 | | #include "tls13exthandle.h" |
26 | | #include "tls13psk.h" |
27 | | #include "tls13subcerts.h" |
28 | | #include "prtime.h" |
29 | | #include "prinrval.h" |
30 | | #include "prerror.h" |
31 | | #include "pratom.h" |
32 | | #include "prthread.h" |
33 | | #include "nss.h" |
34 | | #include "nssoptions.h" |
35 | | |
36 | | #include "pk11func.h" |
37 | | #include "secmod.h" |
38 | | #include "blapi.h" |
39 | | |
40 | | #include <stdio.h> |
41 | | |
42 | | static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, |
43 | | PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot); |
44 | | static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, |
45 | | PK11SymKey **msp); |
46 | | static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss, |
47 | | PK11SymKey *masterSecret); |
48 | | static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss); |
49 | | static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss); |
50 | | static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss); |
51 | | static SECStatus ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss); |
52 | | static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); |
53 | | static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss); |
54 | | static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss); |
55 | | static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, |
56 | | SECItem *suites, |
57 | | sslSessionID *sid, |
58 | | const PRUint8 *msg, |
59 | | unsigned int len); |
60 | | static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, |
61 | | const SECItem *sidBytes, |
62 | | int *retErrCode); |
63 | | static SECStatus ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, |
64 | | PRUint8 *b, |
65 | | PRUint32 length); |
66 | | static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); |
67 | | static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType); |
68 | | static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash); |
69 | | PRBool ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); |
70 | | PRBool ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); |
71 | | PRBool ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); |
72 | | PRBool ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); |
73 | | static SECStatus ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, |
74 | | const unsigned char *b, |
75 | | unsigned int l); |
76 | | const PRUint32 kSSLSigSchemePolicy = |
77 | | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE; |
78 | | |
79 | | const PRUint8 ssl_hello_retry_random[] = { |
80 | | 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11, |
81 | | 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91, |
82 | | 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E, |
83 | | 0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C |
84 | | }; |
85 | | PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_hello_retry_random) == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
86 | | |
87 | | /* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of |
88 | | * precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement. |
89 | | * This table is modified by SSL3_SetPolicy(). The ordering of cipher suites |
90 | | * in this table must match the ordering in SSL_ImplementedCiphers (sslenum.c) |
91 | | * |
92 | | * Important: See bug 946147 before enabling, reordering, or adding any cipher |
93 | | * suites to this list. |
94 | | */ |
95 | | /* clang-format off */ |
96 | | static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { |
97 | | /* cipher_suite policy enabled isPresent */ |
98 | | /* Special TLS 1.3 suites. */ |
99 | | { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, |
100 | | { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, |
101 | | { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, |
102 | | |
103 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
104 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
105 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
106 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
107 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
108 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
109 | | /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is out of order to work around |
110 | | * bug 946147. |
111 | | */ |
112 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
113 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
114 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
115 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
116 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
117 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
118 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
119 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
120 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
121 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
122 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
123 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
124 | | |
125 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
126 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,SSL_ALLOWED,PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
127 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
128 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
129 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
130 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
131 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
132 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
133 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
134 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
135 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
136 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
137 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
138 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
139 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
140 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
141 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
142 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
143 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
144 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
145 | | |
146 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
147 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
148 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
149 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
150 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
151 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
152 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
153 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
154 | | |
155 | | /* RSA */ |
156 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
157 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
158 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
159 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
160 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
161 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
162 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
163 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
164 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
165 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
166 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
167 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, |
168 | | |
169 | | /* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */ |
170 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
171 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
172 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
173 | | |
174 | | /* ciphersuites with no encryption */ |
175 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
176 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
177 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
178 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
179 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
180 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
181 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, |
182 | | }; |
183 | | /* clang-format on */ |
184 | | |
185 | | /* This is the default supported set of signature schemes. The order of the |
186 | | * hashes here is all that is important, since that will (sometimes) determine |
187 | | * which hash we use. The key pair (i.e., cert) is the primary thing that |
188 | | * determines what we use and this doesn't affect how we select key pairs. The |
189 | | * order of signature types is based on the same rules for ordering we use for |
190 | | * cipher suites just for consistency. |
191 | | */ |
192 | | static const SSLSignatureScheme defaultSignatureSchemes[] = { |
193 | | ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, |
194 | | ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, |
195 | | ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, |
196 | | ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1, |
197 | | ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, |
198 | | ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, |
199 | | ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, |
200 | | ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, |
201 | | ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, |
202 | | ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, |
203 | | ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, |
204 | | ssl_sig_dsa_sha256, |
205 | | ssl_sig_dsa_sha384, |
206 | | ssl_sig_dsa_sha512, |
207 | | ssl_sig_dsa_sha1 |
208 | | }; |
209 | | PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes) <= |
210 | | MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES); |
211 | | |
212 | | /* Verify that SSL_ImplementedCiphers and cipherSuites are in consistent order. |
213 | | */ |
214 | | #ifdef DEBUG |
215 | | void |
216 | | ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency() |
217 | 1 | { |
218 | 1 | unsigned int i; |
219 | | |
220 | 1 | PORT_Assert(SSL_NumImplementedCiphers == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites)); |
221 | | |
222 | 72 | for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites); ++i) { |
223 | 71 | PORT_Assert(SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i] == cipherSuites[i].cipher_suite); |
224 | 71 | } |
225 | 1 | } |
226 | | #endif |
227 | | |
228 | | static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types[] = { |
229 | | ct_RSA_sign, |
230 | | ct_ECDSA_sign, |
231 | | ct_DSS_sign, |
232 | | }; |
233 | | |
234 | | static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats; |
235 | | |
236 | | static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] = { |
237 | | /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */ |
238 | | /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType authKeyType ephemeral oid */ |
239 | | { kea_null, ssl_kea_null, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_FALSE, 0 }, |
240 | | { kea_rsa, ssl_kea_rsa, nullKey, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_RSA }, |
241 | | { kea_dh_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_DSS }, |
242 | | { kea_dh_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_RSA }, |
243 | | { kea_dhe_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_DSS }, |
244 | | { kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_RSA }, |
245 | | { kea_dh_anon, ssl_kea_dh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_ANON }, |
246 | | { kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA }, |
247 | | { kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, ecKey, ssl_auth_ecdsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA }, |
248 | | { kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA }, |
249 | | { kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA }, |
250 | | { kea_ecdh_anon, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ANON }, |
251 | | { kea_ecdhe_psk, ssl_kea_ecdh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_PSK }, |
252 | | { kea_dhe_psk, ssl_kea_dh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_PSK }, |
253 | | { kea_tls13_any, ssl_kea_tls13_any, nullKey, ssl_auth_tls13_any, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS13_KEA_ANY }, |
254 | | }; |
255 | | |
256 | | /* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */ |
257 | | static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] = { |
258 | | /* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg prf_hash */ |
259 | | /* Note that the prf_hash_alg is the hash function used by the PRF, see sslimpl.h. */ |
260 | | |
261 | | { TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, ssl_mac_null, kea_null, ssl_hash_none }, |
262 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, ssl_mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
263 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
264 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
265 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
266 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
267 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
268 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
269 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, |
270 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, |
271 | | cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, |
272 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, |
273 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
274 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, |
275 | | cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
276 | | |
277 | | /* New TLS cipher suites */ |
278 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
279 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
280 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, |
281 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
282 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
283 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
284 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
285 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, |
286 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
287 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
288 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, |
289 | | |
290 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
291 | | |
292 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
293 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, |
294 | | cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, |
295 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, |
296 | | cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
297 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
298 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, |
299 | | cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, |
300 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, |
301 | | cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
302 | | |
303 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
304 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
305 | | |
306 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
307 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
308 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, |
309 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, |
310 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, |
311 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, |
312 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
313 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
314 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
315 | | { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha384 }, |
316 | | { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, |
317 | | |
318 | | { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
319 | | |
320 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
321 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
322 | | |
323 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
324 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
325 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
326 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
327 | | { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
328 | | |
329 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
330 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
331 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
332 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
333 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
334 | | { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
335 | | |
336 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
337 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
338 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
339 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
340 | | { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
341 | | |
342 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
343 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
344 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
345 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
346 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
347 | | { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, |
348 | | |
349 | | { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
350 | | { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256 }, |
351 | | { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha384 }, |
352 | | }; |
353 | | |
354 | | static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE auth_alg_defs[] = { |
355 | | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_null */ |
356 | | CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt */ |
357 | | CKM_DSA, /* ? _SHA1 */ /* ssl_auth_dsa */ |
358 | | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_kea (unused) */ |
359 | | CKM_ECDSA, /* ssl_auth_ecdsa */ |
360 | | CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa */ |
361 | | CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa */ |
362 | | CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_sign */ |
363 | | CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_pss */ |
364 | | CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, /* ssl_auth_psk (just check for HKDF) */ |
365 | | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM /* ssl_auth_tls13_any */ |
366 | | }; |
367 | | PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(auth_alg_defs) == ssl_auth_size); |
368 | | |
369 | | static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = { |
370 | | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_null */ |
371 | | CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_kea_rsa */ |
372 | | CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh */ |
373 | | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_fortezza (unused) */ |
374 | | CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh */ |
375 | | CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_psk */ |
376 | | CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh_psk */ |
377 | | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_tls13_any */ |
378 | | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid */ |
379 | | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid_psk */ |
380 | | }; |
381 | | PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kea_alg_defs) == ssl_kea_size); |
382 | | |
383 | | typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr { |
384 | | SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; |
385 | | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech; |
386 | | } SSLCipher2Mech; |
387 | | |
388 | | /* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */ |
389 | | static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = { |
390 | | /* calg, cmech */ |
391 | | { ssl_calg_null, CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM }, |
392 | | { ssl_calg_rc4, CKM_RC4 }, |
393 | | { ssl_calg_rc2, CKM_RC2_CBC }, |
394 | | { ssl_calg_des, CKM_DES_CBC }, |
395 | | { ssl_calg_3des, CKM_DES3_CBC }, |
396 | | { ssl_calg_idea, CKM_IDEA_CBC }, |
397 | | { ssl_calg_fortezza, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 }, |
398 | | { ssl_calg_aes, CKM_AES_CBC }, |
399 | | { ssl_calg_camellia, CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC }, |
400 | | { ssl_calg_seed, CKM_SEED_CBC }, |
401 | | { ssl_calg_aes_gcm, CKM_AES_GCM }, |
402 | | { ssl_calg_chacha20, CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305 }, |
403 | | }; |
404 | | |
405 | | const PRUint8 tls12_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, |
406 | | 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01 }; |
407 | | const PRUint8 tls1_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, |
408 | | 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x00 }; |
409 | | PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random) == |
410 | | sizeof(tls1_downgrade_random)); |
411 | | |
412 | | /* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of |
413 | | * information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey |
414 | | * for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is |
415 | | * a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field |
416 | | * in ECCWrappedKeyInfo can be at most (512 - 8) = 504 bytes. |
417 | | * |
418 | | * XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits |
419 | | * or smaller. The public value will fit within 145 bytes and EC params |
420 | | * will fit within 12 bytes. We'll need to revisit this when NSS |
421 | | * supports arbitrary curves. |
422 | | */ |
423 | 0 | #define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN 504 |
424 | | |
425 | | typedef struct ECCWrappedKeyInfoStr { |
426 | | PRUint16 size; /* EC public key size in bits */ |
427 | | PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */ |
428 | | PRUint16 pubValueLen; /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */ |
429 | | PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen; /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */ |
430 | | PRUint8 var[MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN]; /* this buffer contains the */ |
431 | | /* EC public-key params, the EC public value and the wrapped key */ |
432 | | } ECCWrappedKeyInfo; |
433 | | |
434 | | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE |
435 | | ssl3_Alg2Mech(SSLCipherAlgorithm calg) |
436 | 389k | { |
437 | 389k | PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); |
438 | 389k | return alg2Mech[calg].cmech; |
439 | 389k | } |
440 | | |
441 | | #if defined(TRACE) |
442 | | |
443 | | static char * |
444 | | ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType) |
445 | 0 | { |
446 | 0 | char *rv; |
447 | 0 | static char line[40]; |
448 | |
|
449 | 0 | switch (msgType) { |
450 | 0 | case ssl_hs_hello_request: |
451 | 0 | rv = "hello_request (0)"; |
452 | 0 | break; |
453 | 0 | case ssl_hs_client_hello: |
454 | 0 | rv = "client_hello (1)"; |
455 | 0 | break; |
456 | 0 | case ssl_hs_server_hello: |
457 | 0 | rv = "server_hello (2)"; |
458 | 0 | break; |
459 | 0 | case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request: |
460 | 0 | rv = "hello_verify_request (3)"; |
461 | 0 | break; |
462 | 0 | case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket: |
463 | 0 | rv = "new_session_ticket (4)"; |
464 | 0 | break; |
465 | 0 | case ssl_hs_end_of_early_data: |
466 | 0 | rv = "end_of_early_data (5)"; |
467 | 0 | break; |
468 | 0 | case ssl_hs_hello_retry_request: |
469 | 0 | rv = "hello_retry_request (6)"; |
470 | 0 | break; |
471 | 0 | case ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions: |
472 | 0 | rv = "encrypted_extensions (8)"; |
473 | 0 | break; |
474 | 0 | case ssl_hs_certificate: |
475 | 0 | rv = "certificate (11)"; |
476 | 0 | break; |
477 | 0 | case ssl_hs_server_key_exchange: |
478 | 0 | rv = "server_key_exchange (12)"; |
479 | 0 | break; |
480 | 0 | case ssl_hs_certificate_request: |
481 | 0 | rv = "certificate_request (13)"; |
482 | 0 | break; |
483 | 0 | case ssl_hs_server_hello_done: |
484 | 0 | rv = "server_hello_done (14)"; |
485 | 0 | break; |
486 | 0 | case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: |
487 | 0 | rv = "certificate_verify (15)"; |
488 | 0 | break; |
489 | 0 | case ssl_hs_client_key_exchange: |
490 | 0 | rv = "client_key_exchange (16)"; |
491 | 0 | break; |
492 | 0 | case ssl_hs_finished: |
493 | 0 | rv = "finished (20)"; |
494 | 0 | break; |
495 | 0 | case ssl_hs_certificate_status: |
496 | 0 | rv = "certificate_status (22)"; |
497 | 0 | break; |
498 | 0 | case ssl_hs_key_update: |
499 | 0 | rv = "key_update (24)"; |
500 | 0 | break; |
501 | 0 | case ssl_hs_compressed_certificate: |
502 | 0 | rv = "compressed certificate (25)"; |
503 | 0 | break; |
504 | 0 | default: |
505 | 0 | snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType); |
506 | 0 | rv = line; |
507 | 0 | } |
508 | 0 | return rv; |
509 | 0 | } |
510 | | |
511 | | static char * |
512 | | ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType) |
513 | 0 | { |
514 | 0 | char *rv; |
515 | 0 | static char line[40]; |
516 | |
|
517 | 0 | switch (msgType) { |
518 | 0 | case ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec: |
519 | 0 | rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)"; |
520 | 0 | break; |
521 | 0 | case ssl_ct_alert: |
522 | 0 | rv = "alert (21)"; |
523 | 0 | break; |
524 | 0 | case ssl_ct_handshake: |
525 | 0 | rv = "handshake (22)"; |
526 | 0 | break; |
527 | 0 | case ssl_ct_application_data: |
528 | 0 | rv = "application_data (23)"; |
529 | 0 | break; |
530 | 0 | case ssl_ct_ack: |
531 | 0 | rv = "ack (26)"; |
532 | 0 | break; |
533 | 0 | default: |
534 | 0 | snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType); |
535 | 0 | rv = line; |
536 | 0 | } |
537 | 0 | return rv; |
538 | 0 | } |
539 | | |
540 | | #endif |
541 | | |
542 | | SSL3Statistics * |
543 | | SSL_GetStatistics(void) |
544 | 0 | { |
545 | 0 | return &ssl3stats; |
546 | 0 | } |
547 | | |
548 | | typedef struct tooLongStr { |
549 | | #if defined(IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) |
550 | | PRInt32 low; |
551 | | PRInt32 high; |
552 | | #else |
553 | | PRInt32 high; |
554 | | PRInt32 low; |
555 | | #endif |
556 | | } tooLong; |
557 | | |
558 | | void |
559 | | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long *x) |
560 | 6.06k | { |
561 | 6.06k | if ((sizeof *x) == sizeof(PRInt32)) { |
562 | 0 | PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT((PRInt32 *)x); |
563 | 6.06k | } else { |
564 | 6.06k | tooLong *tl = (tooLong *)x; |
565 | 6.06k | if (PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->low) == 0) |
566 | 0 | PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->high); |
567 | 6.06k | } |
568 | 6.06k | } |
569 | | |
570 | | PRBool |
571 | | ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite, |
572 | | const SSLVersionRange *vrange) |
573 | 109k | { |
574 | 109k | switch (cipherSuite) { |
575 | 1.75k | case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: |
576 | 2.98k | case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: |
577 | 5.03k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: |
578 | 7.02k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384: |
579 | 9.13k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: |
580 | 11.1k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384: |
581 | 12.9k | case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: |
582 | 14.2k | case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: |
583 | 15.6k | case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: |
584 | 16.9k | case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: |
585 | 16.9k | case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: |
586 | 16.9k | case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: |
587 | 17.2k | case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: |
588 | 17.2k | case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: |
589 | 17.2k | case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: |
590 | 21.4k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: |
591 | 25.4k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: |
592 | 31.2k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: |
593 | 35.4k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: |
594 | 37.6k | case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: |
595 | 39.5k | case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: |
596 | 43.6k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: |
597 | 47.9k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: |
598 | 50.0k | case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: |
599 | 50.0k | return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 && |
600 | 50.0k | vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
601 | | |
602 | | /* RFC 4492: ECC cipher suites need TLS extensions to negotiate curves and |
603 | | * point formats.*/ |
604 | 376 | case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: |
605 | 376 | case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: |
606 | 1.77k | case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: |
607 | 3.17k | case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: |
608 | 4.57k | case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: |
609 | 5.00k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: |
610 | 5.00k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: |
611 | 6.89k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: |
612 | 10.8k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: |
613 | 14.9k | case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: |
614 | 14.9k | case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: |
615 | 14.9k | case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: |
616 | 14.9k | case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: |
617 | 14.9k | case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: |
618 | 14.9k | case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: |
619 | 15.3k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: |
620 | 15.3k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: |
621 | 17.3k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: |
622 | 21.3k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: |
623 | 23.4k | case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: |
624 | 23.4k | return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 && |
625 | 23.4k | vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
626 | | |
627 | 6.08k | case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: |
628 | 12.1k | case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: |
629 | 18.2k | case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: |
630 | 18.2k | return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
631 | | |
632 | 18.2k | default: |
633 | 18.2k | return vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
634 | 109k | } |
635 | 109k | } |
636 | | |
637 | | /* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */ |
638 | | /* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ |
639 | | const ssl3CipherSuiteDef * |
640 | | ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite) |
641 | 513k | { |
642 | 513k | int cipher_suite_def_len = |
643 | 513k | sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]); |
644 | 513k | int i; |
645 | | |
646 | 19.9M | for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) { |
647 | 19.9M | if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite) |
648 | 513k | return &cipher_suite_defs[i]; |
649 | 19.9M | } |
650 | 0 | PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */ |
651 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); |
652 | 0 | return NULL; |
653 | 513k | } |
654 | | |
655 | | /* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */ |
656 | | /* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ |
657 | | static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * |
658 | | ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(ssl3CipherSuite suite, |
659 | | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) |
660 | 43.7k | { |
661 | 43.7k | int i; |
662 | | |
663 | 1.84M | for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { |
664 | 1.84M | if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite) |
665 | 43.7k | return &suites[i]; |
666 | 1.84M | } |
667 | | /* return NULL and let the caller handle it. */ |
668 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); |
669 | 0 | return NULL; |
670 | 43.7k | } |
671 | | |
672 | | const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * |
673 | | ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) |
674 | 1.06k | { |
675 | 1.06k | return ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(suite, |
676 | 1.06k | CONST_CAST(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg, suites)); |
677 | 1.06k | } |
678 | | |
679 | | static PRBool |
680 | | ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType) |
681 | 79.8k | { |
682 | 79.8k | unsigned int i; |
683 | 245k | for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { |
684 | 243k | if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && |
685 | 243k | ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == keaType) { |
686 | 77.8k | return PR_TRUE; |
687 | 77.8k | } |
688 | 243k | } |
689 | 1.94k | return PR_FALSE; |
690 | 79.8k | } |
691 | | |
692 | | static PRBool |
693 | | ssl_KEAEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType) |
694 | 111k | { |
695 | 111k | switch (keaType) { |
696 | 13.7k | case ssl_kea_rsa: |
697 | 13.7k | return PR_TRUE; |
698 | | |
699 | 19.7k | case ssl_kea_dh: |
700 | 19.7k | case ssl_kea_dh_psk: { |
701 | 19.7k | if (ss->sec.isServer && !ss->opt.enableServerDhe) { |
702 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
703 | 0 | } |
704 | | |
705 | 19.7k | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
706 | | /* If the server requires named FFDHE groups, then the client |
707 | | * must have included an FFDHE group. peerSupportsFfdheGroups |
708 | | * is set to true in ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(). */ |
709 | 19.7k | if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && |
710 | 19.7k | !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups) { |
711 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
712 | 0 | } |
713 | | |
714 | | /* We can use the weak DH group if all of these are true: |
715 | | * 1. We don't require named groups. |
716 | | * 2. The peer doesn't support named groups. |
717 | | * 3. This isn't TLS 1.3. |
718 | | * 4. The weak group is enabled. */ |
719 | 19.7k | if (!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && |
720 | 19.7k | !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups && |
721 | 19.7k | ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
722 | 19.7k | ss->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled) { |
723 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
724 | 0 | } |
725 | 19.7k | } else { |
726 | 0 | if (ss->vrange.min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
727 | 0 | !ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { |
728 | | /* The client enables DHE cipher suites even if no DHE groups |
729 | | * are enabled. Only if this isn't TLS 1.3 and named groups |
730 | | * are not required. */ |
731 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
732 | 0 | } |
733 | 0 | } |
734 | 19.7k | return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_dh); |
735 | 19.7k | } |
736 | | |
737 | 60.1k | case ssl_kea_ecdh: |
738 | 60.1k | case ssl_kea_ecdh_psk: |
739 | 60.1k | return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_ecdh); |
740 | | |
741 | 0 | case ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid: |
742 | 0 | case ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid_psk: |
743 | 0 | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
744 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
745 | 0 | } |
746 | 0 | return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid); |
747 | | |
748 | 18.2k | case ssl_kea_tls13_any: |
749 | 18.2k | return PR_TRUE; |
750 | | |
751 | 0 | case ssl_kea_fortezza: |
752 | 0 | default: |
753 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
754 | 111k | } |
755 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
756 | 111k | } |
757 | | |
758 | | static PRBool |
759 | | ssl_HasCert(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 maxVersion, SSLAuthType authType) |
760 | 480k | { |
761 | 480k | PRCList *cursor; |
762 | 480k | if (authType == ssl_auth_null || authType == ssl_auth_psk || authType == ssl_auth_tls13_any) { |
763 | 18.2k | return PR_TRUE; |
764 | 18.2k | } |
765 | 462k | for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); |
766 | 948k | cursor != &ss->serverCerts; |
767 | 839k | cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { |
768 | 839k | sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; |
769 | 839k | if (!cert->serverKeyPair || |
770 | 839k | !cert->serverKeyPair->privKey || |
771 | 839k | !cert->serverCertChain || |
772 | 839k | !SSL_CERT_IS(cert, authType)) { |
773 | 461k | continue; |
774 | 461k | } |
775 | | /* When called from ssl3_config_match_init(), all the EC curves will be |
776 | | * enabled, so this will essentially do nothing (unless we implement |
777 | | * curve configuration). However, once we have seen the |
778 | | * supported_groups extension and this is called from config_match(), |
779 | | * this will filter out certificates with an unsupported curve. |
780 | | * |
781 | | * If we might negotiate TLS 1.3, skip this test as group configuration |
782 | | * doesn't affect choices in TLS 1.3. |
783 | | */ |
784 | 377k | if (maxVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
785 | 377k | (authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || |
786 | 377k | authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa || |
787 | 377k | authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa) && |
788 | 377k | !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->namedCurve)) { |
789 | 24.4k | continue; |
790 | 24.4k | } |
791 | 353k | return PR_TRUE; |
792 | 377k | } |
793 | 109k | if (authType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign) { |
794 | 0 | return ssl_HasCert(ss, maxVersion, ssl_auth_rsa_pss); |
795 | 0 | } |
796 | 109k | return PR_FALSE; |
797 | 109k | } |
798 | | |
799 | | /* return true if the scheme is allowed by policy, This prevents |
800 | | * failures later when our actual signatures are rejected by |
801 | | * policy by either ssl code, or lower level NSS code */ |
802 | | static PRBool |
803 | | ssl_SchemePolicyOK(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, PRUint32 require) |
804 | 224k | { |
805 | | /* Hash policy. */ |
806 | 224k | PRUint32 policy; |
807 | 224k | SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme)); |
808 | 224k | SECOidTag sigOID; |
809 | | |
810 | | /* policy bits needed to enable a SignatureScheme */ |
811 | 224k | SECStatus rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy); |
812 | 224k | if (rv == SECSuccess && |
813 | 224k | (policy & require) != require) { |
814 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
815 | 0 | } |
816 | | |
817 | | /* ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType reports rsa for rsa_pss_rsae, but we |
818 | | * actually implement pss signatures when we sign, so just use RSA_PSS |
819 | | * for all RSA PSS Siganture schemes */ |
820 | 224k | if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme)) { |
821 | 133k | sigOID = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE; |
822 | 133k | } else { |
823 | 90.2k | sigOID = ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme)); |
824 | 90.2k | } |
825 | | /* Signature Policy. */ |
826 | 224k | rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(sigOID, &policy); |
827 | 224k | if (rv == SECSuccess && |
828 | 224k | (policy & require) != require) { |
829 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
830 | 0 | } |
831 | 224k | return PR_TRUE; |
832 | 224k | } |
833 | | |
834 | | /* Check that a signature scheme is accepted. |
835 | | * Both by policy and by having a token that supports it. */ |
836 | | static PRBool |
837 | | ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(PRUint16 minVersion, |
838 | | SSLSignatureScheme scheme, |
839 | | PRBool forCert) |
840 | 218k | { |
841 | | /* Disable RSA-PSS schemes if there are no tokens to verify them. */ |
842 | 218k | if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme)) { |
843 | 132k | if (!PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss])) { |
844 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
845 | 0 | } |
846 | 132k | } else if (!forCert && ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(scheme)) { |
847 | | /* Disable PKCS#1 signatures if we are limited to TLS 1.3. |
848 | | * We still need to advertise PKCS#1 signatures in CH and CR |
849 | | * for certificate signatures. |
850 | | */ |
851 | 0 | if (minVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
852 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
853 | 0 | } |
854 | 86.0k | } else if (ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(scheme)) { |
855 | | /* DSA: not in TLS 1.3, and check policy. */ |
856 | 14.0k | if (minVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
857 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
858 | 0 | } |
859 | 14.0k | } |
860 | | |
861 | 218k | return ssl_SchemePolicyOK(scheme, kSSLSigSchemePolicy); |
862 | 218k | } |
863 | | |
864 | | static SECStatus |
865 | | ssl_CheckSignatureSchemes(sslSocket *ss) |
866 | 6.08k | { |
867 | 6.08k | if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
868 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
869 | 0 | } |
870 | | |
871 | | /* If this is a server using TLS 1.3, we just need to have one signature |
872 | | * scheme for which we have a usable certificate. |
873 | | * |
874 | | * Note: Certificates for earlier TLS versions are checked along with the |
875 | | * cipher suite in ssl3_config_match_init. */ |
876 | 6.08k | if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
877 | 0 | PRBool foundCert = PR_FALSE; |
878 | 0 | for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { |
879 | 0 | SSLAuthType authType = |
880 | 0 | ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]); |
881 | 0 | if (ssl_HasCert(ss, ss->vrange.max, authType)) { |
882 | 0 | foundCert = PR_TRUE; |
883 | 0 | break; |
884 | 0 | } |
885 | 0 | } |
886 | 0 | if (!foundCert) { |
887 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
888 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
889 | 0 | } |
890 | 0 | } |
891 | | |
892 | | /* Ensure that there is a signature scheme that can be accepted.*/ |
893 | 6.08k | for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { |
894 | 6.08k | if (ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(ss->vrange.min, |
895 | 6.08k | ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], |
896 | 6.08k | PR_FALSE /* forCert */)) { |
897 | 6.08k | return SECSuccess; |
898 | 6.08k | } |
899 | 6.08k | } |
900 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
901 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
902 | 6.08k | } |
903 | | |
904 | | /* For a server, check that a signature scheme that can be used with the |
905 | | * provided authType is both enabled and usable. */ |
906 | | static PRBool |
907 | | ssl_HasSignatureScheme(const sslSocket *ss, SSLAuthType authType) |
908 | 261k | { |
909 | 261k | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); |
910 | 261k | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_version); |
911 | 261k | PORT_Assert(authType != ssl_auth_null); |
912 | 261k | PORT_Assert(authType != ssl_auth_tls13_any); |
913 | 261k | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 || |
914 | 261k | authType == ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt || |
915 | 261k | authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa || |
916 | 261k | authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) { |
917 | 101k | return PR_TRUE; |
918 | 101k | } |
919 | 646k | for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { |
920 | 646k | SSLSignatureScheme scheme = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; |
921 | 646k | SSLAuthType schemeAuthType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme); |
922 | 646k | PRBool acceptable = authType == schemeAuthType || |
923 | 646k | (schemeAuthType == ssl_auth_rsa_pss && |
924 | 486k | authType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign); |
925 | 646k | if (acceptable && ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(ss->version, scheme, PR_FALSE /* forCert */)) { |
926 | 159k | return PR_TRUE; |
927 | 159k | } |
928 | 646k | } |
929 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
930 | 159k | } |
931 | | |
932 | | /* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match |
933 | | * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens, |
934 | | * regardless of policy or user preference. |
935 | | * If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3. |
936 | | */ |
937 | | unsigned int |
938 | | ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) |
939 | 6.08k | { |
940 | 6.08k | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; |
941 | 6.08k | const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; |
942 | 6.08k | SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg; |
943 | 6.08k | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech; |
944 | 6.08k | SSLAuthType authType; |
945 | 6.08k | SSLKEAType keaType; |
946 | 6.08k | unsigned int i; |
947 | 6.08k | unsigned int numPresent = 0; |
948 | 6.08k | unsigned int numEnabled = 0; |
949 | | |
950 | 6.08k | PORT_Assert(ss); |
951 | 6.08k | if (!ss) { |
952 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
953 | 0 | return 0; |
954 | 0 | } |
955 | 6.08k | if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { |
956 | 0 | return 0; |
957 | 0 | } |
958 | 6.08k | if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->psk && |
959 | 6.08k | PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->serverCerts) && |
960 | 6.08k | (ss->opt.requestCertificate || ss->opt.requireCertificate)) { |
961 | | /* PSK and certificate auth cannot be combined. */ |
962 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); |
963 | 0 | return 0; |
964 | 0 | } |
965 | 6.08k | if (ssl_CheckSignatureSchemes(ss) != SECSuccess) { |
966 | 0 | return 0; /* Code already set. */ |
967 | 0 | } |
968 | | |
969 | 6.08k | ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(ss); |
970 | 437k | for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { |
971 | 431k | suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; |
972 | 431k | if (suite->enabled) { |
973 | 389k | ++numEnabled; |
974 | | /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle |
975 | | * this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition. |
976 | | */ |
977 | 389k | cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); |
978 | 389k | if (!cipher_def) { |
979 | 0 | suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; |
980 | 0 | continue; |
981 | 0 | } |
982 | 389k | cipher_alg = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(cipher_def)->calg; |
983 | 389k | cipher_mech = ssl3_Alg2Mech(cipher_alg); |
984 | | |
985 | | /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */ |
986 | 389k | suite->isPresent = PR_TRUE; |
987 | | |
988 | 389k | authType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].authKeyType; |
989 | 389k | if (authType != ssl_auth_null && authType != ssl_auth_tls13_any) { |
990 | 371k | if (ss->sec.isServer && |
991 | 371k | !(ssl_HasCert(ss, ss->vrange.max, authType) && |
992 | 371k | ssl_HasSignatureScheme(ss, authType))) { |
993 | 109k | suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; |
994 | 261k | } else if (!PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[authType])) { |
995 | 0 | suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; |
996 | 0 | } |
997 | 371k | } |
998 | | |
999 | 389k | keaType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType; |
1000 | 389k | if (keaType != ssl_kea_null && |
1001 | 389k | keaType != ssl_kea_tls13_any && |
1002 | 389k | !PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[keaType])) { |
1003 | 0 | suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; |
1004 | 0 | } |
1005 | | |
1006 | 389k | if (cipher_alg != ssl_calg_null && |
1007 | 389k | !PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech)) { |
1008 | 0 | suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; |
1009 | 0 | } |
1010 | | |
1011 | 389k | if (suite->isPresent) { |
1012 | 279k | ++numPresent; |
1013 | 279k | } |
1014 | 389k | } |
1015 | 431k | } |
1016 | 6.08k | PORT_AssertArg(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0); |
1017 | 6.08k | if (numPresent == 0) { |
1018 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); |
1019 | 0 | } |
1020 | 6.08k | return numPresent; |
1021 | 6.08k | } |
1022 | | |
1023 | | /* Return PR_TRUE if suite is usable. This if the suite is permitted by policy, |
1024 | | * enabled, has a certificate (as needed), has a viable key agreement method, is |
1025 | | * usable with the negotiated TLS version, and is otherwise usable. */ |
1026 | | PRBool |
1027 | | ssl3_config_match(const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, PRUint8 policy, |
1028 | | const SSLVersionRange *vrange, const sslSocket *ss) |
1029 | 148k | { |
1030 | 148k | const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; |
1031 | 148k | const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; |
1032 | | |
1033 | 148k | if (!suite) { |
1034 | 0 | PORT_Assert(suite); |
1035 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1036 | 0 | } |
1037 | | |
1038 | 148k | PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); |
1039 | 148k | if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) |
1040 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1041 | | |
1042 | 148k | if (!suite->enabled || !suite->isPresent) |
1043 | 36.6k | return PR_FALSE; |
1044 | | |
1045 | 111k | if ((suite->policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) || |
1046 | 111k | (suite->policy > policy)) |
1047 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1048 | | |
1049 | 111k | PORT_Assert(ss != NULL); |
1050 | 111k | cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); |
1051 | 111k | PORT_Assert(cipher_def != NULL); |
1052 | 111k | kea_def = &kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg]; |
1053 | 111k | PORT_Assert(kea_def != NULL); |
1054 | 111k | if (!ssl_KEAEnabled(ss, kea_def->exchKeyType)) { |
1055 | 1.94k | return PR_FALSE; |
1056 | 1.94k | } |
1057 | | |
1058 | 109k | if (ss->sec.isServer && !ssl_HasCert(ss, vrange->max, kea_def->authKeyType)) { |
1059 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1060 | 0 | } |
1061 | | |
1062 | | /* If a PSK is selected, disable suites that use a different hash than |
1063 | | * the PSK. We advertise non-PSK-compatible suites in the CH, as we could |
1064 | | * fallback to certificate auth. The client handler will check hash |
1065 | | * compatibility before committing to use the PSK. */ |
1066 | 109k | if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { |
1067 | 0 | if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->hash != cipher_def->prf_hash) { |
1068 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1069 | 0 | } |
1070 | 0 | } |
1071 | | |
1072 | 109k | return ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite->cipher_suite, vrange); |
1073 | 109k | } |
1074 | | |
1075 | | /* For TLS 1.3, when resuming, check for a ciphersuite that is both compatible |
1076 | | * with the identified ciphersuite and enabled. */ |
1077 | | static PRBool |
1078 | | tls13_ResumptionCompatible(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite suite) |
1079 | 0 | { |
1080 | 0 | SSLVersionRange vrange = { SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, |
1081 | 0 | SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 }; |
1082 | 0 | SSLHashType hash = tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(suite); |
1083 | 0 | for (unsigned int i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); i++) { |
1084 | 0 | if (cipher_suite_defs[i].prf_hash == hash) { |
1085 | 0 | const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suiteCfg = |
1086 | 0 | ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite, |
1087 | 0 | ss->cipherSuites); |
1088 | 0 | if (suite && ssl3_config_match(suiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { |
1089 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1090 | 0 | } |
1091 | 0 | } |
1092 | 0 | } |
1093 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1094 | 0 | } |
1095 | | |
1096 | | /* |
1097 | | * Null compression, mac and encryption functions |
1098 | | */ |
1099 | | SECStatus |
1100 | | Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen, |
1101 | | const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) |
1102 | 52.5k | { |
1103 | 52.5k | if (inputLen > maxOutputLen) { |
1104 | 0 | *outputLen = 0; /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */ |
1105 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); |
1106 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1107 | 0 | } |
1108 | 52.5k | *outputLen = inputLen; |
1109 | 52.5k | if (inputLen > 0 && input != output) { |
1110 | 26.0k | PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen); |
1111 | 26.0k | } |
1112 | 52.5k | return SECSuccess; |
1113 | 52.5k | } |
1114 | | |
1115 | | /* |
1116 | | * SSL3 Utility functions |
1117 | | */ |
1118 | | |
1119 | | static void |
1120 | | ssl_SetSpecVersions(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) |
1121 | 19.4k | { |
1122 | 19.4k | spec->version = ss->version; |
1123 | 19.4k | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
1124 | 0 | tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, spec); |
1125 | 19.4k | } else if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
1126 | 19.4k | spec->recordVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version); |
1127 | 19.4k | } else { |
1128 | 0 | spec->recordVersion = ss->version; |
1129 | 0 | } |
1130 | 19.4k | } |
1131 | | |
1132 | | /* allowLargerPeerVersion controls whether the function will select the |
1133 | | * highest enabled SSL version or fail when peerVersion is greater than the |
1134 | | * highest enabled version. |
1135 | | * |
1136 | | * If allowLargerPeerVersion is true, peerVersion is the peer's highest |
1137 | | * enabled version rather than the peer's selected version. |
1138 | | */ |
1139 | | SECStatus |
1140 | | ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion, |
1141 | | PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion) |
1142 | 7.34k | { |
1143 | 7.34k | SSL3ProtocolVersion negotiated; |
1144 | | |
1145 | | /* Prevent negotiating to a lower version in response to a TLS 1.3 HRR. */ |
1146 | 7.34k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
1147 | 1 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); |
1148 | 1 | return SECFailure; |
1149 | 1 | } |
1150 | | |
1151 | 7.34k | if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { |
1152 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); |
1153 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1154 | 0 | } |
1155 | | |
1156 | 7.34k | if (peerVersion < ss->vrange.min || |
1157 | 7.34k | (peerVersion > ss->vrange.max && !allowLargerPeerVersion)) { |
1158 | 4 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); |
1159 | 4 | return SECFailure; |
1160 | 4 | } |
1161 | | |
1162 | 7.34k | negotiated = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max); |
1163 | 7.34k | PORT_Assert(ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, negotiated)); |
1164 | 7.34k | if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->version != negotiated) { |
1165 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); |
1166 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1167 | 0 | } |
1168 | | |
1169 | 7.34k | ss->version = negotiated; |
1170 | 7.34k | return SECSuccess; |
1171 | 7.34k | } |
1172 | | |
1173 | | /* Used by the client when the server produces a version number. |
1174 | | * This reads, validates, and normalizes the value. */ |
1175 | | SECStatus |
1176 | | ssl_ClientReadVersion(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, unsigned int *len, |
1177 | | SSL3ProtocolVersion *version) |
1178 | 0 | { |
1179 | 0 | SSL3ProtocolVersion v; |
1180 | 0 | PRUint32 temp; |
1181 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
1182 | |
|
1183 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, b, len); |
1184 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1185 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* alert has been sent */ |
1186 | 0 | } |
1187 | 0 | v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; |
1188 | |
|
1189 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
1190 | 0 | v = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(v); |
1191 | | /* Check for failure. */ |
1192 | 0 | if (!v || v > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED) { |
1193 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); |
1194 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1195 | 0 | } |
1196 | 0 | } |
1197 | | |
1198 | | /* You can't negotiate TLS 1.3 this way. */ |
1199 | 0 | if (v >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
1200 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); |
1201 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1202 | 0 | } |
1203 | 0 | *version = v; |
1204 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
1205 | 0 | } |
1206 | | |
1207 | | SECStatus |
1208 | | ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random random) |
1209 | 6.04k | { |
1210 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
1211 | | |
1212 | 6.04k | rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
1213 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1214 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); |
1215 | 0 | } |
1216 | 6.04k | return rv; |
1217 | 6.04k | } |
1218 | | |
1219 | | SECStatus |
1220 | | ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, |
1221 | | SSLSignatureScheme scheme, PRBool isTls, SECItem *buf) |
1222 | 5.03k | { |
1223 | 5.03k | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
1224 | 5.03k | PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE; |
1225 | 5.03k | PRBool useRsaPss = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme); |
1226 | 5.03k | SECItem hashItem; |
1227 | | |
1228 | 5.03k | buf->data = NULL; |
1229 | | |
1230 | 5.03k | switch (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(key)) { |
1231 | 4.74k | case rsaKey: |
1232 | 4.74k | hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; |
1233 | 4.74k | hashItem.len = hash->len; |
1234 | 4.74k | break; |
1235 | 0 | case dsaKey: |
1236 | 0 | doDerEncode = isTls; |
1237 | | /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. |
1238 | | * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ |
1239 | 0 | if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { |
1240 | 0 | hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; |
1241 | 0 | hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); |
1242 | 0 | } else { |
1243 | 0 | hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; |
1244 | 0 | hashItem.len = hash->len; |
1245 | 0 | } |
1246 | 0 | break; |
1247 | 283 | case ecKey: |
1248 | 283 | doDerEncode = PR_TRUE; |
1249 | | /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. |
1250 | | * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ |
1251 | 283 | if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { |
1252 | 0 | hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; |
1253 | 0 | hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); |
1254 | 283 | } else { |
1255 | 283 | hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; |
1256 | 283 | hashItem.len = hash->len; |
1257 | 283 | } |
1258 | 283 | break; |
1259 | 0 | default: |
1260 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); |
1261 | 0 | goto done; |
1262 | 5.03k | } |
1263 | 5.03k | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); |
1264 | | |
1265 | 5.03k | if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { |
1266 | 174 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType); |
1267 | 174 | int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key); |
1268 | | |
1269 | 174 | SECItem *params = NULL; |
1270 | 174 | CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams; |
1271 | 174 | SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer, |
1272 | 174 | (unsigned char *)&pssParams, |
1273 | 174 | sizeof(pssParams) }; |
1274 | | |
1275 | 174 | if (signatureLen <= 0) { |
1276 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); |
1277 | 0 | goto done; |
1278 | 0 | } |
1279 | | |
1280 | 174 | buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen; |
1281 | 174 | buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen); |
1282 | 174 | if (!buf->data) |
1283 | 0 | goto done; /* error code was set. */ |
1284 | | |
1285 | 174 | if (useRsaPss) { |
1286 | 174 | pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); |
1287 | 174 | pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); |
1288 | 174 | pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len; |
1289 | 174 | params = &pssParamsItem; |
1290 | 174 | mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS; |
1291 | 174 | } |
1292 | | |
1293 | 174 | rv = PK11_SignWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem); |
1294 | 4.85k | } else { |
1295 | 4.85k | SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg); |
1296 | 4.85k | rv = SGN_Digest(key, hashOID, buf, &hashItem); |
1297 | 4.85k | } |
1298 | 5.03k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1299 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE); |
1300 | 5.03k | } else if (doDerEncode) { |
1301 | 283 | SECItem derSig = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
1302 | | |
1303 | | /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */ |
1304 | 283 | rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len); |
1305 | 283 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
1306 | 283 | PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */ |
1307 | 283 | *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */ |
1308 | 283 | } else if (derSig.data) { |
1309 | 0 | PORT_Free(derSig.data); |
1310 | 0 | } |
1311 | 283 | } |
1312 | | |
1313 | 5.03k | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char *)buf->data, buf->len)); |
1314 | 5.03k | done: |
1315 | 5.03k | if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) { |
1316 | 0 | PORT_Free(buf->data); |
1317 | 0 | buf->data = NULL; |
1318 | 0 | } |
1319 | 5.03k | return rv; |
1320 | 5.03k | } |
1321 | | |
1322 | | /* Called by ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and ssl3_SendCertificateVerify */ |
1323 | | SECStatus |
1324 | | ssl3_SignHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, |
1325 | | SECItem *buf) |
1326 | 5.03k | { |
1327 | 5.03k | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
1328 | 5.03k | PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
1329 | 5.03k | SSLSignatureScheme scheme = ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme; |
1330 | | |
1331 | 5.03k | rv = ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(hash, key, scheme, isTLS, buf); |
1332 | 5.03k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1333 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1334 | 0 | } |
1335 | | |
1336 | 5.03k | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
1337 | 5.03k | ss->sec.signatureScheme = scheme; |
1338 | 5.03k | ss->sec.authType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme); |
1339 | 5.03k | } |
1340 | | |
1341 | 5.03k | return SECSuccess; |
1342 | 5.03k | } |
1343 | | |
1344 | | /* Called from ssl3_VerifySignedHashes and tls13_HandleCertificateVerify. */ |
1345 | | SECStatus |
1346 | | ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *key, |
1347 | | SSLSignatureScheme scheme, |
1348 | | SSL3Hashes *hash, SECItem *buf) |
1349 | 0 | { |
1350 | 0 | SECItem *signature = NULL; |
1351 | 0 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
1352 | 0 | SECItem hashItem; |
1353 | 0 | SECOidTag encAlg; |
1354 | 0 | SECOidTag hashAlg; |
1355 | 0 | void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; |
1356 | 0 | PRBool isRsaPssScheme = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme); |
1357 | |
|
1358 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes", buf->data, buf->len)); |
1359 | |
|
1360 | 0 | hashAlg = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg); |
1361 | 0 | switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key)) { |
1362 | 0 | case rsaKey: |
1363 | 0 | encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; |
1364 | 0 | hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; |
1365 | 0 | hashItem.len = hash->len; |
1366 | 0 | if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { |
1367 | 0 | scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5; |
1368 | 0 | } |
1369 | 0 | break; |
1370 | 0 | case dsaKey: |
1371 | 0 | encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; |
1372 | | /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. |
1373 | | * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ |
1374 | 0 | if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { |
1375 | 0 | hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; |
1376 | 0 | hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); |
1377 | 0 | } else { |
1378 | 0 | hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; |
1379 | 0 | hashItem.len = hash->len; |
1380 | 0 | } |
1381 | | /* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */ |
1382 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 || |
1383 | 0 | buf->len != SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)) { |
1384 | 0 | signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)); |
1385 | 0 | if (!signature) { |
1386 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); |
1387 | 0 | goto loser; |
1388 | 0 | } |
1389 | 0 | buf = signature; |
1390 | 0 | } |
1391 | 0 | if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { |
1392 | 0 | scheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1; |
1393 | 0 | } |
1394 | 0 | break; |
1395 | | |
1396 | 0 | case ecKey: |
1397 | 0 | encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; |
1398 | | /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. |
1399 | | * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. |
1400 | | * ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s using ASN.1 |
1401 | | * (unlike DSA where ASN.1 encoding is used with TLS but not with |
1402 | | * SSL3). So we can use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect for ECDSA. |
1403 | | */ |
1404 | 0 | if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { |
1405 | 0 | hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; |
1406 | 0 | hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; |
1407 | 0 | hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); |
1408 | 0 | } else { |
1409 | 0 | hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; |
1410 | 0 | hashItem.len = hash->len; |
1411 | 0 | } |
1412 | 0 | if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { |
1413 | 0 | scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1; |
1414 | 0 | } |
1415 | 0 | break; |
1416 | | |
1417 | 0 | default: |
1418 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); |
1419 | 0 | goto loser; |
1420 | 0 | } |
1421 | | |
1422 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified", |
1423 | 0 | hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); |
1424 | |
|
1425 | 0 | if (isRsaPssScheme || |
1426 | 0 | hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || |
1427 | 0 | SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key) == dsaKey) { |
1428 | | /* VFY_VerifyDigestDirect requires DSA signatures to be DER-encoded. |
1429 | | * DSA signatures are DER-encoded in TLS but not in SSL3 and the code |
1430 | | * above always removes the DER encoding of DSA signatures when |
1431 | | * present. Thus DSA signatures are always verified with PK11_Verify. |
1432 | | */ |
1433 | 0 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType); |
1434 | |
|
1435 | 0 | SECItem *params = NULL; |
1436 | 0 | CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams; |
1437 | 0 | SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer, |
1438 | 0 | (unsigned char *)&pssParams, |
1439 | 0 | sizeof(pssParams) }; |
1440 | |
|
1441 | 0 | if (isRsaPssScheme) { |
1442 | 0 | pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); |
1443 | 0 | pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); |
1444 | 0 | pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len; |
1445 | 0 | params = &pssParamsItem; |
1446 | 0 | mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS; |
1447 | 0 | } |
1448 | |
|
1449 | 0 | rv = PK11_VerifyWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem, pwArg); |
1450 | 0 | } else { |
1451 | 0 | rv = VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hashItem, key, buf, encAlg, hashAlg, |
1452 | 0 | pwArg); |
1453 | 0 | } |
1454 | 0 | if (signature) { |
1455 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE); |
1456 | 0 | } |
1457 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1458 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); |
1459 | 0 | } |
1460 | 0 | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
1461 | 0 | ss->sec.signatureScheme = scheme; |
1462 | 0 | ss->sec.authType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme); |
1463 | 0 | } |
1464 | |
|
1465 | 0 | loser: |
1466 | | #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE |
1467 | | rv = SECSuccess; |
1468 | | PORT_SetError(0); |
1469 | | #endif |
1470 | 0 | return rv; |
1471 | 0 | } |
1472 | | |
1473 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange, ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify */ |
1474 | | SECStatus |
1475 | | ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SSL3Hashes *hash, |
1476 | | SECItem *buf) |
1477 | 0 | { |
1478 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = |
1479 | 0 | SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(&ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); |
1480 | 0 | if (pubKey == NULL) { |
1481 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); |
1482 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1483 | 0 | } |
1484 | 0 | SECStatus rv = ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(ss, pubKey, scheme, |
1485 | 0 | hash, buf); |
1486 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); |
1487 | 0 | return rv; |
1488 | 0 | } |
1489 | | |
1490 | | /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ |
1491 | | /* Called from ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash |
1492 | | * which are called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. |
1493 | | * |
1494 | | * hashAlg: ssl_hash_none indicates the pre-1.2, MD5/SHA1 combination hash. |
1495 | | */ |
1496 | | SECStatus |
1497 | | ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg, |
1498 | | PRUint8 *hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen, |
1499 | | SSL3Hashes *hashes) |
1500 | 5.03k | { |
1501 | 5.03k | SECStatus rv; |
1502 | 5.03k | SECOidTag hashOID; |
1503 | 5.03k | PRUint32 policy; |
1504 | | |
1505 | 5.03k | if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { |
1506 | 0 | if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_SHA1, &policy) == SECSuccess) && |
1507 | 0 | !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { |
1508 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); |
1509 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1510 | 0 | } |
1511 | 0 | rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen); |
1512 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1513 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
1514 | 0 | return rv; |
1515 | 0 | } |
1516 | 0 | rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen); |
1517 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1518 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
1519 | 0 | return rv; |
1520 | 0 | } |
1521 | 0 | hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; |
1522 | 5.03k | } else { |
1523 | 5.03k | hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg); |
1524 | 5.03k | if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) == SECSuccess) && |
1525 | 5.03k | !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { |
1526 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); |
1527 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1528 | 0 | } |
1529 | 5.03k | hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashOID); |
1530 | 5.03k | if (hashes->len == 0 || hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) { |
1531 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); |
1532 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1533 | 0 | } |
1534 | 5.03k | rv = PK11_HashBuf(hashOID, hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen); |
1535 | 5.03k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1536 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
1537 | 0 | return rv; |
1538 | 0 | } |
1539 | 5.03k | } |
1540 | 5.03k | hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg; |
1541 | 5.03k | return SECSuccess; |
1542 | 5.03k | } |
1543 | | |
1544 | | /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ |
1545 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. */ |
1546 | | static SECStatus |
1547 | | ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sslSocket *ss, SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes, |
1548 | | SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, PRBool padY) |
1549 | 1.07k | { |
1550 | 1.07k | sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; |
1551 | 1.07k | SECStatus rv; |
1552 | 1.07k | unsigned int yLen; |
1553 | 1.07k | unsigned int i; |
1554 | | |
1555 | 1.07k | PORT_Assert(dh_p.data); |
1556 | 1.07k | PORT_Assert(dh_g.data); |
1557 | 1.07k | PORT_Assert(dh_Ys.data); |
1558 | | |
1559 | 1.07k | rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
1560 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1561 | 0 | goto loser; |
1562 | 0 | } |
1563 | 1.07k | rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
1564 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1565 | 0 | goto loser; |
1566 | 0 | } |
1567 | | /* p */ |
1568 | 1.07k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&buf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len, 2); |
1569 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1570 | 0 | goto loser; |
1571 | 0 | } |
1572 | | /* g */ |
1573 | 1.07k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&buf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len, 2); |
1574 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1575 | 0 | goto loser; |
1576 | 0 | } |
1577 | | /* y - complicated by padding */ |
1578 | 1.07k | yLen = padY ? dh_p.len : dh_Ys.len; |
1579 | 1.07k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, yLen, 2); |
1580 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1581 | 0 | goto loser; |
1582 | 0 | } |
1583 | | /* If we're padding Y, dh_Ys can't be longer than dh_p. */ |
1584 | 1.07k | PORT_Assert(!padY || dh_p.len >= dh_Ys.len); |
1585 | 1.07k | for (i = dh_Ys.len; i < yLen; ++i) { |
1586 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, 0, 1); |
1587 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1588 | 0 | goto loser; |
1589 | 0 | } |
1590 | 0 | } |
1591 | 1.07k | rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len); |
1592 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1593 | 0 | goto loser; |
1594 | 0 | } |
1595 | | |
1596 | 1.07k | rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf), |
1597 | 1.07k | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf), hashes); |
1598 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1599 | 0 | goto loser; |
1600 | 0 | } |
1601 | | |
1602 | 1.07k | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf), |
1603 | 1.07k | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf))); |
1604 | 1.07k | if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { |
1605 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result", |
1606 | 0 | hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); |
1607 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result", |
1608 | 0 | hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); |
1609 | 1.07k | } else { |
1610 | 1.07k | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result", |
1611 | 1.07k | hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); |
1612 | 1.07k | } |
1613 | | |
1614 | 1.07k | sslBuffer_Clear(&buf); |
1615 | 1.07k | return SECSuccess; |
1616 | | |
1617 | 0 | loser: |
1618 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&buf); |
1619 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1620 | 1.07k | } |
1621 | | |
1622 | | static SECStatus |
1623 | | ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction, |
1624 | | const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef, |
1625 | | ssl3CipherSpec **specp) |
1626 | 12.0k | { |
1627 | 12.0k | ssl3CipherSpec *spec; |
1628 | 12.0k | const ssl3CipherSpec *prev; |
1629 | | |
1630 | 12.0k | prev = (direction == ssl_secret_write) ? ss->ssl3.cwSpec : ss->ssl3.crSpec; |
1631 | 12.0k | if (prev->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { |
1632 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); |
1633 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1634 | 0 | } |
1635 | | |
1636 | 12.0k | spec = ssl_CreateCipherSpec(ss, direction); |
1637 | 12.0k | if (!spec) { |
1638 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1639 | 0 | } |
1640 | | |
1641 | 12.0k | spec->cipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suiteDef); |
1642 | 12.0k | spec->macDef = ssl_GetMacDef(ss, suiteDef); |
1643 | | |
1644 | 12.0k | spec->epoch = prev->epoch + 1; |
1645 | 12.0k | spec->nextSeqNum = 0; |
1646 | 12.0k | if (IS_DTLS(ss) && direction == ssl_secret_read) { |
1647 | 6.04k | dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); |
1648 | 6.04k | } |
1649 | 12.0k | ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, spec); |
1650 | | |
1651 | 12.0k | ssl_SaveCipherSpec(ss, spec); |
1652 | 12.0k | *specp = spec; |
1653 | 12.0k | return SECSuccess; |
1654 | 12.0k | } |
1655 | | |
1656 | | /* Fill in the pending cipher spec with info from the selected ciphersuite. |
1657 | | ** This is as much initialization as we can do without having key material. |
1658 | | ** Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello(), ssl3_SendServerHello() |
1659 | | ** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock. |
1660 | | ** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock. |
1661 | | */ |
1662 | | SECStatus |
1663 | | ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) |
1664 | 6.04k | { |
1665 | 6.04k | ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; |
1666 | 6.04k | SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea; |
1667 | 6.04k | const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef; |
1668 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
1669 | | |
1670 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
1671 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); |
1672 | | |
1673 | 6.04k | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ |
1674 | | |
1675 | | /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */ |
1676 | 6.04k | if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { |
1677 | | /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ |
1678 | 6.04k | ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version = ss->version; |
1679 | 6.04k | } |
1680 | | |
1681 | 6.04k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x", |
1682 | 6.04k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); |
1683 | | |
1684 | 6.04k | suiteDef = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); |
1685 | 6.04k | if (suiteDef == NULL) { |
1686 | 0 | goto loser; |
1687 | 0 | } |
1688 | | |
1689 | 6.04k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
1690 | | /* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */ |
1691 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(suiteDef->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4); |
1692 | 6.04k | } |
1693 | | |
1694 | 6.04k | ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suiteDef; |
1695 | | |
1696 | 6.04k | kea = suiteDef->key_exchange_alg; |
1697 | 6.04k | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea]; |
1698 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea); |
1699 | | |
1700 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_read, suiteDef, |
1701 | 6.04k | &ss->ssl3.prSpec); |
1702 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1703 | 0 | goto loser; |
1704 | 0 | } |
1705 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_write, suiteDef, |
1706 | 6.04k | &ss->ssl3.pwSpec); |
1707 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1708 | 0 | goto loser; |
1709 | 0 | } |
1710 | | |
1711 | 6.04k | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_record_size_limit_xtn)) { |
1712 | 207 | ss->ssl3.prSpec->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, |
1713 | 207 | ss->opt.recordSizeLimit); |
1714 | 207 | ss->ssl3.pwSpec->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, |
1715 | 207 | ss->xtnData.recordSizeLimit); |
1716 | 207 | } |
1717 | | |
1718 | 6.04k | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ |
1719 | 6.04k | return SECSuccess; |
1720 | | |
1721 | 0 | loser: |
1722 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); |
1723 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1724 | 6.04k | } |
1725 | | |
1726 | | /* ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader writes the SSL/TLS pseudo-header (the data which |
1727 | | * is included in the MAC or AEAD additional data) to |buf|. See |
1728 | | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.3 for the definition of the |
1729 | | * AEAD additional data. |
1730 | | * |
1731 | | * TLS pseudo-header includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. Which |
1732 | | * pseudo-header definition to use should be decided based on the version of |
1733 | | * the protocol that was negotiated when the cipher spec became current, NOT |
1734 | | * based on the version value in the record itself, and the decision is passed |
1735 | | * to this function as the |includesVersion| argument. But, the |version| |
1736 | | * argument should be the record's version value. |
1737 | | */ |
1738 | | static SECStatus |
1739 | | ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(DTLSEpoch epoch, |
1740 | | sslSequenceNumber seqNum, |
1741 | | SSLContentType ct, |
1742 | | PRBool includesVersion, |
1743 | | SSL3ProtocolVersion version, |
1744 | | PRBool isDTLS, |
1745 | | int length, |
1746 | | sslBuffer *buf, SSL3ProtocolVersion v) |
1747 | 52.8k | { |
1748 | 52.8k | SECStatus rv; |
1749 | 52.8k | if (isDTLS && v < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
1750 | 52.8k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, epoch, 2); |
1751 | 52.8k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1752 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1753 | 0 | } |
1754 | 52.8k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, seqNum, 6); |
1755 | 52.8k | } else { |
1756 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, seqNum, 8); |
1757 | 0 | } |
1758 | 52.8k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1759 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1760 | 0 | } |
1761 | 52.8k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ct, 1); |
1762 | 52.8k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1763 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1764 | 0 | } |
1765 | | |
1766 | | /* SSL3 MAC doesn't include the record's version field. */ |
1767 | 52.8k | if (includesVersion) { |
1768 | | /* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */ |
1769 | 52.8k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, version, 2); |
1770 | 52.8k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1771 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1772 | 0 | } |
1773 | 52.8k | } |
1774 | 52.8k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, length, 2); |
1775 | 52.8k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1776 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1777 | 0 | } |
1778 | | |
1779 | 52.8k | return SECSuccess; |
1780 | 52.8k | } |
1781 | | |
1782 | | /* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec. |
1783 | | * Master Secret already is derived. |
1784 | | * Caller holds Spec write lock. |
1785 | | */ |
1786 | | static SECStatus |
1787 | | ssl3_InitPendingContexts(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) |
1788 | 30 | { |
1789 | 30 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE encMechanism; |
1790 | 30 | CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE encMode; |
1791 | 30 | SECItem macParam; |
1792 | 30 | CK_ULONG macLength; |
1793 | 30 | SECItem iv; |
1794 | 30 | SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; |
1795 | | |
1796 | 30 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
1797 | 30 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); |
1798 | | |
1799 | 30 | calg = spec->cipherDef->calg; |
1800 | 30 | PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); |
1801 | | |
1802 | 30 | if (spec->cipherDef->type != type_aead) { |
1803 | 8 | macLength = spec->macDef->mac_size; |
1804 | | |
1805 | | /* |
1806 | | ** Now setup the MAC contexts, |
1807 | | ** crypto contexts are setup below. |
1808 | | */ |
1809 | 8 | macParam.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength; |
1810 | 8 | macParam.len = sizeof(macLength); |
1811 | 8 | macParam.type = siBuffer; |
1812 | | |
1813 | 8 | spec->keyMaterial.macContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( |
1814 | 8 | spec->macDef->mmech, CKA_SIGN, spec->keyMaterial.macKey, &macParam); |
1815 | 8 | if (!spec->keyMaterial.macContext) { |
1816 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); |
1817 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1818 | 0 | } |
1819 | 8 | } |
1820 | | |
1821 | | /* |
1822 | | ** Now setup the crypto contexts. |
1823 | | */ |
1824 | 30 | if (calg == ssl_calg_null) { |
1825 | 0 | spec->cipher = Null_Cipher; |
1826 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
1827 | 0 | } |
1828 | | |
1829 | 30 | encMechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); |
1830 | 30 | encMode = (spec->direction == ssl_secret_write) ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT; |
1831 | 30 | if (spec->cipherDef->type == type_aead) { |
1832 | 22 | encMode |= CKA_NSS_MESSAGE; |
1833 | 22 | iv.data = NULL; |
1834 | 22 | iv.len = 0; |
1835 | 22 | } else { |
1836 | 8 | spec->cipher = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp; |
1837 | 8 | iv.data = spec->keyMaterial.iv; |
1838 | 8 | iv.len = spec->cipherDef->iv_size; |
1839 | 8 | } |
1840 | | |
1841 | | /* |
1842 | | * build the context |
1843 | | */ |
1844 | 30 | spec->cipherContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(encMechanism, encMode, |
1845 | 30 | spec->keyMaterial.key, |
1846 | 30 | &iv); |
1847 | 30 | if (!spec->cipherContext) { |
1848 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); |
1849 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1850 | 0 | } |
1851 | | |
1852 | 30 | return SECSuccess; |
1853 | 30 | } |
1854 | | |
1855 | | /* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts |
1856 | | * for the pending Cipher Spec. |
1857 | | * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) |
1858 | | * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) |
1859 | | * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) |
1860 | | * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) |
1861 | | * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate. |
1862 | | * |
1863 | | * If |secret| is a master secret from a previous connection is reused, |derive| |
1864 | | * is PR_FALSE. If the secret is a pre-master secret, then |derive| is PR_TRUE |
1865 | | * and the master secret is derived from |secret|. |
1866 | | */ |
1867 | | SECStatus |
1868 | | ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *secret, PRBool derive) |
1869 | 15 | { |
1870 | 15 | PK11SymKey *masterSecret; |
1871 | 15 | ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; |
1872 | 15 | ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec; |
1873 | 15 | SECStatus rv; |
1874 | | |
1875 | 15 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
1876 | 15 | PORT_Assert(secret); |
1877 | | |
1878 | 15 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ |
1879 | | |
1880 | 15 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.pwSpec); |
1881 | 15 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch); |
1882 | 15 | prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; |
1883 | 15 | pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; |
1884 | | |
1885 | 15 | if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { |
1886 | | /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many |
1887 | | * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The |
1888 | | * spec says you should be discarding the connection |
1889 | | * and start over, so not much we can do here. */ |
1890 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
1891 | 0 | goto loser; |
1892 | 0 | } |
1893 | | |
1894 | 15 | if (derive) { |
1895 | 15 | rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, secret, &masterSecret); |
1896 | 15 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1897 | 0 | goto loser; |
1898 | 0 | } |
1899 | 15 | } else { |
1900 | 0 | masterSecret = secret; |
1901 | 0 | } |
1902 | | |
1903 | 15 | PORT_Assert(masterSecret); |
1904 | 15 | rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(ss, masterSecret); |
1905 | 15 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1906 | 0 | if (derive) { |
1907 | | /* masterSecret was created here. */ |
1908 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(masterSecret); |
1909 | 0 | } |
1910 | 0 | goto loser; |
1911 | 0 | } |
1912 | | |
1913 | | /* Both cipher specs maintain a reference to the master secret, since each |
1914 | | * is managed and freed independently. */ |
1915 | 15 | prSpec->masterSecret = masterSecret; |
1916 | 15 | pwSpec->masterSecret = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(masterSecret); |
1917 | 15 | rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec); |
1918 | 15 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1919 | 0 | goto loser; |
1920 | 0 | } |
1921 | | |
1922 | 15 | rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec); |
1923 | 15 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1924 | 0 | goto loser; |
1925 | 0 | } |
1926 | | |
1927 | 15 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ |
1928 | 15 | return SECSuccess; |
1929 | | |
1930 | 0 | loser: |
1931 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ |
1932 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); |
1933 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1934 | 15 | } |
1935 | | |
1936 | | /* |
1937 | | * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported. |
1938 | | */ |
1939 | | static const unsigned char mac_pad_1[60] = { |
1940 | | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, |
1941 | | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, |
1942 | | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, |
1943 | | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, |
1944 | | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, |
1945 | | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, |
1946 | | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, |
1947 | | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 |
1948 | | }; |
1949 | | static const unsigned char mac_pad_2[60] = { |
1950 | | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, |
1951 | | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, |
1952 | | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, |
1953 | | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, |
1954 | | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, |
1955 | | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, |
1956 | | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, |
1957 | | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c |
1958 | | }; |
1959 | | |
1960 | | /* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord() |
1961 | | ** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!) |
1962 | | */ |
1963 | | static SECStatus |
1964 | | ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( |
1965 | | ssl3CipherSpec *spec, |
1966 | | const unsigned char *header, |
1967 | | unsigned int headerLen, |
1968 | | const PRUint8 *input, |
1969 | | int inputLen, |
1970 | | unsigned char *outbuf, |
1971 | | unsigned int *outLen) |
1972 | 52.5k | { |
1973 | 52.5k | PK11Context *context; |
1974 | 52.5k | int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size; |
1975 | 52.5k | SECStatus rv; |
1976 | | |
1977 | 52.5k | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: header", header, headerLen)); |
1978 | 52.5k | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLen)); |
1979 | | |
1980 | 52.5k | if (spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { |
1981 | 52.5k | *outLen = 0; |
1982 | 52.5k | return SECSuccess; |
1983 | 52.5k | } |
1984 | | |
1985 | 0 | context = spec->keyMaterial.macContext; |
1986 | 0 | rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context); |
1987 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(context, header, headerLen); |
1988 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(context, input, inputLen); |
1989 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(context, outbuf, outLen, macSize); |
1990 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLen == (unsigned)macSize); |
1991 | |
|
1992 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLen)); |
1993 | |
|
1994 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1995 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
1996 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); |
1997 | 0 | } |
1998 | 0 | return rv; |
1999 | 52.5k | } |
2000 | | |
2001 | | /* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord() |
2002 | | * Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!) |
2003 | | * |
2004 | | * On entry: |
2005 | | * originalLen >= inputLen >= MAC size |
2006 | | */ |
2007 | | static SECStatus |
2008 | | ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( |
2009 | | ssl3CipherSpec *spec, |
2010 | | const unsigned char *header, |
2011 | | unsigned int headerLen, |
2012 | | const PRUint8 *input, |
2013 | | int inputLen, |
2014 | | int originalLen, |
2015 | | unsigned char *outbuf, |
2016 | | unsigned int *outLen) |
2017 | 54 | { |
2018 | 54 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType; |
2019 | 54 | CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params; |
2020 | 54 | SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem; |
2021 | 54 | int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size; |
2022 | 54 | SECStatus rv; |
2023 | | |
2024 | 54 | PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->macDef->mac_size); |
2025 | 54 | PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen); |
2026 | | |
2027 | 54 | if (spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { |
2028 | 0 | *outLen = 0; |
2029 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
2030 | 0 | } |
2031 | | |
2032 | 54 | macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME; |
2033 | 54 | if (spec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { |
2034 | 0 | macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME; |
2035 | 0 | } |
2036 | | |
2037 | 54 | params.macAlg = spec->macDef->mmech; |
2038 | 54 | params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen; |
2039 | 54 | params.pHeader = (unsigned char *)header; /* const cast */ |
2040 | 54 | params.ulHeaderLen = headerLen; |
2041 | | |
2042 | 54 | param.data = (unsigned char *)¶ms; |
2043 | 54 | param.len = sizeof(params); |
2044 | 54 | param.type = 0; |
2045 | | |
2046 | 54 | inputItem.data = (unsigned char *)input; |
2047 | 54 | inputItem.len = inputLen; |
2048 | 54 | inputItem.type = 0; |
2049 | | |
2050 | 54 | outputItem.data = outbuf; |
2051 | 54 | outputItem.len = *outLen; |
2052 | 54 | outputItem.type = 0; |
2053 | | |
2054 | 54 | rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(spec->keyMaterial.macKey, macType, ¶m, |
2055 | 54 | &outputItem, &inputItem); |
2056 | 54 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2057 | 0 | if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) { |
2058 | | /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC() expects the MAC to have been removed |
2059 | | * from the input length already. */ |
2060 | 0 | return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, header, headerLen, |
2061 | 0 | input, inputLen - macSize, |
2062 | 0 | outbuf, outLen); |
2063 | 0 | } |
2064 | | |
2065 | 0 | *outLen = 0; |
2066 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
2067 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); |
2068 | 0 | return rv; |
2069 | 0 | } |
2070 | | |
2071 | 54 | PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)macSize); |
2072 | 54 | *outLen = outputItem.len; |
2073 | | |
2074 | 54 | return rv; |
2075 | 54 | } |
2076 | | |
2077 | | static PRBool |
2078 | | ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) |
2079 | 77.3k | { |
2080 | 77.3k | PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; |
2081 | 77.3k | PRBool isPresent = PR_TRUE; |
2082 | | |
2083 | | /* we only care if we are doing client auth */ |
2084 | 77.3k | if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) { |
2085 | 77.3k | return PR_TRUE; |
2086 | 77.3k | } |
2087 | | |
2088 | | /* get the slot */ |
2089 | 0 | slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID, |
2090 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID); |
2091 | 0 | if (slot == NULL || |
2092 | 0 | !PK11_IsPresent(slot) || |
2093 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) || |
2094 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) || |
2095 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) || |
2096 | 0 | (PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) { |
2097 | 0 | isPresent = PR_FALSE; |
2098 | 0 | } |
2099 | 0 | if (slot) { |
2100 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
2101 | 0 | } |
2102 | 0 | return isPresent; |
2103 | 77.3k | } |
2104 | | |
2105 | | /* Caller must hold the spec read lock. */ |
2106 | | SECStatus |
2107 | | ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, |
2108 | | PRBool isServer, |
2109 | | PRBool isDTLS, |
2110 | | SSLContentType ct, |
2111 | | const PRUint8 *pIn, |
2112 | | PRUint32 contentLen, |
2113 | | sslBuffer *wrBuf) |
2114 | 38.4k | { |
2115 | 38.4k | SECStatus rv; |
2116 | 38.4k | PRUint32 macLen = 0; |
2117 | 38.4k | PRUint32 fragLen; |
2118 | 38.4k | PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0; |
2119 | 38.4k | unsigned int ivLen = 0; |
2120 | 38.4k | unsigned char pseudoHeaderBuf[13]; |
2121 | 38.4k | sslBuffer pseudoHeader = SSL_BUFFER(pseudoHeaderBuf); |
2122 | 38.4k | unsigned int len; |
2123 | | |
2124 | 38.4k | if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block && |
2125 | 38.4k | cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { |
2126 | | /* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from |
2127 | | * RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically |
2128 | | * strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous |
2129 | | * record. |
2130 | | */ |
2131 | 0 | ivLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->iv_size; |
2132 | 0 | if (ivLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) { |
2133 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
2134 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2135 | 0 | } |
2136 | 0 | rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), ivLen); |
2137 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2138 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); |
2139 | 0 | return rv; |
2140 | 0 | } |
2141 | 0 | rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext, |
2142 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* output */ |
2143 | 0 | &len, /* outlen */ |
2144 | 0 | ivLen, /* max outlen */ |
2145 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* input */ |
2146 | 0 | ivLen); /* input len */ |
2147 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess || len != ivLen) { |
2148 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); |
2149 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2150 | 0 | } |
2151 | | |
2152 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL); |
2153 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */ |
2154 | 0 | } |
2155 | 38.4k | rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( |
2156 | 38.4k | cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, ct, |
2157 | 38.4k | cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->recordVersion, |
2158 | 38.4k | isDTLS, contentLen, &pseudoHeader, cwSpec->version); |
2159 | 38.4k | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); |
2160 | 38.4k | if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_aead) { |
2161 | 0 | const unsigned int nonceLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->explicit_nonce_size; |
2162 | 0 | const unsigned int tagLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->tag_size; |
2163 | 0 | unsigned int ivOffset = 0; |
2164 | 0 | CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION gen; |
2165 | | /* ivOut includes the iv and the nonce and is the internal iv/nonce |
2166 | | * for the AEAD function. On Encrypt, this is an in/out parameter */ |
2167 | 0 | unsigned char ivOut[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
2168 | 0 | ivLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->iv_size; |
2169 | |
|
2170 | 0 | PORT_Assert((ivLen + nonceLen) <= MAX_IV_LENGTH); |
2171 | 0 | PORT_Assert((ivLen + nonceLen) >= sizeof(sslSequenceNumber)); |
2172 | |
|
2173 | 0 | if (nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) { |
2174 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
2175 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2176 | 0 | } |
2177 | | |
2178 | 0 | if (nonceLen == 0) { |
2179 | 0 | ivOffset = ivLen - sizeof(sslSequenceNumber); |
2180 | 0 | gen = CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR; |
2181 | 0 | } else { |
2182 | 0 | ivOffset = ivLen; |
2183 | 0 | gen = CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER; |
2184 | 0 | } |
2185 | 0 | ivOffset = tls13_SetupAeadIv(isDTLS, cwSpec->version, ivOut, cwSpec->keyMaterial.iv, |
2186 | 0 | ivOffset, ivLen, cwSpec->epoch); |
2187 | 0 | rv = tls13_AEAD(cwSpec->cipherContext, |
2188 | 0 | PR_FALSE, |
2189 | 0 | gen, ivOffset * BPB, /* iv generator params */ |
2190 | 0 | ivOut, /* iv in */ |
2191 | 0 | ivOut, /* iv out */ |
2192 | 0 | ivLen + nonceLen, /* full iv length */ |
2193 | 0 | NULL, 0, /* nonce is generated*/ |
2194 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader), /* aad */ |
2195 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader), /* aadlen */ |
2196 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + nonceLen, /* output */ |
2197 | 0 | &len, /* out len */ |
2198 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf) - nonceLen, /* max out */ |
2199 | 0 | tagLen, |
2200 | 0 | pIn, contentLen); /* input */ |
2201 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2202 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); |
2203 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2204 | 0 | } |
2205 | 0 | len += nonceLen; /* include the nonce at the beginning */ |
2206 | | /* copy out the generated iv if we are using explict nonces */ |
2207 | 0 | if (nonceLen) { |
2208 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), ivOut + ivLen, nonceLen); |
2209 | 0 | } |
2210 | |
|
2211 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL); |
2212 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */ |
2213 | 38.4k | } else { |
2214 | 38.4k | int blockSize = cwSpec->cipherDef->block_size; |
2215 | | |
2216 | | /* |
2217 | | * Add the MAC |
2218 | | */ |
2219 | 38.4k | rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader), |
2220 | 38.4k | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader), |
2221 | 38.4k | pIn, contentLen, |
2222 | 38.4k | SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + contentLen, &macLen); |
2223 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2224 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); |
2225 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2226 | 0 | } |
2227 | 38.4k | p1Len = contentLen; |
2228 | 38.4k | p2Len = macLen; |
2229 | 38.4k | fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */ |
2230 | 38.4k | PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); |
2231 | | |
2232 | | /* |
2233 | | * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher) |
2234 | | * then Encrypt it |
2235 | | */ |
2236 | 38.4k | if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block) { |
2237 | 0 | unsigned char *pBuf; |
2238 | 0 | int padding_length; |
2239 | 0 | int i; |
2240 | |
|
2241 | 0 | oddLen = contentLen % blockSize; |
2242 | | /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */ |
2243 | 0 | padding_length = blockSize - 1 - ((fragLen) & (blockSize - 1)); |
2244 | 0 | fragLen += padding_length + 1; |
2245 | 0 | PORT_Assert((fragLen % blockSize) == 0); |
2246 | | |
2247 | | /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */ |
2248 | 0 | pBuf = SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + fragLen - 1; |
2249 | 0 | for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) { |
2250 | 0 | *pBuf-- = padding_length; |
2251 | 0 | } |
2252 | | /* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */ |
2253 | 0 | p2Len = fragLen - p1Len; |
2254 | 0 | } |
2255 | 38.4k | if (p1Len < 256) { |
2256 | 26.5k | oddLen = p1Len; |
2257 | 26.5k | p1Len = 0; |
2258 | 26.5k | } else { |
2259 | 11.9k | p1Len -= oddLen; |
2260 | 11.9k | } |
2261 | 38.4k | if (oddLen) { |
2262 | 26.5k | p2Len += oddLen; |
2263 | 26.5k | PORT_Assert((blockSize < 2) || |
2264 | 26.5k | (p2Len % blockSize) == 0); |
2265 | 26.5k | memmove(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, oddLen); |
2266 | 26.5k | } |
2267 | 38.4k | if (p1Len > 0) { |
2268 | 11.9k | unsigned int cipherBytesPart1 = 0; |
2269 | 11.9k | rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext, |
2270 | 11.9k | SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* output */ |
2271 | 11.9k | &cipherBytesPart1, /* actual outlen */ |
2272 | 11.9k | p1Len, /* max outlen */ |
2273 | 11.9k | pIn, |
2274 | 11.9k | p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */ |
2275 | 11.9k | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == p1Len); |
2276 | 11.9k | if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart1 != p1Len) { |
2277 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); |
2278 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2279 | 0 | } |
2280 | 11.9k | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, p1Len, NULL); |
2281 | 11.9k | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); |
2282 | 11.9k | } |
2283 | 38.4k | if (p2Len > 0) { |
2284 | 26.5k | unsigned int cipherBytesPart2 = 0; |
2285 | 26.5k | rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext, |
2286 | 26.5k | SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), |
2287 | 26.5k | &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */ |
2288 | 26.5k | p2Len, /* max outlen */ |
2289 | 26.5k | SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), |
2290 | 26.5k | p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/ |
2291 | 26.5k | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == p2Len); |
2292 | 26.5k | if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != p2Len) { |
2293 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); |
2294 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2295 | 0 | } |
2296 | 26.5k | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, p2Len, NULL); |
2297 | 26.5k | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); |
2298 | 26.5k | } |
2299 | 38.4k | } |
2300 | | |
2301 | 38.4k | return SECSuccess; |
2302 | 38.4k | } |
2303 | | |
2304 | | /* Note: though this can report failure, it shouldn't. */ |
2305 | | SECStatus |
2306 | | ssl_InsertRecordHeader(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, |
2307 | | SSLContentType contentType, sslBuffer *wrBuf, |
2308 | | PRBool *needsLength) |
2309 | 38.4k | { |
2310 | 38.4k | SECStatus rv; |
2311 | | |
2312 | 38.4k | #ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE |
2313 | 38.4k | if (cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
2314 | 38.4k | cwSpec->epoch > TrafficKeyClearText) { |
2315 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
2316 | 0 | return dtls13_InsertCipherTextHeader(ss, cwSpec, wrBuf, |
2317 | 0 | needsLength); |
2318 | 0 | } |
2319 | 0 | contentType = ssl_ct_application_data; |
2320 | 0 | } |
2321 | 38.4k | #endif |
2322 | 38.4k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, contentType, 1); |
2323 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2324 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2325 | 0 | } |
2326 | | |
2327 | 38.4k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->recordVersion, 2); |
2328 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2329 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2330 | 0 | } |
2331 | 38.4k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
2332 | 38.4k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->epoch, 2); |
2333 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2334 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2335 | 0 | } |
2336 | 38.4k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, 6); |
2337 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2338 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2339 | 0 | } |
2340 | 38.4k | } |
2341 | 38.4k | *needsLength = PR_TRUE; |
2342 | 38.4k | return SECSuccess; |
2343 | 38.4k | } |
2344 | | |
2345 | | SECStatus |
2346 | | ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, SSLContentType ct, |
2347 | | const PRUint8 *pIn, PRUint32 contentLen, sslBuffer *wrBuf) |
2348 | 38.4k | { |
2349 | 38.4k | PRBool needsLength; |
2350 | 38.4k | unsigned int lenOffset; |
2351 | 38.4k | SECStatus rv; |
2352 | | |
2353 | 38.4k | PORT_Assert(cwSpec->direction == ssl_secret_write); |
2354 | 38.4k | PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == 0); |
2355 | 38.4k | PORT_Assert(cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX); |
2356 | | |
2357 | 38.4k | if (cwSpec->nextSeqNum >= cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records) { |
2358 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[-]: write sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", |
2359 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->nextSeqNum)); |
2360 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); |
2361 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2362 | 0 | } |
2363 | | |
2364 | 38.4k | rv = ssl_InsertRecordHeader(ss, cwSpec, ct, wrBuf, &needsLength); |
2365 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2366 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2367 | 0 | } |
2368 | 38.4k | if (needsLength) { |
2369 | 38.4k | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, 2, &lenOffset); |
2370 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2371 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2372 | 0 | } |
2373 | 38.4k | } |
2374 | | |
2375 | | #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE |
2376 | | { |
2377 | | unsigned int len; |
2378 | | rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), &len, |
2379 | | SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf), pIn, contentLen); |
2380 | | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2381 | | return SECFailure; /* error was set */ |
2382 | | } |
2383 | | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL); |
2384 | | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */ |
2385 | | } |
2386 | | #else |
2387 | 38.4k | if (cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
2388 | 0 | PRUint8 *cipherText = SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf); |
2389 | 0 | unsigned int bufLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf); |
2390 | 0 | rv = tls13_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, ct, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); |
2391 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2392 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2393 | 0 | } |
2394 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
2395 | 0 | bufLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) - bufLen; |
2396 | 0 | rv = dtls13_MaskSequenceNumber(ss, cwSpec, |
2397 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), |
2398 | 0 | cipherText, bufLen); |
2399 | 0 | } |
2400 | 38.4k | } else { |
2401 | 38.4k | rv = ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss), ct, |
2402 | 38.4k | pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); |
2403 | 38.4k | } |
2404 | 38.4k | #endif |
2405 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2406 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* error was set */ |
2407 | 0 | } |
2408 | | |
2409 | 38.4k | if (needsLength) { |
2410 | | /* Insert the length. */ |
2411 | 38.4k | rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(wrBuf, lenOffset, 2); |
2412 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2413 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); /* Can't fail. */ |
2414 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2415 | 0 | } |
2416 | 38.4k | } |
2417 | | |
2418 | 38.4k | ++cwSpec->nextSeqNum; |
2419 | 38.4k | return SECSuccess; |
2420 | 38.4k | } |
2421 | | |
2422 | | SECStatus |
2423 | | ssl_ProtectNextRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSLContentType ct, |
2424 | | const PRUint8 *pIn, unsigned int nIn, |
2425 | | unsigned int *written) |
2426 | 38.4k | { |
2427 | 38.4k | sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; |
2428 | 38.4k | unsigned int contentLen; |
2429 | 38.4k | unsigned int spaceNeeded; |
2430 | 38.4k | SECStatus rv; |
2431 | | |
2432 | 38.4k | contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, spec->recordSizeLimit); |
2433 | 38.4k | spaceNeeded = contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE; |
2434 | 38.4k | if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && |
2435 | 38.4k | spec->cipherDef->type == type_block) { |
2436 | 0 | spaceNeeded += spec->cipherDef->iv_size; |
2437 | 0 | } |
2438 | 38.4k | if (spaceNeeded > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) { |
2439 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded); |
2440 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2441 | 0 | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: failed to expand write buffer to %d", |
2442 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded)); |
2443 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2444 | 0 | } |
2445 | 0 | } |
2446 | | |
2447 | 38.4k | rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, spec, ct, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); |
2448 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2449 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2450 | 0 | } |
2451 | 38.4k | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:", |
2452 | 38.4k | SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf))); |
2453 | 38.4k | *written = contentLen; |
2454 | 38.4k | return SECSuccess; |
2455 | 38.4k | } |
2456 | | |
2457 | | /* Process the plain text before sending it. |
2458 | | * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent |
2459 | | * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the |
2460 | | * output (write) buffer. |
2461 | | * Returns -1 on an error. PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR is set if the error is blocking |
2462 | | * and not terminal. |
2463 | | * |
2464 | | * Notes on the use of the private ssl flags: |
2465 | | * (no private SSL flags) |
2466 | | * Attempt to make and send SSL records for all plaintext |
2467 | | * If non-blocking and a send gets WOULD_BLOCK, |
2468 | | * or if the pending (ciphertext) buffer is not empty, |
2469 | | * then buffer remaining bytes of ciphertext into pending buf, |
2470 | | * and continue to do that for all succssive records until all |
2471 | | * bytes are used. |
2472 | | * ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER |
2473 | | * As above, except this suppresses all write attempts, and forces |
2474 | | * all ciphertext into the pending ciphertext buffer. |
2475 | | * ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH (for DTLS) |
2476 | | * Forces the use of the provided epoch |
2477 | | */ |
2478 | | PRInt32 |
2479 | | ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, |
2480 | | ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, /* non-NULL for DTLS retransmits */ |
2481 | | SSLContentType ct, |
2482 | | const PRUint8 *pIn, /* input buffer */ |
2483 | | PRInt32 nIn, /* bytes of input */ |
2484 | | PRInt32 flags) |
2485 | 38.5k | { |
2486 | 38.5k | sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; |
2487 | 38.5k | ssl3CipherSpec *spec; |
2488 | 38.5k | SECStatus rv; |
2489 | 38.5k | PRInt32 totalSent = 0; |
2490 | | |
2491 | 38.5k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d", |
2492 | 38.5k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(ct), |
2493 | 38.5k | nIn)); |
2494 | 38.5k | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn)); |
2495 | | |
2496 | 38.5k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
2497 | 38.5k | PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == 0); |
2498 | | |
2499 | 38.5k | if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) { |
2500 | 26 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Suppress write, fatal alert already sent", |
2501 | 26 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
2502 | 26 | if (ct != ssl_ct_alert) { |
2503 | | /* If we are sending an alert, then we already have an |
2504 | | * error, so don't overwrite. */ |
2505 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILED); |
2506 | 0 | } |
2507 | 26 | return -1; |
2508 | 26 | } |
2509 | | |
2510 | | /* check for Token Presence */ |
2511 | 38.4k | if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { |
2512 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); |
2513 | 0 | return -1; |
2514 | 0 | } |
2515 | | |
2516 | 38.4k | if (ss->recordWriteCallback) { |
2517 | 0 | PRUint16 epoch; |
2518 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); |
2519 | 0 | epoch = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch; |
2520 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); |
2521 | 0 | rv = ss->recordWriteCallback(ss->fd, epoch, ct, pIn, nIn, |
2522 | 0 | ss->recordWriteCallbackArg); |
2523 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2524 | 0 | return -1; |
2525 | 0 | } |
2526 | 0 | return nIn; |
2527 | 0 | } |
2528 | | |
2529 | 38.4k | if (cwSpec) { |
2530 | | /* cwSpec can only be set for retransmissions of the DTLS handshake. */ |
2531 | 31.5k | PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && |
2532 | 31.5k | (ct == ssl_ct_handshake || |
2533 | 31.5k | ct == ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec)); |
2534 | 31.5k | spec = cwSpec; |
2535 | 31.5k | } else { |
2536 | 6.93k | spec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; |
2537 | 6.93k | } |
2538 | | |
2539 | 76.9k | while (nIn > 0) { |
2540 | 38.4k | unsigned int written = 0; |
2541 | 38.4k | PRInt32 sent; |
2542 | | |
2543 | 38.4k | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); |
2544 | 38.4k | rv = ssl_ProtectNextRecord(ss, spec, ct, pIn, nIn, &written); |
2545 | 38.4k | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); |
2546 | 38.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2547 | 0 | goto loser; |
2548 | 0 | } |
2549 | | |
2550 | 38.4k | PORT_Assert(written > 0); |
2551 | | /* DTLS should not fragment non-application data here. */ |
2552 | 38.4k | if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ct != ssl_ct_application_data) { |
2553 | 38.4k | PORT_Assert(written == nIn); |
2554 | 38.4k | } |
2555 | | |
2556 | 38.4k | pIn += written; |
2557 | 38.4k | nIn -= written; |
2558 | 38.4k | PORT_Assert(nIn >= 0); |
2559 | | |
2560 | | /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext, |
2561 | | * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet, |
2562 | | * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved. |
2563 | | */ |
2564 | 38.4k | if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) || |
2565 | 38.4k | (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { |
2566 | | |
2567 | 31.5k | rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), |
2568 | 31.5k | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf)); |
2569 | 31.5k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2570 | | /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ |
2571 | 0 | goto loser; |
2572 | 0 | } |
2573 | | |
2574 | 31.5k | if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { |
2575 | 0 | ss->handshakeBegun = 1; |
2576 | 0 | sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); |
2577 | 0 | if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { |
2578 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); |
2579 | 0 | goto loser; |
2580 | 0 | } |
2581 | 0 | if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { |
2582 | 0 | flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; |
2583 | 0 | } |
2584 | 0 | } |
2585 | 31.5k | } else { |
2586 | 6.93k | PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) > 0); |
2587 | 6.93k | ss->handshakeBegun = 1; |
2588 | 6.93k | sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), |
2589 | 6.93k | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf), |
2590 | 6.93k | flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK); |
2591 | 6.93k | if (sent < 0) { |
2592 | 0 | if (PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { |
2593 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); |
2594 | 0 | goto loser; |
2595 | 0 | } |
2596 | | /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */ |
2597 | 0 | sent = 0; |
2598 | 0 | } |
2599 | 6.93k | if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) > (unsigned int)sent) { |
2600 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
2601 | | /* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */ |
2602 | 0 | PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); |
2603 | 0 | goto loser; |
2604 | 0 | } |
2605 | | /* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and |
2606 | | * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext. |
2607 | | */ |
2608 | 0 | rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf) + sent, |
2609 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) - sent); |
2610 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2611 | | /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ |
2612 | 0 | goto loser; |
2613 | 0 | } |
2614 | 0 | } |
2615 | 6.93k | } |
2616 | 38.4k | wrBuf->len = 0; |
2617 | 38.4k | totalSent += written; |
2618 | 38.4k | } |
2619 | 38.4k | return totalSent; |
2620 | | |
2621 | 0 | loser: |
2622 | | /* Don't leave bits of buffer lying around. */ |
2623 | 0 | wrBuf->len = 0; |
2624 | 0 | return -1; |
2625 | 38.4k | } |
2626 | | |
2627 | 0 | #define SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER 1024 |
2628 | | |
2629 | | /* Attempt to send the content of "in" in an SSL application_data record. |
2630 | | * Returns "len" or -1 on failure. |
2631 | | */ |
2632 | | int |
2633 | | ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, |
2634 | | PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags) |
2635 | 0 | { |
2636 | 0 | PRInt32 totalSent = 0; |
2637 | 0 | PRInt32 discarded = 0; |
2638 | 0 | PRBool splitNeeded = PR_FALSE; |
2639 | |
|
2640 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
2641 | | /* These flags for internal use only */ |
2642 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT)); |
2643 | 0 | if (len < 0 || !in) { |
2644 | 0 | PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); |
2645 | 0 | return -1; |
2646 | 0 | } |
2647 | | |
2648 | 0 | if (ss->pendingBuf.len > SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER && |
2649 | 0 | !ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) { |
2650 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); |
2651 | 0 | PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); |
2652 | 0 | return -1; |
2653 | 0 | } |
2654 | | |
2655 | 0 | if (ss->appDataBuffered && len) { |
2656 | 0 | PORT_Assert(in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)); |
2657 | 0 | if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) { |
2658 | 0 | PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); |
2659 | 0 | return -1; |
2660 | 0 | } |
2661 | 0 | in++; |
2662 | 0 | len--; |
2663 | 0 | discarded = 1; |
2664 | 0 | } |
2665 | | |
2666 | | /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record, as |
2667 | | * explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h. |
2668 | | */ |
2669 | 0 | if (len > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV && |
2670 | 0 | ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && |
2671 | 0 | ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block /* CBC */) { |
2672 | 0 | splitNeeded = PR_TRUE; |
2673 | 0 | } |
2674 | |
|
2675 | 0 | while (len > totalSent) { |
2676 | 0 | PRInt32 sent, toSend; |
2677 | |
|
2678 | 0 | if (totalSent > 0) { |
2679 | | /* |
2680 | | * The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a |
2681 | | * chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in |
2682 | | * the middle of a large application data write. (See |
2683 | | * Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.) |
2684 | | */ |
2685 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
2686 | 0 | PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */ |
2687 | 0 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); |
2688 | 0 | } |
2689 | |
|
2690 | 0 | if (splitNeeded) { |
2691 | 0 | toSend = 1; |
2692 | 0 | splitNeeded = PR_FALSE; |
2693 | 0 | } else { |
2694 | 0 | toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); |
2695 | 0 | } |
2696 | | |
2697 | | /* |
2698 | | * Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require |
2699 | | * its use, as guaranteed by the PORT_Assert above. |
2700 | | */ |
2701 | 0 | sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_application_data, |
2702 | 0 | in + totalSent, toSend, flags); |
2703 | 0 | if (sent < 0) { |
2704 | 0 | if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { |
2705 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); |
2706 | 0 | break; |
2707 | 0 | } |
2708 | 0 | return -1; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ |
2709 | 0 | } |
2710 | 0 | totalSent += sent; |
2711 | 0 | if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { |
2712 | | /* must be a non-blocking socket */ |
2713 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); |
2714 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); |
2715 | 0 | break; |
2716 | 0 | } |
2717 | 0 | } |
2718 | 0 | if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { |
2719 | | /* Must be non-blocking. */ |
2720 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); |
2721 | 0 | if (totalSent > 0) { |
2722 | 0 | ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1]; |
2723 | 0 | } |
2724 | |
|
2725 | 0 | totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1; |
2726 | 0 | if (totalSent <= 0) { |
2727 | 0 | PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); |
2728 | 0 | totalSent = SECFailure; |
2729 | 0 | } |
2730 | 0 | return totalSent; |
2731 | 0 | } |
2732 | 0 | ss->appDataBuffered = 0; |
2733 | 0 | return totalSent + discarded; |
2734 | 0 | } |
2735 | | |
2736 | | /* Attempt to send buffered handshake messages. |
2737 | | * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure. |
2738 | | * |
2739 | | * Depending on whether we are doing DTLS or not, this either calls |
2740 | | * |
2741 | | * - ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages if non-DTLS |
2742 | | * - dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages if DTLS |
2743 | | * |
2744 | | * Called from SSL3_SendAlert(), ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(), |
2745 | | * ssl3_AppendHandshake(), ssl3_SendClientHello(), |
2746 | | * ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(), |
2747 | | * ssl3_SendFinished(), |
2748 | | */ |
2749 | | SECStatus |
2750 | | ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) |
2751 | 13.0k | { |
2752 | 13.0k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
2753 | 13.0k | return dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags); |
2754 | 13.0k | } |
2755 | 0 | return ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags); |
2756 | 13.0k | } |
2757 | | |
2758 | | /* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record. |
2759 | | * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure. |
2760 | | * |
2761 | | * Called from ssl3_FlushHandshake |
2762 | | */ |
2763 | | static SECStatus |
2764 | | ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) |
2765 | 0 | { |
2766 | 0 | static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; |
2767 | 0 | PRInt32 count = -1; |
2768 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
2769 | |
|
2770 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
2771 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
2772 | |
|
2773 | 0 | if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) |
2774 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
2775 | | |
2776 | | /* only these flags are allowed */ |
2777 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!(flags & ~allowedFlags)); |
2778 | 0 | if ((flags & ~allowedFlags) != 0) { |
2779 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
2780 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2781 | 0 | } |
2782 | 0 | count = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_handshake, |
2783 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf, |
2784 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags); |
2785 | 0 | if (count < 0) { |
2786 | 0 | int err = PORT_GetError(); |
2787 | 0 | PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); |
2788 | 0 | if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { |
2789 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
2790 | 0 | } |
2791 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
2792 | 0 | } else if ((unsigned int)count < ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) { |
2793 | | /* short write should never happen */ |
2794 | 0 | PORT_Assert((unsigned int)count >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len); |
2795 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
2796 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
2797 | 0 | } else { |
2798 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
2799 | 0 | } |
2800 | | |
2801 | | /* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */ |
2802 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0; |
2803 | 0 | return rv; |
2804 | 0 | } |
2805 | | |
2806 | | /* |
2807 | | * Called from ssl3_HandleAlert and from ssl3_HandleCertificate when |
2808 | | * the remote client sends a negative response to our certificate request. |
2809 | | * Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth. |
2810 | | * SECSuccess otherwise. |
2811 | | */ |
2812 | | SECStatus |
2813 | | ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss) |
2814 | 3 | { |
2815 | 3 | ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); |
2816 | | |
2817 | | /* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't |
2818 | | * actually look at the certificate it won't know that no |
2819 | | * certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure |
2820 | | * an error. We only do this if we haven't already completed the |
2821 | | * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we |
2822 | | * know the server is paying attention to the certificate. |
2823 | | */ |
2824 | 3 | if ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || |
2825 | 3 | (!ss->firstHsDone && |
2826 | 2 | (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) { |
2827 | 1 | PRFileDesc *lower; |
2828 | | |
2829 | 1 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
2830 | | |
2831 | 1 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
2832 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, certificate_required); |
2833 | 1 | } else { |
2834 | 1 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate); |
2835 | 1 | } |
2836 | | |
2837 | 1 | lower = ss->fd->lower; |
2838 | | #ifdef _WIN32 |
2839 | | lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND); |
2840 | | #else |
2841 | 1 | lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH); |
2842 | 1 | #endif |
2843 | 1 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); |
2844 | 1 | return SECFailure; |
2845 | 1 | } |
2846 | 2 | return SECSuccess; |
2847 | 3 | } |
2848 | | |
2849 | | /************************************************************************ |
2850 | | * Alerts |
2851 | | */ |
2852 | | |
2853 | | /* |
2854 | | ** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks. |
2855 | | ** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <- |
2856 | | ** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <- |
2857 | | ** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord. |
2858 | | ** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord |
2859 | | ** ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <- |
2860 | | ** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <- |
2861 | | ** ssl3_HandleServerHello <- |
2862 | | ** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <- |
2863 | | ** ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <- |
2864 | | ** ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <- |
2865 | | ** ssl3_HandleClientHello <- |
2866 | | ** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <- |
2867 | | ** ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <- |
2868 | | ** ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <- |
2869 | | ** ssl3_HandleCertificate <- |
2870 | | ** ssl3_HandleFinished <- |
2871 | | ** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <- |
2872 | | ** ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage <- |
2873 | | ** ssl3_HandleRecord <- |
2874 | | ** |
2875 | | */ |
2876 | | SECStatus |
2877 | | SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc) |
2878 | 6.96k | { |
2879 | 6.96k | PRUint8 bytes[2]; |
2880 | 6.96k | SECStatus rv; |
2881 | 6.96k | PRBool needHsLock = !ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
2882 | | |
2883 | | /* Check that if I need the HS lock I also need the Xmit lock */ |
2884 | 6.96k | PORT_Assert(!needHsLock || !ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
2885 | | |
2886 | 6.96k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d", |
2887 | 6.96k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); |
2888 | | |
2889 | 6.96k | bytes[0] = level; |
2890 | 6.96k | bytes[1] = desc; |
2891 | | |
2892 | 6.96k | if (needHsLock) { |
2893 | 0 | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
2894 | 0 | } |
2895 | 6.96k | if (level == alert_fatal) { |
2896 | 6.96k | if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { |
2897 | 5.38k | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
2898 | 5.38k | } |
2899 | 6.96k | } |
2900 | | |
2901 | 6.96k | rv = tls13_SetAlertCipherSpec(ss); |
2902 | 6.96k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
2903 | 0 | if (needHsLock) { |
2904 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
2905 | 0 | } |
2906 | 0 | return rv; |
2907 | 0 | } |
2908 | | |
2909 | 6.96k | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); |
2910 | 6.96k | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); |
2911 | 6.96k | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
2912 | 6.96k | PRInt32 sent; |
2913 | 6.96k | sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_alert, bytes, 2, |
2914 | 6.96k | (desc == no_certificate) ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0); |
2915 | 6.96k | rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent; |
2916 | 6.96k | } |
2917 | 6.96k | if (level == alert_fatal) { |
2918 | 6.96k | ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent = PR_TRUE; |
2919 | 6.96k | } |
2920 | 6.96k | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
2921 | 6.96k | if (needHsLock) { |
2922 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
2923 | 0 | } |
2924 | 6.96k | if (rv == SECSuccess && ss->alertSentCallback) { |
2925 | 0 | SSLAlert alert = { level, desc }; |
2926 | 0 | ss->alertSentCallback(ss->fd, ss->alertSentCallbackArg, &alert); |
2927 | 0 | } |
2928 | 6.96k | return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */ |
2929 | 6.96k | } |
2930 | | |
2931 | | /* |
2932 | | * Send illegal_parameter alert. Set generic error number. |
2933 | | */ |
2934 | | static SECStatus |
2935 | | ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss) |
2936 | 0 | { |
2937 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); |
2938 | 0 | PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT |
2939 | 0 | : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); |
2940 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2941 | 0 | } |
2942 | | |
2943 | | /* |
2944 | | * Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number. |
2945 | | */ |
2946 | | static SECStatus |
2947 | | ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss) |
2948 | 0 | { |
2949 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); |
2950 | 0 | PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT |
2951 | 0 | : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); |
2952 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
2953 | 0 | } |
2954 | | |
2955 | | void |
2956 | | ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode errCode) |
2957 | 2 | { |
2958 | 2 | SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate; |
2959 | 2 | PRBool isTLS = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS; |
2960 | | |
2961 | 2 | switch (errCode) { |
2962 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: |
2963 | 0 | desc = unsupported_certificate; |
2964 | 0 | break; |
2965 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: |
2966 | 0 | desc = certificate_expired; |
2967 | 0 | break; |
2968 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: |
2969 | 0 | desc = certificate_revoked; |
2970 | 0 | break; |
2971 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: |
2972 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE: |
2973 | 0 | desc = certificate_unknown; |
2974 | 0 | break; |
2975 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: |
2976 | 0 | desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown; |
2977 | 0 | break; |
2978 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: |
2979 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: |
2980 | 0 | desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown; |
2981 | 0 | break; |
2982 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: |
2983 | 0 | desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired; |
2984 | 0 | break; |
2985 | | |
2986 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE: |
2987 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID: |
2988 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: |
2989 | 1 | case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: |
2990 | 2 | default: |
2991 | 2 | desc = bad_certificate; |
2992 | 2 | break; |
2993 | 2 | } |
2994 | 2 | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d", |
2995 | 2 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode)); |
2996 | | |
2997 | 2 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
2998 | 2 | } |
2999 | | |
3000 | | /* |
3001 | | * Send decode_error alert. Set generic error number. |
3002 | | */ |
3003 | | SECStatus |
3004 | | ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss) |
3005 | 212 | { |
3006 | 212 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, |
3007 | 212 | ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error |
3008 | 212 | : illegal_parameter); |
3009 | 212 | PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT |
3010 | 212 | : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); |
3011 | 212 | return SECFailure; |
3012 | 212 | } |
3013 | | |
3014 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. |
3015 | | ** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. |
3016 | | */ |
3017 | | static SECStatus |
3018 | | ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) |
3019 | 636 | { |
3020 | 636 | SSL3AlertLevel level; |
3021 | 636 | SSL3AlertDescription desc; |
3022 | 636 | int error; |
3023 | | |
3024 | 636 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
3025 | 636 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
3026 | | |
3027 | 636 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
3028 | | |
3029 | 636 | if (buf->len != 2) { |
3030 | 39 | (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
3031 | 39 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT); |
3032 | 39 | return SECFailure; |
3033 | 39 | } |
3034 | 597 | level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0]; |
3035 | 597 | desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1]; |
3036 | 597 | buf->len = 0; |
3037 | 597 | SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d", |
3038 | 597 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); |
3039 | | |
3040 | 597 | if (ss->alertReceivedCallback) { |
3041 | 0 | SSLAlert alert = { level, desc }; |
3042 | 0 | ss->alertReceivedCallback(ss->fd, ss->alertReceivedCallbackArg, &alert); |
3043 | 0 | } |
3044 | | |
3045 | 597 | switch (desc) { |
3046 | 2 | case close_notify: |
3047 | 2 | ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1; |
3048 | 2 | error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT; |
3049 | 2 | break; |
3050 | 22 | case unexpected_message: |
3051 | 22 | error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT; |
3052 | 22 | break; |
3053 | 18 | case bad_record_mac: |
3054 | 18 | error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT; |
3055 | 18 | break; |
3056 | 25 | case decryption_failed_RESERVED: |
3057 | 25 | error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT; |
3058 | 25 | break; |
3059 | 12 | case record_overflow: |
3060 | 12 | error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT; |
3061 | 12 | break; |
3062 | 19 | case decompression_failure: |
3063 | 19 | error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT; |
3064 | 19 | break; |
3065 | 26 | case handshake_failure: |
3066 | 26 | error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT; |
3067 | 26 | break; |
3068 | 24 | case no_certificate: |
3069 | 24 | error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE; |
3070 | 24 | break; |
3071 | 10 | case certificate_required: |
3072 | 10 | error = SSL_ERROR_RX_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED_ALERT; |
3073 | 10 | break; |
3074 | 18 | case bad_certificate: |
3075 | 18 | error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT; |
3076 | 18 | break; |
3077 | 20 | case unsupported_certificate: |
3078 | 20 | error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT; |
3079 | 20 | break; |
3080 | 10 | case certificate_revoked: |
3081 | 10 | error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT; |
3082 | 10 | break; |
3083 | 11 | case certificate_expired: |
3084 | 11 | error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT; |
3085 | 11 | break; |
3086 | 18 | case certificate_unknown: |
3087 | 18 | error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT; |
3088 | 18 | break; |
3089 | 18 | case illegal_parameter: |
3090 | 18 | error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT; |
3091 | 18 | break; |
3092 | 11 | case inappropriate_fallback: |
3093 | 11 | error = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; |
3094 | 11 | break; |
3095 | | |
3096 | | /* All alerts below are TLS only. */ |
3097 | 18 | case unknown_ca: |
3098 | 18 | error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT; |
3099 | 18 | break; |
3100 | 12 | case access_denied: |
3101 | 12 | error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT; |
3102 | 12 | break; |
3103 | 23 | case decode_error: |
3104 | 23 | error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT; |
3105 | 23 | break; |
3106 | 18 | case decrypt_error: |
3107 | 18 | error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT; |
3108 | 18 | break; |
3109 | 19 | case export_restriction: |
3110 | 19 | error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT; |
3111 | 19 | break; |
3112 | 18 | case protocol_version: |
3113 | 18 | error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT; |
3114 | 18 | break; |
3115 | 10 | case insufficient_security: |
3116 | 10 | error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT; |
3117 | 10 | break; |
3118 | 21 | case internal_error: |
3119 | 21 | error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; |
3120 | 21 | break; |
3121 | 19 | case user_canceled: |
3122 | 19 | error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT; |
3123 | 19 | break; |
3124 | 20 | case no_renegotiation: |
3125 | 20 | error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT; |
3126 | 20 | break; |
3127 | | |
3128 | | /* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */ |
3129 | 18 | case missing_extension: |
3130 | 18 | error = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENSION_ALERT; |
3131 | 18 | break; |
3132 | 23 | case unsupported_extension: |
3133 | 23 | error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT; |
3134 | 23 | break; |
3135 | 20 | case certificate_unobtainable: |
3136 | 20 | error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT; |
3137 | 20 | break; |
3138 | 19 | case unrecognized_name: |
3139 | 19 | error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; |
3140 | 19 | break; |
3141 | 11 | case bad_certificate_status_response: |
3142 | 11 | error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT; |
3143 | 11 | break; |
3144 | 18 | case bad_certificate_hash_value: |
3145 | 18 | error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT; |
3146 | 18 | break; |
3147 | 10 | case no_application_protocol: |
3148 | 10 | error = SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL; |
3149 | 10 | break; |
3150 | 10 | case ech_required: |
3151 | 10 | error = SSL_ERROR_ECH_REQUIRED_ALERT; |
3152 | 10 | break; |
3153 | 26 | default: |
3154 | 26 | error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT; |
3155 | 26 | break; |
3156 | 597 | } |
3157 | 597 | if ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) && |
3158 | 597 | (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello)) { |
3159 | | /* TLS 1.3 requires all but "end of data" alerts to be |
3160 | | * treated as fatal. */ |
3161 | 0 | switch (desc) { |
3162 | 0 | case close_notify: |
3163 | 0 | case user_canceled: |
3164 | 0 | break; |
3165 | 0 | default: |
3166 | 0 | level = alert_fatal; |
3167 | 0 | } |
3168 | 0 | } |
3169 | 597 | if (level == alert_fatal) { |
3170 | 14 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
3171 | 14 | if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) && |
3172 | 14 | (desc == handshake_failure)) { |
3173 | | /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure |
3174 | | * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers. |
3175 | | */ |
3176 | 0 | error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; |
3177 | 0 | } |
3178 | 14 | PORT_SetError(error); |
3179 | 14 | return SECFailure; |
3180 | 14 | } |
3181 | 583 | if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) { |
3182 | | /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ |
3183 | 3 | SECStatus rv; |
3184 | | |
3185 | 3 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); |
3186 | 3 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; |
3187 | 3 | rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); |
3188 | 3 | return rv; |
3189 | 3 | } |
3190 | 580 | return SECSuccess; |
3191 | 583 | } |
3192 | | |
3193 | | /* |
3194 | | * Change Cipher Specs |
3195 | | * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone, |
3196 | | * ssl3_HandleClientHello, |
3197 | | * and ssl3_HandleFinished |
3198 | | * |
3199 | | * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current |
3200 | | * and pending write spec pointers. |
3201 | | */ |
3202 | | |
3203 | | SECStatus |
3204 | | ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(sslSocket *ss) |
3205 | 0 | { |
3206 | 0 | PRUint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice; |
3207 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
3208 | |
|
3209 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record", |
3210 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
3211 | |
|
3212 | 0 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); |
3213 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
3214 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ |
3215 | 0 | } |
3216 | | |
3217 | 0 | if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
3218 | 0 | PRInt32 sent; |
3219 | 0 | sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec, |
3220 | 0 | &change, 1, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); |
3221 | 0 | if (sent < 0) { |
3222 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ |
3223 | 0 | } |
3224 | 0 | } else { |
3225 | 0 | rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1); |
3226 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
3227 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3228 | 0 | } |
3229 | 0 | } |
3230 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
3231 | 0 | } |
3232 | | |
3233 | | static SECStatus |
3234 | | ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) |
3235 | 0 | { |
3236 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
3237 | |
|
3238 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
3239 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
3240 | |
|
3241 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); |
3242 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
3243 | 0 | return rv; /* Error code set. */ |
3244 | 0 | } |
3245 | | |
3246 | | /* swap the pending and current write specs. */ |
3247 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ |
3248 | |
|
3249 | 0 | ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
3250 | 0 | ss->ssl3.cwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; |
3251 | 0 | ss->ssl3.pwSpec = NULL; |
3252 | |
|
3253 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending", |
3254 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
3255 | | |
3256 | | /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final |
3257 | | * message got lost */ |
3258 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch) { |
3259 | 0 | rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss); |
3260 | 0 | } |
3261 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ |
3262 | |
|
3263 | 0 | return rv; |
3264 | 0 | } |
3265 | | |
3266 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. |
3267 | | ** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. |
3268 | | * |
3269 | | * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current |
3270 | | * and pending write spec pointers. |
3271 | | */ |
3272 | | static SECStatus |
3273 | | ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) |
3274 | 94 | { |
3275 | 94 | SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; |
3276 | 94 | SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change; |
3277 | | |
3278 | 94 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
3279 | 94 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
3280 | | |
3281 | 94 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record", |
3282 | 94 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
3283 | | |
3284 | | /* For DTLS: Ignore this if we aren't expecting it. Don't kill a connection |
3285 | | * as a result of receiving trash. |
3286 | | * For TLS: Maybe ignore, but only after checking format. */ |
3287 | 94 | if (ws != wait_change_cipher && IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
3288 | | /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */ |
3289 | 90 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order " |
3290 | 90 | "DTLS change_cipher_spec", |
3291 | 90 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
3292 | 90 | buf->len = 0; |
3293 | 90 | return SECSuccess; |
3294 | 90 | } |
3295 | | |
3296 | | /* Handshake messages should not span ChangeCipherSpec. */ |
3297 | 4 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes) { |
3298 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
3299 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
3300 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3301 | 0 | } |
3302 | 4 | if (buf->len != 1) { |
3303 | 0 | (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
3304 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
3305 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3306 | 0 | } |
3307 | 4 | change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0]; |
3308 | 4 | if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) { |
3309 | | /* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */ |
3310 | 0 | (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); |
3311 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
3312 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3313 | 0 | } |
3314 | | |
3315 | 4 | buf->len = 0; |
3316 | 4 | if (ws != wait_change_cipher) { |
3317 | | /* Ignore a CCS for TLS 1.3. This only happens if the server sends a |
3318 | | * HelloRetryRequest. In other cases, the CCS will fail decryption and |
3319 | | * will be discarded by ssl3_HandleRecord(). */ |
3320 | 0 | if (ws == wait_server_hello && |
3321 | 0 | ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
3322 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
3323 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); |
3324 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
3325 | 0 | } |
3326 | | /* Note: For a server, we can't test ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry or |
3327 | | * ss->version because the server might be stateless (and so it won't |
3328 | | * have set either value yet). Set a flag so that at least we will |
3329 | | * guarantee that the server will treat any ClientHello properly. */ |
3330 | 0 | if (ws == wait_client_hello && |
3331 | 0 | ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
3332 | 0 | !ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs) { |
3333 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); |
3334 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs = PR_TRUE; |
3335 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
3336 | 0 | } |
3337 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
3338 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
3339 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3340 | 0 | } |
3341 | | |
3342 | 4 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending", |
3343 | 4 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
3344 | 4 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ |
3345 | 4 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec); |
3346 | 4 | ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.crSpec); |
3347 | 4 | ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; |
3348 | 4 | ss->ssl3.prSpec = NULL; |
3349 | 4 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ |
3350 | | |
3351 | 4 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished; |
3352 | 4 | return SECSuccess; |
3353 | 4 | } |
3354 | | |
3355 | | static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE |
3356 | | ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash) |
3357 | 174 | { |
3358 | 174 | switch (hash) { |
3359 | 54 | case ssl_hash_sha256: |
3360 | 54 | return CKG_MGF1_SHA256; |
3361 | 60 | case ssl_hash_sha384: |
3362 | 60 | return CKG_MGF1_SHA384; |
3363 | 60 | case ssl_hash_sha512: |
3364 | 60 | return CKG_MGF1_SHA512; |
3365 | 0 | default: |
3366 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
3367 | 174 | } |
3368 | 0 | return CKG_MGF1_SHA256; |
3369 | 174 | } |
3370 | | |
3371 | | /* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */ |
3372 | | static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE |
3373 | | ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType) |
3374 | 206 | { |
3375 | 206 | switch (hashType) { |
3376 | 60 | case ssl_hash_sha512: |
3377 | 60 | return CKM_SHA512; |
3378 | 66 | case ssl_hash_sha384: |
3379 | 66 | return CKM_SHA384; |
3380 | 75 | case ssl_hash_sha256: |
3381 | 80 | case ssl_hash_none: |
3382 | | /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ |
3383 | 80 | return CKM_SHA256; |
3384 | 0 | case ssl_hash_sha1: |
3385 | 0 | return CKM_SHA_1; |
3386 | 0 | default: |
3387 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
3388 | 206 | } |
3389 | 0 | return CKM_SHA256; |
3390 | 206 | } |
3391 | | |
3392 | | /* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */ |
3393 | | static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE |
3394 | | ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(sslSocket *ss) |
3395 | 32 | { |
3396 | 32 | return ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash); |
3397 | 32 | } |
3398 | | |
3399 | | static SSLHashType |
3400 | | ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(sslSocket *ss) |
3401 | 2 | { |
3402 | | /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ |
3403 | 2 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash == ssl_hash_none) { |
3404 | 0 | return ssl_hash_sha256; |
3405 | 0 | } |
3406 | 2 | return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash; |
3407 | 2 | } |
3408 | | |
3409 | | /* This method completes the derivation of the MS from the PMS. |
3410 | | ** |
3411 | | ** 1. Derive the MS, if possible, else return an error. |
3412 | | ** |
3413 | | ** 2. Check the version if |pms_version| is non-zero and if wrong, |
3414 | | ** return an error. |
3415 | | ** |
3416 | | ** 3. If |msp| is nonzero, return MS in |*msp|. |
3417 | | |
3418 | | ** Called from: |
3419 | | ** ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt |
3420 | | ** tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt |
3421 | | */ |
3422 | | static SECStatus |
3423 | | ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(sslSocket *ss, |
3424 | | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive, |
3425 | | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive, |
3426 | | CK_VERSION *pms_version, |
3427 | | SECItem *params, CK_FLAGS keyFlags, |
3428 | | PK11SymKey *pms, PK11SymKey **msp) |
3429 | 17 | { |
3430 | 17 | PK11SymKey *ms = NULL; |
3431 | | |
3432 | 17 | ms = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(pms, master_derive, |
3433 | 17 | params, key_derive, |
3434 | 17 | CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags); |
3435 | 17 | if (!ms) { |
3436 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); |
3437 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3438 | 0 | } |
3439 | | |
3440 | 17 | if (pms_version && ss->opt.detectRollBack) { |
3441 | 4 | SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version; |
3442 | 4 | client_version = pms_version->major << 8 | pms_version->minor; |
3443 | | |
3444 | 4 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
3445 | 4 | client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version); |
3446 | 4 | } |
3447 | | |
3448 | 4 | if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) { |
3449 | | /* Destroy MS. Version roll-back detected. */ |
3450 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ms); |
3451 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); |
3452 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3453 | 0 | } |
3454 | 4 | } |
3455 | | |
3456 | 17 | if (msp) { |
3457 | 15 | *msp = ms; |
3458 | 15 | } else { |
3459 | 2 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ms); |
3460 | 2 | } |
3461 | | |
3462 | 17 | return SECSuccess; |
3463 | 17 | } |
3464 | | |
3465 | | /* Compute the ordinary (pre draft-ietf-tls-session-hash) master |
3466 | | ** secret and return it in |*msp|. |
3467 | | ** |
3468 | | ** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret |
3469 | | */ |
3470 | | static SECStatus |
3471 | | ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, |
3472 | | PK11SymKey **msp) |
3473 | 15 | { |
3474 | 15 | PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
3475 | 15 | PRBool isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); |
3476 | | /* |
3477 | | * Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH |
3478 | | * which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size |
3479 | | * data into a 48-byte value, and does not expect to return the version. |
3480 | | */ |
3481 | 15 | PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) || |
3482 | 15 | (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh) || |
3483 | 15 | (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid)); |
3484 | 15 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; |
3485 | 15 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; |
3486 | 15 | SECItem params; |
3487 | 15 | CK_FLAGS keyFlags; |
3488 | 15 | CK_VERSION pms_version; |
3489 | 15 | CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL; |
3490 | | /* master_params may be used as a CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS */ |
3491 | 15 | CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params; |
3492 | 15 | unsigned int master_params_len; |
3493 | | |
3494 | 15 | if (isTLS12) { |
3495 | 15 | if (isDH) |
3496 | 11 | master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; |
3497 | 4 | else |
3498 | 4 | master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; |
3499 | 15 | key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; |
3500 | 15 | keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; |
3501 | 15 | } else if (isTLS) { |
3502 | 0 | if (isDH) |
3503 | 0 | master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; |
3504 | 0 | else |
3505 | 0 | master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; |
3506 | 0 | key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; |
3507 | 0 | keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; |
3508 | 0 | } else { |
3509 | 0 | if (isDH) |
3510 | 0 | master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; |
3511 | 0 | else |
3512 | 0 | master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; |
3513 | 0 | key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; |
3514 | 0 | keyFlags = 0; |
3515 | 0 | } |
3516 | | |
3517 | 15 | if (!isDH) { |
3518 | 4 | pms_version_ptr = &pms_version; |
3519 | 4 | } |
3520 | | |
3521 | 15 | master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; |
3522 | 15 | master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; |
3523 | 15 | master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; |
3524 | 15 | master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; |
3525 | 15 | master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; |
3526 | 15 | if (isTLS12) { |
3527 | 15 | master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); |
3528 | 15 | master_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS); |
3529 | 15 | } else { |
3530 | | /* prfHashMechanism is not relevant with this PRF */ |
3531 | 0 | master_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS); |
3532 | 0 | } |
3533 | | |
3534 | 15 | params.data = (unsigned char *)&master_params; |
3535 | 15 | params.len = master_params_len; |
3536 | | |
3537 | 15 | return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive, |
3538 | 15 | pms_version_ptr, ¶ms, |
3539 | 15 | keyFlags, pms, msp); |
3540 | 15 | } |
3541 | | |
3542 | | /* Compute the draft-ietf-tls-session-hash master |
3543 | | ** secret and return it in |*msp|. |
3544 | | ** |
3545 | | ** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret |
3546 | | */ |
3547 | | static SECStatus |
3548 | | tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, |
3549 | | PK11SymKey **msp) |
3550 | 2 | { |
3551 | 2 | ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; |
3552 | 2 | CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS extended_master_params; |
3553 | 2 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
3554 | | /* |
3555 | | * Determine whether to use the DH/ECDH or RSA derivation modes. |
3556 | | */ |
3557 | | /* |
3558 | | * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Verify that the slot can handle this key expansion |
3559 | | * mode. Bug 1198298 */ |
3560 | 2 | PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) || |
3561 | 2 | (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh) || |
3562 | 2 | (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid)); |
3563 | 2 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; |
3564 | 2 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; |
3565 | 2 | SECItem params; |
3566 | 2 | const CK_FLAGS keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; |
3567 | 2 | CK_VERSION pms_version; |
3568 | 2 | CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL; |
3569 | 2 | SECStatus rv; |
3570 | | |
3571 | 2 | rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, pwSpec, &hashes, 0); |
3572 | 2 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
3573 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */ |
3574 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); |
3575 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3576 | 0 | } |
3577 | | |
3578 | 2 | if (isDH) { |
3579 | 2 | master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; |
3580 | 2 | } else { |
3581 | 0 | master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; |
3582 | 0 | pms_version_ptr = &pms_version; |
3583 | 0 | } |
3584 | | |
3585 | 2 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
3586 | | /* TLS 1.2+ */ |
3587 | 2 | extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); |
3588 | 2 | key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; |
3589 | 2 | } else { |
3590 | | /* TLS < 1.2 */ |
3591 | 0 | extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF; |
3592 | 0 | key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; |
3593 | 0 | } |
3594 | | |
3595 | 2 | extended_master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; |
3596 | 2 | extended_master_params.pSessionHash = hashes.u.raw; |
3597 | 2 | extended_master_params.ulSessionHashLen = hashes.len; |
3598 | | |
3599 | 2 | params.data = (unsigned char *)&extended_master_params; |
3600 | 2 | params.len = sizeof extended_master_params; |
3601 | | |
3602 | 2 | return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive, |
3603 | 2 | pms_version_ptr, ¶ms, |
3604 | 2 | keyFlags, pms, msp); |
3605 | 2 | } |
3606 | | |
3607 | | /* Wrapper method to compute the master secret and return it in |*msp|. |
3608 | | ** |
3609 | | ** Called from ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret |
3610 | | */ |
3611 | | static SECStatus |
3612 | | ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, |
3613 | | PK11SymKey **msp) |
3614 | 17 | { |
3615 | 17 | PORT_Assert(pms != NULL); |
3616 | 17 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
3617 | | |
3618 | 17 | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { |
3619 | 2 | return tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp); |
3620 | 15 | } else { |
3621 | 15 | return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp); |
3622 | 15 | } |
3623 | 17 | } |
3624 | | |
3625 | | /* |
3626 | | * Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret |
3627 | | * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure. |
3628 | | * |
3629 | | * Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(), |
3630 | | * which in turn is called from |
3631 | | * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) |
3632 | | * ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) |
3633 | | * ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) |
3634 | | * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) |
3635 | | * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) |
3636 | | * Caller MUST hold the specWriteLock, and SSL3HandshakeLock. |
3637 | | * ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec does that. |
3638 | | * |
3639 | | */ |
3640 | | static SECStatus |
3641 | | ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *masterSecret) |
3642 | 15 | { |
3643 | 15 | ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; |
3644 | 15 | ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; |
3645 | 15 | ssl3CipherSpec *clientSpec; |
3646 | 15 | ssl3CipherSpec *serverSpec; |
3647 | 15 | PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
3648 | 15 | PRBool isTLS12 = |
3649 | 15 | (PRBool)(isTLS && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); |
3650 | 15 | const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipherDef; |
3651 | 15 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; |
3652 | 15 | PK11SymKey *derivedKeyHandle = NULL; |
3653 | 15 | void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; |
3654 | 15 | int keySize; |
3655 | 15 | CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params; /* may be used as a |
3656 | | * CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS */ |
3657 | 15 | unsigned int key_material_params_len; |
3658 | 15 | CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys; |
3659 | 15 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; |
3660 | 15 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism; |
3661 | 15 | SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; |
3662 | 15 | SECItem params; |
3663 | 15 | PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null); |
3664 | | |
3665 | 15 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
3666 | 15 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); |
3667 | 15 | PORT_Assert(masterSecret); |
3668 | | |
3669 | | /* These functions operate in terms of who is writing specs. */ |
3670 | 15 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
3671 | 15 | clientSpec = prSpec; |
3672 | 15 | serverSpec = pwSpec; |
3673 | 15 | } else { |
3674 | 0 | clientSpec = pwSpec; |
3675 | 0 | serverSpec = prSpec; |
3676 | 0 | } |
3677 | | |
3678 | | /* |
3679 | | * generate the key material |
3680 | | */ |
3681 | 15 | if (cipher_def->type == type_block && |
3682 | 15 | ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { |
3683 | | /* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */ |
3684 | 4 | key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; |
3685 | 4 | PORT_Memset(clientSpec->keyMaterial.iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); |
3686 | 4 | PORT_Memset(serverSpec->keyMaterial.iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); |
3687 | 4 | } |
3688 | | |
3689 | 15 | key_material_params.bIsExport = PR_FALSE; |
3690 | 15 | key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; |
3691 | 15 | key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; |
3692 | 15 | key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; |
3693 | 15 | key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; |
3694 | 15 | key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys; |
3695 | | |
3696 | 15 | if (skipKeysAndIVs) { |
3697 | 0 | keySize = 0; |
3698 | 0 | returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL; |
3699 | 0 | returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL; |
3700 | 0 | key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0; |
3701 | 0 | key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; |
3702 | 15 | } else { |
3703 | 15 | keySize = cipher_def->key_size; |
3704 | 15 | returnedKeys.pIVClient = clientSpec->keyMaterial.iv; |
3705 | 15 | returnedKeys.pIVServer = serverSpec->keyMaterial.iv; |
3706 | 15 | key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB; |
3707 | 15 | key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB; |
3708 | 15 | } |
3709 | 15 | key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->macDef->mac_size * BPB; |
3710 | | |
3711 | 15 | calg = cipher_def->calg; |
3712 | 15 | bulk_mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); |
3713 | | |
3714 | 15 | if (isTLS12) { |
3715 | 15 | key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; |
3716 | 15 | key_material_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); |
3717 | 15 | key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); |
3718 | 15 | } else if (isTLS) { |
3719 | 0 | key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; |
3720 | 0 | key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); |
3721 | 0 | } else { |
3722 | 0 | key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; |
3723 | 0 | key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); |
3724 | 0 | } |
3725 | | |
3726 | 15 | params.data = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params; |
3727 | 15 | params.len = key_material_params_len; |
3728 | | |
3729 | | /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and |
3730 | | * DERIVE by DEFAULT */ |
3731 | 15 | derivedKeyHandle = PK11_Derive(masterSecret, key_derive, ¶ms, |
3732 | 15 | bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize); |
3733 | 15 | if (!derivedKeyHandle) { |
3734 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); |
3735 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3736 | 0 | } |
3737 | | /* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we |
3738 | | * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both |
3739 | | * mac's map to the same keytype. |
3740 | | */ |
3741 | 15 | slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(derivedKeyHandle); |
3742 | | |
3743 | 15 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */ |
3744 | 15 | clientSpec->keyMaterial.macKey = |
3745 | 15 | PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, |
3746 | 15 | CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, |
3747 | 15 | PR_TRUE, pwArg); |
3748 | 15 | if (clientSpec->keyMaterial.macKey == NULL) { |
3749 | 0 | goto loser; /* loser sets err */ |
3750 | 0 | } |
3751 | 15 | serverSpec->keyMaterial.macKey = |
3752 | 15 | PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, |
3753 | 15 | CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, |
3754 | 15 | PR_TRUE, pwArg); |
3755 | 15 | if (serverSpec->keyMaterial.macKey == NULL) { |
3756 | 0 | goto loser; /* loser sets err */ |
3757 | 0 | } |
3758 | 15 | if (!skipKeysAndIVs) { |
3759 | 15 | clientSpec->keyMaterial.key = |
3760 | 15 | PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, |
3761 | 15 | bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, |
3762 | 15 | PR_TRUE, pwArg); |
3763 | 15 | if (clientSpec->keyMaterial.key == NULL) { |
3764 | 0 | goto loser; /* loser sets err */ |
3765 | 0 | } |
3766 | 15 | serverSpec->keyMaterial.key = |
3767 | 15 | PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, |
3768 | 15 | bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, |
3769 | 15 | PR_TRUE, pwArg); |
3770 | 15 | if (serverSpec->keyMaterial.key == NULL) { |
3771 | 0 | goto loser; /* loser sets err */ |
3772 | 0 | } |
3773 | 15 | } |
3774 | 15 | PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedKeyHandle); |
3775 | 15 | return SECSuccess; |
3776 | | |
3777 | 0 | loser: |
3778 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedKeyHandle); |
3779 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); |
3780 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3781 | 15 | } |
3782 | | |
3783 | | void |
3784 | | ssl3_CoalesceEchHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) |
3785 | 0 | { |
3786 | | /* |sha| contains the CHOuter transcript, which is the singular |
3787 | | * transcript if not doing ECH. If the server responded with 1.2, |
3788 | | * contexts are not yet initialized. */ |
3789 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { |
3790 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { |
3791 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner); |
3792 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); |
3793 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.sha = ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner; |
3794 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = NULL; |
3795 | 0 | } |
3796 | 0 | } else { |
3797 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) { |
3798 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, PR_TRUE); |
3799 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = NULL; |
3800 | 0 | } |
3801 | 0 | } |
3802 | 0 | } |
3803 | | |
3804 | | /* ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes creates handshake hash contexts and hashes in |
3805 | | * buffered messages in ss->ssl3.hs.messages. Called from |
3806 | | * ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(), tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(), |
3807 | | * and ssl3_HandleServerHello. */ |
3808 | | SECStatus |
3809 | | ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) |
3810 | 6.06k | { |
3811 | 6.06k | SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
3812 | | |
3813 | 6.06k | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown); |
3814 | 6.06k | if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
3815 | 6.06k | ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_record; |
3816 | 6.06k | } else { |
3817 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.md5 && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha); |
3818 | | /* |
3819 | | * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these |
3820 | | * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots |
3821 | | * that the master secret will wind up in ... |
3822 | | */ |
3823 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
3824 | | /* determine the hash from the prf */ |
3825 | 0 | const SECOidData *hash_oid = |
3826 | 0 | SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss)); |
3827 | | |
3828 | | /* Get the PKCS #11 mechanism for the Hash from the cipher suite (prf_hash) |
3829 | | * Convert that to the OidTag. We can then use that OidTag to create our |
3830 | | * PK11Context */ |
3831 | 0 | PORT_Assert(hash_oid != NULL); |
3832 | 0 | if (hash_oid == NULL) { |
3833 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3834 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3835 | 0 | } |
3836 | | |
3837 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset); |
3838 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { |
3839 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3840 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3841 | 0 | } |
3842 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single; |
3843 | 0 | if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { |
3844 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3845 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3846 | 0 | } |
3847 | | |
3848 | | /* Transcript hash used on ECH client. */ |
3849 | 0 | if (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { |
3850 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset); |
3851 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner == NULL) { |
3852 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3853 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3854 | 0 | } |
3855 | 0 | if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) != SECSuccess) { |
3856 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3857 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3858 | 0 | } |
3859 | 0 | } |
3860 | 0 | } else { |
3861 | | /* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or |
3862 | | * created successfully. */ |
3863 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); |
3864 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5 == NULL) { |
3865 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3866 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3867 | 0 | } |
3868 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); |
3869 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { |
3870 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); |
3871 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; |
3872 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3873 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3874 | 0 | } |
3875 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo; |
3876 | |
|
3877 | 0 | if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5) != SECSuccess) { |
3878 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3879 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3880 | 0 | } |
3881 | 0 | if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { |
3882 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3883 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3884 | 0 | } |
3885 | 0 | } |
3886 | 0 | } |
3887 | | |
3888 | 6.06k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record && |
3889 | 6.06k | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > 0) { |
3890 | | /* When doing ECH, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes will store outer messages |
3891 | | * into the both the outer and inner transcripts. |
3892 | | * ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes uses the default context which is |
3893 | | * the outer when doing client ECH. For ECH shared-mode or backend |
3894 | | * servers only the hs.messages buffer is used. */ |
3895 | 0 | if (ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, |
3896 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) != SECSuccess) { |
3897 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3898 | 0 | } |
3899 | | /* When doing ECH, deriving the accept_confirmation value requires all |
3900 | | * messages up to and including the ServerHello |
3901 | | * (see draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7.2). |
3902 | | * |
3903 | | * Don't free the transcript buffer until confirmation calculation. */ |
3904 | 0 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) { |
3905 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); |
3906 | 0 | } |
3907 | 0 | } |
3908 | 6.06k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner && |
3909 | 6.06k | ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len > 0) { |
3910 | 0 | if (PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.buf, |
3911 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len) != SECSuccess) { |
3912 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
3913 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3914 | 0 | } |
3915 | 0 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { |
3916 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); |
3917 | 0 | } |
3918 | 0 | } |
3919 | | |
3920 | 6.06k | return SECSuccess; |
3921 | 6.06k | } |
3922 | | |
3923 | | void |
3924 | | ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) |
3925 | 7.50k | { |
3926 | 7.50k | SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes", |
3927 | 7.50k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
3928 | 7.50k | ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_unknown; |
3929 | 7.50k | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0; |
3930 | 7.50k | ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len = 0; |
3931 | 7.50k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) { |
3932 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); |
3933 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; |
3934 | 0 | } |
3935 | 7.50k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { |
3936 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); |
3937 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL; |
3938 | 0 | } |
3939 | 7.50k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) { |
3940 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, PR_TRUE); |
3941 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = NULL; |
3942 | 0 | } |
3943 | 7.50k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake) { |
3944 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE); |
3945 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = NULL; |
3946 | 0 | } |
3947 | 7.50k | } |
3948 | | |
3949 | | /* Add the provided bytes to the handshake hash context. When doing |
3950 | | * TLS 1.3 ECH, |target| may be provided to specify only the inner/outer |
3951 | | * transcript, else the input is added to both contexts. This happens |
3952 | | * only on the client. On the server, only the default context is used. */ |
3953 | | SECStatus |
3954 | | ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, |
3955 | | unsigned int l, sslBuffer *target) |
3956 | 238k | { |
3957 | | |
3958 | 238k | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
3959 | 238k | PRBool explicit = (target != NULL); |
3960 | 238k | PRBool appendToEchInner = !ss->sec.isServer && |
3961 | 238k | ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && |
3962 | 238k | !explicit; |
3963 | 238k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
3964 | 238k | PORT_Assert(target != &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages || |
3965 | 238k | !ss->sec.isServer); |
3966 | | |
3967 | 238k | if (target == NULL) { |
3968 | | /* Default context. */ |
3969 | 238k | target = &ss->ssl3.hs.messages; |
3970 | 238k | } |
3971 | | /* With TLS 1.3, and versions TLS.1.1 and older, we keep the hash(es) |
3972 | | * always up to date. However, we must initially buffer the handshake |
3973 | | * messages, until we know what to do. |
3974 | | * If ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_unknown, |
3975 | | * it means we know what to do. We calculate (hash our input), |
3976 | | * and we stop appending to the buffer. |
3977 | | * |
3978 | | * With TLS 1.2, we always append all handshake messages, |
3979 | | * and never update the hash, because the hash function we must use for |
3980 | | * certificate_verify might be different from the hash function we use |
3981 | | * when signing other handshake hashes. */ |
3982 | 238k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown || |
3983 | 238k | ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { |
3984 | 238k | rv = sslBuffer_Append(target, b, l); |
3985 | 238k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
3986 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
3987 | 0 | } |
3988 | 238k | if (appendToEchInner) { |
3989 | 0 | return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages, b, l); |
3990 | 0 | } |
3991 | 238k | return SECSuccess; |
3992 | 238k | } |
3993 | | |
3994 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(90, (ss, "handshake hash input:", b, l)); |
3995 | |
|
3996 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { |
3997 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); |
3998 | 0 | if (target == &ss->ssl3.hs.messages) { |
3999 | 0 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); |
4000 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4001 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4002 | 0 | return rv; |
4003 | 0 | } |
4004 | 0 | } |
4005 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner && |
4006 | 0 | (target == &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages || !explicit)) { |
4007 | 0 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, b, l); |
4008 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4009 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4010 | 0 | return rv; |
4011 | 0 | } |
4012 | 0 | } |
4013 | 0 | } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_combo) { |
4014 | 0 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l); |
4015 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4016 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4017 | 0 | return rv; |
4018 | 0 | } |
4019 | 0 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); |
4020 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4021 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4022 | 0 | return rv; |
4023 | 0 | } |
4024 | 0 | } |
4025 | 0 | return rv; |
4026 | 0 | } |
4027 | | |
4028 | | static SECStatus |
4029 | | ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, |
4030 | | unsigned int l) |
4031 | 0 | { |
4032 | 0 | return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, b, l, |
4033 | 0 | &ss->ssl3.hs.messages); |
4034 | 0 | } |
4035 | | |
4036 | | static SECStatus |
4037 | | ssl3_UpdateInnerHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, |
4038 | | unsigned int l) |
4039 | 0 | { |
4040 | 0 | return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, b, l, |
4041 | 0 | &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); |
4042 | 0 | } |
4043 | | |
4044 | | /* |
4045 | | * Handshake messages |
4046 | | */ |
4047 | | /* Called from ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes() |
4048 | | ** ssl3_AppendHandshake() |
4049 | | ** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() |
4050 | | ** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() |
4051 | | ** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock. |
4052 | | */ |
4053 | | SECStatus |
4054 | | ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l) |
4055 | 238k | { |
4056 | 238k | return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, b, l, NULL); |
4057 | 238k | } |
4058 | | |
4059 | | SECStatus |
4060 | | ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l) |
4061 | 0 | { |
4062 | 0 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
4063 | |
|
4064 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
4065 | |
|
4066 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(90, (ss, "post handshake hash input:", b, l)); |
4067 | |
|
4068 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single); |
4069 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); |
4070 | 0 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, b, l); |
4071 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4072 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4073 | 0 | } |
4074 | 0 | return rv; |
4075 | 0 | } |
4076 | | |
4077 | | /* The next two functions serve to append the handshake header. |
4078 | | The first one additionally writes to seqNumberBuffer |
4079 | | the sequence number of the message we are generating. |
4080 | | This function is used when generating the keyUpdate message in dtls13_enqueueKeyUpdateMessage. |
4081 | | */ |
4082 | | SECStatus |
4083 | | ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeaderAndStashSeqNum(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType t, PRUint32 length, PRUint64 *sendMessageSeqOut) |
4084 | 26.6k | { |
4085 | 26.6k | PORT_Assert(t != ssl_hs_client_hello); |
4086 | 26.6k | SECStatus rv; |
4087 | | |
4088 | | /* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it. |
4089 | | * This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call |
4090 | | * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary. |
4091 | | */ |
4092 | 26.6k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
4093 | 26.6k | rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); |
4094 | 26.6k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4095 | 0 | return rv; |
4096 | 0 | } |
4097 | 26.6k | } |
4098 | | |
4099 | 26.6k | SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s", |
4100 | 26.6k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t))); |
4101 | | |
4102 | 26.6k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1); |
4103 | 26.6k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4104 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ |
4105 | 0 | } |
4106 | 26.6k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); |
4107 | 26.6k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4108 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ |
4109 | 0 | } |
4110 | | |
4111 | 26.6k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
4112 | | /* RFC 9147. 5.2. DTLS Handshake Message Format. |
4113 | | * In DTLS 1.3, the message transcript is computed over the original TLS |
4114 | | * 1.3-style Handshake messages without the message_seq, |
4115 | | * fragment_offset, and fragment_length values. Note that this is a |
4116 | | * change from DTLS 1.2 where those values were included in the transcript. */ |
4117 | 26.6k | PRBool suppressHash = ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE; |
4118 | | |
4119 | | /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the |
4120 | | * transmission code, if necessary */ |
4121 | 26.6k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumberSuppressHash(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2, suppressHash); |
4122 | 26.6k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4123 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ |
4124 | 0 | } |
4125 | | /* In case if we provide a buffer for the sequence message, |
4126 | | we write down sendMessageSeq to the buffer. */ |
4127 | 26.6k | if (sendMessageSeqOut != NULL) { |
4128 | 0 | *sendMessageSeqOut = ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq; |
4129 | 0 | } |
4130 | 26.6k | ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++; |
4131 | | |
4132 | | /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */ |
4133 | 26.6k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumberSuppressHash(ss, 0, 3, suppressHash); |
4134 | 26.6k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4135 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ |
4136 | 0 | } |
4137 | | |
4138 | | /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */ |
4139 | 26.6k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumberSuppressHash(ss, length, 3, suppressHash); |
4140 | 26.6k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4141 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ |
4142 | 0 | } |
4143 | 26.6k | } |
4144 | | |
4145 | 26.6k | return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ |
4146 | 26.6k | } |
4147 | | |
4148 | | /* The function calls the ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeaderAndStashSeqNum implemented above. |
4149 | | As in the majority of the cases we do not need the last parameter, |
4150 | | we separate out this function. */ |
4151 | | SECStatus |
4152 | | ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType t, PRUint32 length) |
4153 | 26.6k | { |
4154 | 26.6k | return ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeaderAndStashSeqNum(ss, t, length, NULL); |
4155 | 26.6k | } |
4156 | | |
4157 | | /************************************************************************** |
4158 | | * Consume Handshake functions. |
4159 | | * |
4160 | | * All data used in these functions is protected by two locks, |
4161 | | * the RecvBufLock and the SSL3HandshakeLock |
4162 | | **************************************************************************/ |
4163 | | |
4164 | | /* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input |
4165 | | * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long). Copy them into buffer "v". |
4166 | | * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. |
4167 | | * |
4168 | | * If this function returns SECFailure, it has already sent an alert, |
4169 | | * and has set a generic error code. The caller should probably |
4170 | | * override the generic error code by setting another. |
4171 | | */ |
4172 | | SECStatus |
4173 | | ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, |
4174 | | PRUint32 *length) |
4175 | 7.50k | { |
4176 | 7.50k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
4177 | 7.50k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
4178 | | |
4179 | 7.50k | if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) { |
4180 | 28 | return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
4181 | 28 | } |
4182 | 7.47k | PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes); |
4183 | 7.47k | PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); |
4184 | 7.47k | *b += bytes; |
4185 | 7.47k | *length -= bytes; |
4186 | 7.47k | return SECSuccess; |
4187 | 7.50k | } |
4188 | | |
4189 | | /* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input |
4190 | | * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long), and interpret them as an |
4191 | | * integer in network byte order. Sets *num to the received value. |
4192 | | * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. |
4193 | | * |
4194 | | * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. |
4195 | | */ |
4196 | | SECStatus |
4197 | | ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(sslSocket *ss, PRUint64 *num, PRUint32 bytes, |
4198 | | PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) |
4199 | 87.4k | { |
4200 | 87.4k | PRUint8 *buf = *b; |
4201 | 87.4k | PRUint32 i; |
4202 | | |
4203 | 87.4k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
4204 | 87.4k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
4205 | | |
4206 | 87.4k | *num = 0; |
4207 | 87.4k | if (bytes > sizeof(*num)) { |
4208 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
4209 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4210 | 0 | } |
4211 | | |
4212 | 87.4k | if (bytes > *length) { |
4213 | 18 | return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
4214 | 18 | } |
4215 | 87.4k | PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); |
4216 | | |
4217 | 239k | for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { |
4218 | 152k | *num = (*num << 8) + buf[i]; |
4219 | 152k | } |
4220 | 87.4k | *b += bytes; |
4221 | 87.4k | *length -= bytes; |
4222 | 87.4k | return SECSuccess; |
4223 | 87.4k | } |
4224 | | |
4225 | | SECStatus |
4226 | | ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRUint32 *num, PRUint32 bytes, |
4227 | | PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) |
4228 | 87.4k | { |
4229 | 87.4k | PRUint64 num64; |
4230 | 87.4k | SECStatus rv; |
4231 | | |
4232 | 87.4k | PORT_Assert(bytes <= sizeof(*num)); |
4233 | 87.4k | if (bytes > sizeof(*num)) { |
4234 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
4235 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4236 | 0 | } |
4237 | 87.4k | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(ss, &num64, bytes, b, length); |
4238 | 87.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4239 | 18 | return SECFailure; |
4240 | 18 | } |
4241 | 87.4k | *num = num64 & 0xffffffff; |
4242 | 87.4k | return SECSuccess; |
4243 | 87.4k | } |
4244 | | |
4245 | | /* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is |
4246 | | * *length bytes long. The first value is a number whose size is "bytes" |
4247 | | * bytes long. The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value |
4248 | | * of the first number received. The latter byte-string, and its length, |
4249 | | * is returned in the SECItem i. |
4250 | | * |
4251 | | * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure. |
4252 | | * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. |
4253 | | * |
4254 | | * RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11. All callers of this function make copies |
4255 | | * of the data returned in the SECItem *i, so making a copy of it here |
4256 | | * is simply wasteful. So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to |
4257 | | * point to the values in the buffer **b. |
4258 | | */ |
4259 | | SECStatus |
4260 | | ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRUint32 bytes, |
4261 | | PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) |
4262 | 42.3k | { |
4263 | 42.3k | PRUint32 count; |
4264 | 42.3k | SECStatus rv; |
4265 | | |
4266 | 42.3k | PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3); |
4267 | 42.3k | i->len = 0; |
4268 | 42.3k | i->data = NULL; |
4269 | 42.3k | i->type = siBuffer; |
4270 | 42.3k | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &count, bytes, b, length); |
4271 | 42.3k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4272 | 9 | return SECFailure; |
4273 | 9 | } |
4274 | 42.3k | if (count > 0) { |
4275 | 33.1k | if (count > *length) { |
4276 | 51 | return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
4277 | 51 | } |
4278 | 33.1k | i->data = *b; |
4279 | 33.1k | i->len = count; |
4280 | 33.1k | *b += count; |
4281 | 33.1k | *length -= count; |
4282 | 33.1k | } |
4283 | 42.3k | return SECSuccess; |
4284 | 42.3k | } |
4285 | | |
4286 | | /* ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID converts a TLS hash identifier into an OID value. |
4287 | | * If the hash is not recognised, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is returned. |
4288 | | * |
4289 | | * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ |
4290 | | SECOidTag |
4291 | | ssl3_HashTypeToOID(SSLHashType hashType) |
4292 | 233k | { |
4293 | 233k | switch (hashType) { |
4294 | 21.0k | case ssl_hash_sha1: |
4295 | 21.0k | return SEC_OID_SHA1; |
4296 | 181k | case ssl_hash_sha256: |
4297 | 181k | return SEC_OID_SHA256; |
4298 | 15.7k | case ssl_hash_sha384: |
4299 | 15.7k | return SEC_OID_SHA384; |
4300 | 15.6k | case ssl_hash_sha512: |
4301 | 15.6k | return SEC_OID_SHA512; |
4302 | 0 | default: |
4303 | 0 | break; |
4304 | 233k | } |
4305 | 0 | return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; |
4306 | 233k | } |
4307 | | |
4308 | | SECOidTag |
4309 | | ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(SSLAuthType authType) |
4310 | 92.0k | { |
4311 | 92.0k | switch (authType) { |
4312 | 16.0k | case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: |
4313 | 16.0k | return SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; |
4314 | 0 | case ssl_auth_rsa_pss: |
4315 | 0 | return SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE; |
4316 | 61.0k | case ssl_auth_ecdsa: |
4317 | 61.0k | return SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; |
4318 | 14.9k | case ssl_auth_dsa: |
4319 | 14.9k | return SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; |
4320 | 0 | default: |
4321 | 0 | break; |
4322 | 92.0k | } |
4323 | | /* shouldn't ever get there */ |
4324 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
4325 | 0 | return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; |
4326 | 92.0k | } |
4327 | | |
4328 | | SSLHashType |
4329 | | ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) |
4330 | 229k | { |
4331 | 229k | switch (scheme) { |
4332 | 8.32k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: |
4333 | 12.0k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: |
4334 | 16.3k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: |
4335 | 16.3k | return ssl_hash_sha1; |
4336 | 3.90k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: |
4337 | 51.9k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: |
4338 | 177k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: |
4339 | 178k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256: |
4340 | 181k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: |
4341 | 181k | return ssl_hash_sha256; |
4342 | 3.95k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: |
4343 | 8.02k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: |
4344 | 12.2k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: |
4345 | 12.3k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384: |
4346 | 15.9k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: |
4347 | 15.9k | return ssl_hash_sha384; |
4348 | 3.89k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: |
4349 | 7.94k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: |
4350 | 12.1k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: |
4351 | 12.1k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512: |
4352 | 15.8k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: |
4353 | 15.8k | return ssl_hash_sha512; |
4354 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: |
4355 | 0 | return ssl_hash_none; /* Special for TLS 1.0/1.1. */ |
4356 | 0 | case ssl_sig_none: |
4357 | 0 | case ssl_sig_ed25519: |
4358 | 0 | case ssl_sig_ed448: |
4359 | 0 | break; |
4360 | 229k | } |
4361 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
4362 | 0 | return ssl_hash_none; |
4363 | 229k | } |
4364 | | |
4365 | | static PRBool |
4366 | | ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SECOidTag spkiOid) |
4367 | 1.82k | { |
4368 | 1.82k | SECOidTag authOid = ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme)); |
4369 | | |
4370 | 1.82k | if (spkiOid == authOid) { |
4371 | 770 | return PR_TRUE; |
4372 | 770 | } |
4373 | 1.05k | if ((authOid == SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION) && |
4374 | 1.05k | (spkiOid == SEC_OID_X500_RSA_ENCRYPTION)) { |
4375 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
4376 | 0 | } |
4377 | 1.05k | return PR_FALSE; |
4378 | 1.05k | } |
4379 | | |
4380 | | /* Validate that the signature scheme works for the given key type. */ |
4381 | | PRBool |
4382 | | ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SECOidTag spkiOid, |
4383 | | PRBool isTls13) |
4384 | 7.55k | { |
4385 | 7.55k | if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(scheme)) { |
4386 | 2.50k | return PR_FALSE; |
4387 | 2.50k | } |
4388 | | /* if we are purposefully passed SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, it means |
4389 | | * we not checking the scheme against a potential key, so skip |
4390 | | * the call */ |
4391 | 5.04k | if ((spkiOid != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) && |
4392 | 5.04k | !ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(scheme, spkiOid)) { |
4393 | 1.05k | return PR_FALSE; |
4394 | 1.05k | } |
4395 | 3.99k | if (isTls13) { |
4396 | 0 | if (ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme) == ssl_hash_sha1) { |
4397 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4398 | 0 | } |
4399 | 0 | if (ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(scheme)) { |
4400 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4401 | 0 | } |
4402 | 0 | if (ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(scheme)) { |
4403 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4404 | 0 | } |
4405 | | /* With TLS 1.3, EC keys should have been selected based on calling |
4406 | | * ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(), reject them otherwise. */ |
4407 | 0 | return spkiOid != SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; |
4408 | 0 | } |
4409 | 3.99k | return PR_TRUE; |
4410 | 3.99k | } |
4411 | | |
4412 | | static SECStatus |
4413 | | ssl_SignatureSchemeFromPssSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, |
4414 | | SSLSignatureScheme *scheme) |
4415 | 0 | { |
4416 | 0 | SECKEYRSAPSSParams pssParam = { 0 }; |
4417 | 0 | PORTCheapArenaPool arena; |
4418 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
4419 | | |
4420 | | /* The key doesn't have parameters, boo. */ |
4421 | 0 | if (!spki->algorithm.parameters.len) { |
4422 | 0 | *scheme = ssl_sig_none; |
4423 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
4424 | 0 | } |
4425 | | |
4426 | 0 | PORT_InitCheapArena(&arena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); |
4427 | 0 | rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(&arena.arena, &pssParam, |
4428 | 0 | SEC_ASN1_GET(SECKEY_RSAPSSParamsTemplate), |
4429 | 0 | &spki->algorithm.parameters); |
4430 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4431 | 0 | goto loser; |
4432 | 0 | } |
4433 | | /* Not having hashAlg means SHA-1 and we don't accept that. */ |
4434 | 0 | if (!pssParam.hashAlg) { |
4435 | 0 | goto loser; |
4436 | 0 | } |
4437 | 0 | switch (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(pssParam.hashAlg)) { |
4438 | 0 | case SEC_OID_SHA256: |
4439 | 0 | *scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256; |
4440 | 0 | break; |
4441 | 0 | case SEC_OID_SHA384: |
4442 | 0 | *scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384; |
4443 | 0 | break; |
4444 | 0 | case SEC_OID_SHA512: |
4445 | 0 | *scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512; |
4446 | 0 | break; |
4447 | 0 | default: |
4448 | 0 | goto loser; |
4449 | 0 | } |
4450 | | |
4451 | 0 | PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); |
4452 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
4453 | | |
4454 | 0 | loser: |
4455 | 0 | PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); |
4456 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE); |
4457 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4458 | 0 | } |
4459 | | |
4460 | | static SECStatus |
4461 | | ssl_SignatureSchemeFromEcSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, |
4462 | | SSLSignatureScheme *scheme) |
4463 | 0 | { |
4464 | 0 | const sslNamedGroupDef *group; |
4465 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *key; |
4466 | |
|
4467 | 0 | key = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(spki); |
4468 | 0 | if (!key) { |
4469 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE); |
4470 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4471 | 0 | } |
4472 | 0 | group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(key); |
4473 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); |
4474 | 0 | if (!group) { |
4475 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE); |
4476 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4477 | 0 | } |
4478 | 0 | switch (group->name) { |
4479 | 0 | case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1: |
4480 | 0 | *scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256; |
4481 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
4482 | 0 | case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1: |
4483 | 0 | *scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384; |
4484 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
4485 | 0 | case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1: |
4486 | 0 | *scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512; |
4487 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
4488 | 0 | default: |
4489 | 0 | break; |
4490 | 0 | } |
4491 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE); |
4492 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4493 | 0 | } |
4494 | | |
4495 | | /* Newer signature schemes are designed so that a single SPKI can be used with |
4496 | | * that scheme. This determines that scheme from the SPKI. If the SPKI doesn't |
4497 | | * have a single scheme, |*scheme| is set to ssl_sig_none. */ |
4498 | | SECStatus |
4499 | | ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, |
4500 | | PRBool isTls13, SSLSignatureScheme *scheme) |
4501 | 275 | { |
4502 | 275 | SECOidTag spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&spki->algorithm); |
4503 | | |
4504 | 275 | if (spkiOid == SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE) { |
4505 | 0 | return ssl_SignatureSchemeFromPssSpki(spki, scheme); |
4506 | 0 | } |
4507 | | |
4508 | | /* Only do this lookup for TLS 1.3, where the scheme can be determined from |
4509 | | * the SPKI alone because the ECDSA key size determines the hash. Earlier |
4510 | | * TLS versions allow the same EC key to be used with different hashes. */ |
4511 | 275 | if (isTls13 && spkiOid == SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) { |
4512 | 0 | return ssl_SignatureSchemeFromEcSpki(spki, scheme); |
4513 | 0 | } |
4514 | | |
4515 | 275 | *scheme = ssl_sig_none; |
4516 | 275 | return SECSuccess; |
4517 | 275 | } |
4518 | | |
4519 | | /* Check that a signature scheme is enabled by configuration. */ |
4520 | | PRBool |
4521 | | ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme) |
4522 | 0 | { |
4523 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
4524 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { |
4525 | 0 | if (scheme == ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]) { |
4526 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
4527 | 0 | } |
4528 | 0 | } |
4529 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4530 | 0 | } |
4531 | | |
4532 | | static PRBool |
4533 | | ssl_SignatureKeyMatchesSpkiOid(const ssl3KEADef *keaDef, SECOidTag spkiOid) |
4534 | 0 | { |
4535 | 0 | switch (spkiOid) { |
4536 | 0 | case SEC_OID_X500_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
4537 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
4538 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE: |
4539 | 0 | return keaDef->signKeyType == rsaKey; |
4540 | 0 | case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: |
4541 | 0 | return keaDef->signKeyType == dsaKey; |
4542 | 0 | case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: |
4543 | 0 | return keaDef->signKeyType == ecKey; |
4544 | 0 | default: |
4545 | 0 | break; |
4546 | 0 | } |
4547 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4548 | 0 | } |
4549 | | |
4550 | | /* ssl3_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency checks that the signature algorithm |
4551 | | * identifier in |scheme| is consistent with the public key in |spki|. It also |
4552 | | * checks the hash algorithm against the configured signature algorithms. If |
4553 | | * all the tests pass, SECSuccess is returned. Otherwise, PORT_SetError is |
4554 | | * called and SECFailure is returned. */ |
4555 | | SECStatus |
4556 | | ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, |
4557 | | CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki) |
4558 | 0 | { |
4559 | 0 | SSLSignatureScheme spkiScheme; |
4560 | 0 | PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
4561 | 0 | SECOidTag spkiOid; |
4562 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
4563 | |
|
4564 | 0 | rv = ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(spki, isTLS13, &spkiScheme); |
4565 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4566 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4567 | 0 | } |
4568 | 0 | if (spkiScheme != ssl_sig_none) { |
4569 | | /* The SPKI in the certificate can only be used for a single scheme. */ |
4570 | 0 | if (spkiScheme != scheme || |
4571 | 0 | !ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme)) { |
4572 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
4573 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4574 | 0 | } |
4575 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
4576 | 0 | } |
4577 | | |
4578 | 0 | spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&spki->algorithm); |
4579 | | |
4580 | | /* If we're a client, check that the signature algorithm matches the signing |
4581 | | * key type of the cipher suite. */ |
4582 | 0 | if (!isTLS13 && !ss->sec.isServer) { |
4583 | 0 | if (!ssl_SignatureKeyMatchesSpkiOid(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def, spkiOid)) { |
4584 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
4585 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4586 | 0 | } |
4587 | 0 | } |
4588 | | |
4589 | | /* Verify that the signature scheme matches the signing key. */ |
4590 | 0 | if ((spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) || |
4591 | 0 | !ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13)) { |
4592 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
4593 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4594 | 0 | } |
4595 | | |
4596 | 0 | if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme)) { |
4597 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
4598 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4599 | 0 | } |
4600 | | |
4601 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
4602 | 0 | } |
4603 | | |
4604 | | PRBool |
4605 | | ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) |
4606 | 7.55k | { |
4607 | 7.55k | switch (scheme) { |
4608 | 227 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: |
4609 | 494 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: |
4610 | 843 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: |
4611 | 1.14k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: |
4612 | 1.50k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: |
4613 | 1.84k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: |
4614 | 2.21k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: |
4615 | 2.24k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256: |
4616 | 2.26k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384: |
4617 | 2.29k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512: |
4618 | 2.80k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: |
4619 | 3.30k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: |
4620 | 3.80k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: |
4621 | 4.01k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: |
4622 | 4.22k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: |
4623 | 4.39k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: |
4624 | 4.56k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: |
4625 | 5.04k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: |
4626 | 5.04k | return ssl_SchemePolicyOK(scheme, kSSLSigSchemePolicy); |
4627 | 0 | break; |
4628 | | |
4629 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: |
4630 | 264 | case ssl_sig_none: |
4631 | 268 | case ssl_sig_ed25519: |
4632 | 272 | case ssl_sig_ed448: |
4633 | 272 | return PR_FALSE; |
4634 | 7.55k | } |
4635 | 2.23k | return PR_FALSE; |
4636 | 7.55k | } |
4637 | | |
4638 | | PRBool |
4639 | | ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) |
4640 | 448k | { |
4641 | 448k | switch (scheme) { |
4642 | 251k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: |
4643 | 258k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: |
4644 | 266k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: |
4645 | 266k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256: |
4646 | 266k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384: |
4647 | 266k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512: |
4648 | 266k | return PR_TRUE; |
4649 | | |
4650 | 181k | default: |
4651 | 181k | return PR_FALSE; |
4652 | 448k | } |
4653 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4654 | 448k | } |
4655 | | |
4656 | | PRBool |
4657 | | ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) |
4658 | 0 | { |
4659 | 0 | switch (scheme) { |
4660 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: |
4661 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: |
4662 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: |
4663 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
4664 | | |
4665 | 0 | default: |
4666 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4667 | 0 | } |
4668 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4669 | 0 | } |
4670 | | |
4671 | | PRBool |
4672 | | ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) |
4673 | 43.9k | { |
4674 | 43.9k | switch (scheme) { |
4675 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: |
4676 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: |
4677 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: |
4678 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: |
4679 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
4680 | | |
4681 | 43.9k | default: |
4682 | 43.9k | return PR_FALSE; |
4683 | 43.9k | } |
4684 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4685 | 43.9k | } |
4686 | | |
4687 | | PRBool |
4688 | | ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) |
4689 | 86.0k | { |
4690 | 86.0k | switch (scheme) { |
4691 | 3.51k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: |
4692 | 7.02k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: |
4693 | 10.5k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: |
4694 | 14.0k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: |
4695 | 14.0k | return PR_TRUE; |
4696 | | |
4697 | 72.0k | default: |
4698 | 72.0k | return PR_FALSE; |
4699 | 86.0k | } |
4700 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
4701 | 86.0k | } |
4702 | | |
4703 | | SSLAuthType |
4704 | | ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) |
4705 | 748k | { |
4706 | 748k | switch (scheme) { |
4707 | 12.8k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: |
4708 | 12.8k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: |
4709 | 16.8k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: |
4710 | 20.7k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: |
4711 | 24.6k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: |
4712 | | /* We report based on the key type for PSS signatures. */ |
4713 | 146k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: |
4714 | 146k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: |
4715 | 147k | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: |
4716 | 147k | return ssl_auth_rsa_sign; |
4717 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256: |
4718 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384: |
4719 | 0 | case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512: |
4720 | 0 | return ssl_auth_rsa_pss; |
4721 | 207k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: |
4722 | 333k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: |
4723 | 459k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: |
4724 | 586k | case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: |
4725 | 586k | return ssl_auth_ecdsa; |
4726 | 3.74k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: |
4727 | 7.49k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: |
4728 | 11.2k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: |
4729 | 14.9k | case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: |
4730 | 14.9k | return ssl_auth_dsa; |
4731 | | |
4732 | 0 | default: |
4733 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
4734 | 748k | } |
4735 | 0 | return ssl_auth_null; |
4736 | 748k | } |
4737 | | |
4738 | | /* ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme reads a SSLSignatureScheme (formerly |
4739 | | * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm) structure from |b| and puts the resulting value |
4740 | | * into |out|. |b| and |length| are updated accordingly. |
4741 | | * |
4742 | | * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ |
4743 | | SECStatus |
4744 | | ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, |
4745 | | PRUint32 *length, SSLSignatureScheme *out) |
4746 | 0 | { |
4747 | 0 | PRUint32 tmp; |
4748 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
4749 | |
|
4750 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, b, length); |
4751 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4752 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* Alert sent, Error code set already. */ |
4753 | 0 | } |
4754 | 0 | if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) { |
4755 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); |
4756 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
4757 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4758 | 0 | } |
4759 | 0 | *out = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp; |
4760 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
4761 | 0 | } |
4762 | | |
4763 | | /************************************************************************** |
4764 | | * end of Consume Handshake functions. |
4765 | | **************************************************************************/ |
4766 | | |
4767 | | static SECStatus |
4768 | | ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, |
4769 | | SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes) |
4770 | 2 | { |
4771 | 2 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
4772 | 2 | PK11Context *hashContext = PK11_CreateDigestContext( |
4773 | 2 | ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg)); |
4774 | | |
4775 | 2 | if (!hashContext) { |
4776 | 0 | return rv; |
4777 | 0 | } |
4778 | 2 | rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hashContext); |
4779 | 2 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
4780 | 2 | rv = PK11_DigestOp(hashContext, buf, len); |
4781 | 2 | } |
4782 | 2 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
4783 | 2 | rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hashContext, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, |
4784 | 2 | sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); |
4785 | 2 | } |
4786 | 2 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
4787 | 2 | hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg; |
4788 | 2 | } |
4789 | 2 | PK11_DestroyContext(hashContext, PR_TRUE); |
4790 | 2 | return rv; |
4791 | 2 | } |
4792 | | |
4793 | | /* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point. |
4794 | | * Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify |
4795 | | * ssl3_SendFinished |
4796 | | * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage |
4797 | | * |
4798 | | * Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock. |
4799 | | * Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock. |
4800 | | * (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.) |
4801 | | */ |
4802 | | SECStatus |
4803 | | ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, |
4804 | | ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */ |
4805 | | SSL3Hashes *hashes, /* output goes here. */ |
4806 | | PRUint32 sender) |
4807 | 2 | { |
4808 | 2 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
4809 | 2 | PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
4810 | 2 | unsigned int outLength; |
4811 | 2 | PRUint8 md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; |
4812 | 2 | PRUint8 sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; |
4813 | | |
4814 | 2 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
4815 | 2 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) { |
4816 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
4817 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
4818 | 0 | } |
4819 | | |
4820 | 2 | hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; |
4821 | | |
4822 | 2 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { |
4823 | 0 | PK11Context *h; |
4824 | 0 | unsigned int stateLen; |
4825 | 0 | unsigned char stackBuf[1024]; |
4826 | 0 | unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL; |
4827 | |
|
4828 | 0 | h = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; |
4829 | 0 | stateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(h, stackBuf, |
4830 | 0 | sizeof(stackBuf), &stateLen); |
4831 | 0 | if (stateBuf == NULL) { |
4832 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4833 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4834 | 0 | goto tls12_loser; |
4835 | 0 | } |
4836 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(h, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, |
4837 | 0 | sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); |
4838 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4839 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4840 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4841 | 0 | goto tls12_loser; |
4842 | 0 | } |
4843 | | |
4844 | 0 | hashes->hashAlg = ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss); |
4845 | |
|
4846 | 0 | tls12_loser: |
4847 | 0 | if (stateBuf) { |
4848 | 0 | if (PK11_RestoreContext(h, stateBuf, stateLen) != SECSuccess) { |
4849 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4850 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4851 | 0 | } |
4852 | 0 | if (stateBuf != stackBuf) { |
4853 | 0 | PORT_ZFree(stateBuf, stateLen); |
4854 | 0 | } |
4855 | 0 | } |
4856 | 2 | } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { |
4857 | 2 | rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, |
4858 | 2 | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, |
4859 | 2 | ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss), |
4860 | 2 | hashes); |
4861 | 2 | } else { |
4862 | 0 | PK11Context *md5; |
4863 | 0 | PK11Context *sha = NULL; |
4864 | 0 | unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL; |
4865 | 0 | unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL; |
4866 | 0 | unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen; |
4867 | 0 | unsigned char md5StackBuf[256]; |
4868 | 0 | unsigned char shaStackBuf[512]; |
4869 | 0 | const int md5Pad = ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(ssl_mac_md5)->pad_size; |
4870 | 0 | const int shaPad = ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(ssl_mac_sha)->pad_size; |
4871 | |
|
4872 | 0 | md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf, |
4873 | 0 | sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen); |
4874 | 0 | if (md5StateBuf == NULL) { |
4875 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4876 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4877 | 0 | goto loser; |
4878 | 0 | } |
4879 | 0 | md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5; |
4880 | |
|
4881 | 0 | shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf, |
4882 | 0 | sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen); |
4883 | 0 | if (shaStateBuf == NULL) { |
4884 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4885 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4886 | 0 | goto loser; |
4887 | 0 | } |
4888 | 0 | sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; |
4889 | |
|
4890 | 0 | if (!isTLS) { |
4891 | | /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ |
4892 | 0 | unsigned char s[4]; |
4893 | |
|
4894 | 0 | if (!spec->masterSecret) { |
4895 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); |
4896 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4897 | 0 | goto loser; |
4898 | 0 | } |
4899 | | |
4900 | 0 | s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24); |
4901 | 0 | s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16); |
4902 | 0 | s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8); |
4903 | 0 | s[3] = (unsigned char)sender; |
4904 | |
|
4905 | 0 | if (sender != 0) { |
4906 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4); |
4907 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); |
4908 | 0 | } |
4909 | |
|
4910 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, md5Pad)); |
4911 | |
|
4912 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->masterSecret); |
4913 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, md5Pad); |
4914 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); |
4915 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); |
4916 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4917 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4918 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4919 | 0 | goto loser; |
4920 | 0 | } |
4921 | | |
4922 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength)); |
4923 | |
|
4924 | 0 | if (sender != 0) { |
4925 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4); |
4926 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); |
4927 | 0 | } |
4928 | |
|
4929 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, shaPad)); |
4930 | |
|
4931 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->masterSecret); |
4932 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, shaPad); |
4933 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); |
4934 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); |
4935 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4936 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4937 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4938 | 0 | goto loser; |
4939 | 0 | } |
4940 | | |
4941 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); |
4942 | |
|
4943 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, md5Pad)); |
4944 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); |
4945 | |
|
4946 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5); |
4947 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->masterSecret); |
4948 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, md5Pad); |
4949 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); |
4950 | 0 | } |
4951 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); |
4952 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); |
4953 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4954 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4955 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4956 | 0 | goto loser; |
4957 | 0 | } |
4958 | | |
4959 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); |
4960 | |
|
4961 | 0 | if (!isTLS) { |
4962 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, shaPad)); |
4963 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); |
4964 | |
|
4965 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha); |
4966 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->masterSecret); |
4967 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, shaPad); |
4968 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); |
4969 | 0 | } |
4970 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); |
4971 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); |
4972 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
4973 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4974 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4975 | 0 | goto loser; |
4976 | 0 | } |
4977 | | |
4978 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); |
4979 | |
|
4980 | 0 | hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; |
4981 | |
|
4982 | 0 | loser: |
4983 | 0 | if (md5StateBuf) { |
4984 | 0 | if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen) != |
4985 | 0 | SECSuccess) { |
4986 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4987 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4988 | 0 | } |
4989 | 0 | if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) { |
4990 | 0 | PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen); |
4991 | 0 | } |
4992 | 0 | } |
4993 | 0 | if (shaStateBuf) { |
4994 | 0 | if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen) != |
4995 | 0 | SECSuccess) { |
4996 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
4997 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
4998 | 0 | } |
4999 | 0 | if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) { |
5000 | 0 | PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen); |
5001 | 0 | } |
5002 | 0 | } |
5003 | 0 | } |
5004 | 2 | return rv; |
5005 | 2 | } |
5006 | | |
5007 | | /************************************************************************** |
5008 | | * end of Handshake Hash functions. |
5009 | | * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes. |
5010 | | **************************************************************************/ |
5011 | | |
5012 | | #ifdef TRACE |
5013 | | #define CHTYPE(t) \ |
5014 | 0 | case client_hello_##t: \ |
5015 | 0 | return #t; |
5016 | | |
5017 | | static const char * |
5018 | | ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(sslClientHelloType type) |
5019 | 0 | { |
5020 | 0 | switch (type) { |
5021 | 0 | CHTYPE(initial); |
5022 | 0 | CHTYPE(retry); |
5023 | 0 | CHTYPE(retransmit); /* DTLS only */ |
5024 | 0 | CHTYPE(renegotiation); /* TLS <= 1.2 only */ |
5025 | 0 | } |
5026 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
5027 | 0 | return NULL; |
5028 | 0 | } |
5029 | | #undef CHTYPE |
5030 | | #endif |
5031 | | |
5032 | | PR_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
5033 | | static void |
5034 | | ssl_MakeFakeSid(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf) |
5035 | 0 | { |
5036 | 0 | PRUint8 x = 0x5a; |
5037 | 0 | int i; |
5038 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; ++i) { |
5039 | 0 | x += ss->ssl3.hs.client_random[i]; |
5040 | 0 | buf[i] = x; |
5041 | 0 | } |
5042 | 0 | } |
5043 | | |
5044 | | /* Set the version fields of the cipher spec for a ClientHello. */ |
5045 | | static void |
5046 | | ssl_SetClientHelloSpecVersion(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) |
5047 | 0 | { |
5048 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); |
5049 | 0 | PORT_Assert(spec->cipherDef->cipher == cipher_null); |
5050 | | /* This is - a best guess - but it doesn't matter here. */ |
5051 | 0 | spec->version = ss->vrange.max; |
5052 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5053 | 0 | spec->recordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE; |
5054 | 0 | } else { |
5055 | | /* For new connections, cap the record layer version number of TLS |
5056 | | * ClientHello to { 3, 1 } (TLS 1.0). Some TLS 1.0 servers (which seem |
5057 | | * to use F5 BIG-IP) ignore ClientHello.client_version and use the |
5058 | | * record layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) instead when |
5059 | | * negotiating protocol versions. In addition, if the record layer |
5060 | | * version number of ClientHello is { 3, 2 } (TLS 1.1) or higher, these |
5061 | | * servers reset the TCP connections. Lastly, some F5 BIG-IP servers |
5062 | | * hang if a record containing a ClientHello has a version greater than |
5063 | | * { 3, 1 } and a length greater than 255. Set this flag to work around |
5064 | | * such servers. |
5065 | | * |
5066 | | * The final version is set when a version is negotiated. |
5067 | | */ |
5068 | 0 | spec->recordVersion = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, |
5069 | 0 | ss->vrange.max); |
5070 | 0 | } |
5071 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); |
5072 | 0 | } |
5073 | | |
5074 | | SECStatus |
5075 | | ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(const sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *preamble, const sslBuffer *extensions) |
5076 | 0 | { |
5077 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
5078 | 0 | unsigned int msgLen = preamble->len; |
5079 | 0 | msgLen += extensions->len ? (2 + extensions->len) : 0; |
5080 | 0 | unsigned int headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? 12 : 4; |
5081 | | |
5082 | | /* Record the message length. */ |
5083 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_InsertNumber(preamble, 1, msgLen - headerLen, 3); |
5084 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5085 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* code set */ |
5086 | 0 | } |
5087 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5088 | | /* Record the (unfragmented) fragment length. */ |
5089 | 0 | unsigned int offset = 1 /* ch */ + 3 /* len */ + |
5090 | 0 | 2 /* seq */ + 3 /* fragment offset */; |
5091 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_InsertNumber(preamble, offset, msgLen - headerLen, 3); |
5092 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5093 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* code set */ |
5094 | 0 | } |
5095 | 0 | } |
5096 | | |
5097 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
5098 | 0 | } |
5099 | | |
5100 | | static SECStatus |
5101 | | ssl3_AppendCipherSuites(sslSocket *ss, PRBool fallbackSCSV, sslBuffer *buf) |
5102 | 0 | { |
5103 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
5104 | 0 | unsigned int offset; |
5105 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
5106 | 0 | unsigned int saveLen; |
5107 | |
|
5108 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &offset); |
5109 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5110 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5111 | 0 | } |
5112 | | |
5113 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { |
5114 | | /* Add the actual SCSV */ |
5115 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, |
5116 | 0 | sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); |
5117 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5118 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5119 | 0 | } |
5120 | 0 | } |
5121 | 0 | if (fallbackSCSV) { |
5122 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, |
5123 | 0 | sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); |
5124 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5125 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5126 | 0 | } |
5127 | 0 | } |
5128 | | |
5129 | 0 | saveLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf); |
5130 | | /* CipherSuites are appended to Hello message here */ |
5131 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { |
5132 | 0 | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; |
5133 | 0 | if (ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) { |
5134 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, suite->cipher_suite, |
5135 | 0 | sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); |
5136 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5137 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5138 | 0 | } |
5139 | 0 | } |
5140 | 0 | } |
5141 | | |
5142 | | /* GREASE CipherSuites: |
5143 | | * A client MAY select one or more GREASE cipher suite values and advertise |
5144 | | * them in the "cipher_suites" field [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */ |
5145 | 0 | if (ss->opt.enableGrease && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
5146 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_cipher], |
5147 | 0 | sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); |
5148 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5149 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5150 | 0 | } |
5151 | 0 | } |
5152 | | |
5153 | 0 | if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange) || |
5154 | 0 | (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf) - saveLen) == 0) { |
5155 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); |
5156 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5157 | 0 | } |
5158 | | |
5159 | 0 | return sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, offset, 2); |
5160 | 0 | } |
5161 | | |
5162 | | SECStatus |
5163 | | ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid, |
5164 | | PRBool realSid, PRUint16 version, PRBool isEchInner, |
5165 | | const sslBuffer *extensions, sslBuffer *preamble) |
5166 | 0 | { |
5167 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
5168 | 0 | sslBuffer constructed = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; |
5169 | 0 | const PRUint8 *client_random = isEchInner ? ss->ssl3.hs.client_inner_random : ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; |
5170 | 0 | PORT_Assert(sid); |
5171 | 0 | PRBool fallbackSCSV = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV && !isEchInner && |
5172 | 0 | (!realSid || version < sid->version); |
5173 | |
|
5174 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ssl_hs_client_hello, 1); |
5175 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5176 | 0 | goto loser; |
5177 | 0 | } |
5178 | | |
5179 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&constructed, 3, NULL); |
5180 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5181 | 0 | goto loser; |
5182 | 0 | } |
5183 | | |
5184 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5185 | | /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the |
5186 | | * transmission code, if necessary */ |
5187 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2); |
5188 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5189 | 0 | goto loser; |
5190 | 0 | } |
5191 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++; |
5192 | | |
5193 | | /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */ |
5194 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, 0, 3); |
5195 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5196 | 0 | goto loser; |
5197 | 0 | } |
5198 | | |
5199 | | /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */ |
5200 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&constructed, 3, NULL); |
5201 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5202 | 0 | goto loser; |
5203 | 0 | } |
5204 | 0 | } |
5205 | | |
5206 | 0 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
5207 | | /* The client hello version must stay unchanged to work around |
5208 | | * the Windows SChannel bug described in ssl3_SendClientHello. */ |
5209 | 0 | PORT_Assert(version == ss->clientHelloVersion); |
5210 | 0 | } |
5211 | |
|
5212 | 0 | ss->clientHelloVersion = PR_MIN(version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); |
5213 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5214 | 0 | PRUint16 dtlsVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); |
5215 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, dtlsVersion, 2); |
5216 | 0 | } else { |
5217 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2); |
5218 | 0 | } |
5219 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5220 | 0 | goto loser; |
5221 | 0 | } |
5222 | | |
5223 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_Append(&constructed, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
5224 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5225 | 0 | goto loser; |
5226 | 0 | } |
5227 | | |
5228 | 0 | if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && !isEchInner) { |
5229 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&constructed, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, |
5230 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); |
5231 | 0 | } else if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5232 | | /* We're faking session resumption, so rather than create new |
5233 | | * randomness, just mix up the client random a little. */ |
5234 | 0 | PRUint8 buf[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES]; |
5235 | 0 | ssl_MakeFakeSid(ss, buf); |
5236 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&constructed, buf, SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES, 1); |
5237 | 0 | } else { |
5238 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, 0, 1); |
5239 | 0 | } |
5240 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5241 | 0 | goto loser; |
5242 | 0 | } |
5243 | | |
5244 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5245 | | /* This cookieLen applies to the cookie that appears in the DTLS |
5246 | | * ClientHello, which isn't used in DTLS 1.3. */ |
5247 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&constructed, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data, |
5248 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry ? 0 : ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, |
5249 | 0 | 1); |
5250 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5251 | 0 | goto loser; |
5252 | 0 | } |
5253 | 0 | } |
5254 | | |
5255 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendCipherSuites(ss, fallbackSCSV, &constructed); |
5256 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5257 | 0 | goto loser; |
5258 | 0 | } |
5259 | | |
5260 | | /* Compression methods: count is always 1, null compression. */ |
5261 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, 1, 1); |
5262 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5263 | 0 | goto loser; |
5264 | 0 | } |
5265 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ssl_compression_null, 1); |
5266 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5267 | 0 | goto loser; |
5268 | 0 | } |
5269 | | |
5270 | 0 | rv = ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(ss, &constructed, extensions); |
5271 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5272 | 0 | goto loser; |
5273 | 0 | } |
5274 | | |
5275 | 0 | *preamble = constructed; |
5276 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
5277 | 0 | loser: |
5278 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&constructed); |
5279 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5280 | 0 | } |
5281 | | |
5282 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(), |
5283 | | * ssl3_RedoHandshake() |
5284 | | * ssl_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session) |
5285 | | * dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(with resending=PR_TRUE) |
5286 | | * |
5287 | | * The |type| argument indicates what is going on here: |
5288 | | * - client_hello_initial is set for the very first ClientHello |
5289 | | * - client_hello_retry indicates that this is a second attempt after receiving |
5290 | | * a HelloRetryRequest (in TLS 1.3) |
5291 | | * - client_hello_retransmit is used in DTLS when resending |
5292 | | * - client_hello_renegotiation is used to renegotiate (in TLS <1.3) |
5293 | | */ |
5294 | | SECStatus |
5295 | | ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) |
5296 | 0 | { |
5297 | 0 | sslSessionID *sid; |
5298 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
5299 | 0 | PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; |
5300 | 0 | PRBool requestingResume = PR_FALSE; |
5301 | 0 | PRBool unlockNeeded = PR_FALSE; |
5302 | 0 | sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; |
5303 | 0 | PRUint16 version = ss->vrange.max; |
5304 | 0 | PRInt32 flags; |
5305 | 0 | sslBuffer chBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; |
5306 | |
|
5307 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send %s ClientHello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), |
5308 | 0 | ss->fd, ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(type))); |
5309 | |
|
5310 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
5311 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
5312 | | |
5313 | | /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */ |
5314 | 0 | if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { |
5315 | 0 | PR_NOT_REACHED("No versions of SSL 3.0 or later are enabled"); |
5316 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); |
5317 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5318 | 0 | } |
5319 | | |
5320 | | /* If we are responding to a HelloRetryRequest, don't reinitialize. We need |
5321 | | * to maintain the handshake hashes. */ |
5322 | 0 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
5323 | 0 | ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); |
5324 | 0 | } |
5325 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || type == client_hello_retry); |
5326 | |
|
5327 | 0 | if (type == client_hello_initial) { |
5328 | 0 | ssl_SetClientHelloSpecVersion(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
5329 | 0 | } |
5330 | | /* These must be reset every handshake. */ |
5331 | 0 | ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); |
5332 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; |
5333 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; |
5334 | 0 | PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || type != client_hello_retransmit); |
5335 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); |
5336 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; |
5337 | | |
5338 | | /* How many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */ |
5339 | 0 | if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { |
5340 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */ |
5341 | 0 | } |
5342 | | |
5343 | | /* |
5344 | | * During a renegotiation, ss->clientHelloVersion will be used again to |
5345 | | * work around a Windows SChannel bug. Ensure that it is still enabled. |
5346 | | */ |
5347 | 0 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
5348 | 0 | PORT_Assert(type != client_hello_initial); |
5349 | 0 | if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { |
5350 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); |
5351 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5352 | 0 | } |
5353 | | |
5354 | 0 | if (ss->clientHelloVersion < ss->vrange.min || |
5355 | 0 | ss->clientHelloVersion > ss->vrange.max) { |
5356 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); |
5357 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5358 | 0 | } |
5359 | 0 | } |
5360 | | |
5361 | | /* Check if we have a ss->sec.ci.sid. |
5362 | | * Check that it's not expired. |
5363 | | * If we have an sid and it comes from an external cache, we use it. */ |
5364 | 0 | if (ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == in_external_cache) { |
5365 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); |
5366 | 0 | sid = ssl_ReferenceSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); |
5367 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: using external resumption token in ClientHello", |
5368 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
5369 | 0 | } else if (ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->statelessResume && type == client_hello_retry) { |
5370 | | /* If we are sending a second ClientHello, reuse the same SID |
5371 | | * as the original one. */ |
5372 | 0 | sid = ssl_ReferenceSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); |
5373 | 0 | } else if (!ss->opt.noCache) { |
5374 | | /* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup |
5375 | | * handles expired entries and other details. |
5376 | | * XXX If we've been called from ssl_BeginClientHandshake, then |
5377 | | * this lookup is duplicative and wasteful. |
5378 | | */ |
5379 | 0 | sid = ssl_LookupSID(ssl_Time(ss), &ss->sec.ci.peer, |
5380 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url); |
5381 | 0 | } else { |
5382 | 0 | sid = NULL; |
5383 | 0 | } |
5384 | | |
5385 | | /* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists, |
5386 | | * make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ... |
5387 | | * If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that holds |
5388 | | * the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc. |
5389 | | */ |
5390 | 0 | if (sid) { |
5391 | 0 | PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE; |
5392 | |
|
5393 | 0 | if (sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
5394 | 0 | if (!tls13_ResumptionCompatible(ss, sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)) { |
5395 | 0 | sidOK = PR_FALSE; |
5396 | 0 | } |
5397 | 0 | } else { |
5398 | | /* Check that the cipher suite we need is enabled. */ |
5399 | 0 | const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = |
5400 | 0 | ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite, |
5401 | 0 | ss->cipherSuites); |
5402 | 0 | SSLVersionRange vrange = { sid->version, sid->version }; |
5403 | 0 | if (!suite || !ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { |
5404 | 0 | sidOK = PR_FALSE; |
5405 | 0 | } |
5406 | | |
5407 | | /* Check that no (valid) ECHConfigs are setup in combination with a |
5408 | | * (resumable) TLS < 1.3 session id. */ |
5409 | 0 | if (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs)) { |
5410 | | /* If there are ECH configs, the client must not resume but |
5411 | | * offer ECH. */ |
5412 | 0 | sidOK = PR_FALSE; |
5413 | 0 | } |
5414 | 0 | } |
5415 | | |
5416 | | /* Check that we can recover the master secret. */ |
5417 | 0 | if (sidOK) { |
5418 | 0 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; |
5419 | 0 | if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid) { |
5420 | 0 | slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, |
5421 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); |
5422 | 0 | } |
5423 | 0 | if (slot == NULL) { |
5424 | 0 | sidOK = PR_FALSE; |
5425 | 0 | } else { |
5426 | 0 | PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL; |
5427 | 0 | if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) || |
5428 | 0 | ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, |
5429 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, |
5430 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, |
5431 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, |
5432 | 0 | ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL)) { |
5433 | 0 | sidOK = PR_FALSE; |
5434 | 0 | } |
5435 | 0 | if (wrapKey) |
5436 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); |
5437 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
5438 | 0 | slot = NULL; |
5439 | 0 | } |
5440 | 0 | } |
5441 | | /* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that |
5442 | | ** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been |
5443 | | ** removed, etc. |
5444 | | */ |
5445 | 0 | if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) { |
5446 | 0 | sidOK = PR_FALSE; |
5447 | 0 | } |
5448 | |
|
5449 | 0 | if (sidOK) { |
5450 | | /* Set version based on the sid. */ |
5451 | 0 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
5452 | | /* |
5453 | | * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA |
5454 | | * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the |
5455 | | * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the |
5456 | | * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we |
5457 | | * continue to use the client_version used in the initial |
5458 | | * ClientHello when renegotiating. |
5459 | | * |
5460 | | * The client_version of the initial ClientHello is still |
5461 | | * available in ss->clientHelloVersion. Ensure that |
5462 | | * sid->version is bounded within |
5463 | | * [ss->vrange.min, ss->clientHelloVersion], otherwise we |
5464 | | * can't use sid. |
5465 | | */ |
5466 | 0 | if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min && |
5467 | 0 | sid->version <= ss->clientHelloVersion) { |
5468 | 0 | version = ss->clientHelloVersion; |
5469 | 0 | } else { |
5470 | 0 | sidOK = PR_FALSE; |
5471 | 0 | } |
5472 | 0 | } else { |
5473 | | /* |
5474 | | * Check sid->version is OK first. |
5475 | | * Previously, we would cap the version based on sid->version, |
5476 | | * but that prevents negotiation of a higher version if the |
5477 | | * previous session was reduced (e.g., with version fallback) |
5478 | | */ |
5479 | 0 | if (sid->version < ss->vrange.min || |
5480 | 0 | sid->version > ss->vrange.max) { |
5481 | 0 | sidOK = PR_FALSE; |
5482 | 0 | } |
5483 | 0 | } |
5484 | 0 | } |
5485 | |
|
5486 | 0 | if (!sidOK) { |
5487 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok); |
5488 | 0 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
5489 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
5490 | 0 | sid = NULL; |
5491 | 0 | } |
5492 | 0 | } |
5493 | |
|
5494 | 0 | if (sid) { |
5495 | 0 | requestingResume = PR_TRUE; |
5496 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits); |
5497 | |
|
5498 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, |
5499 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); |
5500 | |
|
5501 | 0 | ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy; |
5502 | 0 | } else { |
5503 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses); |
5504 | | |
5505 | | /* |
5506 | | * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA |
5507 | | * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the |
5508 | | * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the |
5509 | | * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we |
5510 | | * continue to use the client_version used in the initial |
5511 | | * ClientHello when renegotiating. |
5512 | | */ |
5513 | 0 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
5514 | 0 | version = ss->clientHelloVersion; |
5515 | 0 | } |
5516 | |
|
5517 | 0 | sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); |
5518 | 0 | if (!sid) { |
5519 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */ |
5520 | 0 | } |
5521 | | /* ss->version isn't set yet, but the sid needs a sane value. */ |
5522 | 0 | sid->version = version; |
5523 | 0 | } |
5524 | | |
5525 | 0 | isTLS = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
5526 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); |
5527 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { |
5528 | | /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ |
5529 | 0 | ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version = version; |
5530 | 0 | } |
5531 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); |
5532 | |
|
5533 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* release the old sid */ |
5534 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; |
5535 | | |
5536 | | /* HACK for SCSV in SSL 3.0. On initial handshake, prepend SCSV, |
5537 | | * only if TLS is disabled. |
5538 | | */ |
5539 | 0 | if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isTLS) { |
5540 | | /* Must set this before calling Hello Extension Senders, |
5541 | | * to suppress sending of empty RI extension. |
5542 | | */ |
5543 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_TRUE; |
5544 | 0 | } |
5545 | | |
5546 | | /* When we attempt session resumption (only), we must lock the sid to |
5547 | | * prevent races with other resumption connections that receive a |
5548 | | * NewSessionTicket that will cause the ticket in the sid to be replaced. |
5549 | | * Once we've copied the session ticket into our ClientHello message, it |
5550 | | * is OK for the ticket to change, so we just need to make sure we hold |
5551 | | * the lock across the calls to ssl_ConstructExtensions. |
5552 | | */ |
5553 | 0 | if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { |
5554 | 0 | unlockNeeded = PR_TRUE; |
5555 | 0 | PR_RWLock_Rlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); |
5556 | 0 | } |
5557 | | |
5558 | | /* Generate a new random if this is the first attempt or renegotiation. */ |
5559 | 0 | if (type == client_hello_initial || |
5560 | 0 | type == client_hello_renegotiation) { |
5561 | 0 | rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(ss->ssl3.hs.client_random); |
5562 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5563 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */ |
5564 | 0 | } |
5565 | 0 | } |
5566 | | |
5567 | 0 | if (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
5568 | 0 | rv = tls13_SetupClientHello(ss, type); |
5569 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5570 | 0 | goto loser; |
5571 | 0 | } |
5572 | 0 | } |
5573 | | |
5574 | | /* Setup TLS ClientHello Extension Permutation? */ |
5575 | 0 | if (type == client_hello_initial && |
5576 | 0 | ss->vrange.max > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && |
5577 | 0 | ss->opt.enableChXtnPermutation) { |
5578 | 0 | rv = tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationSetup(ss); |
5579 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5580 | 0 | goto loser; |
5581 | 0 | } |
5582 | 0 | } |
5583 | | |
5584 | 0 | if (isTLS || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) { |
5585 | 0 | rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_client_hello); |
5586 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5587 | 0 | goto loser; |
5588 | 0 | } |
5589 | 0 | } |
5590 | | |
5591 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5592 | 0 | ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); |
5593 | 0 | } |
5594 | |
|
5595 | 0 | rv = ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble(ss, sid, requestingResume, version, |
5596 | 0 | PR_FALSE, &extensionBuf, &chBuf); |
5597 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5598 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble. */ |
5599 | 0 | } |
5600 | | |
5601 | 0 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { |
5602 | 0 | if (extensionBuf.len) { |
5603 | 0 | rv = tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(ss, &chBuf, &extensionBuf); |
5604 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5605 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by tls13_MaybeGreaseEch. */ |
5606 | 0 | } |
5607 | 0 | rv = ssl_InsertPaddingExtension(ss, chBuf.len, &extensionBuf); |
5608 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5609 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by ssl_InsertPaddingExtension. */ |
5610 | 0 | } |
5611 | | |
5612 | 0 | rv = ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(ss, &chBuf, &extensionBuf); |
5613 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5614 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize. */ |
5615 | 0 | } |
5616 | | |
5617 | | /* If we are sending a PSK binder, replace the dummy value. */ |
5618 | 0 | if (ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { |
5619 | 0 | rv = tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder(ss, &extensionBuf, &chBuf); |
5620 | 0 | } else { |
5621 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&chBuf, extensionBuf.len, 2); |
5622 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5623 | 0 | goto loser; |
5624 | 0 | } |
5625 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(&chBuf, &extensionBuf); |
5626 | 0 | } |
5627 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5628 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by sslBuffer_Append*. */ |
5629 | 0 | } |
5630 | 0 | } |
5631 | | |
5632 | | /* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it. |
5633 | | * This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call |
5634 | | * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary. */ |
5635 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5636 | 0 | rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); |
5637 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5638 | 0 | goto loser; |
5639 | 0 | } |
5640 | 0 | } |
5641 | | |
5642 | | /* As here the function takes the full message and hashes it in one go, |
5643 | | * For DTLS1.3, we skip hashing the unnecessary header fields. |
5644 | | * See ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader. */ |
5645 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
5646 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeSuppressHash(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len); |
5647 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5648 | 0 | goto loser; /* code set */ |
5649 | 0 | } |
5650 | 0 | if (!ss->firstHsDone) { |
5651 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer.len == 0); |
5652 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer); |
5653 | | /* Here instead of computing the hash, we copy the data to a buffer.*/ |
5654 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len); |
5655 | 0 | } |
5656 | 0 | } else { |
5657 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len); |
5658 | 0 | } |
5659 | |
|
5660 | 0 | } else { |
5661 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); |
5662 | 0 | rv = tls13_ConstructClientHelloWithEch(ss, sid, !requestingResume, &chBuf, &extensionBuf); |
5663 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5664 | 0 | goto loser; /* code set */ |
5665 | 0 | } |
5666 | 0 | rv = ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len); |
5667 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5668 | 0 | goto loser; /* code set */ |
5669 | 0 | } |
5670 | | |
5671 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5672 | 0 | rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); |
5673 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5674 | 0 | goto loser; |
5675 | 0 | } |
5676 | 0 | } |
5677 | | /* By default, all messagess are added to both the inner and |
5678 | | * outer transcripts. For CH (or CH2 if HRR), that's problematic. */ |
5679 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeSuppressHash(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len); |
5680 | 0 | } |
5681 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5682 | 0 | goto loser; |
5683 | 0 | } |
5684 | | |
5685 | 0 | if (unlockNeeded) { |
5686 | | /* Note: goto loser can't be used past this point. */ |
5687 | 0 | PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); |
5688 | 0 | } |
5689 | |
|
5690 | 0 | if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) { |
5691 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_stateless_resumes); |
5692 | 0 | } |
5693 | |
|
5694 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { |
5695 | | /* Since we sent the SCSV, pretend we sent empty RI extension. */ |
5696 | 0 | TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; |
5697 | 0 | xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = |
5698 | 0 | ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn; |
5699 | 0 | } |
5700 | |
|
5701 | 0 | flags = 0; |
5702 | 0 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); |
5703 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5704 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ |
5705 | 0 | } |
5706 | | |
5707 | 0 | if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
5708 | 0 | rv = tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(ss); |
5709 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
5710 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* error code set already. */ |
5711 | 0 | } |
5712 | 0 | } |
5713 | | |
5714 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello; |
5715 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&chBuf); |
5716 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); |
5717 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
5718 | | |
5719 | 0 | loser: |
5720 | 0 | if (unlockNeeded) { |
5721 | 0 | PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); |
5722 | 0 | } |
5723 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&chBuf); |
5724 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); |
5725 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5726 | 0 | } |
5727 | | |
5728 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a |
5729 | | * complete ssl3 Hello Request. |
5730 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
5731 | | */ |
5732 | | static SECStatus |
5733 | | ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) |
5734 | 0 | { |
5735 | 0 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
5736 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
5737 | |
|
5738 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake", |
5739 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
5740 | |
|
5741 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
5742 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
5743 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); |
5744 | |
|
5745 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) |
5746 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
5747 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) { |
5748 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
5749 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); |
5750 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5751 | 0 | } |
5752 | 0 | if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { |
5753 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation); |
5754 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); |
5755 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5756 | 0 | } |
5757 | | |
5758 | 0 | if (sid) { |
5759 | 0 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
5760 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
5761 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; |
5762 | 0 | } |
5763 | |
|
5764 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
5765 | 0 | dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); |
5766 | 0 | } |
5767 | |
|
5768 | 0 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); |
5769 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation); |
5770 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
5771 | |
|
5772 | 0 | return rv; |
5773 | 0 | } |
5774 | | |
5775 | | static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapMechanismList[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS] = { |
5776 | | CKM_DES3_ECB, |
5777 | | CKM_CAST5_ECB, |
5778 | | CKM_DES_ECB, |
5779 | | CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS, |
5780 | | CKM_IDEA_ECB, |
5781 | | CKM_CAST3_ECB, |
5782 | | CKM_CAST_ECB, |
5783 | | CKM_RC5_ECB, |
5784 | | CKM_RC2_ECB, |
5785 | | CKM_CDMF_ECB, |
5786 | | CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, |
5787 | | CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, |
5788 | | CKM_AES_ECB, |
5789 | | CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB, |
5790 | | CKM_SEED_ECB |
5791 | | }; |
5792 | | |
5793 | | static SECStatus |
5794 | | ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, unsigned int *wrapMechIndex) |
5795 | 0 | { |
5796 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
5797 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) { |
5798 | 0 | if (wrapMechanismList[i] == mech) { |
5799 | 0 | *wrapMechIndex = i; |
5800 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
5801 | 0 | } |
5802 | 0 | } |
5803 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
5804 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
5805 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5806 | 0 | } |
5807 | | |
5808 | | /* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of SymKey |
5809 | | * pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap the master |
5810 | | * secrets. There is one key for each authentication type. These Symkeys |
5811 | | * correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache. |
5812 | | */ |
5813 | | const SSLAuthType ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS] = { |
5814 | | ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, |
5815 | | ssl_auth_rsa_sign, |
5816 | | ssl_auth_rsa_pss, |
5817 | | ssl_auth_ecdsa, |
5818 | | ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, |
5819 | | ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa |
5820 | | }; |
5821 | | |
5822 | | static SECStatus |
5823 | | ssl_FindIndexByWrapKey(const sslServerCert *serverCert, unsigned int *wrapKeyIndex) |
5824 | 0 | { |
5825 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
5826 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS; ++i) { |
5827 | 0 | if (SSL_CERT_IS(serverCert, ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[i])) { |
5828 | 0 | *wrapKeyIndex = i; |
5829 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
5830 | 0 | } |
5831 | 0 | } |
5832 | | /* Can't assert here because we still get people using DSA certificates. */ |
5833 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
5834 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5835 | 0 | } |
5836 | | |
5837 | | static PK11SymKey * |
5838 | | ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey( |
5839 | | SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk, |
5840 | | SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey, |
5841 | | unsigned int wrapKeyIndex, |
5842 | | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, |
5843 | | void *pwArg) |
5844 | 0 | { |
5845 | 0 | PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; |
5846 | 0 | SECItem wrappedKey; |
5847 | 0 | PK11SymKey *Ks; |
5848 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey pubWrapKey; |
5849 | 0 | ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; |
5850 | | |
5851 | | /* found the wrapping key on disk. */ |
5852 | 0 | PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech); |
5853 | 0 | PORT_Assert(pWswk->wrapKeyIndex == wrapKeyIndex); |
5854 | 0 | if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech || |
5855 | 0 | pWswk->wrapKeyIndex != wrapKeyIndex) { |
5856 | 0 | goto loser; |
5857 | 0 | } |
5858 | 0 | wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; |
5859 | 0 | wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; |
5860 | 0 | wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen; |
5861 | 0 | PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); |
5862 | |
|
5863 | 0 | switch (ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[wrapKeyIndex]) { |
5864 | | |
5865 | 0 | case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt: |
5866 | 0 | case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */ |
5867 | 0 | unwrappedWrappingKey = |
5868 | 0 | PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey, |
5869 | 0 | masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0); |
5870 | 0 | break; |
5871 | | |
5872 | 0 | case ssl_auth_ecdsa: |
5873 | 0 | case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa: |
5874 | 0 | case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa: |
5875 | | /* |
5876 | | * For ssl_auth_ecd*, we first create an EC public key based on |
5877 | | * data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next, |
5878 | | * we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and |
5879 | | * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting |
5880 | | * shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e., |
5881 | | * it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key. |
5882 | | * |
5883 | | * The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined |
5884 | | * in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. |
5885 | | */ |
5886 | 0 | ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; |
5887 | |
|
5888 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + |
5889 | 0 | ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <= |
5890 | 0 | MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); |
5891 | |
|
5892 | 0 | if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + |
5893 | 0 | ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen > |
5894 | 0 | MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { |
5895 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
5896 | 0 | goto loser; |
5897 | 0 | } |
5898 | | |
5899 | 0 | pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey; |
5900 | 0 | pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size; |
5901 | 0 | pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; |
5902 | 0 | pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var; |
5903 | 0 | pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen; |
5904 | 0 | pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var + |
5905 | 0 | ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; |
5906 | |
|
5907 | 0 | wrappedKey.len = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen; |
5908 | 0 | wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + |
5909 | 0 | ecWrapped->pubValueLen; |
5910 | | |
5911 | | /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ |
5912 | 0 | Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, |
5913 | 0 | NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, |
5914 | 0 | CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); |
5915 | 0 | if (Ks == NULL) { |
5916 | 0 | goto loser; |
5917 | 0 | } |
5918 | | |
5919 | | /* Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */ |
5920 | 0 | unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL, |
5921 | 0 | &wrappedKey, masterWrapMech, |
5922 | 0 | CKA_UNWRAP, 0); |
5923 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); |
5924 | |
|
5925 | 0 | break; |
5926 | | |
5927 | 0 | default: |
5928 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
5929 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
5930 | 0 | goto loser; |
5931 | 0 | } |
5932 | 0 | loser: |
5933 | 0 | return unwrappedWrappingKey; |
5934 | 0 | } |
5935 | | |
5936 | | typedef struct { |
5937 | | PK11SymKey *symWrapKey[SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS]; |
5938 | | } ssl3SymWrapKey; |
5939 | | |
5940 | | static PZLock *symWrapKeysLock = NULL; |
5941 | | static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS]; |
5942 | | |
5943 | | SECStatus |
5944 | | ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void) |
5945 | 1 | { |
5946 | 1 | if (symWrapKeysLock) { |
5947 | 1 | PZ_DestroyLock(symWrapKeysLock); |
5948 | 1 | symWrapKeysLock = NULL; |
5949 | 1 | return SECSuccess; |
5950 | 1 | } |
5951 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); |
5952 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
5953 | 1 | } |
5954 | | |
5955 | | SECStatus |
5956 | | SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void) |
5957 | 1 | { |
5958 | 1 | int i, j; |
5959 | | |
5960 | 1 | if (!symWrapKeysLock) |
5961 | 0 | return SECSuccess; /* lock was never initialized */ |
5962 | 1 | PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); |
5963 | | /* get rid of all symWrapKeys */ |
5964 | 16 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) { |
5965 | 105 | for (j = 0; j < SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS; ++j) { |
5966 | 90 | PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey; |
5967 | 90 | pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j]; |
5968 | 90 | if (*pSymWrapKey) { |
5969 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey); |
5970 | 0 | *pSymWrapKey = NULL; |
5971 | 0 | } |
5972 | 90 | } |
5973 | 15 | } |
5974 | | |
5975 | 1 | PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); |
5976 | 1 | ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks(); |
5977 | 1 | return SECSuccess; |
5978 | 1 | } |
5979 | | |
5980 | | SECStatus |
5981 | | ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void) |
5982 | 1 | { |
5983 | 1 | symWrapKeysLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther); |
5984 | 1 | return symWrapKeysLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; |
5985 | 1 | } |
5986 | | |
5987 | | /* Try to get wrapping key for mechanism from in-memory array. |
5988 | | * If that fails, look for one on disk. |
5989 | | * If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk, |
5990 | | * Put the new key in the in-memory array. |
5991 | | * |
5992 | | * Note that this function performs some fairly inadvisable functions with |
5993 | | * certificate private keys. ECDSA keys are used with ECDH; similarly, RSA |
5994 | | * signing keys are used to encrypt. Bug 1248320. |
5995 | | */ |
5996 | | PK11SymKey * |
5997 | | ssl3_GetWrappingKey(sslSocket *ss, |
5998 | | PK11SlotInfo *masterSecretSlot, |
5999 | | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, |
6000 | | void *pwArg) |
6001 | 0 | { |
6002 | 0 | SSLAuthType authType; |
6003 | 0 | SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey; |
6004 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = NULL; |
6005 | 0 | PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; |
6006 | 0 | PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey; |
6007 | 0 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; |
6008 | 0 | int length; |
6009 | 0 | unsigned int wrapMechIndex; |
6010 | 0 | unsigned int wrapKeyIndex; |
6011 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
6012 | 0 | SECItem wrappedKey; |
6013 | 0 | SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk; |
6014 | 0 | PK11SymKey *Ks = NULL; |
6015 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubWrapKey = NULL; |
6016 | 0 | SECKEYPrivateKey *privWrapKey = NULL; |
6017 | 0 | ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; |
6018 | 0 | const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert; |
6019 | |
|
6020 | 0 | PORT_Assert(serverCert); |
6021 | 0 | PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair); |
6022 | 0 | PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey); |
6023 | 0 | PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey); |
6024 | 0 | if (!serverCert || !serverCert->serverKeyPair || |
6025 | 0 | !serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey || |
6026 | 0 | !serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey) { |
6027 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
6028 | 0 | return NULL; /* hmm */ |
6029 | 0 | } |
6030 | | |
6031 | 0 | rv = ssl_FindIndexByWrapKey(serverCert, &wrapKeyIndex); |
6032 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
6033 | 0 | return NULL; /* unusable wrapping key. */ |
6034 | | |
6035 | 0 | rv = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech, &wrapMechIndex); |
6036 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
6037 | 0 | return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */ |
6038 | | |
6039 | 0 | authType = ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[wrapKeyIndex]; |
6040 | 0 | svrPrivKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; |
6041 | 0 | pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[wrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[wrapKeyIndex]; |
6042 | |
|
6043 | 0 | ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE); |
6044 | |
|
6045 | 0 | PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); |
6046 | |
|
6047 | 0 | unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey; |
6048 | 0 | if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) { |
6049 | 0 | if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) { |
6050 | 0 | unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); |
6051 | 0 | goto done; |
6052 | 0 | } |
6053 | | /* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */ |
6054 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); |
6055 | 0 | *pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; |
6056 | 0 | } |
6057 | | |
6058 | | /* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */ |
6059 | | /* Following call fills in wswk on success. */ |
6060 | 0 | rv = ssl_GetWrappingKey(wrapMechIndex, wrapKeyIndex, &wswk); |
6061 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
6062 | | /* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */ |
6063 | 0 | unwrappedWrappingKey = |
6064 | 0 | ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, wrapKeyIndex, |
6065 | 0 | masterWrapMech, pwArg); |
6066 | 0 | if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { |
6067 | 0 | goto install; |
6068 | 0 | } |
6069 | 0 | } |
6070 | | |
6071 | 0 | if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */ |
6072 | 0 | goto loser; |
6073 | | |
6074 | 0 | length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech); |
6075 | | /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. |
6076 | | * It's ambiguous. |
6077 | | */ |
6078 | 0 | unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL, |
6079 | 0 | length, pwArg); |
6080 | 0 | if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) { |
6081 | 0 | goto loser; |
6082 | 0 | } |
6083 | | |
6084 | | /* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey, |
6085 | | * the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key. |
6086 | | */ |
6087 | 0 | PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */ |
6088 | |
|
6089 | 0 | svrPubKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey; |
6090 | 0 | wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; |
6091 | 0 | wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); |
6092 | 0 | wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; |
6093 | |
|
6094 | 0 | PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); |
6095 | 0 | if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey) |
6096 | 0 | goto loser; |
6097 | | |
6098 | | /* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */ |
6099 | 0 | switch (authType) { |
6100 | 0 | case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt: |
6101 | 0 | case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */ |
6102 | 0 | case ssl_auth_rsa_pss: |
6103 | 0 | asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; |
6104 | 0 | rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey, |
6105 | 0 | unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); |
6106 | 0 | break; |
6107 | | |
6108 | 0 | case ssl_auth_ecdsa: |
6109 | 0 | case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa: |
6110 | 0 | case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa: |
6111 | | /* |
6112 | | * We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH |
6113 | | * computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and |
6114 | | * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting |
6115 | | * shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks, |
6116 | | * i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate |
6117 | | * unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all |
6118 | | * relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in |
6119 | | * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as |
6120 | | * described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. |
6121 | | */ |
6122 | 0 | PORT_Assert(SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) == ecKey); |
6123 | 0 | if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != ecKey) { |
6124 | | /* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */ |
6125 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
6126 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
6127 | 0 | goto ec_cleanup; |
6128 | 0 | } |
6129 | | |
6130 | 0 | privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey( |
6131 | 0 | &svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL); |
6132 | 0 | if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) { |
6133 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
6134 | 0 | goto ec_cleanup; |
6135 | 0 | } |
6136 | | |
6137 | | /* Set the key size in bits */ |
6138 | 0 | if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) { |
6139 | 0 | pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey); |
6140 | 0 | } |
6141 | |
|
6142 | 0 | PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + |
6143 | 0 | pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len < |
6144 | 0 | MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); |
6145 | 0 | if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + |
6146 | 0 | pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >= |
6147 | 0 | MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { |
6148 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); |
6149 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
6150 | 0 | goto ec_cleanup; |
6151 | 0 | } |
6152 | | |
6153 | | /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ |
6154 | 0 | Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, |
6155 | 0 | NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, |
6156 | 0 | CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); |
6157 | 0 | if (Ks == NULL) { |
6158 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
6159 | 0 | goto ec_cleanup; |
6160 | 0 | } |
6161 | | |
6162 | 0 | ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)(wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); |
6163 | 0 | ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size; |
6164 | 0 | ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len; |
6165 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data, |
6166 | 0 | pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len); |
6167 | |
|
6168 | 0 | ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; |
6169 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen, |
6170 | 0 | pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, |
6171 | 0 | pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); |
6172 | |
|
6173 | 0 | wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN - |
6174 | 0 | (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen); |
6175 | 0 | wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + |
6176 | 0 | ecWrapped->pubValueLen; |
6177 | | |
6178 | | /* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */ |
6179 | 0 | rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks, |
6180 | 0 | unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); |
6181 | |
|
6182 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6183 | 0 | goto ec_cleanup; |
6184 | 0 | } |
6185 | | |
6186 | | /* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer |
6187 | | * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset |
6188 | | */ |
6189 | 0 | ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; |
6190 | |
|
6191 | 0 | ec_cleanup: |
6192 | 0 | if (privWrapKey) |
6193 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey); |
6194 | 0 | if (pubWrapKey) |
6195 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey); |
6196 | 0 | if (Ks) |
6197 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); |
6198 | 0 | asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; |
6199 | 0 | break; |
6200 | | |
6201 | 0 | default: |
6202 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
6203 | 0 | break; |
6204 | 0 | } |
6205 | | |
6206 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6207 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
6208 | 0 | goto loser; |
6209 | 0 | } |
6210 | | |
6211 | 0 | PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM); |
6212 | |
|
6213 | 0 | wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; |
6214 | 0 | wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism; |
6215 | 0 | wswk.wrapMechIndex = wrapMechIndex; |
6216 | 0 | wswk.wrapKeyIndex = wrapKeyIndex; |
6217 | 0 | wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; |
6218 | | |
6219 | | /* put it on disk. */ |
6220 | | /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set, |
6221 | | * then abandon the value we just computed and |
6222 | | * use the one we got from the disk. |
6223 | | */ |
6224 | 0 | rv = ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk); |
6225 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
6226 | | /* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk |
6227 | | * has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard |
6228 | | * the key we just created and unwrap this new one. |
6229 | | */ |
6230 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); |
6231 | |
|
6232 | 0 | unwrappedWrappingKey = |
6233 | 0 | ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, wrapKeyIndex, |
6234 | 0 | masterWrapMech, pwArg); |
6235 | 0 | } |
6236 | |
|
6237 | 0 | install: |
6238 | 0 | if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { |
6239 | 0 | *pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); |
6240 | 0 | } |
6241 | |
|
6242 | 0 | loser: |
6243 | 0 | done: |
6244 | 0 | PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); |
6245 | 0 | return unwrappedWrappingKey; |
6246 | 0 | } |
6247 | | |
6248 | | #ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE |
6249 | | /* hexEncode hex encodes |length| bytes from |in| and writes it as |length*2| |
6250 | | * bytes to |out|. */ |
6251 | | static void |
6252 | | hexEncode(char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int length) |
6253 | 0 | { |
6254 | 0 | static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef"; |
6255 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
6256 | |
|
6257 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { |
6258 | 0 | *(out++) = hextable[in[i] >> 4]; |
6259 | 0 | *(out++) = hextable[in[i] & 15]; |
6260 | 0 | } |
6261 | 0 | } |
6262 | | #endif |
6263 | | |
6264 | | /* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ |
6265 | | static SECStatus |
6266 | | ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) |
6267 | 0 | { |
6268 | 0 | PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; |
6269 | 0 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
6270 | 0 | SECItem enc_pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
6271 | 0 | PRBool isTLS; |
6272 | |
|
6273 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
6274 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
6275 | | |
6276 | | /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ |
6277 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); |
6278 | 0 | isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
6279 | |
|
6280 | 0 | pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL); |
6281 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); |
6282 | 0 | if (pms == NULL) { |
6283 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
6284 | 0 | goto loser; |
6285 | 0 | } |
6286 | | |
6287 | | /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */ |
6288 | 0 | unsigned int svrPubKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey); |
6289 | 0 | enc_pms.len = (svrPubKeyBits + 7) / 8; |
6290 | | /* Check that the RSA key isn't larger than 8k bit. */ |
6291 | 0 | if (svrPubKeyBits > SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS) { |
6292 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); |
6293 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
6294 | 0 | goto loser; |
6295 | 0 | } |
6296 | 0 | enc_pms.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len); |
6297 | 0 | if (enc_pms.data == NULL) { |
6298 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */ |
6299 | 0 | } |
6300 | | |
6301 | | /* Wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */ |
6302 | 0 | rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms); |
6303 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6304 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
6305 | 0 | goto loser; |
6306 | 0 | } |
6307 | | |
6308 | 0 | #ifdef TRACE |
6309 | 0 | if (ssl_trace >= 100) { |
6310 | 0 | SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms); |
6311 | 0 | if (extractRV == SECSuccess) { |
6312 | 0 | SECItem *keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms); |
6313 | 0 | if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) { |
6314 | 0 | ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret", |
6315 | 0 | keyData->data, keyData->len); |
6316 | 0 | } |
6317 | 0 | } |
6318 | 0 | } |
6319 | 0 | #endif |
6320 | |
|
6321 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_key_exchange, |
6322 | 0 | isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 |
6323 | 0 | : enc_pms.len); |
6324 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6325 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ |
6326 | 0 | } |
6327 | 0 | if (isTLS) { |
6328 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2); |
6329 | 0 | } else { |
6330 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len); |
6331 | 0 | } |
6332 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6333 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ |
6334 | 0 | } |
6335 | | |
6336 | 0 | rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); |
6337 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); |
6338 | 0 | pms = NULL; |
6339 | |
|
6340 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6341 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
6342 | 0 | goto loser; |
6343 | 0 | } |
6344 | | |
6345 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
6346 | |
|
6347 | 0 | loser: |
6348 | 0 | if (enc_pms.data != NULL) { |
6349 | 0 | PORT_Free(enc_pms.data); |
6350 | 0 | } |
6351 | 0 | if (pms != NULL) { |
6352 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); |
6353 | 0 | } |
6354 | 0 | return rv; |
6355 | 0 | } |
6356 | | |
6357 | | /* DH shares need to be padded to the size of their prime. Some implementations |
6358 | | * require this. TLS 1.3 also requires this. */ |
6359 | | SECStatus |
6360 | | ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(sslBuffer *buf, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, |
6361 | | PRBool appendLength) |
6362 | 1.07k | { |
6363 | 1.07k | SECStatus rv; |
6364 | 1.07k | unsigned int pad = pubKey->u.dh.prime.len - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len; |
6365 | | |
6366 | 1.07k | if (appendLength) { |
6367 | 1.07k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); |
6368 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6369 | 0 | return rv; |
6370 | 0 | } |
6371 | 1.07k | } |
6372 | 1.07k | while (pad) { |
6373 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 1); |
6374 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6375 | 0 | return rv; |
6376 | 0 | } |
6377 | 0 | --pad; |
6378 | 0 | } |
6379 | 1.07k | rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, |
6380 | 1.07k | pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len); |
6381 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6382 | 0 | return rv; |
6383 | 0 | } |
6384 | 1.07k | return SECSuccess; |
6385 | 1.07k | } |
6386 | | |
6387 | | /* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ |
6388 | | static SECStatus |
6389 | | ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) |
6390 | 0 | { |
6391 | 0 | PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; |
6392 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
6393 | 0 | PRBool isTLS; |
6394 | 0 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; |
6395 | |
|
6396 | 0 | const ssl3DHParams *params; |
6397 | 0 | ssl3DHParams customParams; |
6398 | 0 | const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; |
6399 | 0 | static const sslNamedGroupDef customGroupDef = { |
6400 | 0 | ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom, 0, ssl_kea_dh, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_CUSTOM, PR_FALSE |
6401 | 0 | }; |
6402 | 0 | sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; |
6403 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; |
6404 | 0 | PRUint8 dhData[SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS / 8 + 2]; |
6405 | 0 | sslBuffer dhBuf = SSL_BUFFER(dhData); |
6406 | |
|
6407 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
6408 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
6409 | |
|
6410 | 0 | isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
6411 | | |
6412 | | /* Copy DH parameters from server key */ |
6413 | |
|
6414 | 0 | if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != dhKey) { |
6415 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); |
6416 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6417 | 0 | } |
6418 | | |
6419 | | /* Work out the parameters. */ |
6420 | 0 | rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &svrPubKey->u.dh.prime, |
6421 | 0 | &svrPubKey->u.dh.base, |
6422 | 0 | &groupDef, ¶ms); |
6423 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6424 | | /* If we require named groups, we will have already validated the group |
6425 | | * in ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange() */ |
6426 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && |
6427 | 0 | !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups); |
6428 | |
|
6429 | 0 | customParams.name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom; |
6430 | 0 | customParams.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data; |
6431 | 0 | customParams.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len; |
6432 | 0 | customParams.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data; |
6433 | 0 | customParams.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len; |
6434 | 0 | params = &customParams; |
6435 | 0 | groupDef = &customGroupDef; |
6436 | 0 | } |
6437 | 0 | ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; |
6438 | |
|
6439 | 0 | rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); |
6440 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6441 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); |
6442 | 0 | goto loser; |
6443 | 0 | } |
6444 | 0 | pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; |
6445 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", |
6446 | 0 | pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, |
6447 | 0 | pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); |
6448 | |
|
6449 | 0 | if (isTLS) |
6450 | 0 | target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; |
6451 | 0 | else |
6452 | 0 | target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; |
6453 | | |
6454 | | /* Determine the PMS */ |
6455 | 0 | pms = PK11_PubDerive(keyPair->keys->privKey, svrPubKey, |
6456 | 0 | PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, |
6457 | 0 | target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); |
6458 | |
|
6459 | 0 | if (pms == NULL) { |
6460 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
6461 | 0 | goto loser; |
6462 | 0 | } |
6463 | | |
6464 | | /* Note: send the DH share padded to avoid triggering bugs. */ |
6465 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_key_exchange, |
6466 | 0 | params->prime.len + 2); |
6467 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6468 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ |
6469 | 0 | } |
6470 | 0 | rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(&dhBuf, pubKey, PR_TRUE); |
6471 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6472 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare */ |
6473 | 0 | } |
6474 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &dhBuf); |
6475 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6476 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake */ |
6477 | 0 | } |
6478 | | |
6479 | 0 | rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); |
6480 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6481 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
6482 | 0 | goto loser; |
6483 | 0 | } |
6484 | | |
6485 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); |
6486 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); |
6487 | 0 | ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); |
6488 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
6489 | | |
6490 | 0 | loser: |
6491 | 0 | if (pms) |
6492 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); |
6493 | 0 | if (keyPair) |
6494 | 0 | ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); |
6495 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); |
6496 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6497 | 0 | } |
6498 | | |
6499 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ |
6500 | | static SECStatus |
6501 | | ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) |
6502 | 0 | { |
6503 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *serverKey = NULL; |
6504 | 0 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
6505 | |
|
6506 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake", |
6507 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
6508 | |
|
6509 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
6510 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
6511 | |
|
6512 | 0 | if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) { |
6513 | 0 | serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); |
6514 | 0 | if (serverKey == NULL) { |
6515 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); |
6516 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6517 | 0 | } |
6518 | 0 | } else { |
6519 | 0 | serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey; |
6520 | 0 | ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */ |
6521 | 0 | } |
6522 | | |
6523 | 0 | ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; |
6524 | 0 | ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey); |
6525 | |
|
6526 | 0 | switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { |
6527 | 0 | case ssl_kea_rsa: |
6528 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); |
6529 | 0 | break; |
6530 | | |
6531 | 0 | case ssl_kea_dh: |
6532 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); |
6533 | 0 | break; |
6534 | | |
6535 | 0 | case ssl_kea_ecdh: |
6536 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); |
6537 | 0 | break; |
6538 | | |
6539 | 0 | default: |
6540 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
6541 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
6542 | 0 | break; |
6543 | 0 | } |
6544 | | |
6545 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange", |
6546 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
6547 | |
|
6548 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey); |
6549 | 0 | return rv; /* err code already set. */ |
6550 | 0 | } |
6551 | | |
6552 | | /* Used by ssl_PickSignatureScheme(). */ |
6553 | | PRBool |
6554 | | ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, |
6555 | | const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes, |
6556 | | unsigned int peerSchemeCount, |
6557 | | PRBool requireSha1, |
6558 | | PRBool slotDoesPss) |
6559 | 770 | { |
6560 | 770 | SSLHashType hashType; |
6561 | 770 | unsigned int i; |
6562 | | |
6563 | | /* Skip RSA-PSS schemes when the certificate's private key slot does |
6564 | | * not support this signature mechanism. */ |
6565 | 770 | if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme) && !slotDoesPss) { |
6566 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
6567 | 0 | } |
6568 | | |
6569 | 770 | hashType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme); |
6570 | 770 | if (requireSha1 && (hashType != ssl_hash_sha1)) { |
6571 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
6572 | 0 | } |
6573 | | |
6574 | 770 | if (!ssl_SchemePolicyOK(scheme, kSSLSigSchemePolicy)) { |
6575 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
6576 | 0 | } |
6577 | | |
6578 | 4.47k | for (i = 0; i < peerSchemeCount; i++) { |
6579 | 3.95k | if (peerSchemes[i] == scheme) { |
6580 | 253 | return PR_TRUE; |
6581 | 253 | } |
6582 | 3.95k | } |
6583 | 517 | return PR_FALSE; |
6584 | 770 | } |
6585 | | |
6586 | | SECStatus |
6587 | | ssl_PrivateKeySupportsRsaPss(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, CERTCertificate *cert, |
6588 | | void *pwarg, PRBool *supportsRsaPss) |
6589 | 275 | { |
6590 | 275 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; |
6591 | 275 | if (privKey) { |
6592 | 275 | slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); |
6593 | 275 | } else { |
6594 | 0 | CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certID = PK11_FindObjectForCert(cert, pwarg, &slot); |
6595 | 0 | if (certID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { |
6596 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
6597 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6598 | 0 | } |
6599 | 0 | } |
6600 | 275 | if (!slot) { |
6601 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
6602 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6603 | 0 | } |
6604 | 275 | *supportsRsaPss = PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss]); |
6605 | 275 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
6606 | 275 | return SECSuccess; |
6607 | 275 | } |
6608 | | |
6609 | | SECStatus |
6610 | | ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, |
6611 | | CERTCertificate *cert, |
6612 | | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, |
6613 | | SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, |
6614 | | const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes, |
6615 | | unsigned int peerSchemeCount, |
6616 | | PRBool requireSha1, |
6617 | | SSLSignatureScheme *schemePtr) |
6618 | 275 | { |
6619 | 275 | unsigned int i; |
6620 | 275 | PRBool doesRsaPss; |
6621 | 275 | PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
6622 | 275 | SECStatus rv; |
6623 | 275 | SSLSignatureScheme scheme; |
6624 | 275 | SECOidTag spkiOid; |
6625 | | |
6626 | | /* We can't require SHA-1 in TLS 1.3. */ |
6627 | 275 | PORT_Assert(!(requireSha1 && isTLS13)); |
6628 | 275 | if (!pubKey || !cert) { |
6629 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
6630 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
6631 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6632 | 0 | } |
6633 | 275 | rv = ssl_PrivateKeySupportsRsaPss(privKey, cert, ss->pkcs11PinArg, |
6634 | 275 | &doesRsaPss); |
6635 | 275 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6636 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6637 | 0 | } |
6638 | | |
6639 | | /* If the certificate SPKI indicates a single scheme, don't search. */ |
6640 | 275 | rv = ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo, |
6641 | 275 | isTLS13, &scheme); |
6642 | 275 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6643 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6644 | 0 | } |
6645 | 275 | if (scheme != ssl_sig_none) { |
6646 | 0 | if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme) || |
6647 | 0 | !ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(scheme, peerSchemes, peerSchemeCount, |
6648 | 0 | requireSha1, doesRsaPss)) { |
6649 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
6650 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6651 | 0 | } |
6652 | 0 | *schemePtr = scheme; |
6653 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
6654 | 0 | } |
6655 | | |
6656 | 275 | spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm); |
6657 | 275 | if (spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) { |
6658 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6659 | 0 | } |
6660 | | |
6661 | | /* Now we have to search based on the key type. Go through our preferred |
6662 | | * schemes in order and find the first that can be used. */ |
6663 | 1.84k | for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { |
6664 | 1.82k | scheme = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; |
6665 | | |
6666 | 1.82k | if (ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13) && |
6667 | 1.82k | ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(scheme, peerSchemes, peerSchemeCount, |
6668 | 770 | requireSha1, doesRsaPss)) { |
6669 | 253 | *schemePtr = scheme; |
6670 | 253 | return SECSuccess; |
6671 | 253 | } |
6672 | 1.82k | } |
6673 | | |
6674 | 22 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
6675 | 22 | return SECFailure; |
6676 | 275 | } |
6677 | | |
6678 | | static SECStatus |
6679 | | ssl_PickFallbackSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) |
6680 | 4.77k | { |
6681 | 4.77k | PRBool isTLS12 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; |
6682 | | |
6683 | 4.77k | switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) { |
6684 | 4.53k | case rsaKey: |
6685 | 4.53k | if (isTLS12) { |
6686 | 4.53k | ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1; |
6687 | 4.53k | } else { |
6688 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5; |
6689 | 0 | } |
6690 | 4.53k | break; |
6691 | 244 | case ecKey: |
6692 | 244 | ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1; |
6693 | 244 | break; |
6694 | 0 | case dsaKey: |
6695 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1; |
6696 | 0 | break; |
6697 | 0 | default: |
6698 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
6699 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); |
6700 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6701 | 4.77k | } |
6702 | 4.77k | return SECSuccess; |
6703 | 4.77k | } |
6704 | | |
6705 | | /* ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme selects a signature scheme for signing the |
6706 | | * handshake. Most of this is determined by the key pair we are using. |
6707 | | * Prior to TLS 1.2, the MD5/SHA1 combination is always used. With TLS 1.2, a |
6708 | | * client may advertise its support for signature and hash combinations. */ |
6709 | | static SECStatus |
6710 | | ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss) |
6711 | 5.05k | { |
6712 | 5.05k | const sslServerCert *cert = ss->sec.serverCert; |
6713 | 5.05k | PRBool isTLS12 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; |
6714 | | |
6715 | 5.05k | if (!isTLS12 || !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn)) { |
6716 | | /* If the client didn't provide any signature_algorithms extension then |
6717 | | * we can assume that they support SHA-1: RFC5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1. */ |
6718 | 4.77k | return ssl_PickFallbackSignatureScheme(ss, cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey); |
6719 | 4.77k | } |
6720 | | |
6721 | | /* Sets error code, if needed. */ |
6722 | 275 | return ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, cert->serverCert, |
6723 | 275 | cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey, |
6724 | 275 | cert->serverKeyPair->privKey, |
6725 | 275 | ss->xtnData.sigSchemes, |
6726 | 275 | ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes, |
6727 | 275 | PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */, |
6728 | 275 | &ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); |
6729 | 5.05k | } |
6730 | | |
6731 | | SECStatus |
6732 | | ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, CERTCertificate *clientCertificate, |
6733 | | SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, |
6734 | | const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, |
6735 | | unsigned int numSchemes, |
6736 | | SSLSignatureScheme *schemePtr) |
6737 | 0 | { |
6738 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
6739 | 0 | PRBool isTLS13 = (PRBool)ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
6740 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(clientCertificate); |
6741 | |
|
6742 | 0 | PORT_Assert(pubKey); |
6743 | |
|
6744 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
6745 | | /* We should have already checked that a signature scheme was |
6746 | | * listed in the request. */ |
6747 | 0 | PORT_Assert(schemes && numSchemes > 0); |
6748 | 0 | } |
6749 | |
|
6750 | 0 | if (!isTLS13 && |
6751 | 0 | (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == rsaKey || |
6752 | 0 | SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == dsaKey) && |
6753 | 0 | SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey) <= 1024) { |
6754 | | /* If the key is a 1024-bit RSA or DSA key, assume conservatively that |
6755 | | * it may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes. This is the case for older |
6756 | | * Estonian ID cards that have 1024-bit RSA keys. In FIPS 186-2 and |
6757 | | * older, DSA key size is at most 1024 bits and the hash function must |
6758 | | * be SHA-1. |
6759 | | */ |
6760 | 0 | rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, clientCertificate, |
6761 | 0 | pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes, |
6762 | 0 | PR_TRUE /* requireSha1 */, schemePtr); |
6763 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
6764 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); |
6765 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
6766 | 0 | } |
6767 | | /* If this fails, that's because the peer doesn't advertise SHA-1, |
6768 | | * so fall back to the full negotiation. */ |
6769 | 0 | } |
6770 | 0 | rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, clientCertificate, |
6771 | 0 | pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes, |
6772 | 0 | PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */, schemePtr); |
6773 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); |
6774 | 0 | return rv; |
6775 | 0 | } |
6776 | | |
6777 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ |
6778 | | static SECStatus |
6779 | | ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) |
6780 | 0 | { |
6781 | 0 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
6782 | 0 | PRBool isTLS12; |
6783 | 0 | SECItem buf = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
6784 | 0 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
6785 | 0 | unsigned int len; |
6786 | 0 | SSLHashType hashAlg; |
6787 | |
|
6788 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
6789 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
6790 | |
|
6791 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake", |
6792 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
6793 | |
|
6794 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); |
6795 | |
|
6796 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { |
6797 | 0 | hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); |
6798 | 0 | } else { |
6799 | | /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ |
6800 | 0 | hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; |
6801 | 0 | } |
6802 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record && |
6803 | 0 | hashAlg != ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss)) { |
6804 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, |
6805 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, |
6806 | 0 | hashAlg, &hashes); |
6807 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6808 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); |
6809 | 0 | } |
6810 | 0 | } else { |
6811 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0); |
6812 | 0 | } |
6813 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); |
6814 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6815 | 0 | goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(es) */ |
6816 | 0 | } |
6817 | | |
6818 | 0 | isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); |
6819 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); |
6820 | |
|
6821 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, privKey, &buf); |
6822 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess && !ss->sec.isServer) { |
6823 | | /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. |
6824 | | ** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. |
6825 | | ** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. |
6826 | | */ |
6827 | 0 | PK11SlotInfo *slot; |
6828 | 0 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
6829 | |
|
6830 | 0 | slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); |
6831 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); |
6832 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); |
6833 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); |
6834 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE; |
6835 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
6836 | 0 | } |
6837 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6838 | 0 | goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ |
6839 | 0 | } |
6840 | | |
6841 | 0 | len = buf.len + 2 + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0); |
6842 | |
|
6843 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, len); |
6844 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6845 | 0 | goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ |
6846 | 0 | } |
6847 | 0 | if (isTLS12) { |
6848 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); |
6849 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6850 | 0 | goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
6851 | 0 | } |
6852 | 0 | } |
6853 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2); |
6854 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
6855 | 0 | goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ |
6856 | 0 | } |
6857 | | |
6858 | 0 | done: |
6859 | 0 | if (buf.data) |
6860 | 0 | PORT_Free(buf.data); |
6861 | 0 | return rv; |
6862 | 0 | } |
6863 | | |
6864 | | /* Once a cipher suite has been selected, make sure that the necessary secondary |
6865 | | * information is properly set. */ |
6866 | | SECStatus |
6867 | | ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, PRBool initHashes) |
6868 | 6.06k | { |
6869 | 6.06k | ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite); |
6870 | 6.06k | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { |
6871 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
6872 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
6873 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6874 | 0 | } |
6875 | | |
6876 | 6.06k | ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->key_exchange_alg]; |
6877 | 6.06k | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite; |
6878 | | |
6879 | 6.06k | if (!initHashes) { |
6880 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
6881 | 0 | } |
6882 | | /* Now we have a cipher suite, initialize the handshake hashes. */ |
6883 | 6.06k | return ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); |
6884 | 6.06k | } |
6885 | | |
6886 | | SECStatus |
6887 | | ssl_ClientSetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion version, |
6888 | | ssl3CipherSuite suite, PRBool initHashes) |
6889 | 0 | { |
6890 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
6891 | 0 | if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { |
6892 | 0 | PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); |
6893 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6894 | 0 | } |
6895 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { |
6896 | 0 | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suiteCfg = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; |
6897 | 0 | if (suite == suiteCfg->cipher_suite) { |
6898 | 0 | SSLVersionRange vrange = { version, version }; |
6899 | 0 | if (!ssl3_config_match(suiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { |
6900 | | /* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is |
6901 | | * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here |
6902 | | * in order to give a more precise error code. */ |
6903 | 0 | if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite, &vrange)) { |
6904 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION); |
6905 | 0 | } else { |
6906 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); |
6907 | 0 | } |
6908 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6909 | 0 | } |
6910 | 0 | break; |
6911 | 0 | } |
6912 | 0 | } |
6913 | 0 | if (i >= ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED) { |
6914 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); |
6915 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6916 | 0 | } |
6917 | | |
6918 | | /* Don't let the server change its mind. */ |
6919 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && suite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { |
6920 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); |
6921 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO); |
6922 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
6923 | 0 | } |
6924 | | |
6925 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)suite; |
6926 | 0 | return ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, initHashes); |
6927 | 0 | } |
6928 | | |
6929 | | /* Check that session ID we received from the server, if any, matches our |
6930 | | * expectations, depending on whether we're in compat mode and whether we |
6931 | | * negotiated TLS 1.3+ or TLS 1.2-. |
6932 | | */ |
6933 | | static PRBool |
6934 | | ssl_CheckServerSessionIdCorrectness(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *sidBytes) |
6935 | 0 | { |
6936 | 0 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
6937 | 0 | PRBool sidMatch = PR_FALSE; |
6938 | 0 | PRBool sentFakeSid = PR_FALSE; |
6939 | 0 | PRBool sentRealSid = sid && sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
6940 | | |
6941 | | /* If attempting to resume a TLS 1.2 connection, the session ID won't be a |
6942 | | * fake. Check for the real value. */ |
6943 | 0 | if (sentRealSid) { |
6944 | 0 | sidMatch = (sidBytes->len == sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) && |
6945 | 0 | (!sidBytes->len || PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len) == 0); |
6946 | 0 | } else { |
6947 | | /* Otherwise, the session ID was a fake if TLS 1.3 compat mode is |
6948 | | * enabled. If so, check for the fake value. */ |
6949 | 0 | sentFakeSid = ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss); |
6950 | 0 | if (sentFakeSid && sidBytes->len == SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { |
6951 | 0 | PRUint8 buf[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES]; |
6952 | 0 | ssl_MakeFakeSid(ss, buf); |
6953 | 0 | sidMatch = PORT_Memcmp(buf, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len) == 0; |
6954 | 0 | } |
6955 | 0 | } |
6956 | | |
6957 | | /* TLS 1.2: Session ID shouldn't match if we sent a fake. */ |
6958 | 0 | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
6959 | 0 | if (sentFakeSid) { |
6960 | 0 | return !sidMatch; |
6961 | 0 | } |
6962 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
6963 | 0 | } |
6964 | | |
6965 | | /* TLS 1.3: We sent a session ID. The server's should match. */ |
6966 | 0 | if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && (sentRealSid || sentFakeSid)) { |
6967 | 0 | return sidMatch; |
6968 | 0 | } |
6969 | | |
6970 | | /* TLS 1.3 (no SID)/DTLS 1.3: The server shouldn't send a session ID. */ |
6971 | 0 | return sidBytes->len == 0; |
6972 | 0 | } |
6973 | | |
6974 | | static SECStatus |
6975 | | ssl_CheckServerRandom(sslSocket *ss) |
6976 | 0 | { |
6977 | | /* Check the ServerHello.random per [RFC 8446 Section 4.1.3]. |
6978 | | * |
6979 | | * TLS 1.3 clients receiving a ServerHello indicating TLS 1.2 or below |
6980 | | * MUST check that the last 8 bytes are not equal to either of these |
6981 | | * values. TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last 8 bytes are |
6982 | | * not equal to the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS 1.1 or |
6983 | | * below. If a match is found, the client MUST abort the handshake with |
6984 | | * an "illegal_parameter" alert. |
6985 | | */ |
6986 | 0 | SSL3ProtocolVersion checkVersion = |
6987 | 0 | ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion ? ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion |
6988 | 0 | : ss->vrange.max; |
6989 | |
|
6990 | 0 | if (checkVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 && |
6991 | 0 | checkVersion > ss->version) { |
6992 | | /* Both sections use the same sentinel region. */ |
6993 | 0 | PRUint8 *downgrade_sentinel = |
6994 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.server_random + |
6995 | 0 | SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random); |
6996 | |
|
6997 | 0 | if (!PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel, |
6998 | 0 | tls12_downgrade_random, |
6999 | 0 | sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random)) || |
7000 | 0 | !PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel, |
7001 | 0 | tls1_downgrade_random, |
7002 | 0 | sizeof(tls1_downgrade_random))) { |
7003 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7004 | 0 | } |
7005 | 0 | } |
7006 | | |
7007 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
7008 | 0 | } |
7009 | | |
7010 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete |
7011 | | * ssl3 ServerHello message. |
7012 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
7013 | | */ |
7014 | | static SECStatus |
7015 | | ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
7016 | 0 | { |
7017 | 0 | PRUint32 cipher; |
7018 | 0 | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; |
7019 | 0 | PRUint32 compression; |
7020 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
7021 | 0 | SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
7022 | 0 | PRBool isHelloRetry; |
7023 | 0 | SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; |
7024 | 0 | const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b; |
7025 | 0 | const PRUint32 savedLength = length; |
7026 | |
|
7027 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake", |
7028 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
7029 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
7030 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
7031 | |
|
7032 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) { |
7033 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO; |
7034 | 0 | desc = unexpected_message; |
7035 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7036 | 0 | } |
7037 | | |
7038 | | /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */ |
7039 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { |
7040 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); |
7041 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; |
7042 | 0 | } |
7043 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) { |
7044 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); |
7045 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; |
7046 | 0 | } |
7047 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) { |
7048 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); |
7049 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; |
7050 | 0 | } |
7051 | | // TODO(djackson) - Bob removed this. Why? |
7052 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes != NULL) { |
7053 | 0 | PR_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes); |
7054 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL; |
7055 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; |
7056 | 0 | } |
7057 | | |
7058 | | /* Note that if the server selects TLS 1.3, this will set the version to TLS |
7059 | | * 1.2. We will amend that once all other fields have been read. */ |
7060 | 0 | rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &b, &length, &ss->version); |
7061 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7062 | 0 | goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ |
7063 | 0 | } |
7064 | | |
7065 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( |
7066 | 0 | ss, ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); |
7067 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7068 | 0 | goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ |
7069 | 0 | } |
7070 | 0 | isHelloRetry = !PORT_Memcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, |
7071 | 0 | ssl_hello_retry_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
7072 | |
|
7073 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); |
7074 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7075 | 0 | goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ |
7076 | 0 | } |
7077 | 0 | if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { |
7078 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0) |
7079 | 0 | desc = decode_error; |
7080 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ |
7081 | 0 | } |
7082 | | |
7083 | | /* Read the cipher suite. */ |
7084 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &cipher, 2, &b, &length); |
7085 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7086 | 0 | goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ |
7087 | 0 | } |
7088 | | |
7089 | | /* Compression method. */ |
7090 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &compression, 1, &b, &length); |
7091 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7092 | 0 | goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ |
7093 | 0 | } |
7094 | 0 | if (compression != ssl_compression_null) { |
7095 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
7096 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; |
7097 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7098 | 0 | } |
7099 | | |
7100 | | /* Parse extensions. */ |
7101 | 0 | if (length != 0) { |
7102 | 0 | PRUint32 extensionLength; |
7103 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extensionLength, 2, &b, &length); |
7104 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7105 | 0 | goto loser; /* alert already sent */ |
7106 | 0 | } |
7107 | 0 | if (extensionLength != length) { |
7108 | 0 | desc = decode_error; |
7109 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7110 | 0 | } |
7111 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); |
7112 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7113 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ |
7114 | 0 | } |
7115 | 0 | } |
7116 | | |
7117 | | /* Read supported_versions if present. */ |
7118 | 0 | rv = tls13_ClientReadSupportedVersion(ss); |
7119 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7120 | 0 | goto loser; |
7121 | 0 | } |
7122 | | |
7123 | | /* RFC 9147. 5.2. |
7124 | | * DTLS Handshake Message Format states the difference between the computation |
7125 | | * of the transcript if the version is DTLS1.2 or DTLS1.3. |
7126 | | * |
7127 | | * At this moment we are sure which version |
7128 | | * we are planning to use during the connection, so we can compute the hash. */ |
7129 | 0 | rv = ssl3_MaybeUpdateHashWithSavedRecord(ss); |
7130 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7131 | 0 | goto loser; |
7132 | 0 | } |
7133 | | |
7134 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)); |
7135 | | /* Check that the version is within the configured range. */ |
7136 | 0 | if (ss->vrange.min > ss->version || ss->vrange.max < ss->version) { |
7137 | 0 | desc = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) |
7138 | 0 | ? protocol_version |
7139 | 0 | : handshake_failure; |
7140 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; |
7141 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7142 | 0 | } |
7143 | | |
7144 | 0 | if (isHelloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
7145 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: received a second hello_retry_request", |
7146 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
7147 | 0 | desc = unexpected_message; |
7148 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; |
7149 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7150 | 0 | } |
7151 | | |
7152 | | /* There are three situations in which the server must pick |
7153 | | * TLS 1.3. |
7154 | | * |
7155 | | * 1. We received HRR |
7156 | | * 2. We sent early app data |
7157 | | * 3. ECH was accepted (checked in MaybeHandleEchSignal) |
7158 | | * |
7159 | | * If we offered ECH and the server negotiated a lower version, |
7160 | | * authenticate to the public name for secure disablement. |
7161 | | * |
7162 | | */ |
7163 | 0 | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
7164 | 0 | if (isHelloRetry || ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
7165 | | /* SSL3_SendAlert() will uncache the SID. */ |
7166 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
7167 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; |
7168 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7169 | 0 | } |
7170 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { |
7171 | | /* SSL3_SendAlert() will uncache the SID. */ |
7172 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
7173 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_DOWNGRADE_WITH_EARLY_DATA; |
7174 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7175 | 0 | } |
7176 | 0 | } |
7177 | | |
7178 | | /* Check that the server negotiated the same version as it did |
7179 | | * in the first handshake. This isn't really the best place for |
7180 | | * us to be getting this version number, but it's what we have. |
7181 | | * (1294697). */ |
7182 | 0 | if (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->version != ss->ssl3.crSpec->version)) { |
7183 | 0 | desc = protocol_version; |
7184 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; |
7185 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7186 | 0 | } |
7187 | | |
7188 | 0 | if (ss->opt.enableHelloDowngradeCheck) { |
7189 | 0 | rv = ssl_CheckServerRandom(ss); |
7190 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7191 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
7192 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; |
7193 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7194 | 0 | } |
7195 | 0 | } |
7196 | | |
7197 | | /* Finally, now all the version-related checks have passed. */ |
7198 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; |
7199 | | /* Update the write cipher spec to match the version. But not after |
7200 | | * HelloRetryRequest, because cwSpec might be a 0-RTT cipher spec, |
7201 | | * in which case this is a no-op. */ |
7202 | 0 | if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isHelloRetry) { |
7203 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); |
7204 | 0 | ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
7205 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); |
7206 | 0 | } |
7207 | | |
7208 | | /* Check that the session ID is as expected. */ |
7209 | 0 | if (!ssl_CheckServerSessionIdCorrectness(ss, &sidBytes)) { |
7210 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
7211 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; |
7212 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7213 | 0 | } |
7214 | | |
7215 | | /* Only initialize hashes if this isn't a Hello Retry. */ |
7216 | 0 | rv = ssl_ClientSetCipherSuite(ss, ss->version, cipher, |
7217 | 0 | !isHelloRetry); |
7218 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7219 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
7220 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
7221 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7222 | 0 | } |
7223 | | |
7224 | 0 | dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); |
7225 | |
|
7226 | 0 | if (isHelloRetry) { |
7227 | 0 | rv = tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(ss, savedMsg, savedLength); |
7228 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7229 | 0 | goto loser; |
7230 | 0 | } |
7231 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
7232 | 0 | } |
7233 | | |
7234 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello); |
7235 | 0 | ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); |
7236 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7237 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7238 | 0 | } |
7239 | | |
7240 | 0 | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, |
7241 | 0 | savedMsg, savedLength); |
7242 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7243 | 0 | goto loser; |
7244 | 0 | } |
7245 | | |
7246 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
7247 | 0 | rv = tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss, savedMsg, savedLength); |
7248 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7249 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
7250 | 0 | goto loser; |
7251 | 0 | } |
7252 | 0 | } else { |
7253 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss, &sidBytes, &errCode); |
7254 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
7255 | 0 | goto loser; |
7256 | 0 | } |
7257 | | |
7258 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech; |
7259 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
7260 | | |
7261 | 0 | alert_loser: |
7262 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
7263 | |
|
7264 | 0 | loser: |
7265 | | /* Clean up the temporary pointer to the handshake buffer. */ |
7266 | 0 | ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; |
7267 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); |
7268 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7269 | 0 | } |
7270 | | |
7271 | | static SECStatus |
7272 | | ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretClient(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey **ms) |
7273 | 0 | { |
7274 | 0 | PK11SlotInfo *slot; |
7275 | 0 | PK11SymKey *wrapKey; |
7276 | 0 | CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; |
7277 | 0 | SECItem wrappedMS = { |
7278 | 0 | siBuffer, |
7279 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, |
7280 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len |
7281 | 0 | }; |
7282 | | |
7283 | | /* unwrap master secret */ |
7284 | 0 | slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, |
7285 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); |
7286 | 0 | if (slot == NULL) { |
7287 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7288 | 0 | } |
7289 | 0 | if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) { |
7290 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
7291 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7292 | 0 | } |
7293 | 0 | wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, |
7294 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, |
7295 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, |
7296 | 0 | ss->pkcs11PinArg); |
7297 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
7298 | 0 | if (wrapKey == NULL) { |
7299 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7300 | 0 | } |
7301 | | |
7302 | 0 | if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ |
7303 | 0 | keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; |
7304 | 0 | } |
7305 | |
|
7306 | 0 | *ms = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, |
7307 | 0 | NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, |
7308 | 0 | CKA_DERIVE, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH, keyFlags); |
7309 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); |
7310 | 0 | if (!*ms) { |
7311 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7312 | 0 | } |
7313 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
7314 | 0 | } |
7315 | | |
7316 | | static SECStatus |
7317 | | ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, |
7318 | | int *retErrCode) |
7319 | 0 | { |
7320 | 0 | SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; |
7321 | 0 | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; |
7322 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
7323 | 0 | PRBool sid_match; |
7324 | 0 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
7325 | |
|
7326 | 0 | if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || |
7327 | 0 | (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->peerRequestedProtection || |
7328 | 0 | ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == |
7329 | 0 | SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN))) && |
7330 | 0 | !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { |
7331 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
7332 | 0 | errCode = ss->firstHsDone ? SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED |
7333 | 0 | : SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; |
7334 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7335 | 0 | } |
7336 | | |
7337 | | /* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */ |
7338 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
7339 | | |
7340 | | /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the |
7341 | | * key exchange algorithm. */ |
7342 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(ss); |
7343 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7344 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */ |
7345 | 0 | } |
7346 | | |
7347 | | /* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or |
7348 | | * not and if so it may match the one we sent. |
7349 | | * Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so... |
7350 | | * Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error. |
7351 | | */ |
7352 | 0 | sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes->len > 0 && |
7353 | 0 | sidBytes->len == |
7354 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength && |
7355 | 0 | !PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, |
7356 | 0 | sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len)); |
7357 | |
|
7358 | 0 | if (sid_match) { |
7359 | 0 | if (sid->version != ss->version || |
7360 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { |
7361 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; |
7362 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7363 | 0 | } |
7364 | 0 | do { |
7365 | 0 | PK11SymKey *masterSecret; |
7366 | | |
7367 | | /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] |
7368 | | * |
7369 | | * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" |
7370 | | * extension but the new ServerHello contains the extension, the |
7371 | | * client MUST abort the handshake. |
7372 | | */ |
7373 | 0 | if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && |
7374 | 0 | ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { |
7375 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; |
7376 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7377 | 0 | } |
7378 | | |
7379 | | /* |
7380 | | * o If the original session used an extended master secret but the new |
7381 | | * ServerHello does not contain the "extended_master_secret" |
7382 | | * extension, the client SHOULD abort the handshake. |
7383 | | * |
7384 | | * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Add option to refuse to resume when EMS is not |
7385 | | * used at all (bug 1176526). |
7386 | | */ |
7387 | 0 | if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && |
7388 | 0 | !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { |
7389 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; |
7390 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7391 | 0 | } |
7392 | | |
7393 | 0 | ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; |
7394 | 0 | ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; |
7395 | 0 | ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; |
7396 | 0 | ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; |
7397 | 0 | ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup); |
7398 | 0 | ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme; |
7399 | |
|
7400 | 0 | rv = ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretClient(ss, sid, &masterSecret); |
7401 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7402 | 0 | break; /* not considered an error */ |
7403 | 0 | } |
7404 | | |
7405 | | /* Got a Match */ |
7406 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits); |
7407 | | |
7408 | | /* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */ |
7409 | 0 | if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) |
7410 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes); |
7411 | |
|
7412 | 0 | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) |
7413 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; |
7414 | 0 | else |
7415 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; |
7416 | |
|
7417 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; |
7418 | | |
7419 | | /* copy the peer cert from the SID */ |
7420 | 0 | if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { |
7421 | 0 | ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); |
7422 | 0 | } |
7423 | | |
7424 | | /* We are re-using the old MS, so no need to derive again. */ |
7425 | 0 | rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, masterSecret, PR_FALSE); |
7426 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7427 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */ |
7428 | 0 | } |
7429 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
7430 | 0 | } while (0); |
7431 | 0 | } |
7432 | | |
7433 | 0 | if (sid_match) |
7434 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok); |
7435 | 0 | else |
7436 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses); |
7437 | | |
7438 | | /* We tried to resume a 1.3 session but the server negotiated 1.2. */ |
7439 | 0 | if (ss->statelessResume) { |
7440 | 0 | PORT_Assert(sid->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); |
7441 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); |
7442 | | |
7443 | | /* Reset resumption state, only used by 1.3 code. */ |
7444 | 0 | ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; |
7445 | | |
7446 | | /* Clear TLS 1.3 early data traffic key. */ |
7447 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); |
7448 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; |
7449 | 0 | } |
7450 | | |
7451 | | /* throw the old one away */ |
7452 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE; |
7453 | 0 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
7454 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
7455 | | |
7456 | | /* get a new sid */ |
7457 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); |
7458 | 0 | if (sid == NULL) { |
7459 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */ |
7460 | 0 | } |
7461 | | |
7462 | 0 | sid->version = ss->version; |
7463 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes->len; |
7464 | 0 | if (sidBytes->len > 0) { |
7465 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len); |
7466 | 0 | } |
7467 | |
|
7468 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = |
7469 | 0 | ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); |
7470 | | |
7471 | | /* Copy Signed Certificate Timestamps, if any. */ |
7472 | 0 | if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len) { |
7473 | 0 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, |
7474 | 0 | &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps); |
7475 | 0 | ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; |
7476 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
7477 | 0 | goto loser; |
7478 | 0 | } |
7479 | | |
7480 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; |
7481 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType != ssl_auth_null) { |
7482 | | /* All current cipher suites other than those with ssl_auth_null (i.e., |
7483 | | * (EC)DH_anon_* suites) require a certificate, so use that signal. */ |
7484 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_cert; |
7485 | 0 | } else { |
7486 | | /* All the remaining cipher suites must be (EC)DH_anon_* and so |
7487 | | * must be ephemeral. Note, if we ever add PSK this might |
7488 | | * change. */ |
7489 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral); |
7490 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; |
7491 | 0 | } |
7492 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
7493 | | |
7494 | 0 | alert_loser: |
7495 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
7496 | |
|
7497 | 0 | loser: |
7498 | 0 | *retErrCode = errCode; |
7499 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7500 | 0 | } |
7501 | | |
7502 | | static SECStatus |
7503 | | ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
7504 | 0 | { |
7505 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
7506 | 0 | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; |
7507 | 0 | SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; |
7508 | 0 | SSLHashType hashAlg; |
7509 | 0 | PRBool isTLS = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; |
7510 | 0 | SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; |
7511 | |
|
7512 | 0 | SECItem dh_p = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
7513 | 0 | SECItem dh_g = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
7514 | 0 | SECItem dh_Ys = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
7515 | 0 | unsigned dh_p_bits; |
7516 | 0 | unsigned dh_g_bits; |
7517 | 0 | PRInt32 minDH = 0; |
7518 | 0 | PRInt32 optval; |
7519 | |
|
7520 | 0 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
7521 | 0 | SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
7522 | 0 | PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; |
7523 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; |
7524 | |
|
7525 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length); |
7526 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7527 | 0 | goto loser; /* malformed. */ |
7528 | 0 | } |
7529 | 0 | rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval); |
7530 | 0 | if ((rv == SECSuccess) && (optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG)) { |
7531 | 0 | (void)NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH); |
7532 | 0 | } |
7533 | |
|
7534 | 0 | if (minDH <= 0) { |
7535 | 0 | minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; |
7536 | 0 | } |
7537 | 0 | dh_p_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_p); |
7538 | 0 | if (dh_p_bits < (unsigned)minDH) { |
7539 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; |
7540 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7541 | 0 | } |
7542 | 0 | if (dh_p_bits > SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS) { |
7543 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_DH_KEY_TOO_LONG; |
7544 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7545 | 0 | } |
7546 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length); |
7547 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7548 | 0 | goto loser; /* malformed. */ |
7549 | 0 | } |
7550 | | /* Abort if dh_g is 0, 1, or obviously too big. */ |
7551 | 0 | dh_g_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_g); |
7552 | 0 | if (dh_g_bits > dh_p_bits || dh_g_bits <= 1) { |
7553 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7554 | 0 | } |
7555 | 0 | if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { |
7556 | | /* If we're doing named groups, make sure it's good. */ |
7557 | 0 | rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &dh_p, &dh_g, NULL, NULL); |
7558 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7559 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; |
7560 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7561 | 0 | } |
7562 | 0 | } |
7563 | | |
7564 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length); |
7565 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7566 | 0 | goto loser; /* malformed. */ |
7567 | 0 | } |
7568 | 0 | if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&dh_p, &dh_Ys)) { |
7569 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE; |
7570 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7571 | 0 | } |
7572 | | |
7573 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
7574 | 0 | rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); |
7575 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7576 | 0 | goto loser; /* alert already sent */ |
7577 | 0 | } |
7578 | 0 | rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency( |
7579 | 0 | ss, sigScheme, &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); |
7580 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7581 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7582 | 0 | } |
7583 | 0 | hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); |
7584 | 0 | } else { |
7585 | | /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ |
7586 | 0 | hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; |
7587 | 0 | sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; |
7588 | 0 | } |
7589 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); |
7590 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7591 | 0 | goto loser; /* malformed. */ |
7592 | 0 | } |
7593 | 0 | if (length != 0) { |
7594 | 0 | if (isTLS) { |
7595 | 0 | desc = decode_error; |
7596 | 0 | } |
7597 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ |
7598 | 0 | } |
7599 | | |
7600 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len)); |
7601 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len)); |
7602 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len)); |
7603 | | |
7604 | | /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ |
7605 | | /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ |
7606 | 0 | desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; |
7607 | | |
7608 | | /* |
7609 | | * Check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy. |
7610 | | */ |
7611 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes, |
7612 | 0 | dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys, PR_FALSE /* padY */); |
7613 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7614 | 0 | errCode = |
7615 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
7616 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7617 | 0 | } |
7618 | 0 | rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signature); |
7619 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7620 | 0 | errCode = |
7621 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
7622 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7623 | 0 | } |
7624 | | |
7625 | | /* |
7626 | | * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer |
7627 | | * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate |
7628 | | * pkcs11 slots and ID's. |
7629 | | */ |
7630 | 0 | arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); |
7631 | 0 | if (arena == NULL) { |
7632 | 0 | errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; |
7633 | 0 | goto loser; |
7634 | 0 | } |
7635 | | |
7636 | 0 | peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); |
7637 | 0 | if (peerKey == NULL) { |
7638 | 0 | errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; |
7639 | 0 | goto loser; |
7640 | 0 | } |
7641 | | |
7642 | 0 | peerKey->arena = arena; |
7643 | 0 | peerKey->keyType = dhKey; |
7644 | 0 | peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; |
7645 | 0 | peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; |
7646 | |
|
7647 | 0 | if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) || |
7648 | 0 | SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) || |
7649 | 0 | SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys)) { |
7650 | 0 | errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; |
7651 | 0 | goto loser; |
7652 | 0 | } |
7653 | 0 | ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; |
7654 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
7655 | | |
7656 | 0 | alert_loser: |
7657 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
7658 | 0 | loser: |
7659 | 0 | if (arena) { |
7660 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); |
7661 | 0 | } |
7662 | 0 | PORT_SetError(ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode)); |
7663 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7664 | 0 | } |
7665 | | |
7666 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a |
7667 | | * complete ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message. |
7668 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
7669 | | */ |
7670 | | static SECStatus |
7671 | | ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
7672 | 0 | { |
7673 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
7674 | |
|
7675 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake", |
7676 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
7677 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
7678 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
7679 | |
|
7680 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) { |
7681 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
7682 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); |
7683 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7684 | 0 | } |
7685 | | |
7686 | 0 | switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { |
7687 | 0 | case ssl_kea_dh: |
7688 | 0 | rv = ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); |
7689 | 0 | break; |
7690 | | |
7691 | 0 | case ssl_kea_ecdh: |
7692 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); |
7693 | 0 | break; |
7694 | | |
7695 | 0 | default: |
7696 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); |
7697 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); |
7698 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
7699 | 0 | break; |
7700 | 0 | } |
7701 | | |
7702 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
7703 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; |
7704 | 0 | } |
7705 | | /* All Handle*ServerKeyExchange functions set the error code. */ |
7706 | 0 | return rv; |
7707 | 0 | } |
7708 | | |
7709 | | typedef struct dnameNode { |
7710 | | struct dnameNode *next; |
7711 | | SECItem name; |
7712 | | } dnameNode; |
7713 | | |
7714 | | /* |
7715 | | * Parse the ca_list structure in a CertificateRequest. |
7716 | | * |
7717 | | * Called from: |
7718 | | * ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest |
7719 | | * tls13_HandleCertificateRequest |
7720 | | */ |
7721 | | SECStatus |
7722 | | ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, |
7723 | | CERTDistNames *ca_list) |
7724 | 0 | { |
7725 | 0 | PRUint32 remaining; |
7726 | 0 | int nnames = 0; |
7727 | 0 | dnameNode *node; |
7728 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
7729 | 0 | int i; |
7730 | |
|
7731 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &remaining, 2, b, length); |
7732 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
7733 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ |
7734 | | |
7735 | 0 | if (remaining > *length) |
7736 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7737 | | |
7738 | 0 | ca_list->head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(ca_list->arena, dnameNode); |
7739 | 0 | if (node == NULL) |
7740 | 0 | goto no_mem; |
7741 | | |
7742 | 0 | while (remaining > 0) { |
7743 | 0 | PRUint32 len; |
7744 | |
|
7745 | 0 | if (remaining < 2) |
7746 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ |
7747 | | |
7748 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &len, 2, b, length); |
7749 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
7750 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ |
7751 | 0 | if (len == 0 || remaining < len + 2) |
7752 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ |
7753 | | |
7754 | 0 | remaining -= 2; |
7755 | 0 | if (SECITEM_MakeItem(ca_list->arena, &node->name, *b, len) != SECSuccess) { |
7756 | 0 | goto no_mem; |
7757 | 0 | } |
7758 | 0 | node->name.len = len; |
7759 | 0 | *b += len; |
7760 | 0 | *length -= len; |
7761 | 0 | remaining -= len; |
7762 | 0 | nnames++; |
7763 | 0 | if (remaining <= 0) |
7764 | 0 | break; /* success */ |
7765 | | |
7766 | 0 | node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(ca_list->arena, dnameNode); |
7767 | 0 | node = node->next; |
7768 | 0 | if (node == NULL) |
7769 | 0 | goto no_mem; |
7770 | 0 | } |
7771 | | |
7772 | 0 | ca_list->nnames = nnames; |
7773 | 0 | ca_list->names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(ca_list->arena, SECItem, nnames); |
7774 | 0 | if (nnames > 0 && ca_list->names == NULL) |
7775 | 0 | goto no_mem; |
7776 | | |
7777 | 0 | for (i = 0, node = (dnameNode *)ca_list->head; |
7778 | 0 | i < nnames; |
7779 | 0 | i++, node = node->next) { |
7780 | 0 | ca_list->names[i] = node->name; |
7781 | 0 | } |
7782 | |
|
7783 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
7784 | | |
7785 | 0 | no_mem: |
7786 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7787 | | |
7788 | 0 | alert_loser: |
7789 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, |
7790 | 0 | ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 ? illegal_parameter |
7791 | 0 | : decode_error); |
7792 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); |
7793 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7794 | 0 | } |
7795 | | |
7796 | | SECStatus |
7797 | | ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(const sslSocket *ss, PLArenaPool *arena, |
7798 | | SSLSignatureScheme **schemesOut, |
7799 | | unsigned int *numSchemesOut, |
7800 | | unsigned char **b, unsigned int *len) |
7801 | 446 | { |
7802 | 446 | SECStatus rv; |
7803 | 446 | SECItem buf; |
7804 | 446 | SSLSignatureScheme *schemes = NULL; |
7805 | 446 | unsigned int numSupported = 0; |
7806 | 446 | unsigned int numRemaining = 0; |
7807 | 446 | unsigned int max; |
7808 | | |
7809 | 446 | rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &buf, 2, b, len); |
7810 | 446 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7811 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
7812 | 3 | } |
7813 | | /* An odd-length value is invalid. */ |
7814 | 443 | if ((buf.len & 1) != 0) { |
7815 | 1 | ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); |
7816 | 1 | return SECFailure; |
7817 | 1 | } |
7818 | | |
7819 | | /* Let the caller decide whether to alert here. */ |
7820 | 442 | if (buf.len == 0) { |
7821 | 1 | goto done; |
7822 | 1 | } |
7823 | | |
7824 | | /* Limit the number of schemes we read. */ |
7825 | 441 | numRemaining = buf.len / 2; |
7826 | 441 | max = PR_MIN(numRemaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES); |
7827 | | |
7828 | 441 | if (arena) { |
7829 | 0 | schemes = PORT_ArenaZNewArray(arena, SSLSignatureScheme, max); |
7830 | 441 | } else { |
7831 | 441 | schemes = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, max); |
7832 | 441 | } |
7833 | 441 | if (!schemes) { |
7834 | 0 | ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); |
7835 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7836 | 0 | } |
7837 | | |
7838 | 6.17k | for (; numRemaining && numSupported < MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES; --numRemaining) { |
7839 | 5.73k | PRUint32 tmp; |
7840 | 5.73k | rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, &buf.data, &buf.len); |
7841 | 5.73k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7842 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
7843 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
7844 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
7845 | 0 | } |
7846 | 5.73k | if (ssl_SignatureSchemeValid((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, |
7847 | 5.73k | (PRBool)ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { |
7848 | 3.22k | ; |
7849 | 3.22k | schemes[numSupported++] = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp; |
7850 | 3.22k | } |
7851 | 5.73k | } |
7852 | | |
7853 | 441 | if (!numSupported) { |
7854 | 19 | if (!arena) { |
7855 | 19 | PORT_Free(schemes); |
7856 | 19 | } |
7857 | 19 | schemes = NULL; |
7858 | 19 | } |
7859 | | |
7860 | 442 | done: |
7861 | 442 | *schemesOut = schemes; |
7862 | 442 | *numSchemesOut = numSupported; |
7863 | 442 | return SECSuccess; |
7864 | 441 | } |
7865 | | |
7866 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered |
7867 | | * a complete ssl3 Certificate Request message. |
7868 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
7869 | | */ |
7870 | | static SECStatus |
7871 | | ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
7872 | 0 | { |
7873 | 0 | PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; |
7874 | 0 | PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; |
7875 | 0 | PRBool isTLS12 = PR_FALSE; |
7876 | 0 | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST; |
7877 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
7878 | 0 | SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; |
7879 | 0 | SECItem cert_types = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
7880 | 0 | SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes = NULL; |
7881 | 0 | unsigned int signatureSchemeCount = 0; |
7882 | 0 | CERTDistNames ca_list; |
7883 | |
|
7884 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake", |
7885 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
7886 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
7887 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
7888 | |
|
7889 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_request) { |
7890 | 0 | desc = unexpected_message; |
7891 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST; |
7892 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7893 | 0 | } |
7894 | | |
7895 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL); |
7896 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL); |
7897 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL); |
7898 | |
|
7899 | 0 | isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
7900 | 0 | isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); |
7901 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length); |
7902 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
7903 | 0 | goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ |
7904 | | |
7905 | 0 | arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); |
7906 | 0 | if (arena == NULL) |
7907 | 0 | goto no_mem; |
7908 | | |
7909 | 0 | if (isTLS12) { |
7910 | 0 | rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, arena, |
7911 | 0 | &signatureSchemes, |
7912 | 0 | &signatureSchemeCount, |
7913 | 0 | &b, &length); |
7914 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7915 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); |
7916 | 0 | goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ |
7917 | 0 | } |
7918 | 0 | if (signatureSchemeCount == 0) { |
7919 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
7920 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
7921 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7922 | 0 | } |
7923 | 0 | } |
7924 | | |
7925 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, &ca_list); |
7926 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
7927 | 0 | goto done; /* alert sent in ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs */ |
7928 | | |
7929 | 0 | if (length != 0) |
7930 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ |
7931 | | |
7932 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_hello_done; |
7933 | |
|
7934 | 0 | rv = ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest(ss, signatureSchemes, |
7935 | 0 | signatureSchemeCount, &ca_list); |
7936 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7937 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
7938 | 0 | errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; |
7939 | 0 | desc = internal_error; |
7940 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
7941 | 0 | } |
7942 | 0 | goto done; |
7943 | | |
7944 | 0 | no_mem: |
7945 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
7946 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); |
7947 | 0 | goto done; |
7948 | | |
7949 | 0 | alert_loser: |
7950 | 0 | if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter) |
7951 | 0 | desc = decode_error; |
7952 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
7953 | 0 | loser: |
7954 | 0 | PORT_SetError(errCode); |
7955 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
7956 | 0 | done: |
7957 | 0 | if (arena != NULL) |
7958 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); |
7959 | 0 | return rv; |
7960 | 0 | } |
7961 | | |
7962 | | static void |
7963 | | ssl3_ClientAuthCallbackOutcome(sslSocket *ss, SECStatus outcome) |
7964 | 0 | { |
7965 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
7966 | 0 | switch (outcome) { |
7967 | 0 | case SECSuccess: |
7968 | | /* check what the callback function returned */ |
7969 | 0 | if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) { |
7970 | | /* we are missing either the key or cert */ |
7971 | 0 | goto send_no_certificate; |
7972 | 0 | } |
7973 | | /* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause |
7974 | | * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate. |
7975 | | */ |
7976 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert( |
7977 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, |
7978 | 0 | certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE); |
7979 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) { |
7980 | 0 | goto send_no_certificate; |
7981 | 0 | } |
7982 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record || |
7983 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { |
7984 | 0 | rv = ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(ss, |
7985 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, |
7986 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey, |
7987 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes, |
7988 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen, |
7989 | 0 | &ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); |
7990 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
7991 | | /* This should only happen if our schemes changed or |
7992 | | * if an RSA-PSS cert was selected, but the token |
7993 | | * does not support PSS schemes. |
7994 | | */ |
7995 | 0 | goto send_no_certificate; |
7996 | 0 | } |
7997 | 0 | } |
7998 | 0 | break; |
7999 | | |
8000 | 0 | case SECFailure: |
8001 | 0 | default: |
8002 | 0 | send_no_certificate: |
8003 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); |
8004 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); |
8005 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; |
8006 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; |
8007 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain) { |
8008 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); |
8009 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; |
8010 | 0 | } |
8011 | |
|
8012 | 0 | if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { |
8013 | 0 | ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE; |
8014 | 0 | } else { |
8015 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); |
8016 | 0 | } |
8017 | 0 | break; |
8018 | 0 | } |
8019 | | |
8020 | | /* Release the cached parameters */ |
8021 | 0 | PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes); |
8022 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL; |
8023 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; |
8024 | 0 | } |
8025 | | |
8026 | | SECStatus |
8027 | | ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, |
8028 | | const SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes, |
8029 | | unsigned int signatureSchemeCount, |
8030 | | CERTDistNames *ca_list) |
8031 | 0 | { |
8032 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
8033 | |
|
8034 | 0 | PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending); |
8035 | | |
8036 | | /* Should not send a client cert when (non-GREASE) ECH is rejected. */ |
8037 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { |
8038 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)); |
8039 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
8040 | 0 | } else if (ss->getClientAuthData != NULL) { |
8041 | 0 | PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == |
8042 | 0 | ssl_preinfo_all); |
8043 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL); |
8044 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL); |
8045 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL); |
8046 | | |
8047 | | /* Previously cached parameters should be empty */ |
8048 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes == NULL); |
8049 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen == 0); |
8050 | | /* |
8051 | | * Peer signatures are only available while in the context of |
8052 | | * of a getClientAuthData callback. It is required for proper |
8053 | | * functioning of SSL_CertIsUsable and SSL_FilterClientCertListBySocket |
8054 | | * Calling these functions outside the context of a getClientAuthData |
8055 | | * callback will result in no filtering.*/ |
8056 | |
|
8057 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, signatureSchemeCount); |
8058 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes, signatureSchemes, signatureSchemeCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureScheme)); |
8059 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = signatureSchemeCount; |
8060 | |
|
8061 | 0 | rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg, |
8062 | 0 | ss->fd, ca_list, |
8063 | 0 | &ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, |
8064 | 0 | &ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); |
8065 | 0 | } else { |
8066 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */ |
8067 | 0 | } |
8068 | |
|
8069 | 0 | if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { |
8070 | | /* getClientAuthData needs more time (e.g. for user interaction) */ |
8071 | | |
8072 | | /* The out parameters should not have changed. */ |
8073 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL); |
8074 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL); |
8075 | | |
8076 | | /* Mark the handshake as blocked */ |
8077 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending = PR_TRUE; |
8078 | |
|
8079 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
8080 | 0 | } else { |
8081 | | /* getClientAuthData returned SECSuccess or SECFailure immediately, handle accordingly */ |
8082 | 0 | ssl3_ClientAuthCallbackOutcome(ss, rv); |
8083 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
8084 | 0 | } |
8085 | 0 | return rv; |
8086 | 0 | } |
8087 | | |
8088 | | /* Invoked by the application when client certificate selection is complete */ |
8089 | | SECStatus |
8090 | | ssl3_ClientCertCallbackComplete(sslSocket *ss, SECStatus outcome, SECKEYPrivateKey *clientPrivateKey, CERTCertificate *clientCertificate) |
8091 | 0 | { |
8092 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending); |
8093 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; |
8094 | |
|
8095 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = clientCertificate; |
8096 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = clientPrivateKey; |
8097 | |
|
8098 | 0 | ssl3_ClientAuthCallbackOutcome(ss, outcome); |
8099 | | |
8100 | | /* Continue the handshake */ |
8101 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget); |
8102 | 0 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { |
8103 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, internal_error); |
8104 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8105 | 0 | } |
8106 | 0 | sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget; |
8107 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL; |
8108 | 0 | return target(ss); |
8109 | 0 | } |
8110 | | |
8111 | | static SECStatus |
8112 | | ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss) |
8113 | 0 | { |
8114 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
8115 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending); |
8116 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); |
8117 | |
|
8118 | 0 | if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) { |
8119 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start", |
8120 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
8121 | 0 | } else { |
8122 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
8123 | |
|
8124 | 0 | rv = ssl_CheckServerRandom(ss); |
8125 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8126 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to possible downgrade", |
8127 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
8128 | 0 | goto no_false_start; |
8129 | 0 | } |
8130 | | |
8131 | | /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to |
8132 | | * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is |
8133 | | * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage. |
8134 | | * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */ |
8135 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); |
8136 | 0 | PRBool weakCipher = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipherDef->secret_key_size < 10; |
8137 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); |
8138 | 0 | if (weakCipher) { |
8139 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher", |
8140 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
8141 | 0 | goto no_false_start; |
8142 | 0 | } |
8143 | | |
8144 | 0 | if (ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)) { |
8145 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to lower version after ECH", |
8146 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
8147 | 0 | goto no_false_start; |
8148 | 0 | } |
8149 | | |
8150 | 0 | PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == |
8151 | 0 | ssl_preinfo_all); |
8152 | 0 | rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd, |
8153 | 0 | ss->canFalseStartCallbackData, |
8154 | 0 | &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); |
8155 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
8156 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s", |
8157 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, |
8158 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" |
8159 | 0 | : "FALSE")); |
8160 | 0 | } else { |
8161 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)", |
8162 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, |
8163 | 0 | PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError()))); |
8164 | 0 | } |
8165 | 0 | return rv; |
8166 | 0 | } |
8167 | | |
8168 | 0 | no_false_start: |
8169 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; |
8170 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
8171 | 0 | } |
8172 | | |
8173 | | PRBool |
8174 | | ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) |
8175 | 0 | { |
8176 | 0 | PRBool result; |
8177 | |
|
8178 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
8179 | |
|
8180 | 0 | switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) { |
8181 | 0 | case wait_new_session_ticket: |
8182 | 0 | case wait_change_cipher: |
8183 | 0 | case wait_finished: |
8184 | 0 | result = PR_TRUE; |
8185 | 0 | break; |
8186 | 0 | default: |
8187 | 0 | result = PR_FALSE; |
8188 | 0 | break; |
8189 | 0 | } |
8190 | | |
8191 | 0 | return result; |
8192 | 0 | } |
8193 | | |
8194 | | static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss); |
8195 | | |
8196 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered |
8197 | | * a complete ssl3 Server Hello Done message. |
8198 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
8199 | | */ |
8200 | | static SECStatus |
8201 | | ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) |
8202 | 0 | { |
8203 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
8204 | 0 | SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; |
8205 | |
|
8206 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake", |
8207 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
8208 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
8209 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
8210 | | |
8211 | | /* Skipping CertificateRequest is always permitted. */ |
8212 | 0 | if (ws != wait_hello_done && |
8213 | 0 | ws != wait_cert_request) { |
8214 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
8215 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); |
8216 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8217 | 0 | } |
8218 | | |
8219 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(ss); |
8220 | |
|
8221 | 0 | return rv; |
8222 | 0 | } |
8223 | | |
8224 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone and ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete. |
8225 | | * |
8226 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
8227 | | */ |
8228 | | static SECStatus |
8229 | | ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) |
8230 | 0 | { |
8231 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
8232 | 0 | PRBool sendClientCert; |
8233 | |
|
8234 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
8235 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
8236 | |
|
8237 | 0 | sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert && |
8238 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL && |
8239 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL; |
8240 | | |
8241 | | /* We must wait for the server's certificate to be authenticated before |
8242 | | * sending the client certificate in order to disclosing the client |
8243 | | * certificate to an attacker that does not have a valid cert for the |
8244 | | * domain we are connecting to. |
8245 | | * |
8246 | | * During the initial handshake on a connection, we never send/receive |
8247 | | * application data until we have authenticated the server's certificate; |
8248 | | * i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake before using the cipher |
8249 | | * specs agreed upon for that handshake. During a renegotiation, we may |
8250 | | * continue sending and receiving application data during the handshake |
8251 | | * interleaved with the handshake records. If we were to send the client's |
8252 | | * second round for a renegotiation before the server's certificate was |
8253 | | * authenticated, then the application data sent/received after this point |
8254 | | * would be using cipher spec that hadn't been authenticated. By waiting |
8255 | | * until the server's certificate has been authenticated during |
8256 | | * renegotiations, we ensure that renegotiations have the same property |
8257 | | * as initial handshakes; i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake |
8258 | | * before using the cipher specs agreed upon for that handshake for |
8259 | | * application data. |
8260 | | */ |
8261 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { |
8262 | 0 | PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget"); |
8263 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
8264 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8265 | 0 | } |
8266 | | /* Check whether waiting for client certificate selection OR |
8267 | | waiting on server certificate verification AND |
8268 | | going to send client cert */ |
8269 | 0 | if ((ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending) || |
8270 | 0 | (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending && (sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone))) { |
8271 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because" |
8272 | 0 | " certificate authentication is still pending.", |
8273 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
8274 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound; |
8275 | 0 | PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); |
8276 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8277 | 0 | } |
8278 | | |
8279 | 0 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ |
8280 | |
|
8281 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) { |
8282 | 0 | ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE; |
8283 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); |
8284 | | /* Don't send verify */ |
8285 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8286 | 0 | goto loser; /* error code is set. */ |
8287 | 0 | } |
8288 | 0 | } else if (sendClientCert) { |
8289 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); |
8290 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8291 | 0 | goto loser; /* error code is set. */ |
8292 | 0 | } |
8293 | 0 | } |
8294 | | |
8295 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss); |
8296 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8297 | 0 | goto loser; /* err is set. */ |
8298 | 0 | } |
8299 | | |
8300 | 0 | if (sendClientCert) { |
8301 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); |
8302 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); |
8303 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; |
8304 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8305 | 0 | goto loser; /* err is set. */ |
8306 | 0 | } |
8307 | 0 | } |
8308 | | |
8309 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); |
8310 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8311 | 0 | goto loser; /* err code was set. */ |
8312 | 0 | } |
8313 | | |
8314 | | /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in |
8315 | | * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information |
8316 | | * from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart |
8317 | | * because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from |
8318 | | * the functions that depend on this being set. |
8319 | | */ |
8320 | 0 | ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE; |
8321 | |
|
8322 | 0 | if (!ss->firstHsDone) { |
8323 | 0 | if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) { |
8324 | 0 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { |
8325 | | /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are |
8326 | | * false starting before we try to flush the client second |
8327 | | * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully |
8328 | | * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished, |
8329 | | * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that |
8330 | | * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being |
8331 | | * done before its false start callback is called. |
8332 | | */ |
8333 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
8334 | 0 | rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); |
8335 | 0 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); |
8336 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8337 | 0 | goto loser; |
8338 | 0 | } |
8339 | 0 | } else { |
8340 | | /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished |
8341 | | * message are racing each other. If the certificate |
8342 | | * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in |
8343 | | * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete. |
8344 | | */ |
8345 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because" |
8346 | 0 | " certificate authentication is still pending.", |
8347 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
8348 | 0 | } |
8349 | 0 | } |
8350 | 0 | } |
8351 | | |
8352 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); |
8353 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8354 | 0 | goto loser; /* err code was set. */ |
8355 | 0 | } |
8356 | | |
8357 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ |
8358 | |
|
8359 | 0 | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) |
8360 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; |
8361 | 0 | else |
8362 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; |
8363 | |
|
8364 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)); |
8365 | |
|
8366 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
8367 | | |
8368 | 0 | loser: |
8369 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
8370 | 0 | return rv; |
8371 | 0 | } |
8372 | | |
8373 | | /* |
8374 | | * Routines used by servers |
8375 | | */ |
8376 | | static SECStatus |
8377 | | ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) |
8378 | 0 | { |
8379 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
8380 | |
|
8381 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(), |
8382 | 0 | ss->fd)); |
8383 | |
|
8384 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
8385 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
8386 | |
|
8387 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_hello_request, 0); |
8388 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8389 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */ |
8390 | 0 | } |
8391 | 0 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); |
8392 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8393 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ |
8394 | 0 | } |
8395 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello; |
8396 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
8397 | 0 | } |
8398 | | |
8399 | | /* |
8400 | | * Called from: |
8401 | | * ssl3_HandleClientHello() |
8402 | | */ |
8403 | | static SECComparison |
8404 | | ssl3_ServerNameCompare(const SECItem *name1, const SECItem *name2) |
8405 | 0 | { |
8406 | 0 | if (!name1 != !name2) { |
8407 | 0 | return SECLessThan; |
8408 | 0 | } |
8409 | 0 | if (!name1) { |
8410 | 0 | return SECEqual; |
8411 | 0 | } |
8412 | 0 | if (name1->type != name2->type) { |
8413 | 0 | return SECLessThan; |
8414 | 0 | } |
8415 | 0 | return SECITEM_CompareItem(name1, name2); |
8416 | 0 | } |
8417 | | |
8418 | | /* Sets memory error when returning NULL. |
8419 | | * Called from: |
8420 | | * ssl3_SendClientHello() |
8421 | | * ssl3_HandleServerHello() |
8422 | | * ssl3_HandleClientHello() |
8423 | | * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() |
8424 | | */ |
8425 | | sslSessionID * |
8426 | | ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server) |
8427 | 6.04k | { |
8428 | 6.04k | sslSessionID *sid; |
8429 | | |
8430 | 6.04k | sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID); |
8431 | 6.04k | if (sid == NULL) |
8432 | 0 | return sid; |
8433 | | |
8434 | 6.04k | if (is_server) { |
8435 | 6.04k | const SECItem *srvName; |
8436 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
8437 | | |
8438 | 6.04k | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ |
8439 | 6.04k | srvName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; |
8440 | 6.04k | if (srvName->len && srvName->data) { |
8441 | 0 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.srvName, srvName); |
8442 | 0 | } |
8443 | 6.04k | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ |
8444 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8445 | 0 | PORT_Free(sid); |
8446 | 0 | return NULL; |
8447 | 0 | } |
8448 | 6.04k | } |
8449 | 6.04k | sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID); |
8450 | 6.04k | sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url); |
8451 | 6.04k | sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer; |
8452 | 6.04k | sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port; |
8453 | 6.04k | sid->references = 1; |
8454 | 6.04k | sid->cached = never_cached; |
8455 | 6.04k | sid->version = ss->version; |
8456 | 6.04k | sid->sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; |
8457 | | |
8458 | 6.04k | sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE; |
8459 | 6.04k | sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; |
8460 | 6.04k | sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = PR_FALSE; |
8461 | | |
8462 | 6.04k | if (is_server) { |
8463 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
8464 | 6.04k | int pid = SSL_GETPID(); |
8465 | | |
8466 | 6.04k | sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; |
8467 | 6.04k | sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff; |
8468 | 6.04k | sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff; |
8469 | 6.04k | rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2, |
8470 | 6.04k | SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES - 2); |
8471 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8472 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
8473 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); |
8474 | 0 | return NULL; |
8475 | 0 | } |
8476 | 6.04k | } |
8477 | 6.04k | return sid; |
8478 | 6.04k | } |
8479 | | |
8480 | | /* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello, ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello */ |
8481 | | static SECStatus |
8482 | | ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss) |
8483 | 6.04k | { |
8484 | 6.04k | const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; |
8485 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
8486 | | |
8487 | 6.04k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence", |
8488 | 6.04k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
8489 | | |
8490 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
8491 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
8492 | | |
8493 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); |
8494 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8495 | 0 | return rv; /* err code is set. */ |
8496 | 0 | } |
8497 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); |
8498 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8499 | 0 | return rv; /* error code is set. */ |
8500 | 0 | } |
8501 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(ss); |
8502 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8503 | 0 | return rv; /* error code is set. */ |
8504 | 0 | } |
8505 | | /* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello, |
8506 | | * because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello(). |
8507 | | */ |
8508 | 6.04k | kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; |
8509 | | |
8510 | 6.04k | if (kea_def->ephemeral) { |
8511 | 5.03k | rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss); |
8512 | 5.03k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8513 | 0 | return rv; /* err code was set. */ |
8514 | 0 | } |
8515 | 5.03k | } |
8516 | | |
8517 | 6.04k | if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) { |
8518 | 3.51k | rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss); |
8519 | 3.51k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8520 | 0 | return rv; /* err code is set. */ |
8521 | 0 | } |
8522 | 3.51k | } |
8523 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss); |
8524 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8525 | 0 | return rv; /* err code is set. */ |
8526 | 0 | } |
8527 | | |
8528 | 6.04k | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->opt.requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert |
8529 | 6.04k | : wait_client_key; |
8530 | 6.04k | return SECSuccess; |
8531 | 6.04k | } |
8532 | | |
8533 | | /* An empty TLS Renegotiation Info (RI) extension */ |
8534 | | static const PRUint8 emptyRIext[5] = { 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00 }; |
8535 | | |
8536 | | static PRBool |
8537 | | ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(const ssl3KEADef *kea_def) |
8538 | 0 | { |
8539 | 0 | if (kea_def->signKeyType == dsaKey) { |
8540 | | /* TODO: Fix session tickets for DSS. The server code rejects the |
8541 | | * session ticket received from the client. Bug 1174677 */ |
8542 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
8543 | 0 | } |
8544 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
8545 | 0 | } |
8546 | | |
8547 | | static PRBool |
8548 | | ssl3_PeerSupportsCipherSuite(const SECItem *peerSuites, uint16_t suite) |
8549 | 91.6k | { |
8550 | 580k | for (unsigned int i = 0; i + 1 < peerSuites->len; i += 2) { |
8551 | 494k | PRUint16 suite_i = (peerSuites->data[i] << 8) | peerSuites->data[i + 1]; |
8552 | 494k | if (suite_i == suite) { |
8553 | 6.06k | return PR_TRUE; |
8554 | 6.06k | } |
8555 | 494k | } |
8556 | 85.6k | return PR_FALSE; |
8557 | 91.6k | } |
8558 | | |
8559 | | SECStatus |
8560 | | ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuiteInner(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, |
8561 | | PRUint16 version, PRUint16 *suitep) |
8562 | 6.08k | { |
8563 | 6.08k | unsigned int i; |
8564 | 6.08k | SSLVersionRange vrange = { version, version }; |
8565 | | |
8566 | | /* If we negotiated an External PSK and that PSK has a ciphersuite |
8567 | | * configured, we need to constrain our choice. If the client does |
8568 | | * not support it, negotiate a certificate auth suite and fall back. |
8569 | | */ |
8570 | 6.08k | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
8571 | 6.08k | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk && |
8572 | 6.08k | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->type == ssl_psk_external && |
8573 | 6.08k | ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite != TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) { |
8574 | 0 | PRUint16 pskSuite = ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite; |
8575 | 0 | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *pskSuiteCfg = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(pskSuite, |
8576 | 0 | ss->cipherSuites); |
8577 | 0 | if (ssl3_config_match(pskSuiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss) && |
8578 | 0 | ssl3_PeerSupportsCipherSuite(suites, pskSuite)) { |
8579 | 0 | *suitep = pskSuite; |
8580 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
8581 | 0 | } |
8582 | 0 | } |
8583 | | |
8584 | 148k | for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { |
8585 | 148k | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; |
8586 | 148k | if (!ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { |
8587 | 56.8k | continue; |
8588 | 56.8k | } |
8589 | 91.6k | if (!ssl3_PeerSupportsCipherSuite(suites, suite->cipher_suite)) { |
8590 | 85.6k | continue; |
8591 | 85.6k | } |
8592 | 6.06k | *suitep = suite->cipher_suite; |
8593 | 6.06k | return SECSuccess; |
8594 | 91.6k | } |
8595 | 20 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); |
8596 | 20 | return SECFailure; |
8597 | 6.08k | } |
8598 | | |
8599 | | /* Select a cipher suite. |
8600 | | ** |
8601 | | ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in |
8602 | | ** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(). |
8603 | | ** |
8604 | | ** If TLS 1.0 is enabled, we could handle the case where the client |
8605 | | ** offered TLS 1.1 but offered only export cipher suites by choosing TLS |
8606 | | ** 1.0 and selecting one of those export cipher suites. However, a secure |
8607 | | ** TLS 1.1 client should not have export cipher suites enabled at all, |
8608 | | ** and a TLS 1.1 client should definitely not be offering *only* export |
8609 | | ** cipher suites. Therefore, we refuse to negotiate export cipher suites |
8610 | | ** with any client that indicates support for TLS 1.1 or higher when we |
8611 | | ** (the server) have TLS 1.1 support enabled. |
8612 | | */ |
8613 | | SECStatus |
8614 | | ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, |
8615 | | PRBool initHashes) |
8616 | 6.08k | { |
8617 | 6.08k | PRUint16 selected; |
8618 | 6.08k | SECStatus rv; |
8619 | | |
8620 | | /* Ensure that only valid cipher suites are enabled. */ |
8621 | 6.08k | if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { |
8622 | | /* No configured cipher is both supported by PK11 and allowed. |
8623 | | * This is a configuration error, so report handshake failure.*/ |
8624 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), handshake_failure); |
8625 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8626 | 0 | } |
8627 | | |
8628 | 6.08k | rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuiteInner(ss, suites, ss->version, &selected); |
8629 | 6.08k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8630 | 20 | return SECFailure; |
8631 | 20 | } |
8632 | | |
8633 | 6.06k | ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = selected; |
8634 | 6.06k | return ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, initHashes); |
8635 | 6.08k | } |
8636 | | |
8637 | | /* |
8638 | | * Call the SNI config hook. |
8639 | | * |
8640 | | * Called from: |
8641 | | * ssl3_HandleClientHello |
8642 | | * tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2 |
8643 | | */ |
8644 | | SECStatus |
8645 | | ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss) |
8646 | 6.06k | { |
8647 | 6.06k | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
8648 | 6.06k | SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; |
8649 | 6.06k | int ret = 0; |
8650 | | |
8651 | | #ifdef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS |
8652 | | #error("No longer allowed to set SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS") |
8653 | | #endif |
8654 | 6.06k | if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) { |
8655 | 6.06k | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
8656 | | /* Check that we don't have the name is current spec |
8657 | | * if this extension was not negotiated on the 2d hs. */ |
8658 | 0 | PRBool passed = PR_TRUE; |
8659 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*******************************/ |
8660 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName.data) { |
8661 | 0 | passed = PR_FALSE; |
8662 | 0 | } |
8663 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/ |
8664 | 0 | if (!passed) { |
8665 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; |
8666 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
8667 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
8668 | 0 | } |
8669 | 0 | } |
8670 | 6.06k | return SECSuccess; |
8671 | 6.06k | } |
8672 | | |
8673 | 0 | if (ss->sniSocketConfig) |
8674 | 0 | do { /* not a loop */ |
8675 | 0 | PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == |
8676 | 0 | ssl_preinfo_all); |
8677 | |
|
8678 | 0 | ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; |
8679 | | /* If extension is negotiated, the len of names should > 0. */ |
8680 | 0 | if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { |
8681 | | /* Calling client callback to reconfigure the socket. */ |
8682 | 0 | ret = (SECStatus)(*ss->sniSocketConfig)(ss->fd, |
8683 | 0 | ss->xtnData.sniNameArr, |
8684 | 0 | ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize, |
8685 | 0 | ss->sniSocketConfigArg); |
8686 | 0 | } |
8687 | 0 | if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { |
8688 | | /* Application does not know the name or was not able to |
8689 | | * properly reconfigure the socket. */ |
8690 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; |
8691 | 0 | desc = unrecognized_name; |
8692 | 0 | break; |
8693 | 0 | } else if (ret == SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED) { |
8694 | 0 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
8695 | 0 | SECItem pwsNameBuf = { 0, NULL, 0 }; |
8696 | 0 | SECItem *pwsName = &pwsNameBuf; |
8697 | 0 | SECItem *cwsName; |
8698 | |
|
8699 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ |
8700 | 0 | cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; |
8701 | | /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ |
8702 | 0 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
8703 | 0 | if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(pwsName, cwsName)) { |
8704 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ |
8705 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; |
8706 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
8707 | 0 | ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; |
8708 | 0 | break; |
8709 | 0 | } |
8710 | 0 | } |
8711 | 0 | if (pwsName->data) { |
8712 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); |
8713 | 0 | } |
8714 | 0 | if (cwsName->data) { |
8715 | 0 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, cwsName); |
8716 | 0 | } |
8717 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************/ |
8718 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8719 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; |
8720 | 0 | desc = internal_error; |
8721 | 0 | ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; |
8722 | 0 | break; |
8723 | 0 | } |
8724 | 0 | } else if ((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { |
8725 | | /* Application has configured new socket info. Lets check it |
8726 | | * and save the name. */ |
8727 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
8728 | 0 | SECItem *name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret]; |
8729 | 0 | SECItem *pwsName; |
8730 | | |
8731 | | /* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */ |
8732 | | /* This code is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock. */ |
8733 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ |
8734 | | /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ |
8735 | 0 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
8736 | 0 | SECItem *cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; |
8737 | 0 | if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(name, cwsName)) { |
8738 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ |
8739 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; |
8740 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
8741 | 0 | ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; |
8742 | 0 | break; |
8743 | 0 | } |
8744 | 0 | } |
8745 | 0 | pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; |
8746 | 0 | if (pwsName->data) { |
8747 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); |
8748 | 0 | } |
8749 | 0 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, name); |
8750 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /***************************/ |
8751 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8752 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; |
8753 | 0 | desc = internal_error; |
8754 | 0 | ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; |
8755 | 0 | break; |
8756 | 0 | } |
8757 | | /* Need to tell the client that application has picked |
8758 | | * the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket. |
8759 | | */ |
8760 | 0 | ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_server_name_xtn, |
8761 | 0 | ssl_SendEmptyExtension); |
8762 | 0 | } else { |
8763 | | /* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */ |
8764 | 0 | PORT_Assert((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize); |
8765 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; |
8766 | 0 | desc = internal_error; |
8767 | 0 | ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; |
8768 | 0 | break; |
8769 | 0 | } |
8770 | 0 | } while (0); |
8771 | 0 | ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData); |
8772 | 0 | if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { |
8773 | | /* desc and errCode should be set. */ |
8774 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
8775 | 0 | } |
8776 | | |
8777 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
8778 | | |
8779 | 0 | alert_loser: |
8780 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
8781 | 0 | PORT_SetError(errCode); |
8782 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8783 | 0 | } |
8784 | | |
8785 | | SECStatus |
8786 | | ssl3_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss) |
8787 | 6.06k | { |
8788 | 6.06k | const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; |
8789 | 6.06k | PRCList *cursor; |
8790 | 6.06k | SECStatus rv; |
8791 | | |
8792 | | /* If the client didn't include the supported groups extension, assume just |
8793 | | * P-256 support and disable all the other ECDHE groups. This also affects |
8794 | | * ECDHE group selection, but this function is called first. */ |
8795 | 6.06k | if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_supported_groups_xtn)) { |
8796 | 4.02k | unsigned int i; |
8797 | 132k | for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { |
8798 | 128k | if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && |
8799 | 128k | ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh && |
8800 | 128k | ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->name != ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1) { |
8801 | 12.0k | ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL; |
8802 | 12.0k | } |
8803 | 128k | } |
8804 | 4.02k | } |
8805 | | |
8806 | | /* This picks the first certificate that has: |
8807 | | * a) the right authentication method, and |
8808 | | * b) the right named curve (EC only) |
8809 | | * |
8810 | | * We might want to do some sort of ranking here later. For now, it's all |
8811 | | * based on what order they are configured in. */ |
8812 | 6.06k | for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); |
8813 | 11.6k | cursor != &ss->serverCerts; |
8814 | 11.6k | cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { |
8815 | 11.6k | sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; |
8816 | 11.6k | if (kea_def->authKeyType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign) { |
8817 | | /* We consider PSS certificates here as well for TLS 1.2. */ |
8818 | 9.52k | if (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_sign) && |
8819 | 9.52k | (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_pss) || |
8820 | 4.76k | ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2)) { |
8821 | 4.76k | continue; |
8822 | 4.76k | } |
8823 | 9.52k | } else { |
8824 | 2.12k | if (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, kea_def->authKeyType)) { |
8825 | 826 | continue; |
8826 | 826 | } |
8827 | 1.29k | if (SSL_CERT_IS_EC(cert) && |
8828 | 1.29k | !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->namedCurve)) { |
8829 | 0 | continue; |
8830 | 0 | } |
8831 | 1.29k | } |
8832 | | |
8833 | | /* Found one. */ |
8834 | 6.06k | ss->sec.serverCert = cert; |
8835 | 6.06k | ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->serverKeyBits; |
8836 | | |
8837 | | /* Don't pick a signature scheme if we aren't going to use it. */ |
8838 | 6.06k | if (kea_def->signKeyType == nullKey) { |
8839 | 1.00k | ss->sec.authType = kea_def->authKeyType; |
8840 | 1.00k | return SECSuccess; |
8841 | 1.00k | } |
8842 | | |
8843 | 5.05k | rv = ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(ss); |
8844 | 5.05k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8845 | 22 | return SECFailure; |
8846 | 22 | } |
8847 | 5.03k | ss->sec.authType = |
8848 | 5.03k | ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); |
8849 | 5.03k | return SECSuccess; |
8850 | 5.05k | } |
8851 | | |
8852 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); |
8853 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8854 | 6.06k | } |
8855 | | |
8856 | | static SECStatus |
8857 | | ssl_GenerateServerRandom(sslSocket *ss) |
8858 | 6.04k | { |
8859 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
8860 | 6.04k | PRUint8 *downgradeSentinel; |
8861 | | |
8862 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(ss->ssl3.hs.server_random); |
8863 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8864 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8865 | 0 | } |
8866 | | |
8867 | 6.04k | if (ss->version == ss->vrange.max) { |
8868 | 6.04k | return SECSuccess; |
8869 | 6.04k | } |
8870 | | |
8871 | | /* |
8872 | | * [RFC 8446 Section 4.1.3]. |
8873 | | * |
8874 | | * TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in response to a |
8875 | | * ClientHello MUST set the last 8 bytes of their Random value specially in |
8876 | | * their ServerHello. |
8877 | | * |
8878 | | * If negotiating TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 servers MUST set the last 8 bytes of |
8879 | | * their Random value to the bytes: |
8880 | | * |
8881 | | * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01 |
8882 | | * |
8883 | | * If negotiating TLS 1.1 or below, TLS 1.3 servers MUST, and TLS 1.2 |
8884 | | * servers SHOULD, set the last 8 bytes of their ServerHello.Random value to |
8885 | | * the bytes: |
8886 | | * |
8887 | | * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00 |
8888 | | */ |
8889 | 0 | downgradeSentinel = |
8890 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.server_random + |
8891 | 0 | SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random); |
8892 | 0 | if (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
8893 | 0 | switch (ss->version) { |
8894 | 0 | case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2: |
8895 | | /* vrange.max > 1.2, since we didn't early exit above. */ |
8896 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(downgradeSentinel, |
8897 | 0 | tls12_downgrade_random, sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random)); |
8898 | 0 | break; |
8899 | 0 | case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1: |
8900 | 0 | case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0: |
8901 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(downgradeSentinel, |
8902 | 0 | tls1_downgrade_random, sizeof(tls1_downgrade_random)); |
8903 | 0 | break; |
8904 | 0 | default: |
8905 | | /* Do not change random. */ |
8906 | 0 | break; |
8907 | 0 | } |
8908 | 0 | } |
8909 | | |
8910 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
8911 | 0 | } |
8912 | | |
8913 | | SECStatus |
8914 | | ssl3_HandleClientHelloPreamble(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, SECItem *sidBytes, |
8915 | | SECItem *cookieBytes, SECItem *suites, SECItem *comps) |
8916 | 7.50k | { |
8917 | 7.50k | SECStatus rv; |
8918 | 7.50k | PRUint32 tmp; |
8919 | 7.50k | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, b, length); |
8920 | 7.50k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8921 | 4 | return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert already sent */ |
8922 | 4 | } |
8923 | | |
8924 | | /* Translate the version. */ |
8925 | 7.50k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
8926 | 7.50k | ss->clientHelloVersion = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion((SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp); |
8927 | 7.50k | } else { |
8928 | 0 | ss->clientHelloVersion = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp; |
8929 | 0 | } |
8930 | | |
8931 | | /* Grab the client random data. */ |
8932 | 7.50k | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( |
8933 | 7.50k | ss, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, b, length); |
8934 | 7.50k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8935 | 28 | return SECFailure; /* malformed */ |
8936 | 28 | } |
8937 | | |
8938 | | /* Grab the client's SID, if present. */ |
8939 | 7.47k | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, sidBytes, 1, b, length); |
8940 | | /* Check that the SID has the format: opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>, as |
8941 | | * specified in RFC8446, Section 4.1.2. */ |
8942 | 7.47k | if (rv != SECSuccess || sidBytes->len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { |
8943 | 17 | return SECFailure; /* malformed */ |
8944 | 17 | } |
8945 | | |
8946 | | /* Grab the client's cookie, if present. It is checked after version negotiation. */ |
8947 | 7.45k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
8948 | 7.45k | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, cookieBytes, 1, b, length); |
8949 | 7.45k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8950 | 11 | return SECFailure; /* malformed */ |
8951 | 11 | } |
8952 | 7.45k | } |
8953 | | |
8954 | | /* Grab the list of cipher suites. */ |
8955 | 7.44k | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, suites, 2, b, length); |
8956 | 7.44k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8957 | 19 | return SECFailure; /* malformed */ |
8958 | 19 | } |
8959 | | |
8960 | | /* Grab the list of compression methods. */ |
8961 | 7.42k | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, comps, 1, b, length); |
8962 | 7.42k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8963 | 5 | return SECFailure; /* malformed */ |
8964 | 5 | } |
8965 | 7.42k | return SECSuccess; |
8966 | 7.42k | } |
8967 | | |
8968 | | static SECStatus |
8969 | | ssl3_ValidatePreambleWithVersion(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, const SECItem *comps, |
8970 | | const SECItem *cookieBytes) |
8971 | 7.36k | { |
8972 | 7.36k | SECStatus rv; |
8973 | 7.36k | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
8974 | 0 | if (sidBytes->len > 0 && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
8975 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE); |
8976 | 0 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, sidBytes); |
8977 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
8978 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); |
8979 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8980 | 0 | } |
8981 | 0 | } |
8982 | | |
8983 | | /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression include only null. */ |
8984 | 0 | if (comps->len != 1 || comps->data[0] != ssl_compression_null) { |
8985 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); |
8986 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8987 | 0 | } |
8988 | | |
8989 | | /* receivedCcs is only valid if we sent an HRR. */ |
8990 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
8991 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER, unexpected_message); |
8992 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
8993 | 0 | } |
8994 | | |
8995 | | /* A DTLS 1.3-only client MUST set the legacy_cookie field to zero length. |
8996 | | * If a DTLS 1.3 ClientHello is received with any other value in this field, |
8997 | | * the server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. */ |
8998 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss) && cookieBytes->len != 0) { |
8999 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); |
9000 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9001 | 0 | } |
9002 | 7.36k | } else { |
9003 | | /* ECH not possible here. */ |
9004 | 7.36k | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech; |
9005 | | |
9006 | | /* HRR and ECH are TLS1.3-only. We ignore the Cookie extension here. */ |
9007 | 7.36k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { |
9008 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, protocol_version); |
9009 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9010 | 0 | } |
9011 | | |
9012 | | /* receivedCcs is only valid if we sent an HRR. */ |
9013 | 7.36k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs) { |
9014 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER, unexpected_message); |
9015 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9016 | 0 | } |
9017 | | |
9018 | | /* TLS versions prior to 1.3 must include null somewhere. */ |
9019 | 7.36k | if (comps->len < 1 || |
9020 | 7.36k | !memchr(comps->data, ssl_compression_null, comps->len)) { |
9021 | 3 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); |
9022 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
9023 | 3 | } |
9024 | | |
9025 | | /* We never send cookies in DTLS 1.2. */ |
9026 | 7.36k | if (IS_DTLS(ss) && cookieBytes->len != 0) { |
9027 | 2 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); |
9028 | 2 | return SECFailure; |
9029 | 2 | } |
9030 | 7.36k | } |
9031 | | |
9032 | 7.36k | return SECSuccess; |
9033 | 7.36k | } |
9034 | | |
9035 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete |
9036 | | * ssl3 Client Hello message. |
9037 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
9038 | | */ |
9039 | | static SECStatus |
9040 | | ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
9041 | 7.50k | { |
9042 | 7.50k | sslSessionID *sid = NULL; |
9043 | 7.50k | unsigned int i; |
9044 | 7.50k | SECStatus rv; |
9045 | 7.50k | PRUint32 extensionLength; |
9046 | 7.50k | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
9047 | 7.50k | SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; |
9048 | 7.50k | SSL3AlertLevel level = alert_fatal; |
9049 | 7.50k | TLSExtension *versionExtension; |
9050 | 7.50k | SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
9051 | 7.50k | SECItem cookieBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
9052 | 7.50k | SECItem suites = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
9053 | 7.50k | SECItem comps = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
9054 | 7.50k | SECItem *echInner = NULL; |
9055 | 7.50k | PRBool isTLS13; |
9056 | 7.50k | const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b; |
9057 | 7.50k | const PRUint32 savedLen = length; |
9058 | | |
9059 | 7.50k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake", |
9060 | 7.50k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
9061 | | |
9062 | 7.50k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
9063 | 7.50k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
9064 | 7.50k | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; |
9065 | | |
9066 | 7.50k | if (!ss->sec.isServer || |
9067 | 7.50k | (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello && |
9068 | 7.50k | ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) { |
9069 | 1 | desc = unexpected_message; |
9070 | 1 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
9071 | 1 | goto alert_loser; |
9072 | 1 | } |
9073 | 7.50k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) { |
9074 | | /* Refuse re-handshake when we have already negotiated TLS 1.3. */ |
9075 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
9076 | 0 | desc = unexpected_message; |
9077 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; |
9078 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9079 | 0 | } |
9080 | 0 | if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { |
9081 | 0 | desc = no_renegotiation; |
9082 | 0 | level = alert_warning; |
9083 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; |
9084 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9085 | 0 | } |
9086 | 0 | } |
9087 | | |
9088 | | /* We should always be in a fresh state. */ |
9089 | 7.50k | SSL_ASSERT_HASHES_EMPTY(ss); |
9090 | | |
9091 | | /* Get peer name of client */ |
9092 | 7.50k | rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss); |
9093 | 7.50k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9094 | 0 | return rv; /* error code is set. */ |
9095 | 0 | } |
9096 | | |
9097 | | /* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should |
9098 | | * clear previous state. |
9099 | | */ |
9100 | 7.50k | ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); |
9101 | 7.50k | ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; |
9102 | | |
9103 | 7.50k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
9104 | 7.50k | dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); |
9105 | 7.50k | } |
9106 | | |
9107 | 7.50k | rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPreamble(ss, &b, &length, &sidBytes, |
9108 | 7.50k | &cookieBytes, &suites, &comps); |
9109 | 7.50k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9110 | 84 | goto loser; /* malformed */ |
9111 | 84 | } |
9112 | | |
9113 | | /* Handle TLS hello extensions for SSL3 & TLS. We do not know if |
9114 | | * we are restarting a previous session until extensions have been |
9115 | | * parsed, since we might have received a SessionTicket extension. |
9116 | | * Note: we allow extensions even when negotiating SSL3 for the sake |
9117 | | * of interoperability (and backwards compatibility). |
9118 | | */ |
9119 | 7.42k | if (length) { |
9120 | | /* Get length of hello extensions */ |
9121 | 4.01k | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extensionLength, 2, &b, &length); |
9122 | 4.01k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9123 | 1 | goto loser; /* alert already sent */ |
9124 | 1 | } |
9125 | 4.00k | if (extensionLength != length) { |
9126 | 23 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
9127 | 23 | desc = decode_error; |
9128 | 23 | goto alert_loser; |
9129 | 23 | } |
9130 | | |
9131 | 3.98k | rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); |
9132 | 3.98k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9133 | 8 | goto loser; /* malformed */ |
9134 | 8 | } |
9135 | 3.98k | } |
9136 | | |
9137 | 7.39k | versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn); |
9138 | 7.39k | if (versionExtension) { |
9139 | 43 | rv = tls13_NegotiateVersion(ss, versionExtension); |
9140 | 43 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9141 | 18 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9142 | 18 | desc = (errCode == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION) ? protocol_version : illegal_parameter; |
9143 | 18 | goto alert_loser; |
9144 | 18 | } |
9145 | 7.34k | } else { |
9146 | | /* The PR_MIN here ensures that we never negotiate 1.3 if the |
9147 | | * peer didn't offer "supported_versions". */ |
9148 | 7.34k | rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, |
9149 | 7.34k | PR_MIN(ss->clientHelloVersion, |
9150 | 7.34k | SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2), |
9151 | 7.34k | PR_TRUE); |
9152 | | /* Send protocol version alert if the ClientHello.legacy_version is not |
9153 | | * supported by the server. |
9154 | | * |
9155 | | * If the "supported_versions" extension is absent and the server only |
9156 | | * supports versions greater than ClientHello.legacy_version, the |
9157 | | * server MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert |
9158 | | * [RFC8446, Appendix D.2]. */ |
9159 | 7.34k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9160 | 5 | desc = protocol_version; |
9161 | 5 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; |
9162 | 5 | goto alert_loser; |
9163 | 5 | } |
9164 | 7.34k | } |
9165 | 7.36k | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; |
9166 | | |
9167 | | /* Update the write spec to match the selected version. */ |
9168 | 7.36k | if (!ss->firstHsDone) { |
9169 | 7.36k | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); |
9170 | 7.36k | ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
9171 | 7.36k | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); |
9172 | 7.36k | } |
9173 | | |
9174 | 7.36k | isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
9175 | 7.36k | if (isTLS13) { |
9176 | 0 | if (ss->firstHsDone) { |
9177 | 0 | desc = unexpected_message; |
9178 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; |
9179 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9180 | 0 | } |
9181 | | |
9182 | | /* If there is a cookie, then this is a second ClientHello (TLS 1.3). */ |
9183 | 0 | if (ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn)) { |
9184 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE; |
9185 | 0 | } |
9186 | |
|
9187 | 0 | rv = tls13_MaybeHandleEch(ss, savedMsg, savedLen, &sidBytes, |
9188 | 0 | &comps, &cookieBytes, &suites, &echInner); |
9189 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9190 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9191 | 0 | goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */ |
9192 | 0 | } |
9193 | 0 | } |
9194 | | |
9195 | 7.36k | rv = ssl3_ValidatePreambleWithVersion(ss, &sidBytes, &comps, &cookieBytes); |
9196 | 7.36k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9197 | 5 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9198 | 5 | goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */ |
9199 | 5 | } |
9200 | | |
9201 | | /* Now parse the rest of the extensions. */ |
9202 | 7.36k | rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello); |
9203 | 7.36k | ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); |
9204 | 7.36k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9205 | 92 | if (PORT_GetError() == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM) { |
9206 | 20 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
9207 | 20 | } |
9208 | 92 | goto loser; /* malformed */ |
9209 | 92 | } |
9210 | | |
9211 | | /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a |
9212 | | * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */ |
9213 | 7.27k | if (ss->vrange.max > ss->version) { |
9214 | 0 | for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { |
9215 | 0 | PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; |
9216 | 0 | if (suite_i != TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) |
9217 | 0 | continue; |
9218 | 0 | desc = inappropriate_fallback; |
9219 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; |
9220 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9221 | 0 | } |
9222 | 0 | } |
9223 | | |
9224 | 7.27k | if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { |
9225 | | /* If we didn't receive an RI extension, look for the SCSV, |
9226 | | * and if found, treat it just like an empty RI extension |
9227 | | * by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension. |
9228 | | */ |
9229 | 14.3k | for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { |
9230 | 10.8k | PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; |
9231 | 10.8k | if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { |
9232 | 3.13k | PRUint8 *b2 = (PRUint8 *)emptyRIext; |
9233 | 3.13k | PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; |
9234 | 3.13k | (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, ssl_hs_client_hello); |
9235 | 3.13k | break; |
9236 | 3.13k | } |
9237 | 10.8k | } |
9238 | 6.58k | } |
9239 | | |
9240 | | /* The check for renegotiation in TLS 1.3 is earlier. */ |
9241 | 7.27k | if (!isTLS13) { |
9242 | 7.27k | if (ss->firstHsDone && |
9243 | 7.27k | (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN || |
9244 | 0 | ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) && |
9245 | 7.27k | !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { |
9246 | 0 | desc = no_renegotiation; |
9247 | 0 | level = alert_warning; |
9248 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; |
9249 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9250 | 0 | } |
9251 | 7.27k | if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || |
9252 | 7.27k | (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) && |
9253 | 7.27k | !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { |
9254 | 1.19k | desc = handshake_failure; |
9255 | 1.19k | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; |
9256 | 1.19k | goto alert_loser; |
9257 | 1.19k | } |
9258 | 7.27k | } |
9259 | | |
9260 | | /* We do stateful resumes only if we are in TLS < 1.3 and |
9261 | | * either of the following conditions are satisfied: |
9262 | | * (1) the client does not support the session ticket extension, or |
9263 | | * (2) the client support the session ticket extension, but sent an |
9264 | | * empty ticket. |
9265 | | */ |
9266 | 6.08k | if (!isTLS13 && |
9267 | 6.08k | (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) || |
9268 | 6.08k | ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket)) { |
9269 | 6.08k | if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) { |
9270 | 2.54k | SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x", |
9271 | 2.54k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0], |
9272 | 2.54k | ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1], |
9273 | 2.54k | ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2], |
9274 | 2.54k | ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3])); |
9275 | 2.54k | if (ssl_sid_lookup) { |
9276 | 2.54k | sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(ssl_Time(ss), &ss->sec.ci.peer, |
9277 | 2.54k | sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle); |
9278 | 2.54k | } else { |
9279 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED; |
9280 | 0 | goto loser; |
9281 | 0 | } |
9282 | 2.54k | } |
9283 | 6.08k | } else if (ss->statelessResume) { |
9284 | | /* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume. |
9285 | | * (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.) |
9286 | | * This branch also handles TLS 1.3 resumption-PSK. |
9287 | | */ |
9288 | 0 | sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
9289 | 0 | PORT_Assert(sid != NULL); /* Should have already been filled in.*/ |
9290 | |
|
9291 | 0 | if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { |
9292 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; |
9293 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, |
9294 | 0 | sidBytes.len); |
9295 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; |
9296 | 0 | } else { |
9297 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0; |
9298 | 0 | } |
9299 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; |
9300 | 0 | } |
9301 | | |
9302 | | /* Free a potentially leftover session ID from a previous handshake. */ |
9303 | 6.08k | if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { |
9304 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); |
9305 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; |
9306 | 0 | } |
9307 | | |
9308 | 6.08k | if (sid != NULL) { |
9309 | | /* We've found a session cache entry for this client. |
9310 | | * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert, |
9311 | | * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache, |
9312 | | * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo), |
9313 | | * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session. |
9314 | | */ |
9315 | 0 | if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate && |
9316 | 0 | ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || |
9317 | 0 | (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) || |
9318 | 0 | ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE) && |
9319 | 0 | !ss->firstHsDone))) { |
9320 | |
|
9321 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok); |
9322 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
9323 | 0 | sid = NULL; |
9324 | 0 | ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; |
9325 | 0 | } |
9326 | 0 | } |
9327 | | |
9328 | 6.08k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
9329 | 6.08k | ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); |
9330 | 6.08k | dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); |
9331 | 6.08k | } |
9332 | | |
9333 | 6.08k | if (isTLS13) { |
9334 | 0 | rv = tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid, |
9335 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted ? echInner->data : savedMsg, |
9336 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted ? echInner->len : savedLen); |
9337 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(echInner, PR_TRUE); |
9338 | 0 | echInner = NULL; |
9339 | 6.08k | } else { |
9340 | 6.08k | rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid, |
9341 | 6.08k | savedMsg, savedLen); |
9342 | 6.08k | } |
9343 | 6.08k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9344 | 42 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9345 | 42 | goto loser; |
9346 | 42 | } |
9347 | 6.04k | return SECSuccess; |
9348 | | |
9349 | 1.23k | alert_loser: |
9350 | 1.23k | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc); |
9351 | | /* FALLTHRU */ |
9352 | 1.46k | loser: |
9353 | 1.46k | SECITEM_FreeItem(echInner, PR_TRUE); |
9354 | 1.46k | PORT_SetError(errCode); |
9355 | 1.46k | return SECFailure; |
9356 | 1.23k | } |
9357 | | |
9358 | | /* unwrap helper function to handle the case where the wrapKey doesn't wind |
9359 | | * up in the correct token for the master secret */ |
9360 | | PK11SymKey * |
9361 | | ssl_unwrapSymKey(PK11SymKey *wrapKey, |
9362 | | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, SECItem *param, |
9363 | | SECItem *wrappedKey, |
9364 | | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, |
9365 | | int keySize, CK_FLAGS keyFlags, void *pinArg) |
9366 | 0 | { |
9367 | 0 | PK11SymKey *unwrappedKey; |
9368 | | |
9369 | | /* unwrap the master secret. */ |
9370 | 0 | unwrappedKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, wrapType, param, |
9371 | 0 | wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, |
9372 | 0 | keyFlags); |
9373 | 0 | if (!unwrappedKey) { |
9374 | 0 | PK11SlotInfo *targetSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(target, pinArg); |
9375 | 0 | PK11SymKey *newWrapKey; |
9376 | | |
9377 | | /* it's possible that we failed to unwrap because the wrapKey is in |
9378 | | * a slot that can't handle target. Move the wrapKey to a slot that |
9379 | | * can handle this mechanism and retry the operation */ |
9380 | 0 | if (targetSlot == NULL) { |
9381 | 0 | return NULL; |
9382 | 0 | } |
9383 | 0 | newWrapKey = PK11_MoveSymKey(targetSlot, CKA_UNWRAP, 0, |
9384 | 0 | PR_FALSE, wrapKey); |
9385 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(targetSlot); |
9386 | 0 | if (newWrapKey == NULL) { |
9387 | 0 | return NULL; |
9388 | 0 | } |
9389 | 0 | unwrappedKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(newWrapKey, wrapType, param, |
9390 | 0 | wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, |
9391 | 0 | keyFlags); |
9392 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(newWrapKey); |
9393 | 0 | } |
9394 | 0 | return unwrappedKey; |
9395 | 0 | } |
9396 | | |
9397 | | static SECStatus |
9398 | | ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretServer(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey **ms) |
9399 | 0 | { |
9400 | 0 | PK11SymKey *wrapKey; |
9401 | 0 | CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; |
9402 | 0 | SECItem wrappedMS = { |
9403 | 0 | siBuffer, |
9404 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, |
9405 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len |
9406 | 0 | }; |
9407 | |
|
9408 | 0 | wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, |
9409 | 0 | ss->pkcs11PinArg); |
9410 | 0 | if (!wrapKey) { |
9411 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9412 | 0 | } |
9413 | | |
9414 | 0 | if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ |
9415 | 0 | keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; |
9416 | 0 | } |
9417 | |
|
9418 | 0 | *ms = ssl_unwrapSymKey(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, NULL, |
9419 | 0 | &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, |
9420 | 0 | CKA_DERIVE, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH, |
9421 | 0 | keyFlags, ss->pkcs11PinArg); |
9422 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); |
9423 | 0 | if (!*ms) { |
9424 | 0 | SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server wrapping key found, but couldn't unwrap MasterSecret. wrapMech=0x%0lx", |
9425 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech)); |
9426 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9427 | 0 | } |
9428 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
9429 | 0 | } |
9430 | | |
9431 | | static SECStatus |
9432 | | ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, |
9433 | | SECItem *suites, |
9434 | | sslSessionID *sid, |
9435 | | const PRUint8 *msg, |
9436 | | unsigned int len) |
9437 | 6.08k | { |
9438 | 6.08k | PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; |
9439 | 6.08k | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
9440 | 6.08k | SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; |
9441 | 6.08k | SECStatus rv; |
9442 | 6.08k | unsigned int i; |
9443 | 6.08k | unsigned int j; |
9444 | | |
9445 | 6.08k | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello, msg, len); |
9446 | 6.08k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9447 | 0 | errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; |
9448 | 0 | desc = internal_error; |
9449 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9450 | 0 | } |
9451 | | |
9452 | | /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the same |
9453 | | ** cipher suite we picked before. This is not a loop, despite appearances. |
9454 | | */ |
9455 | 6.08k | if (sid) |
9456 | 0 | do { |
9457 | 0 | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; |
9458 | 0 | SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; |
9459 | |
|
9460 | 0 | suite = ss->cipherSuites; |
9461 | | /* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */ |
9462 | 0 | for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) { |
9463 | 0 | if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) |
9464 | 0 | break; |
9465 | 0 | } |
9466 | 0 | PORT_Assert(j > 0); |
9467 | 0 | if (j == 0) |
9468 | 0 | break; |
9469 | | |
9470 | | /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled, |
9471 | | * implemented, and allowed by policy. Might have been disabled. |
9472 | | */ |
9473 | 0 | if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { |
9474 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
9475 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9476 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9477 | 0 | } |
9478 | 0 | if (!ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) |
9479 | 0 | break; |
9480 | | |
9481 | | /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's |
9482 | | * list. If it isn't, fall through and start a new session. */ |
9483 | 0 | for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) { |
9484 | 0 | PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1]; |
9485 | 0 | if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { |
9486 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite_i; |
9487 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_TRUE); |
9488 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9489 | 0 | desc = internal_error; |
9490 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9491 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9492 | 0 | } |
9493 | | |
9494 | 0 | goto cipher_found; |
9495 | 0 | } |
9496 | 0 | } |
9497 | 0 | } while (0); |
9498 | | /* START A NEW SESSION */ |
9499 | | |
9500 | 6.08k | rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(ss, suites, PR_TRUE); |
9501 | 6.08k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9502 | 20 | desc = handshake_failure; |
9503 | 20 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9504 | 20 | goto alert_loser; |
9505 | 20 | } |
9506 | | |
9507 | 6.06k | cipher_found: |
9508 | 6.06k | suites->data = NULL; |
9509 | | |
9510 | | /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid, |
9511 | | * we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave |
9512 | | * as if the client had sent us no sid to begin with, and make a new one. |
9513 | | * The exception here is attempts to resume extended_master_secret |
9514 | | * sessions without the extension, which causes an alert. |
9515 | | */ |
9516 | 6.06k | if (sid != NULL) |
9517 | 0 | do { |
9518 | 0 | PK11SymKey *masterSecret; |
9519 | |
|
9520 | 0 | if (sid->version != ss->version || |
9521 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { |
9522 | 0 | break; /* not an error */ |
9523 | 0 | } |
9524 | | |
9525 | | /* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, |
9526 | | ** but they do remember the slot we originally used, so we |
9527 | | ** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket |
9528 | | ** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one. |
9529 | | */ |
9530 | 0 | ss->sec.serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, sid->authType, sid->namedCurve); |
9531 | 0 | if (!ss->sec.serverCert || !ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert) { |
9532 | | /* A compatible certificate must not have been configured. It |
9533 | | * might not be the same certificate, but we only find that out |
9534 | | * when the ticket fails to decrypt. */ |
9535 | 0 | break; |
9536 | 0 | } |
9537 | | |
9538 | | /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] |
9539 | | * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" |
9540 | | * extension but the new ClientHello contains the extension, then the |
9541 | | * server MUST NOT perform the abbreviated handshake. Instead, it |
9542 | | * SHOULD continue with a full handshake (as described in |
9543 | | * Section 5.2) to negotiate a new session. |
9544 | | * |
9545 | | * o If the original session used the "extended_master_secret" |
9546 | | * extension but the new ClientHello does not contain the extension, |
9547 | | * the server MUST abort the abbreviated handshake. |
9548 | | */ |
9549 | 0 | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { |
9550 | 0 | if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { |
9551 | 0 | break; /* not an error */ |
9552 | 0 | } |
9553 | 0 | } else { |
9554 | 0 | if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { |
9555 | | /* Note: we do not destroy the session */ |
9556 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
9557 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; |
9558 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9559 | 0 | } |
9560 | 0 | } |
9561 | | |
9562 | 0 | if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { |
9563 | 0 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
9564 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */ |
9565 | 0 | if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) { |
9566 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); |
9567 | 0 | } |
9568 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; |
9569 | 0 | } |
9570 | | |
9571 | | /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */ |
9572 | 0 | rv = ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretServer(ss, sid, &masterSecret); |
9573 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9574 | 0 | break; /* not an error */ |
9575 | 0 | } |
9576 | | |
9577 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; |
9578 | 0 | if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { |
9579 | 0 | ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); |
9580 | 0 | } |
9581 | | |
9582 | | /* |
9583 | | * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session. |
9584 | | */ |
9585 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits); |
9586 | 0 | if (ss->statelessResume) |
9587 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes); |
9588 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; |
9589 | |
|
9590 | 0 | ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; |
9591 | 0 | ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; |
9592 | 0 | ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; |
9593 | 0 | ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; |
9594 | 0 | ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup); |
9595 | 0 | ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme; |
9596 | |
|
9597 | 0 | ss->sec.localCert = |
9598 | 0 | CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); |
9599 | | |
9600 | | /* Copy cached name in to pending spec */ |
9601 | 0 | if (sid != NULL && |
9602 | 0 | sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && |
9603 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len && sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) { |
9604 | | /* Set server name from sid */ |
9605 | 0 | SECItem *sidName = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName; |
9606 | 0 | SECItem *pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; |
9607 | 0 | if (pwsName->data) { |
9608 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); |
9609 | 0 | } |
9610 | 0 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, sidName); |
9611 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9612 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9613 | 0 | desc = internal_error; |
9614 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9615 | 0 | } |
9616 | 0 | } |
9617 | | |
9618 | | /* Clean up sni name array */ |
9619 | 0 | ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData); |
9620 | |
|
9621 | 0 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); |
9622 | 0 | haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE; |
9623 | |
|
9624 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); |
9625 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9626 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9627 | 0 | goto loser; |
9628 | 0 | } |
9629 | | |
9630 | | /* We are re-using the old MS, so no need to derive again. */ |
9631 | 0 | rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, masterSecret, PR_FALSE); |
9632 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9633 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9634 | 0 | goto loser; |
9635 | 0 | } |
9636 | | |
9637 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); |
9638 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9639 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9640 | 0 | goto loser; |
9641 | 0 | } |
9642 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); |
9643 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; |
9644 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9645 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9646 | 0 | goto loser; |
9647 | 0 | } |
9648 | | |
9649 | 0 | if (haveXmitBufLock) { |
9650 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
9651 | 0 | } |
9652 | |
|
9653 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
9654 | 0 | } while (0); |
9655 | | |
9656 | 6.06k | if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ |
9657 | 0 | ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; |
9658 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok); |
9659 | 0 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
9660 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
9661 | 0 | sid = NULL; |
9662 | 0 | } |
9663 | 6.06k | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses); |
9664 | | |
9665 | | /* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports |
9666 | | * the extension and we are unable to resume. |
9667 | | * |
9668 | | * TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful |
9669 | | * resumption. (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session |
9670 | | * ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume, |
9671 | | * but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while |
9672 | | * resuming.) |
9673 | | */ |
9674 | 6.06k | if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && |
9675 | 6.06k | ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) { |
9676 | 0 | ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_session_ticket_xtn, |
9677 | 0 | ssl_SendEmptyExtension); |
9678 | 0 | } |
9679 | | |
9680 | 6.06k | rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss); |
9681 | 6.06k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9682 | | /* The alert has already been sent. */ |
9683 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9684 | 0 | goto loser; |
9685 | 0 | } |
9686 | | |
9687 | 6.06k | rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss); |
9688 | 6.06k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9689 | 22 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9690 | 22 | desc = handshake_failure; |
9691 | 22 | goto alert_loser; |
9692 | 22 | } |
9693 | | |
9694 | 6.04k | sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); |
9695 | 6.04k | if (sid == NULL) { |
9696 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9697 | 0 | goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ |
9698 | 0 | } |
9699 | 6.04k | ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; |
9700 | | |
9701 | 6.04k | sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = |
9702 | 6.04k | ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); |
9703 | 6.04k | ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; |
9704 | | |
9705 | 6.04k | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); |
9706 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); |
9707 | 6.04k | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
9708 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9709 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9710 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
9711 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9712 | 0 | } |
9713 | | |
9714 | 6.04k | if (haveXmitBufLock) { |
9715 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
9716 | 0 | } |
9717 | | |
9718 | 6.04k | return SECSuccess; |
9719 | | |
9720 | 42 | alert_loser: |
9721 | 42 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
9722 | | /* FALLTHRU */ |
9723 | 42 | loser: |
9724 | 42 | if (sid && sid != ss->sec.ci.sid) { |
9725 | 0 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); |
9726 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); |
9727 | 0 | } |
9728 | | |
9729 | 42 | if (haveXmitBufLock) { |
9730 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
9731 | 0 | } |
9732 | | |
9733 | 42 | PORT_SetError(errCode); |
9734 | 42 | return SECFailure; |
9735 | 42 | } |
9736 | | |
9737 | | /* |
9738 | | * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes |
9739 | | * in asking to use the V3 handshake. |
9740 | | */ |
9741 | | SECStatus |
9742 | | ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length, |
9743 | | PRUint8 padding) |
9744 | 0 | { |
9745 | 0 | sslSessionID *sid = NULL; |
9746 | 0 | unsigned char *suites; |
9747 | 0 | unsigned char *random; |
9748 | 0 | SSL3ProtocolVersion version; |
9749 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
9750 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
9751 | 0 | unsigned int j; |
9752 | 0 | unsigned int sid_length; |
9753 | 0 | unsigned int suite_length; |
9754 | 0 | unsigned int rand_length; |
9755 | 0 | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
9756 | 0 | SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; |
9757 | 0 | unsigned int total = SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; |
9758 | |
|
9759 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
9760 | |
|
9761 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
9762 | |
|
9763 | 0 | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
9764 | |
|
9765 | 0 | version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; |
9766 | 0 | if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { |
9767 | 0 | goto loser; |
9768 | 0 | } |
9769 | | |
9770 | 0 | ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); |
9771 | |
|
9772 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) { |
9773 | 0 | desc = unexpected_message; |
9774 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
9775 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9776 | 0 | } |
9777 | | |
9778 | 0 | total += suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4]; |
9779 | 0 | total += sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6]; |
9780 | 0 | total += rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8]; |
9781 | 0 | total += padding; |
9782 | 0 | ss->clientHelloVersion = version; |
9783 | |
|
9784 | 0 | if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
9785 | | /* [draft-ietf-tls-tls-11; C.3] forbids sending a TLS 1.3 |
9786 | | * ClientHello using the backwards-compatible format. */ |
9787 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
9788 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
9789 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9790 | 0 | } |
9791 | | |
9792 | 0 | rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE); |
9793 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9794 | | /* send back which ever alert client will understand. */ |
9795 | 0 | desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version |
9796 | 0 | : handshake_failure; |
9797 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; |
9798 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9799 | 0 | } |
9800 | | /* ECH not possible here. */ |
9801 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech; |
9802 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; |
9803 | 0 | if (!ss->firstHsDone) { |
9804 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); |
9805 | 0 | ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
9806 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); |
9807 | 0 | } |
9808 | | |
9809 | | /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */ |
9810 | 0 | if (length != total) { |
9811 | 0 | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d", |
9812 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length, total)); |
9813 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
9814 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
9815 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9816 | 0 | } |
9817 | | |
9818 | 0 | suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; |
9819 | 0 | random = suites + suite_length + sid_length; |
9820 | |
|
9821 | 0 | if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES || |
9822 | 0 | rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) { |
9823 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
9824 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; |
9825 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9826 | 0 | } |
9827 | | |
9828 | 0 | PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
9829 | |
|
9830 | 0 | PORT_Memset(ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
9831 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length], |
9832 | 0 | random, rand_length); |
9833 | |
|
9834 | 0 | PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, |
9835 | 0 | SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH)); |
9836 | |
|
9837 | 0 | if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { |
9838 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ |
9839 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9840 | 0 | } |
9841 | | |
9842 | | /* Select a cipher suite. |
9843 | | ** |
9844 | | ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in |
9845 | | ** ssl3_HandleClientHello(). |
9846 | | */ |
9847 | 0 | for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { |
9848 | 0 | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; |
9849 | 0 | SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; |
9850 | 0 | if (!ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { |
9851 | 0 | continue; |
9852 | 0 | } |
9853 | 0 | for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { |
9854 | 0 | PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; |
9855 | 0 | if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { |
9856 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite_i; |
9857 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_TRUE); |
9858 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9859 | 0 | desc = internal_error; |
9860 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9861 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9862 | 0 | } |
9863 | 0 | goto suite_found; |
9864 | 0 | } |
9865 | 0 | } |
9866 | 0 | } |
9867 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; |
9868 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9869 | | |
9870 | 0 | suite_found: |
9871 | | |
9872 | | /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a |
9873 | | * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */ |
9874 | 0 | if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) { |
9875 | 0 | for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { |
9876 | 0 | PRUint16 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; |
9877 | 0 | if (suite_i == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) { |
9878 | 0 | desc = inappropriate_fallback; |
9879 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; |
9880 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9881 | 0 | } |
9882 | 0 | } |
9883 | 0 | } |
9884 | | |
9885 | | /* Look for the SCSV, and if found, treat it just like an empty RI |
9886 | | * extension by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension. |
9887 | | */ |
9888 | 0 | for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { |
9889 | 0 | PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; |
9890 | 0 | if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { |
9891 | 0 | PRUint8 *b2 = (PRUint8 *)emptyRIext; |
9892 | 0 | PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; |
9893 | 0 | (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, ssl_hs_client_hello); |
9894 | 0 | break; |
9895 | 0 | } |
9896 | 0 | } |
9897 | |
|
9898 | 0 | if (ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation && |
9899 | 0 | !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { |
9900 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
9901 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; |
9902 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9903 | 0 | } |
9904 | | |
9905 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss); |
9906 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9907 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9908 | 0 | desc = handshake_failure; |
9909 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
9910 | 0 | } |
9911 | | |
9912 | | /* we don't even search for a cache hit here. It's just a miss. */ |
9913 | 0 | SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses); |
9914 | 0 | sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); |
9915 | 0 | if (sid == NULL) { |
9916 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9917 | 0 | goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ |
9918 | 0 | } |
9919 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; |
9920 | | /* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */ |
9921 | | |
9922 | | /* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */ |
9923 | 0 | rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length); |
9924 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9925 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9926 | 0 | goto loser; |
9927 | 0 | } |
9928 | | |
9929 | 0 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); |
9930 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); |
9931 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); |
9932 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9933 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
9934 | 0 | goto loser; |
9935 | 0 | } |
9936 | | |
9937 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
9938 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
9939 | | |
9940 | 0 | alert_loser: |
9941 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
9942 | 0 | loser: |
9943 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
9944 | 0 | PORT_SetError(errCode); |
9945 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9946 | 0 | } |
9947 | | |
9948 | | SECStatus |
9949 | | ssl_ConstructServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool helloRetry, |
9950 | | const sslBuffer *extensionBuf, sslBuffer *messageBuf) |
9951 | 6.04k | { |
9952 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
9953 | 6.04k | SSL3ProtocolVersion version; |
9954 | 6.04k | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
9955 | 6.04k | const PRUint8 *random; |
9956 | | |
9957 | 6.04k | version = PR_MIN(ss->version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); |
9958 | 6.04k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
9959 | 6.04k | version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); |
9960 | 6.04k | } |
9961 | 6.04k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, version, 2); |
9962 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9963 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9964 | 0 | } |
9965 | | |
9966 | 6.04k | if (helloRetry) { |
9967 | 0 | random = ssl_hello_retry_random; |
9968 | 6.04k | } else { |
9969 | 6.04k | rv = ssl_GenerateServerRandom(ss); |
9970 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9971 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9972 | 0 | } |
9973 | 6.04k | random = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; |
9974 | 6.04k | } |
9975 | 6.04k | rv = sslBuffer_Append(messageBuf, random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
9976 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9977 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9978 | 0 | } |
9979 | | |
9980 | 6.04k | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
9981 | 6.04k | if (sid) { |
9982 | 6.04k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(messageBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, |
9983 | 6.04k | sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); |
9984 | 6.04k | } else { |
9985 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, 0, 1); |
9986 | 0 | } |
9987 | 6.04k | } else { |
9988 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(messageBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.data, |
9989 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.len, 1); |
9990 | 0 | } |
9991 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9992 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9993 | 0 | } |
9994 | | |
9995 | 6.04k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2); |
9996 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
9997 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
9998 | 0 | } |
9999 | 6.04k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, ssl_compression_null, 1); |
10000 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10001 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10002 | 0 | } |
10003 | 6.04k | if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(extensionBuf)) { |
10004 | | /* Directly copy the extensions */ |
10005 | 4.86k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(messageBuf, extensionBuf, 2); |
10006 | 4.86k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10007 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10008 | 0 | } |
10009 | 4.86k | } |
10010 | | |
10011 | 6.04k | if (ss->xtnData.ech && ss->xtnData.ech->receivedInnerXtn) { |
10012 | | /* Signal ECH acceptance if we handled handled both CHOuter/CHInner (i.e. |
10013 | | * in shared mode), or if we received a CHInner in split/backend mode. */ |
10014 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) { |
10015 | 0 | if (helloRetry) { |
10016 | 0 | return tls13_WriteServerEchHrrSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf), |
10017 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf)); |
10018 | 0 | } else { |
10019 | 0 | return tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf), |
10020 | 0 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf)); |
10021 | 0 | } |
10022 | 0 | } |
10023 | 0 | } |
10024 | 6.04k | return SECSuccess; |
10025 | 6.04k | } |
10026 | | |
10027 | | /* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version. |
10028 | | ** |
10029 | | ** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session), |
10030 | | ** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session), |
10031 | | ** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session) |
10032 | | */ |
10033 | | SECStatus |
10034 | | ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss) |
10035 | 6.04k | { |
10036 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
10037 | 6.04k | sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; |
10038 | 6.04k | sslBuffer messageBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; |
10039 | | |
10040 | 6.04k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), |
10041 | 6.04k | ss->fd)); |
10042 | | |
10043 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
10044 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
10045 | | |
10046 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); |
10047 | 6.04k | if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { |
10048 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); |
10049 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10050 | 0 | } |
10051 | | |
10052 | 6.04k | rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_server_hello); |
10053 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10054 | 0 | goto loser; |
10055 | 0 | } |
10056 | | |
10057 | 6.04k | rv = ssl_ConstructServerHello(ss, PR_FALSE, &extensionBuf, &messageBuf); |
10058 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10059 | 0 | goto loser; |
10060 | 0 | } |
10061 | | |
10062 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, |
10063 | 6.04k | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf)); |
10064 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10065 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10066 | 0 | } |
10067 | | |
10068 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&messageBuf), |
10069 | 6.04k | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf)); |
10070 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10071 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10072 | 0 | } |
10073 | | |
10074 | 6.04k | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
10075 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(ss); |
10076 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10077 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set */ |
10078 | 0 | } |
10079 | 6.04k | } |
10080 | | |
10081 | 6.04k | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); |
10082 | 6.04k | sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); |
10083 | 6.04k | return SECSuccess; |
10084 | | |
10085 | 0 | loser: |
10086 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); |
10087 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); |
10088 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10089 | 6.04k | } |
10090 | | |
10091 | | SECStatus |
10092 | | ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef, |
10093 | | const ssl3DHParams *params, |
10094 | | sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair) |
10095 | 1.07k | { |
10096 | 1.07k | SECKEYDHParams dhParam; |
10097 | 1.07k | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ |
10098 | 1.07k | SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ |
10099 | 1.07k | sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair; |
10100 | | |
10101 | 1.07k | dhParam.prime.data = params->prime.data; |
10102 | 1.07k | dhParam.prime.len = params->prime.len; |
10103 | 1.07k | dhParam.base.data = params->base.data; |
10104 | 1.07k | dhParam.base.len = params->base.len; |
10105 | | |
10106 | 1.07k | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dhParam.prime.data, |
10107 | 1.07k | dhParam.prime.len)); |
10108 | 1.07k | PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dhParam.base.data, |
10109 | 1.07k | dhParam.base.len)); |
10110 | | |
10111 | | /* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */ |
10112 | 1.07k | privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL); |
10113 | 1.07k | if (!privKey || !pubKey) { |
10114 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); |
10115 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10116 | 0 | } |
10117 | | |
10118 | 1.07k | pair = ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair(groupDef, privKey, pubKey); |
10119 | 1.07k | if (!pair) { |
10120 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); |
10121 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); |
10122 | |
|
10123 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10124 | 0 | } |
10125 | | |
10126 | 1.07k | *keyPair = pair; |
10127 | 1.07k | return SECSuccess; |
10128 | 1.07k | } |
10129 | | |
10130 | | static SECStatus |
10131 | | ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) |
10132 | 1.07k | { |
10133 | 1.07k | const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; |
10134 | 1.07k | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
10135 | 1.07k | int length; |
10136 | 1.07k | SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
10137 | 1.07k | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
10138 | 1.07k | SSLHashType hashAlg; |
10139 | | |
10140 | 1.07k | const ssl3DHParams *params; |
10141 | 1.07k | sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; |
10142 | 1.07k | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; |
10143 | 1.07k | SECKEYPrivateKey *certPrivateKey; |
10144 | 1.07k | const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; |
10145 | | /* Do this on the heap, this could be over 2k long. */ |
10146 | 1.07k | sslBuffer dhBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; |
10147 | | |
10148 | 1.07k | if (kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_dss && kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_rsa) { |
10149 | | /* TODO: Support DH_anon. It might be sufficient to drop the signature. |
10150 | | See bug 1170510. */ |
10151 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
10152 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10153 | 0 | } |
10154 | | |
10155 | 1.07k | rv = ssl_SelectDHEGroup(ss, &groupDef); |
10156 | 1.07k | if (rv == SECFailure) { |
10157 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); |
10158 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10159 | 0 | } |
10160 | 1.07k | ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; |
10161 | | |
10162 | 1.07k | params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef); |
10163 | 1.07k | rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); |
10164 | 1.07k | if (rv == SECFailure) { |
10165 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); |
10166 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10167 | 0 | } |
10168 | 1.07k | PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); |
10169 | | |
10170 | 1.07k | if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
10171 | 1.07k | hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); |
10172 | 1.07k | } else { |
10173 | | /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ |
10174 | 0 | hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; |
10175 | 0 | } |
10176 | | |
10177 | 1.07k | pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; |
10178 | 1.07k | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", |
10179 | 1.07k | pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, |
10180 | 1.07k | pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); |
10181 | 1.07k | rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes, |
10182 | 1.07k | pubKey->u.dh.prime, |
10183 | 1.07k | pubKey->u.dh.base, |
10184 | 1.07k | pubKey->u.dh.publicValue, |
10185 | 1.07k | PR_TRUE /* padY */); |
10186 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10187 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
10188 | 0 | goto loser; |
10189 | 0 | } |
10190 | | |
10191 | 1.07k | certPrivateKey = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; |
10192 | 1.07k | rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, certPrivateKey, &signed_hash); |
10193 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10194 | 0 | goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ |
10195 | 0 | } |
10196 | | |
10197 | 1.07k | length = 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len + |
10198 | 1.07k | 2 + pubKey->u.dh.base.len + |
10199 | 1.07k | 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len + |
10200 | 1.07k | 2 + signed_hash.len; |
10201 | | |
10202 | 1.07k | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
10203 | 1.07k | length += 2; |
10204 | 1.07k | } |
10205 | | |
10206 | 1.07k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_key_exchange, length); |
10207 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10208 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10209 | 0 | } |
10210 | | |
10211 | 1.07k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.data, |
10212 | 1.07k | pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); |
10213 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10214 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10215 | 0 | } |
10216 | | |
10217 | 1.07k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.base.data, |
10218 | 1.07k | pubKey->u.dh.base.len, 2); |
10219 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10220 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10221 | 0 | } |
10222 | | |
10223 | 1.07k | rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(&dhBuf, pubKey, PR_TRUE); |
10224 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10225 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendPaddedDHKeyShare. */ |
10226 | 0 | } |
10227 | 1.07k | rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &dhBuf); |
10228 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10229 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10230 | 0 | } |
10231 | | |
10232 | 1.07k | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
10233 | 1.07k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); |
10234 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10235 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10236 | 0 | } |
10237 | 1.07k | } |
10238 | | |
10239 | 1.07k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, |
10240 | 1.07k | signed_hash.len, 2); |
10241 | 1.07k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10242 | 0 | goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10243 | 0 | } |
10244 | | |
10245 | 1.07k | sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); |
10246 | 1.07k | PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); |
10247 | 1.07k | return SECSuccess; |
10248 | | |
10249 | 0 | loser: |
10250 | 0 | if (signed_hash.data) |
10251 | 0 | PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); |
10252 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); |
10253 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10254 | 1.07k | } |
10255 | | |
10256 | | static SECStatus |
10257 | | ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) |
10258 | 5.03k | { |
10259 | 5.03k | const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; |
10260 | | |
10261 | 5.03k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake", |
10262 | 5.03k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
10263 | | |
10264 | 5.03k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
10265 | 5.03k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
10266 | | |
10267 | 5.03k | switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { |
10268 | 1.07k | case ssl_kea_dh: { |
10269 | 1.07k | return ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(ss); |
10270 | 0 | } |
10271 | | |
10272 | 3.96k | case ssl_kea_ecdh: { |
10273 | 3.96k | return ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss); |
10274 | 0 | } |
10275 | | |
10276 | 0 | case ssl_kea_rsa: |
10277 | 0 | case ssl_kea_null: |
10278 | 0 | default: |
10279 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
10280 | 0 | break; |
10281 | 5.03k | } |
10282 | | |
10283 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10284 | 5.03k | } |
10285 | | |
10286 | | SECStatus |
10287 | | ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 minVersion, PRBool forCert, |
10288 | | PRBool grease, sslBuffer *buf) |
10289 | 3.51k | { |
10290 | 3.51k | SSLSignatureScheme filtered[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES] = { 0 }; |
10291 | 3.51k | unsigned int filteredCount = 0; |
10292 | | |
10293 | 3.51k | SECStatus rv = ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(ss, minVersion, PR_FALSE, forCert, |
10294 | 3.51k | PR_ARRAY_SIZE(filtered), |
10295 | 3.51k | filtered, &filteredCount); |
10296 | 3.51k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10297 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10298 | 0 | } |
10299 | 3.51k | return ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(ss, filtered, filteredCount, grease, buf); |
10300 | 3.51k | } |
10301 | | |
10302 | | SECStatus |
10303 | | ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, |
10304 | | PRUint32 numSchemes, PRBool grease, sslBuffer *buf) |
10305 | 3.51k | { |
10306 | 3.51k | if (!numSchemes) { |
10307 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
10308 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10309 | 0 | } |
10310 | | |
10311 | 3.51k | unsigned int lengthOffset; |
10312 | 3.51k | SECStatus rv; |
10313 | | |
10314 | 3.51k | rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &lengthOffset); |
10315 | 3.51k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10316 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10317 | 0 | } |
10318 | | |
10319 | 56.2k | for (unsigned int i = 0; i < numSchemes; ++i) { |
10320 | 52.7k | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, schemes[i], 2); |
10321 | 52.7k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10322 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10323 | 0 | } |
10324 | 52.7k | } |
10325 | | |
10326 | | /* GREASE SignatureAlgorithms: |
10327 | | * A client MAY select one or more GREASE signature algorithm values and |
10328 | | * advertise them in the "signature_algorithms" or |
10329 | | * "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions, if sent [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. |
10330 | | * |
10331 | | * When sending a CertificateRequest in TLS 1.3, a server MAY behave as |
10332 | | * follows: [...] A server MAY select one or more GREASE signature |
10333 | | * algorithm values and advertise them in the "signature_algorithms" or |
10334 | | * "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions, if present |
10335 | | * [RFC8701, Section 4.1]. */ |
10336 | 3.51k | if (grease && |
10337 | 3.51k | ((!ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) || |
10338 | 0 | (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3))) { |
10339 | 0 | PRUint16 value; |
10340 | 0 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
10341 | 0 | rv = tls13_RandomGreaseValue(&value); |
10342 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10343 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10344 | 0 | } |
10345 | 0 | } else { |
10346 | 0 | value = ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_sigalg]; |
10347 | 0 | } |
10348 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, value, 2); |
10349 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10350 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10351 | 0 | } |
10352 | 0 | } |
10353 | | |
10354 | 3.51k | return sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 2); |
10355 | 3.51k | } |
10356 | | |
10357 | | /* |
10358 | | * In TLS 1.3 we are permitted to advertise support for PKCS#1 |
10359 | | * schemes. This doesn't affect the signatures in TLS itself, just |
10360 | | * those on certificates. Not advertising PKCS#1 signatures creates a |
10361 | | * serious compatibility risk as it excludes many certificate chains |
10362 | | * that include PKCS#1. Hence, forCert is used to enable advertising |
10363 | | * PKCS#1 support. Note that we include these in signature_algorithms |
10364 | | * because we don't yet support signature_algorithms_cert. TLS 1.3 |
10365 | | * requires that PKCS#1 schemes are placed last in the list if they |
10366 | | * are present. This sorting can be removed once we support |
10367 | | * signature_algorithms_cert. |
10368 | | */ |
10369 | | SECStatus |
10370 | | ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 minVersion, PRBool disableRsae, |
10371 | | PRBool forCert, |
10372 | | unsigned int maxSchemes, SSLSignatureScheme *filteredSchemes, |
10373 | | unsigned int *numFilteredSchemes) |
10374 | 3.51k | { |
10375 | 3.51k | PORT_Assert(filteredSchemes); |
10376 | 3.51k | PORT_Assert(numFilteredSchemes); |
10377 | 3.51k | PORT_Assert(maxSchemes >= ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount); |
10378 | 3.51k | if (maxSchemes < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { |
10379 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10380 | 0 | } |
10381 | | |
10382 | 3.51k | *numFilteredSchemes = 0; |
10383 | 3.51k | PRBool allowUnsortedPkcs1 = forCert && minVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
10384 | 56.2k | for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { |
10385 | 52.7k | if (disableRsae && ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i])) { |
10386 | 0 | continue; |
10387 | 0 | } |
10388 | 52.7k | if (ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(minVersion, |
10389 | 52.7k | ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], |
10390 | 52.7k | allowUnsortedPkcs1)) { |
10391 | 52.7k | filteredSchemes[(*numFilteredSchemes)++] = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; |
10392 | 52.7k | } |
10393 | 52.7k | } |
10394 | 3.51k | if (forCert && !allowUnsortedPkcs1) { |
10395 | 0 | for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { |
10396 | 0 | if (disableRsae && ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i])) { |
10397 | 0 | continue; |
10398 | 0 | } |
10399 | 0 | if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(minVersion, |
10400 | 0 | ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], |
10401 | 0 | PR_FALSE) && |
10402 | 0 | ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(minVersion, |
10403 | 0 | ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], |
10404 | 0 | PR_TRUE)) { |
10405 | 0 | filteredSchemes[(*numFilteredSchemes)++] = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; |
10406 | 0 | } |
10407 | 0 | } |
10408 | 0 | } |
10409 | 3.51k | return SECSuccess; |
10410 | 3.51k | } |
10411 | | |
10412 | | static SECStatus |
10413 | | ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) |
10414 | 3.51k | { |
10415 | 3.51k | PRBool isTLS12; |
10416 | 3.51k | const PRUint8 *certTypes; |
10417 | 3.51k | SECStatus rv; |
10418 | 3.51k | PRUint32 length; |
10419 | 3.51k | const SECItem *names; |
10420 | 3.51k | unsigned int calen; |
10421 | 3.51k | unsigned int nnames; |
10422 | 3.51k | const SECItem *name; |
10423 | 3.51k | unsigned int i; |
10424 | 3.51k | int certTypesLength; |
10425 | 3.51k | PRUint8 sigAlgs[2 + MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2]; |
10426 | 3.51k | sslBuffer sigAlgsBuf = SSL_BUFFER(sigAlgs); |
10427 | | |
10428 | 3.51k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake", |
10429 | 3.51k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
10430 | | |
10431 | 3.51k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
10432 | 3.51k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
10433 | | |
10434 | 3.51k | isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); |
10435 | | |
10436 | 3.51k | rv = ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &names, &nnames); |
10437 | 3.51k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10438 | 0 | return rv; |
10439 | 0 | } |
10440 | 3.51k | certTypes = certificate_types; |
10441 | 3.51k | certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types; |
10442 | | |
10443 | 3.51k | length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen; |
10444 | 3.51k | if (isTLS12) { |
10445 | 3.51k | rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, ss->version, PR_TRUE /* forCert */, |
10446 | 3.51k | PR_FALSE /* GREASE */, &sigAlgsBuf); |
10447 | 3.51k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10448 | 0 | return rv; |
10449 | 0 | } |
10450 | 3.51k | length += SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sigAlgsBuf); |
10451 | 3.51k | } |
10452 | | |
10453 | 3.51k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_request, length); |
10454 | 3.51k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10455 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10456 | 0 | } |
10457 | 3.51k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1); |
10458 | 3.51k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10459 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10460 | 0 | } |
10461 | 3.51k | if (isTLS12) { |
10462 | 3.51k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&sigAlgsBuf), |
10463 | 3.51k | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sigAlgsBuf)); |
10464 | 3.51k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10465 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10466 | 0 | } |
10467 | 3.51k | } |
10468 | 3.51k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2); |
10469 | 3.51k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10470 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10471 | 0 | } |
10472 | 3.51k | for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { |
10473 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2); |
10474 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10475 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10476 | 0 | } |
10477 | 0 | } |
10478 | | |
10479 | 3.51k | return SECSuccess; |
10480 | 3.51k | } |
10481 | | |
10482 | | static SECStatus |
10483 | | ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) |
10484 | 6.04k | { |
10485 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
10486 | | |
10487 | 6.04k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake", |
10488 | 6.04k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
10489 | | |
10490 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
10491 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
10492 | | |
10493 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello_done, 0); |
10494 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10495 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
10496 | 0 | } |
10497 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); |
10498 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10499 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ |
10500 | 0 | } |
10501 | 6.04k | return SECSuccess; |
10502 | 6.04k | } |
10503 | | |
10504 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered |
10505 | | * a complete ssl3 Certificate Verify message |
10506 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
10507 | | */ |
10508 | | static SECStatus |
10509 | | ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
10510 | 3 | { |
10511 | 3 | SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
10512 | 3 | SECStatus rv; |
10513 | 3 | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY; |
10514 | 3 | SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; |
10515 | 3 | PRBool isTLS; |
10516 | 3 | SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; |
10517 | 3 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
10518 | 3 | const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b; |
10519 | 3 | const PRUint32 savedLen = length; |
10520 | | |
10521 | 3 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake", |
10522 | 3 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
10523 | 3 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
10524 | 3 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
10525 | | |
10526 | 3 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_verify) { |
10527 | 3 | desc = unexpected_message; |
10528 | 3 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY; |
10529 | 3 | goto alert_loser; |
10530 | 3 | } |
10531 | | |
10532 | | /* TLS 1.3 is handled by tls13_HandleCertificateVerify */ |
10533 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); |
10534 | |
|
10535 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
10536 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record); |
10537 | 0 | rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); |
10538 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10539 | 0 | if (PORT_GetError() == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM) { |
10540 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
10541 | 0 | } |
10542 | 0 | goto loser; /* alert already sent */ |
10543 | 0 | } |
10544 | 0 | rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency( |
10545 | 0 | ss, sigScheme, &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); |
10546 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10547 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
10548 | 0 | desc = illegal_parameter; |
10549 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
10550 | 0 | } |
10551 | | |
10552 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, |
10553 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, |
10554 | 0 | ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme), |
10555 | 0 | &hashes); |
10556 | 0 | } else { |
10557 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record); |
10558 | 0 | sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; |
10559 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, &hashes, 0); |
10560 | 0 | } |
10561 | | |
10562 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10563 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE; |
10564 | 0 | desc = decrypt_error; |
10565 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
10566 | 0 | } |
10567 | | |
10568 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); |
10569 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10570 | 0 | goto loser; /* malformed. */ |
10571 | 0 | } |
10572 | | |
10573 | 0 | isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
10574 | | |
10575 | | /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */ |
10576 | 0 | rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signed_hash); |
10577 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10578 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
10579 | 0 | desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; |
10580 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
10581 | 0 | } |
10582 | | |
10583 | 0 | signed_hash.data = NULL; |
10584 | |
|
10585 | 0 | if (length != 0) { |
10586 | 0 | desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter; |
10587 | 0 | goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ |
10588 | 0 | } |
10589 | | |
10590 | 0 | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, |
10591 | 0 | savedMsg, savedLen); |
10592 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10593 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
10594 | 0 | return rv; |
10595 | 0 | } |
10596 | | |
10597 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; |
10598 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
10599 | | |
10600 | 3 | alert_loser: |
10601 | 3 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
10602 | 3 | loser: |
10603 | 3 | PORT_SetError(errCode); |
10604 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
10605 | 3 | } |
10606 | | |
10607 | | /* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA. |
10608 | | * Then generate and return the PMS. |
10609 | | * If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use |
10610 | | * that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot. |
10611 | | * |
10612 | | * Called from ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys() (above) |
10613 | | * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above) |
10614 | | * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below) |
10615 | | * Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock |
10616 | | */ |
10617 | | static PK11SymKey * |
10618 | | ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, |
10619 | | PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot) |
10620 | 2 | { |
10621 | 2 | PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; |
10622 | 2 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = serverKeySlot; |
10623 | 2 | void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; |
10624 | 2 | SECItem param; |
10625 | 2 | CK_VERSION version; |
10626 | 2 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3]; |
10627 | | |
10628 | 2 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
10629 | | |
10630 | 2 | if (slot == NULL) { |
10631 | 0 | SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; |
10632 | | /* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on |
10633 | | ** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null |
10634 | | ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock. |
10635 | | */ |
10636 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); |
10637 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.pwSpec->epoch); |
10638 | |
|
10639 | 0 | calg = spec->cipherDef->calg; |
10640 | | |
10641 | | /* First get an appropriate slot. */ |
10642 | 0 | mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN; |
10643 | 0 | mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS; |
10644 | 0 | mechanism_array[2] = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); |
10645 | |
|
10646 | 0 | slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg); |
10647 | 0 | if (slot == NULL) { |
10648 | | /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */ |
10649 | 0 | slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg); |
10650 | 0 | if (slot == NULL) { |
10651 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND); |
10652 | 0 | return pms; /* which is NULL */ |
10653 | 0 | } |
10654 | 0 | } |
10655 | 0 | } |
10656 | | |
10657 | | /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ |
10658 | 2 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
10659 | 2 | SSL3ProtocolVersion temp; |
10660 | | |
10661 | 2 | temp = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); |
10662 | 2 | version.major = MSB(temp); |
10663 | 2 | version.minor = LSB(temp); |
10664 | 2 | } else { |
10665 | 0 | version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); |
10666 | 0 | version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); |
10667 | 0 | } |
10668 | | |
10669 | 2 | param.data = (unsigned char *)&version; |
10670 | 2 | param.len = sizeof version; |
10671 | | |
10672 | 2 | pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, ¶m, 0, pwArg); |
10673 | 2 | if (!serverKeySlot) |
10674 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
10675 | 2 | if (pms == NULL) { |
10676 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
10677 | 0 | } |
10678 | 2 | return pms; |
10679 | 2 | } |
10680 | | |
10681 | | static void |
10682 | | ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(PK11SymKey **x, PK11SymKey **y, PRBool c) |
10683 | 4 | { |
10684 | 4 | uintptr_t mask = (uintptr_t)c; |
10685 | 4 | unsigned int i; |
10686 | 28 | for (i = 1; i < sizeof(uintptr_t) * 8; i <<= 1) { |
10687 | 24 | mask |= mask << i; |
10688 | 24 | } |
10689 | 4 | uintptr_t x_ptr = (uintptr_t)*x; |
10690 | 4 | uintptr_t y_ptr = (uintptr_t)*y; |
10691 | 4 | uintptr_t tmp = (x_ptr ^ y_ptr) & mask; |
10692 | 4 | x_ptr = x_ptr ^ tmp; |
10693 | 4 | y_ptr = y_ptr ^ tmp; |
10694 | 4 | *x = (PK11SymKey *)x_ptr; |
10695 | 4 | *y = (PK11SymKey *)y_ptr; |
10696 | 4 | } |
10697 | | |
10698 | | /* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER |
10699 | | * return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message, |
10700 | | * where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message. |
10701 | | * This function must not return SECFailure for any reason that is directly |
10702 | | * or indirectly caused by the content of the client's encrypted PMS. |
10703 | | * We must not send an alert and also not drop the connection. |
10704 | | * Instead, we generate a random PMS. This will cause a failure |
10705 | | * in the processing the finished message, which is exactly where |
10706 | | * the failure must occur. |
10707 | | * |
10708 | | * Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange |
10709 | | */ |
10710 | | static SECStatus |
10711 | | ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, |
10712 | | PRUint8 *b, |
10713 | | PRUint32 length, |
10714 | | sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) |
10715 | 2 | { |
10716 | 2 | SECStatus rv; |
10717 | 2 | SECItem enc_pms; |
10718 | 2 | PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; |
10719 | 2 | PK11SymKey *fauxPms = NULL; |
10720 | 2 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; |
10721 | | |
10722 | 2 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
10723 | 2 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
10724 | 2 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.pwSpec->epoch); |
10725 | | |
10726 | 2 | enc_pms.data = b; |
10727 | 2 | enc_pms.len = length; |
10728 | | |
10729 | 2 | if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ |
10730 | 2 | PRUint32 kLen; |
10731 | 2 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &kLen, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len); |
10732 | 2 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10733 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
10734 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10735 | 0 | } |
10736 | 2 | if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) { |
10737 | 0 | enc_pms.len = kLen; |
10738 | 0 | } |
10739 | 2 | } |
10740 | | |
10741 | | /* |
10742 | | * Get as close to algorithm 2 from RFC 5246; Section 7.4.7.1 |
10743 | | * as we can within the constraints of the PKCS#11 interface. |
10744 | | * |
10745 | | * 1. Unconditionally generate a bogus PMS (what RFC 5246 |
10746 | | * calls R). |
10747 | | * 2. Attempt the RSA decryption to recover the PMS (what |
10748 | | * RFC 5246 calls M). |
10749 | | * 3. Set PMS = (M == NULL) ? R : M |
10750 | | * 4. Use ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) to attempt to derive |
10751 | | * the MS from PMS. This includes performing the version |
10752 | | * check and length check. |
10753 | | * 5. If either the initial RSA decryption failed or |
10754 | | * ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) failed, then discard |
10755 | | * M and set PMS = R. Else, discard R and set PMS = M. |
10756 | | * |
10757 | | * We do two derivations here because we can't rely on having |
10758 | | * a function that only performs the PMS version and length |
10759 | | * check. The only redundant cost is that this runs the PRF, |
10760 | | * which isn't necessary here. |
10761 | | */ |
10762 | | |
10763 | | /* Generate the bogus PMS (R) */ |
10764 | 2 | slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKeyPair->privKey); |
10765 | 2 | if (!slot) { |
10766 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
10767 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10768 | 0 | } |
10769 | | |
10770 | 2 | if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE)) { |
10771 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
10772 | 0 | slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, NULL); |
10773 | 0 | if (!slot) { |
10774 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
10775 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10776 | 0 | } |
10777 | 0 | } |
10778 | | |
10779 | 2 | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); |
10780 | 2 | fauxPms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot); |
10781 | 2 | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); |
10782 | 2 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
10783 | | |
10784 | 2 | if (fauxPms == NULL) { |
10785 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
10786 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10787 | 0 | } |
10788 | | |
10789 | | /* |
10790 | | * unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer |
10791 | | * Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do |
10792 | | * the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the |
10793 | | * unwrapped pms will be used. |
10794 | | */ |
10795 | 2 | pms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKeyPair->privKey, &enc_pms, |
10796 | 2 | CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0); |
10797 | | /* Temporarily use the PMS if unwrapping the real PMS fails. */ |
10798 | 2 | ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(&pms, &fauxPms, pms == NULL); |
10799 | | |
10800 | | /* Attempt to derive the MS from the PMS. This is the only way to |
10801 | | * check the version field in the RSA PMS. If this fails, we |
10802 | | * then use the faux PMS in place of the PMS. Note that this |
10803 | | * operation should never fail if we are using the faux PMS |
10804 | | * since it is correctly formatted. */ |
10805 | 2 | rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, pms, NULL); |
10806 | | |
10807 | | /* If we succeeded, then select the true PMS, else select the FPMS. */ |
10808 | 2 | ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(&pms, &fauxPms, (rv != SECSuccess) & (fauxPms != NULL)); |
10809 | | |
10810 | | /* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */ |
10811 | 2 | rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); |
10812 | | |
10813 | | /* Clear both PMS. */ |
10814 | 2 | PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); |
10815 | 2 | PK11_FreeSymKey(fauxPms); |
10816 | | |
10817 | 2 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10818 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); |
10819 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ |
10820 | 0 | } |
10821 | | |
10822 | 2 | return SECSuccess; |
10823 | 2 | } |
10824 | | |
10825 | | static SECStatus |
10826 | | ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, |
10827 | | PRUint8 *b, |
10828 | | PRUint32 length, |
10829 | | sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) |
10830 | 11 | { |
10831 | 11 | PK11SymKey *pms; |
10832 | 11 | SECStatus rv; |
10833 | 11 | SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey; |
10834 | 11 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; |
10835 | 11 | PRBool isTLS; |
10836 | | |
10837 | 11 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
10838 | 11 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
10839 | | |
10840 | 11 | clntPubKey.keyType = dhKey; |
10841 | 11 | clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.len; |
10842 | 11 | clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.data; |
10843 | 11 | clntPubKey.u.dh.base.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.len; |
10844 | 11 | clntPubKey.u.dh.base.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.data; |
10845 | | |
10846 | 11 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue, |
10847 | 11 | 2, &b, &length); |
10848 | 11 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10849 | 1 | return SECFailure; |
10850 | 1 | } |
10851 | | |
10852 | 10 | if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime, |
10853 | 10 | &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue)) { |
10854 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE); |
10855 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10856 | 0 | } |
10857 | | |
10858 | 10 | isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
10859 | | |
10860 | 10 | if (isTLS) |
10861 | 10 | target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; |
10862 | 0 | else |
10863 | 0 | target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; |
10864 | | |
10865 | | /* Determine the PMS */ |
10866 | 10 | pms = PK11_PubDerive(serverKeyPair->privKey, &clntPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, |
10867 | 10 | CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); |
10868 | 10 | if (pms == NULL) { |
10869 | 0 | ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); |
10870 | 0 | ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); |
10871 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10872 | 0 | } |
10873 | | |
10874 | 10 | rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); |
10875 | 10 | PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); |
10876 | 10 | ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); |
10877 | 10 | return rv; |
10878 | 10 | } |
10879 | | |
10880 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered |
10881 | | * a complete ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client |
10882 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
10883 | | */ |
10884 | | static SECStatus |
10885 | | ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
10886 | 3.21k | { |
10887 | 3.21k | sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair = NULL; |
10888 | 3.21k | SECStatus rv; |
10889 | 3.21k | const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; |
10890 | | |
10891 | 3.21k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake", |
10892 | 3.21k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
10893 | | |
10894 | 3.21k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
10895 | 3.21k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
10896 | | |
10897 | 3.21k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_key) { |
10898 | 3.20k | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
10899 | 3.20k | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); |
10900 | 3.20k | return SECFailure; |
10901 | 3.20k | } |
10902 | | |
10903 | 18 | kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; |
10904 | | |
10905 | 18 | if (kea_def->ephemeral) { |
10906 | 16 | sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; |
10907 | | /* There should be exactly one pair. */ |
10908 | 16 | PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); |
10909 | 16 | PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) == |
10910 | 16 | PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); |
10911 | 16 | keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); |
10912 | 16 | serverKeyPair = keyPair->keys; |
10913 | 16 | ss->sec.keaKeyBits = |
10914 | 16 | SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey); |
10915 | 16 | } else { |
10916 | 2 | serverKeyPair = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair; |
10917 | 2 | ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyBits; |
10918 | 2 | } |
10919 | | |
10920 | 18 | if (!serverKeyPair) { |
10921 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); |
10922 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG); |
10923 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10924 | 0 | } |
10925 | 18 | PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->pubKey); |
10926 | 18 | PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->privKey); |
10927 | | |
10928 | 18 | ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType; |
10929 | | |
10930 | 18 | switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { |
10931 | 2 | case ssl_kea_rsa: |
10932 | 2 | rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); |
10933 | 2 | break; |
10934 | | |
10935 | 11 | case ssl_kea_dh: |
10936 | 11 | rv = ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); |
10937 | 11 | break; |
10938 | | |
10939 | 5 | case ssl_kea_ecdh: |
10940 | 5 | rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); |
10941 | 5 | break; |
10942 | | |
10943 | 0 | default: |
10944 | 0 | (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); |
10945 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); |
10946 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
10947 | 18 | } |
10948 | 18 | ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); |
10949 | 18 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
10950 | 15 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher; |
10951 | 15 | } else { |
10952 | | /* PORT_SetError has been called by all the Handle*ClientKeyExchange |
10953 | | * functions above. However, not all error paths result in an alert, so |
10954 | | * this ensures that the server knows about the error. Note that if an |
10955 | | * alert was already sent, SSL3_SendAlert() is a noop. */ |
10956 | 3 | PRErrorCode errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
10957 | 3 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); |
10958 | 3 | PORT_SetError(errCode); |
10959 | 3 | } |
10960 | 18 | return rv; |
10961 | 18 | } |
10962 | | |
10963 | | /* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */ |
10964 | | SECStatus |
10965 | | ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss) |
10966 | 0 | { |
10967 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
10968 | 0 | unsigned int len = 0; |
10969 | 0 | PRBool isTLS13 = PR_FALSE; |
10970 | 0 | const SECItem *context; |
10971 | |
|
10972 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
10973 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested); |
10974 | 0 | context = &ss->xtnData.certReqContext; |
10975 | 0 | len = context->len + 1; |
10976 | 0 | isTLS13 = PR_TRUE; |
10977 | 0 | } |
10978 | |
|
10979 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, len + 3); |
10980 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10981 | 0 | return rv; |
10982 | 0 | } |
10983 | | |
10984 | 0 | if (isTLS13) { |
10985 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context->data, context->len, 1); |
10986 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
10987 | 0 | return rv; |
10988 | 0 | } |
10989 | 0 | } |
10990 | | |
10991 | 0 | return ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); |
10992 | 0 | } |
10993 | | |
10994 | | /* |
10995 | | * NewSessionTicket |
10996 | | * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished |
10997 | | */ |
10998 | | static SECStatus |
10999 | | ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss) |
11000 | 0 | { |
11001 | 0 | SECItem ticket = { 0, NULL, 0 }; |
11002 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
11003 | 0 | NewSessionTicket nticket = { 0 }; |
11004 | |
|
11005 | 0 | rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &nticket, NULL, 0, |
11006 | 0 | ss->ssl3.pwSpec->masterSecret, &ticket); |
11007 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
11008 | 0 | goto loser; |
11009 | | |
11010 | | /* Serialize the handshake message. Length = |
11011 | | * lifetime (4) + ticket length (2) + ticket. */ |
11012 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_new_session_ticket, |
11013 | 0 | 4 + 2 + ticket.len); |
11014 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
11015 | 0 | goto loser; |
11016 | | |
11017 | | /* This is a fixed value. */ |
11018 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_ticket_lifetime, 4); |
11019 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
11020 | 0 | goto loser; |
11021 | | |
11022 | | /* Encode the ticket. */ |
11023 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ticket.data, ticket.len, 2); |
11024 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
11025 | 0 | goto loser; |
11026 | | |
11027 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
11028 | |
|
11029 | 0 | loser: |
11030 | 0 | if (ticket.data) { |
11031 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket, PR_FALSE); |
11032 | 0 | } |
11033 | 0 | return rv; |
11034 | 0 | } |
11035 | | |
11036 | | static SECStatus |
11037 | | ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
11038 | 0 | { |
11039 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
11040 | 0 | SECItem ticketData; |
11041 | 0 | PRUint32 temp; |
11042 | |
|
11043 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle session_ticket handshake", |
11044 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
11045 | |
|
11046 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
11047 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
11048 | |
|
11049 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); |
11050 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket); |
11051 | |
|
11052 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_new_session_ticket) { |
11053 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
11054 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); |
11055 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11056 | 0 | } |
11057 | | |
11058 | | /* RFC5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid |
11059 | | * until it has verified the server's Finished message." See the comment in |
11060 | | * ssl3_FinishHandshake for more details. |
11061 | | */ |
11062 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time(ss); |
11063 | 0 | if (length < 4) { |
11064 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); |
11065 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); |
11066 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11067 | 0 | } |
11068 | | |
11069 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &b, &length); |
11070 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11071 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); |
11072 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11073 | 0 | } |
11074 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint = temp; |
11075 | |
|
11076 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticketData, 2, &b, &length); |
11077 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) { |
11078 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); |
11079 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); |
11080 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* malformed */ |
11081 | 0 | } |
11082 | | /* If the server sent a zero-length ticket, ignore it and keep the |
11083 | | * existing ticket. */ |
11084 | 0 | if (ticketData.len != 0) { |
11085 | 0 | rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, |
11086 | 0 | &ticketData); |
11087 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11088 | 0 | return rv; |
11089 | 0 | } |
11090 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_TRUE; |
11091 | 0 | } |
11092 | | |
11093 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; |
11094 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
11095 | 0 | } |
11096 | | |
11097 | | #ifdef NISCC_TEST |
11098 | | static PRInt32 connNum = 0; |
11099 | | |
11100 | | static SECStatus |
11101 | | get_fake_cert(SECItem *pCertItem, int *pIndex) |
11102 | | { |
11103 | | PRFileDesc *cf; |
11104 | | char *testdir; |
11105 | | char *startat; |
11106 | | char *stopat; |
11107 | | const char *extension; |
11108 | | int fileNum; |
11109 | | PRInt32 numBytes = 0; |
11110 | | PRStatus prStatus; |
11111 | | PRFileInfo info; |
11112 | | char cfn[100]; |
11113 | | |
11114 | | pCertItem->data = 0; |
11115 | | if ((testdir = PR_GetEnvSecure("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) { |
11116 | | return SECSuccess; |
11117 | | } |
11118 | | *pIndex = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root")); |
11119 | | extension = (strstr(testdir, "simple") ? "" : ".der"); |
11120 | | fileNum = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&connNum) - 1; |
11121 | | if ((startat = PR_GetEnvSecure("START_AT")) != NULL) { |
11122 | | fileNum += atoi(startat); |
11123 | | } |
11124 | | if ((stopat = PR_GetEnvSecure("STOP_AT")) != NULL && |
11125 | | fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) { |
11126 | | *pIndex = -1; |
11127 | | return SECSuccess; |
11128 | | } |
11129 | | snprintf(cfn, sizeof(cfn), "%s/%08d%s", testdir, fileNum, extension); |
11130 | | cf = PR_Open(cfn, PR_RDONLY, 0); |
11131 | | if (!cf) { |
11132 | | goto loser; |
11133 | | } |
11134 | | prStatus = PR_GetOpenFileInfo(cf, &info); |
11135 | | if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) { |
11136 | | PR_Close(cf); |
11137 | | goto loser; |
11138 | | } |
11139 | | pCertItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, pCertItem, info.size); |
11140 | | if (pCertItem) { |
11141 | | numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size); |
11142 | | } |
11143 | | PR_Close(cf); |
11144 | | if (numBytes != info.size) { |
11145 | | SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE); |
11146 | | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO); |
11147 | | goto loser; |
11148 | | } |
11149 | | fprintf(stderr, "using %s\n", cfn); |
11150 | | return SECSuccess; |
11151 | | |
11152 | | loser: |
11153 | | fprintf(stderr, "failed to use %s\n", cfn); |
11154 | | *pIndex = -1; |
11155 | | return SECFailure; |
11156 | | } |
11157 | | #endif |
11158 | | |
11159 | | /* |
11160 | | * Used by both client and server. |
11161 | | * Called from HandleServerHelloDone and from SendServerHelloSequence. |
11162 | | */ |
11163 | | static SECStatus |
11164 | | ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) |
11165 | 6.04k | { |
11166 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
11167 | 6.04k | CERTCertificateList *certChain; |
11168 | 6.04k | int certChainLen = 0; |
11169 | 6.04k | int i; |
11170 | | #ifdef NISCC_TEST |
11171 | | SECItem fakeCert; |
11172 | | int ndex = -1; |
11173 | | #endif |
11174 | 6.04k | PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; |
11175 | 6.04k | SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
11176 | 6.04k | unsigned int contextLen = 0; |
11177 | | |
11178 | 6.04k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake", |
11179 | 6.04k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
11180 | | |
11181 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
11182 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
11183 | 6.04k | PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending); |
11184 | | |
11185 | 6.04k | if (ss->sec.localCert) |
11186 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); |
11187 | 6.04k | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
11188 | | /* A server certificate is selected in ssl3_HandleClientHello. */ |
11189 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert); |
11190 | | |
11191 | 6.04k | certChain = ss->sec.serverCert->serverCertChain; |
11192 | 6.04k | ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); |
11193 | 6.04k | } else { |
11194 | 0 | certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain; |
11195 | 0 | ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); |
11196 | 0 | } |
11197 | | |
11198 | | #ifdef NISCC_TEST |
11199 | | rv = get_fake_cert(&fakeCert, &ndex); |
11200 | | #endif |
11201 | | |
11202 | 6.04k | if (isTLS13) { |
11203 | 0 | contextLen = 1; /* Size of the context length */ |
11204 | 0 | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
11205 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested); |
11206 | 0 | context = ss->xtnData.certReqContext; |
11207 | 0 | contextLen += context.len; |
11208 | 0 | } |
11209 | 0 | } |
11210 | 6.04k | if (certChain) { |
11211 | 12.0k | for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { |
11212 | | #ifdef NISCC_TEST |
11213 | | if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { |
11214 | | certChainLen += fakeCert.len + 3; |
11215 | | } else { |
11216 | | certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; |
11217 | | } |
11218 | | #else |
11219 | 6.04k | certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; |
11220 | 6.04k | #endif |
11221 | 6.04k | } |
11222 | 6.04k | } |
11223 | | |
11224 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, |
11225 | 6.04k | contextLen + certChainLen + 3); |
11226 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11227 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
11228 | 0 | } |
11229 | | |
11230 | 6.04k | if (isTLS13) { |
11231 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context.data, |
11232 | 0 | context.len, 1); |
11233 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11234 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
11235 | 0 | } |
11236 | 0 | } |
11237 | | |
11238 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, certChainLen, 3); |
11239 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11240 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
11241 | 0 | } |
11242 | 6.04k | if (certChain) { |
11243 | 12.0k | for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { |
11244 | | #ifdef NISCC_TEST |
11245 | | if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { |
11246 | | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, fakeCert.data, |
11247 | | fakeCert.len, 3); |
11248 | | SECITEM_FreeItem(&fakeCert, PR_FALSE); |
11249 | | } else { |
11250 | | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, |
11251 | | certChain->certs[i].len, 3); |
11252 | | } |
11253 | | #else |
11254 | 6.04k | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, |
11255 | 6.04k | certChain->certs[i].len, 3); |
11256 | 6.04k | #endif |
11257 | 6.04k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11258 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
11259 | 0 | } |
11260 | 6.04k | } |
11261 | 6.04k | } |
11262 | | |
11263 | 6.04k | return SECSuccess; |
11264 | 6.04k | } |
11265 | | |
11266 | | /* |
11267 | | * Used by server only. |
11268 | | * single-stapling, send only a single cert status |
11269 | | */ |
11270 | | SECStatus |
11271 | | ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss) |
11272 | 6.04k | { |
11273 | 6.04k | SECStatus rv; |
11274 | 6.04k | int len = 0; |
11275 | 6.04k | SECItemArray *statusToSend = NULL; |
11276 | 6.04k | const sslServerCert *serverCert; |
11277 | | |
11278 | 6.04k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate status handshake", |
11279 | 6.04k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
11280 | | |
11281 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
11282 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
11283 | 6.04k | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); |
11284 | | |
11285 | 6.04k | if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) |
11286 | 6.02k | return SECSuccess; |
11287 | | |
11288 | | /* Use certStatus based on the cert being used. */ |
11289 | 16 | serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert; |
11290 | 16 | if (serverCert->certStatusArray && serverCert->certStatusArray->len) { |
11291 | 0 | statusToSend = serverCert->certStatusArray; |
11292 | 0 | } |
11293 | 16 | if (!statusToSend) |
11294 | 16 | return SECSuccess; |
11295 | | |
11296 | | /* Use the array's first item only (single stapling) */ |
11297 | 0 | len = 1 + statusToSend->items[0].len + 3; |
11298 | |
|
11299 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_status, len); |
11300 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11301 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
11302 | 0 | } |
11303 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1); |
11304 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
11305 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
11306 | | |
11307 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, |
11308 | 0 | statusToSend->items[0].data, |
11309 | 0 | statusToSend->items[0].len, |
11310 | 0 | 3); |
11311 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
11312 | 0 | return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
11313 | | |
11314 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
11315 | 0 | } |
11316 | | |
11317 | | /* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain |
11318 | | * from the cert database after they've been validated. |
11319 | | */ |
11320 | | void |
11321 | | ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss) |
11322 | 10 | { |
11323 | 10 | PLArenaPool *arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena; |
11324 | 10 | ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ss->ssl3.peerCertChain; |
11325 | | |
11326 | 10 | for (; certs; certs = certs->next) { |
11327 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert); |
11328 | 0 | } |
11329 | 10 | if (arena) |
11330 | 3 | PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); |
11331 | 10 | ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = NULL; |
11332 | 10 | ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = NULL; |
11333 | | |
11334 | 10 | if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { |
11335 | 0 | if (ss->sec.peerKey) { |
11336 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); |
11337 | 0 | ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; |
11338 | 0 | } |
11339 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); |
11340 | 0 | ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; |
11341 | 0 | } |
11342 | 10 | } |
11343 | | |
11344 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered |
11345 | | * a complete ssl3 CertificateStatus message. |
11346 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
11347 | | */ |
11348 | | static SECStatus |
11349 | | ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
11350 | 3 | { |
11351 | 3 | SECStatus rv; |
11352 | | |
11353 | 3 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_certificate_status) { |
11354 | 3 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
11355 | 3 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS); |
11356 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
11357 | 3 | } |
11358 | | |
11359 | 0 | rv = ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); |
11360 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11361 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* code already set */ |
11362 | 0 | } |
11363 | | |
11364 | 0 | return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); |
11365 | 0 | } |
11366 | | |
11367 | | SECStatus |
11368 | | ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
11369 | 0 | { |
11370 | 0 | PRUint32 status, len; |
11371 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
11372 | |
|
11373 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); |
11374 | | |
11375 | | /* Consume the CertificateStatusType enum */ |
11376 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &status, 1, &b, &length); |
11377 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess || status != 1 /* ocsp */) { |
11378 | 0 | return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
11379 | 0 | } |
11380 | | |
11381 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &len, 3, &b, &length); |
11382 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess || len != length) { |
11383 | 0 | return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
11384 | 0 | } |
11385 | | |
11386 | 0 | #define MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ |
11387 | 0 | if (length > MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN) { |
11388 | 0 | ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */ |
11389 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11390 | 0 | } |
11391 | 0 | #undef MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN |
11392 | | |
11393 | | /* Array size 1, because we currently implement single-stapling only */ |
11394 | 0 | SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, 1); |
11395 | 0 | if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items) |
11396 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* code already set */ |
11397 | | |
11398 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data = PORT_Alloc(length); |
11399 | |
|
11400 | 0 | if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data) { |
11401 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeArray(&ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE); |
11402 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* code already set */ |
11403 | 0 | } |
11404 | | |
11405 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, b, length); |
11406 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len = length; |
11407 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].type = siBuffer; |
11408 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
11409 | 0 | } |
11410 | | |
11411 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered |
11412 | | * a complete ssl3 Certificate message. |
11413 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
11414 | | */ |
11415 | | static SECStatus |
11416 | | ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
11417 | 2.15k | { |
11418 | 2.15k | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake", |
11419 | 2.15k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
11420 | 2.15k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
11421 | 2.15k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
11422 | | |
11423 | 2.15k | if ((ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert) || |
11424 | 2.15k | (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert)) { |
11425 | 2.15k | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
11426 | 2.15k | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE); |
11427 | 2.15k | return SECFailure; |
11428 | 2.15k | } |
11429 | | |
11430 | 4 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
11431 | 4 | dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); |
11432 | 4 | } |
11433 | | |
11434 | 4 | return ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(ss, b, length); |
11435 | 2.15k | } |
11436 | | |
11437 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleCertificate |
11438 | | */ |
11439 | | SECStatus |
11440 | | ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
11441 | 4 | { |
11442 | 4 | ssl3CertNode *c; |
11443 | 4 | ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL; |
11444 | 4 | PRUint32 remaining = 0; |
11445 | 4 | PRUint32 size; |
11446 | 4 | SECStatus rv; |
11447 | 4 | PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; |
11448 | 4 | PRBool isTLS; |
11449 | 4 | SSL3AlertDescription desc; |
11450 | 4 | int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE; |
11451 | 4 | SECItem certItem; |
11452 | | |
11453 | 4 | ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); |
11454 | 4 | isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
11455 | | |
11456 | | /* It is reported that some TLS client sends a Certificate message |
11457 | | ** with a zero-length message body. We'll treat that case like a |
11458 | | ** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability. |
11459 | | */ |
11460 | 4 | if (length) { |
11461 | 4 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &remaining, 3, &b, &length); |
11462 | 4 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
11463 | 1 | goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ |
11464 | 3 | if (remaining > length) |
11465 | 0 | goto decode_loser; |
11466 | 3 | } |
11467 | | |
11468 | 3 | if (!remaining) { |
11469 | 0 | if (!(isTLS && isServer)) { |
11470 | 0 | desc = bad_certificate; |
11471 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
11472 | 0 | } |
11473 | | /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ |
11474 | | /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ |
11475 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); |
11476 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11477 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
11478 | 0 | goto loser; |
11479 | 0 | } |
11480 | | |
11481 | 0 | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
11482 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; |
11483 | 0 | } else { |
11484 | 0 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); |
11485 | 0 | } |
11486 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
11487 | 0 | } |
11488 | | |
11489 | 3 | ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); |
11490 | 3 | if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) { |
11491 | 0 | goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ |
11492 | 0 | } |
11493 | | |
11494 | | /* First get the peer cert. */ |
11495 | 3 | if (remaining < 3) |
11496 | 0 | goto decode_loser; |
11497 | | |
11498 | 3 | remaining -= 3; |
11499 | 3 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &size, 3, &b, &length); |
11500 | 3 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
11501 | 0 | goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ |
11502 | 3 | if (size == 0 || remaining < size) |
11503 | 0 | goto decode_loser; |
11504 | | |
11505 | 3 | certItem.data = b; |
11506 | 3 | certItem.len = size; |
11507 | 3 | b += size; |
11508 | 3 | length -= size; |
11509 | 3 | remaining -= size; |
11510 | | |
11511 | 3 | ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, |
11512 | 3 | PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); |
11513 | 3 | if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { |
11514 | | /* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the |
11515 | | * problem was just some local problem, like memory error. |
11516 | | */ |
11517 | 1 | goto ambiguous_err; |
11518 | 1 | } |
11519 | | |
11520 | | /* Now get all of the CA certs. */ |
11521 | 2 | while (remaining > 0) { |
11522 | 1 | if (remaining < 3) |
11523 | 0 | goto decode_loser; |
11524 | | |
11525 | 1 | remaining -= 3; |
11526 | 1 | rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &size, 3, &b, &length); |
11527 | 1 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
11528 | 0 | goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ |
11529 | 1 | if (size == 0 || remaining < size) |
11530 | 1 | goto decode_loser; |
11531 | | |
11532 | 0 | certItem.data = b; |
11533 | 0 | certItem.len = size; |
11534 | 0 | b += size; |
11535 | 0 | length -= size; |
11536 | 0 | remaining -= size; |
11537 | |
|
11538 | 0 | c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, ssl3CertNode); |
11539 | 0 | if (c == NULL) { |
11540 | 0 | goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ |
11541 | 0 | } |
11542 | | |
11543 | 0 | c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, |
11544 | 0 | PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); |
11545 | 0 | if (c->cert == NULL) { |
11546 | 0 | goto ambiguous_err; |
11547 | 0 | } |
11548 | | |
11549 | 0 | c->next = NULL; |
11550 | 0 | if (lastCert) { |
11551 | 0 | lastCert->next = c; |
11552 | 0 | } else { |
11553 | 0 | ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c; |
11554 | 0 | } |
11555 | 0 | lastCert = c; |
11556 | 0 | } |
11557 | | |
11558 | 1 | SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert); |
11559 | | |
11560 | 1 | if (!isServer && |
11561 | 1 | ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
11562 | 1 | ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) { |
11563 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_certificate_status; |
11564 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
11565 | 1 | } else { |
11566 | 1 | rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ |
11567 | 1 | } |
11568 | | |
11569 | 1 | return rv; |
11570 | | |
11571 | 1 | ambiguous_err: |
11572 | 1 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
11573 | 1 | switch (errCode) { |
11574 | 0 | case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR: |
11575 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: |
11576 | 0 | case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: |
11577 | 0 | if (isTLS) { |
11578 | 0 | desc = internal_error; |
11579 | 0 | goto alert_loser; |
11580 | 0 | } |
11581 | 0 | goto loser; |
11582 | 1 | } |
11583 | 1 | ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); |
11584 | 1 | goto loser; |
11585 | | |
11586 | 1 | decode_loser: |
11587 | 1 | desc = isTLS ? decode_error : bad_certificate; |
11588 | | |
11589 | 1 | alert_loser: |
11590 | 1 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); |
11591 | | |
11592 | 3 | loser: |
11593 | 3 | (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); |
11594 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
11595 | 1 | } |
11596 | | |
11597 | | SECStatus |
11598 | | ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) |
11599 | 0 | { |
11600 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
11601 | 0 | PRUint32 minKey = 0; |
11602 | 0 | PRInt32 optval; |
11603 | 0 | PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_TRUE; |
11604 | |
|
11605 | 0 | rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval); |
11606 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
11607 | 0 | usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG); |
11608 | 0 | } |
11609 | |
|
11610 | 0 | ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey); |
11611 | 0 | switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) { |
11612 | 0 | case rsaKey: |
11613 | 0 | case rsaPssKey: |
11614 | 0 | case rsaOaepKey: |
11615 | 0 | rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval) |
11616 | 0 | : SECFailure; |
11617 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { |
11618 | 0 | minKey = (PRUint32)optval; |
11619 | 0 | } else { |
11620 | 0 | minKey = SSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS; |
11621 | 0 | } |
11622 | 0 | break; |
11623 | | |
11624 | 0 | case dsaKey: |
11625 | 0 | rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval) |
11626 | 0 | : SECFailure; |
11627 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { |
11628 | 0 | minKey = (PRUint32)optval; |
11629 | 0 | } else { |
11630 | 0 | minKey = SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS; |
11631 | 0 | } |
11632 | 0 | break; |
11633 | | |
11634 | 0 | case dhKey: |
11635 | 0 | rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval) |
11636 | 0 | : SECFailure; |
11637 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { |
11638 | 0 | minKey = (PRUint32)optval; |
11639 | 0 | } else { |
11640 | 0 | minKey = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; |
11641 | 0 | } |
11642 | 0 | break; |
11643 | | |
11644 | 0 | case ecKey: |
11645 | 0 | rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval) |
11646 | 0 | : SECFailure; |
11647 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { |
11648 | 0 | minKey = (PRUint32)optval; |
11649 | 0 | } else { |
11650 | | /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we |
11651 | | * only support curves we like. */ |
11652 | 0 | minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits; |
11653 | 0 | } |
11654 | 0 | break; |
11655 | | |
11656 | 0 | default: |
11657 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); |
11658 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11659 | 0 | } |
11660 | | |
11661 | | /* Too small: not good enough. Send a fatal alert. */ |
11662 | 0 | if (ss->sec.authKeyBits < minKey) { |
11663 | 0 | FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_CERT_KEY, |
11664 | 0 | ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 |
11665 | 0 | ? insufficient_security |
11666 | 0 | : illegal_parameter); |
11667 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11668 | 0 | } |
11669 | | |
11670 | | /* PreliminaryChannelInfo.authKeyBits, scheme, and peerDelegCred are now valid. */ |
11671 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_peer_auth; |
11672 | |
|
11673 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
11674 | 0 | } |
11675 | | |
11676 | | SECStatus |
11677 | | ssl3_HandleServerSpki(sslSocket *ss) |
11678 | 0 | { |
11679 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); |
11680 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; |
11681 | |
|
11682 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
11683 | 0 | tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) { |
11684 | 0 | sslDelegatedCredential *dc = ss->xtnData.peerDelegCred; |
11685 | 0 | pubKey = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(dc->spki); |
11686 | 0 | if (!pubKey) { |
11687 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); |
11688 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11689 | 0 | } |
11690 | | |
11691 | | /* Because we have only a single authType (ssl_auth_tls13_any) |
11692 | | * for TLS 1.3 at this point, set the scheme so that the |
11693 | | * callback can interpret |authKeyBits| correctly. |
11694 | | */ |
11695 | 0 | ss->sec.signatureScheme = dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg; |
11696 | 0 | } else { |
11697 | 0 | pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); |
11698 | 0 | if (!pubKey) { |
11699 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); |
11700 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11701 | 0 | } |
11702 | 0 | } |
11703 | | |
11704 | 0 | SECStatus rv = ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(ss, pubKey); |
11705 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); |
11706 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11707 | 0 | return rv; /* Alert sent and code set. */ |
11708 | 0 | } |
11709 | | |
11710 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
11711 | 0 | } |
11712 | | |
11713 | | SECStatus |
11714 | | ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss) |
11715 | 1 | { |
11716 | 1 | SECStatus rv; |
11717 | 1 | PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; |
11718 | 1 | int errCode; |
11719 | | |
11720 | 1 | ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; |
11721 | | |
11722 | 1 | PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == |
11723 | 1 | ssl_preinfo_all); |
11724 | | |
11725 | 1 | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
11726 | | /* Set the |spki| used to verify the handshake. When verifying with a |
11727 | | * delegated credential (DC), this corresponds to the DC public key; |
11728 | | * otherwise it correspond to the public key of the peer's end-entity |
11729 | | * certificate. */ |
11730 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleServerSpki(ss); |
11731 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11732 | | /* Alert sent and code set (if not SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE). |
11733 | | * In either case, we're done here. */ |
11734 | 0 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
11735 | 0 | goto loser; |
11736 | 0 | } |
11737 | | |
11738 | 0 | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
11739 | 0 | ss->sec.authType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType; |
11740 | 0 | ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; |
11741 | 0 | } |
11742 | 0 | } |
11743 | | |
11744 | | /* |
11745 | | * Ask caller-supplied callback function to validate cert chain. |
11746 | | */ |
11747 | 1 | rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd, |
11748 | 1 | PR_TRUE, isServer); |
11749 | 1 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11750 | 1 | errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
11751 | 1 | if (errCode == 0) { |
11752 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
11753 | 0 | } |
11754 | 1 | if (rv != SECWouldBlock) { |
11755 | 1 | if (ss->handleBadCert) { |
11756 | 0 | rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd); |
11757 | 0 | } |
11758 | 1 | } |
11759 | | |
11760 | 1 | if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { |
11761 | 0 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
11762 | 0 | errCode = SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS; |
11763 | 0 | goto loser; |
11764 | 0 | } |
11765 | | |
11766 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE; |
11767 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
11768 | 0 | } |
11769 | | |
11770 | 1 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11771 | 1 | ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); |
11772 | 1 | goto loser; |
11773 | 1 | } |
11774 | 1 | } |
11775 | | |
11776 | 0 | if (ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) { |
11777 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert); |
11778 | 0 | } |
11779 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); |
11780 | |
|
11781 | 0 | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
11782 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
11783 | 0 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); |
11784 | 0 | } else { |
11785 | | /* Ephemeral suites require ServerKeyExchange. */ |
11786 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral) { |
11787 | | /* require server_key_exchange */ |
11788 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; |
11789 | 0 | } else { |
11790 | | /* disallow server_key_exchange */ |
11791 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; |
11792 | | /* This is static RSA key exchange so set the key exchange |
11793 | | * details to compensate for that. */ |
11794 | 0 | ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; |
11795 | 0 | ss->sec.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; |
11796 | 0 | ss->sec.keaGroup = NULL; |
11797 | 0 | } |
11798 | 0 | } |
11799 | 0 | } else { |
11800 | | /* Server */ |
11801 | 0 | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
11802 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; |
11803 | 0 | } else { |
11804 | 0 | TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); |
11805 | 0 | } |
11806 | 0 | } |
11807 | |
|
11808 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); |
11809 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
11810 | 0 | errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; |
11811 | 0 | goto loser; |
11812 | 0 | } |
11813 | | |
11814 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
11815 | | |
11816 | 1 | loser: |
11817 | 1 | (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); |
11818 | 1 | return SECFailure; |
11819 | 0 | } |
11820 | | |
11821 | | static SECStatus ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss); |
11822 | | |
11823 | | static SECStatus |
11824 | | ssl3_AlwaysFail(sslSocket *ss) |
11825 | 0 | { |
11826 | | /* The caller should have cleared the callback. */ |
11827 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail; |
11828 | 0 | PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); |
11829 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11830 | 0 | } |
11831 | | |
11832 | | /* Caller must hold 1stHandshakeLock. |
11833 | | */ |
11834 | | SECStatus |
11835 | | ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error) |
11836 | 0 | { |
11837 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
11838 | |
|
11839 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); |
11840 | |
|
11841 | 0 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
11842 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS); |
11843 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11844 | 0 | } |
11845 | | |
11846 | 0 | ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); |
11847 | 0 | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
11848 | |
|
11849 | 0 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { |
11850 | 0 | PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); |
11851 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; |
11852 | 0 | goto done; |
11853 | 0 | } |
11854 | | |
11855 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; |
11856 | |
|
11857 | 0 | if (error != 0) { |
11858 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail; |
11859 | 0 | ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, error); |
11860 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
11861 | 0 | } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) { |
11862 | 0 | sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget; |
11863 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL; |
11864 | |
|
11865 | 0 | if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) { |
11866 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race" |
11867 | 0 | " with peer's finished message", |
11868 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
11869 | 0 | } |
11870 | |
|
11871 | 0 | rv = target(ss); |
11872 | 0 | } else { |
11873 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with" |
11874 | 0 | " peer's finished message", |
11875 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
11876 | |
|
11877 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming); |
11878 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake); |
11879 | |
|
11880 | 0 | if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart && |
11881 | 0 | !ss->firstHsDone && |
11882 | 0 | !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && |
11883 | 0 | ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) { |
11884 | | /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because |
11885 | | * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still |
11886 | | * haven't received all of the server's second round yet. |
11887 | | */ |
11888 | 0 | rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); |
11889 | 0 | } else { |
11890 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
11891 | 0 | } |
11892 | 0 | } |
11893 | |
|
11894 | 0 | done: |
11895 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
11896 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); |
11897 | |
|
11898 | 0 | return rv; |
11899 | 0 | } |
11900 | | |
11901 | | static SECStatus |
11902 | | ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, |
11903 | | PRBool isServer, |
11904 | | const SSL3Hashes *hashes, |
11905 | | TLSFinished *tlsFinished) |
11906 | 0 | { |
11907 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
11908 | 0 | CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS tls_mac_params; |
11909 | 0 | SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
11910 | 0 | PK11Context *prf_context; |
11911 | 0 | unsigned int retLen; |
11912 | |
|
11913 | 0 | PORT_Assert(spec->masterSecret); |
11914 | 0 | if (!spec->masterSecret) { |
11915 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
11916 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11917 | 0 | } |
11918 | | |
11919 | 0 | if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
11920 | 0 | tls_mac_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF; |
11921 | 0 | } else { |
11922 | 0 | tls_mac_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); |
11923 | 0 | } |
11924 | 0 | tls_mac_params.ulMacLength = 12; |
11925 | 0 | tls_mac_params.ulServerOrClient = isServer ? 1 : 2; |
11926 | 0 | param.data = (unsigned char *)&tls_mac_params; |
11927 | 0 | param.len = sizeof(tls_mac_params); |
11928 | 0 | prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CKM_TLS_MAC, CKA_SIGN, |
11929 | 0 | spec->masterSecret, ¶m); |
11930 | 0 | if (!prf_context) |
11931 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11932 | | |
11933 | 0 | rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); |
11934 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); |
11935 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, tlsFinished->verify_data, &retLen, |
11936 | 0 | sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); |
11937 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); |
11938 | |
|
11939 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); |
11940 | |
|
11941 | 0 | return rv; |
11942 | 0 | } |
11943 | | |
11944 | | /* The calling function must acquire and release the appropriate |
11945 | | * lock (e.g., ssl_GetSpecReadLock / ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock for |
11946 | | * ss->ssl3.crSpec). |
11947 | | */ |
11948 | | SECStatus |
11949 | | ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, |
11950 | | const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, |
11951 | | const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen, |
11952 | | unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen) |
11953 | 0 | { |
11954 | 0 | SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; |
11955 | 0 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL; |
11956 | 0 | PK11Context *prf_context; |
11957 | 0 | unsigned int retLen; |
11958 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
11959 | |
|
11960 | 0 | if (!spec->masterSecret) { |
11961 | 0 | PORT_Assert(spec->masterSecret); |
11962 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
11963 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11964 | 0 | } |
11965 | | |
11966 | 0 | if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { |
11967 | | /* Bug 1312976 non-SHA256 exporters are broken. */ |
11968 | 0 | if (ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss) != CKM_SHA256) { |
11969 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
11970 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
11971 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11972 | 0 | } |
11973 | 0 | mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256; |
11974 | 0 | } |
11975 | 0 | prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN, |
11976 | 0 | spec->masterSecret, ¶m); |
11977 | 0 | if (!prf_context) |
11978 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
11979 | | |
11980 | 0 | rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); |
11981 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *)label, labelLen); |
11982 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen); |
11983 | 0 | rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen); |
11984 | 0 | PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen); |
11985 | |
|
11986 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); |
11987 | 0 | return rv; |
11988 | 0 | } |
11989 | | |
11990 | | /* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound |
11991 | | * ssl3_HandleFinished |
11992 | | */ |
11993 | | static SECStatus |
11994 | | ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss) |
11995 | 0 | { |
11996 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
11997 | 0 | int padding_len; |
11998 | 0 | static const unsigned char padding[32] = { 0 }; |
11999 | |
|
12000 | 0 | if (ss->xtnData.nextProto.len == 0 || |
12001 | 0 | ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) { |
12002 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
12003 | 0 | } |
12004 | | |
12005 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
12006 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
12007 | |
|
12008 | 0 | padding_len = 32 - ((ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2) % 32); |
12009 | |
|
12010 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_next_proto, ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2 + padding_len); |
12011 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12012 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */ |
12013 | 0 | } |
12014 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->xtnData.nextProto.data, |
12015 | 0 | ss->xtnData.nextProto.len, 1); |
12016 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12017 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ |
12018 | 0 | } |
12019 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, padding, padding_len, 1); |
12020 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12021 | 0 | return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ |
12022 | 0 | } |
12023 | 0 | return rv; |
12024 | 0 | } |
12025 | | |
12026 | | /* called from ssl3_SendFinished and tls13_DeriveSecret. |
12027 | | * |
12028 | | * This function is simply a debugging aid and therefore does not return a |
12029 | | * SECStatus. */ |
12030 | | void |
12031 | | ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss, const char *label, PK11SymKey *secret) |
12032 | 0 | { |
12033 | 0 | #ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE |
12034 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
12035 | 0 | SECItem *keyData; |
12036 | | /* Longest label is "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET", master secret is 48 |
12037 | | * bytes which happens to be the largest in TLS 1.3 as well (SHA384). |
12038 | | * Maximum line length: "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" (31) + " " (1) + |
12039 | | * client_random (32*2) + " " (1) + |
12040 | | * traffic_secret (48*2) + "\n" (1) = 194. */ |
12041 | 0 | char buf[200]; |
12042 | 0 | unsigned int offset, len; |
12043 | |
|
12044 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
12045 | |
|
12046 | 0 | if (!ssl_keylog_iob) |
12047 | 0 | return; |
12048 | | |
12049 | 0 | rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(secret); |
12050 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
12051 | 0 | return; |
12052 | | |
12053 | | /* keyData does not need to be freed. */ |
12054 | 0 | keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(secret); |
12055 | 0 | if (!keyData || !keyData->data) |
12056 | 0 | return; |
12057 | | |
12058 | 0 | len = strlen(label) + 1 + /* label + space */ |
12059 | 0 | SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2 + 1 + /* client random (hex) + space */ |
12060 | 0 | keyData->len * 2 + 1; /* secret (hex) + newline */ |
12061 | 0 | PORT_Assert(len <= sizeof(buf)); |
12062 | 0 | if (len > sizeof(buf)) |
12063 | 0 | return; |
12064 | | |
12065 | | /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */ |
12066 | | |
12067 | | /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the |
12068 | | * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to |
12069 | | * fwrite. */ |
12070 | | |
12071 | 0 | strcpy(buf, label); |
12072 | 0 | offset = strlen(label); |
12073 | 0 | buf[offset++] += ' '; |
12074 | 0 | hexEncode(buf + offset, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); |
12075 | 0 | offset += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2; |
12076 | 0 | buf[offset++] = ' '; |
12077 | 0 | hexEncode(buf + offset, keyData->data, keyData->len); |
12078 | 0 | offset += keyData->len * 2; |
12079 | 0 | buf[offset++] = '\n'; |
12080 | |
|
12081 | 0 | PORT_Assert(offset == len); |
12082 | |
|
12083 | 0 | PZ_Lock(ssl_keylog_lock); |
12084 | 0 | if (fwrite(buf, len, 1, ssl_keylog_iob) == 1) |
12085 | 0 | fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); |
12086 | 0 | PZ_Unlock(ssl_keylog_lock); |
12087 | 0 | #endif |
12088 | 0 | } |
12089 | | |
12090 | | /* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound |
12091 | | * ssl3_HandleClientHello |
12092 | | * ssl3_HandleFinished |
12093 | | */ |
12094 | | static SECStatus |
12095 | | ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) |
12096 | 0 | { |
12097 | 0 | ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; |
12098 | 0 | PRBool isTLS; |
12099 | 0 | PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; |
12100 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
12101 | 0 | SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client; |
12102 | 0 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
12103 | 0 | TLSFinished tlsFinished; |
12104 | |
|
12105 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
12106 | |
|
12107 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); |
12108 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
12109 | 0 | PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending); |
12110 | |
|
12111 | 0 | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); |
12112 | 0 | cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; |
12113 | 0 | isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
12114 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender); |
12115 | 0 | if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) { |
12116 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished); |
12117 | 0 | } |
12118 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); |
12119 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12120 | 0 | goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ |
12121 | 0 | } |
12122 | | |
12123 | 0 | if (isTLS) { |
12124 | 0 | if (isServer) |
12125 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; |
12126 | 0 | else |
12127 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; |
12128 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished; |
12129 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, sizeof tlsFinished); |
12130 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
12131 | 0 | goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
12132 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished); |
12133 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
12134 | 0 | goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
12135 | 0 | } else { |
12136 | 0 | if (isServer) |
12137 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s; |
12138 | 0 | else |
12139 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s; |
12140 | 0 | PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s); |
12141 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s; |
12142 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, sizeof hashes.u.s); |
12143 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
12144 | 0 | goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
12145 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s); |
12146 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
12147 | 0 | goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ |
12148 | 0 | } |
12149 | 0 | rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); |
12150 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12151 | 0 | goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ |
12152 | 0 | } |
12153 | | |
12154 | 0 | ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss, "CLIENT_RANDOM", ss->ssl3.cwSpec->masterSecret); |
12155 | |
|
12156 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
12157 | | |
12158 | 0 | fail: |
12159 | 0 | return rv; |
12160 | 0 | } |
12161 | | |
12162 | | /* wrap the master secret, and put it into the SID. |
12163 | | * Caller holds the Spec read lock. |
12164 | | */ |
12165 | | SECStatus |
12166 | | ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, |
12167 | | PK11SymKey *secret) |
12168 | 0 | { |
12169 | 0 | PK11SymKey *wrappingKey = NULL; |
12170 | 0 | PK11SlotInfo *symKeySlot; |
12171 | 0 | void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; |
12172 | 0 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
12173 | 0 | PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; |
12174 | 0 | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; |
12175 | |
|
12176 | 0 | symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(secret); |
12177 | 0 | if (!isServer) { |
12178 | 0 | int wrapKeyIndex; |
12179 | 0 | int incarnation; |
12180 | | |
12181 | | /* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */ |
12182 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex = |
12183 | 0 | PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot); |
12184 | 0 | PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */ |
12185 | |
|
12186 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation = |
12187 | 0 | PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot); |
12188 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot); |
12189 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot); |
12190 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; |
12191 | | /* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before |
12192 | | * placing it in the SID cache entry. */ |
12193 | 0 | wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, |
12194 | 0 | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, |
12195 | 0 | pwArg); |
12196 | 0 | if (wrappingKey) { |
12197 | 0 | mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ |
12198 | 0 | } else { |
12199 | 0 | int keyLength; |
12200 | | /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it. |
12201 | | * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot |
12202 | | * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection, |
12203 | | * but we will not be able to restart this session. |
12204 | | */ |
12205 | 0 | mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); |
12206 | 0 | keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism); |
12207 | | /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. |
12208 | | * It's ambiguous. |
12209 | | */ |
12210 | 0 | wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL, |
12211 | 0 | keyLength, pwArg); |
12212 | 0 | if (wrappingKey) { |
12213 | | /* The thread safety characteristics of PK11_[SG]etWrapKey is |
12214 | | * abominable. This protects against races in calling |
12215 | | * PK11_SetWrapKey by dropping and re-acquiring the canonical |
12216 | | * value once it is set. The mutex in PK11_[SG]etWrapKey will |
12217 | | * ensure that races produce the same value in the end. */ |
12218 | 0 | PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey); |
12219 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); |
12220 | 0 | wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, |
12221 | 0 | CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, pwArg); |
12222 | 0 | if (!wrappingKey) { |
12223 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot); |
12224 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12225 | 0 | } |
12226 | 0 | } |
12227 | 0 | } |
12228 | 0 | } else { |
12229 | | /* server socket using session cache. */ |
12230 | 0 | mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); |
12231 | 0 | if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) { |
12232 | 0 | wrappingKey = |
12233 | 0 | ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, mechanism, pwArg); |
12234 | 0 | if (wrappingKey) { |
12235 | 0 | mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ |
12236 | 0 | } |
12237 | 0 | } |
12238 | 0 | } |
12239 | | |
12240 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism; |
12241 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot); |
12242 | |
|
12243 | 0 | if (wrappingKey) { |
12244 | 0 | SECItem wmsItem; |
12245 | |
|
12246 | 0 | wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; |
12247 | 0 | wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; |
12248 | 0 | rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey, |
12249 | 0 | secret, &wmsItem); |
12250 | | /* rv is examined below. */ |
12251 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len; |
12252 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); |
12253 | 0 | } |
12254 | 0 | return rv; |
12255 | 0 | } |
12256 | | |
12257 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered |
12258 | | * a complete ssl3 Finished message from the peer. |
12259 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
12260 | | */ |
12261 | | static SECStatus |
12262 | | ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
12263 | 2 | { |
12264 | 2 | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
12265 | 2 | PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; |
12266 | 2 | PRBool isTLS; |
12267 | 2 | SSL3Hashes hashes; |
12268 | | |
12269 | 2 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
12270 | 2 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
12271 | | |
12272 | 2 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake", |
12273 | 2 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
12274 | | |
12275 | 2 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_finished) { |
12276 | 2 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12277 | 2 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED); |
12278 | 2 | return SECFailure; |
12279 | 2 | } |
12280 | | |
12281 | 0 | if (!ss->sec.isServer || !ss->opt.requestCertificate) { |
12282 | 0 | dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); |
12283 | 0 | } |
12284 | |
|
12285 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, &hashes, |
12286 | 0 | isServer ? sender_client : sender_server); |
12287 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12288 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
12289 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12290 | 0 | } |
12291 | | |
12292 | 0 | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_finished, b, length); |
12293 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12294 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
12295 | 0 | return rv; |
12296 | 0 | } |
12297 | | |
12298 | 0 | isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
12299 | 0 | if (isTLS) { |
12300 | 0 | TLSFinished tlsFinished; |
12301 | |
|
12302 | 0 | if (length != sizeof(tlsFinished)) { |
12303 | 0 | #ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE |
12304 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); |
12305 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); |
12306 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12307 | 0 | #endif |
12308 | 0 | } |
12309 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer, |
12310 | 0 | &hashes, &tlsFinished); |
12311 | 0 | if (!isServer) |
12312 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; |
12313 | 0 | else |
12314 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; |
12315 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof(tlsFinished); |
12316 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess || |
12317 | 0 | 0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b, |
12318 | 0 | PR_MIN(length, ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes))) { |
12319 | 0 | #ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE |
12320 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error); |
12321 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); |
12322 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12323 | 0 | #endif |
12324 | 0 | } |
12325 | 0 | } else { |
12326 | 0 | if (length != sizeof(SSL3Finished)) { |
12327 | 0 | (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); |
12328 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); |
12329 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12330 | 0 | } |
12331 | | |
12332 | 0 | if (!isServer) |
12333 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s; |
12334 | 0 | else |
12335 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s; |
12336 | 0 | PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s); |
12337 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s; |
12338 | 0 | if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes.u.s, b, length)) { |
12339 | 0 | (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); |
12340 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); |
12341 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12342 | 0 | } |
12343 | 0 | } |
12344 | | |
12345 | 0 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ |
12346 | |
|
12347 | 0 | if ((isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) || |
12348 | 0 | (!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) { |
12349 | 0 | PRInt32 flags = 0; |
12350 | | |
12351 | | /* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us |
12352 | | * either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify. |
12353 | | * (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the |
12354 | | * server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the |
12355 | | * ServerHello message.) |
12356 | | */ |
12357 | 0 | if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && |
12358 | 0 | ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && |
12359 | 0 | ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) { |
12360 | | /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "In the case of a full handshake, the |
12361 | | * server MUST verify the client's Finished message before sending |
12362 | | * the ticket." Presumably, this also means that the client's |
12363 | | * certificate, if any, must be verified beforehand too. |
12364 | | */ |
12365 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss); |
12366 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12367 | 0 | goto xmit_loser; |
12368 | 0 | } |
12369 | 0 | } |
12370 | | |
12371 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); |
12372 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12373 | 0 | goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ |
12374 | 0 | } |
12375 | | /* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data) |
12376 | | ** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the |
12377 | | ** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished) |
12378 | | ** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data. |
12379 | | */ |
12380 | 0 | if (ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) { |
12381 | 0 | flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; |
12382 | 0 | } |
12383 | |
|
12384 | 0 | if (!isServer && !ss->firstHsDone) { |
12385 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss); |
12386 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12387 | 0 | goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */ |
12388 | 0 | } |
12389 | 0 | } |
12390 | | |
12391 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
12392 | 0 | flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT; |
12393 | 0 | } |
12394 | |
|
12395 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags); |
12396 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12397 | 0 | goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ |
12398 | 0 | } |
12399 | 0 | } |
12400 | | |
12401 | 0 | xmit_loser: |
12402 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ |
12403 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12404 | 0 | return rv; |
12405 | 0 | } |
12406 | | |
12407 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { |
12408 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { |
12409 | 0 | PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_HandleFinished: unexpected restartTarget"); |
12410 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
12411 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12412 | 0 | } |
12413 | | |
12414 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_FinishHandshake; |
12415 | 0 | PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); |
12416 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12417 | 0 | } |
12418 | | |
12419 | 0 | rv = ssl3_FinishHandshake(ss); |
12420 | 0 | return rv; |
12421 | 0 | } |
12422 | | |
12423 | | SECStatus |
12424 | | ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey *secret) |
12425 | 0 | { |
12426 | 0 | PORT_Assert(secret); |
12427 | | |
12428 | | /* fill in the sid */ |
12429 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; |
12430 | 0 | sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy; |
12431 | 0 | sid->version = ss->version; |
12432 | 0 | sid->authType = ss->sec.authType; |
12433 | 0 | sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; |
12434 | 0 | sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType; |
12435 | 0 | sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; |
12436 | 0 | if (ss->sec.keaGroup) { |
12437 | 0 | sid->keaGroup = ss->sec.keaGroup->name; |
12438 | 0 | } else { |
12439 | 0 | sid->keaGroup = ssl_grp_none; |
12440 | 0 | } |
12441 | 0 | sid->sigScheme = ss->sec.signatureScheme; |
12442 | 0 | sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(ss); |
12443 | 0 | sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + (ssl_ticket_lifetime * PR_USEC_PER_SEC); |
12444 | 0 | sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); |
12445 | 0 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
12446 | 0 | sid->namedCurve = ss->sec.serverCert->namedCurve; |
12447 | 0 | } |
12448 | |
|
12449 | 0 | if (ss->xtnData.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT && |
12450 | 0 | ss->xtnData.nextProto.data) { |
12451 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, PR_FALSE); |
12452 | 0 | if (SECITEM_CopyItem( |
12453 | 0 | NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, &ss->xtnData.nextProto) != SECSuccess) { |
12454 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* error already set. */ |
12455 | 0 | } |
12456 | 0 | } |
12457 | | |
12458 | | /* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */ |
12459 | 0 | return ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, secret); |
12460 | 0 | } |
12461 | | |
12462 | | /* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs |
12463 | | * to have type sslRestartTarget. |
12464 | | */ |
12465 | | SECStatus |
12466 | | ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss) |
12467 | 0 | { |
12468 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
12469 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
12470 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL); |
12471 | 0 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
12472 | 0 | SECStatus sidRv = SECFailure; |
12473 | | |
12474 | | /* The first handshake is now completed. */ |
12475 | 0 | ss->handshake = NULL; |
12476 | |
|
12477 | 0 | if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache) { |
12478 | | /* If the wrap fails, don't cache the sid. The connection proceeds |
12479 | | * normally, so the rv is only used to determine whether we cache. */ |
12480 | 0 | sidRv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, sid, ss->ssl3.crSpec->masterSecret); |
12481 | 0 | } |
12482 | | |
12483 | | /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid |
12484 | | * until it has verified the server's Finished message." When the server |
12485 | | * sends a NewSessionTicket in a resumption handshake, we must wait until |
12486 | | * the handshake is finished (we have verified the server's Finished |
12487 | | * AND the server's certificate) before we update the ticket in the sid. |
12488 | | * |
12489 | | * This must be done before we call ssl_CacheSessionID(ss) |
12490 | | * because CacheSID requires the session ticket to already be set, and also |
12491 | | * because of the lazy lock creation scheme used by CacheSID and |
12492 | | * ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket. */ |
12493 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket) { |
12494 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); |
12495 | 0 | if (sidRv == SECSuccess) { |
12496 | | /* The sid takes over the ticket data */ |
12497 | 0 | ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, |
12498 | 0 | &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket); |
12499 | 0 | } else { |
12500 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); |
12501 | 0 | SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, |
12502 | 0 | PR_FALSE); |
12503 | 0 | } |
12504 | 0 | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); |
12505 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; |
12506 | 0 | } |
12507 | 0 | if (sidRv == SECSuccess) { |
12508 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached); |
12509 | 0 | ssl_CacheSessionID(ss); |
12510 | 0 | } |
12511 | |
|
12512 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */ |
12513 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake; |
12514 | |
|
12515 | 0 | return ssl_FinishHandshake(ss); |
12516 | 0 | } |
12517 | | |
12518 | | SECStatus |
12519 | | ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, |
12520 | | PRUint32 dtlsSeq, |
12521 | | const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, |
12522 | | sslUpdateHandshakeHashes updateHashes) |
12523 | 11.4k | { |
12524 | 11.4k | PRUint8 hdr[4]; |
12525 | 11.4k | PRUint8 dtlsData[8]; |
12526 | 11.4k | SECStatus rv; |
12527 | | |
12528 | 11.4k | PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Hash handshake message:", b, length)); |
12529 | | |
12530 | 11.4k | hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ct; |
12531 | 11.4k | hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); |
12532 | 11.4k | hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); |
12533 | 11.4k | hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length); |
12534 | | |
12535 | 11.4k | rv = updateHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)hdr, 4); |
12536 | 11.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
12537 | 0 | return rv; /* err code already set. */ |
12538 | | |
12539 | | /* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */ |
12540 | 11.4k | if (IS_DTLS_1_OR_12(ss)) { |
12541 | | /* Sequence number */ |
12542 | 11.4k | dtlsData[0] = MSB(dtlsSeq); |
12543 | 11.4k | dtlsData[1] = LSB(dtlsSeq); |
12544 | | |
12545 | | /* Fragment offset */ |
12546 | 11.4k | dtlsData[2] = 0; |
12547 | 11.4k | dtlsData[3] = 0; |
12548 | 11.4k | dtlsData[4] = 0; |
12549 | | |
12550 | | /* Fragment length */ |
12551 | 11.4k | dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); |
12552 | 11.4k | dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); |
12553 | 11.4k | dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length); |
12554 | | |
12555 | 11.4k | rv = updateHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)dtlsData, sizeof(dtlsData)); |
12556 | 11.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
12557 | 0 | return rv; /* err code already set. */ |
12558 | 11.4k | } |
12559 | | |
12560 | | /* The message body */ |
12561 | 11.4k | rv = updateHashes(ss, b, length); |
12562 | 11.4k | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
12563 | 0 | return rv; /* err code already set. */ |
12564 | | |
12565 | 11.4k | return SECSuccess; |
12566 | 11.4k | } |
12567 | | |
12568 | | SECStatus |
12569 | | ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, |
12570 | | const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
12571 | 11.4k | { |
12572 | 11.4k | return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq, |
12573 | 11.4k | b, length, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes); |
12574 | 11.4k | } |
12575 | | |
12576 | | SECStatus |
12577 | | ssl_HashHandshakeMessageDefault(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, |
12578 | | const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
12579 | 0 | { |
12580 | 0 | return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq, |
12581 | 0 | b, length, ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes); |
12582 | 0 | } |
12583 | | SECStatus |
12584 | | ssl_HashHandshakeMessageEchInner(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, |
12585 | | const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
12586 | 0 | { |
12587 | 0 | return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq, |
12588 | 0 | b, length, ssl3_UpdateInnerHandshakeHashes); |
12589 | 0 | } |
12590 | | |
12591 | | SECStatus |
12592 | | ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, |
12593 | | const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) |
12594 | 0 | { |
12595 | 0 | return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq, |
12596 | 0 | b, length, ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes); |
12597 | 0 | } |
12598 | | |
12599 | | /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3 |
12600 | | * handshake message. |
12601 | | * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
12602 | | */ |
12603 | | SECStatus |
12604 | | ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, |
12605 | | PRBool endOfRecord) |
12606 | 12.9k | { |
12607 | 12.9k | SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; |
12608 | 12.9k | PRUint16 epoch; |
12609 | | |
12610 | 12.9k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
12611 | 12.9k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
12612 | | |
12613 | 12.9k | SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(), |
12614 | 12.9k | ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type))); |
12615 | | |
12616 | | /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake. */ |
12617 | 12.9k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == ssl_hs_client_hello) { |
12618 | 7.50k | ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); |
12619 | 7.50k | } |
12620 | 12.9k | switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { |
12621 | 6 | case ssl_hs_hello_request: |
12622 | 7 | case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request: |
12623 | | /* We don't include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages |
12624 | | * in the handshake hashes */ |
12625 | 7 | break; |
12626 | | |
12627 | | /* Defer hashing of these messages until the message handlers. */ |
12628 | 7.50k | case ssl_hs_client_hello: |
12629 | 7.51k | case ssl_hs_server_hello: |
12630 | 7.51k | case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: |
12631 | 7.51k | case ssl_hs_finished: |
12632 | 7.51k | break; |
12633 | | |
12634 | 5.40k | default: |
12635 | 5.40k | if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { |
12636 | 5.40k | rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type, b, length); |
12637 | 5.40k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12638 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12639 | 0 | } |
12640 | 5.40k | } |
12641 | 12.9k | } |
12642 | | |
12643 | 12.9k | PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */ |
12644 | | |
12645 | 12.9k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_certificate_status && |
12646 | 12.9k | ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != ssl_hs_certificate_status) { |
12647 | | /* If we negotiated the certificate_status extension then we deferred |
12648 | | * certificate validation until we get the CertificateStatus messsage. |
12649 | | * But the CertificateStatus message is optional. If the server did |
12650 | | * not send it then we need to validate the certificate now. If the |
12651 | | * server does send the CertificateStatus message then we will |
12652 | | * authenticate the certificate in ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus. |
12653 | | */ |
12654 | 0 | rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ |
12655 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12656 | | /* This can't block. */ |
12657 | 0 | PORT_Assert(PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); |
12658 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12659 | 0 | } |
12660 | 0 | } |
12661 | | |
12662 | 12.9k | epoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch; |
12663 | 12.9k | switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { |
12664 | 7.50k | case ssl_hs_client_hello: |
12665 | 7.50k | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
12666 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12667 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO); |
12668 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12669 | 0 | } |
12670 | 7.50k | rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length); |
12671 | 7.50k | break; |
12672 | 3 | case ssl_hs_server_hello: |
12673 | 3 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
12674 | 3 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12675 | 3 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO); |
12676 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
12677 | 3 | } |
12678 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length); |
12679 | 0 | break; |
12680 | 5.41k | default: |
12681 | 5.41k | if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
12682 | 5.41k | rv = ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length); |
12683 | 5.41k | } else { |
12684 | 0 | rv = tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length); |
12685 | 0 | } |
12686 | 5.41k | break; |
12687 | 12.9k | } |
12688 | 12.9k | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
12689 | 12.9k | (epoch != ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) && !endOfRecord) { |
12690 | | /* If we changed read cipher states, there must not be any |
12691 | | * data in the input queue. */ |
12692 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12693 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); |
12694 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12695 | 0 | } |
12696 | | /* We consider the record to have been handled if SECSuccess or else WOULD_BLOCK is set |
12697 | | * Whoever set WOULD_BLOCK must handle any remaining actions required to finsih processing the record. |
12698 | | * e.g. by setting restartTarget. |
12699 | | */ |
12700 | 12.9k | if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (rv == SECSuccess || (rv == SECFailure && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR))) { |
12701 | | /* Increment the expected sequence number */ |
12702 | 6.05k | ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++; |
12703 | 6.05k | } |
12704 | | |
12705 | | /* Taint the message so that it's easier to detect UAFs. */ |
12706 | 12.9k | PORT_Memset(b, 'N', length); |
12707 | | |
12708 | 12.9k | return rv; |
12709 | 12.9k | } |
12710 | | |
12711 | | static SECStatus |
12712 | | ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, |
12713 | | PRUint32 length) |
12714 | 5.41k | { |
12715 | 5.41k | SECStatus rv; |
12716 | 5.41k | PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); |
12717 | | |
12718 | 5.41k | switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { |
12719 | 6 | case ssl_hs_hello_request: |
12720 | 6 | if (length != 0) { |
12721 | 3 | (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
12722 | 3 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST); |
12723 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
12724 | 3 | } |
12725 | 3 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
12726 | 3 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12727 | 3 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); |
12728 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
12729 | 3 | } |
12730 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss); |
12731 | 0 | break; |
12732 | | |
12733 | 1 | case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request: |
12734 | 1 | if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) { |
12735 | 1 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12736 | 1 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST); |
12737 | 1 | return SECFailure; |
12738 | 1 | } |
12739 | 0 | rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length); |
12740 | 0 | break; |
12741 | 2.15k | case ssl_hs_certificate: |
12742 | 2.15k | rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); |
12743 | 2.15k | break; |
12744 | 3 | case ssl_hs_certificate_status: |
12745 | 3 | rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); |
12746 | 3 | break; |
12747 | 5 | case ssl_hs_server_key_exchange: |
12748 | 5 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
12749 | 5 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12750 | 5 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); |
12751 | 5 | return SECFailure; |
12752 | 5 | } |
12753 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); |
12754 | 0 | break; |
12755 | 3 | case ssl_hs_certificate_request: |
12756 | 3 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
12757 | 3 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12758 | 3 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST); |
12759 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
12760 | 3 | } |
12761 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); |
12762 | 0 | break; |
12763 | 7 | case ssl_hs_server_hello_done: |
12764 | 7 | if (length != 0) { |
12765 | 3 | (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
12766 | 3 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE); |
12767 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
12768 | 3 | } |
12769 | 4 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
12770 | 4 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12771 | 4 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); |
12772 | 4 | return SECFailure; |
12773 | 4 | } |
12774 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss); |
12775 | 0 | break; |
12776 | 3 | case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: |
12777 | 3 | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
12778 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12779 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY); |
12780 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12781 | 0 | } |
12782 | 3 | rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length); |
12783 | 3 | break; |
12784 | 3.21k | case ssl_hs_client_key_exchange: |
12785 | 3.21k | if (!ss->sec.isServer) { |
12786 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12787 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); |
12788 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12789 | 0 | } |
12790 | 3.21k | rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length); |
12791 | 3.21k | break; |
12792 | 3 | case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket: |
12793 | 3 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
12794 | 3 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12795 | 3 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); |
12796 | 3 | return SECFailure; |
12797 | 3 | } |
12798 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); |
12799 | 0 | break; |
12800 | 2 | case ssl_hs_finished: |
12801 | 2 | rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length); |
12802 | 2 | break; |
12803 | 2 | default: |
12804 | 2 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
12805 | 2 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE); |
12806 | 2 | rv = SECFailure; |
12807 | 5.41k | } |
12808 | | |
12809 | 5.38k | return rv; |
12810 | 5.41k | } |
12811 | | |
12812 | | /* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) ssl3 record. |
12813 | | * origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content. |
12814 | | * Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks. |
12815 | | */ |
12816 | | static SECStatus |
12817 | | ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) |
12818 | 0 | { |
12819 | 0 | sslBuffer buf = *origBuf; /* Work from a copy. */ |
12820 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
12821 | |
|
12822 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
12823 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
12824 | |
|
12825 | 0 | while (buf.len > 0) { |
12826 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) { |
12827 | 0 | PRUint8 t; |
12828 | 0 | t = *(buf.buf++); |
12829 | 0 | buf.len--; |
12830 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0) |
12831 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSLHandshakeType)t; |
12832 | 0 | else |
12833 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t; |
12834 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) |
12835 | 0 | continue; |
12836 | | |
12837 | 0 | #define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ |
12838 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) { |
12839 | 0 | (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); |
12840 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); |
12841 | 0 | goto loser; |
12842 | 0 | } |
12843 | 0 | #undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN |
12844 | | |
12845 | | /* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through, |
12846 | | ** even if buf.len is zero. |
12847 | | */ |
12848 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0) |
12849 | 0 | continue; |
12850 | 0 | } |
12851 | | |
12852 | | /* |
12853 | | * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new |
12854 | | * data available for this message. If it can be done right out |
12855 | | * of the original buffer, then use it from there. |
12856 | | */ |
12857 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf.len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { |
12858 | | /* handle it from input buffer */ |
12859 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len, |
12860 | 0 | buf.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); |
12861 | 0 | buf.buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; |
12862 | 0 | buf.len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; |
12863 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; |
12864 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; |
12865 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12866 | 0 | goto loser; |
12867 | 0 | } |
12868 | 0 | } else { |
12869 | | /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */ |
12870 | 0 | unsigned int bytes; |
12871 | |
|
12872 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); |
12873 | 0 | bytes = PR_MIN(buf.len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len); |
12874 | | |
12875 | | /* Grow the buffer if needed */ |
12876 | 0 | rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); |
12877 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12878 | | /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ |
12879 | 0 | goto loser; |
12880 | 0 | } |
12881 | | |
12882 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len, |
12883 | 0 | buf.buf, bytes); |
12884 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes; |
12885 | 0 | buf.buf += bytes; |
12886 | 0 | buf.len -= bytes; |
12887 | |
|
12888 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); |
12889 | | |
12890 | | /* if we have a whole message, do it */ |
12891 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { |
12892 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage( |
12893 | 0 | ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len, |
12894 | 0 | buf.len == 0); |
12895 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0; |
12896 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; |
12897 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; |
12898 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
12899 | 0 | goto loser; |
12900 | 0 | } |
12901 | 0 | } else { |
12902 | 0 | PORT_Assert(buf.len == 0); |
12903 | 0 | break; |
12904 | 0 | } |
12905 | 0 | } |
12906 | 0 | } /* end loop */ |
12907 | | |
12908 | 0 | origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ |
12909 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
12910 | | |
12911 | 0 | loser : { |
12912 | | /* Make sure to remove any data that was consumed. */ |
12913 | 0 | unsigned int consumed = origBuf->len - buf.len; |
12914 | 0 | PORT_Assert(consumed == buf.buf - origBuf->buf); |
12915 | 0 | if (consumed > 0) { |
12916 | 0 | memmove(origBuf->buf, origBuf->buf + consumed, buf.len); |
12917 | 0 | origBuf->len = buf.len; |
12918 | 0 | } |
12919 | 0 | } |
12920 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12921 | 0 | } |
12922 | | |
12923 | | /* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if |
12924 | | * rv == SECSuccess. Otherwise it returns zero. */ |
12925 | | static unsigned int |
12926 | | SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv) |
12927 | 14.2k | { |
12928 | 14.2k | return PORT_CT_EQ(rv, SECSuccess); |
12929 | 14.2k | } |
12930 | | |
12931 | | /* ssl_ConstantTimeGE returns 0xffffffff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */ |
12932 | | static unsigned char |
12933 | | ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) |
12934 | 10.4k | { |
12935 | 10.4k | return PORT_CT_GE(a, b); |
12936 | 10.4k | } |
12937 | | |
12938 | | /* ssl_ConstantTimeEQ returns 0xffffffff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */ |
12939 | | static unsigned char |
12940 | | ssl_ConstantTimeEQ(unsigned char a, unsigned char b) |
12941 | 119k | { |
12942 | 119k | return PORT_CT_EQ(a, b); |
12943 | 119k | } |
12944 | | |
12945 | | /* ssl_constantTimeSelect return a if mask is 0xFF and b if mask is 0x00 */ |
12946 | | static unsigned char |
12947 | | ssl_constantTimeSelect(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b) |
12948 | 2.63k | { |
12949 | 2.63k | return (mask & a) | (~mask & b); |
12950 | 2.63k | } |
12951 | | |
12952 | | static SECStatus |
12953 | | ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, |
12954 | | unsigned int blockSize, |
12955 | | unsigned int macSize) |
12956 | 0 | { |
12957 | 0 | unsigned int paddingLength, good; |
12958 | 0 | const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize; |
12959 | | |
12960 | | /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant |
12961 | | * time. */ |
12962 | 0 | if (overhead > plaintext->len) { |
12963 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12964 | 0 | } |
12965 | | |
12966 | 0 | paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; |
12967 | | /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */ |
12968 | 0 | good = PORT_CT_GE(plaintext->len, paddingLength + overhead); |
12969 | | /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ |
12970 | 0 | good &= PORT_CT_GE(blockSize, paddingLength + 1); |
12971 | 0 | plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1); |
12972 | 0 | return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure); |
12973 | 0 | } |
12974 | | |
12975 | | SECStatus |
12976 | | ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize) |
12977 | 54 | { |
12978 | 54 | unsigned int paddingLength, good, toCheck, i; |
12979 | 54 | const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize; |
12980 | | |
12981 | | /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant |
12982 | | * time. */ |
12983 | 54 | if (overhead > plaintext->len) { |
12984 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
12985 | 0 | } |
12986 | | |
12987 | 54 | paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; |
12988 | 54 | good = PORT_CT_GE(plaintext->len, paddingLength + overhead); |
12989 | | |
12990 | | /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and then |
12991 | | * that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length byte. |
12992 | | * Thus, with the length byte included, there are paddingLength+1 bytes of |
12993 | | * padding. |
12994 | | * |
12995 | | * We can't check just |paddingLength+1| bytes because that leaks |
12996 | | * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum |
12997 | | * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is |
12998 | | * public information so we can use it.) */ |
12999 | 54 | toCheck = 256; /* maximum amount of padding + 1. */ |
13000 | 54 | if (toCheck > plaintext->len) { |
13001 | 52 | toCheck = plaintext->len; |
13002 | 52 | } |
13003 | | |
13004 | 3.87k | for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) { |
13005 | | /* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is |
13006 | | * 0xff. Otherwise, mask is 0. */ |
13007 | 3.82k | unsigned char mask = PORT_CT_LE(i, paddingLength); |
13008 | 3.82k | unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1 - i]; |
13009 | | /* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value |
13010 | | * |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ |
13011 | 3.82k | good &= ~(mask & (paddingLength ^ b)); |
13012 | 3.82k | } |
13013 | | |
13014 | | /* If any of the final |paddingLength+1| bytes had the wrong value, |
13015 | | * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We |
13016 | | * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the |
13017 | | * bits. */ |
13018 | 54 | good &= good >> 4; |
13019 | 54 | good &= good >> 2; |
13020 | 54 | good &= good >> 1; |
13021 | 54 | good <<= sizeof(good) * 8 - 1; |
13022 | 54 | good = PORT_CT_DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); |
13023 | | |
13024 | 54 | plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1); |
13025 | 54 | return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure); |
13026 | 54 | } |
13027 | | |
13028 | | /* On entry: |
13029 | | * originalLength >= macSize |
13030 | | * macSize <= MAX_MAC_LENGTH |
13031 | | * plaintext->len >= macSize |
13032 | | */ |
13033 | | static void |
13034 | | ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext, |
13035 | | unsigned int originalLength, |
13036 | | PRUint8 *out, |
13037 | | unsigned int macSize) |
13038 | 54 | { |
13039 | 54 | unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; |
13040 | | /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the |
13041 | | * MAC. */ |
13042 | 54 | unsigned macEnd = plaintext->len; |
13043 | 54 | unsigned macStart = macEnd - macSize; |
13044 | | /* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because |
13045 | | * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ |
13046 | 54 | unsigned scanStart = 0; |
13047 | 54 | unsigned i, j; |
13048 | 54 | unsigned char rotateOffset; |
13049 | | |
13050 | 54 | if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1) { |
13051 | 2 | scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1); |
13052 | 2 | } |
13053 | | |
13054 | | /* We want to compute |
13055 | | * rotateOffset = (macStart - scanStart) % macSize |
13056 | | * But the time to compute this varies based on the amount of padding. Thus |
13057 | | * we explicitely handle all mac sizes with (hopefully) constant time modulo |
13058 | | * using Barrett reduction: |
13059 | | * q := (rotateOffset * m) >> k |
13060 | | * rotateOffset -= q * n |
13061 | | * if (n <= rotateOffset) rotateOffset -= n |
13062 | | */ |
13063 | 54 | rotateOffset = macStart - scanStart; |
13064 | | /* rotateOffset < 255 + 1 + 48 = 304 */ |
13065 | 54 | if (macSize == 16) { |
13066 | 0 | rotateOffset &= 15; |
13067 | 54 | } else if (macSize == 20) { |
13068 | | /* |
13069 | | * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/20 - 25/2^9 ) < 1 |
13070 | | * with rotateOffset <= 853 |
13071 | | */ |
13072 | 1 | unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 25) >> 9; |
13073 | 1 | rotateOffset -= q * 20; |
13074 | 1 | rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 20), |
13075 | 1 | 20, 0); |
13076 | 53 | } else if (macSize == 32) { |
13077 | 2 | rotateOffset &= 31; |
13078 | 51 | } else if (macSize == 48) { |
13079 | | /* |
13080 | | * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/48 - 10/2^9 ) < 1 |
13081 | | * with rotateOffset < 768 |
13082 | | */ |
13083 | 51 | unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 10) >> 9; |
13084 | 51 | rotateOffset -= q * 48; |
13085 | 51 | rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 48), |
13086 | 51 | 48, 0); |
13087 | 51 | } else { |
13088 | | /* |
13089 | | * SHA384 (macSize == 48) is the largest we support. We should never |
13090 | | * get here. |
13091 | | */ |
13092 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
13093 | 0 | rotateOffset = rotateOffset % macSize; |
13094 | 0 | } |
13095 | | |
13096 | 54 | memset(rotatedMac, 0, macSize); |
13097 | 179 | for (i = scanStart; i < originalLength;) { |
13098 | 4.01k | for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) { |
13099 | 3.89k | unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart); |
13100 | 3.89k | unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd); |
13101 | 3.89k | unsigned char b = 0; |
13102 | 3.89k | b = plaintext->buf[i]; |
13103 | 3.89k | rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded; |
13104 | 3.89k | } |
13105 | 125 | } |
13106 | | |
13107 | | /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line |
13108 | | * we could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */ |
13109 | 54 | memset(out, 0, macSize); |
13110 | 54 | rotateOffset = macSize - rotateOffset; |
13111 | 54 | rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize), |
13112 | 54 | 0, rotateOffset); |
13113 | 2.58k | for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) { |
13114 | 122k | for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) { |
13115 | 119k | out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ(j, rotateOffset); |
13116 | 119k | } |
13117 | 2.53k | rotateOffset++; |
13118 | 2.53k | rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize), |
13119 | 2.53k | 0, rotateOffset); |
13120 | 2.53k | } |
13121 | 54 | } |
13122 | | |
13123 | | /* MAX_EXPANSION is the amount by which a record might plausibly be expanded |
13124 | | * when protected. It's the worst case estimate, so the sum of block cipher |
13125 | | * padding (up to 256 octets), HMAC (48 octets for SHA-384), and IV (16 |
13126 | | * octets for AES). */ |
13127 | 14.4k | #define MAX_EXPANSION (256 + 48 + 16) |
13128 | | |
13129 | | /* Unprotect an SSL3 record and leave the result in plaintext. |
13130 | | * |
13131 | | * If SECFailure is returned, we: |
13132 | | * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent. |
13133 | | * 2. Call PORT_SetError() with an appropriate code. |
13134 | | * |
13135 | | * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock. |
13136 | | * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert(). |
13137 | | * |
13138 | | */ |
13139 | | static SECStatus |
13140 | | ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, |
13141 | | ssl3CipherSpec *spec, |
13142 | | SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, |
13143 | | SSL3AlertDescription *alert) |
13144 | 14.4k | { |
13145 | 14.4k | const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = spec->cipherDef; |
13146 | 14.4k | PRBool isTLS; |
13147 | 14.4k | unsigned int good; |
13148 | 14.4k | unsigned int ivLen = 0; |
13149 | 14.4k | SSLContentType rType; |
13150 | 14.4k | SSL3ProtocolVersion rVersion; |
13151 | 14.4k | unsigned int minLength; |
13152 | 14.4k | unsigned int originalLen = 0; |
13153 | 14.4k | PRUint8 headerBuf[13]; |
13154 | 14.4k | sslBuffer header = SSL_BUFFER(headerBuf); |
13155 | 14.4k | PRUint8 hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; |
13156 | 14.4k | PRUint8 givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; |
13157 | 14.4k | PRUint8 *givenHash; |
13158 | 14.4k | unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1; |
13159 | 14.4k | SECStatus rv; |
13160 | | |
13161 | 14.4k | PORT_Assert(spec->direction == ssl_secret_read); |
13162 | | |
13163 | 14.4k | good = ~0U; |
13164 | 14.4k | minLength = spec->macDef->mac_size; |
13165 | 14.4k | if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { |
13166 | | /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */ |
13167 | 136 | minLength++; |
13168 | 136 | if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { |
13169 | | /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */ |
13170 | 136 | minLength += cipher_def->iv_size; |
13171 | 136 | } |
13172 | 14.3k | } else if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { |
13173 | 239 | minLength = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size + cipher_def->tag_size; |
13174 | 239 | } |
13175 | | |
13176 | | /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total |
13177 | | * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */ |
13178 | 14.4k | if (cText->buf->len < minLength) { |
13179 | 77 | goto decrypt_loser; |
13180 | 77 | } |
13181 | | |
13182 | 14.4k | if (cipher_def->type == type_block && |
13183 | 14.4k | spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { |
13184 | | /* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states |
13185 | | * "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and |
13186 | | * then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV |
13187 | | * component." Instead, we decrypt the first cipher block and then |
13188 | | * discard it before decrypting the rest. |
13189 | | */ |
13190 | 59 | PRUint8 iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
13191 | 59 | unsigned int decoded; |
13192 | | |
13193 | 59 | ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; |
13194 | 59 | if (ivLen < 8 || ivLen > sizeof(iv)) { |
13195 | 0 | *alert = internal_error; |
13196 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
13197 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13198 | 0 | } |
13199 | | |
13200 | 59 | PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen)); |
13201 | | |
13202 | | /* The decryption result is garbage, but since we just throw away |
13203 | | * the block it doesn't matter. The decryption of the next block |
13204 | | * depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block. |
13205 | | */ |
13206 | 59 | rv = spec->cipher(spec->cipherContext, iv, &decoded, |
13207 | 59 | sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen); |
13208 | | |
13209 | 59 | good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); |
13210 | 59 | } |
13211 | | |
13212 | 14.4k | PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen, |
13213 | 14.4k | cText->buf->len - ivLen)); |
13214 | | |
13215 | | /* Check if the ciphertext can be valid if we assume maximum plaintext and |
13216 | | * add the maximum possible ciphersuite expansion. |
13217 | | * This way we detect overlong plaintexts/padding before decryption. |
13218 | | * This check enforces size limitations more strict than the RFC. |
13219 | | * [RFC5246, Section 6.2.3] */ |
13220 | 14.4k | if (cText->buf->len > (spec->recordSizeLimit + MAX_EXPANSION)) { |
13221 | 6 | *alert = record_overflow; |
13222 | 6 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); |
13223 | 6 | return SECFailure; |
13224 | 6 | } |
13225 | | |
13226 | 14.4k | isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
13227 | 14.4k | rType = (SSLContentType)cText->hdr[0]; |
13228 | 14.4k | rVersion = ((SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[1] << 8) | |
13229 | 14.4k | (SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[2]; |
13230 | 14.4k | if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { |
13231 | | /* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the |
13232 | | * ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general. |
13233 | | * Each AEAD cipher should provide a function that returns the |
13234 | | * plaintext length for a given ciphertext. */ |
13235 | 239 | const unsigned int explicitNonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; |
13236 | 239 | const unsigned int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; |
13237 | 239 | unsigned int nonceLen = explicitNonceLen; |
13238 | 239 | unsigned int decryptedLen = cText->buf->len - nonceLen - tagLen; |
13239 | | /* even though read doesn't return and IV, we still need a space to put |
13240 | | * the combined iv/nonce n the gcm 1.2 case*/ |
13241 | 239 | unsigned char ivOut[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
13242 | 239 | unsigned char *iv = NULL; |
13243 | 239 | unsigned char *nonce = NULL; |
13244 | | |
13245 | 239 | ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; |
13246 | | |
13247 | 239 | rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( |
13248 | 239 | spec->epoch, cText->seqNum, |
13249 | 239 | rType, isTLS, rVersion, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen, &header, spec->version); |
13250 | 239 | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); |
13251 | | |
13252 | | /* build the iv */ |
13253 | 239 | if (explicitNonceLen == 0) { |
13254 | 0 | nonceLen = sizeof(cText->seqNum); |
13255 | 0 | iv = spec->keyMaterial.iv; |
13256 | 0 | nonce = SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header); |
13257 | 239 | } else { |
13258 | 239 | PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, spec->keyMaterial.iv, ivLen); |
13259 | 239 | PORT_Memset(ivOut + ivLen, 0, explicitNonceLen); |
13260 | 239 | iv = ivOut; |
13261 | 239 | nonce = cText->buf->buf; |
13262 | 239 | nonceLen = explicitNonceLen; |
13263 | 239 | } |
13264 | 239 | rv = tls13_AEAD(spec->cipherContext, PR_TRUE, |
13265 | 239 | CKG_NO_GENERATE, 0, /* iv generator params |
13266 | | * (not used in decrypt)*/ |
13267 | 239 | iv, /* iv in */ |
13268 | 239 | NULL, /* iv out */ |
13269 | 239 | ivLen + explicitNonceLen, /* full iv length */ |
13270 | 239 | nonce, nonceLen, /* nonce in */ |
13271 | 239 | SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), /* aad */ |
13272 | 239 | SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header), /* aadlen */ |
13273 | 239 | plaintext->buf, /* output */ |
13274 | 239 | &plaintext->len, /* out len */ |
13275 | 239 | plaintext->space, /* max out */ |
13276 | 239 | tagLen, |
13277 | 239 | cText->buf->buf + explicitNonceLen, /* input */ |
13278 | 239 | cText->buf->len - explicitNonceLen); /* input len */ |
13279 | 239 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
13280 | 239 | good = 0; |
13281 | 239 | } |
13282 | 14.1k | } else { |
13283 | 14.1k | if (cipher_def->type == type_block && |
13284 | 14.1k | ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) { |
13285 | 5 | goto decrypt_loser; |
13286 | 5 | } |
13287 | | |
13288 | | /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */ |
13289 | 14.1k | rv = spec->cipher( |
13290 | 14.1k | spec->cipherContext, plaintext->buf, &plaintext->len, |
13291 | 14.1k | plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen); |
13292 | 14.1k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
13293 | 0 | goto decrypt_loser; |
13294 | 0 | } |
13295 | | |
13296 | 14.1k | PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len)); |
13297 | | |
13298 | 14.1k | originalLen = plaintext->len; |
13299 | | |
13300 | | /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */ |
13301 | 14.1k | if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { |
13302 | 54 | const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size; |
13303 | 54 | const unsigned int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size; |
13304 | | |
13305 | 54 | if (!isTLS) { |
13306 | 0 | good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding( |
13307 | 0 | plaintext, blockSize, macSize)); |
13308 | 54 | } else { |
13309 | 54 | good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding( |
13310 | 54 | plaintext, macSize)); |
13311 | 54 | } |
13312 | 54 | } |
13313 | | |
13314 | | /* compute the MAC */ |
13315 | 14.1k | rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( |
13316 | 14.1k | spec->epoch, cText->seqNum, |
13317 | 14.1k | rType, isTLS, rVersion, IS_DTLS(ss), |
13318 | 14.1k | plaintext->len - spec->macDef->mac_size, &header, spec->version); |
13319 | 14.1k | PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); |
13320 | 14.1k | if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { |
13321 | 54 | rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( |
13322 | 54 | spec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header), |
13323 | 54 | plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen, |
13324 | 54 | hash, &hashBytes); |
13325 | | |
13326 | 54 | ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf, |
13327 | 54 | spec->macDef->mac_size); |
13328 | 54 | givenHash = givenHashBuf; |
13329 | | |
13330 | | /* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC |
13331 | | * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust |
13332 | | * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we |
13333 | | * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */ |
13334 | 54 | plaintext->len -= spec->macDef->mac_size; |
13335 | 14.1k | } else { |
13336 | | /* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */ |
13337 | 14.1k | plaintext->len -= spec->macDef->mac_size; |
13338 | | |
13339 | 14.1k | rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( |
13340 | 14.1k | spec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header), |
13341 | 14.1k | plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes); |
13342 | | |
13343 | | /* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location |
13344 | | * is public when a stream cipher is used. */ |
13345 | 14.1k | givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len; |
13346 | 14.1k | } |
13347 | | |
13348 | 14.1k | good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); |
13349 | | |
13350 | 14.1k | if (hashBytes != (unsigned)spec->macDef->mac_size || |
13351 | 14.1k | NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, spec->macDef->mac_size) != 0) { |
13352 | | /* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */ |
13353 | 54 | good = 0; |
13354 | 54 | } |
13355 | 14.1k | } |
13356 | | |
13357 | 14.3k | if (good == 0) { |
13358 | 375 | decrypt_loser: |
13359 | | /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */ |
13360 | 375 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); |
13361 | 375 | *alert = bad_record_mac; |
13362 | 375 | return SECFailure; |
13363 | 293 | } |
13364 | 14.1k | return SECSuccess; |
13365 | 14.3k | } |
13366 | | |
13367 | | SECStatus |
13368 | | ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, SSLContentType rType, |
13369 | | DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum, |
13370 | | sslBuffer *databuf) |
13371 | 16.3k | { |
13372 | 16.3k | SECStatus rv; |
13373 | | |
13374 | | /* check for Token Presence */ |
13375 | 16.3k | if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { |
13376 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); |
13377 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13378 | 0 | } |
13379 | | |
13380 | 16.3k | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
13381 | | |
13382 | | /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if |
13383 | | ** they return SECFailure. |
13384 | | */ |
13385 | 16.3k | switch (rType) { |
13386 | 94 | case ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec: |
13387 | 94 | rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf); |
13388 | 94 | break; |
13389 | 636 | case ssl_ct_alert: |
13390 | 636 | rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf); |
13391 | 636 | break; |
13392 | 15.5k | case ssl_ct_handshake: |
13393 | 15.5k | if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
13394 | 0 | rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); |
13395 | 15.5k | } else { |
13396 | 15.5k | rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, epoch, seqNum, databuf); |
13397 | 15.5k | } |
13398 | 15.5k | break; |
13399 | 6 | case ssl_ct_ack: |
13400 | 6 | if (IS_DTLS(ss) && tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) { |
13401 | 0 | rv = dtls13_HandleAck(ss, databuf); |
13402 | 0 | break; |
13403 | 0 | } |
13404 | | /* Fall through. */ |
13405 | 84 | default: |
13406 | | /* If a TLS implementation receives an unexpected record type, |
13407 | | * it MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" |
13408 | | * alert [RFC8446, Section 5]. |
13409 | | * |
13410 | | * For TLS 1.3 the outer content type is checked before in |
13411 | | * tls13con.c/tls13_UnprotectRecord(), |
13412 | | * For DTLS 1.3 the outer content type is checked before in |
13413 | | * ssl3gthr.c/dtls_GatherData. |
13414 | | * The inner content types will be checked here. |
13415 | | * |
13416 | | * In DTLS generally invalid records SHOULD be silently discarded, |
13417 | | * no alert is sent [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. |
13418 | | */ |
13419 | 84 | if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
13420 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
13421 | 0 | } |
13422 | 84 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); |
13423 | 84 | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d", |
13424 | 84 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rType)); |
13425 | 84 | rv = SECFailure; |
13426 | 84 | break; |
13427 | 16.3k | } |
13428 | | |
13429 | 16.3k | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
13430 | 16.3k | return rv; |
13431 | 16.3k | } |
13432 | | |
13433 | | /* Find the cipher spec to use for a given record. For TLS, this |
13434 | | * is the current cipherspec. For DTLS, we look up by epoch. |
13435 | | * In DTLS < 1.3 this just means the current epoch or nothing, |
13436 | | * but in DTLS >= 1.3, we keep multiple reading cipherspecs. |
13437 | | * Returns NULL if no appropriate cipher spec is found. |
13438 | | */ |
13439 | | static ssl3CipherSpec * |
13440 | | ssl3_GetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText) |
13441 | 22.5k | { |
13442 | 22.5k | ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; |
13443 | 22.5k | ssl3CipherSpec *newSpec = NULL; |
13444 | 22.5k | DTLSEpoch epoch; |
13445 | | |
13446 | 22.5k | if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
13447 | 0 | return crSpec; |
13448 | 0 | } |
13449 | 22.5k | epoch = dtls_ReadEpoch(crSpec->version, crSpec->epoch, cText->hdr); |
13450 | 22.5k | if (crSpec->epoch == epoch) { |
13451 | 20.8k | return crSpec; |
13452 | 20.8k | } |
13453 | 1.67k | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
13454 | | /* Try to find the cipher spec. */ |
13455 | 0 | newSpec = ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, |
13456 | 0 | epoch); |
13457 | 0 | if (newSpec != NULL) { |
13458 | 0 | return newSpec; |
13459 | 0 | } |
13460 | 0 | } |
13461 | 1.67k | SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: %s couldn't find cipherspec from epoch %d", |
13462 | 1.67k | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), epoch)); |
13463 | 1.67k | return NULL; |
13464 | 1.67k | } |
13465 | | |
13466 | | /* if cText is non-null, then decipher and check the MAC of the |
13467 | | * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf) |
13468 | | * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf |
13469 | | * is lost. Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type, |
13470 | | * unless it's an application record. |
13471 | | * |
13472 | | * If cText is NULL, then the ciphertext has previously been deciphered and |
13473 | | * checked, and is already sitting in databuf. It is processed as an SSL |
13474 | | * Handshake message. |
13475 | | * |
13476 | | * DOES NOT process the decrypted application data. |
13477 | | * On return, databuf contains the decrypted record. |
13478 | | * |
13479 | | * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake |
13480 | | * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq |
13481 | | * |
13482 | | * Caller must hold the RecvBufLock. |
13483 | | * |
13484 | | * This function aquires and releases the SSL3Handshake Lock, holding the |
13485 | | * lock around any calls to functions that handle records other than |
13486 | | * Application Data records. |
13487 | | */ |
13488 | | SECStatus |
13489 | | ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText) |
13490 | 22.5k | { |
13491 | 22.5k | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
13492 | 22.5k | PRBool isTLS, isTLS13; |
13493 | 22.5k | DTLSEpoch epoch; |
13494 | 22.5k | ssl3CipherSpec *spec = NULL; |
13495 | 22.5k | PRUint16 recordSizeLimit, cTextSizeLimit; |
13496 | 22.5k | PRBool outOfOrderSpec = PR_FALSE; |
13497 | 22.5k | SSLContentType rType; |
13498 | 22.5k | sslBuffer *plaintext = &ss->gs.buf; |
13499 | 22.5k | SSL3AlertDescription alert = internal_error; |
13500 | 22.5k | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); |
13501 | | |
13502 | | /* check for Token Presence */ |
13503 | 22.5k | if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { |
13504 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); |
13505 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13506 | 0 | } |
13507 | | |
13508 | | /* Clear out the buffer in case this exits early. Any data then won't be |
13509 | | * processed twice. */ |
13510 | 22.5k | plaintext->len = 0; |
13511 | | |
13512 | | /* We're waiting for another ClientHello, which will appear unencrypted. |
13513 | | * Use the content type to tell whether this should be discarded. */ |
13514 | 22.5k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr && |
13515 | 22.5k | cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_application_data) { |
13516 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello); |
13517 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
13518 | 0 | } |
13519 | | |
13520 | 22.5k | ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/ |
13521 | 22.5k | spec = ssl3_GetCipherSpec(ss, cText); |
13522 | 22.5k | if (!spec) { |
13523 | 1.67k | PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); |
13524 | 1.67k | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ |
13525 | 1.67k | return SECSuccess; |
13526 | 1.67k | } |
13527 | 20.8k | if (spec != ss->ssl3.crSpec) { |
13528 | 0 | PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); |
13529 | 0 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: Handling out-of-epoch record from epoch=%d", |
13530 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec->epoch)); |
13531 | 0 | outOfOrderSpec = PR_TRUE; |
13532 | 0 | } |
13533 | 20.8k | isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); |
13534 | 20.8k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
13535 | 20.8k | if (dtls13_MaskSequenceNumber(ss, spec, cText->hdr, |
13536 | 20.8k | SSL_BUFFER_BASE(cText->buf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(cText->buf)) != SECSuccess) { |
13537 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ |
13538 | | /* code already set. */ |
13539 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13540 | 0 | } |
13541 | 20.8k | if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, spec, cText, &cText->seqNum)) { |
13542 | 1.27k | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ |
13543 | 1.27k | return SECSuccess; |
13544 | 1.27k | } |
13545 | 20.8k | } else { |
13546 | 0 | cText->seqNum = spec->nextSeqNum; |
13547 | 0 | } |
13548 | 19.6k | if (cText->seqNum >= spec->cipherDef->max_records) { |
13549 | 1 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ |
13550 | 1 | SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: read sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", |
13551 | 1 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->seqNum)); |
13552 | 1 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); |
13553 | 1 | return SECFailure; |
13554 | 1 | } |
13555 | | |
13556 | 19.6k | isTLS13 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); |
13557 | 19.6k | recordSizeLimit = spec->recordSizeLimit; |
13558 | 19.6k | cTextSizeLimit = recordSizeLimit; |
13559 | 19.6k | cTextSizeLimit += (isTLS13) ? TLS_1_3_MAX_EXPANSION : TLS_1_2_MAX_EXPANSION; |
13560 | | |
13561 | | /* Check if the specified recordSizeLimit and the RFC8446 specified max |
13562 | | * expansion are respected. recordSizeLimit is probably at the default for |
13563 | | * the first (hello) handshake message and then set to a smaller size by |
13564 | | * the Record Size Limit Extension. |
13565 | | * Stricter expansion size checks dependent on implemented cipher suites |
13566 | | * are performed in ssl3con.c/ssl3_UnprotectRecord() OR |
13567 | | * tls13con.c/tls13_UnprotextRecord(). |
13568 | | * After Decryption the plaintext size is checked (l. 13424). This also |
13569 | | * applies to unencrypted records. */ |
13570 | 19.6k | if (cText->buf->len > cTextSizeLimit) { |
13571 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ |
13572 | | /* Drop DTLS Record Errors silently [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7] */ |
13573 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
13574 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
13575 | 0 | } |
13576 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); |
13577 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); |
13578 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13579 | 0 | } |
13580 | | |
13581 | 19.6k | #ifdef DEBUG |
13582 | | /* In debug builds the gather buffers are freed after the handling of each |
13583 | | * record for advanced ASAN coverage. Allocate the buffer again to the |
13584 | | * maximum possibly needed size as on gather initialization in |
13585 | | * ssl3gthr.c/ssl3_InitGather(). */ |
13586 | 19.6k | PR_ASSERT(sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, TLS_1_2_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH) == SECSuccess); |
13587 | 19.6k | #endif |
13588 | | /* This replaces a dynamic plaintext buffer size check, since the buffer is |
13589 | | * allocated to the maximum size in ssl3gthr.c/ssl3_InitGather(). The buffer |
13590 | | * was always grown to the maximum size at first record gathering before. */ |
13591 | 19.6k | PR_ASSERT(plaintext->space >= cTextSizeLimit); |
13592 | | |
13593 | | /* Most record types aside from protected TLS 1.3 records carry the content |
13594 | | * type in the first octet. TLS 1.3 will override this value later. */ |
13595 | 19.6k | rType = cText->hdr[0]; |
13596 | | /* Encrypted application data records could arrive before the handshake |
13597 | | * completes in DTLS 1.3. These can look like valid TLS 1.2 application_data |
13598 | | * records in epoch 0, which is never valid. Pretend they didn't decrypt. */ |
13599 | 19.6k | if (spec->epoch == 0 && ((IS_DTLS(ss) && |
13600 | 19.2k | dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(0, rType)) || |
13601 | 19.2k | rType == ssl_ct_application_data)) { |
13602 | 2.89k | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA); |
13603 | 2.89k | alert = unexpected_message; |
13604 | 2.89k | rv = SECFailure; |
13605 | 16.7k | } else { |
13606 | | #ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE |
13607 | | rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, plaintext->buf, &plaintext->len, |
13608 | | plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len); |
13609 | | #else |
13610 | | /* IMPORTANT: |
13611 | | * Unprotect functions MUST NOT send alerts |
13612 | | * because we still hold the spec read lock. Instead, if they |
13613 | | * return SECFailure, they set *alert to the alert to be sent. |
13614 | | * Additionaly, this is used to silently drop DTLS encryption/record |
13615 | | * errors/alerts using the error handling below as suggested in the |
13616 | | * DTLS specification [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. */ |
13617 | 16.7k | if (spec->cipherDef->cipher == cipher_null && cText->buf->len == 0) { |
13618 | | /* Handle a zero-length unprotected record |
13619 | | * In this case, we treat it as a no-op and let later functions decide |
13620 | | * whether to ignore or alert accordingly. */ |
13621 | 2.23k | PR_ASSERT(plaintext->len == 0); |
13622 | 2.23k | rv = SECSuccess; |
13623 | 14.4k | } else if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || spec->epoch == 0) { |
13624 | 14.4k | rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &alert); |
13625 | 14.4k | } else { |
13626 | 0 | rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &rType, |
13627 | 0 | &alert); |
13628 | 0 | } |
13629 | 16.7k | #endif |
13630 | 16.7k | } |
13631 | | |
13632 | | /* Error/Alert handling for ssl3/tls13_UnprotectRecord */ |
13633 | 19.6k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
13634 | 3.27k | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/ |
13635 | | |
13636 | 3.27k | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
13637 | | |
13638 | | /* Ensure that we don't process this data again. */ |
13639 | 3.27k | plaintext->len = 0; |
13640 | | |
13641 | | /* Ignore a CCS if compatibility mode is negotiated. Note that this |
13642 | | * will fail if the server fails to negotiate compatibility mode in a |
13643 | | * 0-RTT session that is resumed from a session that did negotiate it. |
13644 | | * We don't care about that corner case right now. */ |
13645 | 3.27k | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
13646 | 3.27k | cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec && |
13647 | 3.27k | ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake && |
13648 | 3.27k | cText->buf->len == 1 && |
13649 | 3.27k | cText->buf->buf[0] == change_cipher_spec_choice) { |
13650 | 0 | if (!ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs) { |
13651 | | /* Allow only the first CCS. */ |
13652 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs = PR_TRUE; |
13653 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
13654 | 0 | } else { |
13655 | 0 | alert = unexpected_message; |
13656 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
13657 | 0 | } |
13658 | 0 | } |
13659 | | |
13660 | | /* All errors/alerts that might occur during unprotection are related |
13661 | | * to invalid records (e.g. invalid formatting, length, MAC, ...). |
13662 | | * Following the DTLS specification such errors/alerts SHOULD be |
13663 | | * dropped silently [RFC9147, Section 4.5.2]. |
13664 | | * This is done below. */ |
13665 | | |
13666 | 3.27k | if ((IS_DTLS(ss) && !dtls13_AeadLimitReached(spec)) || |
13667 | 3.27k | (!IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->sec.isServer && |
13668 | 3.27k | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial)) { |
13669 | | /* Silently drop the packet unless we set ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent. |
13670 | | * (Manually or by using functions like |
13671 | | * SSL3_SendAlert(.., alert_fatal,..)) |
13672 | | * This is not currently used in the unprotection functions since |
13673 | | * all TLS and DTLS errors are propagated to this handler. */ |
13674 | 3.27k | if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) { |
13675 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13676 | 0 | } |
13677 | 3.27k | return SECSuccess; |
13678 | 3.27k | } |
13679 | | |
13680 | 0 | int errCode = PORT_GetError(); |
13681 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, alert); |
13682 | | /* Reset the error code in case SSL3_SendAlert called |
13683 | | * PORT_SetError(). */ |
13684 | 0 | PORT_SetError(errCode); |
13685 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13686 | 3.27k | } |
13687 | | |
13688 | | /* SECSuccess */ |
13689 | 16.3k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
13690 | 16.3k | dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&spec->recvdRecords, cText->seqNum); |
13691 | 16.3k | spec->nextSeqNum = PR_MAX(spec->nextSeqNum, cText->seqNum + 1); |
13692 | 16.3k | } else { |
13693 | 0 | ++spec->nextSeqNum; |
13694 | 0 | } |
13695 | 16.3k | epoch = spec->epoch; |
13696 | | |
13697 | 16.3k | ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/ |
13698 | | |
13699 | | /* |
13700 | | * The decrypted data is now in plaintext. |
13701 | | */ |
13702 | | |
13703 | | /* IMPORTANT: We are in DTLS 1.3 mode and we have processed something |
13704 | | * from the wrong epoch. Divert to a divert processing function to make |
13705 | | * sure we don't accidentally use the data unsafely. */ |
13706 | | |
13707 | | /* We temporary allowed reading the records from the previous epoch n-1 |
13708 | | until the moment we get a message from the new epoch n. */ |
13709 | | |
13710 | 16.3k | if (outOfOrderSpec) { |
13711 | 0 | PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); |
13712 | 0 | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
13713 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.hs.allowPreviousEpoch && spec->epoch == ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch - 1) { |
13714 | 0 | SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: DTLS13[%d]: Out of order message %d is accepted", |
13715 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec->epoch)); |
13716 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
13717 | 0 | } else { |
13718 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
13719 | 0 | return dtls13_HandleOutOfEpochRecord(ss, spec, rType, plaintext); |
13720 | 0 | } |
13721 | 16.3k | } else { |
13722 | 16.3k | ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
13723 | | /* Forbid (application) messages from the previous epoch. |
13724 | | From now, messages that arrive out of order will be discarded. */ |
13725 | 16.3k | ss->ssl3.hs.allowPreviousEpoch = PR_FALSE; |
13726 | 16.3k | ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); |
13727 | 16.3k | } |
13728 | | |
13729 | | /* Check the length of the plaintext. */ |
13730 | 16.3k | if (isTLS && plaintext->len > recordSizeLimit) { |
13731 | 2 | plaintext->len = 0; |
13732 | | /* Drop DTLS Record Errors silently [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7] */ |
13733 | 2 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
13734 | 2 | return SECSuccess; |
13735 | 2 | } |
13736 | 0 | SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); |
13737 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); |
13738 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13739 | 2 | } |
13740 | | |
13741 | | /* Application data records are processed by the caller of this |
13742 | | ** function, not by this function. |
13743 | | */ |
13744 | 16.3k | if (rType == ssl_ct_application_data) { |
13745 | 0 | if (ss->firstHsDone) |
13746 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
13747 | 0 | if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && |
13748 | 0 | ss->sec.isServer && |
13749 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { |
13750 | 0 | return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, plaintext); |
13751 | 0 | } |
13752 | 0 | plaintext->len = 0; |
13753 | 0 | (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); |
13754 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA); |
13755 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13756 | 0 | } |
13757 | | |
13758 | 16.3k | rv = ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, rType, epoch, cText->seqNum, |
13759 | 16.3k | plaintext); |
13760 | | |
13761 | 16.3k | #ifdef DEBUG |
13762 | | /* In Debug builds free and zero gather plaintext buffer after its content |
13763 | | * has been used/copied for advanced ASAN coverage/utilization. |
13764 | | * This frees buffer for non application data records, for application data |
13765 | | * records it is freed in sslsecur.c/DoRecv(). */ |
13766 | 16.3k | sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->gs.buf); |
13767 | 16.3k | #endif |
13768 | | |
13769 | 16.3k | return rv; |
13770 | 16.3k | } |
13771 | | |
13772 | | /* |
13773 | | * Initialization functions |
13774 | | */ |
13775 | | |
13776 | | void |
13777 | | ssl_InitSecState(sslSecurityInfo *sec) |
13778 | 8.40k | { |
13779 | 8.40k | sec->authType = ssl_auth_null; |
13780 | 8.40k | sec->authKeyBits = 0; |
13781 | 8.40k | sec->signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; |
13782 | 8.40k | sec->keaType = ssl_kea_null; |
13783 | 8.40k | sec->keaKeyBits = 0; |
13784 | 8.40k | sec->keaGroup = NULL; |
13785 | 8.40k | } |
13786 | | |
13787 | | SECStatus |
13788 | | ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) |
13789 | 8.40k | { |
13790 | 8.40k | SECStatus rv; |
13791 | | |
13792 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; |
13793 | | |
13794 | 8.40k | ssl_InitSecState(&ss->sec); |
13795 | | |
13796 | 8.40k | ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); |
13797 | 8.40k | PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); |
13798 | 8.40k | rv = ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_read); |
13799 | 8.40k | rv |= ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_write); |
13800 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec = NULL; |
13801 | 8.40k | ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); |
13802 | 8.40k | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
13803 | | /* Rely on ssl_CreateNullCipherSpec() to set error code. */ |
13804 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13805 | 0 | } |
13806 | | |
13807 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; |
13808 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; |
13809 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : idle_handshake; |
13810 | | |
13811 | 8.40k | ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); |
13812 | 8.40k | PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); |
13813 | 8.40k | PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions); |
13814 | 8.40k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
13815 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0; |
13816 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0; |
13817 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer->timeout = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS; |
13818 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0; |
13819 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1; |
13820 | 8.40k | PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); |
13821 | 8.40k | dtls_SetMTU(ss, 0); /* Set the MTU to the highest plateau */ |
13822 | 8.40k | } |
13823 | | |
13824 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; |
13825 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = NULL; |
13826 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL; |
13827 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret = NULL; |
13828 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret = NULL; |
13829 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL; |
13830 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret = NULL; |
13831 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret = NULL; |
13832 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = NULL; |
13833 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchSize = 100; |
13834 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_FALSE; |
13835 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_FALSE; |
13836 | | |
13837 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL; |
13838 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; |
13839 | | |
13840 | 8.40k | PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space); |
13841 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL; |
13842 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0; |
13843 | | |
13844 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; |
13845 | 8.40k | PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket, 0, |
13846 | 8.40k | sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket)); |
13847 | | |
13848 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; |
13849 | 8.40k | return SECSuccess; |
13850 | 8.40k | } |
13851 | | |
13852 | | /* record the export policy for this cipher suite */ |
13853 | | SECStatus |
13854 | | ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy) |
13855 | 0 | { |
13856 | 0 | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; |
13857 | |
|
13858 | 0 | suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites); |
13859 | 0 | if (suite == NULL) { |
13860 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ |
13861 | 0 | } |
13862 | 0 | suite->policy = policy; |
13863 | |
|
13864 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
13865 | 0 | } |
13866 | | |
13867 | | SECStatus |
13868 | | ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy) |
13869 | 0 | { |
13870 | 0 | const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; |
13871 | 0 | PRInt32 policy; |
13872 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
13873 | |
|
13874 | 0 | suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); |
13875 | 0 | if (suite) { |
13876 | 0 | policy = suite->policy; |
13877 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
13878 | 0 | } else { |
13879 | 0 | policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; |
13880 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ |
13881 | 0 | } |
13882 | 0 | *oPolicy = policy; |
13883 | 0 | return rv; |
13884 | 0 | } |
13885 | | |
13886 | | /* record the user preference for this suite */ |
13887 | | SECStatus |
13888 | | ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) |
13889 | 0 | { |
13890 | 0 | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; |
13891 | |
|
13892 | 0 | suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites); |
13893 | 0 | if (suite == NULL) { |
13894 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ |
13895 | 0 | } |
13896 | 0 | suite->enabled = enabled; |
13897 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
13898 | 0 | } |
13899 | | |
13900 | | /* return the user preference for this suite */ |
13901 | | SECStatus |
13902 | | ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) |
13903 | 0 | { |
13904 | 0 | const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; |
13905 | 0 | PRBool pref; |
13906 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
13907 | |
|
13908 | 0 | suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); |
13909 | 0 | if (suite) { |
13910 | 0 | pref = suite->enabled; |
13911 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
13912 | 0 | } else { |
13913 | 0 | pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; |
13914 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ |
13915 | 0 | } |
13916 | 0 | *enabled = pref; |
13917 | 0 | return rv; |
13918 | 0 | } |
13919 | | |
13920 | | SECStatus |
13921 | | ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) |
13922 | 42.6k | { |
13923 | 42.6k | ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; |
13924 | | |
13925 | 42.6k | suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, ss->cipherSuites); |
13926 | 42.6k | if (suite == NULL) { |
13927 | 0 | return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ |
13928 | 0 | } |
13929 | 42.6k | suite->enabled = enabled; |
13930 | 42.6k | return SECSuccess; |
13931 | 42.6k | } |
13932 | | |
13933 | | SECStatus |
13934 | | ssl3_CipherPrefGet(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) |
13935 | 1.06k | { |
13936 | 1.06k | const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; |
13937 | 1.06k | PRBool pref; |
13938 | 1.06k | SECStatus rv; |
13939 | | |
13940 | 1.06k | suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites); |
13941 | 1.06k | if (suite) { |
13942 | 1.06k | pref = suite->enabled; |
13943 | 1.06k | rv = SECSuccess; |
13944 | 1.06k | } else { |
13945 | 0 | pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; |
13946 | 0 | rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ |
13947 | 0 | } |
13948 | 1.06k | *enabled = pref; |
13949 | 1.06k | return rv; |
13950 | 1.06k | } |
13951 | | |
13952 | | SECStatus |
13953 | | SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, |
13954 | | unsigned int count) |
13955 | 0 | { |
13956 | 0 | sslSocket *ss; |
13957 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
13958 | 0 | unsigned int supported = 0; |
13959 | |
|
13960 | 0 | ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
13961 | 0 | if (!ss) { |
13962 | 0 | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet", |
13963 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), fd)); |
13964 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
13965 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13966 | 0 | } |
13967 | | |
13968 | 0 | if (!count) { |
13969 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
13970 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13971 | 0 | } |
13972 | | |
13973 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { |
13974 | 0 | if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) { |
13975 | 0 | ++supported; |
13976 | 0 | } |
13977 | 0 | } |
13978 | | /* We don't check for duplicates, so it's possible to get too many. */ |
13979 | 0 | if (supported > MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES) { |
13980 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
13981 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13982 | 0 | } |
13983 | | |
13984 | 0 | ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = 0; |
13985 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { |
13986 | 0 | if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) { |
13987 | 0 | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid signature scheme %d ignored", |
13988 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), fd, schemes[i])); |
13989 | 0 | continue; |
13990 | 0 | } |
13991 | | |
13992 | 0 | ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount++] = schemes[i]; |
13993 | 0 | } |
13994 | |
|
13995 | 0 | if (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount == 0) { |
13996 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); |
13997 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
13998 | 0 | } |
13999 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
14000 | 0 | } |
14001 | | |
14002 | | SECStatus |
14003 | | SSL_SignaturePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, |
14004 | | unsigned int count) |
14005 | 0 | { |
14006 | 0 | SSLSignatureScheme schemes[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES]; |
14007 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
14008 | |
|
14009 | 0 | count = PR_MIN(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(schemes), count); |
14010 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { |
14011 | 0 | schemes[i] = (algorithms[i].hashAlg << 8) | algorithms[i].sigAlg; |
14012 | 0 | } |
14013 | 0 | return SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(fd, schemes, count); |
14014 | 0 | } |
14015 | | |
14016 | | SECStatus |
14017 | | SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, |
14018 | | unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount) |
14019 | 0 | { |
14020 | 0 | sslSocket *ss; |
14021 | |
|
14022 | 0 | ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
14023 | 0 | if (!ss) { |
14024 | 0 | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet", |
14025 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), fd)); |
14026 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
14027 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
14028 | 0 | } |
14029 | | |
14030 | 0 | if (!schemes || !count || |
14031 | 0 | maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { |
14032 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
14033 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
14034 | 0 | } |
14035 | | |
14036 | 0 | PORT_Memcpy(schemes, ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, |
14037 | 0 | ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureScheme)); |
14038 | 0 | *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; |
14039 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
14040 | 0 | } |
14041 | | |
14042 | | SECStatus |
14043 | | SSL_SignaturePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, |
14044 | | unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount) |
14045 | 0 | { |
14046 | 0 | sslSocket *ss; |
14047 | 0 | unsigned int i; |
14048 | |
|
14049 | 0 | ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); |
14050 | 0 | if (!ss) { |
14051 | 0 | SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignaturePrefGet", |
14052 | 0 | SSL_GETPID(), fd)); |
14053 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
14054 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
14055 | 0 | } |
14056 | | |
14057 | 0 | if (!algorithms || !count || |
14058 | 0 | maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { |
14059 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
14060 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
14061 | 0 | } |
14062 | | |
14063 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { |
14064 | 0 | algorithms[i].hashAlg = (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] >> 8) & 0xff; |
14065 | 0 | algorithms[i].sigAlg = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] & 0xff; |
14066 | 0 | } |
14067 | 0 | *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; |
14068 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
14069 | 0 | } |
14070 | | |
14071 | | unsigned int |
14072 | | SSL_SignatureMaxCount(void) |
14073 | 0 | { |
14074 | 0 | return MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES; |
14075 | 0 | } |
14076 | | |
14077 | | /* copy global default policy into socket. */ |
14078 | | void |
14079 | | ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss) |
14080 | 8.40k | { |
14081 | 8.40k | PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof(cipherSuites)); |
14082 | 8.40k | PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, defaultSignatureSchemes, |
14083 | 8.40k | sizeof(defaultSignatureSchemes)); |
14084 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes); |
14085 | 8.40k | } |
14086 | | |
14087 | | /* |
14088 | | ** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state, |
14089 | | ** then start a new handshake. |
14090 | | ** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a |
14091 | | ** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done. |
14092 | | ** |
14093 | | ** called from SSL_RedoHandshake(), which already holds the handshake locks. |
14094 | | */ |
14095 | | SECStatus |
14096 | | ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache) |
14097 | 0 | { |
14098 | 0 | sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; |
14099 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
14100 | |
|
14101 | 0 | PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); |
14102 | |
|
14103 | 0 | if (!ss->firstHsDone || (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) { |
14104 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); |
14105 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
14106 | 0 | } |
14107 | | |
14108 | 0 | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
14109 | 0 | dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); |
14110 | 0 | } |
14111 | |
|
14112 | 0 | if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER || |
14113 | 0 | ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { |
14114 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); |
14115 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
14116 | 0 | } |
14117 | 0 | if (ss->version > ss->vrange.max || ss->version < ss->vrange.min) { |
14118 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); |
14119 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
14120 | 0 | } |
14121 | | |
14122 | 0 | if (sid && flushCache) { |
14123 | 0 | ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */ |
14124 | 0 | ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */ |
14125 | 0 | ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; |
14126 | 0 | } |
14127 | |
|
14128 | 0 | ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ |
14129 | | |
14130 | | /* start off a new handshake. */ |
14131 | 0 | if (ss->sec.isServer) { |
14132 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss); |
14133 | 0 | } else { |
14134 | 0 | rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation); |
14135 | 0 | } |
14136 | |
|
14137 | 0 | ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ |
14138 | 0 | return rv; |
14139 | 0 | } |
14140 | | |
14141 | | /* Called from ssl_DestroySocketContents() in sslsock.c */ |
14142 | | void |
14143 | | ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss) |
14144 | 8.40k | { |
14145 | | |
14146 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) |
14147 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); |
14148 | | |
14149 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) |
14150 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); |
14151 | | |
14152 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes != NULL) { |
14153 | 0 | PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes); |
14154 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL; |
14155 | 0 | ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; |
14156 | 0 | } |
14157 | | |
14158 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena != NULL) |
14159 | 3 | ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); |
14160 | | |
14161 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { |
14162 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); |
14163 | 0 | ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; |
14164 | 0 | } |
14165 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.ca_list) { |
14166 | 0 | CERT_FreeDistNames(ss->ssl3.ca_list); |
14167 | 0 | } |
14168 | | |
14169 | | /* clean up handshake */ |
14170 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) { |
14171 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); |
14172 | 0 | } |
14173 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { |
14174 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); |
14175 | 0 | } |
14176 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) { |
14177 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, PR_TRUE); |
14178 | 0 | } |
14179 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake) { |
14180 | 0 | PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE); |
14181 | 0 | } |
14182 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf) { |
14183 | 6.10k | sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); |
14184 | 6.10k | } |
14185 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.buf) { |
14186 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); |
14187 | 0 | } |
14188 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer.buf) { |
14189 | 0 | sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer); |
14190 | 0 | } |
14191 | | |
14192 | | /* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */ |
14193 | 8.40k | PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf); |
14194 | | |
14195 | 8.40k | SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); |
14196 | 8.40k | SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName, PR_FALSE); |
14197 | 8.40k | SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE); |
14198 | | |
14199 | | /* Destroy the DTLS data */ |
14200 | 8.40k | if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { |
14201 | 8.40k | dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); |
14202 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf) { |
14203 | 177 | PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf); |
14204 | 177 | } |
14205 | 8.40k | } |
14206 | | |
14207 | | /* Destroy remote extensions */ |
14208 | 8.40k | ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); |
14209 | 8.40k | ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions); |
14210 | 8.40k | ssl3_DestroyExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); |
14211 | | |
14212 | | /* Destroy cipher specs */ |
14213 | 8.40k | ssl_DestroyCipherSpecs(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); |
14214 | | |
14215 | | /* Destroy TLS 1.3 keys */ |
14216 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) |
14217 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); |
14218 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret) |
14219 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret); |
14220 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret) |
14221 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); |
14222 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret) |
14223 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret); |
14224 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret) |
14225 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); |
14226 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret) |
14227 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); |
14228 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret) |
14229 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret); |
14230 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret) |
14231 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret); |
14232 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret) |
14233 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret); |
14234 | 8.40k | if (ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret) |
14235 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret); |
14236 | | |
14237 | 8.40k | ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; |
14238 | | /* Destroy TLS 1.3 buffered early data. */ |
14239 | 8.40k | tls13_DestroyEarlyData(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); |
14240 | | |
14241 | | /* Destroy TLS 1.3 PSKs. */ |
14242 | 8.40k | tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); |
14243 | | |
14244 | | /* TLS 1.3 ECH state. */ |
14245 | 8.40k | PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, PR_TRUE); |
14246 | 8.40k | PORT_Free((void *)ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName); /* CONST */ |
14247 | 8.40k | sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf); |
14248 | | |
14249 | | /* TLS 1.3 GREASE (client) state. */ |
14250 | 8.40k | tls13_ClientGreaseDestroy(ss); |
14251 | | |
14252 | | /* TLS ClientHello Extension Permutation state. */ |
14253 | 8.40k | tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationDestroy(ss); |
14254 | 8.40k | } |
14255 | | |
14256 | | /* check if the current cipher spec is FIPS. We only need to |
14257 | | * check the contexts here, if the kea, prf or keys were not FIPS, |
14258 | | * that status would have been rolled up in the create context |
14259 | | * call */ |
14260 | | static PRBool |
14261 | | ssl_cipherSpecIsFips(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) |
14262 | 0 | { |
14263 | 0 | if (!spec || !spec->cipherDef) { |
14264 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
14265 | 0 | } |
14266 | | |
14267 | 0 | if (spec->cipherDef->type != type_aead) { |
14268 | 0 | if (spec->keyMaterial.macContext == NULL) { |
14269 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
14270 | 0 | } |
14271 | 0 | if (!PK11_ContextGetFIPSStatus(spec->keyMaterial.macContext)) { |
14272 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
14273 | 0 | } |
14274 | 0 | } |
14275 | 0 | if (!spec->cipherContext) { |
14276 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
14277 | 0 | } |
14278 | 0 | return PK11_ContextGetFIPSStatus(spec->cipherContext); |
14279 | 0 | } |
14280 | | |
14281 | | /* return true if the current operation is running in FIPS mode */ |
14282 | | PRBool |
14283 | | ssl_isFIPS(sslSocket *ss) |
14284 | 0 | { |
14285 | 0 | if (!ssl_cipherSpecIsFips(ss->ssl3.crSpec)) { |
14286 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
14287 | 0 | } |
14288 | 0 | return ssl_cipherSpecIsFips(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); |
14289 | 0 | } |
14290 | | |
14291 | | /* |
14292 | | * parse the policy value for a single algorithm in a cipher_suite, |
14293 | | * return TRUE if we disallow by the cipher suite by policy |
14294 | | * (we don't have to parse any more algorithm policies on this cipher suite), |
14295 | | * otherwise return FALSE. |
14296 | | * 1. If we don't have the required policy, disable by default, disallow by |
14297 | | * policy and return TRUE (no more processing needed). |
14298 | | * 2. If we have the required policy, and we are disabled, return FALSE, |
14299 | | * (if we are disabled, we only need to parse policy, not default). |
14300 | | * 3. If we have the required policy, and we aren't adjusting the defaults |
14301 | | * return FALSE. (only parsing the policy, not default). |
14302 | | * 4. We have the required policy and we are adjusting the defaults. |
14303 | | * If we are setting default = FALSE, set isDisabled to true so that |
14304 | | * we don't try to re-enable the cipher suite based on a different |
14305 | | * algorithm. |
14306 | | */ |
14307 | | PRBool |
14308 | | ssl_HandlePolicy(int cipher_suite, SECOidTag policyOid, |
14309 | | PRUint32 requiredPolicy, PRBool *isDisabled) |
14310 | 0 | { |
14311 | 0 | PRUint32 policy; |
14312 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
14313 | | |
14314 | | /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */ |
14315 | 0 | rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy); |
14316 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
14317 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; /* no policy value, continue to the next algorithm */ |
14318 | 0 | } |
14319 | | /* first, are we allowed by policy, if not turn off allow and disable */ |
14320 | 0 | if (!(policy & requiredPolicy)) { |
14321 | 0 | ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); |
14322 | 0 | ssl_CipherPolicySet(cipher_suite, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); |
14323 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
14324 | 0 | } |
14325 | | /* If we are already disabled, or the policy isn't setting a default |
14326 | | * we are done processing this algorithm */ |
14327 | 0 | if (*isDisabled || (policy & NSS_USE_DEFAULT_NOT_VALID)) { |
14328 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
14329 | 0 | } |
14330 | | /* set the default value for the cipher suite. If we disable the cipher |
14331 | | * suite, remember that so we don't process the next default. This has |
14332 | | * the effect of disabling the whole cipher suite if any of the |
14333 | | * algorithms it uses are disabled by default. We still have to |
14334 | | * process the upper level because the cipher suite is still allowed |
14335 | | * by policy, and we may still have to disallow it based on other |
14336 | | * algorithms in the cipher suite. */ |
14337 | 0 | if (policy & NSS_USE_DEFAULT_SSL_ENABLE) { |
14338 | 0 | ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(cipher_suite, PR_TRUE); |
14339 | 0 | } else { |
14340 | 0 | *isDisabled = PR_TRUE; |
14341 | 0 | ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); |
14342 | 0 | } |
14343 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
14344 | 0 | } |
14345 | | |
14346 | 0 | #define MAP_NULL(x) (((x) != 0) ? (x) : SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER) |
14347 | | |
14348 | | SECStatus |
14349 | | ssl3_ApplyNSSPolicy(void) |
14350 | 1 | { |
14351 | 1 | unsigned i; |
14352 | 1 | SECStatus rv; |
14353 | 1 | PRUint32 policy = 0; |
14354 | | |
14355 | 1 | rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, &policy); |
14356 | 1 | if (rv != SECSuccess || !(policy & NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL)) { |
14357 | 1 | return SECSuccess; /* do nothing */ |
14358 | 1 | } |
14359 | | |
14360 | | /* disable every ciphersuite */ |
14361 | 0 | for (i = 1; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); ++i) { |
14362 | 0 | const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite = &cipher_suite_defs[i]; |
14363 | 0 | SECOidTag policyOid; |
14364 | 0 | PRBool isDisabled = PR_FALSE; |
14365 | | |
14366 | | /* if we haven't explicitly disabled it below enable by policy */ |
14367 | 0 | ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, SSL_ALLOWED); |
14368 | | |
14369 | | /* now check the various key exchange, ciphers and macs and |
14370 | | * if we ever disallow by policy, we are done, go to the next cipher |
14371 | | */ |
14372 | 0 | policyOid = MAP_NULL(kea_defs[suite->key_exchange_alg].oid); |
14373 | 0 | if (ssl_HandlePolicy(suite->cipher_suite, policyOid, |
14374 | 0 | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX, &isDisabled)) { |
14375 | 0 | continue; |
14376 | 0 | } |
14377 | | |
14378 | 0 | policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->oid); |
14379 | 0 | if (ssl_HandlePolicy(suite->cipher_suite, policyOid, |
14380 | 0 | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL, &isDisabled)) { |
14381 | 0 | continue; |
14382 | 0 | } |
14383 | | |
14384 | 0 | if (ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->type != type_aead) { |
14385 | 0 | policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(suite->mac_alg)->oid); |
14386 | 0 | if (ssl_HandlePolicy(suite->cipher_suite, policyOid, |
14387 | 0 | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL, &isDisabled)) { |
14388 | 0 | continue; |
14389 | 0 | } |
14390 | 0 | } |
14391 | 0 | } |
14392 | |
|
14393 | 0 | rv = ssl3_ConstrainRangeByPolicy(); |
14394 | |
|
14395 | 0 | return rv; |
14396 | 1 | } |
14397 | | |
14398 | | /* End of ssl3con.c */ |