/src/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7decode.c
Line | Count | Source (jump to first uncovered line) |
1 | | /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
2 | | * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
3 | | * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
4 | | |
5 | | /* |
6 | | * PKCS7 decoding, verification. |
7 | | */ |
8 | | |
9 | | #include "p7local.h" |
10 | | |
11 | | #include "cert.h" |
12 | | /* XXX do not want to have to include */ |
13 | | #include "certdb.h" /* certdb.h -- the trust stuff needed by */ |
14 | | /* the add certificate code needs to get */ |
15 | | /* rewritten/abstracted and then this */ |
16 | | /* include should be removed! */ |
17 | | /*#include "cdbhdl.h" */ |
18 | | #include "cryptohi.h" |
19 | | #include "keyhi.h" |
20 | | #include "secasn1.h" |
21 | | #include "secitem.h" |
22 | | #include "secoid.h" |
23 | | #include "pk11func.h" |
24 | | #include "prtime.h" |
25 | | #include "secerr.h" |
26 | | #include "sechash.h" /* for HASH_GetHashObject() */ |
27 | | #include "secder.h" |
28 | | #include "secpkcs5.h" |
29 | | |
30 | | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker { |
31 | | int depth; |
32 | | int digcnt; |
33 | | void **digcxs; |
34 | | const SECHashObject **digobjs; |
35 | | sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj; |
36 | | PRBool saw_contents; |
37 | | }; |
38 | | |
39 | | struct SEC_PKCS7DecoderContextStr { |
40 | | SEC_ASN1DecoderContext *dcx; |
41 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo; |
42 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb; |
43 | | void *cb_arg; |
44 | | SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn; |
45 | | void *pwfn_arg; |
46 | | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker worker; |
47 | | PLArenaPool *tmp_poolp; |
48 | | int error; |
49 | | SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback dkcb; |
50 | | void *dkcb_arg; |
51 | | SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb; |
52 | | }; |
53 | | |
54 | | /* |
55 | | * Handle one worker, decrypting and digesting the data as necessary. |
56 | | * |
57 | | * XXX If/when we support nested contents, this probably needs to be |
58 | | * revised somewhat to get passed the content-info (which unfortunately |
59 | | * can be two different types depending on whether it is encrypted or not) |
60 | | * corresponding to the given worker. |
61 | | */ |
62 | | static void |
63 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
64 | | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker, |
65 | | const unsigned char *data, unsigned long len, |
66 | | PRBool final) |
67 | 0 | { |
68 | 0 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
69 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
70 | 0 | int i; |
71 | | |
72 | | /* |
73 | | * We should really have data to process, or we should be trying |
74 | | * to finish/flush the last block. (This is an overly paranoid |
75 | | * check since all callers are in this file and simple inspection |
76 | | * proves they do it right. But it could find a bug in future |
77 | | * modifications/development, that is why it is here.) |
78 | | */ |
79 | 0 | PORT_Assert((data != NULL && len) || final); |
80 | | |
81 | | /* |
82 | | * Decrypt this chunk. |
83 | | * |
84 | | * XXX If we get an error, we do not want to do the digest or callback, |
85 | | * but we want to keep decoding. Or maybe we want to stop decoding |
86 | | * altogether if there is a callback, because obviously we are not |
87 | | * sending the data back and they want to know that. |
88 | | */ |
89 | 0 | if (worker->decryptobj != NULL) { |
90 | | /* XXX the following lengths should all be longs? */ |
91 | 0 | unsigned int inlen; /* length of data being decrypted */ |
92 | 0 | unsigned int outlen; /* length of decrypted data */ |
93 | 0 | unsigned int buflen; /* length available for decrypted data */ |
94 | 0 | SECItem *plain; |
95 | |
|
96 | 0 | inlen = len; |
97 | 0 | buflen = sec_PKCS7DecryptLength(worker->decryptobj, inlen, final); |
98 | 0 | if (buflen == 0) { |
99 | 0 | if (inlen == 0) /* no input and no output */ |
100 | 0 | return; |
101 | | /* |
102 | | * No output is expected, but the input data may be buffered |
103 | | * so we still have to call Decrypt. |
104 | | */ |
105 | 0 | rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt(worker->decryptobj, NULL, NULL, 0, |
106 | 0 | data, inlen, final); |
107 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
108 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
109 | 0 | return; /* XXX indicate error? */ |
110 | 0 | } |
111 | 0 | return; |
112 | 0 | } |
113 | | |
114 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) { |
115 | 0 | buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(buflen); |
116 | 0 | plain = NULL; |
117 | 0 | } else { |
118 | 0 | unsigned long oldlen; |
119 | | |
120 | | /* |
121 | | * XXX This assumes one level of content only. |
122 | | * See comment above about nested content types. |
123 | | * XXX Also, it should work for signedAndEnvelopedData, too! |
124 | | */ |
125 | 0 | plain = &(p7dcx->cinfo->content.envelopedData->encContentInfo.plainContent); |
126 | |
|
127 | 0 | oldlen = plain->len; |
128 | 0 | if (oldlen == 0) { |
129 | 0 | buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7dcx->cinfo->poolp, |
130 | 0 | buflen); |
131 | 0 | } else { |
132 | 0 | buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaGrow(p7dcx->cinfo->poolp, |
133 | 0 | plain->data, |
134 | 0 | oldlen, oldlen + buflen); |
135 | 0 | if (buf != NULL) |
136 | 0 | buf += oldlen; |
137 | 0 | } |
138 | 0 | plain->data = buf; |
139 | 0 | } |
140 | 0 | if (buf == NULL) { |
141 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; |
142 | 0 | return; /* XXX indicate error? */ |
143 | 0 | } |
144 | 0 | rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt(worker->decryptobj, buf, &outlen, buflen, |
145 | 0 | data, inlen, final); |
146 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
147 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
148 | 0 | return; /* XXX indicate error? */ |
149 | 0 | } |
150 | 0 | if (plain != NULL) { |
151 | 0 | PORT_Assert(final || outlen == buflen); |
152 | 0 | plain->len += outlen; |
153 | 0 | } |
154 | 0 | data = buf; |
155 | 0 | len = outlen; |
156 | 0 | } |
157 | | |
158 | | /* |
159 | | * Update the running digests. |
160 | | */ |
161 | 0 | if (len) { |
162 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++) { |
163 | 0 | (*worker->digobjs[i]->update)(worker->digcxs[i], data, len); |
164 | 0 | } |
165 | 0 | } |
166 | | |
167 | | /* |
168 | | * Pass back the contents bytes, and free the temporary buffer. |
169 | | */ |
170 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) { |
171 | 0 | if (len) |
172 | 0 | (*p7dcx->cb)(p7dcx->cb_arg, (const char *)data, len); |
173 | 0 | if (worker->decryptobj != NULL) { |
174 | 0 | PORT_Assert(buf != NULL); |
175 | 0 | PORT_Free(buf); |
176 | 0 | } |
177 | 0 | } |
178 | 0 | } |
179 | | |
180 | | static void |
181 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter(void *arg, const char *data, unsigned long len, |
182 | | int depth, SEC_ASN1EncodingPart data_kind) |
183 | 0 | { |
184 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx; |
185 | 0 | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker; |
186 | | |
187 | | /* |
188 | | * Since we do not handle any nested contents, the only bytes we |
189 | | * are really interested in are the actual contents bytes (not |
190 | | * the identifier, length, or end-of-contents bytes). If we were |
191 | | * handling nested types we would probably need to do something |
192 | | * smarter based on depth and data_kind. |
193 | | */ |
194 | 0 | if (data_kind != SEC_ASN1_Contents) |
195 | 0 | return; |
196 | | |
197 | | /* |
198 | | * The ASN.1 decoder should not even call us with a length of 0. |
199 | | * Just being paranoid. |
200 | | */ |
201 | 0 | PORT_Assert(len); |
202 | 0 | if (len == 0) |
203 | 0 | return; |
204 | | |
205 | 0 | p7dcx = (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *)arg; |
206 | | |
207 | | /* |
208 | | * Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain |
209 | | * of workers -- one per each level of content. The following |
210 | | * would start with the first worker and loop over them. |
211 | | */ |
212 | 0 | worker = &(p7dcx->worker); |
213 | |
|
214 | 0 | worker->saw_contents = PR_TRUE; |
215 | |
|
216 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data(p7dcx, worker, |
217 | 0 | (const unsigned char *)data, len, PR_FALSE); |
218 | 0 | } |
219 | | |
220 | | /* |
221 | | * Create digest contexts for each algorithm in "digestalgs". |
222 | | * No algorithms is not an error, we just do not do anything. |
223 | | * An error (like trouble allocating memory), marks the error |
224 | | * in "p7dcx" and returns SECFailure, which means that our caller |
225 | | * should just give up altogether. |
226 | | */ |
227 | | static SECStatus |
228 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int depth, |
229 | | SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs) |
230 | 0 | { |
231 | 0 | int i, digcnt; |
232 | |
|
233 | 0 | if (digestalgs == NULL) |
234 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
235 | | |
236 | | /* |
237 | | * Count the algorithms. |
238 | | */ |
239 | 0 | digcnt = 0; |
240 | 0 | while (digestalgs[digcnt] != NULL) |
241 | 0 | digcnt++; |
242 | | |
243 | | /* |
244 | | * No algorithms means no work to do. |
245 | | * Just act as if there were no algorithms specified. |
246 | | */ |
247 | 0 | if (digcnt == 0) |
248 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
249 | | |
250 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcxs = (void **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, |
251 | 0 | digcnt * sizeof(void *)); |
252 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digobjs = (const SECHashObject **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, |
253 | 0 | digcnt * sizeof(SECHashObject *)); |
254 | 0 | if (p7dcx->worker.digcxs == NULL || p7dcx->worker.digobjs == NULL) { |
255 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; |
256 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
257 | 0 | } |
258 | | |
259 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.depth = depth; |
260 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcnt = 0; |
261 | | |
262 | | /* |
263 | | * Create a digest context for each algorithm. |
264 | | */ |
265 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < digcnt; i++) { |
266 | 0 | SECAlgorithmID *algid = digestalgs[i]; |
267 | 0 | SECOidTag oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(algid->algorithm)); |
268 | 0 | const SECHashObject *digobj = HASH_GetHashObjectByOidTag(oidTag); |
269 | 0 | void *digcx; |
270 | | |
271 | | /* |
272 | | * Skip any algorithm we do not even recognize; obviously, |
273 | | * this could be a problem, but if it is critical then the |
274 | | * result will just be that the signature does not verify. |
275 | | * We do not necessarily want to error out here, because |
276 | | * the particular algorithm may not actually be important, |
277 | | * but we cannot know that until later. |
278 | | */ |
279 | 0 | if (digobj == NULL) { |
280 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcnt--; |
281 | 0 | continue; |
282 | 0 | } |
283 | | |
284 | 0 | digcx = (*digobj->create)(); |
285 | 0 | if (digcx != NULL) { |
286 | 0 | (*digobj->begin)(digcx); |
287 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digobjs[p7dcx->worker.digcnt] = digobj; |
288 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcxs[p7dcx->worker.digcnt] = digcx; |
289 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.digcnt++; |
290 | 0 | } |
291 | 0 | } |
292 | |
|
293 | 0 | if (p7dcx->worker.digcnt != 0) |
294 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx, |
295 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter, |
296 | 0 | p7dcx, |
297 | 0 | (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL)); |
298 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
299 | 0 | } |
300 | | |
301 | | /* |
302 | | * Close out all of the digest contexts, storing the results in "digestsp". |
303 | | */ |
304 | | static SECStatus |
305 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
306 | | PLArenaPool *poolp, |
307 | | SECItem ***digestsp) |
308 | 0 | { |
309 | 0 | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker; |
310 | 0 | const SECHashObject *digobj; |
311 | 0 | void *digcx; |
312 | 0 | SECItem **digests, *digest; |
313 | 0 | int i; |
314 | 0 | void *mark; |
315 | | |
316 | | /* |
317 | | * XXX Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain |
318 | | * of workers -- one per each level of content. The following |
319 | | * would want to find the last worker in the chain. |
320 | | */ |
321 | 0 | worker = &(p7dcx->worker); |
322 | | |
323 | | /* |
324 | | * If no digests, then we have nothing to do. |
325 | | */ |
326 | 0 | if (worker->digcnt == 0) |
327 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
328 | | |
329 | | /* |
330 | | * No matter what happens after this, we want to stop filtering. |
331 | | * XXX If we handle nested contents, we only want to stop filtering |
332 | | * if we are finishing off the *last* worker. |
333 | | */ |
334 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
335 | | |
336 | | /* |
337 | | * If we ended up with no contents, just destroy each |
338 | | * digest context -- they are meaningless and potentially |
339 | | * confusing, because their presence would imply some content |
340 | | * was digested. |
341 | | */ |
342 | 0 | if (!worker->saw_contents) { |
343 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++) { |
344 | 0 | digcx = worker->digcxs[i]; |
345 | 0 | digobj = worker->digobjs[i]; |
346 | 0 | (*digobj->destroy)(digcx, PR_TRUE); |
347 | 0 | } |
348 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
349 | 0 | } |
350 | | |
351 | 0 | mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp); |
352 | | |
353 | | /* |
354 | | * Close out each digest context, saving digest away. |
355 | | */ |
356 | 0 | digests = |
357 | 0 | (SECItem **)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, (worker->digcnt + 1) * sizeof(SECItem *)); |
358 | 0 | digest = (SECItem *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, worker->digcnt * sizeof(SECItem)); |
359 | 0 | if (digests == NULL || digest == NULL) { |
360 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
361 | 0 | PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark); |
362 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
363 | 0 | } |
364 | | |
365 | 0 | for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++, digest++) { |
366 | 0 | digcx = worker->digcxs[i]; |
367 | 0 | digobj = worker->digobjs[i]; |
368 | |
|
369 | 0 | digest->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, digobj->length); |
370 | 0 | if (digest->data == NULL) { |
371 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
372 | 0 | PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark); |
373 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
374 | 0 | } |
375 | | |
376 | 0 | digest->len = digobj->length; |
377 | 0 | (*digobj->end)(digcx, digest->data, &(digest->len), digest->len); |
378 | 0 | (*digobj->destroy)(digcx, PR_TRUE); |
379 | |
|
380 | 0 | digests[i] = digest; |
381 | 0 | } |
382 | 0 | digests[i] = NULL; |
383 | 0 | *digestsp = digests; |
384 | |
|
385 | 0 | PORT_ArenaUnmark(poolp, mark); |
386 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
387 | 0 | } |
388 | | |
389 | | /* |
390 | | * XXX Need comment explaining following helper function (which is used |
391 | | * by sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt). |
392 | | */ |
393 | | |
394 | | static PK11SymKey * |
395 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_get_recipient_key(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
396 | | SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos, |
397 | | SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo) |
398 | 0 | { |
399 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *ri; |
400 | 0 | CERTCertificate *cert = NULL; |
401 | 0 | SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey = NULL; |
402 | 0 | PK11SymKey *bulkkey = NULL; |
403 | 0 | SECOidTag keyalgtag, bulkalgtag, encalgtag; |
404 | 0 | PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; |
405 | |
|
406 | 0 | if (recipientinfos == NULL || recipientinfos[0] == NULL) { |
407 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT; |
408 | 0 | goto no_key_found; |
409 | 0 | } |
410 | | |
411 | 0 | cert = PK11_FindCertAndKeyByRecipientList(&slot, recipientinfos, &ri, |
412 | 0 | &privkey, p7dcx->pwfn_arg); |
413 | 0 | if (cert == NULL) { |
414 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT; |
415 | 0 | goto no_key_found; |
416 | 0 | } |
417 | | |
418 | 0 | ri->cert = cert; /* so we can find it later */ |
419 | 0 | PORT_Assert(privkey != NULL); |
420 | |
|
421 | 0 | keyalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm)); |
422 | 0 | encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(ri->keyEncAlg)); |
423 | 0 | if (keyalgtag != encalgtag) { |
424 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_KEYALG_MISMATCH; |
425 | 0 | goto no_key_found; |
426 | 0 | } |
427 | 0 | bulkalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg)); |
428 | |
|
429 | 0 | switch (encalgtag) { |
430 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
431 | 0 | bulkkey = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(privkey, &ri->encKey, |
432 | 0 | PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(bulkalgtag), |
433 | 0 | CKA_DECRYPT, 0); |
434 | 0 | if (bulkkey == NULL) { |
435 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
436 | 0 | PORT_SetError(0); |
437 | 0 | goto no_key_found; |
438 | 0 | } |
439 | 0 | break; |
440 | 0 | default: |
441 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG; |
442 | 0 | break; |
443 | 0 | } |
444 | | |
445 | 0 | no_key_found: |
446 | 0 | if (privkey != NULL) |
447 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey); |
448 | 0 | if (slot != NULL) |
449 | 0 | PK11_FreeSlot(slot); |
450 | |
|
451 | 0 | return bulkkey; |
452 | 0 | } |
453 | | |
454 | | /* |
455 | | * XXX The following comment is old -- the function used to only handle |
456 | | * EnvelopedData or SignedAndEnvelopedData but now handles EncryptedData |
457 | | * as well (and it had all of the code of the helper function above |
458 | | * built into it), though the comment was left as is. Fix it... |
459 | | * |
460 | | * We are just about to decode the content of an EnvelopedData. |
461 | | * Set up a decryption context so we can decrypt as we go. |
462 | | * Presumably we are one of the recipients listed in "recipientinfos". |
463 | | * (XXX And if we are not, or if we have trouble, what should we do? |
464 | | * It would be nice to let the decoding still work. Maybe it should |
465 | | * be an error if there is a content callback, but not an error otherwise?) |
466 | | * The encryption key and related information can be found in "enccinfo". |
467 | | */ |
468 | | static SECStatus |
469 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int depth, |
470 | | SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos, |
471 | | SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo, |
472 | | PK11SymKey **copy_key_for_signature) |
473 | 0 | { |
474 | 0 | PK11SymKey *bulkkey = NULL; |
475 | 0 | sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj; |
476 | | |
477 | | /* |
478 | | * If a callback is supplied to retrieve the encryption key, |
479 | | * for instance, for Encrypted Content infos, then retrieve |
480 | | * the bulkkey from the callback. Otherwise, assume that |
481 | | * we are processing Enveloped or SignedAndEnveloped data |
482 | | * content infos. |
483 | | * |
484 | | * XXX Put an assert here? |
485 | | */ |
486 | 0 | if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(p7dcx->cinfo) == SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA) { |
487 | 0 | if (p7dcx->dkcb != NULL) { |
488 | 0 | bulkkey = (*p7dcx->dkcb)(p7dcx->dkcb_arg, |
489 | 0 | &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg)); |
490 | 0 | } |
491 | 0 | enccinfo->keysize = 0; |
492 | 0 | } else { |
493 | 0 | bulkkey = sec_pkcs7_decoder_get_recipient_key(p7dcx, recipientinfos, |
494 | 0 | enccinfo); |
495 | 0 | if (bulkkey == NULL) |
496 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
497 | 0 | enccinfo->keysize = PK11_GetKeyStrength(bulkkey, |
498 | 0 | &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg)); |
499 | 0 | } |
500 | | |
501 | | /* |
502 | | * XXX I think following should set error in p7dcx and clear set error |
503 | | * (as used to be done here, or as is done in get_receipient_key above. |
504 | | */ |
505 | 0 | if (bulkkey == NULL) { |
506 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
507 | 0 | } |
508 | | |
509 | | /* |
510 | | * We want to make sure decryption is allowed. This is done via |
511 | | * a callback specified in SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(). |
512 | | */ |
513 | 0 | if (p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb) { |
514 | 0 | if ((*p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb)(&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg), |
515 | 0 | bulkkey) == PR_FALSE) { |
516 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_DECRYPTION_DISALLOWED; |
517 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
518 | 0 | } |
519 | 0 | } else { |
520 | 0 | p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_DECRYPTION_DISALLOWED; |
521 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
522 | 0 | } |
523 | | |
524 | | /* |
525 | | * When decrypting a signedAndEnvelopedData, the signature also has |
526 | | * to be decrypted with the bulk encryption key; to avoid having to |
527 | | * get it all over again later (and do another potentially expensive |
528 | | * RSA operation), copy it for later signature verification to use. |
529 | | */ |
530 | 0 | if (copy_key_for_signature != NULL) |
531 | 0 | *copy_key_for_signature = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(bulkkey); |
532 | | |
533 | | /* |
534 | | * Now we have the bulk encryption key (in bulkkey) and the |
535 | | * the algorithm (in enccinfo->contentEncAlg). Using those, |
536 | | * create a decryption context. |
537 | | */ |
538 | 0 | decryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject(bulkkey, |
539 | 0 | &(enccinfo->contentEncAlg)); |
540 | | |
541 | | /* |
542 | | * We are done with (this) bulkkey now. |
543 | | */ |
544 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(bulkkey); |
545 | 0 | bulkkey = NULL; |
546 | |
|
547 | 0 | if (decryptobj == NULL) { |
548 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
549 | 0 | PORT_SetError(0); |
550 | 0 | goto no_decryption; |
551 | 0 | } |
552 | | |
553 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx, |
554 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter, |
555 | 0 | p7dcx, |
556 | 0 | (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL)); |
557 | |
|
558 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.depth = depth; |
559 | 0 | p7dcx->worker.decryptobj = decryptobj; |
560 | |
|
561 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
562 | | |
563 | 0 | no_decryption: |
564 | 0 | PK11_FreeSymKey(bulkkey); |
565 | | /* |
566 | | * For some reason (error set already, if appropriate), we cannot |
567 | | * decrypt the content. I am not sure what exactly is the right |
568 | | * thing to do here; in some cases we want to just stop, and in |
569 | | * others we want to let the decoding finish even though we cannot |
570 | | * decrypt the content. My current thinking is that if the caller |
571 | | * set up a content callback, then they are really interested in |
572 | | * getting (decrypted) content, and if they cannot they will want |
573 | | * to know about it. However, if no callback was specified, then |
574 | | * maybe it is not important that the decryption failed. |
575 | | */ |
576 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) |
577 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
578 | 0 | else |
579 | 0 | return SECSuccess; /* Let the decoding continue. */ |
580 | 0 | } |
581 | | |
582 | | static SECStatus |
583 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
584 | | PLArenaPool *poolp, |
585 | | SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo) |
586 | 0 | { |
587 | 0 | struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker; |
588 | | |
589 | | /* |
590 | | * XXX Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain |
591 | | * of workers -- one per each level of content. The following |
592 | | * would want to find the last worker in the chain. |
593 | | */ |
594 | 0 | worker = &(p7dcx->worker); |
595 | | |
596 | | /* |
597 | | * If no decryption context, then we have nothing to do. |
598 | | */ |
599 | 0 | if (worker->decryptobj == NULL) |
600 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
601 | | |
602 | | /* |
603 | | * No matter what happens after this, we want to stop filtering. |
604 | | * XXX If we handle nested contents, we only want to stop filtering |
605 | | * if we are finishing off the *last* worker. |
606 | | */ |
607 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
608 | | |
609 | | /* |
610 | | * Handle the last block. |
611 | | */ |
612 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data(p7dcx, worker, NULL, 0, PR_TRUE); |
613 | | |
614 | | /* |
615 | | * All done, destroy it. |
616 | | */ |
617 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(worker->decryptobj); |
618 | 0 | worker->decryptobj = NULL; |
619 | |
|
620 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
621 | 0 | } |
622 | | |
623 | | static void |
624 | | sec_pkcs7_decoder_notify(void *arg, PRBool before, void *dest, int depth) |
625 | 0 | { |
626 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx; |
627 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo; |
628 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sigd; |
629 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envd; |
630 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saed; |
631 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encd; |
632 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DigestedData *digd; |
633 | 0 | PRBool after; |
634 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
635 | | |
636 | | /* |
637 | | * Just to make the code easier to read, create an "after" variable |
638 | | * that is equivalent to "not before". |
639 | | * (This used to be just the statement "after = !before", but that |
640 | | * causes a warning on the mac; to avoid that, we do it the long way.) |
641 | | */ |
642 | 0 | if (before) |
643 | 0 | after = PR_FALSE; |
644 | 0 | else |
645 | 0 | after = PR_TRUE; |
646 | |
|
647 | 0 | p7dcx = (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *)arg; |
648 | 0 | if (!p7dcx) { |
649 | 0 | return; |
650 | 0 | } |
651 | | |
652 | 0 | cinfo = p7dcx->cinfo; |
653 | |
|
654 | 0 | if (!cinfo) { |
655 | 0 | return; |
656 | 0 | } |
657 | | |
658 | 0 | if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == NULL) { |
659 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(cinfo->contentType)) |
660 | 0 | cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOID(&(cinfo->contentType)); |
661 | 0 | return; |
662 | 0 | } |
663 | | |
664 | 0 | switch (cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset) { |
665 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: |
666 | 0 | sigd = cinfo->content.signedData; |
667 | 0 | if (sigd == NULL) |
668 | 0 | break; |
669 | | |
670 | 0 | if (sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) { |
671 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.contentType)) |
672 | 0 | sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag = |
673 | 0 | SECOID_FindOID(&(sigd->contentInfo.contentType)); |
674 | 0 | break; |
675 | 0 | } |
676 | | |
677 | | /* |
678 | | * We only set up a filtering digest if the content is |
679 | | * plain DATA; anything else needs more work because a |
680 | | * second pass is required to produce a DER encoding from |
681 | | * an input that can be BER encoded. (This is a requirement |
682 | | * of PKCS7 that is unfortunate, but there you have it.) |
683 | | * |
684 | | * XXX Also, since we stop here if this is not DATA, the |
685 | | * inner content is not getting processed at all. Someday |
686 | | * we may want to fix that. |
687 | | */ |
688 | 0 | if (sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag->offset != SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA) { |
689 | | /* XXX Set an error in p7dcx->error */ |
690 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
691 | 0 | break; |
692 | 0 | } |
693 | | |
694 | | /* |
695 | | * Just before the content, we want to set up a digest context |
696 | | * for each digest algorithm listed, and start a filter which |
697 | | * will run all of the contents bytes through that digest. |
698 | | */ |
699 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content)) { |
700 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests(p7dcx, depth, |
701 | 0 | sigd->digestAlgorithms); |
702 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
703 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
704 | |
|
705 | 0 | break; |
706 | 0 | } |
707 | | |
708 | | /* |
709 | | * XXX To handle nested types, here is where we would want |
710 | | * to check for inner boundaries that need handling. |
711 | | */ |
712 | | |
713 | | /* |
714 | | * Are we done? |
715 | | */ |
716 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content)) { |
717 | | /* |
718 | | * Close out the digest contexts. We ignore any error |
719 | | * because we are stopping anyway; the error status left |
720 | | * behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions. |
721 | | */ |
722 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
723 | 0 | &(sigd->digests)); |
724 | | |
725 | | /* |
726 | | * XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove |
727 | | * the worker from the chain (and free it). |
728 | | */ |
729 | | |
730 | | /* |
731 | | * Stop notify. |
732 | | */ |
733 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
734 | 0 | } |
735 | 0 | break; |
736 | | |
737 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
738 | 0 | envd = cinfo->content.envelopedData; |
739 | 0 | if (envd == NULL) |
740 | 0 | break; |
741 | | |
742 | 0 | if (envd->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) { |
743 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.contentType)) |
744 | 0 | envd->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag = |
745 | 0 | SECOID_FindOID(&(envd->encContentInfo.contentType)); |
746 | 0 | break; |
747 | 0 | } |
748 | | |
749 | | /* |
750 | | * Just before the content, we want to set up a decryption |
751 | | * context, and start a filter which will run all of the |
752 | | * contents bytes through it to determine the plain content. |
753 | | */ |
754 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
755 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(p7dcx, depth, |
756 | 0 | envd->recipientInfos, |
757 | 0 | &(envd->encContentInfo), |
758 | 0 | NULL); |
759 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
760 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
761 | |
|
762 | 0 | break; |
763 | 0 | } |
764 | | |
765 | | /* |
766 | | * Are we done? |
767 | | */ |
768 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
769 | | /* |
770 | | * Close out the decryption context. We ignore any error |
771 | | * because we are stopping anyway; the error status left |
772 | | * behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions. |
773 | | */ |
774 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
775 | 0 | &(envd->encContentInfo)); |
776 | | |
777 | | /* |
778 | | * XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove |
779 | | * the worker from the chain (and free it). |
780 | | */ |
781 | | |
782 | | /* |
783 | | * Stop notify. |
784 | | */ |
785 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
786 | 0 | } |
787 | 0 | break; |
788 | | |
789 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
790 | 0 | saed = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData; |
791 | 0 | if (saed == NULL) |
792 | 0 | break; |
793 | | |
794 | 0 | if (saed->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) { |
795 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.contentType)) |
796 | 0 | saed->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag = |
797 | 0 | SECOID_FindOID(&(saed->encContentInfo.contentType)); |
798 | 0 | break; |
799 | 0 | } |
800 | | |
801 | | /* |
802 | | * Just before the content, we want to set up a decryption |
803 | | * context *and* digest contexts, and start a filter which |
804 | | * will run all of the contents bytes through both. |
805 | | */ |
806 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
807 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(p7dcx, depth, |
808 | 0 | saed->recipientInfos, |
809 | 0 | &(saed->encContentInfo), |
810 | 0 | &(saed->sigKey)); |
811 | 0 | if (rv == SECSuccess) |
812 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests(p7dcx, depth, |
813 | 0 | saed->digestAlgorithms); |
814 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
815 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
816 | |
|
817 | 0 | break; |
818 | 0 | } |
819 | | |
820 | | /* |
821 | | * Are we done? |
822 | | */ |
823 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
824 | | /* |
825 | | * Close out the decryption and digests contexts. |
826 | | * We ignore any errors because we are stopping anyway; |
827 | | * the error status left behind in p7dcx will be seen by |
828 | | * outer functions. |
829 | | * |
830 | | * Note that the decrypt stuff must be called first; |
831 | | * it may have a last buffer to do which in turn has |
832 | | * to be added to the digest. |
833 | | */ |
834 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
835 | 0 | &(saed->encContentInfo)); |
836 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
837 | 0 | &(saed->digests)); |
838 | | |
839 | | /* |
840 | | * XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove |
841 | | * the worker from the chain (and free it). |
842 | | */ |
843 | | |
844 | | /* |
845 | | * Stop notify. |
846 | | */ |
847 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
848 | 0 | } |
849 | 0 | break; |
850 | | |
851 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
852 | 0 | digd = cinfo->content.digestedData; |
853 | 0 | if (digd == NULL) |
854 | 0 | break; |
855 | | |
856 | | /* |
857 | | * XXX Want to do the digest or not? Maybe future enhancement... |
858 | | */ |
859 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content.data)) { |
860 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx, sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter, |
861 | 0 | p7dcx, |
862 | 0 | (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL)); |
863 | 0 | break; |
864 | 0 | } |
865 | | |
866 | | /* |
867 | | * Are we done? |
868 | | */ |
869 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content.data)) { |
870 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
871 | 0 | } |
872 | 0 | break; |
873 | | |
874 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
875 | 0 | encd = cinfo->content.encryptedData; |
876 | |
|
877 | 0 | if (!encd) { |
878 | 0 | break; |
879 | 0 | } |
880 | | |
881 | | /* |
882 | | * XXX If the decryption key callback is set, we want to start |
883 | | * the decryption. If the callback is not set, we will treat the |
884 | | * content as plain data, since we do not have the key. |
885 | | * |
886 | | * Is this the proper thing to do? |
887 | | */ |
888 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
889 | | /* |
890 | | * Start the encryption process if the decryption key callback |
891 | | * is present. Otherwise, treat the content like plain data. |
892 | | */ |
893 | 0 | rv = SECSuccess; |
894 | 0 | if (p7dcx->dkcb != NULL) { |
895 | 0 | rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt(p7dcx, depth, NULL, |
896 | 0 | &(encd->encContentInfo), |
897 | 0 | NULL); |
898 | 0 | } |
899 | |
|
900 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
901 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
902 | |
|
903 | 0 | break; |
904 | 0 | } |
905 | | |
906 | | /* |
907 | | * Are we done? |
908 | | */ |
909 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent)) { |
910 | | /* |
911 | | * Close out the decryption context. We ignore any error |
912 | | * because we are stopping anyway; the error status left |
913 | | * behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions. |
914 | | */ |
915 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt(p7dcx, cinfo->poolp, |
916 | 0 | &(encd->encContentInfo)); |
917 | | |
918 | | /* |
919 | | * Stop notify. |
920 | | */ |
921 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
922 | 0 | } |
923 | 0 | break; |
924 | | |
925 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
926 | | /* |
927 | | * If a output callback has been specified, we want to set the filter |
928 | | * to call the callback. This is taken care of in |
929 | | * sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt() or |
930 | | * sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests() for the other content types. |
931 | | */ |
932 | |
|
933 | 0 | if (before && dest == &(cinfo->content.data)) { |
934 | | |
935 | | /* |
936 | | * Set the filter proc up. |
937 | | */ |
938 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx, |
939 | 0 | sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter, |
940 | 0 | p7dcx, |
941 | 0 | (PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL)); |
942 | 0 | break; |
943 | 0 | } |
944 | | |
945 | 0 | if (after && dest == &(cinfo->content.data)) { |
946 | | /* |
947 | | * Time to clean up after ourself, stop the Notify and Filter |
948 | | * procedures. |
949 | | */ |
950 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
951 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
952 | 0 | } |
953 | 0 | break; |
954 | | |
955 | 0 | default: |
956 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc(p7dcx->dcx); |
957 | 0 | break; |
958 | 0 | } |
959 | 0 | } |
960 | | |
961 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext * |
962 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb, void *cb_arg, |
963 | | SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg, |
964 | | SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb, |
965 | | void *decrypt_key_cb_arg, |
966 | | SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb) |
967 | 0 | { |
968 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx; |
969 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderContext *dcx; |
970 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo; |
971 | 0 | PLArenaPool *poolp; |
972 | |
|
973 | 0 | poolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); /* XXX what is right value? */ |
974 | 0 | if (poolp == NULL) |
975 | 0 | return NULL; |
976 | | |
977 | 0 | cinfo = (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(*cinfo)); |
978 | 0 | if (cinfo == NULL) { |
979 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE); |
980 | 0 | return NULL; |
981 | 0 | } |
982 | | |
983 | 0 | cinfo->poolp = poolp; |
984 | 0 | cinfo->pwfn = pwfn; |
985 | 0 | cinfo->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg; |
986 | 0 | cinfo->created = PR_FALSE; |
987 | 0 | cinfo->refCount = 1; |
988 | |
|
989 | 0 | p7dcx = |
990 | 0 | (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *)PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext)); |
991 | 0 | if (p7dcx == NULL) { |
992 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE); |
993 | 0 | return NULL; |
994 | 0 | } |
995 | | |
996 | 0 | p7dcx->tmp_poolp = PORT_NewArena(1024); /* XXX what is right value? */ |
997 | 0 | if (p7dcx->tmp_poolp == NULL) { |
998 | 0 | PORT_Free(p7dcx); |
999 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE); |
1000 | 0 | return NULL; |
1001 | 0 | } |
1002 | | |
1003 | 0 | dcx = SEC_ASN1DecoderStart(poolp, cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate); |
1004 | 0 | if (dcx == NULL) { |
1005 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, PR_FALSE); |
1006 | 0 | PORT_Free(p7dcx); |
1007 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_FALSE); |
1008 | 0 | return NULL; |
1009 | 0 | } |
1010 | | |
1011 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderSetNotifyProc(dcx, sec_pkcs7_decoder_notify, p7dcx); |
1012 | |
|
1013 | 0 | p7dcx->dcx = dcx; |
1014 | 0 | p7dcx->cinfo = cinfo; |
1015 | 0 | p7dcx->cb = cb; |
1016 | 0 | p7dcx->cb_arg = cb_arg; |
1017 | 0 | p7dcx->pwfn = pwfn; |
1018 | 0 | p7dcx->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg; |
1019 | 0 | p7dcx->dkcb = decrypt_key_cb; |
1020 | 0 | p7dcx->dkcb_arg = decrypt_key_cb_arg; |
1021 | 0 | p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb = decrypt_allowed_cb; |
1022 | |
|
1023 | 0 | return p7dcx; |
1024 | 0 | } |
1025 | | |
1026 | | /* |
1027 | | * Do the next chunk of PKCS7 decoding. If there is a problem, set |
1028 | | * an error and return a failure status. Note that in the case of |
1029 | | * an error, this routine is still prepared to be called again and |
1030 | | * again in case that is the easiest route for our caller to take. |
1031 | | * We simply detect it and do not do anything except keep setting |
1032 | | * that error in case our caller has not noticed it yet... |
1033 | | */ |
1034 | | SECStatus |
1035 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, |
1036 | | const char *buf, unsigned long len) |
1037 | 0 | { |
1038 | 0 | if (!p7dcx) { |
1039 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); |
1040 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1041 | 0 | } |
1042 | | |
1043 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cinfo != NULL && p7dcx->dcx != NULL) { |
1044 | 0 | PORT_Assert(p7dcx->error == 0); |
1045 | 0 | if (p7dcx->error == 0) { |
1046 | 0 | if (SEC_ASN1DecoderUpdate(p7dcx->dcx, buf, len) != SECSuccess) { |
1047 | 0 | p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError(); |
1048 | 0 | PORT_Assert(p7dcx->error); |
1049 | 0 | if (p7dcx->error == 0) |
1050 | 0 | p7dcx->error = -1; |
1051 | 0 | } |
1052 | 0 | } |
1053 | 0 | } |
1054 | |
|
1055 | 0 | if (p7dcx->error) { |
1056 | 0 | if (p7dcx->dcx != NULL) { |
1057 | 0 | (void)SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish(p7dcx->dcx); |
1058 | 0 | p7dcx->dcx = NULL; |
1059 | 0 | } |
1060 | 0 | if (p7dcx->cinfo != NULL) { |
1061 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(p7dcx->cinfo); |
1062 | 0 | p7dcx->cinfo = NULL; |
1063 | 0 | } |
1064 | 0 | PORT_SetError(p7dcx->error); |
1065 | 0 | return SECFailure; |
1066 | 0 | } |
1067 | | |
1068 | 0 | return SECSuccess; |
1069 | 0 | } |
1070 | | |
1071 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo * |
1072 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx) |
1073 | 0 | { |
1074 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo; |
1075 | |
|
1076 | 0 | cinfo = p7dcx->cinfo; |
1077 | 0 | if (p7dcx->dcx != NULL) { |
1078 | 0 | if (SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish(p7dcx->dcx) != SECSuccess) { |
1079 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo); |
1080 | 0 | cinfo = NULL; |
1081 | 0 | } |
1082 | 0 | } |
1083 | | /* free any NSS data structures */ |
1084 | 0 | if (p7dcx->worker.decryptobj) { |
1085 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(p7dcx->worker.decryptobj); |
1086 | 0 | } |
1087 | 0 | PORT_FreeArena(p7dcx->tmp_poolp, PR_FALSE); |
1088 | 0 | PORT_Free(p7dcx); |
1089 | 0 | return cinfo; |
1090 | 0 | } |
1091 | | |
1092 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo * |
1093 | | SEC_PKCS7DecodeItem(SECItem *p7item, |
1094 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb, void *cb_arg, |
1095 | | SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg, |
1096 | | SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb, |
1097 | | void *decrypt_key_cb_arg, |
1098 | | SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb) |
1099 | 0 | { |
1100 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx; |
1101 | |
|
1102 | 0 | p7dcx = SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(cb, cb_arg, pwfn, pwfn_arg, decrypt_key_cb, |
1103 | 0 | decrypt_key_cb_arg, decrypt_allowed_cb); |
1104 | 0 | if (!p7dcx) { |
1105 | | /* error code is set */ |
1106 | 0 | return NULL; |
1107 | 0 | } |
1108 | 0 | (void)SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate(p7dcx, (char *)p7item->data, p7item->len); |
1109 | 0 | return SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish(p7dcx); |
1110 | 0 | } |
1111 | | |
1112 | | /* |
1113 | | * Abort the ASN.1 stream. Used by pkcs 12 |
1114 | | */ |
1115 | | void |
1116 | | SEC_PKCS7DecoderAbort(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int error) |
1117 | 0 | { |
1118 | 0 | PORT_Assert(p7dcx); |
1119 | 0 | SEC_ASN1DecoderAbort(p7dcx->dcx, error); |
1120 | 0 | } |
1121 | | |
1122 | | /* |
1123 | | * If the thing contains any certs or crls return true; false otherwise. |
1124 | | */ |
1125 | | PRBool |
1126 | | SEC_PKCS7ContainsCertsOrCrls(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1127 | 0 | { |
1128 | 0 | SECOidTag kind; |
1129 | 0 | SECItem **certs; |
1130 | 0 | CERTSignedCrl **crls; |
1131 | |
|
1132 | 0 | kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo); |
1133 | 0 | switch (kind) { |
1134 | 0 | default: |
1135 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1136 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1137 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1138 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1139 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1140 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: |
1141 | 0 | certs = cinfo->content.signedData->rawCerts; |
1142 | 0 | crls = cinfo->content.signedData->crls; |
1143 | 0 | break; |
1144 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1145 | 0 | certs = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->rawCerts; |
1146 | 0 | crls = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->crls; |
1147 | 0 | break; |
1148 | 0 | } |
1149 | | |
1150 | | /* |
1151 | | * I know this could be collapsed, but I was in a mood to be explicit. |
1152 | | */ |
1153 | 0 | if (certs != NULL && certs[0] != NULL) |
1154 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1155 | 0 | else if (crls != NULL && crls[0] != NULL) |
1156 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1157 | 0 | else |
1158 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1159 | 0 | } |
1160 | | |
1161 | | /* return the content length...could use GetContent, however we |
1162 | | * need the encrypted content length |
1163 | | */ |
1164 | | PRBool |
1165 | | SEC_PKCS7IsContentEmpty(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, unsigned int minLen) |
1166 | 0 | { |
1167 | 0 | SECItem *item = NULL; |
1168 | |
|
1169 | 0 | if (cinfo == NULL) { |
1170 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1171 | 0 | } |
1172 | | |
1173 | 0 | switch (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo)) { |
1174 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1175 | 0 | item = cinfo->content.data; |
1176 | 0 | break; |
1177 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1178 | 0 | item = &cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent; |
1179 | 0 | break; |
1180 | 0 | default: |
1181 | | /* add other types */ |
1182 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1183 | 0 | } |
1184 | | |
1185 | 0 | if (!item) { |
1186 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1187 | 0 | } else if (item->len <= minLen) { |
1188 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1189 | 0 | } |
1190 | | |
1191 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1192 | 0 | } |
1193 | | |
1194 | | PRBool |
1195 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentIsEncrypted(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1196 | 0 | { |
1197 | 0 | SECOidTag kind; |
1198 | |
|
1199 | 0 | kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo); |
1200 | 0 | switch (kind) { |
1201 | 0 | default: |
1202 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1203 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1204 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: |
1205 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1206 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1207 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1208 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1209 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1210 | 0 | } |
1211 | 0 | } |
1212 | | |
1213 | | /* |
1214 | | * If the PKCS7 content has a signature (not just *could* have a signature) |
1215 | | * return true; false otherwise. This can/should be called before calling |
1216 | | * VerifySignature, which will always indicate failure if no signature is |
1217 | | * present, but that does not mean there even was a signature! |
1218 | | * Note that the content itself can be empty (detached content was sent |
1219 | | * another way); it is the presence of the signature that matters. |
1220 | | */ |
1221 | | PRBool |
1222 | | SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1223 | 0 | { |
1224 | 0 | SECOidTag kind; |
1225 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos; |
1226 | |
|
1227 | 0 | kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo); |
1228 | 0 | switch (kind) { |
1229 | 0 | default: |
1230 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1231 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1232 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1233 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1234 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1235 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: |
1236 | 0 | signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos; |
1237 | 0 | break; |
1238 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1239 | 0 | signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->signerInfos; |
1240 | 0 | break; |
1241 | 0 | } |
1242 | | |
1243 | | /* |
1244 | | * I know this could be collapsed; but I kind of think it will get |
1245 | | * more complicated before I am finished, so... |
1246 | | */ |
1247 | 0 | if (signerinfos != NULL && signerinfos[0] != NULL) |
1248 | 0 | return PR_TRUE; |
1249 | 0 | else |
1250 | 0 | return PR_FALSE; |
1251 | 0 | } |
1252 | | |
1253 | | /* |
1254 | | * sec_pkcs7_verify_signature |
1255 | | * |
1256 | | * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature is good. |
1257 | | * The digest was either calculated earlier (and is stored in the |
1258 | | * contentInfo itself) or is passed in via "detached_digest". |
1259 | | * |
1260 | | * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted |
1261 | | * for the purpose specified by "certusage" at |
1262 | | * - "*atTime" if "atTime" is not null, or |
1263 | | * - the signing time if the signing time is available in "cinfo", or |
1264 | | * - the current time (as returned by PR_Now). |
1265 | | * |
1266 | | * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found |
1267 | | * into our local database. |
1268 | | * |
1269 | | * XXX Each place which returns PR_FALSE should be sure to have a good |
1270 | | * error set for inspection by the caller. Alternatively, we could create |
1271 | | * an enumeration of success and each type of failure and return that |
1272 | | * instead of a boolean. For now, the default in a bad situation is to |
1273 | | * set the error to SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE. But this should be |
1274 | | * reviewed; better (more specific) errors should be possible (to distinguish |
1275 | | * a signature failure from a badly-formed pkcs7 signedData, for example). |
1276 | | * Some of the errors should probably just be SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE, |
1277 | | * but that has a less helpful error string associated with it right now; |
1278 | | * if/when that changes, review and change these as needed. |
1279 | | * |
1280 | | * XXX This is broken wrt signedAndEnvelopedData. In that case, the |
1281 | | * message digest is doubly encrypted -- first encrypted with the signer |
1282 | | * private key but then again encrypted with the bulk encryption key used |
1283 | | * to encrypt the content. So before we can pass the digest to VerifyDigest, |
1284 | | * we need to decrypt it with the bulk encryption key. Also, in this case, |
1285 | | * there should be NO authenticatedAttributes (signerinfo->authAttr should |
1286 | | * be NULL). |
1287 | | */ |
1288 | | static PRBool |
1289 | | sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, |
1290 | | SECCertUsage certusage, |
1291 | | const SECItem *detached_digest, |
1292 | | HASH_HashType digest_type, |
1293 | | PRBool keepcerts, |
1294 | | const PRTime *atTime) |
1295 | 0 | { |
1296 | 0 | SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs, *bulkid; |
1297 | 0 | const SECItem *digest; |
1298 | 0 | SECItem **digests; |
1299 | 0 | SECItem **rawcerts; |
1300 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos, *signerinfo; |
1301 | 0 | CERTCertificate *cert, **certs; |
1302 | 0 | PRBool goodsig; |
1303 | 0 | CERTCertDBHandle *certdb, *defaultdb; |
1304 | 0 | SECOidTag encTag, digestTag; |
1305 | 0 | HASH_HashType found_type; |
1306 | 0 | int i, certcount; |
1307 | 0 | SECKEYPublicKey *publickey; |
1308 | 0 | SECItem *content_type; |
1309 | 0 | PK11SymKey *sigkey; |
1310 | 0 | SECItem *encoded_stime; |
1311 | 0 | PRTime stime; |
1312 | 0 | PRTime verificationTime; |
1313 | 0 | SECStatus rv; |
1314 | | |
1315 | | /* |
1316 | | * Everything needed in order to "goto done" safely. |
1317 | | */ |
1318 | 0 | goodsig = PR_FALSE; |
1319 | 0 | certcount = 0; |
1320 | 0 | cert = NULL; |
1321 | 0 | certs = NULL; |
1322 | 0 | certdb = NULL; |
1323 | 0 | defaultdb = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(); |
1324 | 0 | publickey = NULL; |
1325 | |
|
1326 | 0 | if (!SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned(cinfo)) { |
1327 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1328 | 0 | goto done; |
1329 | 0 | } |
1330 | | |
1331 | 0 | PORT_Assert(cinfo->contentTypeTag != NULL); |
1332 | |
|
1333 | 0 | switch (cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset) { |
1334 | 0 | default: |
1335 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1336 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1337 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1338 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1339 | | /* Could only get here if SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned is broken. */ |
1340 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
1341 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: { |
1342 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp; |
1343 | |
|
1344 | 0 | sdp = cinfo->content.signedData; |
1345 | 0 | digestalgs = sdp->digestAlgorithms; |
1346 | 0 | digests = sdp->digests; |
1347 | 0 | rawcerts = sdp->rawCerts; |
1348 | 0 | signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos; |
1349 | 0 | content_type = &(sdp->contentInfo.contentType); |
1350 | 0 | sigkey = NULL; |
1351 | 0 | bulkid = NULL; |
1352 | 0 | } break; |
1353 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: { |
1354 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp; |
1355 | |
|
1356 | 0 | saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData; |
1357 | 0 | digestalgs = saedp->digestAlgorithms; |
1358 | 0 | digests = saedp->digests; |
1359 | 0 | rawcerts = saedp->rawCerts; |
1360 | 0 | signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos; |
1361 | 0 | content_type = &(saedp->encContentInfo.contentType); |
1362 | 0 | sigkey = saedp->sigKey; |
1363 | 0 | bulkid = &(saedp->encContentInfo.contentEncAlg); |
1364 | 0 | } break; |
1365 | 0 | } |
1366 | | |
1367 | 0 | if ((signerinfos == NULL) || (signerinfos[0] == NULL)) { |
1368 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1369 | 0 | goto done; |
1370 | 0 | } |
1371 | | |
1372 | | /* |
1373 | | * XXX Need to handle multiple signatures; checking them is easy, |
1374 | | * but what should be the semantics here (like, return value)? |
1375 | | */ |
1376 | 0 | if (signerinfos[1] != NULL) { |
1377 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1378 | 0 | goto done; |
1379 | 0 | } |
1380 | | |
1381 | 0 | signerinfo = signerinfos[0]; |
1382 | | |
1383 | | /* |
1384 | | * XXX I would like to just pass the issuerAndSN, along with the rawcerts |
1385 | | * and crls, to some function that did all of this certificate stuff |
1386 | | * (open/close the database if necessary, verifying the certs, etc.) |
1387 | | * and gave me back a cert pointer if all was good. |
1388 | | */ |
1389 | 0 | certdb = defaultdb; |
1390 | 0 | if (certdb == NULL) { |
1391 | 0 | goto done; |
1392 | 0 | } |
1393 | | |
1394 | 0 | certcount = 0; |
1395 | 0 | if (rawcerts != NULL) { |
1396 | 0 | for (; rawcerts[certcount] != NULL; certcount++) { |
1397 | | /* just counting */ |
1398 | 0 | } |
1399 | 0 | } |
1400 | | |
1401 | | /* |
1402 | | * Note that the result of this is that each cert in "certs" |
1403 | | * needs to be destroyed. |
1404 | | */ |
1405 | 0 | rv = CERT_ImportCerts(certdb, certusage, certcount, rawcerts, &certs, |
1406 | 0 | keepcerts, PR_FALSE, NULL); |
1407 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1408 | 0 | goto done; |
1409 | 0 | } |
1410 | | |
1411 | | /* |
1412 | | * This cert will also need to be freed, but since we save it |
1413 | | * in signerinfo for later, we do not want to destroy it when |
1414 | | * we leave this function -- we let the clean-up of the entire |
1415 | | * cinfo structure later do the destroy of this cert. |
1416 | | */ |
1417 | 0 | cert = CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN(certdb, signerinfo->issuerAndSN); |
1418 | 0 | if (cert == NULL) { |
1419 | 0 | goto done; |
1420 | 0 | } |
1421 | | |
1422 | 0 | signerinfo->cert = cert; |
1423 | | |
1424 | | /* |
1425 | | * Get and convert the signing time; if available, it will be used |
1426 | | * both on the cert verification and for importing the sender |
1427 | | * email profile. |
1428 | | */ |
1429 | 0 | encoded_stime = SEC_PKCS7GetSigningTime(cinfo); |
1430 | 0 | if (encoded_stime != NULL) { |
1431 | 0 | if (DER_DecodeTimeChoice(&stime, encoded_stime) != SECSuccess) |
1432 | 0 | encoded_stime = NULL; /* conversion failed, so pretend none */ |
1433 | 0 | } |
1434 | | |
1435 | | /* |
1436 | | * XXX This uses the signing time, if available. Additionally, we |
1437 | | * might want to, if there is no signing time, get the message time |
1438 | | * from the mail header itself, and use that. That would require |
1439 | | * a change to our interface though, and for S/MIME callers to pass |
1440 | | * in a time (and for non-S/MIME callers to pass in nothing, or |
1441 | | * maybe make them pass in the current time, always?). |
1442 | | */ |
1443 | 0 | if (atTime) { |
1444 | 0 | verificationTime = *atTime; |
1445 | 0 | } else if (encoded_stime != NULL) { |
1446 | 0 | verificationTime = stime; |
1447 | 0 | } else { |
1448 | 0 | verificationTime = PR_Now(); |
1449 | 0 | } |
1450 | 0 | if (CERT_VerifyCert(certdb, cert, PR_TRUE, certusage, verificationTime, |
1451 | 0 | cinfo->pwfn_arg, NULL) != SECSuccess) { |
1452 | | /* |
1453 | | * XXX Give the user an option to check the signature anyway? |
1454 | | * If we want to do this, need to give a way to leave and display |
1455 | | * some dialog and get the answer and come back through (or do |
1456 | | * the rest of what we do below elsewhere, maybe by putting it |
1457 | | * in a function that we call below and could call from a dialog |
1458 | | * finish handler). |
1459 | | */ |
1460 | 0 | goto savecert; |
1461 | 0 | } |
1462 | | |
1463 | 0 | publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); |
1464 | 0 | if (publickey == NULL) |
1465 | 0 | goto done; |
1466 | | |
1467 | | /* |
1468 | | * XXX No! If digests is empty, see if we can create it now by |
1469 | | * digesting the contents. This is necessary if we want to allow |
1470 | | * somebody to do a simple decode (without filtering, etc.) and |
1471 | | * then later call us here to do the verification. |
1472 | | * OR, we can just specify that the interface to this routine |
1473 | | * *requires* that the digest(s) be done before calling and either |
1474 | | * stashed in the struct itself or passed in explicitly (as would |
1475 | | * be done for detached contents). |
1476 | | */ |
1477 | 0 | if ((digests == NULL || digests[0] == NULL) && (detached_digest == NULL || detached_digest->data == NULL)) |
1478 | 0 | goto done; |
1479 | | |
1480 | | /* |
1481 | | * Find and confirm digest algorithm. |
1482 | | */ |
1483 | 0 | digestTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(signerinfo->digestAlg.algorithm)); |
1484 | | |
1485 | | /* make sure we understand the digest type first */ |
1486 | 0 | found_type = HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(digestTag); |
1487 | 0 | if ((digestTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) || (found_type == HASH_AlgNULL)) { |
1488 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1489 | 0 | goto done; |
1490 | 0 | } |
1491 | | |
1492 | 0 | if (detached_digest != NULL) { |
1493 | 0 | unsigned int hashLen = HASH_ResultLen(found_type); |
1494 | |
|
1495 | 0 | if (digest_type != found_type || |
1496 | 0 | detached_digest->len != hashLen) { |
1497 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1498 | 0 | goto done; |
1499 | 0 | } |
1500 | 0 | digest = detached_digest; |
1501 | 0 | } else { |
1502 | 0 | PORT_Assert(digestalgs != NULL && digestalgs[0] != NULL); |
1503 | 0 | if (digestalgs == NULL || digestalgs[0] == NULL) { |
1504 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1505 | 0 | goto done; |
1506 | 0 | } |
1507 | | |
1508 | | /* |
1509 | | * pick digest matching signerinfo->digestAlg from digests |
1510 | | */ |
1511 | 0 | for (i = 0; digestalgs[i] != NULL; i++) { |
1512 | 0 | if (SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(digestalgs[i]->algorithm)) == digestTag) |
1513 | 0 | break; |
1514 | 0 | } |
1515 | 0 | if (digestalgs[i] == NULL) { |
1516 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1517 | 0 | goto done; |
1518 | 0 | } |
1519 | | |
1520 | 0 | digest = digests[i]; |
1521 | 0 | } |
1522 | | |
1523 | 0 | encTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&(signerinfo->digestEncAlg.algorithm)); |
1524 | 0 | if (encTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) { |
1525 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1526 | 0 | goto done; |
1527 | 0 | } |
1528 | | |
1529 | 0 | if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) { |
1530 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr; |
1531 | 0 | SECItem *value; |
1532 | 0 | SECItem encoded_attrs; |
1533 | | |
1534 | | /* |
1535 | | * We have a sigkey only for signedAndEnvelopedData, which is |
1536 | | * not supposed to have any authenticated attributes. |
1537 | | */ |
1538 | 0 | if (sigkey != NULL) { |
1539 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1540 | 0 | goto done; |
1541 | 0 | } |
1542 | | |
1543 | | /* |
1544 | | * PKCS #7 says that if there are any authenticated attributes, |
1545 | | * then there must be one for content type which matches the |
1546 | | * content type of the content being signed, and there must |
1547 | | * be one for message digest which matches our message digest. |
1548 | | * So check these things first. |
1549 | | * XXX Might be nice to have a compare-attribute-value function |
1550 | | * which could collapse the following nicely. |
1551 | | */ |
1552 | 0 | attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr, |
1553 | 0 | SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE, PR_TRUE); |
1554 | 0 | value = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr); |
1555 | 0 | if (value == NULL || value->len != content_type->len) { |
1556 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1557 | 0 | goto done; |
1558 | 0 | } |
1559 | 0 | if (PORT_Memcmp(value->data, content_type->data, value->len) != 0) { |
1560 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1561 | 0 | goto done; |
1562 | 0 | } |
1563 | | |
1564 | 0 | attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr, |
1565 | 0 | SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST, PR_TRUE); |
1566 | 0 | value = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr); |
1567 | 0 | if (value == NULL || value->len != digest->len) { |
1568 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1569 | 0 | goto done; |
1570 | 0 | } |
1571 | 0 | if (PORT_Memcmp(value->data, digest->data, value->len) != 0) { |
1572 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1573 | 0 | goto done; |
1574 | 0 | } |
1575 | | |
1576 | | /* |
1577 | | * Okay, we met the constraints of the basic attributes. |
1578 | | * Now check the signature, which is based on a digest of |
1579 | | * the DER-encoded authenticated attributes. So, first we |
1580 | | * encode and then we digest/verify. |
1581 | | */ |
1582 | 0 | encoded_attrs.data = NULL; |
1583 | 0 | encoded_attrs.len = 0; |
1584 | 0 | if (sec_PKCS7EncodeAttributes(NULL, &encoded_attrs, |
1585 | 0 | &(signerinfo->authAttr)) == NULL) |
1586 | 0 | goto done; |
1587 | | |
1588 | 0 | if (encoded_attrs.data == NULL || encoded_attrs.len == 0) { |
1589 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1590 | 0 | goto done; |
1591 | 0 | } |
1592 | | |
1593 | 0 | goodsig = (PRBool)(VFY_VerifyDataDirect(encoded_attrs.data, |
1594 | 0 | encoded_attrs.len, |
1595 | 0 | publickey, &(signerinfo->encDigest), |
1596 | 0 | encTag, digestTag, NULL, |
1597 | 0 | cinfo->pwfn_arg) == SECSuccess); |
1598 | 0 | PORT_Free(encoded_attrs.data); |
1599 | 0 | } else { |
1600 | 0 | SECItem *sig; |
1601 | 0 | SECItem holder; |
1602 | | |
1603 | | /* |
1604 | | * No authenticated attributes. |
1605 | | * The signature is based on the plain message digest. |
1606 | | */ |
1607 | |
|
1608 | 0 | sig = &(signerinfo->encDigest); |
1609 | 0 | if (sig->len == 0) { /* bad signature */ |
1610 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1611 | 0 | goto done; |
1612 | 0 | } |
1613 | | |
1614 | 0 | if (sigkey != NULL) { |
1615 | 0 | sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj; |
1616 | 0 | unsigned int buflen; |
1617 | | |
1618 | | /* |
1619 | | * For signedAndEnvelopedData, we first must decrypt the encrypted |
1620 | | * digest with the bulk encryption key. The result is the normal |
1621 | | * encrypted digest (aka the signature). |
1622 | | */ |
1623 | 0 | decryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject(sigkey, bulkid); |
1624 | 0 | if (decryptobj == NULL) |
1625 | 0 | goto done; |
1626 | | |
1627 | 0 | buflen = sec_PKCS7DecryptLength(decryptobj, sig->len, PR_TRUE); |
1628 | 0 | PORT_Assert(buflen); |
1629 | 0 | if (buflen == 0) { /* something is wrong */ |
1630 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(decryptobj); |
1631 | 0 | goto done; |
1632 | 0 | } |
1633 | | |
1634 | 0 | holder.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(buflen); |
1635 | 0 | if (holder.data == NULL) { |
1636 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(decryptobj); |
1637 | 0 | goto done; |
1638 | 0 | } |
1639 | | |
1640 | 0 | rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt(decryptobj, holder.data, &holder.len, buflen, |
1641 | 0 | sig->data, sig->len, PR_TRUE); |
1642 | 0 | sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject(decryptobj); |
1643 | 0 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
1644 | 0 | goto done; |
1645 | 0 | } |
1646 | | |
1647 | 0 | sig = &holder; |
1648 | 0 | } |
1649 | | |
1650 | 0 | goodsig = (PRBool)(VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(digest, publickey, sig, |
1651 | 0 | encTag, digestTag, cinfo->pwfn_arg) == SECSuccess); |
1652 | |
|
1653 | 0 | if (sigkey != NULL) { |
1654 | 0 | PORT_Assert(sig == &holder); |
1655 | 0 | PORT_ZFree(holder.data, holder.len); |
1656 | 0 | } |
1657 | 0 | } |
1658 | | |
1659 | 0 | if (!goodsig) { |
1660 | | /* |
1661 | | * XXX Change the generic error into our specific one, because |
1662 | | * in that case we get a better explanation out of the Security |
1663 | | * Advisor. This is really a bug in our error strings (the |
1664 | | * "generic" error has a lousy/wrong message associated with it |
1665 | | * which assumes the signature verification was done for the |
1666 | | * purposes of checking the issuer signature on a certificate) |
1667 | | * but this is at least an easy workaround and/or in the |
1668 | | * Security Advisor, which specifically checks for the error |
1669 | | * SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE and gives more explanation |
1670 | | * in that case but does not similarly check for |
1671 | | * SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE. It probably should, but then would |
1672 | | * probably say the wrong thing in the case that it *was* the |
1673 | | * certificate signature check that failed during the cert |
1674 | | * verification done above. Our error handling is really a mess. |
1675 | | */ |
1676 | 0 | if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) |
1677 | 0 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
1678 | 0 | } |
1679 | |
|
1680 | 0 | savecert: |
1681 | | /* |
1682 | | * Only save the smime profile if we are checking an email message and |
1683 | | * the cert has an email address in it. |
1684 | | */ |
1685 | 0 | if (cert->emailAddr && cert->emailAddr[0] && |
1686 | 0 | ((certusage == certUsageEmailSigner) || |
1687 | 0 | (certusage == certUsageEmailRecipient))) { |
1688 | 0 | SECItem *profile = NULL; |
1689 | 0 | int save_error; |
1690 | | |
1691 | | /* |
1692 | | * Remember the current error set because we do not care about |
1693 | | * anything set by the functions we are about to call. |
1694 | | */ |
1695 | 0 | save_error = PORT_GetError(); |
1696 | |
|
1697 | 0 | if (goodsig && (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL)) { |
1698 | | /* |
1699 | | * If the signature is good, then we can save the S/MIME profile, |
1700 | | * if we have one. |
1701 | | */ |
1702 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr; |
1703 | |
|
1704 | 0 | attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfo->authAttr, |
1705 | 0 | SEC_OID_PKCS9_SMIME_CAPABILITIES, |
1706 | 0 | PR_TRUE); |
1707 | 0 | profile = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr); |
1708 | 0 | } |
1709 | |
|
1710 | 0 | rv = CERT_SaveSMimeProfile(cert, profile, encoded_stime); |
1711 | | |
1712 | | /* |
1713 | | * Restore the saved error in case the calls above set a new |
1714 | | * one that we do not actually care about. |
1715 | | */ |
1716 | 0 | PORT_SetError(save_error); |
1717 | | |
1718 | | /* |
1719 | | * XXX Failure is not indicated anywhere -- the signature |
1720 | | * verification itself is unaffected by whether or not the |
1721 | | * profile was successfully saved. |
1722 | | */ |
1723 | 0 | } |
1724 | |
|
1725 | 0 | done: |
1726 | | |
1727 | | /* |
1728 | | * See comment above about why we do not want to destroy cert |
1729 | | * itself here. |
1730 | | */ |
1731 | |
|
1732 | 0 | if (certs != NULL) |
1733 | 0 | CERT_DestroyCertArray(certs, certcount); |
1734 | |
|
1735 | 0 | if (publickey != NULL) |
1736 | 0 | SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey); |
1737 | |
|
1738 | 0 | return goodsig; |
1739 | 0 | } |
1740 | | |
1741 | | /* |
1742 | | * SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature |
1743 | | * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature is good. |
1744 | | * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted |
1745 | | * for the purpose specified by "certusage". |
1746 | | * |
1747 | | * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found |
1748 | | * into our local database. |
1749 | | */ |
1750 | | PRBool |
1751 | | SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, |
1752 | | SECCertUsage certusage, |
1753 | | PRBool keepcerts) |
1754 | 0 | { |
1755 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certusage, |
1756 | 0 | NULL, HASH_AlgNULL, keepcerts, NULL); |
1757 | 0 | } |
1758 | | |
1759 | | /* |
1760 | | * SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature |
1761 | | * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature matches |
1762 | | * a passed-in digest (calculated, supposedly, from detached contents). |
1763 | | * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted |
1764 | | * for the purpose specified by "certusage". |
1765 | | * |
1766 | | * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found |
1767 | | * into our local database. |
1768 | | */ |
1769 | | PRBool |
1770 | | SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, |
1771 | | SECCertUsage certusage, |
1772 | | const SECItem *detached_digest, |
1773 | | HASH_HashType digest_type, |
1774 | | PRBool keepcerts) |
1775 | 0 | { |
1776 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certusage, |
1777 | 0 | detached_digest, digest_type, |
1778 | 0 | keepcerts, NULL); |
1779 | 0 | } |
1780 | | |
1781 | | /* |
1782 | | * SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignatureAtTime |
1783 | | * Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature matches |
1784 | | * a passed-in digest (calculated, supposedly, from detached contents). |
1785 | | * The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted |
1786 | | * for the purpose specified by "certusage" at time "atTime". |
1787 | | * |
1788 | | * In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found |
1789 | | * into our local database. |
1790 | | */ |
1791 | | PRBool |
1792 | | SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignatureAtTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, |
1793 | | SECCertUsage certusage, |
1794 | | const SECItem *detached_digest, |
1795 | | HASH_HashType digest_type, |
1796 | | PRBool keepcerts, |
1797 | | PRTime atTime) |
1798 | 0 | { |
1799 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certusage, |
1800 | 0 | detached_digest, digest_type, |
1801 | 0 | keepcerts, &atTime); |
1802 | 0 | } |
1803 | | |
1804 | | /* |
1805 | | * Return the asked-for portion of the name of the signer of a PKCS7 |
1806 | | * signed object. |
1807 | | * |
1808 | | * Returns a pointer to allocated memory, which must be freed. |
1809 | | * A NULL return value is an error. |
1810 | | */ |
1811 | | |
1812 | 0 | #define sec_common_name 1 |
1813 | 0 | #define sec_email_address 2 |
1814 | | |
1815 | | static char * |
1816 | | sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, int selector) |
1817 | 0 | { |
1818 | 0 | SECOidTag kind; |
1819 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos; |
1820 | 0 | CERTCertificate *signercert; |
1821 | 0 | char *container; |
1822 | |
|
1823 | 0 | kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo); |
1824 | 0 | switch (kind) { |
1825 | 0 | default: |
1826 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA: |
1827 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA: |
1828 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA: |
1829 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA: |
1830 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
1831 | 0 | return NULL; |
1832 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA: { |
1833 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp; |
1834 | |
|
1835 | 0 | sdp = cinfo->content.signedData; |
1836 | 0 | signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos; |
1837 | 0 | } break; |
1838 | 0 | case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA: { |
1839 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp; |
1840 | |
|
1841 | 0 | saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData; |
1842 | 0 | signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos; |
1843 | 0 | } break; |
1844 | 0 | } |
1845 | | |
1846 | 0 | if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL) |
1847 | 0 | return NULL; |
1848 | | |
1849 | 0 | signercert = signerinfos[0]->cert; |
1850 | | |
1851 | | /* |
1852 | | * No cert there; see if we can find one by calling verify ourselves. |
1853 | | */ |
1854 | 0 | if (signercert == NULL) { |
1855 | | /* |
1856 | | * The cert usage does not matter in this case, because we do not |
1857 | | * actually care about the verification itself, but we have to pick |
1858 | | * some valid usage to pass in. |
1859 | | */ |
1860 | 0 | (void)sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(cinfo, certUsageEmailSigner, |
1861 | 0 | NULL, HASH_AlgNULL, PR_FALSE, NULL); |
1862 | 0 | signercert = signerinfos[0]->cert; |
1863 | 0 | if (signercert == NULL) |
1864 | 0 | return NULL; |
1865 | 0 | } |
1866 | | |
1867 | 0 | switch (selector) { |
1868 | 0 | case sec_common_name: |
1869 | 0 | container = CERT_GetCommonName(&signercert->subject); |
1870 | 0 | break; |
1871 | 0 | case sec_email_address: |
1872 | 0 | if (signercert->emailAddr && signercert->emailAddr[0]) { |
1873 | 0 | container = PORT_Strdup(signercert->emailAddr); |
1874 | 0 | } else { |
1875 | 0 | container = NULL; |
1876 | 0 | } |
1877 | 0 | break; |
1878 | 0 | default: |
1879 | 0 | PORT_Assert(0); |
1880 | 0 | container = NULL; |
1881 | 0 | break; |
1882 | 0 | } |
1883 | | |
1884 | 0 | return container; |
1885 | 0 | } |
1886 | | |
1887 | | char * |
1888 | | SEC_PKCS7GetSignerCommonName(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1889 | 0 | { |
1890 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(cinfo, sec_common_name); |
1891 | 0 | } |
1892 | | |
1893 | | char * |
1894 | | SEC_PKCS7GetSignerEmailAddress(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1895 | 0 | { |
1896 | 0 | return sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(cinfo, sec_email_address); |
1897 | 0 | } |
1898 | | |
1899 | | /* |
1900 | | * Return the signing time, in UTCTime format, of a PKCS7 contentInfo. |
1901 | | */ |
1902 | | SECItem * |
1903 | | SEC_PKCS7GetSigningTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) |
1904 | 0 | { |
1905 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos; |
1906 | 0 | SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr; |
1907 | |
|
1908 | 0 | if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA) |
1909 | 0 | return NULL; |
1910 | | |
1911 | 0 | signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos; |
1912 | | |
1913 | | /* |
1914 | | * No signature, or more than one, means no deal. |
1915 | | */ |
1916 | 0 | if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL || signerinfos[1] != NULL) |
1917 | 0 | return NULL; |
1918 | | |
1919 | 0 | attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute(signerinfos[0]->authAttr, |
1920 | 0 | SEC_OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME, PR_TRUE); |
1921 | 0 | return sec_PKCS7AttributeValue(attr); |
1922 | 0 | } |