Coverage Report

Created: 2023-06-08 06:41

/src/openssl111/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
Line
Count
Source (jump to first uncovered line)
1
/*
2
 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3
 *
4
 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
5
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
6
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8
 */
9
10
#include <stdio.h>
11
#include <time.h>
12
#include <errno.h>
13
#include <limits.h>
14
15
#include "crypto/ctype.h"
16
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
18
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
19
#include <openssl/evp.h>
20
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
21
#include <openssl/x509.h>
22
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23
#include <openssl/objects.h>
24
#include "internal/dane.h"
25
#include "crypto/x509.h"
26
#include "x509_local.h"
27
28
/* CRL score values */
29
30
/* No unhandled critical extensions */
31
32
0
#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
33
34
/* certificate is within CRL scope */
35
36
0
#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
37
38
/* CRL times valid */
39
40
0
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
41
42
/* Issuer name matches certificate */
43
44
0
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
45
46
/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
47
48
0
#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
49
50
/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
51
52
0
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
53
54
/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
55
56
0
#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
57
58
/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
59
60
0
#define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
61
62
/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
63
64
0
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
65
66
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
67
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
68
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
69
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
70
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
71
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
72
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
73
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
74
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
75
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
76
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
80
static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
81
static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
82
static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
83
static int check_curve(X509 *cert);
84
85
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
86
                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
87
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
88
                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
89
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
90
                         int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
91
                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
92
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
93
                           int *pcrl_score);
94
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
95
                           unsigned int *preasons);
96
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
97
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
98
                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
99
                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
100
101
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
102
103
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
104
0
{
105
0
    return ok;
106
0
}
107
108
/*
109
 * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not or on error.
110
 * This does not verify self-signedness but relies on x509v3_cache_extensions()
111
 * matching issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
112
 * present authority key identifier matching the subject key identifier, etc.
113
 */
114
static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
115
0
{
116
0
    if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
117
0
        return 0;
118
0
    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
119
0
        return 1;
120
0
    else
121
0
        return 0;
122
0
}
123
124
/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
125
126
static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
127
0
{
128
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
129
0
    X509 *xtmp = NULL;
130
0
    int i;
131
    /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
132
0
    certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
133
0
    if (certs == NULL)
134
0
        return NULL;
135
    /* Look for exact match */
136
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
137
0
        xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
138
0
        if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
139
0
            break;
140
0
        xtmp = NULL;
141
0
    }
142
0
    if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp))
143
0
        xtmp = NULL;
144
0
    sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
145
0
    return xtmp;
146
0
}
147
148
/*-
149
 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
150
 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
151
 * B<depth>.
152
 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
153
 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
154
 *
155
 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
156
 */
157
static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
158
0
{
159
0
    ctx->error_depth = depth;
160
0
    ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
161
0
    if (err != X509_V_OK)
162
0
        ctx->error = err;
163
0
    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
164
0
}
165
166
/*-
167
 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant.  Here, the
168
 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
169
 * number.
170
 *
171
 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
172
 */
173
static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
174
0
{
175
0
    ctx->error = err;
176
0
    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
177
0
}
178
179
static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
180
0
{
181
0
    int i;
182
0
    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
183
184
0
    if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
185
0
        return 1;
186
187
0
    for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
188
0
        X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
189
190
        /*
191
         * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
192
         * check the security of issuer keys.
193
         */
194
0
        if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
195
0
            verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
196
0
            return 0;
197
        /*
198
         * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
199
         * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
200
         */
201
0
        if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
202
0
            verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
203
0
            return 0;
204
0
    }
205
0
    return 1;
206
0
}
207
208
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
209
0
{
210
0
    int err;
211
0
    int ok;
212
213
    /*
214
     * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
215
     * instantiate chain public key parameters.
216
     */
217
0
    if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
218
0
        (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
219
0
        (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
220
0
        (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
221
0
        X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
222
0
    if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
223
0
        return ok;
224
225
0
    err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
226
0
                                  ctx->param->flags);
227
0
    if (err != X509_V_OK) {
228
0
        if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
229
0
            return ok;
230
0
    }
231
232
    /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
233
0
    ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
234
0
    if (!ok)
235
0
        return ok;
236
237
0
    if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0)
238
0
        return ok;
239
240
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
241
    /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
242
0
    if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
243
0
        return ok;
244
0
    if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
245
0
        return ok;
246
0
#endif
247
248
    /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
249
0
    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
250
0
        ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
251
0
    return ok;
252
0
}
253
254
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
255
0
{
256
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
257
0
    int ret;
258
259
0
    if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
260
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
261
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
262
0
        return -1;
263
0
    }
264
265
0
    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
266
        /*
267
         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
268
         * cannot do another one.
269
         */
270
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
271
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
272
0
        return -1;
273
0
    }
274
275
0
    if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->cert)) {
276
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
277
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
278
0
        return -1;
279
0
    }
280
281
    /*
282
     * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
283
     * the first entry is in place
284
     */
285
0
    if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
286
0
            || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
287
0
        X509_free(ctx->cert);
288
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
289
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
290
0
        return -1;
291
0
    }
292
293
0
    ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
294
295
    /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
296
0
    if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
297
0
        !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
298
0
        return 0;
299
300
0
    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
301
0
        ret = dane_verify(ctx);
302
0
    else
303
0
        ret = verify_chain(ctx);
304
305
    /*
306
     * Safety-net.  If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
307
     * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
308
     * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
309
     */
310
0
    if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
311
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
312
0
    return ret;
313
0
}
314
315
static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert)
316
0
{
317
0
    int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk);
318
319
0
    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
320
0
        if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
321
0
            return 1;
322
0
    return 0;
323
0
}
324
325
/*
326
 * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) sk an issuer cert of given cert x.
327
 * The issuer must not yet be in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case
328
 * that x is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed.
329
 * Prefer the first one that is not expired, else take the last expired one.
330
 */
331
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
332
0
{
333
0
    int i;
334
0
    X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
335
336
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
337
0
        issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
338
0
        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)
339
0
            && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
340
0
                || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) {
341
0
            rv = issuer;
342
0
            if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
343
0
                break;
344
0
        }
345
0
    }
346
0
    return rv;
347
0
}
348
349
/* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */
350
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
351
0
{
352
0
    return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK;
353
0
}
354
355
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
356
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
357
0
{
358
0
    *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
359
360
0
    if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer))
361
0
        goto err;
362
363
0
    return 1;
364
365
0
 err:
366
0
    *issuer = NULL;
367
0
    return 0;
368
0
}
369
370
static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
371
0
{
372
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
373
0
    X509 *x;
374
0
    int i;
375
376
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
377
0
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
378
0
        if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
379
0
            if (!X509_up_ref(x)) {
380
0
                sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
381
0
                X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
382
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
383
0
                return NULL;
384
0
            }
385
0
            if (sk == NULL)
386
0
                sk = sk_X509_new_null();
387
0
            if (sk == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
388
0
                X509_free(x);
389
0
                sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
390
0
                X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
391
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
392
0
                return NULL;
393
0
            }
394
0
        }
395
0
    }
396
0
    return sk;
397
0
}
398
399
/*
400
 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose.  For trusted certificates explicit local
401
 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
402
 */
403
static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
404
                         int must_be_ca)
405
0
{
406
0
    int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
407
408
    /*
409
     * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
410
     * settings trump the purpose constraints.
411
     *
412
     * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
413
     * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
414
     * ctx->param->purpose!
415
     *
416
     * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
417
     * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
418
     * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose.  It is however
419
     * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
420
     * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
421
     *
422
     * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
423
     * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
424
     * also set.
425
     */
426
0
    if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
427
0
        tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
428
429
0
    switch (tr_ok) {
430
0
    case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
431
0
        return 1;
432
0
    case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
433
0
        break;
434
0
    default:
435
0
        switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
436
0
        case 1:
437
0
            return 1;
438
0
        case 0:
439
0
            break;
440
0
        default:
441
0
            if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
442
0
                return 1;
443
0
        }
444
0
        break;
445
0
    }
446
447
0
    return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
448
0
}
449
450
/*
451
 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
452
 * purpose
453
 */
454
455
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
456
0
{
457
0
    int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
458
0
    X509 *x;
459
0
    int proxy_path_length = 0;
460
0
    int purpose;
461
0
    int allow_proxy_certs;
462
0
    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
463
464
    /*-
465
     *  must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
466
     * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
467
     *     use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
468
     * 0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
469
     *     used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
470
     * 1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
471
     *     all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
472
     */
473
0
    must_be_ca = -1;
474
475
    /* CRL path validation */
476
0
    if (ctx->parent) {
477
0
        allow_proxy_certs = 0;
478
0
        purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
479
0
    } else {
480
0
        allow_proxy_certs =
481
0
            ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
482
0
        purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
483
0
    }
484
485
0
    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
486
0
        int ret;
487
0
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
488
0
        if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
489
0
            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
490
0
            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
491
0
                                X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
492
0
                return 0;
493
0
        }
494
0
        if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
495
0
            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
496
0
                                X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
497
0
                return 0;
498
0
        }
499
0
        ret = X509_check_ca(x);
500
0
        switch (must_be_ca) {
501
0
        case -1:
502
0
            if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
503
0
                && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
504
0
                ret = 0;
505
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
506
0
            } else
507
0
                ret = 1;
508
0
            break;
509
0
        case 0:
510
0
            if (ret != 0) {
511
0
                ret = 0;
512
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
513
0
            } else
514
0
                ret = 1;
515
0
            break;
516
0
        default:
517
            /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
518
0
            if ((ret == 0)
519
0
                || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
520
0
                    && (ret != 1))) {
521
0
                ret = 0;
522
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
523
0
            } else
524
0
                ret = 1;
525
0
            break;
526
0
        }
527
0
        if (ret > 0
528
0
            && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
529
            /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
530
0
            ret = check_curve(x);
531
0
            if (ret < 0) {
532
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
533
0
                ret = 0;
534
0
            } else if (ret == 0) {
535
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS;
536
0
            }
537
0
        }
538
0
        if (ret > 0
539
0
            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
540
0
            && x->ex_pathlen != -1
541
0
            && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) {
542
0
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
543
0
            ret = 0;
544
0
        }
545
0
        if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
546
0
            return 0;
547
        /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
548
0
        if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
549
0
            return 0;
550
        /* Check pathlen */
551
0
        if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
552
0
            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) {
553
0
            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
554
0
                return 0;
555
0
        }
556
        /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
557
0
        if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
558
0
            plen++;
559
        /*
560
         * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
561
         * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate.  If not,
562
         * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
563
         */
564
0
        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
565
            /*
566
             * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
567
             * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
568
             * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
569
             * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
570
             *
571
             * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
572
             * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
573
             * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
574
             * increment proxy_path_length.
575
             */
576
0
            if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
577
0
                if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
578
0
                    if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
579
0
                                        X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
580
0
                        return 0;
581
0
                }
582
0
                proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
583
0
            }
584
0
            proxy_path_length++;
585
0
            must_be_ca = 0;
586
0
        } else
587
0
            must_be_ca = 1;
588
0
    }
589
0
    return 1;
590
0
}
591
592
static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype)
593
0
{
594
0
    int i;
595
0
    int ret = 0;
596
0
    GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
597
598
0
    if (gs == NULL)
599
0
        return 0;
600
601
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) {
602
0
        GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i);
603
604
0
        if (g->type == gtype) {
605
0
            ret = 1;
606
0
            break;
607
0
        }
608
0
    }
609
0
    GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs);
610
0
    return ret;
611
0
}
612
613
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
614
0
{
615
0
    int i;
616
617
    /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
618
0
    for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
619
0
        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
620
0
        int j;
621
622
        /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
623
0
        if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
624
0
            continue;
625
626
        /*
627
         * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
628
         * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
629
         * added.
630
         * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
631
         */
632
0
        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
633
0
            X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
634
0
            X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
635
0
            X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
636
0
            int last_object_nid = 0;
637
0
            int err = X509_V_OK;
638
0
            int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
639
640
            /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
641
0
            if (last_object_loc < 1) {
642
0
                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
643
0
                goto proxy_name_done;
644
0
            }
645
646
            /*
647
             * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
648
             * there is in issuer.
649
             */
650
0
            if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
651
0
                != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
652
0
                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
653
0
                goto proxy_name_done;
654
0
            }
655
656
            /*
657
             * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
658
             * multivalued RDN
659
             */
660
0
            if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
661
0
                                                        last_object_loc))
662
0
                == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
663
0
                                                           last_object_loc - 1))) {
664
0
                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
665
0
                goto proxy_name_done;
666
0
            }
667
668
            /*
669
             * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
670
             * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
671
             */
672
0
            tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
673
0
            if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
674
0
                X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
675
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
676
0
                return 0;
677
0
            }
678
679
0
            tmpentry =
680
0
                X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
681
0
            last_object_nid =
682
0
                OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
683
684
0
            if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
685
0
                || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
686
0
                err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
687
0
            }
688
689
0
            X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
690
0
            X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
691
692
0
         proxy_name_done:
693
0
            if (err != X509_V_OK
694
0
                && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
695
0
                return 0;
696
0
        }
697
698
        /*
699
         * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
700
         * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
701
         * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
702
         * to be obeyed.
703
         */
704
0
        for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
705
0
            NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
706
707
0
            if (nc) {
708
0
                int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
709
710
                /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
711
0
                if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0
712
0
                    && (ctx->param->hostflags
713
0
                        & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0
714
0
                    && ((ctx->param->hostflags
715
0
                         & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0
716
0
                        || !has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS)))
717
0
                    rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
718
719
0
                switch (rv) {
720
0
                case X509_V_OK:
721
0
                    break;
722
0
                case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
723
0
                    return 0;
724
0
                default:
725
0
                    if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
726
0
                        return 0;
727
0
                    break;
728
0
                }
729
0
            }
730
0
        }
731
0
    }
732
0
    return 1;
733
0
}
734
735
static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
736
0
{
737
0
    return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
738
0
}
739
740
static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
741
0
{
742
0
    int i;
743
0
    int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
744
0
    char *name;
745
746
0
    if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
747
0
        OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
748
0
        vpm->peername = NULL;
749
0
    }
750
0
    for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
751
0
        name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
752
0
        if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
753
0
            return 1;
754
0
    }
755
0
    return n == 0;
756
0
}
757
758
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
759
0
{
760
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
761
0
    X509 *x = ctx->cert;
762
0
    if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
763
0
        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
764
0
            return 0;
765
0
    }
766
0
    if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
767
0
        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
768
0
            return 0;
769
0
    }
770
0
    if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
771
0
        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
772
0
            return 0;
773
0
    }
774
0
    return 1;
775
0
}
776
777
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
778
0
{
779
0
    int i;
780
0
    X509 *x = NULL;
781
0
    X509 *mx;
782
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
783
0
    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
784
0
    int trust;
785
786
    /*
787
     * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
788
     * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
789
     */
790
0
    if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
791
0
        switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
792
0
        case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
793
0
        case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
794
0
            return trust;
795
0
        }
796
0
    }
797
798
    /*
799
     * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
800
     * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
801
     * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
802
     * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
803
     */
804
0
    for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
805
0
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
806
0
        trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
807
        /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
808
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
809
0
            goto trusted;
810
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
811
0
            goto rejected;
812
0
    }
813
814
    /*
815
     * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
816
     * the chain is PKIX trusted.
817
     */
818
0
    if (num_untrusted < num) {
819
0
        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
820
0
            goto trusted;
821
0
        return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
822
0
    }
823
824
0
    if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
825
        /*
826
         * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
827
         * for a direct trust store match.
828
         */
829
0
        i = 0;
830
0
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
831
0
        mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
832
0
        if (!mx)
833
0
            return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
834
835
        /*
836
         * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings.  If none are set,
837
         * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
838
         */
839
0
        trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
840
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
841
0
            X509_free(mx);
842
0
            goto rejected;
843
0
        }
844
845
        /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
846
0
        (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
847
0
        X509_free(x);
848
0
        ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
849
0
        goto trusted;
850
0
    }
851
852
    /*
853
     * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
854
     * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
855
     */
856
0
    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
857
858
0
 rejected:
859
0
    if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
860
0
        return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
861
0
    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
862
863
0
 trusted:
864
0
    if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
865
0
        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
866
0
    if (dane->pdpth < 0)
867
0
        dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
868
    /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
869
0
    if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
870
0
        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
871
0
    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
872
0
}
873
874
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
875
0
{
876
0
    int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
877
0
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
878
0
        return 1;
879
0
    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
880
0
        last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
881
0
    else {
882
        /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
883
0
        if (ctx->parent)
884
0
            return 1;
885
0
        last = 0;
886
0
    }
887
0
    for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
888
0
        ctx->error_depth = i;
889
0
        ok = check_cert(ctx);
890
0
        if (!ok)
891
0
            return ok;
892
0
    }
893
0
    return 1;
894
0
}
895
896
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
897
0
{
898
0
    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
899
0
    int ok = 0;
900
0
    int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
901
0
    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
902
903
0
    ctx->current_cert = x;
904
0
    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
905
0
    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
906
0
    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
907
908
0
    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
909
0
        return 1;
910
911
0
    while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
912
0
        unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
913
914
        /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
915
0
        if (ctx->get_crl)
916
0
            ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
917
0
        else
918
0
            ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
919
        /*
920
         * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
921
         */
922
0
        if (!ok) {
923
0
            ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
924
0
            goto done;
925
0
        }
926
0
        ctx->current_crl = crl;
927
0
        ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
928
0
        if (!ok)
929
0
            goto done;
930
931
0
        if (dcrl) {
932
0
            ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
933
0
            if (!ok)
934
0
                goto done;
935
0
            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
936
0
            if (!ok)
937
0
                goto done;
938
0
        } else
939
0
            ok = 1;
940
941
        /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
942
0
        if (ok != 2) {
943
0
            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
944
0
            if (!ok)
945
0
                goto done;
946
0
        }
947
948
0
        X509_CRL_free(crl);
949
0
        X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
950
0
        crl = NULL;
951
0
        dcrl = NULL;
952
        /*
953
         * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
954
         * so exit loop.
955
         */
956
0
        if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
957
0
            ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
958
0
            goto done;
959
0
        }
960
0
    }
961
0
 done:
962
0
    X509_CRL_free(crl);
963
0
    X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
964
965
0
    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
966
0
    return ok;
967
0
}
968
969
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
970
971
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
972
0
{
973
0
    time_t *ptime;
974
0
    int i;
975
976
0
    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
977
0
        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
978
0
    else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
979
0
        return 1;
980
0
    else
981
0
        ptime = NULL;
982
0
    if (notify)
983
0
        ctx->current_crl = crl;
984
985
0
    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
986
0
    if (i == 0) {
987
0
        if (!notify)
988
0
            return 0;
989
0
        if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
990
0
            return 0;
991
0
    }
992
993
0
    if (i > 0) {
994
0
        if (!notify)
995
0
            return 0;
996
0
        if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
997
0
            return 0;
998
0
    }
999
1000
0
    if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1001
0
        i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1002
1003
0
        if (i == 0) {
1004
0
            if (!notify)
1005
0
                return 0;
1006
0
            if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
1007
0
                return 0;
1008
0
        }
1009
        /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1010
0
        if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1011
0
            if (!notify)
1012
0
                return 0;
1013
0
            if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
1014
0
                return 0;
1015
0
        }
1016
0
    }
1017
1018
0
    if (notify)
1019
0
        ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1020
1021
0
    return 1;
1022
0
}
1023
1024
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1025
                      X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1026
                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1027
0
{
1028
0
    int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1029
0
    unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1030
0
    X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1031
0
    X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1032
0
    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1033
1034
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1035
0
        crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1036
0
        reasons = *preasons;
1037
0
        crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1038
0
        if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1039
0
            continue;
1040
        /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1041
0
        if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1042
0
            int day, sec;
1043
0
            if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1044
0
                               X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1045
0
                continue;
1046
            /*
1047
             * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1048
             * and |sec|.
1049
             */
1050
0
            if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1051
0
                continue;
1052
0
        }
1053
0
        best_crl = crl;
1054
0
        best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1055
0
        best_score = crl_score;
1056
0
        best_reasons = reasons;
1057
0
    }
1058
1059
0
    if (best_crl) {
1060
0
        X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1061
0
        *pcrl = best_crl;
1062
0
        *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1063
0
        *pscore = best_score;
1064
0
        *preasons = best_reasons;
1065
0
        X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1066
0
        X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1067
0
        *pdcrl = NULL;
1068
0
        get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1069
0
    }
1070
1071
0
    if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1072
0
        return 1;
1073
1074
0
    return 0;
1075
0
}
1076
1077
/*
1078
 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1079
 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1080
 */
1081
1082
static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1083
0
{
1084
0
    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1085
0
    int i;
1086
0
    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1087
0
    if (i >= 0) {
1088
        /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1089
0
        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1090
0
            return 0;
1091
0
        exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1092
0
    } else
1093
0
        exta = NULL;
1094
1095
0
    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1096
1097
0
    if (i >= 0) {
1098
1099
0
        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1100
0
            return 0;
1101
0
        extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1102
0
    } else
1103
0
        extb = NULL;
1104
1105
0
    if (!exta && !extb)
1106
0
        return 1;
1107
1108
0
    if (!exta || !extb)
1109
0
        return 0;
1110
1111
0
    if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1112
0
        return 0;
1113
1114
0
    return 1;
1115
0
}
1116
1117
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1118
1119
static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1120
0
{
1121
    /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1122
0
    if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1123
0
        return 0;
1124
    /* Base must have a CRL number */
1125
0
    if (!base->crl_number)
1126
0
        return 0;
1127
    /* Issuer names must match */
1128
0
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1129
0
        return 0;
1130
    /* AKID and IDP must match */
1131
0
    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1132
0
        return 0;
1133
0
    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1134
0
        return 0;
1135
    /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1136
0
    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1137
0
        return 0;
1138
    /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1139
0
    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1140
0
        return 1;
1141
0
    return 0;
1142
0
}
1143
1144
/*
1145
 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1146
 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1147
 */
1148
1149
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1150
                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1151
0
{
1152
0
    X509_CRL *delta;
1153
0
    int i;
1154
0
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1155
0
        return;
1156
0
    if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1157
0
        return;
1158
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1159
0
        delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1160
0
        if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1161
0
            if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1162
0
                *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1163
0
            X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1164
0
            *dcrl = delta;
1165
0
            return;
1166
0
        }
1167
0
    }
1168
0
    *dcrl = NULL;
1169
0
}
1170
1171
/*
1172
 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1173
 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1174
 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1175
 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1176
 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1177
 */
1178
1179
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1180
                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1181
0
{
1182
1183
0
    int crl_score = 0;
1184
0
    unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1185
1186
    /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1187
1188
    /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1189
0
    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1190
0
        return 0;
1191
    /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1192
0
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1193
0
        if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1194
0
            return 0;
1195
0
    } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1196
        /* If no new reasons reject */
1197
0
        if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1198
0
            return 0;
1199
0
    }
1200
    /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1201
0
    else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1202
0
        return 0;
1203
    /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1204
0
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1205
0
        if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1206
0
            return 0;
1207
0
    } else
1208
0
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1209
1210
0
    if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1211
0
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1212
1213
    /* Check expiry */
1214
0
    if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1215
0
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1216
1217
    /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1218
0
    crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1219
1220
    /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1221
1222
0
    if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1223
0
        return 0;
1224
1225
    /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1226
1227
0
    if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1228
        /* If no new reasons reject */
1229
0
        if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1230
0
            return 0;
1231
0
        tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1232
0
        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1233
0
    }
1234
1235
0
    *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1236
1237
0
    return crl_score;
1238
1239
0
}
1240
1241
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1242
                           X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1243
0
{
1244
0
    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1245
0
    X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1246
0
    int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1247
0
    int i;
1248
1249
0
    if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1250
0
        cidx++;
1251
1252
0
    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1253
1254
0
    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1255
0
        if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1256
0
            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1257
0
            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1258
0
            return;
1259
0
        }
1260
0
    }
1261
1262
0
    for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1263
0
        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1264
0
        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1265
0
            continue;
1266
0
        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1267
0
            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1268
0
            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1269
0
            return;
1270
0
        }
1271
0
    }
1272
1273
    /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1274
1275
0
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1276
0
        return;
1277
1278
    /*
1279
     * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1280
     * untrusted certificates.
1281
     */
1282
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1283
0
        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1284
0
        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1285
0
            continue;
1286
0
        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1287
0
            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1288
0
            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1289
0
            return;
1290
0
        }
1291
0
    }
1292
0
}
1293
1294
/*
1295
 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1296
 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1297
 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1298
 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1299
 */
1300
1301
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1302
0
{
1303
0
    X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1304
0
    int ret;
1305
1306
    /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1307
0
    if (ctx->parent)
1308
0
        return 0;
1309
0
    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1310
0
        return -1;
1311
1312
0
    crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1313
    /* Copy verify params across */
1314
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1315
1316
0
    crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1317
0
    crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1318
1319
    /* Verify CRL issuer */
1320
0
    ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1321
0
    if (ret <= 0)
1322
0
        goto err;
1323
1324
    /* Check chain is acceptable */
1325
0
    ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1326
0
 err:
1327
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1328
0
    return ret;
1329
0
}
1330
1331
/*
1332
 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1333
 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1334
 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1335
 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1336
 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1337
 * RFC5280 version
1338
 */
1339
1340
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1341
                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1342
                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1343
0
{
1344
0
    X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1345
0
    cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1346
0
    crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1347
0
    if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1348
0
        return 1;
1349
0
    return 0;
1350
0
}
1351
1352
/*-
1353
 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1354
 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1355
 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1356
 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1357
 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1358
 */
1359
1360
static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1361
0
{
1362
0
    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1363
0
    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1364
0
    GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1365
0
    int i, j;
1366
0
    if (!a || !b)
1367
0
        return 1;
1368
0
    if (a->type == 1) {
1369
0
        if (!a->dpname)
1370
0
            return 0;
1371
        /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1372
0
        if (b->type == 1) {
1373
0
            if (!b->dpname)
1374
0
                return 0;
1375
0
            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1376
0
                return 1;
1377
0
            else
1378
0
                return 0;
1379
0
        }
1380
        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1381
0
        nm = a->dpname;
1382
0
        gens = b->name.fullname;
1383
0
    } else if (b->type == 1) {
1384
0
        if (!b->dpname)
1385
0
            return 0;
1386
        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1387
0
        gens = a->name.fullname;
1388
0
        nm = b->dpname;
1389
0
    }
1390
1391
    /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1392
0
    if (nm) {
1393
0
        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1394
0
            gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1395
0
            if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1396
0
                continue;
1397
0
            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1398
0
                return 1;
1399
0
        }
1400
0
        return 0;
1401
0
    }
1402
1403
    /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1404
1405
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1406
0
        gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1407
0
        for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1408
0
            genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1409
0
            if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1410
0
                return 1;
1411
0
        }
1412
0
    }
1413
1414
0
    return 0;
1415
1416
0
}
1417
1418
static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1419
0
{
1420
0
    int i;
1421
0
    X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1422
    /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1423
0
    if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1424
0
        return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1425
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1426
0
        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1427
0
        if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1428
0
            continue;
1429
0
        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1430
0
            return 1;
1431
0
    }
1432
0
    return 0;
1433
0
}
1434
1435
/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1436
1437
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1438
                           unsigned int *preasons)
1439
0
{
1440
0
    int i;
1441
0
    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1442
0
        return 0;
1443
0
    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1444
0
        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1445
0
            return 0;
1446
0
    } else {
1447
0
        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1448
0
            return 0;
1449
0
    }
1450
0
    *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1451
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1452
0
        DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1453
0
        if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1454
0
            if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1455
0
                *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1456
0
                return 1;
1457
0
            }
1458
0
        }
1459
0
    }
1460
0
    if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1461
0
        && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1462
0
        return 1;
1463
0
    return 0;
1464
0
}
1465
1466
/*
1467
 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1468
 * to find a delta CRL too
1469
 */
1470
1471
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1472
                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1473
0
{
1474
0
    int ok;
1475
0
    X509 *issuer = NULL;
1476
0
    int crl_score = 0;
1477
0
    unsigned int reasons;
1478
0
    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1479
0
    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1480
0
    X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1481
1482
0
    reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1483
0
    ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1484
0
                    &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1485
0
    if (ok)
1486
0
        goto done;
1487
1488
    /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1489
1490
0
    skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1491
1492
    /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1493
0
    if (!skcrl && crl)
1494
0
        goto done;
1495
1496
0
    get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1497
1498
0
    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1499
1500
0
 done:
1501
    /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1502
0
    if (crl) {
1503
0
        ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1504
0
        ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1505
0
        ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1506
0
        *pcrl = crl;
1507
0
        *pdcrl = dcrl;
1508
0
        return 1;
1509
0
    }
1510
0
    return 0;
1511
0
}
1512
1513
/* Check CRL validity */
1514
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1515
0
{
1516
0
    X509 *issuer = NULL;
1517
0
    EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1518
0
    int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1519
0
    int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1520
1521
    /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1522
0
    if (ctx->current_issuer)
1523
0
        issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1524
    /*
1525
     * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1526
     * certificate in chain.
1527
     */
1528
0
    else if (cnum < chnum)
1529
0
        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1530
0
    else {
1531
0
        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1532
        /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1533
0
        if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1534
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1535
0
            return 0;
1536
0
    }
1537
1538
0
    if (issuer == NULL)
1539
0
        return 1;
1540
1541
    /*
1542
     * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1543
     */
1544
0
    if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1545
        /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1546
0
        if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1547
0
            !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
1548
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1549
0
            return 0;
1550
1551
0
        if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
1552
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1553
0
            return 0;
1554
1555
0
        if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
1556
0
            check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1557
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1558
0
            return 0;
1559
1560
0
        if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
1561
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1562
0
            return 0;
1563
0
    }
1564
1565
0
    if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
1566
0
        !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1567
0
        return 0;
1568
1569
    /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1570
0
    ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
1571
1572
0
    if (!ikey &&
1573
0
        !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1574
0
        return 0;
1575
1576
0
    if (ikey) {
1577
0
        int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1578
1579
0
        if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1580
0
            return 0;
1581
        /* Verify CRL signature */
1582
0
        if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1583
0
            !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1584
0
            return 0;
1585
0
    }
1586
0
    return 1;
1587
0
}
1588
1589
/* Check certificate against CRL */
1590
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1591
0
{
1592
0
    X509_REVOKED *rev;
1593
1594
    /*
1595
     * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1596
     * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1597
     * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1598
     * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1599
     */
1600
0
    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1601
0
        && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
1602
0
        !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1603
0
        return 0;
1604
    /*
1605
     * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL.  If found, make sure
1606
     * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1607
     */
1608
0
    if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1609
0
        if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1610
0
            return 2;
1611
0
        if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
1612
0
            return 0;
1613
0
    }
1614
1615
0
    return 1;
1616
0
}
1617
1618
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1619
0
{
1620
0
    int ret;
1621
1622
0
    if (ctx->parent)
1623
0
        return 1;
1624
    /*
1625
     * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1626
     * certificate!  In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1627
     * certificate as a top-most element.  This comports well with RFC5280
1628
     * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1629
     * chain to be verified.  In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1630
     * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1631
     * element.  We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1632
     * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1633
     * X509_policy_check() call.
1634
     */
1635
0
    if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1636
0
        X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1637
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1638
0
        return 0;
1639
0
    }
1640
0
    ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1641
0
                            ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1642
0
    if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1643
0
        sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1644
1645
0
    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
1646
0
        X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1647
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1648
0
        return 0;
1649
0
    }
1650
    /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1651
0
    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
1652
0
        int i, cbcalled = 0;
1653
1654
        /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1655
0
        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1656
0
            X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1657
1658
0
            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1659
0
                continue;
1660
0
            cbcalled = 1;
1661
0
            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
1662
0
                                X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
1663
0
                return 0;
1664
0
        }
1665
0
        if (!cbcalled) {
1666
            /* Should not be able to get here */
1667
0
            X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1668
0
            return 0;
1669
0
        }
1670
        /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
1671
0
        return 1;
1672
0
    }
1673
0
    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
1674
0
        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1675
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1676
0
        return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1677
0
    }
1678
0
    if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1679
0
        X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1680
0
        return 0;
1681
0
    }
1682
1683
0
    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1684
0
        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1685
        /*
1686
         * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1687
         * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1688
         * remain in an error state.  Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1689
         * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1690
         */
1691
0
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1692
0
            return 0;
1693
0
    }
1694
1695
0
    return 1;
1696
0
}
1697
1698
/*-
1699
 * Check certificate validity times.
1700
 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1701
 * the validation status.
1702
 *
1703
 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1704
 */
1705
int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1706
0
{
1707
0
    time_t *ptime;
1708
0
    int i;
1709
1710
0
    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1711
0
        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1712
0
    else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1713
0
        return 1;
1714
0
    else
1715
0
        ptime = NULL;
1716
1717
0
    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
1718
0
    if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1719
0
        return 0;
1720
0
    if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1721
0
                                  X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1722
0
        return 0;
1723
0
    if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1724
0
        return 0;
1725
1726
0
    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
1727
0
    if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1728
0
        return 0;
1729
0
    if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1730
0
                                  X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1731
0
        return 0;
1732
0
    if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1733
0
        return 0;
1734
0
    return 1;
1735
0
}
1736
1737
/* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */
1738
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1739
0
{
1740
0
    int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1741
0
    X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1742
0
    X509 *xs;
1743
1744
    /*
1745
     * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1746
     * check the timestamps of the top certificate.  We report the issuer as
1747
     * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1748
     */
1749
0
    if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1750
0
        xs = xi;
1751
0
        xi = NULL;
1752
0
        goto check_cert_time;
1753
0
    }
1754
1755
0
    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1756
0
        xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
1757
0
    else {
1758
0
        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1759
0
            xs = xi;
1760
0
            goto check_cert_time;
1761
0
        }
1762
0
        if (n <= 0) {
1763
0
            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1764
0
                                X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE))
1765
0
                return 0;
1766
1767
0
            xs = xi;
1768
0
            goto check_cert_time;
1769
0
        }
1770
1771
0
        n--;
1772
0
        ctx->error_depth = n;
1773
0
        xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1774
0
    }
1775
1776
    /*
1777
     * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1778
     * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1779
     */
1780
0
    while (n >= 0) {
1781
        /*
1782
         * For each iteration of this loop:
1783
         * n is the subject depth
1784
         * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
1785
         * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
1786
         * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
1787
         *
1788
         * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly
1789
         * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
1790
         */
1791
0
        if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)
1792
0
                         && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) {
1793
0
            EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1794
            /*
1795
             * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
1796
             * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer
1797
             * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject).
1798
             */
1799
0
            int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1);
1800
            /*
1801
             * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4
1802
             * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
1803
             * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
1804
             * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
1805
             * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the
1806
             * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
1807
             * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
1808
             * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
1809
             * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
1810
             * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus
1811
             * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
1812
             */
1813
0
            int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
1814
0
                ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs);
1815
1816
0
            if (ret != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret))
1817
0
                return 0;
1818
0
            if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1819
0
                ret = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1820
0
                if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret))
1821
0
                    return 0;
1822
0
            } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1823
0
                ret = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1824
0
                if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, ret))
1825
0
                    return 0;
1826
0
            }
1827
0
        }
1828
1829
0
    check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */
1830
        /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1831
0
        if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1832
0
            return 0;
1833
1834
        /*
1835
         * Signal success at this depth.  However, the previous error (if any)
1836
         * is retained.
1837
         */
1838
0
        ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1839
0
        ctx->current_cert = xs;
1840
0
        ctx->error_depth = n;
1841
0
        if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1842
0
            return 0;
1843
1844
0
        if (--n >= 0) {
1845
0
            xi = xs;
1846
0
            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1847
0
        }
1848
0
    }
1849
0
    return 1;
1850
0
}
1851
1852
int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1853
0
{
1854
0
    return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1855
0
}
1856
1857
int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1858
0
{
1859
0
    static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1860
0
    static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1861
0
    ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1862
0
    int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1863
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
1864
    const char upper_z = 0x5A;
1865
#else
1866
0
    const char upper_z = 'Z';
1867
0
#endif
1868
    /*
1869
     * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1870
     * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1871
     * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1872
     * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1873
     *
1874
     * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1875
     * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1876
     *  validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1877
     *  dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1878
     */
1879
0
    switch (ctm->type) {
1880
0
    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1881
0
        if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
1882
0
            return 0;
1883
0
        break;
1884
0
    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
1885
0
        if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
1886
0
            return 0;
1887
0
        break;
1888
0
    default:
1889
0
        return 0;
1890
0
    }
1891
1892
    /**
1893
     * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1894
     * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1895
     * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1896
     */
1897
0
    for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
1898
0
        if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
1899
0
            return 0;
1900
0
    }
1901
0
    if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z)
1902
0
        return 0;
1903
1904
    /*
1905
     * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1906
     * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1907
     * so we go through ASN.1
1908
     */
1909
0
    asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
1910
0
    if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
1911
0
        goto err;
1912
0
    if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
1913
0
        goto err;
1914
1915
    /*
1916
     * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1917
     * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1918
     */
1919
0
    ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1920
1921
0
 err:
1922
0
    ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
1923
0
    return ret;
1924
0
}
1925
1926
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1927
0
{
1928
0
    return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1929
0
}
1930
1931
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1932
0
{
1933
0
    return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1934
0
}
1935
1936
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1937
                            int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1938
0
{
1939
0
    time_t t;
1940
1941
0
    if (in_tm)
1942
0
        t = *in_tm;
1943
0
    else
1944
0
        time(&t);
1945
1946
0
    if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1947
0
        if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1948
0
            return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1949
0
        if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1950
0
            return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1951
0
    }
1952
0
    return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1953
0
}
1954
1955
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1956
0
{
1957
0
    EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1958
0
    int i, j;
1959
1960
0
    if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1961
0
        return 1;
1962
1963
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1964
0
        ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1965
0
        if (ktmp == NULL) {
1966
0
            X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1967
0
                    X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1968
0
            return 0;
1969
0
        }
1970
0
        if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1971
0
            break;
1972
0
    }
1973
0
    if (ktmp == NULL) {
1974
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1975
0
                X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1976
0
        return 0;
1977
0
    }
1978
1979
    /* first, populate the other certs */
1980
0
    for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1981
0
        ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1982
0
        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1983
0
    }
1984
1985
0
    if (pkey != NULL)
1986
0
        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1987
0
    return 1;
1988
0
}
1989
1990
/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1991
1992
X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1993
                        EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1994
0
{
1995
0
    X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1996
0
    int i;
1997
0
    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1998
    /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1999
0
    if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2000
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2001
0
        return NULL;
2002
0
    }
2003
    /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2004
0
    if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2005
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2006
0
        return NULL;
2007
0
    }
2008
    /* Issuer names must match */
2009
0
    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2010
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2011
0
        return NULL;
2012
0
    }
2013
    /* AKID and IDP must match */
2014
0
    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2015
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2016
0
        return NULL;
2017
0
    }
2018
0
    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2019
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2020
0
        return NULL;
2021
0
    }
2022
    /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2023
0
    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2024
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2025
0
        return NULL;
2026
0
    }
2027
    /* CRLs must verify */
2028
0
    if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2029
0
                 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2030
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2031
0
        return NULL;
2032
0
    }
2033
    /* Create new CRL */
2034
0
    crl = X509_CRL_new();
2035
0
    if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2036
0
        goto memerr;
2037
    /* Set issuer name */
2038
0
    if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2039
0
        goto memerr;
2040
2041
0
    if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
2042
0
        goto memerr;
2043
0
    if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
2044
0
        goto memerr;
2045
2046
    /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2047
2048
0
    if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2049
0
        goto memerr;
2050
2051
    /*
2052
     * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2053
     * number to correct value too.
2054
     */
2055
2056
0
    for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2057
0
        X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2058
0
        ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2059
0
        if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2060
0
            goto memerr;
2061
0
    }
2062
2063
    /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2064
2065
0
    revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2066
2067
0
    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2068
0
        X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2069
0
        rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2070
        /*
2071
         * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2072
         * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2073
         */
2074
0
        if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
2075
0
            rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2076
0
            if (!rvtmp)
2077
0
                goto memerr;
2078
0
            if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2079
0
                X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2080
0
                goto memerr;
2081
0
            }
2082
0
        }
2083
0
    }
2084
    /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2085
2086
0
    if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2087
0
        goto memerr;
2088
2089
0
    return crl;
2090
2091
0
 memerr:
2092
0
    X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2093
0
    X509_CRL_free(crl);
2094
0
    return NULL;
2095
0
}
2096
2097
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2098
0
{
2099
0
    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2100
0
}
2101
2102
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2103
0
{
2104
0
    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2105
0
}
2106
2107
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2108
0
{
2109
0
    return ctx->error;
2110
0
}
2111
2112
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2113
0
{
2114
0
    ctx->error = err;
2115
0
}
2116
2117
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2118
0
{
2119
0
    return ctx->error_depth;
2120
0
}
2121
2122
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2123
0
{
2124
0
    ctx->error_depth = depth;
2125
0
}
2126
2127
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2128
0
{
2129
0
    return ctx->current_cert;
2130
0
}
2131
2132
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2133
0
{
2134
0
    ctx->current_cert = x;
2135
0
}
2136
2137
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2138
0
{
2139
0
    return ctx->chain;
2140
0
}
2141
2142
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2143
0
{
2144
0
    if (!ctx->chain)
2145
0
        return NULL;
2146
0
    return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2147
0
}
2148
2149
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2150
0
{
2151
0
    return ctx->current_issuer;
2152
0
}
2153
2154
X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2155
0
{
2156
0
    return ctx->current_crl;
2157
0
}
2158
2159
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2160
0
{
2161
0
    return ctx->parent;
2162
0
}
2163
2164
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2165
0
{
2166
0
    ctx->cert = x;
2167
0
}
2168
2169
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2170
0
{
2171
0
    ctx->crls = sk;
2172
0
}
2173
2174
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2175
0
{
2176
    /*
2177
     * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2178
     * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all?  Or should the trust
2179
     * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2180
     */
2181
0
    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2182
0
}
2183
2184
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2185
0
{
2186
    /*
2187
     * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2188
     * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2189
     */
2190
0
    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2191
0
}
2192
2193
/*
2194
 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2195
 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2196
 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2197
 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2198
 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2199
 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2200
 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2201
 * client/server.
2202
 */
2203
2204
int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2205
                                   int purpose, int trust)
2206
0
{
2207
0
    int idx;
2208
    /* If purpose not set use default */
2209
0
    if (!purpose)
2210
0
        purpose = def_purpose;
2211
    /*
2212
     * If purpose is set but we don't have a default then set the default to
2213
     * the current purpose
2214
     */
2215
0
    else if (def_purpose == 0)
2216
0
        def_purpose = purpose;
2217
    /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2218
0
    if (purpose) {
2219
0
        X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2220
0
        idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2221
0
        if (idx == -1) {
2222
0
            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2223
0
                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2224
0
            return 0;
2225
0
        }
2226
0
        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2227
0
        if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2228
0
            idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2229
0
            if (idx == -1) {
2230
0
                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2231
0
                        X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2232
0
                return 0;
2233
0
            }
2234
0
            ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2235
0
        }
2236
        /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2237
0
        if (!trust)
2238
0
            trust = ptmp->trust;
2239
0
    }
2240
0
    if (trust) {
2241
0
        idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2242
0
        if (idx == -1) {
2243
0
            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2244
0
                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2245
0
            return 0;
2246
0
        }
2247
0
    }
2248
2249
0
    if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2250
0
        ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2251
0
    if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2252
0
        ctx->param->trust = trust;
2253
0
    return 1;
2254
0
}
2255
2256
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2257
0
{
2258
0
    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2259
2260
0
    if (ctx == NULL) {
2261
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2262
0
        return NULL;
2263
0
    }
2264
0
    return ctx;
2265
0
}
2266
2267
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2268
0
{
2269
0
    if (ctx == NULL)
2270
0
        return;
2271
2272
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2273
0
    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2274
0
}
2275
2276
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2277
                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2278
0
{
2279
0
    int ret = 1;
2280
2281
0
    ctx->ctx = store;
2282
0
    ctx->cert = x509;
2283
0
    ctx->untrusted = chain;
2284
0
    ctx->crls = NULL;
2285
0
    ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
2286
0
    ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2287
0
    ctx->valid = 0;
2288
0
    ctx->chain = NULL;
2289
0
    ctx->error = 0;
2290
0
    ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2291
0
    ctx->error_depth = 0;
2292
0
    ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2293
0
    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2294
0
    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2295
0
    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2296
0
    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2297
0
    ctx->tree = NULL;
2298
0
    ctx->parent = NULL;
2299
0
    ctx->dane = NULL;
2300
0
    ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
2301
    /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2302
0
    memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2303
2304
    /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2305
0
    if (store)
2306
0
        ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2307
0
    else
2308
0
        ctx->cleanup = 0;
2309
2310
0
    if (store && store->check_issued)
2311
0
        ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2312
0
    else
2313
0
        ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2314
2315
0
    if (store && store->get_issuer)
2316
0
        ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2317
0
    else
2318
0
        ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2319
2320
0
    if (store && store->verify_cb)
2321
0
        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2322
0
    else
2323
0
        ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2324
2325
0
    if (store && store->verify)
2326
0
        ctx->verify = store->verify;
2327
0
    else
2328
0
        ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2329
2330
0
    if (store && store->check_revocation)
2331
0
        ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2332
0
    else
2333
0
        ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2334
2335
0
    if (store && store->get_crl)
2336
0
        ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2337
0
    else
2338
0
        ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2339
2340
0
    if (store && store->check_crl)
2341
0
        ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2342
0
    else
2343
0
        ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2344
2345
0
    if (store && store->cert_crl)
2346
0
        ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2347
0
    else
2348
0
        ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2349
2350
0
    if (store && store->check_policy)
2351
0
        ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
2352
0
    else
2353
0
        ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2354
2355
0
    if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2356
0
        ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2357
0
    else
2358
0
        ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
2359
2360
0
    if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2361
0
        ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2362
0
    else
2363
0
        ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
2364
2365
0
    ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2366
0
    if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2367
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2368
0
        goto err;
2369
0
    }
2370
2371
    /*
2372
     * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2373
     */
2374
0
    if (store)
2375
0
        ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2376
0
    else
2377
0
        ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2378
2379
0
    if (ret)
2380
0
        ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2381
0
                                        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2382
2383
0
    if (ret == 0) {
2384
0
        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2385
0
        goto err;
2386
0
    }
2387
2388
    /*
2389
     * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2390
     * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2391
     */
2392
0
    if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2393
0
        int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2394
0
        X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2395
2396
0
        if (xp != NULL)
2397
0
            ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2398
0
    }
2399
2400
0
    if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2401
0
                           &ctx->ex_data))
2402
0
        return 1;
2403
0
    X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2404
2405
0
 err:
2406
    /*
2407
     * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2408
     * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2409
     */
2410
0
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2411
0
    return 0;
2412
0
}
2413
2414
/*
2415
 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2416
 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2417
 */
2418
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2419
0
{
2420
0
    ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2421
0
    ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2422
0
    ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2423
0
}
2424
2425
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2426
0
{
2427
    /*
2428
     * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2429
     * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2430
     * calls cleanup() for the same object twice!  Thus we must zero the
2431
     * pointers below after they're freed!
2432
     */
2433
    /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2434
0
    if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2435
0
        ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2436
0
        ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2437
0
    }
2438
0
    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2439
0
        if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2440
0
            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2441
0
        ctx->param = NULL;
2442
0
    }
2443
0
    X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2444
0
    ctx->tree = NULL;
2445
0
    sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2446
0
    ctx->chain = NULL;
2447
0
    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2448
0
    memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2449
0
}
2450
2451
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2452
0
{
2453
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2454
0
}
2455
2456
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2457
0
{
2458
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2459
0
}
2460
2461
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2462
                             time_t t)
2463
0
{
2464
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2465
0
}
2466
2467
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2468
0
{
2469
0
    return ctx->cert;
2470
0
}
2471
2472
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2473
0
{
2474
0
    return ctx->untrusted;
2475
0
}
2476
2477
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2478
0
{
2479
0
    ctx->untrusted = sk;
2480
0
}
2481
2482
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2483
0
{
2484
0
    sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2485
0
    ctx->chain = sk;
2486
0
}
2487
2488
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2489
                                  X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
2490
0
{
2491
0
    ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2492
0
}
2493
2494
X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2495
0
{
2496
0
    return ctx->verify_cb;
2497
0
}
2498
2499
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2500
                               X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
2501
0
{
2502
0
    ctx->verify = verify;
2503
0
}
2504
2505
X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2506
0
{
2507
0
    return ctx->verify;
2508
0
}
2509
2510
X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2511
0
{
2512
0
    return ctx->get_issuer;
2513
0
}
2514
2515
X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2516
0
{
2517
0
    return ctx->check_issued;
2518
0
}
2519
2520
X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2521
0
{
2522
0
    return ctx->check_revocation;
2523
0
}
2524
2525
X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2526
0
{
2527
0
    return ctx->get_crl;
2528
0
}
2529
2530
X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2531
0
{
2532
0
    return ctx->check_crl;
2533
0
}
2534
2535
X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2536
0
{
2537
0
    return ctx->cert_crl;
2538
0
}
2539
2540
X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2541
0
{
2542
0
    return ctx->check_policy;
2543
0
}
2544
2545
X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2546
0
{
2547
0
    return ctx->lookup_certs;
2548
0
}
2549
2550
X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2551
0
{
2552
0
    return ctx->lookup_crls;
2553
0
}
2554
2555
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2556
0
{
2557
0
    return ctx->cleanup;
2558
0
}
2559
2560
X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2561
0
{
2562
0
    return ctx->tree;
2563
0
}
2564
2565
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2566
0
{
2567
0
    return ctx->explicit_policy;
2568
0
}
2569
2570
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2571
0
{
2572
0
    return ctx->num_untrusted;
2573
0
}
2574
2575
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2576
0
{
2577
0
    const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2578
0
    param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2579
0
    if (!param)
2580
0
        return 0;
2581
0
    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2582
0
}
2583
2584
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2585
0
{
2586
0
    return ctx->param;
2587
0
}
2588
2589
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2590
0
{
2591
0
    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2592
0
    ctx->param = param;
2593
0
}
2594
2595
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
2596
0
{
2597
0
    ctx->dane = dane;
2598
0
}
2599
2600
static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2601
    X509 *cert,
2602
    uint8_t selector,
2603
    unsigned int *i2dlen)
2604
0
{
2605
0
    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2606
0
    int len;
2607
2608
    /*
2609
     * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2610
     */
2611
0
    switch (selector) {
2612
0
    case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2613
0
        len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2614
0
        break;
2615
0
    case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2616
0
        len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2617
0
        break;
2618
0
    default:
2619
0
        X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2620
0
        return NULL;
2621
0
    }
2622
2623
0
    if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2624
0
        X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2625
0
        return NULL;
2626
0
    }
2627
2628
0
    *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2629
0
    return buf;
2630
0
}
2631
2632
0
#define DANETLS_NONE 256        /* impossible uint8_t */
2633
2634
static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2635
0
{
2636
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2637
0
    unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2638
0
    unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2639
0
    unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2640
0
    unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2641
0
    unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2642
0
    unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2643
0
    unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2644
0
    unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2645
0
    unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2646
0
    int i;
2647
0
    int recnum;
2648
0
    int matched = 0;
2649
0
    danetls_record *t = NULL;
2650
0
    uint32_t mask;
2651
2652
0
    mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2653
2654
    /*
2655
     * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2656
     */
2657
0
    if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2658
0
        mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2659
2660
    /*
2661
     * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2662
     * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2663
     * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2664
     */
2665
0
    if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2666
0
        mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2667
2668
    /*-
2669
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2670
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2671
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2672
     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2673
     *
2674
     * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2675
     * and no expiration or hostname checks.  We also process digests with
2676
     * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2677
     * is always processed (last).  If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2678
     *
2679
     * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2680
     * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2681
     * priorities.  See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2682
     *
2683
     * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2684
     * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2685
     * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2686
     * usages, that's OK.  Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2687
     * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2688
     * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2689
     * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2690
     *
2691
     * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2692
     * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2693
     * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2694
     * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2695
     */
2696
0
    recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2697
0
    for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2698
0
        t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2699
0
        if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2700
0
            continue;
2701
0
        if (t->usage != usage) {
2702
0
            usage = t->usage;
2703
2704
            /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2705
0
            mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2706
0
            ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2707
0
        }
2708
0
        if (t->selector != selector) {
2709
0
            selector = t->selector;
2710
2711
            /* Update per-selector state */
2712
0
            OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2713
0
            i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2714
0
            if (i2dbuf == NULL)
2715
0
                return -1;
2716
2717
            /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2718
0
            mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2719
0
            ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2720
0
        } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2721
            /*-
2722
             * Digest agility:
2723
             *
2724
             *     <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2725
             *
2726
             * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2727
             * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2728
             * other than "Full".
2729
             */
2730
0
            if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2731
0
                continue;
2732
0
        }
2733
2734
        /*
2735
         * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2736
         * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2737
         */
2738
0
        if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2739
0
            const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2740
0
            cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
2741
0
            cmplen = i2dlen;
2742
2743
0
            if (md != NULL) {
2744
0
                cmpbuf = mdbuf;
2745
0
                if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2746
0
                    matched = -1;
2747
0
                    break;
2748
0
                }
2749
0
            }
2750
0
        }
2751
2752
        /*
2753
         * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match.  Any
2754
         * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2755
         * full chain.
2756
         */
2757
0
        if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2758
0
            memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2759
0
            if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2760
0
                matched = 1;
2761
0
            if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2762
0
                dane->mdpth = depth;
2763
0
                dane->mtlsa = t;
2764
0
                OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2765
0
                dane->mcert = cert;
2766
0
                X509_up_ref(cert);
2767
0
            }
2768
0
            break;
2769
0
        }
2770
0
    }
2771
2772
    /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2773
0
    OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2774
0
    return matched;
2775
0
}
2776
2777
static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2778
0
{
2779
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2780
0
    int matched = 0;
2781
0
    X509 *cert;
2782
2783
0
    if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2784
0
        return  X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2785
2786
    /*
2787
     * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2788
     * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2789
     * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2790
     */
2791
0
    cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
2792
0
    if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
2793
0
        return  X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2794
0
    if (matched > 0) {
2795
0
        ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
2796
0
        return  X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2797
0
    }
2798
2799
0
    return  X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2800
0
}
2801
2802
static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2803
0
{
2804
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2805
0
    danetls_record *t;
2806
0
    int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
2807
0
    X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2808
0
    int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
2809
0
    int i;
2810
2811
0
    for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
2812
0
        t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2813
0
        if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
2814
0
            t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
2815
0
            t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
2816
0
            X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
2817
0
            continue;
2818
2819
        /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2820
0
        X509_free(dane->mcert);
2821
0
        dane->mcert = NULL;
2822
2823
        /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2824
0
        ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
2825
0
        dane->mdpth = num - 1;
2826
0
        dane->mtlsa = t;
2827
2828
        /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2829
0
        num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2830
0
        for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
2831
0
            X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2832
2833
0
        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2834
0
    }
2835
2836
0
    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2837
0
}
2838
2839
static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
2840
0
{
2841
    /*
2842
     * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2843
     */
2844
0
    X509_free(dane->mcert);
2845
0
    dane->mcert = NULL;
2846
0
    dane->mtlsa = NULL;
2847
0
    dane->mdpth = -1;
2848
0
    dane->pdpth = -1;
2849
0
}
2850
2851
static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2852
0
{
2853
0
    int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
2854
2855
0
    if (err == X509_V_OK)
2856
0
        return 1;
2857
0
    return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
2858
0
}
2859
2860
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2861
0
{
2862
0
    X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
2863
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2864
0
    int matched;
2865
0
    int done;
2866
2867
0
    dane_reset(dane);
2868
2869
    /*-
2870
     * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2871
     * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done.  If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2872
     * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2873
     * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2874
     * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2875
     * if:
2876
     *   + matched < 0, internal error.
2877
     *   + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2878
     *   + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2879
     *     DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2880
     */
2881
0
    matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
2882
0
    done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
2883
2884
0
    if (done)
2885
0
        X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
2886
2887
0
    if (matched > 0) {
2888
        /* Callback invoked as needed */
2889
0
        if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2890
0
            return 0;
2891
        /* Callback invoked as needed */
2892
0
        if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
2893
0
            !check_id(ctx))
2894
0
            return 0;
2895
        /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2896
0
        ctx->error_depth = 0;
2897
0
        ctx->current_cert = cert;
2898
0
        return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
2899
0
    }
2900
2901
0
    if (matched < 0) {
2902
0
        ctx->error_depth = 0;
2903
0
        ctx->current_cert = cert;
2904
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2905
0
        return -1;
2906
0
    }
2907
2908
0
    if (done) {
2909
        /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2910
0
        if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2911
0
            return 0;
2912
0
        return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
2913
0
    }
2914
2915
    /*
2916
     * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2.  TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2917
     * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2918
     */
2919
0
    return verify_chain(ctx);
2920
0
}
2921
2922
/* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2923
static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2924
0
{
2925
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
2926
0
    int ok;
2927
2928
0
    ctx->chain = NULL;
2929
0
    ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
2930
0
    ctx->chain = saved_chain;
2931
2932
0
    return ok;
2933
0
}
2934
2935
static int augment_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *src, STACK_OF(X509) **dstPtr)
2936
0
{
2937
0
    if (src) {
2938
0
        STACK_OF(X509) *dst;
2939
0
        int i;
2940
2941
0
        if (*dstPtr == NULL)
2942
0
            return ((*dstPtr = sk_X509_dup(src)) != NULL);
2943
2944
0
        for (dst = *dstPtr, i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(src); ++i) {
2945
0
            if (!sk_X509_push(dst, sk_X509_value(src, i))) {
2946
0
                sk_X509_free(dst);
2947
0
                *dstPtr = NULL;
2948
0
                return 0;
2949
0
            }
2950
0
        }
2951
0
    }
2952
0
    return 1;
2953
0
}
2954
2955
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2956
0
{
2957
0
    SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2958
0
    int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2959
0
    X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2960
0
    int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
2961
0
    STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
2962
0
    unsigned int search;
2963
0
    int may_trusted = 0;
2964
0
    int may_alternate = 0;
2965
0
    int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2966
0
    int alt_untrusted = 0;
2967
0
    int depth;
2968
0
    int ok = 0;
2969
0
    int i;
2970
2971
    /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2972
0
    if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num))  {
2973
0
        X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2974
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
2975
0
        return 0;
2976
0
    }
2977
2978
0
#define S_DOUNTRUSTED      (1 << 0)     /* Search untrusted chain */
2979
0
#define S_DOTRUSTED        (1 << 1)     /* Search trusted store */
2980
0
#define S_DOALTERNATE      (1 << 2)     /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2981
    /*
2982
     * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2983
     * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2984
     * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first.  If not trusted-first,
2985
     * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2986
     * if no luck with untrusted first.
2987
     */
2988
0
    search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
2989
0
    if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
2990
0
        if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
2991
0
            search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2992
0
        else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
2993
0
            may_alternate = 1;
2994
0
        may_trusted = 1;
2995
0
    }
2996
2997
    /*
2998
     * If we got any "Cert(0) Full(0)" issuer certificates from DNS, *prepend*
2999
     * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack.  Since the
3000
     * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
3001
     * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
3002
     * an empty stack first.  [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
3003
     * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
3004
     * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
3005
     * this to change. ]
3006
     */
3007
0
    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && !augment_stack(dane->certs, &sktmp)) {
3008
0
        X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3009
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3010
0
        return 0;
3011
0
    }
3012
3013
    /*
3014
     * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
3015
     * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
3016
     * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
3017
     */
3018
0
    if (!augment_stack(ctx->untrusted, &sktmp)) {
3019
0
        X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3020
0
        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3021
0
        return 0;
3022
0
    }
3023
3024
    /*
3025
     * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
3026
     * might be reasonable.
3027
     */
3028
0
    if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
3029
0
        ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
3030
3031
    /*
3032
     * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
3033
     * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
3034
     * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
3035
     */
3036
0
    depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
3037
3038
0
    while (search != 0) {
3039
0
        X509 *x;
3040
0
        X509 *xtmp = NULL;
3041
3042
        /*
3043
         * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
3044
         * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled.  When we
3045
         * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
3046
         * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
3047
         *
3048
         * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
3049
         * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
3050
         * not ultimately-trusted issuer.  For example, with verify_depth = 0,
3051
         * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
3052
         * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor.  No attempt will be
3053
         * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
3054
         * would be a-priori too long.
3055
         */
3056
0
        if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
3057
0
            i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3058
0
            if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
3059
                /*
3060
                 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
3061
                 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
3062
                 * has an untrusted issuer.  We use the alt_untrusted variable
3063
                 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match.  It
3064
                 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
3065
                 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
3066
                 * untrusted certificates.  While we're searching for such a
3067
                 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
3068
                 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3069
                 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3070
                 *
3071
                 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3072
                 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3073
                 */
3074
0
                i = alt_untrusted;
3075
0
            }
3076
0
            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
3077
3078
0
            ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
3079
3080
0
            if (ok < 0) {
3081
0
                trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3082
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
3083
0
                search = 0;
3084
0
                continue;
3085
0
            }
3086
3087
0
            if (ok > 0) {
3088
                /*
3089
                 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3090
                 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry.  We might now
3091
                 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store.  Note
3092
                 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
3093
                 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
3094
                 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3095
                 * again.  Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3096
                 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3097
                 *
3098
                 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3099
                 * anchor, reset DANE trust.  We might find a suitable trusted
3100
                 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3101
                 */
3102
0
                if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
3103
0
                    if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0)) {
3104
0
                        X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3105
0
                        X509_free(xtmp);
3106
0
                        trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3107
0
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3108
0
                        search = 0;
3109
0
                        continue;
3110
0
                    }
3111
0
                    search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
3112
0
                    for (; num > i; --num)
3113
0
                        X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
3114
0
                    ctx->num_untrusted = num;
3115
3116
0
                    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3117
0
                        dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
3118
0
                        dane->mdpth = -1;
3119
0
                        X509_free(dane->mcert);
3120
0
                        dane->mcert = NULL;
3121
0
                    }
3122
0
                    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3123
0
                        dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
3124
0
                        dane->pdpth = -1;
3125
0
                }
3126
3127
                /*
3128
                 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3129
                 * trusted matching issuer.  Otherwise, grow the chain.
3130
                 */
3131
0
                if (ss == 0) {
3132
0
                    if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
3133
0
                        X509_free(xtmp);
3134
0
                        X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3135
0
                        trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3136
0
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3137
0
                        search = 0;
3138
0
                        continue;
3139
0
                    }
3140
0
                    ss = cert_self_signed(x);
3141
0
                } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
3142
                    /*
3143
                     * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3144
                     * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3145
                     * a trust-anchor.  We must have an exact match to avoid
3146
                     * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3147
                     */
3148
0
                    if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
3149
                        /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3150
0
                        X509_free(xtmp);
3151
0
                        ok = 0;
3152
0
                    } else {
3153
0
                        X509_free(x);
3154
0
                        ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
3155
0
                        (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
3156
0
                    }
3157
0
                }
3158
3159
                /*
3160
                 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3161
                 * trust.  If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3162
                 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3163
                 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3164
                 *
3165
                 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3166
                 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3167
                 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3168
                 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store.  In particular, the
3169
                 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3170
                 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3171
                 */
3172
0
                if (ok) {
3173
0
                    if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) {
3174
0
                        X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3175
0
                        trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3176
0
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3177
0
                        search = 0;
3178
0
                        continue;
3179
0
                    }
3180
0
                    search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3181
0
                    switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
3182
0
                    case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3183
0
                    case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3184
0
                        search = 0;
3185
0
                        continue;
3186
0
                    }
3187
0
                    if (ss == 0)
3188
0
                        continue;
3189
0
                }
3190
0
            }
3191
3192
            /*
3193
             * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3194
             * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3195
             * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3196
             * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3197
             */
3198
0
            if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
3199
                /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3200
0
                if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
3201
0
                    continue;
3202
                /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3203
0
                if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
3204
0
                    ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
3205
0
                    break;
3206
                /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3207
0
                search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
3208
0
                alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
3209
0
                ss = 0;
3210
0
            }
3211
0
        }
3212
3213
        /*
3214
         * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3215
         */
3216
0
        if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
3217
0
            num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3218
0
            if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) {
3219
0
                X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3220
0
                trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3221
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3222
0
                search = 0;
3223
0
                continue;
3224
0
            }
3225
0
            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
3226
3227
            /*
3228
             * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3229
             * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3230
             */
3231
0
            xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
3232
0
            if (xtmp == NULL) {
3233
0
                search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3234
0
                if (may_trusted)
3235
0
                    search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3236
0
                continue;
3237
0
            }
3238
3239
            /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3240
0
            (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
3241
3242
0
            if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) {
3243
0
                X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3244
0
                trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3245
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3246
0
                search = 0;
3247
0
                continue;
3248
0
            }
3249
3250
0
            if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
3251
0
                X509_free(xtmp);
3252
0
                X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3253
0
                trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3254
0
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3255
0
                search = 0;
3256
0
                continue;
3257
0
            }
3258
3259
0
            x = xtmp;
3260
0
            ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3261
0
            ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
3262
3263
            /*
3264
             * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3265
             */
3266
0
            switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
3267
0
            case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3268
0
            case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3269
0
                search = 0;
3270
0
                continue;
3271
0
            }
3272
0
        }
3273
0
    }
3274
0
    sk_X509_free(sktmp);
3275
3276
    /*
3277
     * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3278
     * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3279
     */
3280
0
    num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3281
0
    if (num <= depth) {
3282
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3283
0
            trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
3284
0
        if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3285
0
            trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3286
0
    }
3287
3288
0
    switch (trust) {
3289
0
    case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3290
0
        return 1;
3291
0
    case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3292
        /* Callback already issued */
3293
0
        return 0;
3294
0
    case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3295
0
    default:
3296
0
        num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3297
0
        if (num > depth)
3298
0
            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3299
0
                                  X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3300
0
        if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3301
0
            (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
3302
0
            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3303
0
        if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
3304
0
            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3305
0
                                  X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
3306
0
        if (ss)
3307
0
            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3308
0
                                  X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3309
0
        if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
3310
0
            return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3311
0
                                  X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
3312
0
        return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3313
0
                              X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
3314
0
    }
3315
0
}
3316
3317
static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3318
static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3319
3320
/*
3321
 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3322
 * ``ctx``.
3323
 *
3324
 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3325
 */
3326
static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3327
0
{
3328
0
    EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3329
0
    int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3330
3331
    /*
3332
     * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
3333
     * key type.  Some engines support key types not understood outside the
3334
     * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
3335
     * floor.
3336
     */
3337
0
    if (level <= 0)
3338
0
        return 1;
3339
3340
    /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3341
0
    if (pkey == NULL)
3342
0
        return 0;
3343
3344
0
    if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3345
0
        level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3346
3347
0
    return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3348
0
}
3349
3350
/*
3351
 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
3352
 * for an elliptic curve.
3353
 *
3354
 * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors.
3355
 */
3356
static int check_curve(X509 *cert)
3357
0
{
3358
0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3359
0
    EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3360
3361
    /* Unsupported or malformed key */
3362
0
    if (pkey == NULL)
3363
0
        return -1;
3364
3365
0
    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3366
0
        int ret;
3367
3368
0
        ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
3369
0
        return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret;
3370
0
    }
3371
0
#endif
3372
3373
0
    return 1;
3374
0
}
3375
3376
/*
3377
 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3378
 * level of ``ctx``.  Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3379
 * self-signed or otherwise).
3380
 *
3381
 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3382
 */
3383
static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3384
0
{
3385
0
    int secbits = -1;
3386
0
    int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3387
3388
0
    if (level <= 0)
3389
0
        return 1;
3390
0
    if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3391
0
        level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3392
3393
0
    if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
3394
0
        return 0;
3395
3396
0
    return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3397
0
}