/src/openssl111/ssl/t1_enc.c

Source (jump to first uncovered line)
/*
 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
 *
 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_local.h"
#include <openssl/comp.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>

/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
                    const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
                    const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
                    const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
                    const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len,
                    const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len,
                    const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
                    unsigned char *out, size_t olen, int fatal)
{
    const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
    int ret = 0;

    if (md == NULL) {
        /* Should never happen */
        if (fatal)
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        else
            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        return 0;
    }
    pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
    if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, (int)slen) <= 0
        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, (int)seed1_len) <= 0
        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, (int)seed2_len) <= 0
        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, (int)seed3_len) <= 0
        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed4, (int)seed4_len) <= 0
        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed5, (int)seed5_len) <= 0
        || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &olen) <= 0) {
        if (fatal)
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        else
            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    ret = 1;

 err:
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
    return ret;
}

static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num)
{
    int ret;

    /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
    ret = tls1_PRF(s,
                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
                   TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
                   SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                   NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
                   s->session->master_key_length, km, num, 1);

    return ret;
}

int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
    unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
    unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
    const EVP_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
    const SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
    const EVP_MD *m;
    int mac_type;
    size_t *mac_secret_size;
    EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
    EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
    size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
    int reuse_dd = 0;

    c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
    m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
    mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
    comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
#endif

    if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
        if (s->ext.use_etm)
            s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
        else
            s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;

        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
        else
            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;

        if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
            reuse_dd = 1;
        } else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            goto err;
        } else {
            /*
             * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
             */
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
        }
        dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
        mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
        if (mac_ctx == NULL)
            goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
        COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
        s->expand = NULL;
        if (comp != NULL) {
            s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
            if (s->expand == NULL) {
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                         SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
                goto err;
            }
        }
#endif
        /*
         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
         */
        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
            RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
        mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
    } else {
        s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
        if (s->ext.use_etm)
            s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
        else
            s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;

        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
            s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
        else
            s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
        if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
            reuse_dd = 1;
        } else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            goto err;
        }
        dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
            mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
            if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto err;
            }
            s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
        } else {
            mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
            if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto err;
            }
        }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
        COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
        s->compress = NULL;
        if (comp != NULL) {
            s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
            if (s->compress == NULL) {
                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                         SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                        SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
                goto err;
            }
        }
#endif
        /*
         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
         */
        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
            RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
        mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
        mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
    }

    if (reuse_dd)
        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);

    p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
    i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;

    /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
    cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
    j = cl;
    /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
    /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
    if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
        k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
    else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
        k = EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
    else
        k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
    if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
        (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
        ms = &(p[0]);
        n = i + i;
        key = &(p[n]);
        n += j + j;
        iv = &(p[n]);
        n += k + k;
    } else {
        n = i;
        ms = &(p[n]);
        n += i + j;
        key = &(p[n]);
        n += j + k;
        iv = &(p[n]);
        n += k;
    }

    if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);

    if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
        /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
        mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
                                               (int)*mac_secret_size);
        if (mac_key == NULL
            || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
            EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            goto err;
        }
        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
    }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
    printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
    {
        size_t z;
        for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
            printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
    }
#endif

    if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,
                                    iv)) {
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            goto err;
        }
    } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
        int taglen;
        if (s->s3->tmp.
            new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
            taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
        else
            taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL)
            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL)
            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv)
            || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            goto err;
        }
    } else {
        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            goto err;
        }
    }
    /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
    if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
        && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
                                (int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }
    s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;

#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
    printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
    {
        int z;
        for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
            printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
    }
    printf("\niv=");
    {
        size_t z;
        for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
            printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
    }
    printf("\n");
#endif

    return 1;
 err:
    return 0;
}

int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
    unsigned char *p;
    const EVP_CIPHER *c;
    const EVP_MD *hash;
    SSL_COMP *comp;
    int mac_type = NID_undef;
    size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;
    int ret = 0;

    if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
        return 1;

    if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size,
                            &comp, s->ext.use_etm)) {
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
                 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
        return 0;
    }

    s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
    s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
    s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
    s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
    num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
    num *= 2;

    ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);

    if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto err;
    }

    s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
    s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;

#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
    printf("client random\n");
    {
        int z;
        for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
            printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
                   ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
    }
    printf("server random\n");
    {
        int z;
        for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
            printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
                   ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
    }
    printf("master key\n");
    {
        size_t z;
        for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
            printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
                   ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
    }
#endif
    if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) {
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
        goto err;
    }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
    printf("\nkey block\n");
    {
        size_t z;
        for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
            printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
    }
#endif

    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
        && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
        /*
         * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
         * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
         */
        s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;

        if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
            if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
                s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#endif
        }
    }

    ret = 1;
 err:
    return ret;
}

size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
                             unsigned char *out)
{
    size_t hashlen;
    unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
        return 0;
    }

    if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
        return 0;
    }

    if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
                  s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
                  out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 1)) {
        /* SSLfatal() already called */
        return 0;
    }
    OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
    return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
}

int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
                                size_t len, size_t *secret_size)
{
    if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
        unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
        size_t hashlen;
        /*
         * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this won't
         * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
         * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
         */
        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
                || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
            /* SSLfatal() already called */
            return 0;
        }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
        fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n");
        BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen);
#endif
        if (!tls1_PRF(s,
                      TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
                      TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
                      hash, hashlen,
                      NULL, 0,
                      NULL, 0,
                      NULL, 0, p, len, out,
                      SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
            /* SSLfatal() already called */
            return 0;
        }
        OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
    } else {
        if (!tls1_PRF(s,
                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
                      s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                      NULL, 0,
                      s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                      NULL, 0, p, len, out,
                      SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
           /* SSLfatal() already called */
            return 0;
        }
    }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
    fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
    fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
    fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
    fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
    BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
                SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
#endif

    *secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
    return 1;
}

int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
                                const char *label, size_t llen,
                                const unsigned char *context,
                                size_t contextlen, int use_context)
{
    unsigned char *val = NULL;
    size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
    int rv;

    /*
     * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
     * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
     * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
     */
    vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
    if (use_context) {
        vallen += 2 + contextlen;
    }

    val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
    if (val == NULL)
        goto err2;
    currentvalpos = 0;
    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
    currentvalpos += llen;
    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
    currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
    memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
    currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

    if (use_context) {
        val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
        currentvalpos++;
        val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
        currentvalpos++;
        if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
            memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
        }
    }

    /*
     * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
     * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
     * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
     */
    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
               TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
        goto err1;
    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
               TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
        goto err1;
    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
               TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
        goto err1;
    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
               TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
        goto err1;
    if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
               TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
        goto err1;

    rv = tls1_PRF(s,
                  val, vallen,
                  NULL, 0,
                  NULL, 0,
                  NULL, 0,
                  NULL, 0,
                  s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
                  out, olen, 0);

    goto ret;
 err1:
    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
    rv = 0;
    goto ret;
 err2:
    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
    rv = 0;
 ret:
    OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
    return rv;
}

int tls1_alert_code(int code)
{
    switch (code) {
    case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
        return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
    case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
        return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
    case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
        return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
    case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
        return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
    case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
        return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
    case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
        return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
    case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
        return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
    case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
        return -1;
    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
        return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
        return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
        return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
    case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
        return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
        return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
    case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
        return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
    case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
        return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
    case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
        return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
    case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
        return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
    case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
        return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
    case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
        return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
    case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
        return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
        return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
    case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
        return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
        return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
        return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;
    case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
        return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
        return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
        return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;
    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
        return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
    case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
        return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
    case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
        return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:
        return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
    case SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION:
        return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
    default:
        return -1;
    }
}

Coverage Report

Created: 2023-06-08 06:41

Line	Count	Source (jump to first uncovered line)
1		/*
2		* Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3		* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
4		*
5		* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6		* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7		* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8		* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
9		*/
10
11		#include <stdio.h>
12		#include "ssl_local.h"
13		#include <openssl/comp.h>
14		#include <openssl/evp.h>
15		#include <openssl/kdf.h>
16		#include <openssl/rand.h>
17
18		/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
19		static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
20		const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
21		const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
22		const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
23		const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len,
24		const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len,
25		const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
26		unsigned char *out, size_t olen, int fatal)
27	0	{
28	0	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s);
29	0	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
30	0	int ret = 0;
31
32	0	if (md == NULL) {
33		/* Should never happen */
34	0	if (fatal)
35	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
36	0	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
37	0	else
38	0	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
39	0	return 0;
40	0	}
41	0	pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
42	0	if (pctx == NULL \|\| EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
43	0	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
44	0	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, (int)slen) <= 0
45	0	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, (int)seed1_len) <= 0
46	0	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, (int)seed2_len) <= 0
47	0	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, (int)seed3_len) <= 0
48	0	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed4, (int)seed4_len) <= 0
49	0	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed5, (int)seed5_len) <= 0
50	0	\|\| EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &olen) <= 0) {
51	0	if (fatal)
52	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
53	0	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
54	0	else
55	0	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56	0	goto err;
57	0	}
58
59	0	ret = 1;
60
61	0	err:
62	0	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
63	0	return ret;
64	0	}
65
66		static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL s, unsigned char km, size_t num)
67	0	{
68	0	int ret;
69
70		/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
71	0	ret = tls1_PRF(s,
72	0	TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
73	0	TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
74	0	SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
75	0	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
76	0	s->session->master_key_length, km, num, 1);
77
78	0	return ret;
79	0	}
80
81		int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
82	0	{
83	0	unsigned char p, mac_secret;
84	0	unsigned char ms, key, *iv;
85	0	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
86	0	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
87	0	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
88	0	const SSL_COMP *comp;
89	0	#endif
90	0	const EVP_MD *m;
91	0	int mac_type;
92	0	size_t *mac_secret_size;
93	0	EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
94	0	EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
95	0	size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
96	0	int reuse_dd = 0;
97
98	0	c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
99	0	m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
100	0	mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
101	0	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
102	0	comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
103	0	#endif
104
105	0	if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
106	0	if (s->ext.use_etm)
107	0	s->s3->flags \|= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
108	0	else
109	0	s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
110
111	0	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
112	0	s->mac_flags \|= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
113	0	else
114	0	s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
115
116	0	if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
117	0	reuse_dd = 1;
118	0	} else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
119	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
120	0	ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
121	0	goto err;
122	0	} else {
123		/*
124		* make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
125		*/
126	0	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
127	0	}
128	0	dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
129	0	mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
130	0	if (mac_ctx == NULL)
131	0	goto err;
132	0	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
133	0	COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
134	0	s->expand = NULL;
135	0	if (comp != NULL) {
136	0	s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
137	0	if (s->expand == NULL) {
138	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
139	0	SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
140	0	SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
141	0	goto err;
142	0	}
143	0	}
144	0	#endif
145		/*
146		* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
147		*/
148	0	if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
149	0	RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
150	0	mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
151	0	mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
152	0	} else {
153	0	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
154	0	if (s->ext.use_etm)
155	0	s->s3->flags \|= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
156	0	else
157	0	s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
158
159	0	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
160	0	s->mac_flags \|= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
161	0	else
162	0	s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
163	0	if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
164	0	reuse_dd = 1;
165	0	} else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
166	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
167	0	ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
168	0	goto err;
169	0	}
170	0	dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
171	0	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
172	0	mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
173	0	if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
174	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
175	0	SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
176	0	ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
177	0	goto err;
178	0	}
179	0	s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
180	0	} else {
181	0	mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
182	0	if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
183	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
184	0	SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
185	0	ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
186	0	goto err;
187	0	}
188	0	}
189	0	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
190	0	COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
191	0	s->compress = NULL;
192	0	if (comp != NULL) {
193	0	s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
194	0	if (s->compress == NULL) {
195	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
196	0	SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
197	0	SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
198	0	goto err;
199	0	}
200	0	}
201	0	#endif
202		/*
203		* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
204		*/
205	0	if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
206	0	RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
207	0	mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
208	0	mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
209	0	}
210
211	0	if (reuse_dd)
212	0	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
213
214	0	p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
215	0	i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
216
217		/* TODO(size_t): convert me */
218	0	cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
219	0	j = cl;
220		/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
221		/* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
222	0	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
223	0	k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
224	0	else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
225	0	k = EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
226	0	else
227	0	k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
228	0	if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) \|\|
229	0	(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
230	0	ms = &(p[0]);
231	0	n = i + i;
232	0	key = &(p[n]);
233	0	n += j + j;
234	0	iv = &(p[n]);
235	0	n += k + k;
236	0	} else {
237	0	n = i;
238	0	ms = &(p[n]);
239	0	n += i + j;
240	0	key = &(p[n]);
241	0	n += j + k;
242	0	iv = &(p[n]);
243	0	n += k;
244	0	}
245
246	0	if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
247	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
248	0	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
249	0	goto err;
250	0	}
251
252	0	memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
253
254	0	if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
255		/* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
256	0	mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
257	0	(int)*mac_secret_size);
258	0	if (mac_key == NULL
259	0	\|\| EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
260	0	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
261	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
262	0	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
263	0	goto err;
264	0	}
265	0	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
266	0	}
267		#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
268		printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
269		{
270		size_t z;
271		for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
272		printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
273		}
274		#endif
275
276	0	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
277	0	if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
278	0	\|\| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,
279	0	iv)) {
280	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
281	0	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
282	0	goto err;
283	0	}
284	0	} else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
285	0	int taglen;
286	0	if (s->s3->tmp.
287	0	new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 \| SSL_AES256CCM8))
288	0	taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
289	0	else
290	0	taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
291	0	if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
292	0	\|\| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL)
293	0	\|\| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL)
294	0	\|\| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv)
295	0	\|\| !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
296	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
297	0	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
298	0	goto err;
299	0	}
300	0	} else {
301	0	if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
302	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
303	0	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
304	0	goto err;
305	0	}
306	0	}
307		/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
308	0	if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
309	0	&& !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
310	0	(int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
311	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
312	0	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
313	0	goto err;
314	0	}
315	0	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
316
317		#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
318		printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
319		{
320		int z;
321		for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
322		printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
323		}
324		printf("\niv=");
325		{
326		size_t z;
327		for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
328		printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
329		}
330		printf("\n");
331		#endif
332
333	0	return 1;
334	0	err:
335	0	return 0;
336	0	}
337
338		int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
339	0	{
340	0	unsigned char *p;
341	0	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
342	0	const EVP_MD *hash;
343	0	SSL_COMP *comp;
344	0	int mac_type = NID_undef;
345	0	size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;
346	0	int ret = 0;
347
348	0	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
349	0	return 1;
350
351	0	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size,
352	0	&comp, s->ext.use_etm)) {
353	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
354	0	SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
355	0	return 0;
356	0	}
357
358	0	s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
359	0	s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
360	0	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
361	0	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
362	0	num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
363	0	num *= 2;
364
365	0	ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
366
367	0	if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
368	0	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
369	0	ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
370	0	goto err;
371	0	}
372
373	0	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
374	0	s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
375
376		#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
377		printf("client random\n");
378		{
379		int z;
380		for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
381		printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
382		((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
383		}
384		printf("server random\n");
385		{
386		int z;
387		for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
388		printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
389		((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
390		}
391		printf("master key\n");
392		{
393		size_t z;
394		for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
395		printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
396		((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
397		}
398		#endif
399	0	if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) {
400		/* SSLfatal() already called */
401	0	goto err;
402	0	}
403		#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
404		printf("\nkey block\n");
405		{
406		size_t z;
407		for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
408		printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
409		}
410		#endif
411
412	0	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
413	0	&& s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
414		/*
415		* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
416		* problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
417		*/
418	0	s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
419
420	0	if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
421	0	if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
422	0	s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
423
424	0	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
425	0	if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
426	0	s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
427	0	#endif
428	0	}
429	0	}
430
431	0	ret = 1;
432	0	err:
433	0	return ret;
434	0	}
435
436		size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL s, const char str, size_t slen,
437		unsigned char *out)
438	0	{
439	0	size_t hashlen;
440	0	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
441
442	0	if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
443		/* SSLfatal() already called */
444	0	return 0;
445	0	}
446
447	0	if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
448		/* SSLfatal() already called */
449	0	return 0;
450	0	}
451
452	0	if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
453	0	s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
454	0	out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 1)) {
455		/* SSLfatal() already called */
456	0	return 0;
457	0	}
458	0	OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
459	0	return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
460	0	}
461
462		int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL s, unsigned char out, unsigned char *p,
463		size_t len, size_t *secret_size)
464	0	{
465	0	if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
466	0	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
467	0	size_t hashlen;
468		/*
469		* Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this won't
470		* affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
471		* point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
472		*/
473	0	if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
474	0	\|\| !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
475		/* SSLfatal() already called */
476	0	return 0;
477	0	}
478		#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
479		fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n");
480		BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen);
481		#endif
482	0	if (!tls1_PRF(s,
483	0	TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
484	0	TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
485	0	hash, hashlen,
486	0	NULL, 0,
487	0	NULL, 0,
488	0	NULL, 0, p, len, out,
489	0	SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
490		/* SSLfatal() already called */
491	0	return 0;
492	0	}
493	0	OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
494	0	} else {
495	0	if (!tls1_PRF(s,
496	0	TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
497	0	TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
498	0	s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
499	0	NULL, 0,
500	0	s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
501	0	NULL, 0, p, len, out,
502	0	SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) {
503		/* SSLfatal() already called */
504	0	return 0;
505	0	}
506	0	}
507		#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
508		fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
509		BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
510		fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
511		BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
512		fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
513		BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
514		fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
515		BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
516		SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
517		#endif
518
519	0	*secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
520	0	return 1;
521	0	}
522
523		int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL s, unsigned char out, size_t olen,
524		const char *label, size_t llen,
525		const unsigned char *context,
526		size_t contextlen, int use_context)
527	0	{
528	0	unsigned char *val = NULL;
529	0	size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
530	0	int rv;
531
532		/*
533		* construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
534		* than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
535		* concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
536		*/
537	0	vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
538	0	if (use_context) {
539	0	vallen += 2 + contextlen;
540	0	}
541
542	0	val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
543	0	if (val == NULL)
544	0	goto err2;
545	0	currentvalpos = 0;
546	0	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
547	0	currentvalpos += llen;
548	0	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
549	0	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
550	0	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
551	0	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
552
553	0	if (use_context) {
554	0	val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
555	0	currentvalpos++;
556	0	val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
557	0	currentvalpos++;
558	0	if ((contextlen > 0) \|\| (context != NULL)) {
559	0	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
560	0	}
561	0	}
562
563		/*
564		* disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
565		* label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
566		* the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
567		*/
568	0	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
569	0	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
570	0	goto err1;
571	0	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
572	0	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
573	0	goto err1;
574	0	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
575	0	TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
576	0	goto err1;
577	0	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
578	0	TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
579	0	goto err1;
580	0	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
581	0	TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
582	0	goto err1;
583
584	0	rv = tls1_PRF(s,
585	0	val, vallen,
586	0	NULL, 0,
587	0	NULL, 0,
588	0	NULL, 0,
589	0	NULL, 0,
590	0	s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
591	0	out, olen, 0);
592
593	0	goto ret;
594	0	err1:
595	0	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
596	0	rv = 0;
597	0	goto ret;
598	0	err2:
599	0	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
600	0	rv = 0;
601	0	ret:
602	0	OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
603	0	return rv;
604	0	}
605
606		int tls1_alert_code(int code)
607	0	{
608	0	switch (code) {
609	0	case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
610	0	return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
611	0	case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
612	0	return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
613	0	case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
614	0	return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
615	0	case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
616	0	return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
617	0	case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
618	0	return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
619	0	case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
620	0	return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
621	0	case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
622	0	return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
623	0	case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
624	0	return -1;
625	0	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
626	0	return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
627	0	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
628	0	return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
629	0	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
630	0	return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
631	0	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
632	0	return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
633	0	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
634	0	return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
635	0	case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
636	0	return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
637	0	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
638	0	return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
639	0	case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
640	0	return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
641	0	case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
642	0	return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
643	0	case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
644	0	return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
645	0	case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
646	0	return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
647	0	case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
648	0	return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
649	0	case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
650	0	return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
651	0	case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
652	0	return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
653	0	case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
654	0	return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
655	0	case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
656	0	return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
657	0	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
658	0	return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
659	0	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
660	0	return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;
661	0	case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
662	0	return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
663	0	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
664	0	return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
665	0	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
666	0	return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;
667	0	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
668	0	return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
669	0	case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
670	0	return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
671	0	case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL:
672	0	return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
673	0	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:
674	0	return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
675	0	case SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION:
676	0	return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
677	0	default:
678	0	return -1;
679	0	}
680	0	}